1 Friday, 3 February 2023 2 (10.00 am) 3 MR BEER: Good morning, sir. Can you see and hear me? 4 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, I can, thank you. 5 MR BEER: May I call Andrew Winn, please. 6 ANDREW FRANK WINN (affirmed) 7 Questioned by MR BEER 8 MR BEER: Good morning, Mr Winn. My name is Jason Beer and, 9 as you know, I ask questions on behalf of the Inquiry. 10 Can you give us your full name, please? 11 A. Andrew Frank Winn. 12 Q. Thank you. Many thanks for coming to give evidence to 13 the Inquiry today and for the provision of two witness 14 statements. Can I deal with your first witness 15 statement first, please. It should be in the hard copy 16 bundle in front of you at tab A1. It's 24 pages in 17 length and is dated 26 December 2022. Do you have that? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. For the transcript the URN is WITN01090100. Can you go 20 to the 24th page of it, please. 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. Is that your signature? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. Are the contents of that witness statement true to the 25 best of your knowledge and belief? 1 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. Thank you. A copy of that witness statement will be 3 uploaded to the Inquiry's website and therefore I'm only 4 going to ask you questions about selected parts of it. 5 Can we turn to the second witness statement, please. 6 That's four pages in length and was signed by you today. 7 Can you look at the fourth page, please, and tell me 8 whether that's your signature? 9 A. Just give me a moment. I'm struggling with my folder 10 here. Sorry, where is it? 11 Q. I think it's immediately after the first witness 12 statement. 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. Is that your signature on the fourth page? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. The URN for that is WITN01090200. Are the contents of 17 that witness statement true to the best of your 18 knowledge and belief? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. Thank you very much. 21 I'm going to ask you, Mr Winn, questions about the 22 matters that arise in what we in the Inquiry are calling 23 Phase 3 of the Inquiry. 24 I'm not going to ask you any detailed questions 25 today about cases involving the prosecution of 2 1 individual subpostmasters, as that will be a matter 2 addressed in Phase 4 of the Inquiry, or in relation to 3 investigations that took place after the scandal broke. 4 That may be addressed in Phase 5 of the Inquiry and you 5 may be recalled within it. There may be some questions 6 that do touch on those matters but only where it's 7 necessary to understand and explore your evidence on 8 Phase 3 issues. Do you understand? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. Thank you. Can I start with your background and 11 experience. I think you worked for the Royal Mail Group 12 and then the Post Office for 20 years between 1996 and 13 2016; is that right? 14 A. That's correct. 15 Q. Have you any professional qualifications that are 16 relevant to the issues that we're considering today? 17 A. No. 18 Q. You say in your witness statement that you started 19 working for the Post Office or Post Office Limited in 20 around 2001. Before that time, what was your role 21 within Royal Mail Group? 22 A. I started off as a postman, part-time postman. Then 23 I worked in a management reporting role. Then I worked 24 in an audit role and, from there, I moved into Post 25 Office Limited. 3 1 Q. What was the audit role? 2 A. Initially it was with Parcelforce, which largely 3 involved checking out individual branches, depos, 4 checking the records, et cetera, and then we moved into 5 a group audit. It consolidated into a group audit and 6 that would involve going into all the different areas of 7 the business, usually in groups and carrying out audits 8 of what was going on there. 9 Q. Before 2001, before you took up your role in the Post 10 Office in 2001, did your role require you to have any 11 involvement with the Horizon System? 12 A. No, I believe not. 13 Q. Before you took up your role in the Post Office in 2001, 14 what did you know, if anything, about the Horizon 15 System? 16 A. Nothing. 17 Q. If you can just maybe move forward slightly so that the 18 microphones pick up your voice. You will see that the 19 Chairman is listening remotely and the proceedings are 20 broadcast and so it's really important that the 21 microphones pick up what you say. 22 A. Okay, sorry. 23 Q. So the answer was "Nothing" I think. 24 A. Correct. 25 Q. Thank you. So does it follow that before you took up 4 1 your role in 2001, you didn't know anything about 2 whether there existed any bugs, errors or defects in the 3 Horizon System? 4 A. Correct. 5 Q. Now, you joined Post Office Limited, you say in your 6 statement, in 2001 in the Network Improvement Team. 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. What was your job title in the Network Improvement Team? 9 A. I can't remember. 10 Q. What was your function in the Network Improvement Team? 11 A. A little bit, as the name suggests, trying to find ways 12 of improving the performance of the team. I was 13 particularly involved in an activity based costing 14 exercise, trying to pull together activity based costing 15 to help make decisions and, in truth, it ended up being 16 too high a level to have much effect. 17 I also got involved with the -- I can't remember 18 what it were called but, basically, where you get 19 mystery shoppers going into branches. So I was involved 20 in creating the questions and writing -- and that 21 changed every month, so that would be part of my job. 22 Q. What level within the Network Improvement Team were you? 23 A. In terms of tiers, you mean? 24 Q. Well, were you at the lowest rung in the ladder? Would 25 you a supervisor, if there were such things? Were 5 1 a manager? Were you the head of the unit? 2 A. I was manager without anybody to manage. So I was what 3 would be a CM2 grade, I believe. So there was an admin 4 officer, who would be the admin grade, but then I think 5 there was probably one person same grade as me and then 6 three or one senior manager grades with a team leader on 7 top of that. 8 Q. To whom did you report? 9 A. One of the senior managers. 10 Q. You didn't manage a team? 11 A. No. 12 Q. How many people were in the Network Improvement Team? 13 A. Seven or eight. 14 Q. Where was it based? 15 A. In Chesterfield. 16 Q. Did your role in the Network Improvement Team require 17 you to have knowledge of and understanding of the 18 operation of the Horizon System? 19 A. No. 20 Q. In the course of that role, did you acquire any 21 knowledge about whether there existed any bugs, errors 22 or defects in the Horizon System? 23 A. No. 24 Q. You say in your witness statement that you moved to the 25 problem management team in 2005. I think you've since 6 1 seen an email which suggests that it was earlier than 2 that because it refers to you being in that team in at 3 least 2003? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. What was your job title in the problem management team? 6 A. Problem management team leader. 7 Q. What was the function of the problem management team? 8 A. As I understand, it was a response to basically the Post 9 Office moving onto an IT-type platform, rather than 10 a manual-type platform, and it was part of the kind of 11 plan that was laid out that, effectively, the concept 12 was that anybody within the Post Office who got 13 a problem reported it to the problem management team. 14 In reality, it should have been just an IT 15 function but the way it was set up was that everyone who 16 had a problem reported it in there. The IT kind of 17 structure at the time was that the problem management 18 team managed the problem in terms of making sure the 19 relevant people were involved in correcting the problem, 20 rather than actually resolving the problem themselves, 21 which I found a difficult concept to deal with. 22 Q. So it was like a signposting service, was it? 23 A. Yes, that's correct. 24 Q. Did you manage a team? 25 A. I did, yes. 7 1 Q. How many people were in that team? 2 A. There was probably, I think, about 12 other team 3 members. 4 Q. To whom did you report? 5 A. A senior manager. 6 Q. Who was that? 7 A. Initially, it was Marie Cochate but she left. I can't 8 remember who took over from there. 9 Q. Where were you based? 10 A. In Dearne House. 11 Q. Which is? 12 A. Near Barnsley. 13 Q. Did that role and the role of the team that you managed 14 require knowledge of and understanding of the operation 15 of the Horizon System? 16 A. Yes, but I didn't have knowledge of the Horizon System. 17 So I would have said I was a bad placement into that 18 role. 19 Q. How did you acquire, if you did, any knowledge and 20 understanding of the operation of the Horizon System? 21 A. There were couple of members of the team who had some 22 knowledge, basically from working in branches, but it 23 was really a case of trying to figure it out as I went 24 along. 25 Q. So you weren't given any training at that stage? 8 1 A. No. I think at the time there was very few people 2 within the Post Office who'd got much IT knowledge, to 3 be frank. 4 Q. Horizon had by this time, 2003, been up and running for 5 three years. In that time, had you acquired any 6 knowledge or understanding of the operation of the 7 system? 8 A. Some but very limited, I would say. 9 Q. You said that you were a bad fit or words to that 10 effect. 11 A. I would have said so, yes. 12 Q. Why were you a bad fit? 13 A. Because I'm not a technically -- I find technology quite 14 difficult even now. I always felt as though I was 15 playing catch up with technology, kind of still do now. 16 So ideally somebody in that role would have had a good 17 understanding and been able to understand problems 18 easily, whereas I was -- forever seemed to be trying to 19 understand what it was that was meant. 20 Q. You said that an important part of the intended function 21 of the problem management team was IT, information 22 technology, although the boundaries were stretched on 23 that. 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. An important part of that would have been Horizon 9 1 itself? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. Do you know why you were picked them if you were a bad 4 fit, bad with technology, and had no training to be 5 a team leader in the problem management team? 6 A. You'd have to ask the people who interviewed me but 7 I would guess that my competition were in a similar 8 situation. 9 Q. I'm sorry -- 10 A. The competition for the role. There was -- I don't know 11 how many people were interviewed for the role but I got 12 the role on -- 13 Q. You were all in the same boat? 14 A. I would say -- I don't particularly know the people who 15 were competing with me but that would be my 16 understanding, yes. 17 Q. You say in your witness statement that after about 18 18 months in the problem management team you moved to 19 a data management team, the name of which you can't 20 remember. 21 A. Correct. 22 Q. In that 18-month period in the problem management team, 23 did you acquire any knowledge about the number and 24 nature of any bugs, errors and defects in the Horizon 25 System? 10 1 A. To be honest, I kind of -- my memory of the time is 2 largely more about dealing with outages or breaks 3 between the different data houses that information flew 4 through. So it kind of feels more around checking that 5 the different data centres were talking to each other 6 and who was owning the problem and resolving it. There 7 obviously must have been issues on Horizon that came 8 through but that's my principal memory of the role. 9 Q. Looking at it globally -- I appreciate it may be 10 difficult to isolate a period of time given what you 11 then went on to do -- what would your view have been of 12 Horizon at that time, in this 18-month period before you 13 went on to the data management team? 14 A. I don't think I got a great view of the actual Horizon 15 System in branches. I think I was more looking at kind 16 of Fujitsu into other data warehouses. So I'd not got 17 a strong view in any direct direction. 18 Q. What were you looking at in relation to the flow of data 19 into data warehouses involving Fujitsu? 20 A. Whether it's flowing as it was required. 21 Q. And was it? 22 A. Most of the time, yes, and occasionally, when a problem 23 arose, it wasn't. 24 Q. Did this experience tell you anything that you can now 25 remember about the way that Horizon was operating? 11 1 A. With no experience of other systems of anything like 2 similar or really any other systems, I couldn't compare 3 it to say whether it was good, bad or indifferent. It 4 seemed to work most of the time fine, yes. 5 Q. Would that be your abiding memory, that Horizon at this 6 time seemed to work fine most of the time? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. So when you went into the role in the data management 9 team you wouldn't have gone into the team thinking this 10 is a problematic system, Horizon? 11 A. No. 12 Q. So you moved into the data management team. What was 13 your job title in the data management team? 14 A. I can't remember. It was the database, whatever it was 15 called, manager. 16 Q. Where was that based? 17 A. Again that was in Dearne House. 18 Q. What was the function of that data management team? 19 A. There wasn't really a great function. It basically 20 compiled data and I can't remember what type of data it 21 was. It was only used by one team within POL, as far as 22 I was aware. When I got into the role, there was 23 a reorganisation and the problem management team and the 24 risk team, I think, were combined into one team and the 25 risk manager took over management of the team. So I was 12 1 left in a situation where was I going to go, there was 2 a space there so I was kind of fitted in there. 3 Q. What data did it manage and for what purpose did it 4 manage it? 5 A. It seems -- I really -- it is a blur, that role. It 6 kind of felt like different product descriptions 7 perhaps, promotional information. 8 Q. Did your undertaking of that role require knowledge of 9 and understanding of the operation of the Horizon 10 System? 11 A. No. 12 Q. In the course of that role, therefore, did you acquire 13 any more knowledge of any errors, bugs and defects in 14 the operation of the Horizon System? 15 A. No. 16 Q. So Horizon wasn't really on your horizon in that role. 17 A. Not at that point, no. 18 Q. In 2007, you moved to the Finance Reporting Team? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. What was your title in the Finance Reporting Team? 21 A. I can't remember that. 22 Q. What was the function of the Finance Reporting Team? 23 A. It was basically producing monthly reports for different 24 teams within the Post Office, financial management 25 reports. 13 1 Q. Where were you based? 2 A. In Chesterfield. 3 Q. To whom did you report? 4 A. I can't the lady's name. 5 Q. Did you manage a team? 6 A. No. 7 Q. How many people were in the function of finance 8 reporting or in the Finance Reporting Team? 9 A. I would estimate about twelve. 10 Q. In that role, did you require knowledge and 11 understanding of the operation of the Horizon System? 12 A. No. 13 Q. Does it follow that you didn't acquire any more 14 knowledge in that role of any errors, bugs and defects 15 in the Horizon System? 16 A. Yes. No, I would say not because I would have been 17 working there when Horizon Online went live. So I would 18 be in the same building. 19 Q. Just think back. In your statement, you say that you 20 moved to the Finance Reporting Team in 2007 and I think 21 that you're going to tell us in a moment that in 2008 22 you moved to the Product & Branch Accounting team. 23 A. To my best memory. 24 Q. Horizon Online didn't go live, really, until 2010. 25 A. Okay. So I was certainly in the Finance Reporting Team 14 1 when Horizon Online went live, so I obviously got those 2 dates wrong. 3 Q. So the date that you have given us in your statement of 4 moving to the Product & Branch Accounting team in 5 2009 -- sorry, 2008, might that be wrong? 6 A. Yes, I think so. 7 Q. We've certainly got documents from you in 2009, 8 ie before Horizon Online went live, with you in the 9 Product & Branch Accounting team. So you had certainly 10 moved by then. 11 A. Okay. There was certainly something -- my memory is 12 that something had happened in terms of a major project 13 around Horizon during the period that I was not in 14 Product & Branch Accounting. So all I can say was I was 15 aware that a major Horizon-related project had gone live 16 and there was lots of issues flying around there. 17 But I'd been in the same building as a lot of 18 people and knowing people who were involved. So, in 19 terms of my actual role, I wasn't involved at that point 20 but I was aware within the business of things happening. 21 Q. On that awareness, were you aware of anything 22 particularly problematic or difficult? 23 A. Yes, I was aware that the accounting in Product & Branch 24 Accounting was causing a lot of problems in a lot of 25 areas -- not so much -- I wasn't particularly aware of 15 1 issues impacting branches then because Product & Branch 2 Accounting was based in the same building as I was in. 3 I was aware that that there was a lot of stress coming 4 there that needed resolving. 5 Q. What was the stress that was coming there? 6 A. I think feeds from branch, right, whenever things were 7 falling into the wrong accounts and the accounts weren't 8 functioning as planned. 9 Q. How widely known was this? Even though it wasn't your 10 team, it was obviously being talked about? 11 A. Yes. So I would guess, if I was relatively new to 12 the -- well, no I'd worked in the building before but 13 I wasn't particularly well-known person within Post 14 Office Limited, so I would guess other people would know 15 more than me but that's a guess. 16 Q. Before you moved to the Product & Branch Accounting 17 team -- we'll try and establish the date with greater 18 specificity in a moment -- were you aware of any bugs, 19 errors and defects in the Horizon System that affected 20 the integrity of the data that it produced? 21 A. No. I think I was more aware that the mapping in 22 preparation hadn't, in terms of how it fed into P&BA 23 accounts was the issue. I wasn't particularly aware of 24 what was happening in branches. 25 Q. What do you mean the mapping of how it went into P&BA 16 1 accounts? 2 A. Part of the project planning would be to prepare data 3 flows. So you sell a stamp in a branch and cash is paid 4 for it and how that flows into the accounts within 5 Product & Branch Accounting, and things were running up 6 in unexpected areas, et cetera. 7 Q. So it was a mismatch between what was, in fact, going on 8 in the branches and what the data showed at 9 Chesterfield; is that a fair way of describing it? 10 A. Yes, I think so. 11 Q. Were you just picking this up before you moved to P&BA, 12 in the noise, the conversations that you were hearing? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. At what level of seriousness was this being expressed? 15 A. Oh, it was serious. 16 Q. Can you remember before you moved into P&BA whether this 17 was being attributed to the way that the Horizon System 18 was operating? 19 A. No, I can't answer that one. 20 Q. So on a date you moved into Product & Branch Accounting, 21 which as we've discussed already was called P&BA; what 22 was your job title in P&BA? 23 A. Initially it was an analyst. 24 Q. You say in your statement that you were initially 25 an analyst in the debt recovery team. 17 1 A. Debt recovery, yes. 2 Q. Yes, I think that's what I said. 3 A. I heard "guess", sorry. 4 Q. Debt recovery team. Your post, you say, later became 5 described as relationship manager? 6 A. That's correct. 7 Q. Can you remember when that was? 8 A. No. 9 Q. What was the debt recovery team? 10 A. It was the team -- so branches had -- one of the options 11 with their debt was to put it into an account called 12 "Settle centrally". So if you had a £100, let's say, 13 debt at your balance period, you had a number of 14 choices: make good cash, put the cash in to make up the 15 deficit; make good cheque, equally put the cheque in; or 16 settle centrally, in which case the debt would flow 17 through to an account in Chesterfield and, hopefully, it 18 would be a case where the debt would get balanced off 19 against something else but, if the debt sat there, the 20 debt recovery team would then look to recover from the 21 subpostmaster. 22 Q. So the debt recovery team, would this be fair, its 23 function was to seek to recover debts that may be owed 24 by subpostmasters? 25 A. Yes. 18 1 Q. What was the function more broadly of the P&BA team? 2 A. To account for mainly branch activity, to consolidate it 3 and report it. 4 Q. What do you mean to account for branch activity? 5 A. I'm struggling to explain that. Effectively, data would 6 flow in from branches, it would flow in from clients, it 7 would flow in from other parts of the business from, for 8 example, cash centres, stock centres, all these data 9 flows would come in and they should get matched off one 10 against the other and accounts cleared down to zero. 11 Q. Thank you. If we look at your witness statement, 12 please, WITN01090100 at page 2 -- it will come up on the 13 screen for you on the right-hand side. Look at 14 paragraph 3. 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. You are talking about the role that we're now 17 discussing. You say: 18 "The role initially focused on process 19 improvements and looking at accounting queries from 20 branches but over time concentrated almost entirely on 21 accounting problems in branches and as a single P&BA ... 22 point for both branches and other relevant teams..." 23 Yes? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. Then you go on to list the other relevant teams. 19 1 Starting with branches first, how would branches contact 2 the P&BA team that were performing this role? 3 A. My role or P&BA? 4 Q. Your role. 5 A. Ideally in writing, explaining what the problem was. 6 Q. More broadly, the P&BA team, how would branches contact 7 the P&BA team? 8 A. The P&BA team, broadly if -- a lot of the teams were 9 based in correcting -- managing accounts of products and 10 they would be looking to effectively get an input from 11 the branch, and input from the client, match the two 12 off, clears down to nothing. 13 Branches might feel as though they need 14 a transaction correction, for example. They would 15 contact the NBSC, the helpline, who would then direct 16 them into the relevant team within P&BA. 17 Q. How would that contact be made once they had spoken to 18 NBSC? 19 A. Normally by phone. 20 Q. Looking at the other relevant teams that would use P&BA 21 as this single point of input you say "primarily 22 Network", just inside the brackets there. 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. Who or what do you mean by the word "Network"? 25 A. There was a Network team within POL at the time and that 20 1 would involve -- so it was primarily field support 2 advisers, people who were in contact with branches. So 3 it may well be that they had been in contact with the 4 branch who then said "I've got this problem, what do 5 I do?" They would direct them in towards P&BA. 6 Q. If Network were contacting P&BA, how would they do that: 7 by phone or in writing? 8 A. Oh, by phone normally or email. 9 Q. The next relevant team that you mention is "Helpline", 10 the NBSC. 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Was that the only helpline that would get in contact 13 with P&BA? 14 A. As far as I'm aware, yes. 15 Q. How would people in the NBSC contact P&BA? 16 A. By phone -- again, possibly by email but more normally 17 by phone. 18 Q. Then, lastly, you mention within the brackets there 19 "Product & Security". Who or what is/was Product & 20 Security"? 21 A. They would be separate teams. There would be a Product 22 team who kind of, what it says on the can, would manage 23 the products in terms of the relationships with the 24 clients but also how the products are working with it at 25 branch level. 21 1 Q. So product could be, what, Lottery or -- 2 A. Yes. So there would be a Lottery product manager who 3 would talk to Camelot and also be in contact during the 4 network into products. So when there were products -- 5 that was a product where there was quite a lot of issues 6 that arose they would be in communication with Camelot 7 and different parts of POL to try and improve, smooth 8 out the process. 9 Q. How would Product get in contact with P&BA? 10 A. Same again: email or phone. 11 Q. And Security? 12 A. Security -- 13 Q. Who or what are you describing by the word "Security" 14 there? 15 A. There was a Security team who were the ones who were 16 probably, I believe -- ultimately they bring 17 prosecutions against branches but also looking after the 18 integrity of the POL cash and products, the security of 19 it, and they would occasionally -- we'd occasionally 20 link up where need be, again email or phone. 21 Q. Then, lastly, outside the brackets you say: 22 "... along with the National Federation of 23 SubPostmasters (NFSP) ..." 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. How would the NFSP contact P&BA? 22 1 A. They would normally ring -- well, the contact would 2 generally be to me, usually, by phone. 3 Q. Why would the NFSP usually come to you? 4 A. Because I'd built -- that was part of the defined role 5 when the job set up, to get a link into the network, 6 actually, rather than the POL network, the subpostmaster 7 network, to give them a direct line into P&BA. 8 Q. Was there one person that you particularly engaged with 9 or was it a range of people? 10 A. There was one person who I dealt with, a paid officer, 11 within the NFSP, who was -- 12 Q. Who was that? 13 A. Sorry, I can't remember. Oh, Stoddart ... someone -- 14 something like Marie Stoddart. 15 Q. Marie Stoddart? 16 A. Yes, I think I've probably got the first name wrong -- 17 Q. Okay. 18 A. -- which apologies to her because I knew her very well, 19 which is sad. 20 But also I used to go to a monthly meeting where 21 they get together and I'd go and join in with them, make 22 a presentation and also sit and listen to some of the 23 other issues going round. So we do have quite a close 24 relationship, I think. 25 Q. Thank you. That statement can come down from the screen 23 1 now, thank you. 2 To whom did you report? 3 A. A senior manager named Alison Bolsover. 