

From: Angela Van-Den-Bogerd [GRO]
Sent: Fri 21/08/2015 4:11:45 PM (UTC)
To: Melanie Corfield [GRO]; Mark Underwood1 [GRO]; Lorraine Lynch [GRO]; Ward, Alexandra [GRO]
Cc: Steve Allchorn [GRO]
Subject: RE: Transcript of Panorama

Mel,

Thank you – this is helpful.

I believe I now have everything I need for Monday. Thanks all for your support in getting to this position.

Have a great weekend.

Angela



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From: Melanie Corfield
Sent: 21 August 2015 17:08
To: Angela Van-Den-Bogerd; Mark Underwood1; Lorraine Lynch; Ward, Alexandra
Cc: Steve Allchorn
Subject: RE: Transcript of Panorama

Hi Angela

Just a thought - an extract from the legal letter to BBC (not yet finalised and sent as you know) might help with this. Mr Rolls has no knowledge of individual cases so cannot, in fact, know whether 'suffering' was caused by Horizon or not. He states only 'it is possible', a pretty meaningless response and made without knowing anything about individual cases, Post Office's business practices regarding postmasters etc etc.

Mel

Extract below:

Mr Sweeney further asks Mr Rolls the highly leading question: *"It is possible that suffering could have been caused because there are problems in the Horizon system?"*. Mr Rolls states that this is possible.

However, again, **no evidence** is presented by Mr Rolls or during the Programme to suggest that any problem with the Horizon system has resulted in a loss for which any postmaster was prosecuted. Nonetheless, the manner in which Mr Rolls' contribution is presented is intended to mislead viewers into believing that he has a greater degree of knowledge of individual cases than is accurate.

From: Angela Van-Den-Bogerd
Sent: 21 August 2015 15:46
To: Mark Underwood1; Lorraine Lynch; Ward, Alexandra
Cc: Steve Allchorn; Melanie Corfield
Subject: RE: Transcript of Panorama

Mark,

There is another part of RR & JS discussion that is relevant:

JS: *Some people have been ruined financially. People have gone to prison. Is it possible that suffering could have been caused because there are problems in the Horizon system?*

RR: Yes, it is possible.

Any further comments/positioning on the above please?

Thanks,
Angela



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From: Mark Underwood1
Sent: 21 August 2015 15:31
To: Angela Van-Den-Bogerd; Lorraine Lynch; Ward, Alexandra
Cc: Steve Allchorn; Melanie Corfield
Subject: RE: Transcript of Panorama

Hi,

With thanks to Mel for obtaining the large part of the below information from Peter Newsome...

Looking at the transcript, I think the below is the key sentence from RR. He states:

“RR: *We went in through the backdoor and made changes. Sometimes you would be putting several lines of code in at a time. If we hadn't done that then the counters would have stopped working”.*

What RR is actually talking about here is, I think, open to interpretation.

What we do know about RR is that he:

- worked in 3rd / 4th line support on the 6th floor for a couple of years in the early 2000's;
- worked on 'estate management' rather than the accountancy side;
- left Fujitsu on good terms as he had become disillusioned with IT to become a chiropractor in the Bracknell area.

What we know about Horizon pre- 2010 is:

- It was a 'dial up' system (encrypted) and Fujitsu application software specialists could access the system remotely, as you would expect them to be able to do as part of any standard IT support function, but the system did not allow remote agents to manipulate branch transactions. These remote agents perform tasks like examining diagnostic information not transmitted to the central servers and modifying application functionality on behalf of the subpostmaster that is not part of the standard interface e.g. forcing the counter to re-download its personality and product set data.
- Remote agents could not 'work' the terminals as there was no functionality for this
- Every access was logged and so there is an auditable footprint where records are still within the retention period

JS interpreted RR's statement to be in relation to financial records. The reality is that, given the above- RR's role would have involved putting in codes for various and numerous reasons - updating, maintaining etc - but this would have had nothing to do with branch transactions.

This in mind, I think our initial reply should be that, RR was actually referring to providing support rather than editing transactional records.

