1 Tuesday, 19 September 2023 2 (9.06 pm) 3 MR BEER: Good morning, sir, can you see and hear 4 me? 5 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, I can, thank you. 6 MR BEER: Sir, before we move to call Helen Rose, 7 can I say something briefly about ongoing 8 disclosure? 9 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Of course. 10 MR BEER: As everyone will know, following the 11 hearing held on 5 September this year, you 12 decided that the Inquiry could commence hearing 13 from Phase 4 witnesses today and you 14 subsequently issued a statement giving further 15 directions. As has been made clear on previous 16 occasions when the Inquiry has addressing the 17 issue of late disclosure, all of those 18 interested in the work of the Inquiry, including 19 but not limited to witnesses and Core 20 Participants, should understand that the fact 21 that the Inquiry has decided to continue to hear 22 evidence does not mean that the witnesses from 23 whom evidence is about to be taken will be 24 giving evidence just once. 25 The Inquiry will not hesitate to request 1 1 a further witness statement or statements from 2 witnesses and call witnesses back to give 3 evidence in the event that sufficiently relevant 4 material is either disclosed before the witness 5 gives evidence but the Inquiry has not had the 6 opportunity to process it or such evidence is 7 disclosed after a witness gives evidence. 8 This is not only to ensure that all 9 sufficiently relevant material is put to 10 witnesses but also in fairness to witnesses, so 11 that they have the opportunity to address all 12 sufficiently relevant material. 13 To put into context what I've just said, 14 I should say that since 3 July this year, so 15 just before the first disclosure hearing, the 16 Post Office has disclosed approximately 23,000 17 potentially relevant documents to the Inquiry. 18 This included disclosures right up until the end 19 of last week with 1,500 documents coming in on 20 Thursday and 1,500 documents coming in on Friday 21 of last week. 22 Of those approximately 23,000 documents, on 23 the basis of how the Post Office has categorised 24 them when disclosing them, approximately 15,200 25 are said by the Post Office to relate to Phase 4 2 1 of the Inquiry. 2 Many but not all of these documents have 3 been provided in response to the three 4 disclosure failings that you identified 5 following the disclosure hearing held on 4 July, 6 namely search terms, family documents and 7 deduplication. 8 These documents relate to a range of 9 requests made by the Inquiry to the Post Office 10 dating back to 8 October 2021 and running up 11 until 5 June 2023. 12 It follows from what I've said that a high 13 number of potentially relevant documents have 14 been disclosed in the recent past by the Post 15 Office and many of them are presently being 16 processed by the Inquiry, albeit a large number 17 of them appear to be duplicates of material 18 already disclosed to the Inquiry. 19 As I've said, no one should be surprised if 20 witnesses have to be re-called as a consequence 21 of this and other disclosure issues. 22 Sir, you're still on mute. 23 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Thank you, Mr Beer. I don't 24 propose to add to what you've said but 25 I certainly endorse it. 3 1 MR BEER: Thank you. Just so everyone knows, we 2 propose to sit until 1.30 pm today, rather than 3 the 2.00 pm that was advertised. 4 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: That, I have to confess, is due 5 to my personal circumstances so I apologise for 6 that. 7 MR BEER: Thank you, sir. 8 Might I therefore call -- and she's giving 9 evidence remotely -- Helen Rose, please. 10 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Of course, yes. 11 HELEN ROSE (affirmed) 12 Questioned by MR BEER 13 MR BEER: Thank you very much. Mrs Rose, my name is 14 Jason Beer, as you know, and I ask questions on 15 behalf of the Inquiry. Can you give us your 16 full name, please. 17 A. Helen Rose. 18 Q. Thank you for attending remotely to assist the 19 Inquiry in its work and for previously providing 20 a witness statement to the Inquiry. You should 21 have in front of you a hard copy of that witness 22 statement. It's in your name and dated 10 May 23 2023. If you turn to the last page of it, which 24 is page 9, there's a signature. Is that your 25 signature? 4 1 A. It is, yes. 2 Q. Are the contents of that statement true to the 3 best of your knowledge and belief? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. For the purposes of the transcript, the URN is 6 WITN00790100. That need not be displayed. 7 Can I start by asking you some questions 8 about your career qualifications and experience. 9 You joined the Post Office in 1997; is that 10 right? 11 A. Correct, yes. 12 Q. Did you have any professional qualifications 13 prior to joining the Post Office? 14 A. No. 15 Q. Having joined in 1997, you worked in what you 16 describe in your witness statement as head 17 office branches. Can you describe what a head 18 office branch is, please? 19 A. It was the Post Office Counters but it was in 20 main branches, the Crown Offices. 21 Q. So what we know as Crown Office branches? 22 A. Correct, yeah. 23 Q. Whereabouts were you based? 24 A. I was based at Huddersfield. 25 Q. What responsibilities did your role entail when 5 1 you were working in the Crown Office branch? 2 A. Serving customers, dealing -- I think it did 3 eventually go on to Horizon. I can't confirm if 4 it was Horizon when I started at the Crown 5 Office. 6 Q. Okay, so you were working on the counters, 7 essentially? 8 A. Correct. 9 Q. I think you remained there until 1999 when you 10 became an auditor; is that right? 11 A. Correct, yes. 12 Q. If that chronology is right, I think it follows 13 that you wouldn't have worked with Horizon 14 before moving to become an auditor because it 15 hadn't -- 16 A. No. 17 Q. -- been rolled out by 1999? 18 A. No. 19 Q. What if any knowledge did you have of the 20 Horizon System when you worked on the counters 21 in the Huddersfield Crown Office? 22 A. I can't remember the system back then. It was 23 a computerised system but I couldn't tell you 24 which it was. 25 Q. In any event, you became an auditor in 1999 and 6 1 remained an auditor for five years until 2004; 2 is that right? 3 A. That's correct, yeah. 4 Q. Did you have any qualifications to be 5 an auditor? 6 A. No. 7 Q. Did you receive any training to be an auditor? 8 A. I believe it was on-the-job training. 9 Q. Did you have any training on the operation of 10 the Horizon System? 11 A. I can't remember whether we did any courses or 12 whether it was, again, on-the-job training with 13 the system. 14 Q. Did any on-the-job training as an auditor, or 15 indeed later as an investigator, include any 16 discussion of any bugs, errors or defects in the 17 Horizon System? 18 A. Not that I can remember, no. 19 Q. Did your training as an auditor on the job or 20 later as an investigator include any discussion 21 about the role of Fujitsu in providing support 22 for the correction of any bugs, errors or 23 defects in the system? 24 A. Not that I can recall, no. 25 Q. When you were an auditor, where were you based? 7 1 A. Leeds. 2 Q. Did you have a geographical area of coverage? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. What was that area? 5 A. From memory, it was the northeast, so I seem to 6 think it was from Lincoln, potentially up to the 7 Scottish border and across to the east side of 8 Manchester. 9 Q. Thank you. What did your responsibilities 10 entail when you were an auditor for those five 11 years? 12 A. It would have been -- given a list of offices to 13 visit and confirm cash and stock at branches. 14 Q. What do you mean by confirm cash and stock at 15 branches? 16 A. From memory, attending a branch and just 17 ensuring the assets were on site. 18 Q. So was it essentially a counting function? 19 A. Yes, basically, yes. 20 Q. If there were discrepancies, did your role as 21 an auditor involve investigating why the 22 discrepancies had arisen? 23 A. Not that I can recall. If it was clear that you 24 could see where the error was made, I would 25 obviously report that. But no, no, it would be 8 1 passed up the line. 2 Q. Did your role as an auditor involve 3 consideration of whether the Horizon System was 4 responsible for any discrepancies in accounts or 5 figures? 6 A. No, I wouldn't have thought so, no. 7 Q. In the witness statement you gave in the Lee 8 Castleton trial -- I'm not going to turn it up 9 at the moment, I'm just going to give the 10 reference, it's POL00082945, page 2, 11 paragraph 4 -- you said that you carried out at 12 least one audit every day, sometimes two or 13 three audits a day, sometimes four, and that, in 14 this five-year period, you completed well over 15 1,400 audits. Is that accurate? 16 A. From memory, yes. 17 Q. In those 1,400 audits, what audit information 18 held by Fujitsu would you have ordinarily 19 accessed when carrying out your audit? 20 A. As an auditor, none. 21 Q. To whom did you report at this time? 22 A. I can't remember my first line manager. 23 I believe my line manager at some point in 24 auditing was John Jenkinson but, sorry, I can't 25 remember any other names. 