4 Q. Say that more slowly? 5 A. A senior manager called Alison Bolsover. 6 Q. Was she one of four senior managers? 7 A. Correct. 8 Q. Who were the other three senior managers? 9 A. They changed during my time there. 10 Q. Can you give us names that you can remember? 11 A. Yes. (Pause) 12 You know, I can't remember a single name, sorry. 13 Q. You say in your witness statement that the four senior 14 managers themselves reported in to the head of P&BA. 15 Who was the head of P&BA? 16 A. Rod Ismay for most of the time that I was there. 17 Q. What was his title? 18 A. I believe it was head of P&BA. 19 Q. He reported to the Finance Director; is that right? 20 A. Correct. 21 Q. Who was that? 22 A. Again, that changed during the time I was there and 23 I can't remember either of the names, I'm afraid. 24 Q. Did you manage a team? 25 A. Yes, one admin officer. 24 1 Q. What was the role of the admin officer? 2 A. It was largely to document the cases that came in and, 3 yes, that was the main part of the role. 4 Q. How would they document the cases that came in? 5 A. They would generally come by letter. They'd be opening 6 a letter, they'd be trying to work out what the case 7 related to and -- 8 Q. Just stopping you there, you said earlier they would 9 generally come in by phone or email? 10 A. Not to me, from the branches. 11 Q. Okay. I was talking about the whole range of reporting 12 from Product and Security, from the NFSP, from the NBSC, 13 from Network. We went through those and you said that 14 they generally came in through phone or email contact. 15 A. Yes, yes. 16 Q. How would the admin officer document those? 17 A. They wouldn't, unless I asked them to. It would be 18 usually a case of they'd raise an issue, perhaps which 19 might relate to a branch which may raise a case which 20 would then get documented. 21 But if the NFSP rang me and said, "What's going 22 off with this product" or whatever, that wouldn't be 23 documented by the admin assistant. 24 Q. You describe in your statement that this role 25 concentrated almost entirely on problems in branches and 25 1 was a single point of contact. 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. Did your role therefore require knowledge of and 4 understanding of the operation of the Horizon System? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. Had you got any knowledge of the operation of the 7 Horizon System by the time you joined? 8 A. It's possible that I did because managers were typically 9 given training to cover strike action and Christmas 10 support and I think that would have happened before, so 11 I would have thought I'd have a basic understanding of 12 how the Horizon System worked, yes. 13 Q. In that sentence you used the word "basic 14 understanding". I take it you use that deliberately 15 because that would be your level of understanding as 16 an occasional end user? 17 A. That's correct, yes. 18 Q. Wasn't the role that you were performing a role that 19 required much more detailed knowledge of the operation 20 of Horizon than that? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. Again, do you know why you were selected for the job if 23 you didn't have a detailed understanding of the way in 24 which Horizon worked? 25 A. I would probably again point to the lack of competition 26 1 in terms of advance knowledge of the Horizon System but, 2 again, that's probably one for the people that were 3 interviewing, rather than -- in fact, I don't think 4 there was an interview for that. I think it was placed 5 in there. So that was more probably a case of Alison 6 Bolsover, who whoever within P&BA, talking to my manager 7 in the reporting team at the time and seeing how the fit 8 went, after -- I said I'd expressed an interest in the 9 role when I saw the reorganisation of P&BA. 10 Q. Now, we've got a document dating from 2009 suggesting 11 that you were in role in P&BA and that you undertook 12 a review. Can we look at that, please. It's 13 POL00039029. 14 Do you see this appears to be a PowerPoint 15 presentation -- 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. -- and I think you have seen it before. There's some 18 notes, when we get to the successive pages, underneath 19 each slide. Maybe if we just look at an example of 20 those, if we go to page 5 -- and scroll down, please. 21 Thank you. 22 So the slide that's displayed is at the top and 23 then some notes at the bottom; is that right? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. So the people who are getting the presentation don't see 27 1 the notes. They are like a speaking note for yourself? 2 A. That's right. 3 Q. Yes? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. So if we just go back to page 1, please, we'll see that 6 the title of the presentation is "Transaction 7 Corrections, Debt Reporting and Debt Recovery Review", 8 with your name and "January 2009" underneath it. Did 9 you write this document? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. So this relates, is this right, to the period when you 12 were in P&BA? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. So it's a review conducted before the introduction of 15 Horizon Online? 16 A. If -- 17 Q. If my date of 2010 is correct. 18 A. Yes, yes. 19 Q. Can we look at page 2 of the document, please. We'll 20 see the "Objectives": 21 "Review current ways of working and supporting 22 operating processes in the transaction correction, debt 23 reporting and debt recovery areas. 24 "Review the impact of the current ways of working 25 and current operating processes in the transaction 28 1 correction, debt reporting and debt recovery area on the 2 POL Network." 3 Then thirdly: 4 "Analyse and then recommend cost effective 5 improvements to the way the correct end-to-end 6 transaction correction, debt reporting and debt recovery 7 operating processes work." 8 So it's focused, is this right, on looking at the 9 way that the systems were working at that time? 10 A. Yes, it sounds very much as though that's -- I've been 11 put in a role, I've had conversations with my boss and 12 probably other people within P&BA, and pulled together 13 a what do I think this role involves. 14 Q. Not just what does it involve, but look at ways in which 15 it could be changed, in order to make cost effective 16 improvements -- 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. -- to save money? 19 A. I think everything you do, you're looking at working as 20 efficiently as possible. I don't think it was 21 particularly a brief to come in and find ways of cutting 22 down our costs. 23 Q. Now, the Inquiry's heard some evidence from a previous 24 witness, Ms Susan Harding; do you remember her? 25 A. Yes. 29 1 Q. What do you remember her as, a role that she performed? 2 A. She was actually my -- for a while in the network 3 intervention team, we talked about earlier, the previous 4 team that I was in. 5 Q. She told the Chairman that subpostmasters were never 6 forced to settle centrally. Can we just look at page 3 7 of this document, please. You in the first bullet point 8 ask "What is 'Settle Centrally'?" and then say: 9 "Branch Trading forces [transaction correction] 10 acceptance." 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. "Inadequate [transaction correction] 13 evidence/instructions. 14 "Unclear process. 15 "Non-conformance not addressed. 16 "New subpostmasters. 17 "Aged/High Value/High Volume [transaction 18 corrections]." 19 Overall, without coming to the detail of each 20 bullet point first, what are you speaking about? Can 21 you explain what is being said in this slide of yours? 22 A. I think I'm saying that I got into this role, I've had 23 a look at what areas we can make improvements on and 24 what is going to be priority ones, where it is a lack of 25 understanding, and these are the kind of things I'm 30 1 going to be trying to focus on and probably some things 2 are going to become more important than others as we go 3 along. But that's probably the list of to-dos that were 4 being agreed. 5 Q. What did you mean by the second bullet point "Branch 6 Trading forces [transaction correction] acceptance"? 7 A. So every month a branch is required to carry out 8 a branch trading process where effectively they pulled 9 everything together, ideally everything balances, they 10 have a nice zero at the bottom and we move on to the 11 next trading period. 12 The transaction corrections can be issued at any 13 time and there was a significant issue with the branches 14 expressed particularly through the NFSP about -- well, 15 sorry, just re-track a little bit. Branches used to, 16 pre-Horizon days, used to balance weekly and it was 17 still recommended to do a balance, not a complete 18 balance but a kind of summary balance, to try and get 19 a view of where they were, but the primary balance was 20 held monthly. 21 There was a kind of half-hearted -- what seemed to 22 be a half-hearted claim that you only issue transaction 23 corrections on a Tuesday so we get it on a Wednesday 24 morning when we've got to do the balancing, and 25 I actually did a bit of exercise to disprove that and it 31 1 turned out we did issue the most transaction corrections 2 on a Tuesday. There may -- it wasn't significantly 3 relevant compared to Wednesday or Thursdays. 4 But on branch trading, on the monthly branch 5 trading, everything kind of has to be cleaned up, so 6 that would mean any transaction corrections that are 7 outstanding needed to be accepted before you could roll 8 into the next trading period. 9 Q. By "accepted", you mean accepted by the subpostmaster? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. So what is the bullet point is saying is that the action 12 of branch trading, the monthly reconciliation process, 13 is forcing subpostmasters to accept transaction 14 corrections that the centre is putting to them? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. Were you saying that's a good thing or a bad thing? 17 A. I was saying it was -- I don't think it was a good 18 thing. 19 Q. Why wasn't it a good thing? 20 A. Because branches would potentially walk in on 21 a Wednesday morning of balance day, turn the Horizon on, 22 first thing they see is a transaction correction come 23 through, they know they have got a balance on the night, 24 they've got to understand what the transaction 25 correction is and, if it's particularly one that's 32 1 a debt transaction correction that's going to 2 potentially cost them money, they need more time -- 3 potentially need more time to review it and potentially 4 appeal against it. 5 Q. But the system is forcing them to accept it -- 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. -- in order to continue trading? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. This was an inbuilt feature of the system, is this 10 right, on a monthly basis, in order for a subpostmaster 11 to continue trading? 12 A. No. No, that was an operational requirement. But in 13 practice if you didn't carry out a branch trading 14 rollover Horizon didn't mind. It was kind of quite 15 happy to go along with that to a point -- I can't 16 remember how far in the future when the whole thing 17 would start falling over but, effectively, if you didn't 18 do your branch trading, nobody cared. A lot of branches 19 actually did their branch trading on a Thursday for 20 operational reasons, particularly the multiple partners, 21 I think, if I remember correctly. 22 Q. But the point that you are making here is that this 23 monthly exercise is forcing subpostmasters to accept 24 transaction corrections without necessarily a proper 25 exploration of the merits of the correction? 33 1 A. That's correct. The system wasn't forcing you to do 2 that. It was the operational instructions that was 3 saying you need to do that, which for a conscientious 4 subpostmaster they would take it as I've got to do it on 5 a Wednesday night. 6 Q. Thank you. Can we go over to page 4 of your document, 7 please. 8 This seems to relate to issues seemingly raised by 9 the National Federation of SubPostmasters. 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Including under the first bullet point "Dispute Button" 12 and other matters including, two bullet points from the 13 bottom, "Horizon [transaction correction] Receipt" and 14 "Core & Outreach Consolidated Statements". 15 Were the National Federation raising with you 16 concerns about the operation of the dispute process on 17 balancing? 18 A. That would be one of their issues, yes. 19 Q. What did they say to you about it? 20 A. They were reflecting the views of the branches, which 21 I think I've probably already covered, that they felt 22 under pressure, that it was unfair to receive 23 a transaction correction which they weren't aware of, 24 they weren't expecting and potentially to have to be 25 forced to accept it with the risk that POL may then 34 1 ultimately say "No, you've accepted it, so you pay up". 2 Q. What the Federation were saying, would this be right, 3 was that there ought to be the facility to have 4 a dispute button, to say "I dispute that transaction 5 correction, I shouldn't be forced to accept it"? 6 A. They raised it as a possibility, as an idea. Certainly, 7 there would have been branches who were saying "We need 8 a dispute button" but they were throwing it in, let's 9 look at whether that makes sense to do that. 10 Q. Can we see your notes underneath, please, on "Dispute 11 Button". Can we see your notes, the first one if that 12 can be highlighted under "Dispute Button". You wrote: 13 "... facility would be abused. POL believe they 14 have provided evidence to support validity on issue. 15 Dispute simply asks us to do it again. Robust dispute 16 process is answer." 17 Is that your reply, essentially, to the suggestion 18 that there should be a dispute facility; namely, no, it 19 would be abused? 20 A. I don't think I would put it quite as bluntly as that. 21 I think it was kind of looking at what the benefits and 22 risks might be. 23 Q. This doesn't say that. 24 A. No, no. 25 Q. "Let's look at what the benefits and risks might be". 35 1 It says in your speaking note "Dispute button -- 2 facility would be abused". 3 A. Yes. Sorry, these aren't speaking notes. These are 4 notes to make me -- to lead me and don't forget to 5 mention this, this and this. That's not what I would 6 say. 7 Q. Why wouldn't you put a note "Let's explore the merits, 8 the advantages and disadvantages of it? Why would you 9 make a note to, remind yourself to say "facility would 10 be abused"? 11 A. I can't answer that. That's the way I ... 12 Q. Is the truth of the matter that that note is there as 13 a prompt to remind you to say, "No, there won't be 14 a dispute button because the facility would be abused"? 15 A. I was going into that discussion having thought through 16 the pros and cons and my view is that a dispute button 17 would not improve the process. So I guess, yes, but it 18 was a case of discussing the pros and cons and 19 explaining why I felt, on balance, it wasn't a good 20 idea. 21 Q. On what evidence did you conclude that the existence of 22 a dispute facility would be abused? 23 A. I think to say evidence would be pushing it; so I think 24 an assumption. 25 Q. Why would you assume -- 36 1 A. Sorry, there would be examples in the past. For 2 example, lots of transaction corrections are effectively 3 equal and opposite. So you might have made an error in 4 this product set, which should have -- so the 5 transaction's been made here, it should have been made 6 over there, so two transactions equal and opposite value 7 need to be issued. In an ideal world, particularly if 8 they are in the same team, they could be issued at the 9 same time, so they are accepted at the same time, but it 10 might be kind of potentially a month apart from one 11 another. 12 Essentially, the two transaction corrections have 13 no impact on a branch. If you accept the credit 14 transaction correction and make good, then you can take 15 the cash out of the till. If you dispute the debit 16 transaction correction, then there's no requirement to 17 return that cash back in there until the dispute has 18 been resolved and, effectively, there is no dispute that 19 we can see, it's perfectly clear they should accept them 20 both, but how do we get to the point where that second 21 transaction correction is accepted? 22 Q. In the answer before last you said you wouldn't say that 23 this view was based on evidence, you used the word 24 "assumption". 25 Why would you reject the idea of a dispute button 37 1 not on the basis of evidence but on the basis of 2 assumption? 3 A. The question I guess I'd throw back: where's the 4 evidence that there would be any benefit in a dispute 5 button. 6 Q. Haven't you explained to us what the benefit was 7 already, that subpostmasters were being forced into 8 accepting a transaction correction without a full and 9 proper exploration of the merits of the correction? 10 A. And that's why we introduced a procedure for branches 11 who were left in that situation, where they were able to 12 effectively raise a dispute within POL or to raise the 13 fact that they were accepting a transaction correction 14 which they hadn't fully explored which, if it kind of 15 ended up further down the line in a debt recovery place, 16 they could use that to support their challenge. 17 Q. So you make the subpostmaster accept the validity of 18 something before a proper exploration of the dispute 19 they wish to raise; is that the long and the short of 20 it? 21 A. Sorry can you repeat that? 22 Q. Yes. You force the subpostmaster to accept the validity 23 of the transaction correction before a proper 24 exploration of the dispute that they wish to raise about 25 it. 38 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. Your note continues: 3 "POL believe they have provided evidence to 4 support validity on issue." 5 Is that a note saying, "We've already explored the 6 merits of the transaction correction. We have provided 7 evidence already. Therefore, there's no need for 8 a dispute button"? 9 A. Yes, that's -- the theory behind the issue of 10 transaction correction is that you have evidence to 11 support that. So if you don't have the evidence, you 12 shouldn't be issuing the transaction correction. 13 Q. The note says POL believe they've provided evidence. 14 Does that mean provided evidence to the subpostmaster 15 already of the correction? 16 A. Yes, although that evidence may and would normally just 17 be the narrative attached to the transaction correction. 18 Q. The note continues: 19 "Dispute simply asks us to do it again." 20 Is that another reason for rejecting the 21 suggestion of a dispute facility? 22 A. Yes. As our understanding was, you press a button and 23 the onus moves back to POL to prove the transaction 24 correction. If we've already provided the evidence that 25 we have, what are we supposed to do more to persuade the 39 1 subpostmaster that it is acceptable? That would be -- 2 really that would be the point where I'm saying a robust 3 dispute process is the answer, in that if the 4 subpostmaster doesn't accept the evidence, there will 5 always be -- a transaction correction will always have 6 a contact number, they could -- they would then contact 7 the team member who's issued the transaction correction 8 and they can talk it through. If they don't accept it, 9 then we've got a dispute process to follow through. 10 Q. On that last note you say: 11 "Robust dispute process is the answer." 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. Who was being robust or what was robust? 14 A. The aspiration for me to carry out -- well, to set up 15 the process to start with, so that it's available to 16 branches and the whole of POL to be able -- aware of it 17 and for how to kick off the process and then for me to 18 ensure that the process is done as robustly as I'm able. 19 Q. What does "robustly" mean in this context? 20 A. Fair, accurate, timely. 21 Q. The notes continue, if we skip down to "TC receipt", so 22 three bullet points on, so "TC receipt", so transaction 23 correction receipt, remembering that there was a request 24 for, I think, a Horizon transaction correction receipt, 25 and it looks like your note-to-self is: 40 1 "... no clear benefit bar subpostmasters claiming 2 for losses." 3 Can you firstly explain, please, what the request 4 was in relation to a transaction correction receipt.? 5 A. I've a very, very vague memory of this one. I think it 6 was subpostmasters wanted a separate piece of paper to 7 put in their accounts, to give to their accountant at 8 the end of the year, which I think would be to claim 9 losses on their accounts. I can't remember exactly what 10 they wanted, to be honest. 11 Q. This was, it seems, rejected too; is that right? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. You said: 14 "... no clear benefit bar subpostmasters claiming 15 for losses." 16 Wouldn't a benefit be subpostmasters exist in that 17 there would be a receipt in respect losses they didn't 18 accept were genuine or a genuine debt? Wouldn't that be 19 an important benefit to them? 20 A. It never occurred to me that. 21 Q. Okay. Can we go on to page 5, please. "Key Issues -- 22 P&BA". I think this is addressing the key issues for 23 the P&BA team; is that right? 24 A. Yes, it looks like it, yes. 25 Q. If we just expand a little, so we can see the notes 41 1 below, please. Thank you. 2 Looking at the notes below, these suggest that the 3 Post Office, I think, was concerned about its own 4 practices and the inconsistency of them towards 5 transaction corrections, including the operation of back 6 office systems including IMPACT; is that right? 7 A. Yes, it looks like it. 8 Q. We can see in the first note: 9 "Varying [transaction correction] routines -- one 10 of the clear ideals I had on setting out and from others 11 who I spoke to was consistency." 12 But then you noted: 13 "But then most teams have completely different 14 approaches to identifying errors and resolving them -- 15 and for good reasons." 16 So was there an inconsistency of approach within 17 P&BA to identifying errors and resolving them at 18 Chesterfield? 19 A. I don't think it was so much identifying and resolving 20 them -- well, identifying them, I don't think was so 21 much of an issue. I think it was more about -- if I can 22 give one example, within I think it was the cheques team 23 at the time where one duty would issue a transaction 24 correction for every cheque error and another duty might 25 issue a consolidated -- so if there was a problem with 42 1 a batch, they might issue a consolidated transaction 2 correction which showed the net effect of the bulk 3 error. 4 Both kind had kind of quite eloquently described 5 their rationale behind what they were doing in terms of 6 how the subpostmaster saw it, and I could totally 7 understand -- it wasn't clear to me whether it was 8 better for a subpostmaster to see everything on the one 9 transaction correction or lots of different individual 10 transaction corrections. So that was the issue with 11 that one. 12 A better example might be the Lottery team where 13 there was a big issue accurately recording the Lottery 14 and a lot of that was around the fact that Lottery was 15 typically sold a lot on the retail side, as opposed to 16 the Post Office side, and there was the problem of 17 getting the data across to the Post Office side in time 18 to be reported before cut-off time, which I think was 19 7.00. 20 So it was fine for the branch offices that 21 everyone shut up at 5.30, everything was accounted for. 22 Branches that their retail side particularly would be up 23 until 10.00 at night were missing the cut-off. 24 So what we found was that lots of branches were 25 making lots of errors, which were really just timing 43 1 errors and we could have been in a situation of issuing 2 every day a transaction correction and then the next day 3 a transaction correction would be coming back which 4 would compensate for the errors. 5 Q. So cutting through it, what were the good reasons for 6 the completely different approaches to identifying 7 errors and resolving them? 8 A. The different requirements and the different attributes 9 or problems of the products and how the team saw best to 10 deal with them. 11 Q. This suggests that there was a difference between teams; 12 is that right? 13 A. In their approach but, essentially, the difference -- 14 the teams were doing the same thing. They were looking 15 at an account, where there was -- where it wasn't 16 netting off to zero and their kind of goal in life, 17 I guess, was to get that account down to zero. 18 Q. Moving a bullet point on underneath: 19 "POLFS -- space/access to reference data/different 20 transactions used by different teams." 21 Can you shortly explain what POLFS was? 22 A. POLFS, I think, was a name for Product & Branch 23 Accounting. 24 Q. Were you concerned about the limitations of or within 25 Product & Branch Accounting, in being able to 44 1 investigate errors and resolving them? 2 A. I think -- I can't remember exactly when this was but -- 3 Q. January 2009? 4 A. Okay. So at that point, there would be, in many of the 5 teams, quite large backlogs and, clearly, if you have 6 got a large backlog of work, you'd like more resource to 7 help clear it but there were limitations. 8 Q. I think that might be a different issue. Isn't this 9 talking about the extent to which this back office team 10 had access to all of the data generated by both the POL 11 back office systems and by Horizon, for the purposes of 12 an investigation into the validity of a transaction 13 correction or a discrepancy? 14 A. Their checking a transaction correction would be about 15 what there is in POLFS. Sorry, POLFS is the Finance 16 System, isn't it? Sorry, I do beg your pardon. It 17 would be about what's in the Finance System not 18 particularly what was on the Horizon System because the 19 Horizon System should -- if this has happened on 20 Horizon, then this data should then flow into this point 21 within POLFS. 22 Q. You are speaking to the limitations of POLFS here. What 23 were the limitations of POLFS? 24 A. I'm sorry, I can't recall what I was thinking of at that 25 point. 45 1 Q. Next, if we skip over debt levels, we go to "Ownership": 2 "Ownership -- main focus has been on clearing 3 backlog. Whether that helps the bottom line depends on 4 whether debts generated are paid. Equally there is no 5 incentive to seek out compensating [transaction 6 corrections]." 7 Does this reflect the fact that the Post Office, 8 through P&BA, was most concerned about getting money 9 back into the business, debt which it considered owing 10 and outstanding? 