As included in our Scheme report:

It is also possible for Fujitsu to view branch data in order to provide support and conduct maintenance but this does not allow access to any functionality that could be used to edit recorded transaction data. Having reviewed all the cases, no-one (including all the Applicants and Second Sight) has been able to identify a specific transaction that did not originate in branch.

A number of different explanations were found for the 'unknown' transactions:

- The transaction was conducted by the Applicant but they could not remember the transaction. Every input into Horizon is logged against the unique identity of the user. Each user ID is personal to that user and protected with a password that must not be shared. Where the transaction data was available, the Post Office was able to identify the user entering the questioned transactions. In some cases, this was the Applicant (where the Applicant had confirmed that their password was secure).
- The transaction was entered using the Applicant's user ID but the Applicant had shared their password with other staff members. In these cases, the most likely explanation is that a staff member had conducted the transaction without the Applicant's knowledge.
- A staff member had conducted the transaction with their own user ID without the Applicant's knowledge (albeit that a postmaster is able to determine this himself by accessing the branch records available through Horizon).
- The entries correlated to periods when relief or temporary postmasters were running a branch.

- The entries were conducted by Post Office staff conducting audits of branches and who had logged on to the branch terminals with the Applicant's full knowledge but these entries were determined not to affect the branch's accounting position.

If, it is then asserted that RR was referring altering financial records or the Balancing transaction Process, I think our lines should be similar to:

- As we have always said, Horizon does not have functionality that allows Post Office or Fujitsu to edit or delete the transactions recorded by branches
- It has however always been possible for Post Office to correct errors in and/or update a branch's accounts. This is most commonly done by way of a transaction correction however it could also be by way of a balancing transaction or transaction acknowledgement.
- A Post Office employee could also, in special circumstances, log on to a branch terminal locally (i.e. by being physically in a branch) using a new User ID and password and then conduct transactions (though these would register against that unique User ID).
- All of the above processes for correcting / updating a branch's accounts have similar features. All of them involve inputting a new transaction into the branch's records (not editing or removing any previous transactions) and all are shown transparently in the branch transaction records available to Subpostmasters (as well as in the master ARQ data).
- We have never made the BTP a secret. In fact we reference it in both our published Scheme Report and our Reply to Second Sight's Part Two Report.

Does this give you what you need?

Mark Underwood
Complaint Review and Mediation Scheme
GRO

From: Mark Underwood1
Sent: 21 August 2015 12:11
To: Angela Van-Den-Bogerd; Lorraine Lynch; Ward, Alexandra
Cc: Steve Allchorn
Subject: RE: Transcript of Panorama

Hi Angela, understood – leave it with me

Mark

Mark Underwood
Complaint Review and Mediation Scheme
GRO

From: Angela Van-Den-Bogerd
Sent: 21 August 2015 12:05
To: Mark Underwood1; Lorraine Lynch; Ward, Alexandra
Cc: Steve Allchorn
Subject: RE: Transcript of Panorama

Mark,

Would you also provide our (PO) response to what Richard Rolls' said on the programme. I expect this to be a key discussion point on Monday and I'd like to have a robust response/explanation of the mention of going in by the back door and altering the coding - I need a lay person's explanation on what this actually means.

Thanks,
Angela



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From: Mark Underwood1
Sent: 21 August 2015 11:29
To: Lorraine Lynch; Angela Van-Den-Bogerd; Ward, Alexandra
Cc: Steve Allchorn
Subject: RE: Transcript of Panorama

Angela & Lex,

With reference to the below – please see attached

Mark

Mark Underwood
Complaint Review and Mediation Scheme

GRO

From: Lorraine Lynch
Sent: 21 August 2015 11:08
To: Mark Underwood1
Cc: Steve Allchorn
Subject: Transcript of Panorama

Mark

Would you be able to send the transcript of Monday night's Panorama to Angela and Lex Ward (BD) please. They are mediating M005 on Monday and her mediation statement has mentioned the programme.

L