

Witness Name: Brian Trotter

Statement No: WITN00980100

Dated: 4 January 2023

POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY

FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF BRIAN TROTTER

1. I, Brian Trotter, will say as follows:
2. In making this statement I would like to acknowledge the importance of the Horizon Inquiry and to offer my full co-operation to Sir Wyn Williams in his investigation of relevant issues. I would also like to express my sympathy to all those who were affected.
3. To confirm why I am providing this statement, on 8 September 2022 I received a written request from the Post Office Horizon Inquiry for me to provide a written statement pursuant to Rule 9 of the Inquiry Rules 2006 – Request 1. This Request contained 21 questions which the Inquiry asked me to address in my statement. For ease of reference, I have written out each question with its corresponding question number.

Question 1: Describe your role at the Post Office.

Area Manager

4. Between 1995 and 2005 I had two roles within the Post Office which were the same in all but the title. These roles were in the 'Agency Network' division and were essentially Area Manager roles where I looked after agency branches.
5. Initially, this role included visiting branches as determined by the Head of Retail network usually once a year and dependent on branch size I would also manage sites' adherence to business standards. This could be done by face to face visits, telephone or written correspondence. This management activity would be triggered by a wide range of issues, including customer complaints or post masters asking for assistance, which was mainly via the National Business Support Centre helpline
6. This role did not deal with quality assurance or training. However, I supported the roll-out of Horizon by supporting Postmasters with their first balance post implementation of Horizon. Agents would already have had some training, but I would go in person to the site and 'hand-hold' the Post Masters through the Horizon balancing process in the first week. Other than this, I had no involvement with Horizon apart from using it myself when I occasionally worked on centrally managed counters during strike action or busy periods. There was a structure in place to deal with transaction-based issues or system issues and if individuals had a problem with Horizon systems they should have been sent to the Helpline or I would refer them to specialist teams in the central support function of the Post Office.

7. The Contracts Manager for each particular area would have dealt with any allegations or suspicions of false accounting and therefore as Area Manager, I had very minimal dialogue on interventions or suspensions although I may have got involved with meeting with a Postmaster after red flags were raised via escalations from support teams or field intervention teams. During this period there were rare occasions when I might have been consulted about a suspension of a Postmaster. Contact would normally have taken place if the decision resulted in the closure of the branch and loss of service. From 2001 Contracts Managers dealt with contractual breach following an audit.

Contracts and Services Manager & Contract Advisor

8. Between 2004 and 2006 I was Contracts and Services Manager; an Area Performance manager and 2 Intervention Managers reported directly to me. Following a restructure of the Post Office in 2006 the role line management responsibility and job title changed to Contract Advisor. Within the scope of the role I was responsible for the management of a wide range of franchising contracts covering a geographical area of around 1,000 branches. I was not focused specifically Horizon during this period, however it could have come up in my management of interventions with my colleagues in the contracts team.
9. As Contract Service Manager, usually the first I would know about an audit would be when I got a call from the audit team. I would not schedule the audits and I would not be present at them. However, in exceptional cases where information may have come from another source for example bankruptcy or loss, criminal convictions coming to light and the loss of the use of the premises in which the branch was located. In these cases, I could

highlight problems to the Central function and request a special audit be scheduled to investigate further and verify assets. Please see below my answer to question 15 for when audits were usually carried out.

10. Once an audit had been undertaken I would be informed of the outcome by phone by the audit lead. The lead would give me a verbal breakdown of their findings. For example, it might show that a branch previous night's balance declared to have £30k in cash, but in actual fact, only had £10k of physical cash on hand. At the end of the audit the lead would ask the Postmaster to verify and agree the audit findings. On some occasions, before the audit was started, the Postmaster would ask to speak to the lead and provide an explanation for example, by admitting to misusing funds to pay for staff wages, business purchases or the payment of bills.
11. On completion of the audit I would speak to the Postmaster and go through the findings, I might have also made reference to any checks that had been undertaken during the audit such as calls logs, training records, Horizon reports and any other interventions, which had been undertaken by the Contracts team. It was usual at this stage for the Postmaster either to admit to misusing funds or to say that they couldn't provide an explanation for the shortage.
12. If the Postmaster admitted to the misuse of Post Office funds, I would contact my Line Manager urgently to discuss and agree on enforcement / suspension and would look at whether the Postmaster was willing to repay the discrepancy found during the audit. However, the final decision on suspension had to be agreed and signed off by the Head of Contracts.