11 A. I think that was my -- we talked before about me making 12 assumptions about evidence and this is perhaps another 13 example of that. But, certainly, the biggest focus was 14 around getting these accounts down to a manageable 15 format. So the teams were dealing with stuff in 16 a timely manner rather than trying to pull something -- 17 work on something that was months old. 18 But the point I was trying to make was that, just 19 to send out lots and lots of transaction corrections to 20 move these values, if they all end up being disputed, 21 and correctly so in many cases, then the stuff just 22 still flows around within POLFS and isn't being cleared 23 down. 24 Q. Aren't you emphasising by this that it's no good doing 25 transaction corrections, just to help the bottom line -- 46 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. -- by doing them; you have actually got to follow them 3 up by debt recovery? 4 A. I think the first point is to make sure that they're 5 right and if we know that they're right then we can 6 focus on debt recovery where necessary. 7 Q. Was a focus on helping the bottom line, ie by generating 8 money for the Post Office through debt recovery from 9 subpostmasters? 10 A. I personally wasn't ever given that pressure, whether 11 somebody like Rod Ismay was, from his Finance Director, 12 I couldn't say. 13 Q. What was the purpose of mentioning whether clearing the 14 backlog helps actually depends on whether the debts are 15 paid by the subpostmasters? Why were you mentioning 16 that? 17 A. I was trying to make sure that teams weren't just 18 ramming out as many transaction corrections as possible. 19 The integrity of them was important -- well, more than 20 important, it was critical that things went out that 21 were correct, and that would ultimately save because it 22 would potentially just create a circle if we were 23 disputing, reissuing, et cetera. We needed to be able 24 to deal with it once, make sure we dealt with it 25 properly, so it then doesn't come back on us. 47 1 Q. The last sentence on this page: 2 "Equally there is no incentive to seek out 3 compensating [transaction corrections]." 4 Were you suggesting there that there was no 5 incentive within Chesterfield to seek out transaction 6 corrections that would have the effect of the Post 7 Office paying money to the subpostmasters? 8 A. Yes, I think one of the issues is, as I already 9 mentioned, is different -- so we had different teams 10 that dealt with different products. There was two ways 11 that we could have looked at this and the alternative 12 way had been in operation before, where team -- 13 individuals looked after branches. So they would look 14 after a branch across the board, which was great because 15 they got a view of the branch but perhaps not so great 16 in terms of knowledge of dealing with products, whereas 17 the way we operated was, in terms of products, so teams 18 became very knowledgeable about their products and 19 hopefully dealt with them well. But they didn't get 20 a view of the branch they were dealing with. 21 So whereas if you are looking at a branch as 22 a whole it might be more obvious to pick up "Well, we've 23 got an error here, we've got an error there. Oh, look, 24 these actually match, we can sort this branch out fine". 25 Whereas if you're just looking in a single line under 48 1 a limited number of products, then you won't be aware of 2 what's going on there and if you're being told "Clear 3 this account down", then you're not going to trot off to 4 the other side of the room and have a conversation "Have 5 you got a matching item to this, because I think" -- 6 some people will do that anyway; other people wouldn't. 7 Q. In this sentence, were you reflecting the fact that in 8 the team as you saw it there was no incentive to seek 9 out corrections that had the effect of benefiting 10 subpostmasters? 11 A. I would say that's correct, yes. 12 Q. Can we turn to page 6, please: 13 "Key Recommendations -- Existing Processes." 14 Under the third of them: 15 "Define 'settle centrally'." 16 Then scroll down to the notes, please, and the 17 third point under your notes you say: 18 "Define Settle Centrally -- legally they have 19 accepted the debt. But would a court wear it? Need 20 some assurances around it." 21 Can you just explain what "settle centrally" was, 22 please? 23 A. Settle centrally was an option where a discrepancy arose 24 either through accepting a transaction correction or as 25 a cash balance at the end of the branch trading. 49 1 I think there was a limit of £150, below which you 2 couldn't settle centrally but, if, say, you had a debt, 3 a loss of £200, at the end of branch trading, then you 4 had the choice of putting the cash in, which got rid of 5 the debt, making out a cheque, make good by cheque, 6 which sends a cheque off for £200 to clear off the debt, 7 or not to clear the debt at that point but to settle 8 centrally, moves it onto a separate account within POL 9 and, if nothing subsequently would happen from that, the 10 team would then -- the debt recovery team would then 11 start to recover that £200. 12 But it may well be that the subpostmaster is fully 13 aware that they are due a credit transaction correction, 14 which hopefully will arrive in the next trading period, 15 they get that credit transaction correction, settle it 16 centrally, the two net off and everyone's forgotten 17 about it. 18 If there's no compensating transaction correction 19 or compensating credit at the end of the next branch 20 trading, at some point, defined point, the debt recovery 21 team would start looking at recovering that debt. 22 Q. So you have identified three options where there's 23 a discrepancy: firstly, pay up in cash by the 24 subpostmaster -- 25 A. Yes. 50 1 Q. -- secondly, pay up by cheque; or, thirdly, settle 2 centrally? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. They were the only three options? 5 A. I think multiple branches might have had a different way 6 of doing it and, certainly, Crown Offices had 7 a different approach. But your bog standard 8 subpostmaster -- 9 Q. They were the three options? 10 A. -- they were their options, yes. 11 Q. So the first two involved the payment or the promise of 12 payment of money through a cheque, yes? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. The third option, settle centrally, you note: 15 "... legally they [that's the subpostmasters] have 16 accepted the debt." 17 A. That was -- I've got no legal training whatsoever so 18 that was my understanding of -- and also like the 19 NFSP -- I think everybody's understanding was, if you 20 accepted that TC, you have accepted it. 21 Q. Where did you get that understanding; where did everyone 22 get that understanding from? 23 A. I couldn't specifically answer that. 24 Q. If you had that understanding and everyone in P&BA had 25 that understanding, did you communicate that to 51 1 subpostmasters or their representatives when they spoke 2 to you, "But hold on, by asking to settle centrally you 3 have legally accepted the debt"? 4 A. No, I would never say that. 5 Q. Why not, if that was your belief? 6 A. Because that wasn't my -- my approach was to make sure 7 that the subpostmasters and POL were treated correctly, 8 that things were done correctly. 9 Q. Why were you asking the question "would a court wear 10 it"? 11 A. Because of some of the problems that we've already 12 discussed. Branches are obliged to settle -- to accept 13 transaction corrections, which they may not think is 14 proper to them at the time, to get -- okay, they might 15 not want to pay the £200 straight away but they will 16 settle centrally, which defers and gives them a chance 17 to challenge. But my non-legal opinion is that, in 18 a court of law, if a subpostmaster went into a court 19 saying, "Look, I was forced to settle centrally, I had 20 to settle centrally, the Post Office is now trying to 21 recover this money, this is the evidence that I have 22 that says it's not correct", in my view, the court would 23 say, "Well, yeah, you're right, the Post Office is 24 wrong". 25 Q. You knew, I presume, that the IMPACT Programme had 52 1 removed the facility to put any disputed funds into 2 a suspense account where the disputed funds would be 3 identified before the subpostmaster accepted the cash 4 account. You knew that that was the previous position? 5 A. Sorry, could you read that again for me. 6 Q. Yes. That before the IMPACT Programme -- did you know 7 about the IMPACT Programme? 8 A. I recognise the name but I'm not quite sure what that 9 did. 10 Q. That previously there was a facility to put disputed 11 funds into a suspense account before the subpostmaster 12 accepted the cash account? 13 A. All right. No, I wasn't aware of that or I can't 14 remember being aware of it. 15 Q. But the position from when you came into post was that 16 that wasn't possible on rollover on branch trading? 17 A. That's correct, yes. 18 Q. You had to either pay money or promise to pay money, 19 which you understood to mean that the subpostmaster had 20 accepted their liability to pay the debt? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. The fourth bullet point that top of the page, "Disputes 23 resolved prior to DFR", and then your notes, which are 24 the next paragraph on, at the bottom: 25 "Disputes pre-DFR -- should not happen but need to 53 1 lay out their responsibilities as well as ours. How 2 does a dispute become formal? They need to present 3 evidence." 4 What does "dispute pre-DFR" mean, please? 5 A. Branches having the opportunity -- DFR means "deduction 6 from remuneration". So we would start -- the debt 7 recovery team would start taking money from -- 8 Q. From their pay? 9 A. From their pay, yes. So it was about no DFR should be 10 happening -- should start while a dispute is still live. 11 Q. So would a dispute only be treated as formal by the Post 12 Office after the presentation of evidence by 13 a subpostmaster? 14 A. Yes. Well, not necessarily evidence but, for example, 15 if a subpostmaster had written in to me, then we would 16 put a block on the debt recovery process until I'd 17 responded, backing up or accepting -- backing up POL's 18 position or accepting the subpostmaster's position. 19 Q. Would a subpostmaster's statement that the figures that 20 were being produced by Horizon didn't tally with the 21 records that they had kept in store be sufficient? 22 A. If you are talking about paper records or -- I'd 23 certainly look at Horizon records and -- well, I'd be 24 looking -- as part of my job, I'd be looking at Horizon 25 records to see what was in it. 54 1 Q. Let's take a different example. What about 2 a subpostmaster that suggested that a large transaction 3 that was shown by Horizon had, in fact, never taken 4 place. 5 A. Right. I don't think that that ever came up but, if 6 that did, then that would be a massive red flag. 7 Q. Put another way, what evidence did you have in mind when 8 they said "they need to present evidence"; what evidence 9 was sufficient? 10 A. Pretty much every case is different but they would lay 11 out what their understanding of what happened, where 12 they thought the problem was. I would investigate that, 13 I would look into Horizon records and try and understand 14 what's happened and be able to explain what's happened 15 and hopefully find a resolution or illustrate why this 16 has happened. 17 Q. Was there any formality brought to bear, any 18 description, on what evidence was sufficient to make 19 a dispute formal and, therefore, stop deductions from 20 remuneration? 21 A. No. The process was to write in to me. Once that 22 letter arrived, and it could be a very basic -- some 23 subpostmasters would write reams of pages, others 24 would -- half an A4 but that would create a formal 25 dispute. Any debt recovery would be paused at that 55 1 point and not reinstated or started until I'd responded 2 to the subpostmaster's concern. It may well be, if 3 there's just a short amount, I might we'll have to go 4 back to the subpostmaster and say, "Look, I need a bit 5 more what can you provide us", but then the dispute will 6 be myself and the subpostmaster trying to find the 7 evidence that supported the issue one way or the other. 8 Q. What if the subpostmaster said that, "The figures in 9 Horizon are just wrong, I can't tell you why they're 10 wrong"? 11 A. Then I would look at it to try and work out what -- if 12 there was -- what I'd typically do, if we're saying that 13 a branch, for example, has got a cash shortage and we 14 knew -- we could see that on the previous evening that 15 they'd balanced, or whatever the discrepancy was, and 16 then at the end of the next day they'd got this 17 particular cash shortage, then what I would typically do 18 is look at the transactions for that branch for that 19 day. There may be something that just jumps out at me 20 straight away, I can say "Oh, yes, I can seek what the 21 issue is". Most usually there wouldn't be. 22 But I would send -- potentially send an Excel 23 spreadsheet to branches where they could look at the 24 transactions in a better format than what Horizon 25 reporting would come up and they could have a look and 56 1 say if there's any transaction -- and I'd suggest "Look, 2 you know, there's this transaction, is that going to be 3 right; is this transaction going to be right? Have 4 a look at this one or -- but have a look at them all, 5 see if there's any transactions that you don't recognise 6 that you think is suspicious, where there might be 7 miskeying, have I missed anything?" 8 Q. You were working only from the data that Horizon itself 9 produced? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. What if that data was wrong? 12 A. Then I'd be looking for a branch to say something like, 13 "The butcher always comes in at 3.30 and makes a cash 14 deposit and there isn't one there". So we need to 15 understand did the butcher actually come in that day or 16 he did and there's no record of it on Horizon, or 17 there's a transaction here which I don't recognise, that 18 hasn't happened. 19 I can't recall that actually happening. 20 Q. Can we, just before the morning break, look at the last 21 page of this document, please, page 7. The first bullet 22 point: 23 "Remove second reminder letter" and then look at 24 the notes underneath: 25 "Recovery -- remove one letter in process -- not 57 1 contractual and adds no value. People either pay up or 2 hang out to DFR -- may as well get there." 3 Were you by this saying that a step in the process 4 should be removed so that you could get to debt recovery 5 from the subpostmaster sooner rather than later? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. Is that a reflection of pressure to recover, from 8 subpostmasters, debts? 9 A. No. No, I would say it was more a case of we'd done 10 some analysis and found out that people paid the debts 11 straight away, or once we sent a letter, they paid the 12 debt. The second letter didn't make any difference. 13 They obviously didn't get the second letter if 14 they'd already paid. If they hadn't paid, they didn't 15 start paying. So there was no benefit in sending that 16 out. It saved resource within the team and, yes, it 17 would have had an impact on the bottom line but it would 18 have been pretty marginal. 19 Q. And the "may as well get there", you're saying you may 20 as well get to taking money from subpostmasters' wages 21 sooner rather than later? 22 A. Yes. 23 MR BEER: Thank you very much. Can we take a break there 24 for 15 minutes, please? 25 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes. So that takes us to 11.45; is that 58 1 right? 2 MR BEER: Yes, please. 3 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Fine. 4 (11.32 am) 5 (A short break) 6 (11.48 am) 7 MR BEER: Good morning, sir. Can you see and hear me okay. 8 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, I can thank you. 9 MR BEER: Thank you very much. 10 Mr Winn, I want to look at something called the 11 receipts/payments mismatch book. Can we start by 12 looking at POL00028838. Thank you very much. 13 These appear to be notes about a meeting to 14 discuss the receipts/payments mismatch bug. Can you see 15 at the top "Receipts/Payments Mismatch issue notes"? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. We can see that the attendees at a meeting to discuss 18 the receipts and payments mismatch issue include you? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. "Andrew Winn (AW) POL Finance". We can also see that 21 Mr Jenkins from Fujitsu was there, yes? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. Can I just deal with the date of this meeting first. 24 This document is not dated and does not itself identify 25 the date of the meeting but if we look at page 3 of the 59 1 document, we can see in the second paragraph Fujitsu are 2 writing a code fix which will stop the discrepancy 3 disappearing, et cetera, et cetera, and then there are 4 some dates mentioned of 4 October, that's 2010, and then 5 a date of 11 October, 21 October, yes? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. Then if we go to page 4, on this page and on the next 8 page there are a series of actions. Would these be 9 actions arising from the meeting? 10 A. That would seem sensible. 11 Q. You can see that there are target completion dates 12 ranging between 6 and 8 October. 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. Would it follow from this that the meeting is likely to 15 have taken place in September 2010 or early October 16 2010? 17 A. I'm not sure where the years come from. I'd say 18 September certainly but -- have we seen the year? 19 Q. We haven't seen a year but we know that this bug was 20 only discovered in that year and therefore I'm taking 21 that as the year. 22 A. I've got nothing to argue with there. 23 Q. Okay. Can we go back to page 1, please, and look at the 24 nature of the receipts and payments mismatch bug. If we 25 look at page 1, underneath the table, under the 60 1 cross-heading "What is the issue?" it reads: 2 "Discrepancies showing at the Horizon counter 3 disappear when the branch follows certain process steps, 4 but will still show within the back end branch account. 5 This is currently impacting circa 40 Branches since 6 migration onto Horizon Online, with an overall cash 7 value of circa [£20,000] loss. This issue will only 8 occur if a branch cancels the completion of the trading 9 period, but within the same session continues to roll 10 into a new balance period." 11 Then if we go on to page 2, please, in the middle 12 in bold, I think it's in bold, anyway: 13 "Note the Branch will not get a prompt from the 14 system to say there is a Receipts and Payments mismatch, 15 therefore the Branch will believe they have balanced 16 correctly." 17 Then under lastly "Impact" at the foot of the 18 page, the first two bullet points: 19 "The branch has appeared to have balanced whereas 20 in fact they could have a loss or a gain." 21 And: 22 "Our accounting systems will be out of sync with 23 what is recorded at the branch." 24 Does all of the information in those three places 25 accurately and fairly describe the nature of what was 61 1 then understood about the receipts and payments mismatch 2 issue? 3 A. Yes, I think so, although my memory of the receipts and 4 payments mismatch would be that the branch trading 5 statements would show a compensating figure. I can't 6 remember where it would be. It's not something I would 7 expect branches to see and they would believe that 8 they'd balanced correctly but, if my memory serves 9 correct, on the branch trading statement there would be 10 a value showing. 11 Q. If that memory is correct, why does this say the 12 opposite? 13 A. That's a very good question, although it doesn't say 14 anything about the branch trading statement. 15 Q. That would be the obvious place where a loss or a gain 16 would be shown and this is saying that the branch won't 17 get a prompt and the branch will believe they have 18 balanced correctly and under "Impact: 19 "The branch appears to have balanced, whereas in 20 fact they could have a gain or a loss." 21 A. I think my memory as it is would be that when you get, 22 towards the end of your branch trading statements, your 23 final kind of thing before rolling is to say "This is 24 the balance" or "There is no balance". So I think that 25 is the point that subpostmasters would look at and say 62 1 "I'm fine, I've got nothing to put in, take out, 2 whatever. I've balanced to the penny, that's great, 3 press rollover", and then a statement will roll out but 4 whether it's actually reviewed in detail, I would say 5 not. 6 I've got to apologise, I may be wrong on that, but 7 that's my memory from the receipts and payments 8 mismatch. 9 Q. Would you accept that the contemporaneous evidence 10 suggests that it was believed that there wouldn't be 11 anything in branch to show the branch that they had not 12 balanced? 13 A. I think -- I'm surprised about that. I think the branch 14 trading statements would show -- whether the branch 15 would be able to interpret it as not balancing, I'm not 16 sure. I couldn't say that. But I think branches would 17 believe, from the branch trading process, they had 18 balanced and I believe a lot of branches did not 19 routinely check over their branch trading statements 20 when it balanced. But that's -- 21 Q. Just one final point at this. We could look at another 22 place at the top of this page: 23 "Note at this point nothing feeds into POLSAP and 24 Credence, so in effect the POLSAP and Credence shows 25 discrepancy whereas the Horizon System in the branch 63 1 doesn't. So the branch will then believe they have 2 balanced." 3 Does that help you with some further -- a further 4 contemporaneous record to suggest that the branch will 5 believe they have balanced, whereas, in fact, they have 6 not? 7 A. Yes, I would -- that does suggest it's not that I'm 8 mistaken, it wasn't shown on the branch trading 9 statement. My main recollection is that the balancing 10 amount showed in a discrepancy account within POLSAP. 11 So I would accept that it may not have shown, I'm 12 mistaken on my memory of that. 13 Q. I understand, thank you. 14 Can we look at the date of discovery of the 15 receipts and payments mismatch bug and can we look, 16 please -- well, can you remember when you attended this 17 meeting for how long the payments and mismatch bug had 18 been discovered or was this the first that you became 19 aware of it? 20 A. I must have been. I wouldn't have just gone to 21 a meeting without knowing anything about it. So I must 22 have known something beforehand. 23 Q. Can you remember from whom you learnt that? 24 A. No, sorry. 25 Q. Who would it be likely to be? 64 1 A. Not sure. 2 Q. Can we look at the third page of the document, please. 3 The top paragraph: 4 "The Receipts and Payments mismatch will result in 5 an error code being generated which will allow Fujitsu 6 to isolate branches affected by this problem, although 7 this is not seen by the branches. We have asked Fujitsu 8 why it has taken so long to react to and escalate an 9 issue which began in May. They will provide feedback in 10 due course." 11 Can we firstly look at whether that's accurate, 12 that the problem first began in May and then what 13 response the Post Office got when it challenged Fujitsu 14 on why did taken so long to react and escalate the 15 issues. 16 So firstly the date on which the problem was 17 discovered. If the problem was discovered in May, that 18 would be just before Horizon Online was accepted in June 19 2010; would that be right or don't you remember when 20 Horizon Online was accepted? 21 A. I don't remember exactly. 22 Q. We know the acceptance of Horizon Online was June 2010. 23 This record here suggests that the problem was 24 discovered or it began in May. If it's correct that the 25 problem began in May, that would be about four months or 65 1 so before this meeting, if we're right that this was 2 September/October time, yes? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. Can we just look, please, at POL00029084. This is 5 an email exchange that you weren't copied into but 6 I want to ask you something about the content of it. 7 A. Sure. 8 Q. If we look at the foot of the page, if we scroll down, 9 please, we can see this is an email from Gareth Jenkins, 10 on a date in September 2010, to Mark Wright. It's cut 11 off on the page but if we scroll up we can see the reply 12 from mark is Mark Wright. Now, we know that Mr Jenkins 13 attended the meeting that you attended, yes? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Just if we look at the penultimate paragraph on this 16 page, at the foot of the page: 17 "Jon is easily able to reproduce the problem in 18 a development environment and we are planning to 19 recreate the scenario and attempt a fix in that 20 environment in the next couple of days. However it is 21 probably worth starting on the data extraction to 22 ascertain the full scope of the issue ... since it has 23 probably been around since day one and data more than 6 24 months old is being dropped from BRSS, so the sooner we 25 run the queries the better." 66 1 If that's right it's probably been around since 2 day one and data is being dropped after 6 months, that 3 would put the bug's existence before May 2010, wouldn't 4 it? 5 A. Correct, yes. 6 Q. From an email being sent in September 2010. Were you 7 ever given that information by Fujitsu? 8 A. No. 9 Q. How would it have affected your conduct and thinking if 10 you had been told that information, that the bug had 11 probably been around since day one? 12 A. It would have been a little bit scary, I think. 13 Q. Turning to -- 14 A. Sorry, can I just expand on that a little bit. Myself, 15 P&BA, were pretty much dependent on Fujitsu alerting us 16 to what branches were affected by a receipts and 17 payments mismatch. So if we weren't -- if my memory is 18 correct, the discrepancy would fall into the discrepancy 19 accounts within our team. My worry from that earlier 20 period is -- when I'm saying there's lots of things 21 flying around into the wrong accounts, and what have 22 you -- whether any values ended up getting written off 23 because we were -- my later memory of the receipts and 24 payments mismatch was that it sits there, they have 25 a discrepancy of 10 quid, 10 quid sat in the discrepancy 67 1 account, we just basically give that back to the branch 2 and away we go. If we haven't got the money in the 3 discrepancy account, we wouldn't know there was any 4 issue. So yes, that would worry me. 5 Q. Can I go back to the second question then, what was done 6 within POL to question why Fujitsu hadn't reported the 7 problem sooner. If we just go back to the document we 8 were previously looking at, which was POL00028838, and 9 go to page 3, please. It's that paragraph at the top, 10 again, in the second line: 11 "We have asked Fujitsu why it has taken so long to 12 react and escalate an issue which began in May. They 13 will provide feedback in due course." 