

Background



Announcement

- Following the Prime Minister's commitment on 26 February 2020 and the Ministerial Statements of 10 June 2020 and 30 September 2020, the Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry was established as a non-statutory inquiry in September 2020.
- The government converted that into the new Post Office Horizon IT statutory inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005 on 1 June 2021.
- The Inquiry is led by retired High Court judge, Sir Wyn Williams

Scope of the Inquiry

- The Government wants to be fully assured that through the Inquiry there is a public summary of the failings associated with POL's Horizon IT system.
- The Inquiry will draw on the findings made by Mr Justice Fraser from the Bates & others v Post Office Limited Group Litigation (in particular the Common Issues Judgment, and Horizon issues Judgment), the judgments of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in R v Hamilton & others, and other judgments in which convictions have been quashed.
- It will consider all other relevant evidence, listen to those that have been affected, understand what went wrong, assess whether lessons have been learned and whether concrete changes have taken place, or are underway, at Post Office Ltd.

Inquiry terms of reference



Revised Terms of Reference for Statutory Inquiry (19 May 2021)

A: Understand and acknowledge what went wrong in relation to Horizon, leading to the civil proceedings in Bates and others v Post Office Limited and the quashing of criminal convictions, by drawing from the judgments of Mr Justice Fraser in Bates and others, the judgments of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in R v Hamilton and others, other judgments in which convictions have been quashed, affected postmasters' experiences and any other relevant evidence in order to identify what key lessons must be learned for the future.

B: Build upon the findings of Mr Justice Fraser and the judgments of the criminal courts specified in A above by obtaining all available relevant evidence from Post Office Ltd, Fujitsu, BEIS and UKGI to establish a clear account of 1) the implementation and failings of Horizon over its lifecycle and 2) Post Office Ltd's use of information from Horizon when taking action against persons alleged to be responsible for shortfalls.


C: Assess whether Post Office Ltd has learned the lessons from the criticisms made by Mr Justice Fraser in his judgments following the 'Common Issues' and 'Horizon Issues' trials and those identified by affected postmasters and has delivered or made good progress on the organisational and cultural changes necessary to ensure a similar case does not happen in the future.


D: Assess whether the commitments made by Post Office Ltd within the mediation settlement – including the historical shortfall scheme – have been properly delivered.


E: Assess whether the processes and information provided by Post Office Ltd to postmasters are sufficient: i.to enable both parties to meet their contractual obligations ii.to enable postmasters to run their businesses. This includes assessing whether Post Office Ltd's related processes such as recording and resolving postmaster queries, dispute handling, suspension and termination are fit for purpose. In addition, determine whether the quality of the service offer for postmasters and their relationship with Post Office Ltd has materially improved since the conclusions reached by Mr Justice Fraser.


F: Examine the historic and current governance and whistleblowing controls in place at Post Office Ltd, identify any relevant failings, and establish whether current controls are now sufficient to ensure that failing leading to the issues covered by this Inquiry do not happen again.


The Inquiry will consider only those matters set out in the preceding sections A-F. The Inquiry will not consider any issue which is outside the scope of the powers conferred upon the Inquiry by the Inquiries Act 2005. The Horizon group damages settlement (albeit the Inquiry may examine the events leading to the settlement), and/or the engagement or findings of any other supervisory or complaints mechanisms, including in the public sector, are outside the Inquiry's scope.























The Inquiry's Confidentiality Undertaking



- The Inquiry requires that all POL personnel who may require access to any restricted Inquiry confidential information, personally sign a confidentiality undertaking for submission to the Inquiry. The undertaking is only effective once accepted by the Inquiry.
- The following are examples of scenarios that would still be caught by the Inquiry's confidentiality undertaking and where individuals involved would need to hold an approved undertaking.

Unpublished Inquiry information which does not form part of a request and which is forwarded to POL's finance team for financial planning in its entirety wher only parts of the information are relevant for that purpose or where the information shared is high-level.

Circulation of internal POL documents which refer to information provided by the Inquiry regarding Inquiry timetable planning or witness evidence scheduling before it is published on the Inquiry's website. Requests to a Personal Assistant to file, print, handle or distribute papers which contain unpublished Inquiry information which does not form part of a request.

Evidence given by a witness in a statement or at hearing which is not published or broadcast on the Inquiry's dedicated channels. Attendance at a Board meeting where information from the Inquiry is shared which does not form part of an Inquiry request and is not in the public domain.


 An internal POL email containing or referring to Inquiry information or a Rule 9 request that is marked "Private and Confidential".


Document preservation




- On 18 October 2021, POL implemented a document hold in relation to the Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry in order to comply with POL's
 obligations as a Core Participant in the Inquiry, which includes the disclosure of relevant documents.
- The document hold* informed all POL staff and contractors (including third party contractors) that all documents must be preserved (ie. not destroyed) that may ultimately need to be disclosed to the Inquiry.
- "Document" is defined very widely and includes not only hard copy documents and correspondence, but any media on which
 information of any description is stored.
- The range of documents that could be relevant is very broad the document hold captures anything that relates to the Inquiry's <u>Terms of Reference</u> or <u>Completed List of Issues</u> which would include by non-exhaustive way of example, documents that relate to liaison with Fujitsu, policies in respect of Horizon, governance documents, audit and investigation documents.
- Failure to preserve relevant documents could result in severe sanctions against POL.
- Where there are queries about whether material can be destroyed, these should be directed to the Inquiry legal team for advice.

* The document hold can be found on SharePoint Document Preservation - a message from Ben Foat (sharepoint.com)







Key links



Horizon IT Scandal - Hub page

Horizon IT Scandal - FAQs (sharepoint.com)

The Horizon Inquiry intranet site

Horizon IT Inquiry - Home (sharepoint.com)

Inquiry Website

Homepage | Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry (postofficehorizoninquiry.org.uk)

You Tube Hearings

Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry - YouTube

An introduction to Phases 5 & 6 of the Inquiry

Phases 5 and 6 of the Inquiry - Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry (youtube.com)