13. Following the audit in most cases a formal/informal meeting would take place to discuss the reasons for suspension or a non-suspension decision. This would normally be a fact-finding meeting taking place to give the Postmaster the opportunity to provide their version of events, discuss the audit findings and next steps. At the fact finding interview the Postmaster could be accompanied by a representative from the Federation of Suppostmasters, an assistant or an employee of the Post Office. Following the meeting, further investigations might take place I would then submit a decision rationale to the Head of Contracts recommending reinstatement no further action, reinstatement with a warning or Contract termination.
14. The decision rationale document would be based upon input from the Postmaster during the meeting and all other relevant reports from central functions and field teams. It would also include historical information detailing training, interventions and call logs to the helpline etc. The Security Team dealt with allegations of criminality, some contact may have been made with them during the course of the contractual investigations.
15. My role also included discussing with the suspended Postmaster the use of the premises to appoint a temporary agent. If this was agreed the appointment and selection of the temporary agent was the responsibility of the temporary Postmaster advisor. The aim was to avoid loss of Post Office service and minimise the impact to the Postmaster retail business.
16. If concerns were raised about the functionality of the Horizon system, then I would raise that with my Line Manager and also the appropriate technology team for input into the report. I recall that if there was no obvious explanation

for problems, I would monitor the performance of the temporary Postmaster to see if the same problem continued. However, from my personal experience there were no problems with temporary Postmasters.

17. As Contract Advisor, my role would also involve dealing with any contractual issues highlighted by Subpostmasters. Day-to-day issues were usually dealt with by the Helpline in the first instance or, if appropriate, were flagged to me via other central support departments. Subpostmasters could also contact me direct via the federation representation and I would be very willing to investigate their issues.

18. In my role as a Contract Advisor, I was responsible for the effective management of the Agents' life cycle, including the recruitment and appointment of conventional Main and Local Post Office operators, using competency-based assessments.

19. I was also responsible for the delivery of effective change in the Agency network in Scotland, from initial recruitment through to improved performance of them and their teams by monitoring of performance indicators and defining appropriate support or remedial actions.

20. I dealt with the management of debt and financial performance in this network and the delivery of improved client performance indicators through focused supportive actions or direct intervention where required.

Question 2: Set out any qualifications that you received to obtain this role.

21. The business was restructured in 2001 and 2006 and following these restructures, a formal assessment and selection process took place to appoint individuals to their roles, including myself. I had on-the-job

experience and there was also an appraisal system which identified any training needed to obtain the role.

Question 3: Describe any training that you received on the role

22. I can recall that I received the following training:

- Objection handling
- Media training
- Interview techniques
- Horizon system training (user)

23. I was also mentored in the role by other managers in the role for several years.

24. The Post Office have provided me a spreadsheet of my training records unfortunately this only covers on-line training between 2013 and 2022. As such, this is of limited relevance and therefore I have not included it in my statement.

Question 4: Please explain whether your role evolved over time and, if so, how.

25. The role evolved between 2002 and 2020 due to changes in the Post Office network with the introduction of new operating models leading to more complex contractual agreements.

26. Please see my answer to question 1 as to how my different roles during my time at the Post Office evolved over time.

IDENTIFYING ISSUES IDENTIFIED BY SUBPOSTMASTERS

The documents listed below are not exhaustive but are included to assist with answering the questions posted.

Please consider FUJ00083815, FUJ00083770, POL00025697, POL00030241

Question 5: Describe what involvement you had in investigating any issues encountered by SPMs.

As Area Manager, I had very minimal involvement with investigations, the aim was always to work with the agent and be corrective rather than punitive. My role may have involved meeting with the Postmaster after red flags had been raised, this might have resulted in no action, a verbal warning or advising the Contract team at the time to issue a formal warning. However, as Contract Manager, I would have dealt with any allegations or suspicions of false accounting. I would only have been involved in the early investigation stages in investigating accounting discrepancies, which may have been raised by a central function. Please see my response to question 1 for further details on my involvement in investigations as Contract Manager.

27. Document FUJ0008315 is a document which logs a visit to Callendar Square by the Area Intervention Manager, Sandra Mackay, on 12 January 2006.

28. At this point, my title was Contract and Services Manager and there was two intervention managers and an Area Performance manager reporting to me. Helplines were the first port of call and if they could not resolve the issue, it came through to the Contract team mailbox and escalated to an Area Intervention Manager who would phone the branch, write to the Postmaster, or do a site visit. Although it is not conclusive in this document, I suggest that

the issue came from the helpline via the Postmaster regarding concerns about what was happening with Horizon.