14 What was done within POL to question why Fujitsu 15 had not reported the problem whenever it began? 16 A. I can't answer that. That wouldn't be me who was 17 raising that question. I would guess that was someone 18 from the IT team within POL. 19 Q. Just looking at the first page of the document, the list 20 of the people there, which of those people would be 21 doing the questioning of Fujitsu, why it had taken so 22 long to report the issue? 23 A. I would guess Ian Trundell. 24 Q. Because he has "IT" written next to him? 25 A. Yes. But also I think he's probably the most senior 68 1 manager on that list. 2 Q. The first six of you are from POL -- is that right -- 3 from Post Office -- 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. -- and then the last four or from Fujitsu? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. He was the most senior person present? 8 A. I believe so. 9 Q. None of the people there appear to be from Legal; is 10 that right? 11 A. No, but Security is probably quite close that would kind 12 of deal closely with Legal but, yes, you're correct, 13 nobody from Legal. 14 Q. Can you recall what the response was from Fujitsu, if it 15 was passed on to you: why has it taken so long to react 16 to and escalate this issue which, according to them, 17 began in May? 18 A. No, I've got no recollection, I'm afraid. 19 Q. Why would it be important to pursue that with Fujitsu or 20 would it be important to pursue that? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. Why would it be important? 23 A. Because we would need to know things in a timely manner 24 to make sure that branches are properly supported if 25 there are issues impacting them. 69 1 Q. We're on page 1 of the document, can we look at the 2 second paragraph: 3 "At this time we have not communicated with 4 branches affected and we do not believe they are 5 exploiting this bug intentionally." 6 Putting aside for one moment the cases in which 7 data produced by Horizon was being relied on in the 8 prosecution of subpostmasters, why wouldn't POL tell 9 branches affected and, indeed, other branches that there 10 may be a bug in the Horizon System that was affecting 11 the balancing process? 12 A. I don't know. I think there would be a concern about 13 putting out a branch-wide notice but I think if we 14 identified a branch had been impacted by the problem 15 then they need to know about it as soon as possible and 16 told that we're sorting it out. 17 Q. Can we look at page 6, please. This is a document dated 18 29 September 2010, produced by Mr Gareth Jenkins. If we 19 just expand it, please, to look at the whole document 20 and just take a moment. You've seen this before. This 21 has been, I think, sent to you. 22 A. No, it doesn't ring a bell. It might do. 23 Q. It's in the pack of documents that was sent to you but 24 it's about the same issue. 25 A. Okay. 70 1 Q. It's a note by Mr Jenkins. Can you remember whether 2 this was a document that was sent to you at the time or 3 tabled at the meeting that we're discussing? 4 A. No, I've got no memory of it, I'm afraid. 5 Q. Let's look at page 8, please. At the foot of the page, 6 in the last paragraph: 7 "It should be noted that as Discrepancies are 8 normally Losses, then a Lost Discrepancy would normally 9 work in the Branch's favour and so there is no incentive 10 for the Branch to report the problem. Also if we do 11 amend the data to reintroduce the Discrepancy, this will 12 need to be carefully communicated to the Branches to 13 avoid questions about the system integrity." 14 Why would anyone wish carefully to communicate 15 information to branches to avoid questions about the 16 integrity of the Horizon System? 17 A. I would assume to illustrate -- to suggest that it's 18 a controlled issue rather than a kind of all-embracing, 19 the system's bust, issue. 20 Q. Can I put it another way: this bug did raise questions 21 about the integrity of the Horizon System, didn't it? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. What proper or appropriate reason would there be for not 24 telling people the existence of the bug and, therefore, 25 its impact on the integrity of the Horizon System? 71 1 A. I can't answer that. 2 Q. Wouldn't the reason be that care would need to be taken 3 because, if the full facts were revealed, it would raise 4 questions about the integrity of the Horizon System and 5 that might damage the business of Post Office and 6 Fujitsu? 7 A. Yes, I think it would need to be presented in a way of 8 saying "We've identified this, this is the impact on 9 branches, this is what we're doing about it". I just 10 think it would need to be explained carefully. 11 Q. Why would you want to avoid -- why would anyone want to 12 avoid questions about the system's integrity? 13 A. It's difficult to put that into the correct words. I'm 14 sorry, I'm struggling to find the right words. 15 Q. I can understand. 16 Can we go back to page 2, please. This is back to 17 the note prepared, we think, following the meeting and 18 so of the meeting. At the foot of the page, we looked 19 at the first two bullet points under "Impact". Can 20 I examine the remaining three, please, at the foot of 21 the page. "Impact": 22 "If widely known could cause a loss of confidence 23 in the Horizon System by branches." 24 Would you agree that a fairer and more balanced 25 way of writing the sentiments behind that sentence would 72 1 be: if the bug was widely known, it could ensure that 2 branches are provided with accurate information about 3 a known fault in the system that they are required to 4 use? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. Why wasn't the discussion along those lines -- let's 7 provide accurate if to subpostmasters about the facts as 8 they are known -- rather than: if this bug is widely 9 known, it will cause or could cause a loss of confidence 10 in the system by branches? 11 A. Yes, I think it's a fair question. I think I was 12 certainly of the view that impacted branches should be 13 fully informed of what's happening. I don't think 14 I ever really considered a branch-wide communication. 15 Q. Would a fairer approach to have been to discuss and 16 conclude that the dissemination of such information 17 would ensure that subpostmasters and those who were 18 investigating them do not proceed on the false basis 19 that the Horizon System is robust and that discrepancies 20 are always the responsibility of the subpostmaster? 21 A. Yes, yes. 22 Q. Does the fact that this note was not written in either 23 of those ways reflect the fact that that wasn't a view 24 expressed by anyone at the meeting? 25 A. I've not got a clear enough memory of the meeting. 73 1 I can't remember anybody supporting that suggestion. 2 Q. Why would that be? Why would anyone not support the 3 suggestion that I've made: let's reveal a known fault in 4 the system so on that people don't proceed on a false 5 basis? 6 A. Yes, I think in hindsight you're probably right. 7 I think what you need to be able to do is "This fault 8 has been identified, this is the impact of it, this is 9 how you can check to ensure that your branch has not 10 been affected. The vast majority of branches have not 11 been affected", but giving the branch the opportunity to 12 check that they haven't got that problem -- something 13 along that kind of line. 14 Q. Was there a definitive list of those branches that were 15 affected? 16 A. I believe so but we depended on Fujitsu to identify 17 these branches. 18 Q. Given that they had seemingly delayed in the provision 19 of information to you promptly, was there confidence in 20 the definitive list that they produced? 21 A. I think there was -- personally, I think there was 22 a concern "Have they identified every branch", but kind 23 of would have felt "Well, what can I do about it?" 24 Fujitsu have got the information. We don't have the 25 information to check that. I don't know -- I wouldn't 74 1 know where to go from there. It wasn't something where 2 I was able to sit there with Fujitsu and say, "I don't 3 believe you've told us about every branch". 4 Q. You can test their methodology, can't you: how have you 5 reached this; what investigations have you undertaken; 6 who's involved; how seriously are you considering this; 7 what effort have you put into it? 8 A. Yes, and I think that would be something that the IT -- 9 ie Ian Trundell, that would be his area to investigate 10 that. I could ask a question similar to that and 11 basically not understand a word that comes back, I'm 12 afraid. I've already said before, my IT knowledge is 13 very limited. 14 Q. So the next bullet point: 15 "Potential impact upon ongoing legal cases where 16 branches are disputing the integrity of Horizon Data." 17 Did you or anyone else in the meeting, to your 18 knowledge, consider whether information about the bug 19 needed to go to POL Legal in order to make disclosures 20 in ongoing court cases? 21 A. That would seem sensible. 22 Q. Did anyone do that which seemed sensible? 23 A. I can't recall, I'm afraid. I wouldn't have. 24 Q. Whose responsibility, on the POL side of the house, of 25 the people that we saw in the list -- do you want to go 75 1 back to the list -- would it be? 2 A. Can we go back to the list? 3 Q. Yes. It's page 1. 4 A. I would probably say Alan Simpson. 5 Q. Because he's from Security? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. So we should highlight Mr Simpson as being the person 8 responsible for making disclosures of this bug to POL 9 Legal, in order to potentially make a disclosure in 10 ongoing legal proceedings? 11 A. That seems sensible. I don't know if that was the 12 process that should or actually did take place but that 13 sounds a sensible summation or assumption. 14 Q. The notes for this meeting generally suggest that the 15 Post Office knew that knowledge of the bug should create 16 caution over the accuracy of some of the data that 17 Horizon was producing? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. And that that could undermine confidence in Horizon? 20 A. That would be a concern, yes. 21 Q. You would know also, wouldn't you, that that information 22 would be relevant to subpostmasters who had been 23 prosecuted? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. And those who might be prosecuted in the future? 76 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. And the information would be relevant to anyone who had 3 had proceedings brought against them by POL for the 4 recovery of debts, civil recovery? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. Or who had challenged POL -- 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. -- in the courts. 9 Did anyone in the meeting discuss handing that 10 information over to the defence teams? 11 A. No, I cannot recall that being mentioned. 12 Q. When you attended this meeting in September/October 13 2010, I think you were already aware of the prosecution 14 of Seema Misra, weren't you? 15 A. It's a name that rings a bell. 16 Q. Can we look, please, at POL00055100. Can we look, 17 please, at the middle of the page. We can see this is 18 an email sent to you by Jon Longman on 27 July 2010, 19 concerning the prosecution of Seema Misra at Guildford 20 Crown Court, yes? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. We're going to come to that in a moment but let's get 23 some context first. Can we look at page 2 of the 24 document, please, and then just scroll down. This is 25 an email from Issy Hogg, she is the defence solicitor, 77 1 to Jarnail Singh. If we just scroll to the top of the 2 page, we can see on his signature block Jarnail Singh 3 was a senior officer in the Post Office's Criminal Law 4 Division, yes? 5 A. Yes, yes. 6 Q. If we scroll back down, please, Ms Hogg says: 7 "Jarnail, 8 "As a result of the meeting that took place 9 between Charles McLachlan and Gareth Jenkins as directed 10 by the judge, we now need to have: 11 "access to the system in the Midlands where it 12 appears there are live, reproducible errors. 13 "access to the operations at Chesterfield to 14 understand how reconciliation and transaction 15 corrections are dealt with. 16 "access to the system change requests, Known Error 17 Log and new release documentation to understand what 18 problems have had to be fixed. 19 "Please you contact me with regard to these 20 issues. Please you respond [to an email address]." 21 Yes? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. Then if we go further up the page, we can see 24 a forwarding: 25 "... please advise on the three points raised 78 1 below following our telephone conversation of today." 2 Then go back to page 1, please, the foot of the 3 page, an email sent on behalf of Mr Singh to Jon 4 Longman. Can you remember who Jon Longman was? 5 A. No, I can't, no. 6 Q. And Warwick Tatford, he was prosecution counsel in the 7 Seema Misra trial: 8 "I enclose a copy of an email received from Issy 9 Hogg, the defence solicitors of 22 July 2010, the 10 content of which is self-explanatory. Could you please 11 be kind enough to let me have your urgent instructions 12 as to the access and information she is requesting in 13 respect of the system in the Midlands and the operation 14 at Chesterfield and the errors logs. I will contact 15 Gareth Jenkins to find out what transpired at the 16 meeting with Charles McLachlan." 17 Then scroll up, please. We can see that on the 18 same day, about an hour later, Mr Longman forwarded the 19 email to you, yes? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. Then we can see about 33 minutes later you reply, so at 22 12.13 that day, and you say: 23 "John 24 "Rod Ismay the head of P&BA is not happy at the 25 prospect of an open ended invite. He has asked the 79 1 question of what are the legal parameters we are working 2 within. Simplistically if we refuse or impose 3 conditions do we lose the case? I think we need more 4 guidance on how something like this might reasonably 5 operate. 6 "I think Mark Burley would be the route into IT to 7 identify who might be best placed to deal with that 8 aspect." 9 This was a reply that was essentially your boss, 10 Rod Ismay, in P&BA, seeking to close down the disclosure 11 request as much as possible, wasn't it? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. What reasons did he give to close down the disclosure 14 request as much as possible? 15 A. I can't recall any more detail than what's shown there. 16 Q. What was the nature of his unhappiness about the 17 disclosure request? 18 A. I think he didn't feel as though it would produce 19 anything and create more questions than it would answer. 20 Q. What kind of questions would it create? 21 A. I can't recall. I don't think he specified. I think 22 that was probably a generic term or -- 23 Q. Was it a generic reply "Don't let them have access to 24 systems or data that would reveal issues or problems 25 with our system"? 80 1 A. No, I don't think so. I don't think -- knowing Rod, 2 I don't think he would view it that way. I think he'd 3 just struggle to understand what it was that they would 4 want to see and where it might lead, and there's also 5 an issue of confidentiality in terms of the data we're 6 holding, financial information regarding other branches, 7 for example. 8 Q. Why wasn't the reply along those lines then: there are 9 some practical hurdles to this, rather than just closing 10 it down? 11 A. Yes, I think it's the parameters that we're working 12 with, so, for example, other subpostmaster information. 13 Q. Why did you suggest Mark Burley would be a person who 14 ought to be involved? 15 A. I can't recall. I knew Mark, I worked in the product 16 process improvement team with him. Presumably the role 17 he was in at that point would seem the most appropriate 18 one. I think I possibly had spoken to him about it 19 beforehand. 20 Q. Can we turn, please, to POL00055225. This is an email 21 dated 13 September 2010 and you can see the subject 22 "West Byfleet", that was her post office 23 "Mrs Seema Misra". You can see who it's from and to, 24 not you, but we're going to see in a moment that it 25 references a conversation with you. It reads: 81 1 "Hi John 2 "The last update I had on the above was in July, 3 the defence solicitors had requested they had access to 4 the operations in Chesterfield." 5 I think that's the email discussion we've just 6 seen. 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. "This was discussed by Andy Winn/Rod Ismay. I have 9 today spoken with Andy Winn and he has informed me that 10 Rod had made a decision to not allow this. Therefore 11 could you please update me with the latest progress on 12 the case." 13 Do you now recall any conversation with Mr Ismay? 14 A. Yes, I recall a conversation but the detail of it, 15 beyond "I don't think it's a good idea", and what 16 I stated in the previous email, I can't remember any 17 more detail than that, I'm afraid. 18 Q. The record here is that Mr Ismay had made a decision not 19 to allow it, so was bringing the shutters down on it? 20 A. I think that would be -- I can't remember what the 21 difference between -- in the timings was but, yes, that 22 would be fair summation. I don't know if anything more 23 had happened in between the first document that we 24 looked at and this one. 25 Q. What reasons were discussed between you and Ismay for 82 1 refusing access that was sought by the defence? 2 A. Sorry, I thought we covered that in the previous -- 3 Q. Yes, the previous email was "We need to know what the 4 implications are. If we refuse access will we lose the 5 case?" 6 A. I didn't hear any more -- I don't believe I heard 7 anything more from that up to this point, apart from the 8 fact that Rod had -- no, I can't remember if there was 9 anything more that developed. 10 Q. Did the reasons include that because if such access is 11 given then the lack of integrity of the data that 12 Horizon produced may be discovered? 13 A. That was never stated, no. 14 Q. Even though, by this time, you may have been aware that 15 there was a bug that was producing data that lacked 16 integrity? 17 A. Yes, but -- well, yes. 18 Q. But even if you wouldn't allow a defence solicitor or 19 a defence expert into the building to examine P&BA 20 operations or P&BA equipment, you'd presumably have 21 discussed, wouldn't you, "Look, there's someone on trial 22 for a very serious crime here based on data produced by 23 Horizon. She's alleging that the data's not accurate. 24 We know that the data produced by Horizon may not be 25 accurate. We need to find out a way of ensuring that 83 1 she knows what we know" -- wouldn't you? 2 A. Yes, I totally understand from their point of view, yes. 3 Q. You would agree that that would be the open thing to do. 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. You would agree that would be the honest thing to do? 6 A. I think, within the concerns about data protection for 7 other branches and issues like that, yes. 8 Q. You would agree that that would be the thing a person 9 with integrity would do? 10 A. I'm not -- I think Rod laid out his reasons, his 11 concerns about it. I don't know if there was any 12 comeback from that. 13 Q. Well, the comeback would have come from you, wouldn't 14 it, because this was a conversation between the pair of 15 you? 16 A. We had the conversation I would have expected probably 17 to have said, "Yes, they can come in" but I've got to 18 say that I didn't put up any impassioned disagreement 19 with Rod. I accepted that he took a considered view of 20 things and he was my boss and, yes, I didn't put up 21 a fight. 22 Q. If it was the open and honest thing to do, if it was the 23 thing that a person with integrity would do, why did you 24 and Mr Ismay not do it? 25 A. Yes, I mean I've got to say -- refer to the previous 84 1 question. That was Rod's view. I didn't have a strong 2 enough view to argue against it. 3 Q. Were these requests by defence solicitors for access to 4 systems and data on your mind when considering whether 5 and how to communicate with affected subpostmasters and 6 others the discovery of the receipts and payments 7 mismatch bug in the September/October meeting? 8 A. No. 9 Q. Can we go back, please to Fujitsu 00081584. That's an 10 errant reference. I'm going to stick with the version 11 of the document I've been using, POL00028838, the second 12 page, please. At the foot of the page under "impact", 13 the third bullet point: 14 "If widely known, could cause a loss of confidence 15 in the Horizon System by branches. Potential impact 16 upon ongoing legal cases where branches are disputing 17 the integrity of Horizon data." 18 This appears to be a record that those two things 19 were brought into account at the meeting. Can I ask 20 again: were the discussions over the defence requests 21 for access to Horizon systems and data on your mind when 22 considering whether to communicate with subpostmasters 23 and others about the discovery of the receipts and 24 payments mismatch bug? 25 A. No. 85 1 Q. What's this referring to then? 2 A. Sorry, I don't really understand which we're going. 3 Q. We've seen that at two points, once in July and once in 4 September, you were involved in conversations over 5 defence access to systems and data on behalf of 6 a subpostmistress who said the data provided by Horizon 7 is not accurate. You're in a meeting about data 8 provided by Horizon not being accurate and there's 9 a record saying it has a potential impact upon ongoing 10 legal cases where branches are disputing the integrity 11 of the Horizon data. 12 I'm asking you were the requests that you received 13 for access on your mind when you were considering the 14 potential impact on legal cases that's recorded at this 15 meeting? 16 A. I would probably say no. 17 Q. Was the discussion at this meeting over whether 18 Mr Jenkins was going to give evidence in Seema Misra's 19 trial in October 2010? 20 A. I've no idea. 21 Q. Was anything said about the Seema Misra case in this 22 meeting? 23 A. I wouldn't have thought so. 24 Q. Were any decisions made about the disclosure of the 25 existence of the bug to the defence team? 86 1 A. Not that I'm aware of. 2 Q. If we just go on to page 6 of the document, this is the 3 Gareth Jenkins document that we mentioned earlier. We 4 know that this was sent on to the solicitor with the 5 conduct of the Seema Misra prosecution, Jarnail Singh, 6 on Friday, 8 October before her trial started on Monday, 7 11 October. 8 We can see that if we just go to the foot of the 9 page, please. Do you see the file string at the foot of 10 the page showing the presence of the document in 11 a Jarnail Singh folder and that it was printed on 12 8 October? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. I won't turn it up now but there's also an email. I'll 15 give the reference for the transcript, POL00055410, 16 which shows this document being sent to Mr Singh. 17 Was there discussion at the meeting of the need to 18 disclose information that Mr Jenkins had to the 19 prosecution solicitor in the Seema Misra case? 20 A. I don't recall. I don't recall that case being raised 21 in this meeting. 22 Q. We know that neither Mr Singh nor Mr Jenkins disclosed 23 information about the receipts and payments mismatch bug 24 to Ms Misra's defence team or indeed to the court. Was 25 that discussed in the course of the meeting, whether 87 1 that information should be disclosed or not? 2 A. Again, I don't remember this ex-subpostmaster being 3 mentioned in the meeting. 4 Q. Can we go to page 2 of the document, please, and look at 5 the foot of the page. We've dealt with the first five 6 bullet points. Can I deal with the last -- sorry, we've 7 dead with the first four bullet points. Can we deal 8 with the last, the fifth: 9 "It could provide branches ammunition to blame 10 Horizon for future discrepancies." 11 Was that a consideration? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. So disclosure could provide branches with ammunition to 14 blame Horizon? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. It would be accurate ammunition, though, wouldn't it? 17 A. It would be accurate in terms of there is a Horizon 18 integrity impact which needs to be checked out before 19 going forward. I would say that's reasonable, yes. 20 Q. So if the ammunition was an arrow, it would fly true and 21 straight, wouldn't it? 22 A. If it was relevant to the branch, yes. I think if 23 a branch had a discrepancy, they would be entitled to 24 assume that before any type of prosecution, or anything 25 like that, that it was checked that there were no error 88 1 impacts on their accounts, yes. 2 Q. And it could be ammunition that hit the correct target; 3 namely, a discrepancy is being caused by the Horizon 4 System, not by the subpostmaster? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. It wouldn't be information that damaged, hurt or injured 7 any subpostmaster? It's not that kind of ammunition, is 8 it? 9 A. It could end up working out the wrong way round because 10 the receipts and payments mismatch could produce gains 11 or losses but -- 12 Q. That would be a good thing, though, wouldn't it, because 13 it would mean recovery to the Post Office of debt that 14 was truly owing? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. But it wasn't seen in any of those ways, was it? It was 17 seen in the light of "we can't disclose material that 18 might undermine our system, even if the system is in 19 fact faulty". 20 A. Yes, I think that's probably a fair summation. 21 Q. Can we look over the page, please. Under "Proposal for 22 affected branches", the document reads: 23 "There are three potential solutions to apply to 24 the impacted branches. The group's recommendation is 25 that solution 2 should be progressed." 89 1 Can we look at solutions 1 and 3 first and then go 2 to solution 2. So solution 1: 3 "Alter the Horizon branch figure at the counter to 4 show the discrepancy. Fujitsu would have to manually 5 write an entry value to the local branch account. 