9 1 Q. That's all right. How many people were in your 2 audit team? 3 A. Oh, wow. There were a few different audit 4 teams. I'm going to hazard a guess at six, 5 I think, but that probably changed on and off. 6 Q. Between 2004 -- so for two years -- and 2006, 7 you became an investigator in the Security team; 8 is that right? 9 A. That's right yes. 10 Q. Where were you based? 11 A. Sheffield. 12 Q. What responsibilities did your role as 13 an investigator within the Security team entail? 14 A. From memory, it would have been -- you would 15 have been a case to look into to try to 16 understand what had happened in that case. 17 Q. How would you understand what had happened in 18 that case? 19 A. That would have been more looking at 20 transactions, findings, results from previous 21 audits. I'm sorry, I don't remember an awful 22 lot in that role. 23 Q. When you say that it would involve looking at 24 transactions, how would you look at 25 transactions? 10 1 A. I can't remember whether there was a system that 2 we could download it on. We had to go in and 3 look at the actual -- when you visited the 4 office. Sorry, I haven't got very much 5 recollection from then. 6 Q. By this time, had you received any specialist 7 training in the operation of the Horizon System? 8 A. Not that I can recall, no. 9 Q. Had you received any training in the operation 10 of the Horizon System by this time? 11 A. Other than gaining experience in the years of 12 auditing and not that I can recall, no. 13 Q. Between 2006 and 2016, you say in your statement 14 that you undertook a range of analytical roles; 15 is that right? 16 A. Correct, yes. 17 Q. Until you left the Post Office in 2016? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. I wonder whether we could look at some 20 documents, please, to try to jog your memory as 21 to what some of those analytical roles were. 22 Can we start, please, and it'll come up on the 23 screen in front of you, Mrs Rose, POL00104906. 24 Can you see this is a document entitled 25 "Fraud & Conformance Team, Team Leader 11 1 Handover", 3 March 2012? 2 A. Mm-hm. 3 Q. So this would have been well into your role as 4 an analyst or undertaking analytical work in the 5 Security team, yes? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. Can you remember what the Fraud and Conformance 8 team was? 9 A. Not specifically, no. I know it was a team in 10 Chesterfield but other than that, no. 11 Q. Were you a part of it? 12 A. Sorry? 13 Q. Were you a part of it, the Fraud and Conformance 14 team? 15 A. I don't think so. 16 Q. Can we turn to page 3, please. Looking at "Team 17 Purpose": 18 "Since 2008 additional agency resource has 19 been used on the team to enable detailed Branch 20 Investigation. This resource has been utilised 21 to check branch accounting activity and has been 22 used to identify new fraudulent indicators. It 23 has also been used to support elements of the 24 Santander contract with POL to address 25 non-conformance and identify fraud relating to 12 1 Green giro transactions and despatch." 2 Was what is described there part of your 3 role? 4 A. Prior to this, yes, but I can't remember the 5 details, I'm sorry. 6 Q. When you say "prior to this", prior to March 7 2012? What do you mean, "prior to this"? 8 A. Prior to that date. I used to look at data 9 at -- I can't remember which data -- to identify 10 any fraudulent indicators or compliance that -- 11 I'm sorry, I don't have an awful lot of memory 12 on that. 13 Q. Can we look at page 9 of the document, please. 14 There's a table that lasts in summary form 15 a couple of pages and then in many more pages in 16 detail, called "Fraud Indicators Summary"? 17 A. Mm-hm. 18 Q. You'll see down the left-hand side there is 19 a list of indicators, cash, scratchcard stock, 20 or cheques, a level of risk, and then a method 21 of detection? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. You're, for the first and third on there, cash 24 and cheques, said to be a useful contact. Can 25 you see that? 13 1 A. I can, yes. 2 Q. Why were you a useful contact for the fraud 3 indicators of cash and cheques? 4 A. I'm presuming at the time I had quite a bit 5 knowledge on the data and what it was telling 6 people. 7 Q. What kind of people contacted you about these 8 fraud indicators? 9 A. The Fraud team. 10 Q. Okay, so they were based in Chesterfield and you 11 were in Sheffield; is this right? 12 A. No, I worked -- I was in Sheffield when I did 13 the investigation role. When I did the 14 analytical role I was based -- I think initially 15 I was based home working and then it went into 16 Manchester but I did do quite a bit of work in 17 Chesterfield. 18 Q. Okay. Anyway, members of the Fraud and 19 Conformance team, of which you were not a part, 20 contacted you? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. Why would you be contacted? 23 A. I can only think that at the time I had 24 knowledge to assist any questions. 25 Q. What kind of advice would you give? 14 1 A. I honestly couldn't remember. Advice on, 2 I would guess, where to look for things. But 3 I can't remember the systems, I'm sorry. 4 Q. Can we turn to page 23, please. There's a list 5 of "Key Contacts from around the business" 6 within this document and if we see, about seven 7 or eight lines in, your name I see mentioned and 8 your role is described as "Crime Risk"? 9 A. It is. 10 Q. Did your role involve investigating branches to 11 look for evidence of criminal activity such as 12 theft or false accounting? 13 A. It would have been to identify anomalous 14 behaviour, which could be theft, false 15 accounting, compliance, human error, various 16 things. 17 Q. When performing that role, did you consider 18 whether the Horizon System was at fault, that 19 that was amongst the list of potential problems 20 that you ought to encourage people to look at or 21 you look at yourself? 22 A. At the time, I don't recall that coming to 23 light, no. 24 Q. When you were undertaking this role, crime risk, 25 did you review what's known as ARQ data? 15 1 A. Looking at the documents I've been sent over, 2 yes, I believe I could have done. I don't 3 recall any but potentially could have done. 4 Q. What role did you play in determining whether 5 branches were to be investigated or not? 6 A. If my memory serves me right, if anything 7 highlighted outside the normal -- and I can't 8 tell you what the normal is without seeing the 9 data -- I would have probably passed that on to 10 somebody to look into further. 11 Q. What role, if any, did you play in determining 12 whether branches or subpostmasters operating 13 branches were to be the subject of prosecutions? 14 A. None. 15 Q. Did you play any role in supporting 16 prosecutions? 17 A. Other than providing data for anybody that 18 requested it, no. 19 Q. Can we look, please, at POL00105025. This will 20 come up on the screen for you, Mrs Rose. This 21 document appears to set out the objectives of 22 each member of the security team for 2013 to 23 2014. If we go to the second page, please, we 24 can see that there's an index and it goes 25 through role by role, person by person. Can you 16 1 see that? 2 A. I can. 3 Q. That index goes on for 3 pages. You'll see 4 there that your name appears -- 5 A. Mm-hm. 6 Q. -- "Helen Rose -- Security Manager, Grapevine". 7 A. Mm. 8 Q. It says go to page 44 but, in fact, that's 9 wrong. It's page 55, please, in the document. 10 We can see your role set out. It appears to be 11 one of those documents that sets out, in the 12 second box in, an objective and then a timescale 13 for achieving it in the far right-hand side; can 14 you see that? 15 A. I can, yes. 16 Q. You're described as at this time as a Security 17 Manager in Grapevine. What was Grapevine? 18 A. My memory of Grapevine would have been just 19 a Security team name. 20 Q. So it was a Security team name; is that right? 21 A. From memory, yes. 22 Q. You were the manager of it, is that right, or 23 a manager of it? 24 A. No, I think Security Manager was given to just 25 about most people within the Security team. 17 1 Q. Everyone was a manager, were they? 2 A. I think that was just the name that people 3 working in the Security team at that time were 4 given. 5 Q. You'll see in paragraph 1 -- if you just read 6 that to yourself, paragraph 1 -- 7 A. Mm-hm. 8 Q. -- the third bullet point states the following 9 in relation to your role: 10 "Provide end-to-end process map for all 11 procedures to identify current known risks." 12 Do you remember that being a function of 13 yours, to produce a process map for all 14 procedures to identify known risks. 15 A. I don't recall it -- no, I can't remember it. 16 Q. Would you have produced such a map if that was 17 your objective for the following year? 18 A. I presume at the time I would have -- if that 19 was my objective, I would have produced the 20 process map, yes. 21 Q. Reading this to yourself now, such a map was to 22 identify "current known risks". What would you 23 understand "current known risks" to refer to? 24 Risks to what or to whom? 25 A. Post Office assets. 18 1 Q. So the money and physical possessions of the 2 Post Office? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. Can you recall whether the map addressed any 5 risks inherent in a computer system such as 6 Horizon? 7 A. I can't recall that, no. 8 Q. Can you recall how large the Grapevine team was? 9 A. No. 10 Q. You can't remember how many people were in it? 11 A. No, I can't. 12 Q. In respect of Grapevine, how was it different 13 from any other Security team? Why was it called 14 "Grapevine"? 15 A. I don't know. My very vague memory of Grapevine 16 was more external loss, robberies, burglaries, 17 that kind of thing. I don't have any other 18 recollection of it, sorry. 19 Q. The first of your objectives is listed as: 20 "Identify potential fraud investigations and 21 trends." 22 Then skipping to the fourth one: 23 "Train and develop colleagues on the use of 24 Credence and other analytical tools." 25 Would you agree that by 2013, it appears 19 1 that you played a role, an important role, in 2 helping to identify potential fraud and trends? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. Your role was an analytical one? 5 A. Correct, yes. 6 Q. You were amongst other functions helping to 7 identify trends in fraud investigation across 8 the business? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. You were responsible for training others on 11 analytical tools to find fraud and help in the 12 investigation of fraud; is that right? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. Your performance was being tested against those 15 tasks? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. Can you help us as to what Credence was, please? 18 A. I believe it was a software program that you 19 could download Horizon data, but that's a very 20 vague memory of it. 21 Q. By this time, 2013 to 2014, was it the case that 22 the Post Office, in your section of it, relied 23 predominantly on Credence for the purposes of 24 investigation? 25 A. I believe it relied quite heavily on the initial 20 1 data, yes. 2 Q. There's no reference here or elsewhere in this 3 document to Fujitsu audit data or ARQ data or 4 even enhanced ARQ data. Does that reflect the 5 fact that you would not habitually access such 6 data in order to conduct investigations? 7 A. Not in that role, no. 8 Q. Is it also the case that, by this time, 9 investigators didn't habitually access Fujitsu 10 audit data or ARQ data or enhanced ARQ data in 11 order to conduct their investigations? 12 A. I don't know what individual investigators would 13 have accessed. 14 Q. This fourth bullet point refers to "other 15 analytical tools". Can you recall what they 16 were? 17 A. No, I can't. Sorry. 18 Q. Can we look, please, at POL00120956. Thank you. 19 You'll see this is an email from Dave Posnett; 20 do you remember him? 21 A. I do, yes. 22 Q. Do you remember what function he performed at 23 this time, mid-2012? 24 A. I know from reading the document that was sent 25 me that -- at the time I believe he was 21 1 a financial investigator but I don't know from 2 what dates he did that. 3 Q. You'll see that it's dated 15 June 2012 and it's 4 sent to a wide range of people. 5 A. Mm-hm. 6 Q. Looking at those, do they appear to be people 7 who worked in the Security team or people who 8 were performing analytical functions, such as 9 you? 10 A. I recognise quite few of the names, yes, 11 I believe they were a part of the Security team. 12 Q. So they're mainly Security team people? 13 A. I would say so, yes. 14 Q. You're amongst them; can you see that? 15 A. I can, yes. 16 Q. It's about case compliance and do you remember 17 the topic of case compliance? 18 A. No. 19 Q. Let's read it together if we scroll down, 20 please: 21 "All, 22 "Just a little reminder that the compliance 23 on green jacket/offender files will recommence 24 in July. I associate the emails ..." 25 I think that means "I attach": 22 1 "[I attach] the emails and attachments 2 I sent out a month or two ago for reference." 3 If you just control up, please, you'll see 4 a zip file is an attachment; can you see that? 5 A. Mm-hm. 6 Q. Then carrying on reading: 7 "The compliance checks on submitted offender 8 interview case files will continue in 2012/2013. 9 Associated are all the supporting documents 10 needed, which have been amended where 11 appropriate. I suggest that these are referred 12 to when you have time and/or when submitting 13 an offender interview case file. Some salient 14 points and changes are summarised as follows, to 15 take effect immediately where applicable." 16 Then there's a list of bullet points in 17 changes in case compliance; do you see that? 18 A. I can, yes. 19 Q. So, essentially, in June 2012, the contents -- 20 in July 2012, the contents of case files for 21 offenders were going to be checked for 22 compliance. That process was going to 23 recommence and this was giving everyone 24 a heads-up, yes? 25 A. Mm-hm, that's what it looks like. 23 1 Q. I'm so sorry? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. If we just scroll down: 4 "This communication has been sent out now to 5 inform you in advance of the changes in 6 compliance and provide you with the information 7 needed on recommencement of the compliance 8 checks." 9 You can see Mr Posnett's title, yes? 10 A. Yeah. 11 Q. Now, we saw that there was a zip file attached. 12 That zip file contained various documents, some 13 of which I would now like to look at. Before we 14 do that, do you remember the need to comply with 15 certain standards when submitting an offender 16 file? 17 A. A vague memory of things you had to ensure were 18 in there, but in the role I was doing at that 19 time, I wouldn't have been completing those 20 files. 21 Q. Why would you be sent the email? 22 A. I don't know. I'm guessing because I may have 23 supported people with any documentation. 24 Q. What do you mean by you may have supported 25 people with documentation? 24 1 A. At the time, my job would have been the 2 analytical side, so if people needed things 3 looking at, I think I probably assisted them, 4 but, to be honest, I can't remember any specific 5 ones. I would have been a support, I guess. 6 Q. I'm sorry, I missed that? 7 A. I would have been a support to them rather than 8 actually providing the green jackets. 9 Q. So you wouldn't have been sending your own green 10 jackets in, you might have been helping other 11 people in the compilation and completion of 12 their own? 13 A. Of any data that they asked for. Not the actual 14 completing of the green jacket, no. 15 Q. So presumably it was important that you had 16 sight of the case compliance standards so that 17 you could provide that support function knowing 18 the standards which the investigators themselves 19 had to comply with? 20 A. I would guess that's why I was copied in, yes. 21 Q. So, presumably at the time, I don't expect you 22 to remember it now, you would have read the 23 email and looked at the attachments? 24 A. Yes. I would have presumed so, yes. 25 Q. Can we look, please, at POL00038452. This is 25 1 one of the attachments within that zip file; do 2 you understand? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. If you look at page 1 that we're looking at now, 5 "Security Operations Team Compliance, Guide to 6 the Preparation and Layout of Investigation Red 7 Label Case Files", can you remember what a red 8 label case file was? 9 A. I'm sorry, I can't remember now, no. 10 Q. "Offender reports & Discipline reports". Then 11 page 2, we can see the purpose of the document, 12 essentially: 13 "The purpose of the Suspect Offender report 14 is to provide a storyboard of the events and 15 evidence of an investigation to the relevant 16 stakeholders and Post Office Limited Legal & 17 Compliance Team to enable a decision to be made 18 as to the future conduct of a case. 19 "This guide is produced for all Security 20 Operations Managers, irrespective of location 21 ... 22 "The general principle is that the 23 description of investigation activities should 24 read in the sequence they occurred ... The 25 following is only a guide ... 26 1 "A single report is required in cases where 2 more than one suspect offender is identified 3 ..." 4 Then at the foot of the page, please, just 5 a bit below: 6 "The aim of this document is to give 7 guidance to Security Operations Managers and 8 Team Leaders on the current compliance ..." 9 Then over the page: 10 "... standards for the preparation of red 11 label case offender reports and discipline 12 reports." 13 Then there is set out, essentially, on 14 page 3 a template or an index for what the case 15 file should look like. 16 A. Mm-hm. 17 Q. Then if we go to page 5, please. We can see 18 a template, essentially, for a case file, and so 19 the preamble suggests that headers and footers 20 should read "Post Office Limited Confidential 21 Investigation, Legal". 22 Does that reflect the fact, to your 23 recollection, that offender reports were kept 24 internally and not disclosed to those who were 25 being investigated? 27 1 A. To be honest, I don't know the answer to that. 2 I would imagine if that was completed, the 3 person that you were completing it about should 4 know what details. They would have had to 5 provide the details surely. 