29. The box entitled 'Expand on any letter requested/clarify any point' mentions me and is written by Sandra. I agreed to go along with her to the site as support as she was new to the job and I knew the history behind the branch because I had previously been its Area Manager.
30. Document FUJ00083770 is an email chain starting with an email from Sandra Mackay to Shaun Turner on 11 January 2006 discussing problems with balancing at Callendar Square. I recall that Shaun worked in IT and was part of the roll-out of the Horizon programme. He would have been heavily involved in the infrastructure and implementing the system and following up issues. The email chain also involves Gary Blackburn who I don't recall. In the email chain he is using technical IT language which I do not understand but he is interfacing with Liz Evans who deals with the Post Office account for Fujitsu services and so I assume that Gary is the go-between for the Post Office and Fujitsu.
31. The email in the chain which is dated 16 January 2006 at 14:14 refers to 'P & BA' (Product & Branch Accounting), they are an internal department which should send a transactional correction to the Postmaster via the Horizon system if there is an error to balance it. Upon receipt of the message, the Postmaster can either accept the correction or decline settle centrally for further investigation. Looking at the email, it says that there was a breakdown in the processes and so Gary is not convinced that the branch was set up correctly in the first place.

32. A further email in the chain dated 17 February 2006 at 10:16 refers to 'S90'.

From the discussion in the email I am not sure, but I think this is a system update which was intended to fix the problem.

33. This appeared to be an isolated issue and it was not within my skills or remit to understand the nature of these problems. My job is to support the Postmaster and ensure that there is a solution or to signpost it to the Post Office to make sure that when these things are raised, they are dealt with quickly and appropriately and they are signposted to the most appropriate department. Reading the email chain as an outsider, it looks as though the problem was raised and dealt with quickly.

34. I cannot recall exactly who everybody in this email chain is but from reading the emails, I think Mike Stewart is from the Post Office and Ann Chambers works for Fujitsu.

35. The last inclusion of me in the email chain is 17 February 2006. I cannot recall Gary ever speaking to me beyond this to say that the problem was not resolved and there might be a bigger issue. I am confident that if he had come back to me and said that it was not an isolated issue, I would have had a conversation with my boss, Andy Bayfield, with whom I had regular monthly meetings, or who I could call at any time and discuss any areas of concern to me.

36. If an IT issue came up, I would signpost the individual to the relevant helpline. Each issue had a unique reference number which would give an audit trail. You should be able to track the reference number to see where the issue started and where it finished and, if it finished, what the resolution was.

Therefore, if an issue came across my desk, the first thing I would say to the Postmaster is to chase it using the reference number. Otherwise, if no progress had been made I would escalate internally to Shaun Turner, Service Support Manager, Service Team, Post Office Ltd Operations and say that the Postmaster had been in touch with the Horizon helpline multiple times and was not getting anywhere.

37. Document POL00030241 is an email chain starting with an email dated 11 January 2006 which also relates to issues with balancing at Callendar Square. Looking at the dates, some of it falls in parallel with the email chain of document FUJ00083770 and some it prior to the visit that took place on 12 January 2006.

38. In the email chain, Shaun Turner is telling Sandra and myself that there is a recognition that there is a wider issue than just a software quirk at one branch. However, as a layman I would have been satisfied that we had reported the problem back to the agent and if they had been unhappy, I think that there would have been further emails stating this. From reading the emails, the issue was saved in the Contract Teams electronic files on 6 March 2006 and that was the end of it. This appeared to be an isolated issue, but I was alive to it and if this issue had happened more than once then I would have informed my boss that it had happened in multiple places and therefore, I think it might be a wider problem. The earliest knowledge I had about technical problems with the system was in 2006 at which point it was outside the scope of my role or seniority and appeared to be being dealt with by Fujitsu and the Resolution Manager at a higher level.

Question 6: Describe what sorts of issues you were called on to investigate by SPMs

39. I was called to investigate on the following sorts of issues by Postmasters:

- Opening hours
- Holiday pay
- Resignation
- Customer complaints (banning orders)
- Additional training
- Outstanding debt
- Failing to comply with Post Office business standards

40. The business standards folder was like the Post Master's manual.

Question 7: Explain at what stage you carried out formal investigations

41. I would carry out a formal investigation when an audit was conducted on an alleged shortfall or when concerns were flagged by other central teams, such as the agent's account team.