6 "Impact -- when the branch comes to complete next 7 trading period, they would have a discrepancy, which 8 they would have to bring to account. 9 "Risk -- this has significant data integrity 10 concerns and could lead to questions of 'tampering' with 11 the branch system and could generate questions around 12 how the discrepancy was caused. The solution could have 13 moral implications of Post Office changing branch data 14 without informing the branch." 15 So summing up solution 1 is: the branch never 16 knows about this but there's a fix applied; is that 17 right? 18 A. That's fair, yes. 19 Q. What were the moral implications? 20 A. I don't understand where that came from. 21 Q. Can you try and help us? 22 A. It's just not a term I would use. I would certainly say 23 it was important that Fujitsu or -- well, presumably 24 Fujitsu, weren't changing figures willy-nilly without 25 the branch being aware of it. That shouldn't happen. 90 1 Q. So it reflects a belief -- is this right -- that 2 whenever Fujitsu changed branch data, the branch should 3 be informed? 4 A. I think there's -- yes, in that kind of scenario 5 changing branch data is a very kind of wide thing. So 6 you change the price of a first class stamp every year. 7 You don't particularly ring the branch up and say we're 8 doing that. So in the scenario you're talking about 9 here, then yes, very much so. 10 Q. And that wouldn't be moral in the language of the 11 document here? 12 A. It just seems a strange terminology to me. 13 Q. Can you remember who made the suggestion? 14 A. No. 15 Q. Can you remember who rejected it? 16 A. I would have rejected it. Whether other -- and people 17 would have as well from my -- not particularly a memory 18 of that meeting but the type of thinking that NBSC 19 tended to think in the same way as me, the Networks 20 tended to think in the same way as me. 21 Q. Can we look at solution 3 then, please, at the foot of 22 the page. It's decided: 23 "... not to correct the data in the branches 24 (ie Post Office would prefer to write off the 'lost'" 25 and then it's missing. 91 1 "Impact -- Post Office must absorb around £20,000 2 loss. 3 "Risk -- huge moral implications to the integrity 4 of the business, as there are agents that were 5 potentially due a cash gain on their system." 6 So this is a write off. But what about the 7 subpostmasters that were owed money? That's what that's 8 raising, isn't it? 9 A. That's right, yes. 10 Q. The answer to that isn't really given in solution 3, is 11 it? 12 A. I think that was probably one that we could do this but 13 we're never seriously going to do it. 14 Q. Who made the suggestion? 15 A. I don't know. 16 Q. Who rejected it? 17 A. Well, I would have, along with other colleagues, I would 18 imagine. 19 Q. Solutions 1 and 3, is this -- I'm sorry. 20 A. I would suggest that the options were probably driven by 21 Fujitsu's suggestion for us to consider but that's 22 a suggestion. 23 Q. Solutions 1 and 3 keep subpostmasters in the dark, don't 24 they? 25 A. Yes. 92 1 Q. Both those subpostmasters who are known to be affected 2 by the bug and the wider subpostmaster community? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. Solution 2 was the recommended solution, if we read 5 that, please: 6 "P&BA will journal values from the discrepancy 7 account into the customer account and recover/refund via 8 normal processes. This will need to be supported by an 9 approved POL communication. Unlike the branch POLSAP 10 remains in, balance albeit with an account discrepancies 11 that should be cleared. 12 "Impact -- POL will be required to explain the 13 reason for a debt recovery/refund even though there is 14 no discrepancy at the branch. 15 "Risk -- could potentially highlight to branches 16 that Horizon can lose data." 17 The end of the first line/beginning of the second: 18 "This will need to be supported by an approved POL 19 communication." 20 Would the approved communication leave out some of 21 the facts? 22 A. I'd probably need to see the communication to comment on 23 that. I don't think that would be the intention of that 24 solution. It doesn't suggest let's do it. But I think 25 it would be -- what that would be saying is that it 93 1 would probably need to be checked off at legal level 2 before we send it. That's my assumption. 3 Q. Was there a feeling at this meeting that the principle 4 of the less said, the soonest mended should be applied? 5 A. No, I don't think so. I think the less said would be 6 the clean it up without telling the branches. 7 Q. The less that subpostmasters know, the better? 8 A. No. I think again it comes back to let's let the 9 subpostmasters that are impacted know what's happened 10 and what we've done to resolve an issue even if they 11 potentially didn't know they had an issue, but I don't 12 think it was ever suggested to do a branch-wide 13 communication. 14 Q. What would POL senior management have said if the 15 outcome of the receipts and payments mismatch meeting 16 was a recommendation that the whole of the network 17 should be warned of this potential problem? 18 A. I think they would have said no. 19 Q. Why is that? 20 A. Because they were keen to maintain the integrity of 21 Horizon as far as possible, but -- 22 Q. When you say, "They were keen to maintain the integrity" 23 do you mean keen to maintain the appearance of 24 integrity? 25 A. Yes. But again I'm assuming what the manager's -- his 94 1 position might have been. I wasn't at that kind of 2 level so. 3 Q. You're assuming it on the basis of some facts or 4 information, though, aren't you? You're not just 5 guessing? 6 A. No, I think there was a feeling (and I use that term 7 carefully, a "feeling") that when we got on to these 8 issues calls, it was more the kind of ground roots, 9 people in the NBSC, Network and myself in finance, who 10 were, "This is what's happened, let's tell them, let's 11 tell them exactly what's gone off and this is what we've 12 done to resolve it". Whereas there seemed to be more -- 13 possibly more strategic, dare I say, view from more 14 senior managers of "should we really be telling 15 everybody that this has happened?" 16 Now, that's tarring every senior manager with 17 a brush that's unfair, but there was a feeling that 18 there was a bit more resistance to communication kind of 19 the higher things went, which I don't know if there was 20 a pressure that they were being given under or whether 21 that was a more general way of just thinking rather than 22 somebody else providing pressure. I don't know. 23 Q. But looking at senior management collectively, and 24 without identifying individuals, your clear 25 understanding was that senior management expected or 95 1 required you to stick to the message that Horizon had 2 integrity? 3 A. Yes. 4 MR BEER: Sir, I wonder whether we might take the lunch 5 break early? 6 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Certainly. 7 MR BEER: And come back at 1.45. 8 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, that's fine. See you then. 9 MR BEER: Thank you very much, sir. 10 (12.49 pm) 11 (Luncheon Adjournment) 12 (1.45 pm) 13 MR BEER: Good afternoon, sir. Can you see and hear me? 14 Sir, you are still on mute. I think that was a yes. 15 Can you see and hear us, sir? (Pause) 16 Sir, can you see and hear us? Can we just pause 17 while that's sorted out. (Pause) 18 We'll break for five minutes, if that's possible, 19 please, whilst we restore the link. So five minutes. 20 Thank you. 21 (1.47 pm) 22 (A short break) 23 (1.50 pm) 24 MR BEER: Thank you very much, Mr Winn. 25 A. Sorry to have delayed everyone. 96 1 MR BEER: Can I just check, sir, that you can see and hear 2 me? 3 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Well, I can hear you. I now can't -- now 4 I can see you as well. So we're fine. 5 MR BEER: Fantastic, thank you. 6 Mr Winn, when I was asking questions before lunch 7 about the date of the receipts and payments mismatch 8 bug, the meeting about that, and one of the actions 9 arising from it (namely, whose job it was, if anyone's, 10 to inform lawyers in ongoing or past prosecutions and 11 civil proceedings about the bug), I mentioned a document 12 that I gave the reference to but did not display. Can 13 I display the document for you, please. It's 14 POL00055410. 15 If we look at the lower email first, please, 16 you'll see that it's from Alan Simpson and it's dated 17 8 October 2010 and Alan Simpson, we can see from his 18 signature block, was the POL information security 19 incident senior. You can see that it's to Rob Wilson. 20 Mr Wilson was the head of criminal law in the Criminal 21 Law Division within Post Office at the time. 22 Did you know that -- 23 A. No, I don't think I came across him at all. 24 Q. It helps us on two things if we can just read it. It 25 says: 97 1 "I am forwarding you the attachments above in 2 relation to a series of incidents ..." 3 If we just scroll up, please, we can see that 4 under the attachments there are two that are mentioned, 5 "ReceiptsPayments notes[version]5". That appears to be 6 a version of the notes that we looked at earlier 7 concerning a meeting or meetings about the receipts and 8 payments mismatch bug. 9 Then "Lost Discrepancies [29 September 2010]", 10 that appears to be Mr Jenkins' document of 29 September 11 2010 that we looked at earlier. 12 Just going back down to the email: 13 "I am forwarding you the attachments above in 14 relation to a series of incidents, identified by Fujitsu 15 this week, whereby it appears that when posting 16 discrepancies to the local suspense, these amounts 17 simply disappear at branch level, and a balance is 18 shown. 19 "The above includes Fujitsu's initial analysis 20 [that appears to be a reference to Mr Jenkins' 21 documents] and proposed solution/s, whilst the other 22 documents the outputs from various meetings held this 23 week." 24 That appears to be a reference, would you agree, 25 to the note of the meeting that we saw? 98 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. It would appear that the meetings, plural, were held in 3 the week ending Friday, 8 October. Do you see that? 4 A. Yes, I can see that. 5 Q. "My concern is around the proposed solution/s, one or 6 more of which may have repercussions in any future 7 prosecution cases and on the integrity of the Horizon 8 Online system." 9 So Mr Simpson is referring the issue to the head 10 of criminal law about future prosecutions based on data 11 produced by Horizon Online. Do you remember whether 12 there was any discussion about disclosure of the bug to 13 those conducting current prosecutions, based on data 14 produced by Legacy Horizon? 15 A. No, I wouldn't be aware of that, no. 16 Q. Can you recall that being discussed in the meeting? 17 A. In this meeting? 18 Q. Yes, in the meeting that we saw the notes of this 19 morning. 20 A. Not in detail but I would imagine it would be mentioned, 21 yes. 22 Q. Was this seen as a bug that just afflicted Horizon 23 Online? 24 A. As far as I can recall, yes. 25 Q. What exploration was there of whether this was a bug 99 1 that afflicted Legacy Horizon? 2 A. I wasn't aware of any. 3 Q. Thank you. That can come down. 4 Can we move forward, please, to December 2010 and 5 look at POL00029718. Can we start, please, on page 8 of 6 this collection and scroll down, please. This is 7 an email from Emma Langfield to a number of people, 8 including you and Mr Jenkins, dated 24 December 2010. 9 Can you see that? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. She's asking for help there as there are some branches 12 for whom values appear marooned in the P&BA discrepancy 13 account. If you just scroll down. It says: 14 "Morning 15 "Please see below from [P&BA]. They have 16 identified some branches where values appear marooned in 17 the P&BA discrepancy account ..." 18 Yes? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. And that they: 21 "... either appear not to align to the values and 22 last Fujitsu spreadsheet or have not been identified as 23 part of this issue." 24 Then there are a number of emails exchanged as 25 part of this collection of emails, with ultimately 100 1 a response from Mr Jenkins on page 1 of this collection. 2 We see this is an email from him to you moving forward 3 a number of years to May 2012. He says: 4 "Sorry it has taken me so long to get back to you. 5 "I've had a trawl back through my old emails and 6 what I've found is the following ..." 7 He sets out in his paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 what he's 8 discovered in relation to two branches that were in the 9 original list, associated with the lost discrepancy 10 issue that had occurred in 2010. Then in paragraph 4 he 11 says: 12 "I can also see that although [a branch number] 13 was in the original list, it seems to know dropped off 14 very early. This is because it wasn't in the original 15 list from POL and also the precise symptoms in terms of 16 [something] left behind were different. I can't find 17 any trace of any further investigation of this in my 18 emails. 19 "Given that the discrepancy amounts in both cases 20 was very large, I'd be surprised if they weren't 21 properly investigated at the time, but they don't seem 22 to be included in the lists relating to the '[something] 23 Discrepancy' investigation. 24 "If you want this followed up further I suggest 25 you raise it with the POL Problem Management team (Emma 101 1 Langfield), who can then get the Fujitsu Problem 2 Management team to dig further." 3 So this is correspondence under two years after 4 the problem was discovered and there appears, would you 5 agree, to have been some doubt as between Fujitsu and 6 POL over which branches had been investigated as 7 possibly impacted and which had not? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. At the very least, no shared understanding of what had 10 happened? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Who was responsible for investigating and understanding 13 the extent of the problem and updating the branches 14 affected? 15 A. In terms of updating the branches, I would probably 16 suggest that that was P&BA. In terms of investigating, 17 I would imagine that would be the IT team. 18 Q. But you have got in 2012 here Mr Jenkins saying that, 19 according to the documents that he can access, there's 20 a branch with a very large discrepancy -- two branches 21 with a very large discrepancy and they don't seem to be 22 included in the list. Would you regard that as 23 problematic? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. Given the seriousness with which the mismatch bug was 102 1 taken back in September/October 2010, we've seen the 2 documents around that, may this suggest that the 3 follow-up on the impact on branches was taken less 4 seriously? 5 A. I can't really say. 6 Q. Did the Post Office take seriously the need to 7 understand the full impact of this significant issue 8 and, in particular, the impact on individual branches 9 and subpostmasters and ensure that all affected branches 10 were identified and there was a proper investigation? 11 A. Yes, as far as I was aware. 12 Q. Can we turn, please, to POL00098016. This continues the 13 thread of discussion on the two outstanding queries on 14 the receipts and payments mismatch bug and we're now 15 ahead to April 2013. Can we go, please, to page 4 of 16 the thread to begin it. 17 At the foot of the page, please, you will see 18 an email from David Wright, who was I think an IT 19 service adviser in service management, and it's an email 20 to Andy Dunks and Penny Thomas, Steve Bansal, Scott 21 Somerside and to you? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. It reads "Andy", and I don't think that's you, that's 24 the Andy Dunks that that was addressed to; is that 25 right? 103 1 A. I would think so, yes. 2 Q. "Andrew Winn (Relationship Manager, Financial Service 3 Centre) has requested Service Management assistance in 4 reopening Fujitsu investigations for two outstanding 5 enquiries he has been dealing with for our branches. 6 "At our recent service review meeting held with 7 Leighton Machin he suggested your names as the 8 appropriate contacts. Gareth Jenkins has also been 9 approached in the past. 10 "I have attached some information previously 11 sharing via email but if you need more detail to help 12 you resolve these incidents, please approach Andy Winn 13 direct." 14 Then they give your details. 15 Then if we go up the chain, please, to page 3 16 we'll see that a chaser is sent on 22 February. Just 17 scroll down, please. Keep going, please. Yes, that's 18 it, 22 February: 19 "Hi Leighton, 20 "I've just picked up a reply from an enquiry 21 I made to Andy Winn in our Finance Service Centre (he 22 has been on leave) and disappointingly he has not heard 23 anything from the contracts you suggested last month. 24 "Can you escalate the enquiry on our behalf?" 25 So that's essentially a chaser, would that be 104 1 right, from somebody that worked to you, David Wright? 2 A. I think I remember David vaguely, I think he might have 3 been working in NBSC at that time but I'm not sure he 4 wasn't in P&BA Or Finance Service Centre, as it was 5 then. 6 Q. You can see his signature block there and he appears to 7 be based in Dearne House in Barnsley? 8 A. Right, okay. 9 Q. Does that mean he was working for you or not? 10 A. No. 11 Q. Anyway it's a chaser, and then if we go back to page 3, 12 please, at the foot of the page, another chaser a month 13 later on 5 March. It's not month later, it's the 14 following month: 15 "Hi Leighton 16 "Were you able to escalate this on our behalf?" 17 Then a reply from Fujitsu: 18 "Apologies ... It seems it was not cascaded at the 19 point of your last request (I will cascade it now!) 20 "A response in one form or another will be 21 provided by [close of play] Thursday." 22 Then up to the bottom of page 2, please, 23 Mr Wright: 24 "Hi Leighton 25 "Did a response get issued on Thursday? I have 105 1 not received it -- did it just go to Andy?" 2 Then up to the bottom of page 1, please, thank 3 you. Steve Bansal to a collection of people including 4 you: 5 "... accept my apologies thought as I thought I'd 6 sent this mail some weeks ago." 7 He answers a query about Paystation transactions. 8 Do you see that in his third paragraph? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. "So to answer the question very Paystation 11 transactions", which is something else, yes? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. Then you reply that top of the page, if we go to the top 14 of the page. On 16 April 2013, you say: 15 "Hi Steve 16 Yes it does ... 17 "However I'm far more concerned about the 18 outstanding enquiry relating to the receipts & payments 19 problem back in 2010 where we have two branches [and you 20 identify them] who appeared [to be] on the initial list 21 of branches but not on the list of those resolved. We 22 still have a large unexplained credit on one branch 23 whilst we have recovered money from pay on the other 24 despite them recording a significant surplus at the 25 time. 106 1 "I need to be clear that there is no unresolved 2 problem in case either branch appears in the ongoing 3 Horizon integrity review. 4 "I know you have previously stated that a work 5 plan was set up to do some further analysis on [one of 6 the branches] but [the Post Office] requested this not 7 to proceed but I need to understand why they disappeared 8 from the resolved spreadsheet." 9 So what you were doing, you were saying that 10 there's an issue that's now two to three years old -- 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. -- and there are two branches that are maybe affected in 13 different ways but I want a resolution? 14 A. Yes, I think from what I remember is that they were on 15 an initial list, a kind of quite big list at the time, 16 and Fujitsu said these have got an issue but they're not 17 the same as the receipts and payments, so we need to 18 separate them, if I remember correctly. 19 Q. For one of them, you had made a deduction -- the Post 20 Office had made a deduction from the SPM's remuneration? 21 A. Yes. Well, that's what it reads there. 22 Q. You say: 23 "I need to be clear that there is no unresolved 24 problem in case either branch appears in the ongoing 25 Horizon integrity review." 107 1 Why would you need to be clear that there's no 2 unresolved problem for that purpose, rather than because 3 in one case the subpostmaster might owe money and in the 4 other case the subpostmaster is owed money. 5 A. There would be no difference between the two. The issue 6 needs to be resolved. 7 Q. But why was it important in case either branch appears 8 in the ongoing integrity review? Wouldn't it be a good 9 enough reason that we've taken some money out of 10 a subpostmaster's wages, perhaps wrongfully, that I need 11 an answer? 12 A. I would say any branch that we know has got a problem we 13 need to resolve it as quickly as possible. 14 Q. But we're two or three years on now? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. Was it because the decks needed to be cleared because 17 you didn't want cases like this showing up in the 18 integrity review, as you call it? 19 A. I don't think it was anything to do with debts, I think 20 it was to do with branches like that shouldn't have 21 issues that need resolving three weeks old, never mind 22 three years. 23 Q. So the bug was a significant issue for the Post Office? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. It was covered in 2010 at some point. Was it causing 108 1 you some considerable concern, even aside from the 2 integrity review, that by 2013 you still didn't have 3 a clear picture as to who was affected and how? 4 A. No, because my belief was that if there was 5 a discrepancy -- if the receipts and payments impacted 6 a branch, then the balancing amount would land in our 7 discrepancy account and we'd got the discrepancy account 8 cleared down so that we could see any figure that was -- 9 because normally in a discrepancy account you would do 10 your branch trading, money would go into the discrepancy 11 account, the subpostmaster would pay it or we'd repay 12 the postmaster, and that amount would clear down to 13 zero. So basically the account, at that kind of time, 14 in 2013, was very clean. 15 So if any branch had a receipts and payments 16 mismatch, we would see it eventually, not in 17 a particularly timely manner, but we start seeing 18 figures rolling forward. 19 Q. Can I turn to a different issue. That document can come 20 down, please. 21 Can we look -- and this is to do with remote 22 access -- at POL00023432. Can we look at the second 23 page first, please. Just to explain, the reason I'm 24 asking you these questions is because they concern your 25 engagement with subpostmasters and your knowledge about 109 1 remote access. So the chain starts, and it's only a two 2 email chain, from Mr Lusher -- can you see that at the 3 foot of the page -- who is a contracts adviser in the 4 network support team in Norwich. 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. Just explain shortly what that role involved. 7 A. They are responsible for making sure that the contracts 8 were applied to subpostmasters and for -- by the 9 subpostmasters. They would be, if I remember right, 10 responsible for signing off any debt recoveries, major 11 debt recoveries. I never really saw a job description. 12 But contracts managers, we were regularly -- they would 13 be involved in becoming aware of debt and so there would 14 be quite a lot of conversation, communication between 15 contract managers and myself, some more than others. 16 Q. If we go to the top of the page, we can see it's 17 an email from Mr Lusher to you of 15 October 2008, and 18 he says: 19 "Hi Andrew 20 "I spoke to you a few days ago about a suspension 21 at Rivenhall. From our conversation, I believe that you 22 had a good understanding of the problem and I would be 23 grateful for further guidance. Rivenhall is a one 24 position rural branch -- the only abnormal product being 25 an ATM. 110 1 "I have attached notes of the interview should you 2 want to refer to them although they are rather long. 3 There are two issues which the suspended subpostmaster, 4 Graham Ward, raised ..." 5 So just some context here, stopping at that point, 6 Graham Ward was a subpostmaster at that branch, the 7 Rivenhall branch, whose contract was terminated, we know 8 whose appeal against contract termination was dismissed, 9 who became one of the 555 Claimants in the Group 10 Litigation and who is a Core Participant in this 11 Inquiry. His evidence was read to the Chairman in the 12 course of the Human Impact hearings last year. 13 In short, he's a subpostmaster who lost his job, 14 whose marriage broke down and who was left in debt with 15 four young children. 16 Now, Mr Lusher encloses the interview transcript 17 and gives a summary. Let's read the summary together: 18 "1. He claims that on a number of occasions 19 figures have appeared in the cheques line of his 20 account. He suspects these have been input into his 21 account electronically without his knowledge or consent. 22 He is certain that he has cleared and remmed out cheques 23 in the correct way and tells me that cheques must be 24 properly cleared on the system to progress to a new 25 account." 111 1 Just stopping there, can you explain what you 2 understand from what is being described there from 3 Mr Ward's account? 4 A. What he's saying is that he's seeing cheques appear on 5 his cheque line that he doesn't believe he has taken and 6 input to the Horizon System. 7 Q. What does he seeing checks appearing on his cheque line 8 mean? 9 A. You can pull up a cheque holdings at any point which 10 will show the values that have been input there and that 11 will be what he's seeing. 12 Q. He is saying that he has cleared and remmed the cheques. 13 What does he mean by that? 14 A. So at end of day you would -- well, not necessarily at 15 the end of the day, when the postman arrives for, say, 16 4.00, just before then you will look to see what cheques 17 you've got, check them against your cheque line, make 18 any adjustments if need be because people will make 19 mistakes of pressing cash, like they do every time. So 20 you need to introduce a cheque there. Rem out the 21 cheques. I can't remember the order of it but basically 22 you rem out the cheques which means you're dispatching 23 them -- 24 Q. You handed the cheque over? 25 A. That's what you're telling the system. That wouldn't -- 112 1 you'd do that at the same time but not precisely the 2 same time and you would need to clear the cheque line, 3 cheque account. 