6 Q. What do you mean "they would have had to provide 7 the details", the person being investigated? 8 A. Well, the date of birth, which office, what 9 their name was, what service, what their 10 National Insurance was. I would think they 11 would have had to have been aware. 12 Q. They would be aware that they were being 13 investigated and they could be asked "Hello, 14 what's your name, what's your branch code, 15 what's your National Insurance number", or 16 whatever. This is saying that the document 17 that's created as a result, the offender report, 18 is to be headed on each page, the header and 19 footer, "Post Office Limited Confidential 20 Investigation, Legal"? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. Which tends to suggest that it's confidential, 23 it's for the eyes of Legal and would not be 24 disclosed to the suspect. Can you recall 25 whether that is correct or not? 28 1 A. I honestly have -- I couldn't answer that, I'm 2 sorry. 3 Q. Okay, well, we'll see a little bit later in this 4 policy document whether what I've said is 5 correct or not. 6 A. Okay. 7 Q. You can see on the right-hand side of the page 8 there that one of the things that investigators 9 were required to complete were identification 10 codes, numbers, 1 to 7 only; can you see that? 11 A. I can, yes. 12 Q. I won't ask you about that for the moment but 13 just remember that's there. Can we go forward 14 to page 10, please, and scroll down, please. 15 I'm so sorry, scroll up to 1.24. Thank you. 16 Paragraph 1.24 of the policy reads as 17 a heading: 18 "Details of failures in security, 19 supervision, procedures and product integrity. 20 "This must be a comprehensive list of all 21 identified failures in security, supervision, 22 procedures and product integrity it must be 23 highlighted bold in the report. Where the 24 Security Manager concludes that there are no 25 failures in security, supervision, procedures 29 1 and product integrity a statement to this effect 2 should be made and highlighted in bold." 3 Do you remember that, that in the offender 4 report any of the four species of failures 5 listed there had to be highlighted in bold in 6 the report? 7 A. I can't remember that but at this time 8 I wouldn't have been doing offender reports. 9 Q. You would have been seeing offender reports 10 though, wouldn't you? 11 A. I would probably have been seeing them as they 12 came thorough. I honestly can't remember. 13 Sorry. 14 Q. Would you agree that that kind of description 15 there is broad enough to capture issues 16 discovered, any issues discovered, with the 17 reliability of Horizon data? 18 A. It should do, yes. 19 Q. If we go to the bottom of the page, please. We 20 then turn to the discipline report. Can you see 21 there, it says "Header and footer" -- so this is 22 what's to go at the top and bottom of the 23 document -- "Post Office Limited Confidential 24 Investigation, Personnel". 25 Yes? 30 1 A. Mm-hm. Mm-hm. 2 Q. Can we go, please, to page 12 of the document, 3 please, and look at 2.15 at the foot of the 4 page. A very similar paragraph to the one we've 5 just read: 6 "Details of failures in security, 7 supervision, procedures and product integrity. 8 "This must be a comprehensive list of all 9 failures in security, supervision, procedures 10 and product integrity it must be highlighted in 11 bold", et cetera. 12 So that's the same as the paragraph we've 13 just read, yes? 14 A. Yes, it is, yes. 15 Q. Over the page, please: 16 "Significant failures that may affect the 17 successful likelihood of any criminal action 18 and/or cause significant damage to the business 19 must be confined, solely, to the confidential 20 offender report. Care must be exercised when 21 including failures within the Discipline Report 22 as obviously this is disclosed to the suspect 23 offender and may have ramifications on both the 24 criminal elements of the enquiry, as well as 25 being potentially damaging to the reputation or 31 1 security of the business. If you are in doubt 2 ... discuss with your Team Leader." 3 A. Mm-hm. 4 Q. Do you remember this difference of approach, 5 that if it has been discovered that there were 6 significant failures that affected the 7 likelihood of criminal proceedings or caused 8 damage to the reputation of the Post Office, 9 they weren't to be included in a document that 10 was disclosed to the offender but were to be 11 kept in the confidential offender report? 12 A. I don't recall that, sorry. 13 Q. Can you remember anything like that, that any 14 failures that concerned the integrity of, for 15 example, Horizon data or any other failures in 16 process that affected or might affect the 17 reputation of the Post Office business weren't 18 included in a document that would be disclosed 19 to the suspect, but were included in 20 a confidential legal report? 21 A. I don't recall that part but, as I say, that 22 probably wouldn't have been part of my role at 23 that time. I would have probably seen 24 a document like this but I can't recall 25 completing these reports. 32 1 Q. Can we look, please -- that document can come 2 down -- at POL00115672. This is another of the 3 attachments to the zip file. 4 A. Mm-hm. 5 Q. This appears to be a template drawn from the 6 policy itself and is essentially in a Word 7 document, either as a first page or a file front 8 page. Do you remember the files -- the green 9 jackets being set out in a format such as this? 10 A. I can remember the green jackets used to be set 11 out in a formal but I can't remember any of the 12 documentation in it. 13 Q. You will see this requires the person completing 14 the file to include identification codes, can 15 you see that on the right-hand side? 16 A. I can, yes. 17 Q. Can we look at POL00115674. This is another one 18 of the attachments to the case compliance email 19 sent to you -- 20 A. Mm-hm. 21 Q. -- which contains a list of identification 22 codes? 23 A. Mm-hm. 24 Q. So this document is an attachment to an email 25 being sent around the Security team and you in 33 1 June 2012. Just read it for yourself, please. 2 A. Okay. 3 Q. Does anything strike you about it? 4 A. Not really, no. 5 Q. What was the purpose of recording the 6 identification codes of suspects? 7 A. I don't know. I can't answer that one. 8 Q. Sorry? 9 A. I don't know why I would have been asked to 10 answer that one. 11 Q. Can you recall any discussion as to the purpose 12 of recording the ethnic or racial identity of 13 a suspect? 14 A. No. 15 Q. Do you know what was done with the information 16 that was recorded as to the racial or ethnic 17 identity of a suspect? 18 A. No, I don't, no. 19 Q. To your knowledge, was any database kept of any 20 racial or ethnic identity? 21 A. Not that I'm aware of, no. 22 Q. Have you any clue as to what was done with the 23 information? 24 A. No, none whatsoever. 25 Q. To your knowledge, did anyone say anything at 34 1 the time about any of the language used in this 2 document? 3 A. No, not that I'm aware of. 4 Q. Nothing strikes you about it, even now? 5 A. No, I can't actually remember the document, but 6 no. 7 Q. I think that document can come down, thank you. 8 I think you left the Post Office in 2016. 9 A. I did. 10 Q. Why did you leave? 11 A. Just a career change. 12 Q. What have you done since, if you don't mind me 13 asking? 14 A. Analytical and financial roles? 15 Q. Sorry, analytical and financial roles? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. Using computers? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. Can I turn, then, to the claim against Lee 20 Castleton. You were involved as an auditor of 21 Mr Castleton's Post Office branch in Marine 22 Drive in Bridlington in Yorkshire. You provided 23 two witness statements in the claim brought by 24 the Post Office against him and you gave oral 25 evidence at his trial. 35 1 I want to ask you about each of those 2 events, if I may. 3 A. Yeah. 4 Q. In a witness statement provided to the Inquiry, 5 Mr Castleton -- I'm not going to ask for it to 6 be turned up but it's WITN03730100 at page 2, 7 paragraph 17 and 18 -- Mr Castleton says that 8 he'd made 91 telephone calls over a period to 9 a helpline and, in the course of those, had 10 asked for an audit. Was it common for 11 postmasters themselves to ask for an audit? 12 A. I don't know, to be honest. As an auditor you 13 would have been given a list of offices to 14 visit. I wouldn't have dictated which they 15 were. 16 Q. Would you know whether this was a random audit, 17 a scheduled audit or one that had been requested 18 by the postmaster himself or herself? 19 A. Ooh, 20 years ago, vague memory, we would have 20 been told if it was random or scheduled but 21 I don't know whether we would have been given 22 details as to why we went. 23 Q. In broad terms, what did you a typical audit 24 process involve at a branch? 25 A. Verifying assets, cash and stock. 36 1 Q. So what would you do when you arrived? 2 A. Oh, vague memory, gosh, it's 20 years ago, um -- 3 Q. But you did 1,400 of them? 4 A. I did, yes, but it is a long while ago. You 5 would introduce yourself, you would check the 6 cash against the system, check the stock, check 7 the transactions. I believe if any differences 8 were found the postmaster would be with you at 9 the time of checking it, so they could double 10 check your figures, make sure they agreed with 11 your counting and your asset verification. 