Question 8: If not covered above, please explain any technical training that you received on;

(a) computer systems

42. I am literate on all Microsoft software packages.

(b) the Horizon system itself

43. I received user training only. I was not there to resolve technical issues as there was a specific helpline and technical team for Horizon.

Question 9: Please explain in what circumstances you would go to visit branches

44. I supported the roll-out of Horizon by supporting Postmasters with the first balance post-implementation. Agents had already had some training in the operation of the system, but I would go in person to handhold them through the process in the first week. Other than this I had no other involvement in Horizon, although sometimes I would have to work on centrally managed counters, for example during busy periods or if strike action was taking place.

45. Besides this, I would rarely visit branches, unless the Postmaster had mobility problems. Most meetings, both formal and informal, took place in Post Office Ltd sites or a secure site close to the Postmasters' premises.

IDENTIFIED SHORTFALLS

Please consider POL00004403, POL00030284

Question 10: How did you identify any shortfalls

46. Post Office Ltd would identify shortfalls by conducting an audit, or from central support teams.

47. Document POL00004403 is an email chain starting with an email dated 24 November 2006 discussing outstanding debt / a transaction error query at Winlaton Mill.

48. From reading the emails I am guessing that the Postmaster accepted that he made a genuine mistake and would pay the missing money back. On top of

that, he has challenged a further discrepancy of £4k. It looks like the Post Office sent £4k to the office and it was signed for, but it has not been input into the Horizon system by the office. When funds are missing, a transaction correction is issued to balance the branch account. The Post Office can prove that the money was delivered because it was signed for by the branch but the Postmaster denies it and cannot prove that he received the funds because it isn't visible. This is one of many problems going on as there were also issues reconciling lottery transactions. The Postmaster was provided with evidence of the delivery of cash to the branch or transactions taking place.

49. The way that lottery transactions were accounted for in most branches was that the Postmaster would have the National Lottery terminal located on the retail counter and the funds and transactions would be transferred to the Post Office terminal, which could be located on the same retail counter or possibly in a dedicated secure Post Office area in the same premises. If you have a Post Office and a retail business the contract Post Office Ltd has with the National Lottery requires the Postmaster to transact or account for the lottery transactions and funds through the Post Office account, not retail. Usually, the Postmaster would keep a dedicated box securely within the retail counter as this was a way of keeping the funds separate from their retail takings. They would sell the lottery tickets for that day and at the end, the terminal would give a summary of the sales minus the prizes and the money left over should be the difference. That difference would then be input into Horizon and the funds secured in the Post Office safe.

50. The only reason I was involved in this email chain is because there is a refusal to repay the debt when evidence has been provided. Under section 12(12) of their contract the Postmaster is obliged to repay all losses without delay. We had a method and system in place called the concurrence process which involved a written instruction coming from the Product & Branch Accounting requesting further investigations take place with the Postmaster and agree the repayment plan stated in the memo/email. This was a method of recovering or speaking to agents about recovering the debt.

51. Document POL00030284 is a duplicate of document FUJ0008315

Question 11: How did you assess whether any disparity or shortfall identified:

a. Was as a result of human error;

52. If the discrepancy or shortfall was as a result of human error, this would normally be highlighted during audit, by the central support function, Post Office client team or following a report from a Postmaster normally via the National Business Support Centre Helpline.

b. Was as a result of any issues with the device's hardware;

53. Any kit issues that were highlighted by an Agent were referred to the Horizon system Helpline in the first instance. I only saw sight of these types of issues if they were escalated to the Contracts team via the team mailbox

c. Was a result of a bug, error or defect in the Horizon system.

54. I do not recall having to deal directly with the issues arising from any complaints or concerns from postmasters regarding system errors.

Question 12: Please explain what, if any, involvement Fujitsu had in the process. Please identify any individuals that you remember having worked with.

55. Except as outlined above, I cannot recall any cases where Fujitsu were involved in the process. However, I would not necessarily have known if they were involved.

56. I was aware of a small number of tech swap outs where there was a suspicion that hardware was broken. The swap-outs would have been tracked to ensure that they had been successful.

Question 13: How adequate did you feel the training of subpostmasters as to how Horizon worked was.

