

27.04.2016- Wednesday Call IT related issues.

1. AP mismatches-

October 2014- first raised on Wednesday call due to an issue at Petersfield Crown 015937 branch. It was then found that issues were raised by a further 4 branches during Jan 2014- Dec 2014 with at least 68 customers affected as follows:-

Frederick Street – 008 824, 6th and 7th January 2014, 10 incorrectly credited transactions to Allpay. All sorted apart from one for £11.00

High Street – 539 246, 4th-10th February 2014, 42 incorrectly credited transactions to Allpay. Only 7 of these transactions have been sorted and credited to the correct accounts.

Silsoe – 113 106, 3rd-7th July 2014, 7 incorrectly credited transactions to Received with Thanks. Only 3 of these transactions have been sorted and credited to the correct accounts.

West Calder – 139 807, 14th and 15th July 2014, 8 incorrectly credited transactions to Allpay. Only one of these has been sorted and credited to the correct account.

2 further incidents up to and including May 2015:-

Bramley, 052 904, 08/04, 10/04, 11/04, 15/04, 16/04, 17/04, 20/04 and 21/04/15. Client: South East Water Ltd: 22 incorrectly credited payments Value: £1002.56

Corporation Street, 523 201, Transaction Date 01/05/15, Client : Allpay – Birmingham CC 11 incorrectly credited payments, Value: £1501.60

The issue described is that a branch scans an AP transaction with a bar code reader, all works fine, when the next customer arrives with an AP barcode the payment the customer makes goes to the previous client account with all future customer barcode scanned payments taken on that particular terminal, in that branch defaulting to the first client account at the time the barcode reader becomes faulty.

The incidents are resolved by replacing the barcode reader once the branch or customers alert the IT helpdesk or CCU of the problem. By this time however a number of customer payments may have gone to the wrong client. FSC have a process for putting things right but it relies on the customer, client or occasionally the branch alerting IT service desk or POL that something has gone wrong, this doesn't always happen and FSC hold the amount pending resolution.

The response to date from Atos or IT was that this type of incident was expected to be resolved with Horizon Next Generation rollout. When it was found it wasn't resolved a review of the incident took place in 2010 and a report was produced. Ian Humphries was trying to get a copy of the report from Pete Newsome in Fujitsu.

What POL need for assurance is:-

- The report detailing the incident & the root cause.
- Confirmation that the incident is resolved.
- An understanding of how many incidents occurred/number of branches/customers affected.
- Whether any branches/customers may have been affected by the issue without knowing about it.

08.04.16 Update from Tracy Middleton (FSC) to say no further incidents received since May 2015. Chased Ian Humphries with regard to the 2010 report on 07.04.16 no response received.

2. Transaction Corrections- CLOSED DOWN

August 2015, first raised on Wednesday call.

27.08.15 response received from Katie Austin to incidents raised by NBSC with affected branch FAD codes:-

FAD 2242176 :FAD 020323:FAD 2652013:FAD 186405:FAD 221340:FAD 3228320.

Katie's initial feedback was that the incidents were user error.

07.09.15 Update from Katie -to say she had discussed the incident with Fujitsu who had confirmed that there was an issue for which a fix would be needed.

09.09.2015 Further branch affected Rugby Post Office, branch code 1512463. Update from Katie-Fujitsu stated that the code change to resolve the issue was currently in testing and would be applied to the Fujitsu model office over the weekend. Pilot test would occur the following week with a view to it being deployed to the majority of the estate overnight on the 17th.

15.09.15 Katie confirmed that Fujitsu had accelerated implementation of the TC fix which was rolled out to all branches the previous night. Any further TC issues should be routed to the Atos Service Desk who would pass to Fujitsu directly.

Revisited Feb 2016 as no update on affected branches had been received. Chased Katie Austin (ATOS) but received no reply, since found out she's moved on so I've emailed Ian Humphries (ATOS) 01.04.16, Chased with Ian on 08.04.16. No update received. Confirmation is needed that

- Fix was put in place and was successful.
- Root Cause Analysis was completed and a documented outcome is available if needed.
- Details of affected branches, FAD codes any loss amounts etc. How have any losses been resolved (specifically have Atos passed across any details needed to FSC to allow Transaction Corrections to be issued if needed).
- Can we (POL) be assured that there will not have been any branches affected without the branch being aware of the issue.

3. Feb 2016 Remittance Mismatch- First reported to Gayle Peacock by Sean Farrow Supply Chain. Details of 5 branches where an unexplained mismatch had occurred between the amount remitted out by cash centre and remitted into branch. 6th branch also noted by FSC. Remittances affected as follows:-

These are cases where the value on Barcode was incorrect as was value posted to G/L 553001

Office Name	FAD Code	Actual Value Sent	Value on Barcode	Delivery Number	Barcode	Make Up date
Wallsend	0083903 29X	24000	26000	25395791	301376042 497	11-Feb-16
Aston	0082684 586	22000	24000	25387370	301375933 888	9-Feb-16
Drakes Broughton	0082292 475	2500	4000	25379066	301375873 917	5-Feb-16
Churchstoke	0082976 412	16000	18000	25314458	301375150 483	8-Jan-16
City of Exeter	0080215 198	16000	22000	25289657	301374840 668	24-Dec-15

In this case an extra barcode was created with apparently an associated value which did not affect G/L 553001

Office Name	FAD Code	Actual Value Sent	Value on Barcode	Delivery Number	Barcode	Make Up date	S96 2	G/L 5530 01
Llanfechain	008539 6417	2500	2500	25353495	3013755 88712	27-Jan-16	4500	2500
		Nil – no pouch made-up	2000		3013755 90210			

08.04.16 -Incident reopened with Atos as they stated they had no record of the original incident number. New Incident number provided is A12063578. Fujitsu

(Graham Heywood) has confirmed receipt of this from Atos, Sean Farrow will be asked for further details if needed by Fujitsu. No further incidents have occurred but no reason has been provided to FSC or Supply Chain to explain what caused these mismatches. Explanation needed from Atos/Fujitsu to understand the root cause and what if any fix is needed or has already occurred.

4. SSKs

First raised October 2014 by Security Team who had received Crown Office loss reports where it was alleged the SSK had contributed to the loss. At that time there was project resource still assigned and ongoing engagement was in place between IT areas and Crown team.

A number of incidents have been raised by Crown team which have resulted in checks being made by Security Team.

A further issue brought to light on 03.03.16. Trowbridge Crown branch complaining of losses attributed to SSK. Open security investigation. AEI Engineer had been to the crown branch and following this, had sent an email to the branch making statements about the system that were misleading. Subsequently engagement has been made between IT, Atos, NCR, 3M and Fujitsu to clarify the comments made. Crown team have an action plan in place for day to day management of SSK with the current position being that security team continue to update the Horizon call on Wednesday.