12 Q. Thank you. Would you consider any data before 13 attending an audit? 14 A. Not that I can recall, no. 15 Q. Would you have accessed any call logs -- 16 A. No. 17 Q. -- or any other operational records that may 18 record issues concerning discrepancies or 19 shortfalls or other problems at the branch that 20 you were about to audit? 21 A. Not that I can recall, no. 22 Q. So if a postmaster had been complaining for 23 weeks and months beforehand about discrepancies 24 and had been explaining problems with, for 25 example, the operation of the Horizon System, 37 1 you would be ignorant of that when you walked 2 through the door? 3 A. Until I got there. As far as I can remember, we 4 didn't do any pre-work for audits. 5 Q. So, in this case, does it follow that you 6 weren't briefed about this branch, nor the 7 contact that had been made by Mr Castleton about 8 the Marine Drive branch before your arrival? 9 A. No, I wouldn't have thought so. 10 Q. Did you speak to Cath Oglesby, Catherine 11 Oglesby, before the start of the audit? 12 A. Oh, I don't know. I don't know. Sorry -- 13 Q. Would you typically speak to the subpostmaster's 14 line manager, area manager, before the start of 15 the audit to find out -- as had been the case 16 here -- that there had been extensive contact 17 about discrepancies and shortfalls and the 18 causes of them before you walked through the 19 door? 20 A. From memory, I don't think so, unless Cath had 21 asked for the audit, and I'd given any 22 information but I can't recall any. 23 Q. By this date -- and we're going to see that this 24 is 23 March 2004 -- that you conducted the 25 audit, had you been made aware of any issues 38 1 that subpostmasters had experienced and had 2 complained of when using Horizon about the 3 integrity of the data that it produced? 4 A. Not I was aware of, no. 5 Q. We know that you went on to provide a witness 6 statement in this case, in fact two witness 7 statements in this case. Can you recall how 8 many cases over time you provided witness 9 statements in? 10 A. As an auditor? 11 Q. Or as an investigator? 12 A. Oh, no, I couldn't put a figure on it. I don't 13 think it would be an awful lot but I couldn't 14 say. 15 Q. It was more than Mr Castleton's case? 16 A. I would say there was more than the one, yes. 17 Q. Were you provided with any advice from Post 18 Office Legal or any other quarter in relation to 19 the making of statements and the giving of 20 evidence in court? 21 A. I can't recall any. 22 Q. Was this the first time that you made witness 23 statements for an action brought against the 24 subpostmaster? 25 A. I can't answer that. I don't know. I'm sorry. 39 1 Q. When you came to give evidence in the claim 2 against Mr Castleton, your evidence was based on 3 the typed and handwritten record of the audit 4 conducted on 23 March 2004 and you exhibited 5 this to your first witness statement in the 6 proceedings against Mr Castleton. Let's just 7 look at the witness statement first. It's 8 POL00082945, thank you. 9 We can see that this is your first witness 10 statement. We can see it's dated 11 January 11 2006 in the top right-hand corner, yes? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. If we go to the third page, we'll see that 14 you've signed it. It's, in fact, obscured by 15 the General Restriction Order redaction but your 16 signature's underneath where it says, "GRO"? 17 A. Uh-huh. 18 Q. If we go back to the first page, please, at the 19 foot of the page, you say: 20 "I make this Witness Statement from facts 21 within my knowledge unless otherwise stated. 22 I have had the benefit of reading through the 23 audit papers. References to page numbers in 24 this Witness Statement are to page numbers of 25 exhibit 'HR1' to this Witness Statement." 40 1 A. Mm. 2 Q. In paragraph 5 you give us the date of the 3 audit, 23 March 2004, and the fact that you 4 attended with your colleague Chris Taylor. 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. You arrived at 8.00 am; can you see that? 7 A. I can, yes. 8 Q. Then paragraph 8, please: 9 "The handwritten notes of the audit are at 10 pages 1 to 47 [that's of your exhibit HR1] and 11 a typed copy of the audit is at pages 48 to 64. 12 A copy of the conclusion of my report is at 13 page 65." 14 Can you see that? 15 A. I can, yes. 16 Q. What you're doing here, is this right, you're 17 referring to the record of the audit in your 18 witness statement because it's a contemporaneous 19 or near contemporaneous record of what happened 20 in the audit. It's like an original note; is 21 that right? 22 A. Yes, that's what it reads like, yes. 23 Q. Because when you were writing your witness 24 statement here in January 2006, two years or 25 just under two years had passed, you'd conduct 41 1 hundreds of audits in the interim and presumably 2 one blurs into the next? 3 A. 100 per cent, yes. 4 Q. So what's in the audit record is important; 5 correct? 6 A. Correct, yes. 7 Q. Can we look at the record of the audit, please. 8 POL00082946. Thank you. This your exhibit HR1, 9 on the first page. Then if we skip over, we can 10 see the handwritten stuff. If we skip to the 11 bottom, please, keep going, and a bit more, we 12 can see a page number in the middle at the 13 bottom, "1"; can you see that? 14 A. I can, yes. 15 Q. As you said, pages 1 to 47 are the handwritten 16 bit; 48 to 64 typewritten; and then an audit 17 report at page 65 of this document. 18 A. Mm-hm. 19 Q. So these parts of the audit record are 20 handwritten by you or your colleague Mr Taylor; 21 is that right? 22 A. Correct, yes. 23 Q. Can we go to page 17, please. I should have 24 started at page 16. No, 17 is correct. There's 25 a section of the notes called "Procedural 42 1 Security Inspection"; can you see that? 2 A. I can, yes. 3 Q. This and the following pages of the exhibit 4 refer to a procedural security inspection that 5 is carried out, contains a series of ticks and 6 sometimes some text, and we can see the branch 7 name of Marine Drive, Mr Castleton's name, the 8 date of the inspection, the manager, Cath 9 Oglesby, and the inspection of C Taylor. Does 10 it follow from that the procedural security 11 inspection was carried out by your colleague, 12 Mr Taylor? 13 A. That looks like it, yes. 14 Q. Then if we go to page 18, please, and scroll 15 down to "Cash and Stock", under "Cash and 16 Stock", against the question "Is the safe kept 17 locked when not in use with the key removed?", 18 "Yes" has been ticked; can you see that? 19 A. I can, yes. 20 Q. Then can we turn to page 48, please. This is 21 part of the typewritten section of the audit 22 record and it's for completion by you because 23 you were the lead inspector; is that right? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. We can see the date on which the relevant issue 43 1 was completed, initials, HH, that's you -- 2 I think that's your maiden name -- 3 A. That was my previous name, yes. 4 Q. -- and then any remarks that were made. If you 5 just look at "Travellers Cheques serial numbers 6 verified on site", can you see that, it's about 7 seven or eight down? Thank you. 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. You've said, "Not applicable". "NA", yes? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Is that right? 12 A. I remember the sheet, um -- 13 Q. Does "NA" mean something else? 14 A. No, no. I -- you're correct, it means "not 15 applicable" but I am presuming he didn't have 16 travellers' cheques, looking at that, but 17 I can't remember. 18 Q. Thank you. If we look at page 56, please. At 19 the foot of the page the "Travellers Cheques 20 Reconciliation"; can you see that? 21 A. I can, yes. 22 Q. That's all completely blank. Again, that would, 23 particularly in conjunction with what you've 24 written already, appear to suggest that there 25 were no travellers' cheques in the branch on the 44 1 day of your audit? 2 A. That's what it would appear like, yes. 3 Q. Thank you. Then can we turn to page 63, please. 4 That's the entirety of that page displayed, and 5 I just want to look at a couple of the things 6 that are written on this page to see if they're 7 in keeping with what we've already noted. To 8 start with, what is this document? 9 A. I don't know, it doesn't look completed, it 10 doesn't look as though it's been finished. 11 Q. No, just stopping there, when you came to give 12 evidence subsequently, just cutting through 13 things, you said to the High Court that this was 14 incomplete and it was incomplete because 15 Mr Castleton was suspended and, therefore, the 16 procedural security inspection was itself not 17 continued and that may explain why this document 18 is incomplete? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. Can you tell, though, who would have completed 21 this? Would it be you or Mr Taylor, you as the 22 lead or him as the subordinate? 23 A. I honestly can't remember. I would -- it would 24 be completed following all the compliance pages 25 completed but, as you say, if he was suspended 45 1 at the time then this part wouldn't have gone 2 any further. 