57. Following a business restructure and implementation of new Postmaster contracts In 2012, the training package for a Postmaster changed with a reduction in some elements of the classroom training, however, from my knowledge this did not have any impact on how much time was dedicated to the operation of the system. In my experience of interviewing agents there appeared to be a reluctance for new Postmasters to commit to attending the classroom training in central locations because of travel and accommodation costs they had to bear. It was business policy that all new agents attend classroom training, however, when these isolated cases arose the training team and contracts team did everything in their power to be flexible with the package to make sure agents were trained adequately and be capable of operating a Post Office branch.

58. In 2012, further changes to company contracts came in and only the nominated director was offered a place on the classroom training course or they could nominate a person to attend on their behalf. It was the company's responsibility to ensure any new staff were trained to work on the Post Office counter. However, Post Office Ltd liked to be flexible in cases like these and if there were spaces available in the classroom they would be offered to the company.

59. If there were issues transactional or technical they could ask via the helpline and they would receive additional ad hoc training. It was not in my interest to abandon Postmasters without training and I prided myself on making sure that whoever was behind the counter was competent and confident; the Post Office was a respected brand and we wanted to protect that, I also wanted to make sure the agent felt supported during the early days of their tenure

60. From my knowledge and experience any issues with the training package was always dealt with on a case-by-case basis and dependent upon the results of the formal assessments made by agency trainers following classroom and on-site training. If there was a concern, the policy was always to find space in the schedule to extend training to make sure that the agent had the capability to operate the branch.

Question 14: In what circumstances would you take a decision to suspend or terminate a subpostmasters contract?

61. The decision to suspend a Postmaster was never taken lightly because of the potential impact on service and any negative impact on the trading of the Postmasters retail business. Suspension decisions were made on the results

of scheduled or unplanned audits, or possibly from intelligence from an external source such as a report of bankruptcy from a receiver or losing the right to operate from the premises the branch is located in from a landlord or owner. Please see below my answer to question 15 for further information as to how I came to this decision.

Please consider POL00015153, POL00033169, POL00026858, POL00005279, POL00005245

Question 15: Please explain when audits were carried out.

62. Audits were both planned and routinely scheduled or unplanned and carried out following an office transfer or if an office was at risk.

63. Balancing discrepancies would be flagged by the central agents accounting team (now known as the loss prevention team), who were responsible for monitoring branch accounts. Shortfalls would be visible to the Postmasters on the system and they would be contractually obliged to make good the difference in the branch trading result. Central support functions were responsible for maintaining a 'Watch List' of Postmasters. The purpose of the process was to highlight any rolling losses in the accounts and any other anomalies in the way the branch was trading. Dependent on the risk to Post Office assets, an on-site audit would occur from the field audit team.

64. Retail cash management may also have been monitoring the branch because there could also be an issue with overnight cash holdings. If the holdings looked abnormally high in the first instance the Postmasters would be telephoned and asked to return the excess cash. However, following

telephone interventions sometimes the cash was not returned, therefore, the only means of verifying assets was by way of an onsite audit.

65. Document POL00015153 is a document which I think has been produced, compiled and issued by the Post Office Security Team. It is a Weekly Incident Report which reports the number of incidents of burglaries, robberies, fraud incidents etc. I am mentioned on page 2 and 3 of the report in relation to two reports of Audit Cash Loss on 6 January 2010 and 6 February 2010. I vaguely recall that there was an incident in 2010 with Killeter which resulted in a loss. This is the kind of document that we would see and discuss at monthly team meetings or alternatively cascaded by email by my line manager, which would tell us what monitoring was being undertaken by the security team.
66. Document POL00033169 is a presentation which defines the role of Contract Manager. It is not obvious which audience this material was delivered to. It is untitled and undated and I cannot recall who gave the presentation, including whether it was me. However, the content of it looks accurate.
67. Document POL00026858 is a duplicate of document POL00004403.
68. Although the Inquiry have listed document POL0005279 first, document POL0005245 precedes this document and therefore I have discussed it first for the sake of chronology.
69. Document POL0005245 records a meeting at Guild Hall, Queen Street, Glasgow on 27 July 2015 with myself in attendance as Agent Contract Advisor. I cannot recall this meeting and I do not know who wrote this attendance note. I do not think that I wrote this because it is not my style of

writing. The note appears to have been written following an audit which identified cash shortages, but I cannot recall anything about this document.

70. Document POL0005279 is an email chain starting with an email dated 16 July 2015 in relation to 'Audit Report – 243855 – Lenzie – 2015-07-15'. I cannot recall sending these emails but from reading them, I am reporting a large discrepancy in cheques and asking the issue to be looked into and escalated by the relevant team.