4 Q. Ie I've received a cheque from somebody I've now passed 5 the cheque on? 6 A. That's right. 7 Q. In physically pass the cheque on? 8 A. Yes, that's what he's telling Horizon. There is a bit 9 and I'm afraid I can't describe it properly but there is 10 two elements to the process. One is the remming out of 11 the cheques and the other one is to clear the cheque 12 line. It sounds -- now it sounds -- there was some 13 logic to it but, at the moment, I can't explain why rem 14 out isn't there. But it did cause problems in terms of 15 if you get distracted and you forget you are doing it 16 and that can result in cheques appearing when you don't 17 expect them to be. 18 Q. What he is saying is that he's certain he has cleared 19 and remmed out the cheques and yet there are some 20 cheques appearing on his cheque line which suggests that 21 he is still sitting on cheques? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. He paragraph 2: 24 "He has made good about £10,000 and not made good 25 about £11,000 of the shortages which arise from these 113 1 figures. He claims that because of the abnormal nature 2 of these entries, the shortages have not just rolled 3 over from one branch trading statement to the next, but 4 have accumulated -- each being added to the last (eg if 5 the account in period one showed a shortage of £100 6 which was not made good, then the shortage shown in 7 period 2 would be £200)." 8 Then just scroll down a little bit: 9 "The subpostmaster's contract remain suspended. 10 I would be very grateful for your expert comment and 11 advice." 12 You would agree that the account summarised by 13 Mr Lusher of what Mr Ward was saying was a clear and 14 coherent one? 15 A. It appears it, yes. 16 Q. He's saying he has put £10,000 of his own money in 17 already but he's not made good another £11,000 of 18 loss -- 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. -- and he's saying that the system's magnifying the 21 loss, even without him doing anything by simply moving 22 from one trading period to the next. 23 A. Well, more than that. It's doubling up every trading 24 period. 25 Q. Yes it's magnifying, doubling up. He uses the £100 to 114 1 £200 example. 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. You would agree, I think, that this is a very serious 4 issue being raised? 5 A. Yes, if it's backed up, yes. 6 Q. It's serious for the subpostmaster, would you agree, 7 because on his account he's lost £10,000 of his own 8 money, yes? 9 A. Yes. Oh, yes. 10 Q. The system is showing that he owes a further £11,000. 11 It's serious for that reason, would you agree? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. It's serious for him because he's been suspended? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. And it's serious for him because his contract might be 16 terminated and he would lose his job and his livelihood? 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. It's serious, would you agree, for the Post Office 19 because if a subpostmaster's saying that the system 20 that's used across the country has introduced a phantom 21 sum into his cheque line of account, that's very 22 serious? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. If it's correct, it's a serious issue with the Horizon 25 System? 115 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. Can we turn to your response, please, page 1. You 3 respond on 23 October, so his email was the 15th, this 4 is 23 October 2008, and you say: 5 "1. The only way POL can impact branch accounts 6 remotely is via the transaction correction process." 7 Reading a couple of sentences on -- sorry I will 8 read the next sentence: 9 "These have to be seared by the branch in the same 10 way that in/out remittances are I guess. If we were 11 able to do this, the integrity of the system would be 12 flawed. Fujitsu have the ability to impact branch 13 records via the message store but have extremely 14 rigorous procedures in place to prevent adjustments 15 being made without prior authorisation -- within POL and 16 Fujitsu." 17 Now, in your witness statement, you say that you 18 were aware that Fujitsu had what you describe as remote 19 access and this is an email suggesting you knew at least 20 by 2008, yes? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. And -- 23 A. I would say that my response there was a repetition of 24 a -- I would imagine from this point I went to someone 25 in Fujitsu or our IT side, asked them that question that 116 1 Alan had posed and repeated it back there. I don't 2 think that kind of would have come just from me. 3 Q. Well, I was going to suggest this first part of 4 paragraph 1 suggests some familiarity by you with 5 Fujitsu's access controls, doesn't it? 6 A. As a result of me -- Alan posed the question "Can we 7 get -- can there be remote access" and I will have asked 8 the question based on that question. 9 Q. How had you satisfied yourself as to the security of the 10 Fujitsu access controls? 11 A. I don't think I did. 12 Q. How could you be satisfied that they were being 13 monitored effectively by Fujitsu? 14 A. I couldn't. 15 Q. We know from some evidence that a man called Richard 16 Roll gave in the Group Litigation and indeed from 17 documents disclosed by Fujitsu to us in this Inquiry, 18 that Fujitsu's third line of support were routinely 19 using their ability to go into the system in a way that 20 was described by them as "off piste". Did you know 21 about that? 22 A. No. 23 Q. That wasn't in accordance with the regularisation 24 controls and protocols that were in place? 25 A. Yes, I wasn't aware of that. 117 1 Q. So what evidence did you have to believe that Fujitsu 2 were following protocol? 3 A. Just what I'd been told. 4 Q. Who had told you that? 5 A. I don't know. 6 Q. But you had been told something by the subpostmaster? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. Why did you accept what Fujitsu were telling you rather 9 than what the subpostmaster was telling you? 10 A. I'm not sure if I did. I'm not sure what research 11 I did, investigation into the branch. 12 Q. Anyway, you continue: 13 "These controls form the core of our court defence 14 if we get to that stage. He makes a casual accusation 15 that is extremely serious to the business. As usual he 16 should either produce the evidence for this or withdraw 17 the accusation." 18 By saying these controls form the core of our 19 court defence, you were indicating to Mr Lusher, weren't 20 you, that it was okay to say to Mr Graham Ward that the 21 Post Office was prepared to go all the way here "We're 22 willing to stand up in court and defend Horizon and its 23 operation by Fujitsu", weren't you? 24 A. Yes, I think so, yes. 25 Q. You say that -- 118 1 A. I'm saying that from -- without any legal background to 2 give me the authority to say that. 3 Q. You say that Mr Ward made a "casual accusation". In 4 what respect was it casual? 5 A. He didn't present any evidence to support his claim. 6 Q. Casual means free and easy, doesn't it? 7 A. Bad choice of words, sorry. 8 Q. Sorry? 9 A. A bad choice of wording at the time. 10 Q. Is that what this is? I mean, "casual" means without 11 thought, free and easy, something just falls from the 12 lips without any real thought being given to it. How 13 did you know it was a casual observation, a casual 14 accusation? 15 A. As I say, I cannot recall what investigation I carried 16 out at the time. 17 Q. Whether you carried out an investigation or not doesn't 18 tell us why you suggested to Mr Lusher that this 19 subpostmaster was making a casual accusation, does it? 20 A. I've already acknowledged that the term "casual" wasn't 21 well used. 22 Q. You didn't know whether it was a casual accusation or 23 not, did you? 24 A. I'm sorry, I feel as though we're going round in 25 circles. I would have carried out an investigation. 119 1 I assume I would have carried out an investigation. 2 Q. There's no reference to an investigation in this email 3 by you. 4 A. Okay. 5 Q. Is there? 6 A. I don't know. I can't see the full email. 7 Q. Have a look at the full email. (Pause) 8 A. Can we move it down a little bit? 9 Q. Yes, yes, please do. 10 There's no reference in that to you carrying out 11 an investigation at all, is there? 12 A. That's correct. 13 Q. So I'll ask again: how did you know that this was 14 a casual accusation by Mr Ward? 15 A. Reading that, I should have done an investigation. 16 Q. You say that that accusation, if we just go back up to 17 paragraph 1, and in the second part of paragraph 1, 18 starting "These controls", in the second sentence: 19 "He makes a casual accusation that is extremely 20 serious to the business." 21 Can you see that? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. Why was it extremely serious to the business? 24 A. Because if the accusation was correct, then that would 25 support the lack of integrity into the system. 120 1 Q. Why was the seriousness of the business seemingly your 2 principal concern, rather than the merits of the issue 3 that had been raised by this subpostmaster? 4 A. I think the nature of the business at -- the state of 5 play within the business at that time, with the concern 6 about Horizon integrity. 7 Q. This is 2008. This is before the Computer Weekly 8 article had broken. 9 A. Okay. 10 Q. Was the integrity of the business your principal concern 11 rather than the actual merits of an issue that had been 12 raised by a subpostmaster? 13 A. No, I would say exactly the opposite and I'm not happy 14 about this. 15 Q. You're not happy about? 16 A. About my actions on this one -- 17 Q. You continue -- 18 A. -- or lack of action. 19 Q. You continue: 20 "As usual he should either produce the evidence 21 for this or withdraw the accusation." 22 This was a subpostmaster saying that the system 23 was introducing phantom figures information his cheque 24 line. 25 A. Yes. 121 1 Q. How could he possibly produce evidence of that? 2 A. You can print the cheque listing reports. It can be 3 printed out. So he could have done before and afters 4 with the remming out of cheques. So if he remmed out 5 £100 of cheques and then it reappears again, then those 6 receipts -- 7 Q. So why didn't you say that? "Just show us these". You 8 are being very combative here, aren't you? "He makes 9 a casual accusation" -- 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. -- "that is extremely serious to the business ... he 12 should either produce evidence or withdraw it." 13 A. Yes, I would agree that this is not the kind of letter 14 I would typically write. 15 Q. You seem concerned that he was slandering the business, 16 don't you? 17 A. Not really. 18 Q. Produce evidence or withdraw that accusation, is what 19 you're saying here, aren't you? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. Would you put the reputation of the business ahead of 22 investigating the merits of what was being said by 23 a subpostmaster? 24 A. No, that would not be the way I would like to think 25 I approached a job. 122 1 Q. Who had determined that it was for subpostmasters to 2 prove that what they were saying was true, rather than 3 raising an issue and it being investigated by P&BA? 4 A. The -- 5 Q. Ie before we'll start an investigation, you've got to 6 prove what you say is true, otherwise we won't start 7 an investigation. 8 A. No. No, I think -- I think this probably suggests that 9 this was done in the very early days of me taking on the 10 role. Would that tie up with dates? I would say that 11 I got significantly better it my job as I gained 12 experience on doing it and I'm not happy looking at 13 this. 14 Q. You commenced that sentence: 15 "As usual he should ..." 16 That suggests a stock line, doesn't it? 17 A. Well, so the bulk of what you are looking at is 18 disputing transaction corrections, that was at that time 19 probably the bulk of my work. So if a subpostmaster 20 said "This transaction correction isn't correct", we'd 21 ask them why they're saying that. So "we provided the 22 evidence for the transaction correction, what are you 23 producing to suggest it's not correct?" I think I would 24 have -- if this would have been three or four years 25 later, I think I would have dealt with it in 123 1 a completely different way. 2 Q. In paragraph 2, you say: 3 "What 'the abnormal nature of these entries' 4 means, I assume no-one knows." 5 He was saying that figures appeared in his cheque 6 line of account without his knowledge or consent. 7 That's pretty abnormal, isn't it? 8 A. Mm-hm. 9 Q. Why were you saying "What" -- quoting back to him, to 10 Mr Lusher -- "'the abnormal nature of these entries' 11 means, I assume no-one knows", when it was perfectly 12 obvious that they were abnormal, they were phantom 13 figures appearing in the cheque line? Why were you 14 taking that point when it was perfectly clear what this 15 subpostmaster was saying? 16 A. I can't respond to that, sorry. 17 Q. You continue: 18 "The implication is that he acknowledges that when 19 he 'made good' at branch trading he did not and 20 falsified his branch trading statement and rolled the 21 loss forward." 22 You were being told by Mr Lusher that the 23 subpostmaster had put £10,000 of his own money in, 24 weren't you, in the previous email? 25 A. Yes. 124 1 Q. And you here appear to be criticising the subpostmaster 2 for doing so, saying that he's guilty of falsification, 3 aren't you? When he made good, ie that's putting the 4 £10,000 in -- 5 A. I think what I was saying is he's told Horizon that he's 6 put £10,000 in but then immediately the -- so he does 7 his cash declaration at branch trading, £10,000 short, 8 he makes good cash 10,000, so it balances. The next day 9 the £10,000 shortage reappears again, which would 10 suggest he's not physically put the £10,000 into the 11 till. 12 Q. That's not what you are saying there at all. 13 A. Isn't it? 14 Q. You are saying that the system is showing a £20,000 debt 15 on the cheque line, he acknowledges some of that debt 16 when he's made good at branch, by putting £10,000 in, 17 and he's, therefore, falsified his branch trading 18 statements, aren't you? 19 A. No, I don't think so. I mean, we're not talking about 20 the cheque line anyway here. We're talking about the 21 cash position. So what I'm saying is that the derived 22 cash position was £20,000 that should be cash. He only 23 physically had £10,000 in the till. He's then told -- 24 he's then increased his cash declaration to 20,000. The 25 system is rolled forward in a balanced state but because 125 1 the £10,000 didn't physically go into the till, when he 2 did his next cash declaration the £10,000 shortage was 3 still there again. 4 Q. Moving on at the foot of the page, two paragraphs up, 5 you say: 6 "If that does not satisfy him he would need to 7 establish that his trial balance actually balances. If 8 it does (and it will) he would need to demonstrate where 9 balancing [£10,000] element of the loss is. 10 "These are all things for him to prove. If he can 11 support any of his allegations we will investigate -- 12 and be extremely worried whilst doing so." 13 In the course of these paragraphs you say, I think 14 four times, that it's down to the subpostmaster to 15 prove; for the subpostmaster to establish; for the 16 subpostmaster to demonstrate; for the subpostmaster to 17 support what he's saying. 18 Was the assumption by you that, if there was no 19 obvious answer or cause for a discrepancy, it was 20 assumed to be the fault of the subpostmaster unless they 21 proved otherwise? 22 A. I think that's probably a fair comment. 23 Q. And, therefore, you are applying an approach of assuming 24 that the subpostmaster's guilty until he proves he's 25 innocent? 126 1 A. I don't -- "guilty" doesn't sound a -- 2 Q. It's not a nice word, is it? 3 A. No, no. 4 Q. But it's accurate. 5 A. No, I don't think it is. 6 Q. You assume that -- 7 A. I believed that the loss was proper to the branch. 8 I think guiltiness is not something that I was -- would 9 be thinking. 10 Q. You assume that he's culpable for wrongdoing -- 11 A. I believed he was -- 12 Q. -- unless he prove otherwise? 13 A. -- culpable for the loss, yes, unless he can give me any 14 indication he was not. 15 Q. Where he was saying that the problem is due to an error 16 in Horizon, its programming, a bug or some such in the 17 code or in the data, how was he to prove that? 18 A. I guess I can't answer that. 19 Q. We've heard evidence from many subpostmasters that once 20 they were suspended they were locked out of their 21 offices. You knew that, didn't you? 22 A. Probably. It wasn't -- 23 Q. This subpostmaster was suspended. If he was locked out 24 of his office, how would he prove it? 25 A. Yes, fair point. 127 1 Q. What is the answer to it? 2 A. I don't know. 3 Q. Is this email a reflection of the fact that it was 4 important for you to maintain the position that Horizon 5 was infallible, was foolproof, and that if he could 6 support any of his allegations that would unfortunately 7 undermine that position? 8 A. I think it's a reflection of me being new to a role and 9 not doing it very well at that point and, as I said, if 10 I was doing it a couple of years later I would have 11 approached it a lot better. So I think I was probably 12 following the company line to some extent at that point. 13 Q. You say, at the foot of the page, in the last line: 14 "If he can support any of his allegations we will 15 investigating -- and be extremely worried whilst doing 16 so." 17 Is that because it would undermine the 18 infallibility of Horizon, the line that the Post Office 19 took? 20 A. Yes, I think if cheques were -- phantom cheques were 21 appearing on a branch's account, then I would be 22 extremely worried and I've kind of agonised over that 23 concept for quite a while and I still cannot understand 24 how that would happen. But if it does, it does. 25 Q. Wouldn't it cause an extreme worry that a man suspended 128 1 from his job, about to lose his livelihood, career and 2 marriage was, in fact, innocent of any wrongdoing? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. Was the attitude of mind that we see displayed in this 5 email reflective of a culture in which you worked and at 6 this time? 7 A. Possibly. 8 Q. Put it another way: if others in your department had 9 been asked to respond to Mr Lusher's email, would they 10 have responded broadly as you did on the key issues or 11 are you the outlier that took a particularly hard line 12 on subpostmasters? 13 A. No, I think the former. 14 Q. The former? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. Can I turn to a related email exchange concerning 17 Mr Ward, POL00002268. Just forgive me whilst I catch up 18 with my hard copy papers. 19 Can we turn to page 2, please. Just scroll down 20 just so we can see the signature block, please. This is 21 an email dated 1 February 2010 from Hayley Fowell, 22 external relations manager at the Royal Mail Group, and 23 it concerns Mr Ward, the man we have been looking at. 24 It's to David Smith, Michele Graves and Dave Hulbert: 25 "Hi all, 129 1 "We've had a media inquiry from Retail Newsagent 2 magazine; they have been talking to a subpostmaster who 3 has said that his branch was closed in [September] 2008 4 because of financial irregularities which he claims are 5 the fault or Horizon. 6 "I am providing our stock line which states the 7 system is robust but in case we get more questions on 8 this please can you advise if you have any record of 9 an investigation for this individual and any relevant 10 details -- Graham Ward, Rivenhall Oak Stores & Post 11 Office in Witham." 12 Can we go back over the page to page 1, please -- 13 the bottom half of the page, please. Michele Graves, 14 the Executive Correspondence Manager for the Executive 15 Correspondence Team, replies: 16 "I have been corresponding with Mr Ward for 17 a while. You may recall he is on the spreadsheet 18 I pulled together. I'll send over what I have. The 19 issue is basically the same -- Horizon is at fault -- 20 and he has focused on some cheques despatched from his 21 branch that [I think that's] then showed up on his 22 cheque line. The termination went to appeal and the 23 decision to terminate was upheld. Mr Ward's MP is 24 Brooks Newmark who I believe has raised Parliamentary 25 questions re Horizon integrity. 130 1 "Andy [I think that's you now copied into this 2 chain], you also asked me for an update on Mr Ward 3 recently -- if you have any new info, can you please let 4 Hayley know." 5 Then at the top of the page, you reply: 6 "Hi Hayley, we're due to restart our former agent 7 debt recovery process. I just wanted to check the 8 recent communications to ensure there was nothing there 9 to suggest we should not do these. Let me know if we 10 should not pursue at this stage." 11 In this email chain, there's a reference to the 12 "stock line", the stock line which states that Horizon 13 is robust. Is that something that you were aware of? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Would you agree that a stock line is a standard 16 response, a hackneyed response -- 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. -- to which no real thought or attention has been given? 19 A. No. 20 Q. Does that not reflect then your understanding of the use 21 of the phrase "stock line"? 22 A. I would say my understanding is that it's used by 23 everybody, but I don't think it undermines the integrity 24 behind that belief. 25 Q. You say you wanted to: 131 1 "... check recent communications don't suggest 2 that we shouldn't restart the debt recovery process." 3 Why would the recent communications affect the 4 restarting of the debt recovery process? 5 A. It depends what the communications have been and whether 6 the business approach had been changed. 7 Q. This was now some time on from your response in 2008 8 that there would be no further investigation by the Post 9 Office, unless Mr Ward could prove what he was saying, 10 and asserting your confidence in Fujitsu's security 11 procedures. 12 Were you concerned at all that Mr Ward was 13 continuing to protest his innocence and to seek answers 14 about why there had been unexplained entries in his 15 accounts? 16 A. I was conscious that he was obviously still protesting 17 his innocence, but I wasn't doing anything about it 18 because there was nothing I could do about it. 19 Q. Why was there nothing you could do about it? 20 A. Because there would be no access to Horizon information 21 at that point. 22 Q. Why? 23 A. You'd have to ask Fujitsu and our IT department that. 24 You can only -- you could only go back so far. 25 Q. How at that stage could Mr Ward establish his innocence? 132 1 A. I can't say. 2 MR BEER: Yes, thank you very much, Mr Winn. Those are the 3 only questions I ask at the moment. 4 I wonder whether we might take a 15-minute break 5 and then the questions for the Core Participants can 6 commence at 3 pm? 7 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, that's fine. 8 MR BEER: Thank you very much, sir. 9 (2.47 pm) 10 (A short break) 11 (3.00 pm) 12 MR BEER: Sir, thank you. I think Mr Stein is going to ask 13 questions first. 14 Questioned by MR STEIN 15 MR STEIN: Good afternoon, Mr Winn, my name is Sam Stein. 16 I represent a large number of subpostmasters and 17 mistresses. 18 I am going to take you back, first of all, to the 19 mismatch document, which I hope I've got the correct 20 reference number to, which is POL00028838. 21 Can we go to page 3, please. Mr Winn, you were 22 taken to this document earlier on by Mr Beer who 23 highlighted with you the various solutions that were 24 discussed on this page. Frankie, can you highlight 25 Solution One, please, in yellow -- thank you. 133 1 Now, let's just remind ourselves of what Solution 2 One referred to, Mr Winn. Solution one was: 3 "Alter the Horizon Branch figure at the counter to 4 show the discrepancy. Fujitsu would have to manually 5 write an entry value to the local branch account." 6 Then it says: 7 "IMPACT -- when the branch comes to complete next 8 Trading Period they would have a discrepancy, which they 9 would have to bring to account." 10 Now under "RISK": 11 "This has significant data integrity concerns and 12 could lead to questions of 'tampering' with the branch 13 system and could generate questions around how the 14 discrepancy was caused. This solution could have moral 15 implications of Post Office changing branch data without 16 informing the branch." 17 Now, you've just been asked before the short 18 break, a few minutes ago, a number of questions about 19 Rivenhall Post Office and about questions that related 20 to interference with the data that was being seen by the 21 postmaster there, Mr Ward, yes? At this particular 22 meeting you are being told it is possible to tamper with 23 branch office accounts and, indeed, the conclusion is, 24 as regards that, that that could have moral implications 25 of Post Office changing branch data without informing 134 1 the branch. 2 Was this the first time that you'd learnt that 3 Fujitsu could alter branch accounts? 4 A. I don't know. 5 Q. Well, it's a fairly significant issue to have come up in 6 this particular meeting, bearing in mind you are dealing 7 with Rivenhall; do you agree? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. As an example did you say to yourself that we'd better 10 do something about Rivenhall because this appears to be 11 show that Mr Ward there may be right, that data there 12 could be interfered with without his knowledge? 13 A. I think there's a difference between entering data to 14 resolve a problem rather than what implication was for 15 Mr Ward of somebody introducing cheques for no apparent 16 reason. 17 Q. I see. Did you, in any way, investigate the issue that 18 comes from this when you thought about Mr Ward's 19 situation? 20 A. No. 21 Q. You understand the link, don't you? 22 A. I do now, yes. I probably wouldn't have at that point. 23 Q. I will take you to another document, please, which is 24 POL00055410. Thank you. Further down the page please, 25 Frankie, and this is a document you were shown just 135 1 after the luncheon adjournment today, the one that is 2 dated 8 October 2010 and Mr Beer took you to this and 3 dealt with particular points. 4 Can I take you to the second paragraph. So this 5 is about the mismatch meeting notes: 6 "The above includes Fujitsu's initial analysis and 7 proposed solution/s." 8 Can we scroll up to the above bit please, Frankie. 