3 Q. It doesn't disclose its author and it's undated 4 and it's not addressed to anyone? 5 A. No, I think it was a template that you would 6 that have completed at the end of an audit, 7 where the postmaster wasn't suspended and you 8 would delete or change or add anything you 9 needed to do. 10 Q. Okay. So does it follow from that that the list 11 of things here might not actually be referring 12 to Mr Castleton at all? 13 A. I think it would refer to any branch and you 14 would delete or add where needed. 15 Q. Okay, and so the fact that this procedural 16 security inspection was not completed means that 17 this checklist here hasn't been crossed through 18 or added to? 19 A. Correct. 20 Q. So would that explain why it says, for example, 21 "Safe left open", where we'd seen the tick 22 previously saying that it was locked, yes? 23 A. Yes, that does identify both gaps and I would 24 believe that the ones that didn't apply would 25 have been removed had the audit gone to the end. 46 1 Q. Okay, and it says, "Travellers cheques not kept 2 in safe" -- 3 A. (The witness nodded) 4 Q. -- even though you've concluded, on the basis of 5 two things that you had written, that there 6 weren't any travellers' cheques on branch that 7 day? 8 A. No, this was just -- I read this as being just 9 a template that could apply to any branch. 10 Q. Okay. Can we go over to page 65, please. This 11 is essentially the audit report, as you refer to 12 it in your previous evidence to the High Court, 13 or the conclusion of the audit report, and we 14 can see that it's written by you it, is that 15 right, at the top there? 16 A. Yes, it looks like it, yes. 17 Q. It's dated 25 March 2004 and it says: 18 "An audit took place at the Marine Drive 19 Post Office on 25 March 2004." 20 That presumably is a mistake because it was 21 23 March, wasn't it? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. Yes? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. You led the audit and in attendance was Chris 47 1 Taylor: 2 "The audit commenced at 8.00 am and on our 3 arrival the subpostmaster was very pleased to 4 see us. He explained problems he had been 5 having at the office regarding balancing. His 6 problems ... started in week 43 with 7 a misbalance of [minus £4,030.97]. He was 8 adamant that no members of staff could be 9 committing theft and felt that the misbalances 10 were due to a computer problem. He had been in 11 contact with the Retail Line Manager Cath 12 Oglesby and the Horizon helpline regularly since 13 the problems began. The following table gives 14 further weeks balance declarations on the cash 15 account." 16 Scroll down, please. 17 "In week 47, £8,243.10 was put into 18 suspense. Although Horizon had been contacted 19 and the Retail Line was aware of this figure, 20 this was not authorised. In week 49, £3,509.68 21 was added to make the amount carried in the 22 suspense account £11,752.78. This was also not 23 authorised. 24 "On the completion of the audit the Retail 25 Line Manager Cath Oglesby was contacted, along 48 1 with the investigation team and the Audit Line 2 Manager. The subpostmaster was suspended 3 pending enquiries and an interim postmaster was 4 put in charge at the office." 5 So just picking out a few features of that, 6 Mr Castleton was very pleased to see you, yes? 7 A. That's what I put, yes. 8 Q. Presumably that would be accurate if you wrote 9 it? 10 A. I presume so, yes. 11 Q. He clearly identified to you that he'd been 12 having a problem with balancing? 13 A. Yes, clearly, yes. 14 Q. He suggested to you that misbalances were due to 15 a computer problem, yes? 16 A. Yes, that's what it said, yes. 17 Q. He told you that he'd been contact with the help 18 line since right from the beginning and that had 19 been in contact with his Retail Line Manager, 20 Cath Oglesby? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. Am I right to think that there is no 23 investigation of what he is saying before he is 24 suspended and an interim postmaster is brought 25 in to run his Post Office. Instead, he's just 49 1 suspended on the spot there and then? 2 A. I -- as an auditor, you would pass that over to 3 the Retail Line Manager to make that decision. 4 Q. But it all happened quite quickly on the day, 5 did it? 6 A. I believe it did, yes. 7 Q. Is that typical of how things worked at this 8 time? It didn't matter if the subpostmaster had 9 asked for the audit it didn't matter if the 10 subpostmaster had been making complaints for 11 weeks and months to the helpline or to his 12 manager of a computer problem; if there was 13 a shortfall that was not authorised, he was 14 suspended? 15 A. That would have been the decision of the Retail 16 Line Manager. 17 Q. No matter whose decision it was, that is what 18 would have happened, is that right, they were 19 just suspended? 20 A. I don't know whether that happened on every 21 occasion, I guess it would depend on each case. 22 Q. Well, were you ever in, amongst the 1,400 audits 23 that you conducted, a situation where 24 a postmaster was saying, "It's not me, it's the 25 computer system", and the Line Manager says, 50 1 "Well, hold on, this us a postmaster -- I don't 2 know -- that has been working for us honestly 3 for 20 years. We need to credit what he or she 4 is saying. We need to conduct an investigation 5 into whether what he says or she says is 6 correct. Let's investigate whether or not what 7 he or she says is accurate", and they weren't 8 suspended, they were allowed to carry on 9 working? 10 A. I don't recall any. I wouldn't have thought 11 a Retail Line Manager would discuss that with 12 an auditor. I think an auditor just verified 13 the things -- you know, the cash and the stock 14 are discrepancies and passed it over. So you 15 wouldn't particularly have been involved in that 16 side. 17 Q. Did you ever hear, because you were standing 18 there in branch, it coming back from the Line 19 Manager, "Let's not suspend them, let's 20 investigate the merits of what they say"? 21 A. No, I can't recall any. 22 Q. Thank you very much. I wonder whether we could 23 take the morning break and perhaps 20 minutes, 24 sir. 25 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: By all means, Mr Beer. So that 51 1 would bring us back at what time, please, by 2 your -- 3 MR BEER: 10.40. 4 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: 10.40. All right. We'll break 5 now for 20 minutes and come back at 10.40. 6 MR BEER: Thank you very much, sir. 7 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 8 (10.20 am) 9 (A short break) 10 (10.40 am) 11 MR BEER: Good morning, sir, and Mrs Rose, can you 12 both see and hear me? 13 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: I can. 14 THE WITNESS: Yes. 15 MR BEER: Thank you very much, Mrs Rose. We just 16 looked at the record of the audit conducted by 17 you and your colleague Mr Taylor on 23 March 18 2004. I want to turn to consider the witness 19 statements that you filed in the civil 20 proceedings bought against Mr Castleton, what 21 was included in them and what changed between 22 the two witness statements. Can we go back to 23 your first witness statement, please, 24 POL00082945? 25 So you remember this is your first witness 52 1 statement, dated 11 January 2006. We've been 2 through the bits of it which say, "I rely on the 3 audit record", yes? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. We left off on page 2 at paragraph 8, where you 6 refer us to the handwritten and typewritten 7 sections of the audit report and the conclusion 8 of the audit report, all of which we've looked 9 at, and then at paragraph 9 you say: 10 "As part of an audit, we have to complete 11 a procedural security inspection. This was 12 carried out by my colleague Chris Taylor. 13 A typed copy of the procedural and security 14 inspection is at page 63 [remember, we looked at 15 that before the break]. The inspection revealed 16 that the safe was left open, the safe keys were 17 left in the safe door and that it was not 18 secured, that cash and stock were not secured 19 during lunchtime if the subpostmaster was not on 20 the premises, that Travellers Cheques were not 21 kept in the safe and Foreign Currency was not 22 held securely, that standard procedures for 23 adjusting losses and gains were not adhered to 24 (because the losses were unauthorised) and 25 personal cheques on hand had been incorrectly 53 1 treated." 2 A. Mm-hm. 3 Q. Those are the standard things on the checklist, 4 aren't they? 5 A. They are, yes. 6 Q. Which didn't necessarily apply to Mr Castleton, 7 did they? 8 A. On reading that, I would have said not. I can't 9 remember writing this, so ... 10 Q. That's what I want to ask about. 11 A. Yeah. 12 Q. Given that you told us already that page 63 is 13 a template and hadn't been -- 14 A. From memory, yes, yes it was. 15 Q. -- ticked or crossed or deleted or added to, why 16 is it, in a witness statement to the court, 17 you're telling the court that all of those 18 failures applied in the case of this audit? 19 A. That's what it looks like, yes. 20 Q. I'm sorry? 