71. Although I cannot recall this particular incident, it would be standard practice for the Post Office to give Postmasters the benefit of the doubt with cheque discrepancies as occasionally items would go missing in transit. We would therefore escalate the issue to the relevant product branch account team, as I have done in this email chain, and ask them to have a look at the issue alongside the audit report. However, beyond these emails I cannot recall anything further about this particular incident.

Question 16: Please set out how items were allocated to the fraud list.

72. This was not within the responsibility of the Contracts team and I would have only been involved in the early investigation stages and would investigate any ledger discrepancies escalated to the Contracts team for further investigation.

Question 17: Please clarify whether this was before or after official investigations were carried out?

73. The central function analysis was undertaken prior to an audit being scheduled. Any additional findings or concerns raised by the Postmaster found during the audit were passed back to the central function for further investigation prior to decision-making.

REFLECTIONS

Question 18: When did your involvement with Horizon cease (if at all)?

74. My involvement with Horizon ceased when I left the business in June 2020.

Question 19: How well did you feel that Horizon functioned?

75. When I was Branch Manager, I found that Horizon functioned as intended. I also found that it functioned as intended during periods when I occasionally worked on a counter to cover strike action or the Christmas pressure.

Question 20: Is there anything you felt could have been handled better? If so, who would have been responsible for implementing that?

76. My role was to deploy strategy and policy in relation to the Postmasters contract for service, any high-level decisions I made had to be signed off and agreed with the heads of contract.

77. I did form the impression that some Post Masters were reluctant to speak to the Post Office about balancing problems because they suspected that it could lead to temporary suspension while matters were investigated. I would encourage agents to call for help if they had issues and I would always respond positively to requests for training as that was within my gift.

Question 21: Is there anything that you felt could have been handled better? If so, who would have been responsible for implementing that?

78. The limits of my role in investigating incidents meant that I was reliant on the audit team, the security team, and any associated teams e.g. IT teams or Horizon teams who would have been involved if there were allegations or suspicions of system errors. With the exception of the incident above, where

Fujitsu were involved, I was not aware of any credible suspicions of system errors. In the cases we investigated, the issues were resolved by training, if there was a suspension by appointing a temporary/replacement postmasters or explained by admissions from postmasters. As a result, there was a context which pointed towards human error being the cause of issues and not system errors. It would have been impossible for someone in my position to discriminate between human errors and system errors but I accept that the same might be true of postmasters themselves in some cases. In the rare case where a system error was suspected, this would have been dealt with by specialists. I have no insight into whether those specialists could or should have identified systemic issues. I do not believe that the Post Office would not take any suspension or termination lightly. A lot of thought and formal detail was given to these steps and a formal decision would be made at the end of a long detailed process, with the input of data, several teams and managers and full agreement, which needed to be signed off by the head of Contracts. I saw it as my job to support postmasters and to respond to their concerns, so it is a source of great regret to me if anyone has been unjustly dealt with as a result of the Horizon system.

Statement of Truth

I believe the content of this statement to be true.

GRO

Signed: _____

Dated: 04/01/2023

Index to First Witness Statement of Brian Trotter

No.	URN	Document Description	Control Number
1	FUJ00083815	Area Intervention Manager Visit Log	POINQ0089986F
2	FUJ00083770	Email thread Re Callendar between Mike Stewart, Anne Chambers, Brian Trotter and Shaun Turner	POINQ0089941F
3	POL00030241	Email from Brian Trotter to Sandra MacKay re Callendar Square FAD 160868	POL-0026723
4	POL00004403	Email from Jaqueline Whitham to Neil Barnard and Brian Trotter - RE Winlaton Mill transaction error query	VIS00005471
5	POL00030284	Area Intervention Manager Visit Log re: Audit Report and Horizon Problems	POL-0026766
6	POL00015153	National Crime Team Weekly Incident Report for 31 May - June 2010	POL-0008345
7	POL00033169	Training Slides: Role of the Contract Manager	POL-0030104
8	POL00026858	Email thread between Brian Trotter, Neil Barnard and Jacqueline Whitham	POL-0023499
9	POL00005245	Meeting Note with Brian Trotter - Agent Contract Advisor	VIS00006313
10	POL00005279	Email Trail RE Audit Report 243855 Lenzie 15.07.2015 between Judi Irish, Brian Trotter, Linda McLaughlin, Margaret Guthrie, Paul Kellet, Gary Groogan, Jamie Haugh	VIS00006347