9 So the attachments in relation to this email are 10 the "ReceiptsPayments notes[version]5", which we believe 11 are the mismatch notes that you have been asked a number 12 of questions about and then, after the colon, 13 highlighted there, "Lost Discrepancies", that's 14 a document drafted by Mr Jenkins, okay. 15 Let's go back to what we're seeing in the middle 16 of this email. You said in your evidence today to the 17 Chair of this Inquiry that you thought that Fujitsu had 18 proposed the three solutions in the mismatch meeting 19 notes? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. Now, this particular email from Alan Simpson who 22 attended that meeting is saying the above -- the above 23 attachments -- includes Fujitsu's initial analysis and 24 proposed solutions. Does that help you in your 25 recollection that it was Fujitsu that had put forward 136 1 the solutions that you have been taken to today? 2 A. It supports what we were saying, yes. 3 Q. Now, as regards those solutions, did anybody consider at 4 the meetings in relation to the mismatch bug and 5 software error, did anybody consider the legal 6 implications of keeping information back from 7 subpostmasters being prosecuted? 8 A. I can't remember that being discussed, no. 9 Q. As an example, did anybody suggest that might be 10 a criminal offence of keeping that information back? 11 A. No. 12 Q. No? 13 A. No. 14 Q. Lastly in relation to this, the email is referring to: 15 "The above includes Fujitsu's initial analysis and 16 proposed solution/s, whilst the other documents the 17 outputs from various meetings held this week." 18 Let's take that apart into two bits. So it looks 19 as though, regarding the mismatch discussions, that 20 there were various meetings. Is that your recollection? 21 A. I don't remember attending various meetings -- it may 22 have been phone conferences rather than meetings. 23 Q. Would it be normal for these meetings to have notes 24 taken? 25 A. Well, somebody would have been responsible, yes, 137 1 I believe so, yes. 2 Q. Presumably, the end result of such meetings would be 3 notes and minutes? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. I am going to take you, please, to then a different 6 document, which is POL00029224, page 5. 7 If you can scroll down the page. This document, 8 I am afraid, is difficult. We might be able to improve 9 it by expanding it slightly, Frankie. Go further down 10 the page, please, and again a little bit further down 11 again. You will see at the bottom of that page, if we 12 can highlight from "Information: Ki Barnes has called 13 in", can we zero on that and expand and highlight. 14 Now, this particular document, as you can see, 15 it's 2001, it looks like, and the reference is to 16 phantom transactions, okay? 17 A. Mm-hm. 18 Q. So I'll read what we have here. This is a record of 19 this matter being dealt with as a PEAK, which is part of 20 the system being used by Fujitsu: 21 "I am unsure as to what to do with this call now. 22 Romec have been to site and state that they have 23 actually seen the phantom transactions, so it is not 24 just the PM's word now. They have fitted suppressors to 25 the kit but the PM is still having problems. As yet 138 1 there has been no re-occurrence to the phantom 2 transactions but there still may be problems." 3 Let's unpick what this all means. Romec the Royal 4 Mail or Post Office engineers; is that correct? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. This is referring to phantom transactions coming up on 7 the screen; do you agree? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. Phantom transactions in relation to the date of this 10 particular entry seems to have gone back to quite early 11 days of Legacy Horizon; do you agree? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. Were you aware of phantom transactions as being 14 a problem? 15 A. No. 16 Q. Do you remember speaking to Colleen Ingham, we think, in 17 about 2004 about phantom or ghost transactions? 18 A. No, sorry, no. 19 Q. So help us a little bit further in relation to this. 20 Bearing in mind that we're talking about phantom or 21 ghost transactions appearing on a subpostmaster's 22 screen, was this some information that would have been 23 useful for your consideration in handling postmaster 24 issues? 25 A. Yes, I think it would be fair to say that when I left 139 1 the business I didn't accept the concept of phantom 2 transactions and that was in 2016. 3 Q. Right. Now, in your evidence earlier on, when you were 4 discussing matters with Mr Beer, you appeared to be 5 familiar with the concept of phantom transactions being 6 raised. You weren't saying to him "I don't know what 7 you're talking about, Mr Beer". So when did you start 8 to become aware of the topic of phantom transactions? 9 A. I would have said it would be when Second Sight started 10 their investigation but that kind of feels a bit too 11 late, to be honest. So I probably heard the term before 12 but I struggled with the concept of it. 13 Q. Ms Ingham, who ran the Cockfield Post Office in County 14 Durham recalls you speaking to her about ghost 15 transactions in around 2004? 16 A. 2004, okay. 17 Q. Thinking back, do you think that's possible? 18 A. I'm trying to think what role I'd be in in 2004. 19 I guess that was in problem management, was it? 20 Q. Very early days of that, we think. 21 A. No, I don't know if I was in problem management then or 22 in the Transaction Improvement Team, Network Improvement 23 Team. 24 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: If it helps, I think early on in your 25 evidence you were referred to paragraph 1 of your 140 1 witness statement where you suggested that you'd gone to 2 the problem management team in 2005 but, in fact, there 3 was a document which showed that you were there in 2003. 4 A. Okay. 5 MR STEIN: So it seems likely this had been once you moved 6 into the problem management role. Do you think then, 7 looking back and looking at the collection of 8 information you now have, that there was an awareness 9 within the Post Office of phantom transactions? 10 A client of mine recalls speaking to you about 11 ghost transactions, that at that time in 2004 you 12 probably did know something about the topic of phantom 13 transactions. 14 A. Obviously, it had been raised. I wouldn't argue with 15 your client's recollections. I don't recall it myself. 16 Q. Now I will ask you about a different document, please, 17 POL00029719. 18 Now, this is an email, Mr Winn, from Rod Ismay. 19 You can see the date of this. This is 3 July 2013, sent 20 to you and the subject matter is "Branches affected by 21 Receipts Payments and Discrepancies issue", okay. So 22 it's a follow-on from such matters. If you go further 23 down, you can see that it says: 24 "1 of 2 emails re the 2 branches on the other 25 list. 141 1 "Thanks, Rod." 2 So you are being referred then to the further 3 information. 4 If we just go down, we'll see therefore the 5 connected email, which says from Pete Newsome to Rod 6 Ismay: 7 "Rod 8 "Looks like this branch had a different problem so 9 was removed from the original list. The email below 10 explains what happened and how we advised Post Office on 11 the situation. Have an answer on second branch as well, 12 will send that through shortly." 13 Again, if we can go further down the page then to 14 the second email, headed from Mark Wright. Then that 15 one from Mark Wright to Pete Newsome, Gareth Jenkins, 16 involving also Steve Parker, Steve Bansal and John 17 Simpkins: 18 "We've unearthed the following email ..." 19 Then there's some figures given "122946", and then 20 go to the second page, please, Frankie. It's probably 21 easiest to look at the second paragraph: 22 "Branch 122946 rolled from TP4 to TP5 on 23 11 August. They accepted a gain of £34,330.88 which was 24 settled centrally. The BTS shows a trading position of 25 £22,021.65. 142 1 "The branch was included in investigations into 2 receipts payments problems at the beginning of October, 3 and was found to be a different problem from the others 4 also under investigation at the time, so was not 5 included in the later spreadsheets sent to POL." 6 Mr Winn, you have been asked various questions 7 about what happened in the mismatch payments issues and 8 about the different solutions that were proposed to the 9 mismatch difficulties and problems. You've been asked 10 questions about whether the postmasters should have been 11 informed that "Here's a problem, here's a bug", that can 12 affect their accounts. 13 What happened regarding this? Did you tell 14 postmaster branches that "There's another problem, 15 another bug, that can affect your figures?" 16 A. I cannot remember what the outcome from these was. 17 Q. Do you recall whether there were similar discussions to 18 perhaps keep this buried and not tip off the 19 subpostmasters? 20 A. No, I'm sorry. Do we know what the name of the branches 21 are, see if that rings any bells with me. 22 Q. I'm not sure I do. If I have the information I will 23 come back to you. 24 A. Okay. 25 Q. Next document, please, POL00004694, pages 1 and 2. I'm 143 1 grateful. 2 So this email dated 10 May 2010 from Nigel Allen 3 to you, and you will see the reference to "Barkham" and 4 then the number appropriate for Barkham "Outstanding 5 losses". This is from Nigel Allen, who was he? 6 A. I believe he was a contract manager. 7 Q. Right. To you: 8 "Andy 9 "What is this [£25,000] of returned cash on 5 Jan? 10 "Has this been properly recorded on the Horizon 11 System? 12 "Was it received back at the Cash Centre?" 13 If we go down to the second page, please, I think 14 a little bit further down, please, thank you. Now, this 15 particular branch concerns Pam Stubbs. Does that name 16 ring a bell? 17 A. It doesn't, I'm afraid. 18 Q. Ms Stubbs was blamed for a shortfall of £28,000. She 19 lost her business and was pursued by the Post Office for 20 settlement of eventually £36,000. She had been told by 21 Fujitsu engineers that the movement of terminals, the 22 putting in and taking out of terminals, without proper 23 safeguards could cause faults. Were you aware of that? 24 A. That doesn't ring any bells. No. 25 Q. If we can go further down to the bottom of this 144 1 particular email and then the starting point for the 2 reference that I'm about to make is "If there is 3 anything specific to investigate". Thank you. 4 So the email is saying: 5 "We are aware of the problems at the branch. The 6 letter suggests she has done all the checks we (and 7 NBSC) would have suggested. There is not a lot of value 8 I can add as there is nothing recorded that would 9 account for the different losses. 10 "There are no transaction corrections that account 11 for the losses or that should have compensated for them. 12 She has already checked her transactional records and 13 can see nothing so it is unlikely that customers are 14 suddenly going to start alerting us to strange deposits 15 into their accounts. 16 "What may or may not be interesting is a [£1,000 17 transaction correction] issued recently for a cash 18 shortage in a rem to the cash centre. One would have 19 thought that with the issues involved that a mistake 20 like this would not have been made that realising. It 21 is possible they did realise once the rem had gone but 22 smacks of carelessness at least." 23 Now, that level of judgement in relation to 24 an investigation as regards this branch, which is 25 suggesting that it's careless, is that in the same line 145 1 as your views earlier, that this is a general view of 2 the Post Office, that it's likely to be down to 3 subpostmaster fault where there are issues? 4 A. I don't think it particularly states that. 5 Q. Then it goes on to say this: 6 "If there is anything specific to investigate I am 7 happy to. It may be worth getting something in writing 8 from Fujitsu to confirm there is nothing that could have 9 failed to have polled/software anomalies that will come 10 back to bite us." 11 Signed "Andy". 12 Is that the right approach, Mr Winn? 13 A. It feels sensible. 14 Q. Does it? 15 A. To me, yes. 16 Q. What about a deeper investigation as to polling issues? 17 A. Well, that would be Fujitsu who would do that. 18 Q. Given at this stage, this is after the other issues that 19 you had been made aware of, after the mismatch bug, such 20 discussions in relation to that, you didn't think at 21 this stage that the best thing to do would be to, in 22 fact, properly investigate this? 23 A. I thought it was -- obviously thought it was worth going 24 back to Fujitsu to get a report on the polling issues 25 but apart from that I couldn't see any other route for 146 1 investigation. 2 Q. Then, lastly for my part, and I take you to another 3 document POL00090726. Page 15 of this document first. 4 Go a little bit further down the page so we can see the 5 letter at the bottom, please. 6 So we can see, Mr Winn, there's a letter from you 7 to Mr Afzal? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. So we're going back to the start of this letter and the 10 date of it, please, if we just show that: 11 October 11 2011. 12 "Dear Mr Afzal 13 "Re Branch Discrepancy 14 "I'm sorry to learn that your branch has 15 experienced connectivity problems in September. I'm 16 afraid I don't think I am going to be able to help you." 17 You go on to say this: 18 "Some transactions will never be recoverable, 19 eg stamp sales whilst others, eg card account 20 withdrawals will be recoverable dependent upon the point 21 at which the communications broke down. I appreciate it 22 is difficult to know where you are if communications are 23 lost." 24 So Mr Winn, can we establish that in at least 25 11 October 2011 your knowledge about connectivity 147 1 problems was that it could lose data? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. Keep reading: 4 "However there is a general principle that if 5 a transaction receipt has not been produced by Horizon, 6 the transaction has not completed and cash should not 7 change hands until you are certain of the transaction 8 status. Clearly if recovery takes a period of time, the 9 customer may have left. If the transaction is seen to 10 be recoverable, the option not to proceed with recovery 11 should be chosen." 12 Then you go on to say this: 13 "Unfortunately I am not able to offer any relief 14 to branches who may not have followed recovery 15 procedures in full." 16 So this is clearly a discussion about connectivity 17 issues that may have caused a branch transaction 18 difficulty; do you agree? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. Why here are you saying that you are not able to help: 21 "I'm sorry to learn your branch has experienced 22 connectivity problems in September. I'm afraid I don't 23 think I'm going to be able to help you." 24 Why is that the attitude of the Post Office? 25 A. I think there was a recovery process to follow. Quite 148 1 why the -- if it wasn't followed properly, it could 2 cause issues. That must have been a business decision 3 that we're unable to resolve. I can't really remember 4 it well enough, I'm afraid. 5 Q. Let's be as generous as we can to the Post Office at 6 this juncture. We've got connectivity issues being 7 caused by the system that the Post Office branches have 8 to use, okay. That's at least a large part of this 9 problem. Why isn't the Post Office saying "Sorry to 10 hear about that problem, obviously this at the very 11 least is partly our fault, we will help come sort it out 12 and repay your losses". Why isn't that happening? 13 A. That sounds reasonable. 14 Q. It does. Why wasn't it happening, Mr Winn? 15 A. I can't say. 16 Q. Can we go then to the page 14, please. Society 17 14 October 2011 to Mr Afzal, Ferry Road Post Office. 18 "Dear Mr Afzal. 19 "Re Branch Discrepancy 20 "I'm sorry doubt I don't think I can assist you 21 any further. The process for disputing losses is via 22 the helpline. As far as I can see there is no evidence 23 of Horizon failure been presented which would generate 24 an investigation." 25 Then: 149 1 "There are processes in place for branches to 2 manage any losses of connectivity. This does not 3 represent Horizon failure and the business has been very 4 clear that it will not compensate losses [due] to 5 connectivity breakdown. 6 "As such I cannot suggest who in Post Office 7 Limited might take a different view and be able to help 8 you." 9 Then if we scroll down to the bottom, we will see 10 it's signing my you: 11 "Yours sincerely 12 "Andrew Winn." 13 So let's have a look at what you said then to 14 Mr Afzal: 15 "I'm sorry but I don't think I can assist you any 16 further. The process for disputing losses is via the 17 helpline." 18 Which helpline did you mean? 19 A. NBSC. 20 Q. NBSC. So via the Post Office helpline, that's the only 21 way that Mr Afzal should be able to dispute these 22 matters? 23 A. That was the designated route for IT problems, yes. 24 Q. Then it goes on to say -- or you go on to say: 25 "There are processes in place for branches to 150 1 manage any losses of connectivity. This does not 2 represent Horizon failure and the business has been very 3 clear that it will not compensate losses due to 4 connectivity break down." 5 Let's take that apart. What are the processes 6 that were in place for branches to manage any losses of 7 connectivity this way? 8 A. I can't remember but they would be -- on the Horizon 9 Help you would be able to put -- but once you got 10 connectivity back, you could refer to them if you hadn't 11 already got the knowledge of what to do. 12 Q. Those processes clearly don't involve compensation, do 13 they? 14 A. No. 15 Q. Because you clear that one up: 16 "This does not represent Horizon failure and the 17 business has been very clear that it will not compensate 18 losses due to connectivity breakdown." 19 Let's just understand what you mean by this. Why 20 would the Post Office not compensate subpostmasters for 21 issues caused by connection problems of the Horizon 22 equipment? 23 A. I cannot recall the process and how it was managed. I'm 24 sorry. 25 Q. As an example, was this directive from the Post Office? 151 1 A. From the wording in my letter I've obviously been up and 2 checked the business position at the time and reiterated 3 what I've been told. 4 Q. Is this you -- you were talking earlier about you 5 settling into your job and getting better at it after 6 a few years. Is this you having settled into the job 7 and having got better at it after a few years, Mr Winn? 8 A. That was the business rules which I'm following. 9 Q. Which you are enforcing. 10 A. Yes, I'm sorry the business rules weren't correct but -- 11 Q. Why do connection issues not represent Horizon failure? 12 A. I would regard loss of connectivity as being like losing 13 Wifi connection, the equivalent, as I understand 14 nowadays. So I wouldn't understand it as Horizon being 15 at fault. I'd understand it as the first links which 16 you know, a lot of rural branches did suffer from 17 connectivity issues. I mean, my interpretation was that 18 that was not Horizon at fault but it might -- 19 Q. So it is just hard luck on subpostmasters; is that 20 right, Mr Winn? 21 A. Well, there's a process -- there was a process to follow 22 to recover the transactions. 23 Q. But to make sure that you are finished with the problem, 24 you finish off by saying: 25 "As such I cannot suggest who in Post Office might 152 1 take a different view and be able to help you." 2 So you're saying "That's it"? 3 A. That would imply that I checked with the people who 4 I think might have a different view and already got 5 their opinion. 6 Q. Excuse me one moment. 7 Thank you, Mr Winn. 8 Thank you, sir. 9 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Thank you, Mr Stein. 10 Anyone else? 11 Questioned by MS PAGE 12 MS PAGE: Yes, please, sir. 13 If I can take us to a document which helps 14 a little bit on the subject of phantom transactions. 15 It's POL00093133. This is an email chain, which you're 16 not actually copied in on but which is makes a reference 17 to you, which may assist. Could we start at the bottom, 18 please, the last page in this so that we read up 19 chronologically. 20 Do you know either of these names Bethany or Sally 21 Buchanan? They seem to be from Customer Service, if 22 that means anything? 23 A. I can't remember -- 24 Q. What we've got here is Bethany saying: 25 "Are you able to help me with this office or let 153 1 me know who can help. 2 "The office had a major software problem back in 3 week 41 (January 2003). After numerous phone calls to 4 NBSC and engineer visits to change cables, monitor 5 et cetera, a software problem was identified and the 6 processor changed. Apparently the screen would take on 7 a mind of its own, jump screens, add items to the sales 8 stack, et cetera. The office balanced £422.74 short 9 that week, which is very unusual for the office -- they 10 are normally within £20 each week. 11 "The subpostmistress has waited for an error 12 notice to come back, nothing has been received yet and 13 I've checked with Chesterfield several times -- nothing 14 so far. I have also checked the paperwork in the office 15 for week 41, along with week 40 and week 42 and I can't 16 find anything. Is there anything you can do at Dearne 17 Valley ..." 18 Is that the place where your premises were when 19 you were in problem management? 20 A. Yes, that's correct. 21 Q. "... to have that week's work checked on the system to 22 see if this has been caused by a systems fault. The 23 only other thing I can think of is that if the system 24 was going daft and putting things onto the sales stack, 25 this wasn't picked up every time by the person serving 154 1 and one or more customers have been given money they 2 were not entitled to and have just kept it." 3 So that is the start and if we go up then to 4 response, there's a blank page so we need to go a little 5 buyer thank you, and we can see that this is 27 June 6 2003 from Terry Rudd in customer relations: 7 "Thanks for raising this matter with us. An 8 investigation has taken place with Julie Welsh, our 9 contact at Fujitsu, and she accepts that the PM did call 10 the Helpdesk to state that transactions were appearing 11 on the sales stack, but kit was swapped out and the 12 problem did not reoccur. As no further problems were 13 reported, she thought that was the end of the matter. 14 "As the losses occurred back in January, 15 information relating to this branch has now been 16 archived but your concerns have today been raise with 17 the Problem Management Team who have more experience in 18 dealing with phantom transactions. I am unsure which 19 member of the team will be assigned to the case, but if 20 you have any further questions, the Line Manager for the 21 team is Andy Winn." 22 Then it sets out a reference code for queries 23 regarding this issue and signs off: 24 "... Customer Relations [can't help] but I am sure 25 Andy and his team will do their best to resolve this." 155 1 So what we have there is an indication that 2 phantom transactions were something sufficiently well 3 known in your team that this was being specifically 4 referred to you and your team? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. Yes? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. Which ties, doesn't it, with what Mr Stein told us, that 9 his Core Participant had spoken to somebody about 10 phantom transactions. So clearly this was a known 11 problem right the way back to this early date. 12 What would you have done about a query like this? 13 A. Would have allocated it to a team member to raise it 14 with Fujitsu. 15 Q. What sort of response might you have got from Fujitsu? 16 A. A review of their -- I don't really know what they would 17 have done. I would have hoped they'd have looked at 18 the -- identified the times and looked to see if there's 19 any problems arising from there and reported them back 20 to us. 21 Q. So following that report, let's say they come back to 22 you and say "Yes, we've identified there are phantom 23 transactions in this particular branch or in this 24 particular group of branches, potentially", what would 25 your team have done about that? 156 1 A. Well, we'd have escalated it probably to our IT team and 2 said what we're going to do about it, how we're going to 3 resolve it. 4 Q. What would you have done in terms of the branches? 5 A. Resolved any financial accounting discrepancies. 6 Q. How did you go about that? 7 A. That would have been done through a P&BA or whatever it 8 was called at that time. 9 Q. So there would have been quite a lot of communication, 10 wouldn't there, between your team and people at Fujitsu, 11 people in P&BA -- 12 A. I would have thought so, yes. 13 Q. -- people in the groups, the POL or perhaps the group, 14 at that stage, IT directorate -- was it one or the 15 other, do you know? 16 A. I wouldn't know. 17 Q. Did your team escalate the issue of phantom 18 transactions? 19 A. I would have thought so from -- I presume that that was 20 raised to our team. I can't remember it. 21 Q. Do you have no memory of escalating this issue of 22 phantom transactions when you were the team leader at 23 this time? 24 A. No. 25 Q. Wouldn't it have been a matter of concern to you? 157 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. Wouldn't it have been a matter of great concern to the 3 business generally? 4 A. I don't know how easily it was -- what the Fujitsu 5 findings were. I can't comment. 6 Q. If Fujitsu had come back and said "No such thing, 7 there's no phantom transactions, it doesn't exist", 8 would you have left it there? 9 A. I don't know where else I could have gone; so, yes, 10 I think I would have. 11 Q. So never mind that your team evidently has, according to 12 this email, more experience in dealing with phantom 13 transactions, never mind that this isn't just a one-off, 14 this is clearly something that's happened on a few 15 occasions, you would have just taken Fujitsu's word? 16 A. I wouldn't have known where else to go. 17 Q. You wouldn't have taken it to anyone in IT at POL? 18 A. If it was -- yes, quite possibly. I would have imagined 19 that the enquiry would have gone to Fujitsu and our IT 20 teams. 21 Q. When you were at problem management, what was the 22 directorate that your team sat in? 23 A. I would imagine the IT directorate. I can't actually 24 remember. 25 Q. So you don't know who the director was in charge of 158 1 problem management? You don't know who it was above 2 your team leader or your boss or whoever that may have 3 been? 4 A. No, I can't remember. 5 Q. You gave us the name of one of your bosses earlier, 6 didn't you. Do you remember what she was the boss of? 7 A. Marie Cochate. Yes, that was when I was in Chesterfield 8 at the process improvement team. 9 Q. I think you gave us a name for somebody at -- 10 A. Actually, I think she was my boss in problem management 11 as well, initially. 