21 A. I said that's what it looks like, but I -- 22 Q. I'm asking why. 23 A. Why it's in there? 24 Q. Yes. 25 A. I can't remember. 54 1 Q. Well, it's not accurate, is it, according to 2 what you've told us already? 3 A. It doesn't look to be, does it? No. 4 Q. So why is inaccurate evidence being given to the 5 High Court? 6 A. I can't recall. I don't know. 7 Q. You're telling the court in this paragraph here, 8 aren't you, "This man, Mr Castleton, was sloppy 9 and slapdash. There are things that we saw when 10 we audited him that could well explain the 11 missing money". that's what this paragraph is 12 for, isn't it? 13 A. That's what it kind of indicates, yes, but, as 14 I say, I don't know why that wasn't picked up at 15 the time of the hearing. 16 Q. Well, we're going to see in a moment that you 17 did something about it -- 18 A. Oh, right, okay. 19 Q. -- between the first and second witness 20 statement. But what I'm asking at the moment is 21 can you recall how it is that this information 22 was included in your first witness statement 23 when it's not accurate? 24 A. I can't recall that. 25 Q. Can we turn, please, to POL00081700_208, thank 55 1 you. This is a record of an email exchange 2 between you and Stephen Dilley, who is the Post 3 Office's solicitor, on 15 September, or 14 and 4 15 September 2006. So it's about eight months 5 after the first witness statement was filed, 6 okay? 7 A. Right. 8 Q. If we go to the foot of the page, please, can 9 you see there's an email, it's slightly hard to 10 read, but it's from Stephen Dilley, to you and 11 some other people? 12 A. Mm-hm. 13 Q. It's dated 14 September 2006, and the subject is 14 "Second witness statement of Helen Rose: Post 15 Office v Castleton"? 16 A. Mm-hm. 17 Q. Mr Dilley says: 18 "I refer to our recent email exchange and 19 attach a second witness statement for your 20 approval, together with just those exhibits that 21 you may not have seen previously. 22 "Please can you read the statement very 23 carefully and make sure you are 100% happy with 24 it, especially paragraph 12. Please could you 25 also answer my question in bold italics in 56 1 paragraph 12. 2 "Once I hear back from you, I'll draw up 3 a final version and send it back to you for 4 signature." 5 Then back to page 1, please. You say: 6 "Stephen, 7 "I have read the statement ..." 8 Then if we go forwards to the fourth 9 paragraph, you say: 10 "The security inspection was started but 11 from what I can remember not completed. The 12 reason for this being that normal audits would 13 require many compliance tests completing, 14 including the security compliance. However when 15 a postmaster is suspended for whatever reason 16 then compliance tests are not completed. This 17 would have been started as a matter of routine 18 until we were notified that Mr Castleton was to 19 be suspended." 20 A. Mm-hm. 21 Q. Yes? So you're telling him there that the stuff 22 that's in the witness statement about security 23 inspection, it was a security inspection that 24 was started but not completed, okay? 25 A. Yeah. 57 1 Q. Then we follow that up with a call a couple of 2 weeks later, can we look at POL00069514. This 3 is a typewritten telephone attendance note, 4 completed, I think, by Mr Dilley and you'll see 5 it's dated 3 October 2006. He records: 6 "I had a telephone conversation with Helen 7 Rose (her call) coming back to me on a voicemail 8 I had left with her. She had read the latest 9 version of the statement and thought that it was 10 better in terms of the balanced snapshots. 11 "However she wanted to make a further change 12 to paragraph 8. She said as soon as the 13 subpostmaster was suspended, the compliance test 14 then became irrelevant. Had it been a normal 15 audit, ie had Castleton been carrying on, the 16 test would have been complete and the postmaster 17 would have been told to get his act together, 18 but she wanted to emphasise that the compliance 19 test failure weren't themselves the reason he 20 was dismissed. He was dismissed because of the 21 loss of stock." 22 Okay? 23 A. (Unclear) 24 Q. That is building on what you had said in the 25 email exchange essentially, yes? 58 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. Then lastly can we look at POL00071196. You'll 3 see this is your second witness statement. 4 A. Mm-hm. 5 Q. It's dated 4 October 2006, so the day after that 6 telephone call. If we look, please, at the 7 second page, at paragraph 8, we can see that 8 paragraph 7 was not dissimilar to your first 9 witness statement about exhibiting the audit 10 report, essentially, and then replacing the list 11 of failures in the security audit, the check box 12 on page 63, is a new paragraph 8: 13 "As part of a normal audit, we have to 14 complete a procedural security inspection. This 15 was initiated by my colleague Chris Taylor. 16 When a postmaster is suspended then any 17 remaining compliance tests are not completed, 18 because of the large number of compliance tests 19 ... that have to be complete for each audit. 20 Accordingly, although the procedural security 21 inspection was started as a matter of routine, 22 I do not recall it being completed because 23 Mr Castleton was suspended prior to its 24 completion and it then became irrelevant." 25 Yes? 59 1 A. Mm-hm, yeah. 2 Q. So it follows, does it, that everything that had 3 been said in the first witness statement, in 4 that paragraph 9, about failures in security 5 that was, in fact, just a recitation of 6 a standard list, is completely irrelevant to the 7 case of Mr Lee Castleton -- 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. -- and wasn't relevant to the reasons why he was 10 suspended and wasn't relevant in deciding 11 whether or not there was a missing sum of money 12 that was attributable to his conduct? 13 A. No. 14 Q. Can I look, please, at some other evidence that 15 you gave or other aspects of it? 16 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Before you do that, Mr Beer, it 17 may be that I'm being slow, but what about 18 paragraph 9 in this statement? 19 MR BEER: Yes, can you help us with that? Despite 20 what you've said -- and you're not being slow -- 21 9 remains. You'll need to read over the page, 22 too. 23 A. I don't have an explanation as to why that 24 wasn't taken out. 25 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Well, Mrs Rose, I am slightly 60 1 concerned because your evidence to me is, in 2 effect, that paragraph 9 in this statement and 3 the previous version in the second statement 4 should, in effect, never have been in those 5 witness statements because they're wrong? 6 A. Mm. 7 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Given that you were the person 8 who signed them, I would like you to try to 9 remember why it is they are there? 10 A. I have no recollection of it. I'm sorry. 11 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: All right. 12 MR BEER: Can we look at some other things that 13 happened between the audit report and the 14 evidence that you gave to the court, and I'd 15 like to try to display two documents side by 16 side, if I can. The first is POL00082946, at 17 page 65. The second is POL00071196 at page 2. 18 So 65 of the first document and 2 of the second. 19 So on the left-hand side we've got your 20 concluding report to Cath Oglesby, yes? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. On the right-hand side, we've got the second 23 page of your final witness statement? 24 A. Mm-hm. 25 Q. You can see that in paragraph 4 you say: 61 1 "On 23 March, I attended the branch [and you 2 give the address] together with my colleague 3 Chris Taylor. We arrived at approximately 4 8.00 am. [No] previous involvement ..." 5 Yes? 6 A. Mm-hm. 7 Q. You say: 8 "The process of carrying out the audit 9 involves physically counting the cash and 10 stock", et cetera. 11 Yes? 12 A. Correct. 13 Q. "Mr Castleton explained he had been having 14 problems balancing the books ..." 15 You see in the left-hand side document, four 16 lines in, you say in that: 17 "He explained problems he had been having at 18 the office regarding balancing. His problems 19 with balancing started in week 43 with 20 a misbalance of [minus] 4230.97." 21 A. Mm-hm. 22 Q. Can you see that you say that in paragraph 6, on 23 the right-hand side? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. Then you continue on the left-hand side: 62 1 "He was adamant that no members of staff 2 could be committing theft and felt the 3 misbalances were due to a computer problem." 4 A. Uh-huh. 5 Q. Then on the right-hand side, second sentence of 6 paragraph 6: 7 "Mr Castleton was adamant that the 8 misbalances were due to a computer problem and 9 that no members of his staff could be committing 10 theft." 11 Yes? 12 A. Mm-hm. 13 Q. Does it follow that you were largely using the 14 audit report as your basis for writing your 15 witness statement? 16 A. I would think I probably did, yes. 17 Q. You see, in your contemporaneous record, you 18 say: 19 "... on our arrival the subpostmaster was 20 very pleased to see us." 21 Can you see that? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. Can you understand the potential relevance of 24 that information? 