12 Q. So that was something in accounting, was it? 13 A. I think she moved as well. I think she moved from the 14 accounting -- from the process improvement team into the 15 same kind of team areas as I was in within problem 16 management, if I remember correctly. 17 Q. Have you listened to the evidence from witnesses over 18 the last week or so? 19 A. No. 20 Q. Because, collectively, they've given evidence that 21 problem management really was the way that Post Office 22 monitored the performance of Horizon and indeed the 23 performance of Fujitsu in running and maintaining the 24 performance of Horizon. Is that how you understood the 25 role? 159 1 A. No, not really. 2 Q. Well, what did you understand it to be then? 3 A. To be resolving problems, making sure the appropriate 4 people were resolving problems. I don't think there was 5 a -- particularly a reporting schedule. I don't 6 remember that coming out of problem management when 7 I was there. 8 Q. Was this the business as usual way to resolve bugs, 9 errors and defects that arose in Horizon? 10 A. It was the way it should be recorded, yes. 11 Q. We know that by 2010 -- and I'm only going forward just 12 to kind of come back, if you like -- by 2010, it was 13 people in problem management that were the interface 14 with Fujitsu over the receipts and payments mismatch 15 bug, weren't they? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. So the role was to be the interface on bugs and defects, 18 and so forth, yes? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. So it was a crucial IT role, wasn't it? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. What interested you in that role when you applied to 23 manage that team? 24 A. To be brutally honest, a promotion. 25 Q. What grade were you as a manager of that team of 12? 160 1 A. CM1. 2 Q. TM1? 3 A. CM1. 4 Q. Where did that place you in the grades at the time? 5 A. That was the highest grade of middle manager before you 6 became a senior manager and from there -- so there's 7 different grades of senior manager and then directorate 8 level. 9 Q. How busy was your team of 12? 10 A. I would say the team were not desperately busy and I was 11 very busy. 12 Q. Right. Perhaps you can pull that apart for us. Why 13 were you busy and they weren't? 14 A. There were plenty of problems coming in. The problem 15 with, in my opinion, the problem management setup was 16 that if, effectively, a member of the product team, 17 which is nothing to do with IT, but a guy from the 18 product team who I knew very well said to me "You know, 19 we're told to report any problems into your team", you 20 make a note of it, say "Thanks very much, let us know 21 when you've resolved it" which -- so the team, bear in 22 mind I've got 12 people, seemed really to be employed 23 just to record something and wait for it to be told it 24 was cleared. 25 So when you went across the team "How are you 161 1 doing on this one?" It was always "I'm waiting for", 2 "I'm waiting for", "I'm waiting for", and it was kind of 3 "Oh, can you chase them", et cetera, et cetera. 4 It didn't seem to -- I was quite uncomfortable 5 with that. I kind of expected it to be much more 6 proactive. I'd say to the teams, you know, "We need 7 an article to resolve a product issue". 8 "Well, they haven't got time to do it". 9 "Well, have a go at doing it yourself, submit it 10 to them and they'll probably be that horrified at what 11 you are doing, they'll do it themselves", and I was 12 trying to work on that basis of being more proactive. 13 On the IT side we wouldn't be able to do because we 14 wouldn't have had the knowledge obviously, but I found 15 it a difficult role. 16 Q. Yes, and one that you have already admitted you weren't 17 really qualified for. 18 A. Correct. 19 Q. Given that it was a role that was crucial for the 20 handling of the defects, bugs, errors and that that's 21 central to the work of this Inquiry, why didn't you say 22 anything about it in your witness statement? 23 A. I did make reference to it, didn't I? 24 Q. Why did the team get taken over by Risk, as you 25 described to us earlier? 162 1 A. A routine business as usual review of the departments, 2 as a whole. It wasn't my decision but there was kind of 3 a lot of change and it was decided to merge the two 4 teams together. They were quite similar in the 5 understanding, et cetera, et cetera. So I could 6 understand why it was done. 7 Q. Was there any strategic thinking at all about the 8 business as usual management of problems, defects, bugs 9 in Horizon? 10 A. Not that I was made aware of, no. 11 Q. Just lastly on this topic, what we have here the one 12 remaining, as far as we can tell document, from this 13 period of time when you were team leader of this crucial 14 team that had to interface on bugs, errors and defects 15 is one email from a different team, customer relations. 16 We have no emails from problem management itself, no 17 records at all from your time at problem management and 18 nothing at all about the problem of phantom or ghost 19 transactions, which apparently your team knew about. 20 Can you give us any understanding or explanation 21 for why there's so little information about your team at 22 that time? 23 A. No, I'm surprised there was -- as far as I'm aware 24 everything that we did was logged, so I'm quite 25 astonished at you saying that. 163 1 Q. Can we perhaps turn then a little ahead to POL00045457. 2 Now, this is a document which seeks to define the 3 process of settling centrally and it says at the bottom 4 that it's been a contribution from you. So it looks 5 perhaps as if it might be something that's to go into 6 a manual or something. Does that look familiar? 7 A. Yes, yes. 8 Q. If we just go back up again, it looks to be -- it's 9 expressed explicitly as a clarification? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. It says: 12 "A recent audit has highlighted that many branches 13 are unclear on how to deal with losses and gains, 14 particularly around 'Settling Centrally'." 15 Do you think that audit might have been what you 16 did before you did those slides in January 2009? 17 A. I wouldn't have done the audit, I don't think. I think 18 that would have been feedback from network auditors. 19 I was out in branches. 20 Q. The reason I ask is because one of the slides that you 21 had created in January '09 sort of set the task of 22 defining the process of settling centrally and this 23 document appears to do that? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. So do you think this document comes then from that 164 1 process in January -- 2 A. Quite possibly, without knowing the date of the 3 document. 4 Q. The document doesn't appear to bear a date and -- 5 A. It sounds sensible. 6 Q. All right. Well let's assume then that it's part of 7 that January 2009 reappraisal, shall we say. When we 8 asked our client subpostmasters who had experience of 9 running post offices before January 2009, when we asked 10 them to have a look at this, none of them recognised 11 this process at all and, indeed, Janet Skinner said that 12 she was not aware that there was any dispute resolution 13 process whatsoever. Is it right that, prior to 14 January 2009, there really wasn't a recognised dispute 15 process at all? 16 A. Well, prior to me starting in the role, then that would 17 be correct, yes. 18 Q. So do you know why that role came up? 19 A. I think when I -- I should say, we had a reorganisation 20 in P&BA and the different teams were created and I went 21 into the debt team and my boss Alison said, "Look, we've 22 got people trying to contact teams and they're not 23 responding to, and we need a central point, we think it 24 should be you, have a look at it", and so the role kind 25 of evolved from there. 165 1 Q. You told us earlier that you didn't have to apply or 2 interview for this job. Was it a job that was, in 3 effect, one that you sort of created yourself once in 4 it? 5 A. Yes. Yes, I think when I first got there Alison and Rod 6 Ismay's view, they had some ideas about the role but, 7 effectively, it was me who kind of developed it to what 8 it was. 9 Q. At this stage, were you still a sort of top middle 10 management or had you entered the realms of senior 11 management by this stage? 12 A. No, still the same grade. 13 Q. Why do you think you were qualified to adjudicate on 14 disputes? 15 A. I don't think I was particularly qualified, but 16 I probably felt that it was the role that I was best 17 suited to working within the whole Royal Mail Group. 18 Q. Why? 19 A. Because I think I investigated things and was prepared 20 to look outside the box and I had a bit of an empathy 21 with the subpostmasters, I think. 22 Q. Do you still think that having looked back at some of 23 your correspondence? 24 A. I'm disappointed with some of the things I wrote, yes. 25 Q. We can take that document down and before I turn to 166 1 another one, I'd just like to ask you a little bit about 2 Mr Lee Castleton. Is that a name that rings any bells 3 for you? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. Did you know about his case at the time? 6 A. I think his case was -- I think his case was very 7 topical when I first joined the team. 8 Q. Right. 9 A. So it would be very much in my early days. I don't 10 think I was involved in any of the decisions around 11 suspension or anything. 12 Q. But it was known about, was it, in your team, quite well 13 known? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. All right. So you'll have been aware then, won't you, 16 that in -- you won't necessarily remember the date but 17 it was in early 2007 that the judge awarded Post Office 18 damages of approximately £26,000 but costs of £321,000 19 which you might imagine bankrupted Mr Castleton. He 20 lost everything he'd invested in his branch, he lost his 21 living, his family were treated like thieves and they 22 endured years of hardship. 23 What we now know from documents in this Inquiry, 24 which haven't yet been sort of picked over but which 25 I can quote to you briefly from -- I don't know if we 167 1 necessarily need to put it on the screen -- is that 2 there was a clear intent on the part of the Post Office, 3 with legal advice, to pursue the claim: 4 "... not to make a net financial recovery but to 5 defend the Horizon System and hopefully send a clear 6 message to other SPMs that the PO will take a firm line 7 and to deter others from raising similar allegations." 8 So that was the purpose. It was not ever 9 envisaged that the Post Office would actually get that 10 costs order back. That was loss leader, if you like. 11 But the purpose was to send a firm line and a clear 12 message to deter others. 13 Now, is that how the case was understood at the 14 time? Is that something that your team would have been 15 aware of, that it was a sort of flagship case, if you 16 like, to try to deter others? 17 A. No, I don't think so. I was conscious that it was 18 probably the most high profile case at that time but 19 I don't think I would have picked up that message. 20 Q. We can also see from documentation that the lawyers in 21 charge of the case were also conscious of other cases, 22 including one which -- 23 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Hang on a minute. 24 Do you have any direct knowledge of Mr Castleton's 25 case at all, Mr Winn? 168 1 A. No, I don't. 2 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: I mean, I'm conscious that this is a very 3 sensitive case, Ms Page, but don't think it's 4 appropriate to use the witness just for you to read 5 extracts of other documents. 6 MS PAGE: I was just to about to come to the documents which 7 he is involved with, sir. So I hope that's. 8 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: That's fine. 9 MS PAGE: That was a scene setting, if you like. 10 The related case, if you like, which you were 11 involved with was a Mr Bilkhu. Does that ring any 12 bells? 13 A. No. 14 Q. So Mr Bilkhu issued a claim against POL but then 15 withdrew it because he was threatened with costs of 16 instructing an expert in the region of £1 million and he 17 told you about that. Do you remember? 18 A. No. 19 Q. Well we can perhaps then have a look at POL00001304 at 20 page 29, bottom of the page. This is from him to you. 21 We can perhaps go to the top of the page, just so that 22 you can see that. He was writing from Bowburn Post 23 Office and you can see there at the top, "Dear Mr Wynn", 24 he has obviously misspelt your name but the 25 correspondence shows that he had written to you and this 169 1 was part of a bit of a back and forth between the two of 2 you. 3 There's one thing that I'd like to just ask you 4 about before we go to the bottom. We see the reference 5 to -- he says: 6 "Your letter is ... a repeat of ... previous 7 letter and is similar in style to those I have received 8 from Michele Graves and Philippa Wright (Flag Case 9 Managers for Adam Crozier/Alan Cook)." 10 Do you know what a "flag case manager" was? 11 A. No. 12 Q. Do you know those names? 13 A. Alan Crozier and Alan Cook, yes. The two ladies, no. 14 I can't remember them. 15 Q. What about the two gentlemen? 16 A. They were heads of Post Office. 17 Q. They were seniors? 18 A. Well, they were executive directors. 19 Q. So you don't recall what the flag case managers did for 20 them? 21 A. No. 22 Q. If we go a bit further down, we see that Mr Bilkhu tells 23 you, "In summary", it says: 24 "... POL may consider the matter closed [that's 25 his complaint] but I do not. According to my legal team 170 1 the case can we resumed subject to legal niceties. 2 "In summary, the case was withdrawn [he is talking 3 about his case] because POL's legal team demanded that 4 Horizon accounts at Bowburn [Post Office] for the last 5 4 years be examined by a forensic accountant. The cost 6 (estimated at £1 million) be borne by me." 7 Reading that letter, does that not ring any bells? 8 A. No. 9 Q. The idea that the legal department would threaten 10 somebody with costs estimated at £1 million? 11 A. No. 12 Q. Looking back, do you think this is part of a culture of 13 using legal process to threaten subpostmasters? 14 A. It's quite possible, yes. 15 Q. Is that perhaps part of the sort of setting of what 16 we've seen in your own correspondence of this sort of 17 putting the burden of proof on the subpostmasters -- 18 A. No, I don't think so. 19 Q. -- of using the law against them? 20 A. No, I don't think I've ever threatened anything like 21 that. I've tried to -- where I can see a way of 22 investigating/helping, I've tried to do that. 23 Q. Some very brief questions, if I may, on the document 24 which we've looked at quite a lot, the receipts and 25 payments mismatch meeting. I just want to look at the 171 1 first page of it again, if I may. It's POL00028838. If 2 we just look at those Post Office names, who would you 3 say was the most senior person there? 4 A. Ian Trundell, although Alan Simpson I don't know what 5 grade he was at. 6 Q. Ian Trundell and Alan -- sorry, did you say? 7 A. Alan Simpson. 8 Q. All right. 9 A. Well, I'm guessing there. I don't actually know what 10 grade anyone was at. 11 Q. But your first reaction was that those were the two 12 senior people that meeting? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. Who would you have reported back to about this? 15 Presumably Mr Ismay? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. And did you report back to Mr Ismay about this bug? 18 A. I'm -- whether I've talked directly to Mr Ismay or 19 Mrs Bolsover, I'm not certain, but I would certainly 20 have fed back as part of normal communications. 21 Q. Thank you. The document can be taken down. 22 So you are saying you would have reported back to 23 Mr Ismay and Ms Bolsover; is that right? 24 A. Yes. 25 MS PAGE: There's just two more issues I would like to look 172 1 at, sir, if I may? 2 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Is anyone else intending to ask 3 questions? 4 MR BEER: Sir, no, they're not. 5 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Fine. Off you go then. Five minutes, 6 Ms Page. 7 MS PAGE: Thank you. If I can look then, please, at 8 POL00105280. If we could look at page 3 -- and I won't 9 take you through the whole history up to page 3. Page 3 10 sort of dives in. 11 This is in the summer of 2013, so this is post 12 receipts and payments mismatch bug and around the time 13 when Second Sight's work is pretty well known within 14 about Post Office, yes, and you're asking a contracts 15 manager -- this is a discussion with a contracts manager 16 having been in touch with a branch about a loss that 17 dates back ten years, and this is your putting three 18 possibilities for how to deal with it to the contracts 19 manager. You say: 20 "Hi Nigel, I don't actually disbelieve the branch 21 here but the claim that two sets of auditors have 22 recorded missing stock as being present is a bit scary. 23 Stamps are just pieces of paper at Swindon so there 24 would not have been a surplus at another branch. 25 "I can see three options. Pay up - we don't 173 1 believe you. Create a phantom rem out, branches can now 2 invent ten year old errors that we have to let them off 3 on because we do not have any information about. Plus 4 Swindon will not pick up a phantom rem, so I can rem 5 stamps out and just sell them on my retail side." 6 I think that seems to be a suggestion that you're 7 making for a way to sort of balance it off. Is that how 8 I should read that? 9 A. Yes, that's how it could have done been done remotely, 10 yes. 11 Q. And then network write off: 12 "We believe you and we're making a gesture in 13 recognition of long years of accurate accounting and his 14 TC rate is excellent. However, this does leave huge 15 question marks over the audit process. None are 16 particularly appearing. Thoughts?" 17 First of all, it's a bit striking, isn't it, that 18 one of the options is "we don't believe you" when you've 19 actually said at the start of the email, "I don't 20 actually disbelieve the branch here"? 21 A. I think what I'm trying to do there is make the first 22 two look at what they were, totally unappealing options, 23 and the third one is where we're going. 24 Q. Well, the third one is indeed where you go. 25 If we go up to the next response, though, page 2, 174 1 what's quite interesting is that the response from the 2 network manager says in paragraph 3 here: 3 "As you say, none of the options are particularly 4 appealing. I think the first option, making the SPMR 5 pay up, could open up a can of worms. I'm not sure that 6 the SPMR is a member of the NFSP but, given that the 7 amount involved represents a significant percentage of 8 his salary, I feel sure he would take this further. 9 This could put us in a position of trying to defend 10 ourselves against a charge that the auditors didn't do 11 their job properly and could potentially give the NFSP 12 or an MP some useful ammunition." 13 So it's again this idea really, isn't it, that 14 it's about the ammunition, it's about MPs, it's not 15 really about doing the right thing? 16 A. No, I don't think so. I think we were aiming to do the 17 right thing. 18 Q. Well, you did do the right thing but, rather than just 19 doing the right thing, you're discounting other options 20 not on the grounds that they're wrong or because you 21 actually believe the branch but because it could 22 potentially give the NFSP or an MP some useful 23 ammunition? 24 A. And I think that would be true if we're saying that two 25 sets of audits were both incorrect. That's not the kind 175 1 of thing you want to advertise particularly when you 2 don't know if that's the case. 3 Q. Well, you do know it's the case. That's the 4 investigation. That's what's happened. 5 A. Well, no, we don't. That was the problem with this 6 case, that we could understand what the guy was saying 7 but he's saying that two sets of auditors have come in, 8 audited the branch. He said there's an issue with these 9 which is going to get -- needs resolving. So the 10 auditors have said, "Okay, we'll assume that they're 11 there". If they weren't there, I mean, that's what an 12 auditor's job is -- to identify discrepancies. So for 13 two of them to go in and not, would suggest that any 14 audit cannot be relied upon. 15 Q. So although you believe the SPMR, although you -- 16 A. I don't disbelieve the postmaster but I don't believe 17 that two auditors have not done their job properly. So 18 I'm left a little bit I don't know where we are anyway. 19 Q. Just one last, if I may, because this brings us up 20 a little bit more to date and it's POL00092640 and this 21 dates from 2015. 22 This seems to relate to what we've come to 23 understand were weekly Horizon meetings. These were 24 regular calls -- is that right -- with lawyers involved 25 as well, people from the security team. Do you remember 176 1 a weekly Horizon meeting being instituted in around 2013 2 and carrying on for some time apparently? 3 A. I don't particularly remember it being a weekly meeting, 4 though I accept that it could have been. 5 Q. You do remember the Horizon meetings, do you? 6 A. I remember being on Horizon meetings. Whether I was on 7 the weekly ones or not I'm not certain. 8 Q. Well, certainly in relation to this one, it's referring 9 to one that's taken place in August of 2015 and it says: 10 "As you will see there were numerous issues raised 11 on the last call which are of concern." 12 First of all, it says: 13 "Andy Winn is still receiving requests to 14 authorise FJ to correct problems." 15 Presumably that's Fujitsu? 16 A. Mm-hm. 17 Q. And what I understand that to mean -- and you correct me 18 if I'm wrong -- is that that's Fujitsu asking to go into 19 Horizon to correct problems and you're authorising them 20 to do so. Is that what's going on there? Is that the 21 process? 22 A. I'm not sure what Fujitsu wanted to do but, yes, it's 23 asking me to authorise them to do something. I don't 24 know what from here. 25 Q. Well, we've actually got three issues that come up. The 177 1 first one is that they asked to do this when kit is 2 removed from branches which can cause issues and then, 3 secondly, there's the discontinued sessions issue which 4 has gone on to explain further, and it talks about two 5 new products which caused the system to disconnect and 6 recovery scripts are failing. 7 So these are two different things which seemingly 8 they're having to go into the system to correct and 9 you're having to sign off on the process. Is that 10 something you recall doing? 11 A. I would imagine -- I could see myself being the voice 12 that would give POL approval, yes, if that makes sense. 13 Q. It says in the latter part of that paragraph: 14 "This is apparently standard business as usual and 15 FJ seek authorisation to correct it. It is unclear at 16 the present time whether or not there is process 17 assurance and documentation. I do not know whether POL 18 have full visibility of the actions of Fujitsu and the 19 ways in which they correct the branch data." 20 Does that ring a bell? 21 A. It doesn't ring a bell but it makes sense to me. 22 Q. That there wasn't really a process that was being 23 followed? 24 A. And that I was -- I think I, possibly naively, assumed 25 that the IT department were the ones who would be kind 178 1 of joined up with that, but certainly as far as I was 2 concerned that wouldn't be the case. 3 Q. Then the paragraph below, just to finish off on this: 4 "Andy Winn also raised the issue of a computer 5 problem with Camelot for which a fix had been issued but 6 pointed out that branches would encounter unexplained 7 losses that Wednesday when they conducted their BTS 8 procedure. He went on to explain that he had received 9 an email from Fujitsu about an incident which had 10 occurred in June. It was termed a 'major incident 11 report' and related to a branch which had an incorrect 12 discrepancy at the time of conducting a branch trading 13 statement. The email suggested that information had 14 been sent to POL. Andy Winn had not previously known 15 about this issue and so asked to whom the information 16 had been sent. He had no response. 17 "Andy went on to say that he did not fully 18 understand the issue and that a maximum of 247 branches 19 would have been affected. 118 of those would have 20 generated reports based on corrupted data. There was 21 only one account in connection with which POL could have 22 held someone responsible for the shortfall." 23 So in 2015, following the receipts and payments 24 mismatch bug, following the fact that Second Sight have 25 become involved, following the fact that that means that 179 1 it became apparent that the receipts and payments 2 mismatch bug still hadn't been followed up properly, 3 you're still having problems, aren't you, at POL with 4 actually getting on top of and dealing with bugs that 5 affect corrupted data? 6 A. Is this a receipts and payments mismatch issue? 7 Q. I don't believe it is. I believe it seems to be 8 a different issue. But this is evidence, is not, that 9 POL and Fujitsu are still not working through proper 10 procedures -- 11 A. Yes, I think so, yes. 12 Q. All right. 13 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Are you going to end on a high note, 14 Ms Page? 15 MS PAGE: Thank you, sir. 16 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Is that it, Mr Beer? 17 MR BEER: Yes, sir. That concludes the questioning of 18 Mr Winn. 19 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Thank you, Mr Winn, for coming to give 20 evidence. It's been a long day clearly. 21 A. It certainly has. 22 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: I'm grateful to you that you came to give 23 the answers to very many questions. 24 A. I hope I could be some help. 25 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Thank you. 180 1 MR BEER: Sir, thank you. I think that's us done now until 2 Tuesday, 7 March when we will hear evidence from Liz 3 Evans-Jones. 4 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, all right. Thanks very much. 5 MR BEER: Thank you, sir. 6 (4.10 pm) 7 (Adjourned until Tuesday, 7 March 2023 at 10.00 am) 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 181 1 I N D E X 2 ANDREW FRANK WINN (affirmed) .....................1 3 Questioned by MR BEER ............................1 4 Questioned by MR STEIN ........................133 5 Questioned by MS PAGE ..........................153 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 182