25 A. Sorry, what do you mean by that? 63 1 Q. Can you understand the potential relevance of 2 you recording that the subpostmaster was very 3 pleased to see the auditors? 4 A. I probably was just stating the fact at the time 5 that he just seemed pleased to see us. 6 Q. Why would you include it in your original note? 7 A. Oh, I don't know, just making notes at the time 8 of what occurred. 9 Q. You don't make a note of everything that 10 occurred, do you? 11 A. I wouldn't have thought so, but -- 12 Q. So why did you make a note of this? 13 A. I obviously felt at the time the need to do 14 that, back in 2004. I can't say why I did it. 15 I obviously thought that it was relevant at the 16 time. 17 Q. You'll see that it's not in your witness 18 statement, is it? 19 A. No. 20 Q. Why is that? 21 A. (Unclear) later. I don't know, I can't answer 22 that one. 23 Q. Do you know why it was omitted from your witness 24 statement -- 25 A. No. 64 1 Q. -- given that the witness statement was 2 seemingly based on what is said in the original 3 note? 4 A. No, I've no explanation for that, why it would 5 be -- I guess the report was more to Cath, 6 whereas the witness statement was just a witness 7 statement. So, no, I don't know why it wouldn't 8 be in both. 9 Q. Let's look at some other issues, then. You see 10 in the contemporaneous note, after the bit 11 that's highlighted, it says: 12 "He had been in contact with the Retail Line 13 Manager Cath Oglesby and the Horizon helpline 14 regularly since the problems began." 15 A. Mm-hm. 16 Q. That's not in your witness statement, is it? 17 A. No. 18 Q. You understand the potential relevance of that 19 information, don't you? 20 A. But that would be him saying he'd done that, 21 rather than me being a witness to him doing 22 that. 23 Q. Why did you record that he had said it in your 24 original note? 25 A. Why? 65 1 Q. Yeah. 2 A. I guess we just noted down things that happened, 3 so, um, I don't know. 4 Q. Why was it omitted from your witness statement, 5 again, when the witness statement was seemingly 6 based on what was said in the original note? 7 A. I don't know. 8 Q. Do you think these two pieces of information 9 might assist Mr Castleton: he was very pleased 10 or he was pleased to see the auditors and he 11 told you "I've been in contact with the Retail 12 Line Manager, Cath Oglesby, and the Horizon 13 helpline regularly since these problems began"? 14 A. I don't know. I can't answer for what I did 15 back in 2004 but I can only presume that the 16 audit report would have been part of the 17 evidence and so it wasn't duplicated. 18 Q. If that's the case, there's no point in making 19 a witness statement, is there? You would say, 20 "Please see my audit report, I've nothing more 21 to say". 22 A. I don't know. 23 Q. Can you see in the audit report on the left-hand 24 side, there's no reference to Mr Castleton 25 coming back from lunch smelling of alcohol or 66 1 having consumed alcohol, is there? 2 A. No. 3 Q. If we look on the right-hand side, if we go 4 forward a page to page 3 please, you say: 5 "I do remember [paragraph 10] that 6 Mr Castleton left the branch at lunchtime and 7 returned in the afternoon smelling strongly of 8 alcohol." 9 A. Mm-hm. 10 Q. So there's no reference in the contemporaneous 11 note of nearly two years previously to that 12 issue and that's found its way into the witness 13 statement. How has that come about? 14 A. I don't know. It must have been a comment 15 I felt necessary to mention but I can't remember 16 it. 17 Q. Wouldn't that be a relevant matter to record at 18 the time, rather than years later? 19 A. Potentially, that's -- I think the audit report 20 was just a report of what happened on the day of 21 the audit. I don't know why that wasn't in or 22 came later. 23 Q. So why is it that these two bits of information 24 that might help Mr Castleton have been excluded 25 from the witness statement but the paragraph 9 67 1 has been left in and paragraph 10 has been 2 added? 3 A. I honestly don't know why other things have not 4 been included at the time. 5 Q. Can we turn to what you said about this when you 6 gave evidence at the trial, POL00070183. Thank 7 you. This is a transcript of the evidence that 8 you gave to His Honour Judge Havery QC on 9 11 December 2006. 10 A. Mm-hm. 11 Q. If we can scroll down, please, we can see that 12 Mr Morgan appeared on behalf of the Post Office 13 and Mr Castleton appeared in person. If we can 14 just go to page 11 of the transcript, please, at 15 the top of the page you're being asked by 16 Mr Castleton some questions not dissimilar to 17 the ones I'm asking, and you say: 18 "I was asked if there was anything specific 19 I can remember, and [then some inaudible words], 20 I could remember that I smelt alcohol on you." 21 He says: 22 "No. I appreciate that so that is, in your 23 opinion [inaudible words]." 24 Answer by you: 25 "It's just a vague memory I had of the 68 1 office. 2 "Question: Right, okay. 3 "Answer: It's [presumably one and a half 4 years ago, two-and-a-half years ago]. Yes. 5 "Question: And how, [a question]. 6 "Answer: A lot. 7 "Question: Could we now go back to 8 page 475. Can you tell me what [that] is, 9 please? 10 "Answer: That's the first page of the audit 11 report." 12 That's the document that I've been showing 13 you at page 65: 14 "Question: ... No mention of alcohol on 15 there? 16 "Answer: Because it wouldn't be relevant. 17 "Question: But it is contracted [inaudible 18 words]. 19 "Answer: (Several inaudible words)." 20 Then the judge intervenes: 21 "Again, As it is an issue in the case, but 22 you are putting to the witness that you did not 23 smell of alcohol? 24 "Mr Castleton: I strongly did not, my Lord." 25 You said: 69 1 "... I can only apologise. I can only go by 2 what my memory was." 3 He says: 4 "I appreciate that. But [inaudible words] 5 just clarifying between what the audit report 6 ... and what your statement says." 7 You said: 8 "I wouldn't put it in the audit report 9 because [something] had any relevance to whether 10 or not the money was there ... or whether the 11 audit was, the office was short or [presumably 12 'not']." 13 Given the fact that you say there that it 14 wasn't in the audit report because it wouldn't 15 have any relevance to whether the money was 16 there or not or whether the office was short or 17 not, why was it included in the witness 18 statement? 19 A. I don't know. Looking back on it, maybe it 20 shouldn't have been. 21 Q. Can we go, please, to POL00071231. This is 22 a copy of one of the drafts of your second 23 witness statement -- sorry, your first witness 24 statement. If we just scroll through it, 25 please. You'll see that -- and it's Mr Dilley 70 1 who sent it to you -- has included in square 2 brackets after paragraphs some questions to you 3 in bold and in italics, yes? 4 A. Mm-hm, yeah. 5 Q. If we just go to the third page, please. We see 6 that paragraph, paragraph 10, where you had 7 written, it was in the first draft too: 8 "I do remember that Mr Castleton left the 9 branch at lunchtime and returned in the 10 afternoon smelling strongly of alcohol." 11 He, the solicitor, asked you "Was he drunk?" 12 Yes? 13 A. I can see that's what he's asked, yes. 14 Q. In the final version you don't add to that, you 15 don't say that he was drunk or he wasn't drunk, 16 yes? We've seen the final version? 17 A. Yeah. 18 Q. Standing back -- that can come down now, please. 19 Standing back, looking at the two passages 20 that were not included in the witness statement 21 but were in the audit report, about Mr Castleton 22 saying he was pleased to see you and that he'd 23 reported matters to the Retail Line Manager and 24 the helpline, and the inclusion of the 25 paragraph 9 information, about failures in 71 1 security measure sand the addition of 2 "Mr Castleton smelt strongly of alcohol", did 3 you ever feel that you were being encouraged by 4 your employer to include matters that were 5 helpful to it, the employer, and exclude matters 6 that were helpful or potentially helpful to 7 Mr Castleton? 8 A. No. 9 Q. In those circumstances, how has the witness 10 statement ended up as it is, with those two 11 things that were in the audit report not in the 12 witness statement, and the addition of the 13 alcohol and the failures in security audit? 14 A. Sorry, what do you mean by that? 15 Q. How, standing back, has this happened? 16 A. I don't know, I clearly did the witness 17 statement to -- some two years after the audit 18 report and picked out the bits that I believed 19 needed to go in it at the time. 20 Q. Why wouldn't you just say, for example, it's 21 only a sentence "Mr Castleton was pleased to see 22 us"? 23 A. I don't know. 24 Q. Okay, I'll move on to a different topic, please. 25 Can you remember performing the role of 72 1 disclosure officer? 2 A. No, I can't remember that being a role that 3 I had. 4 Q. Can we look, please, at FUJ00155090. At the 5 foot of the page, it's not an email exchange 6 that you are included in -- if we just scroll up 7 a little bit, sorry. It's an email from Jarnail 8 Singh, a Post Office solicitor, to Gareth 9 Jenkins and some others of 1 October 2012. 10 Mr Singh says to Mr Jenkins: 11 "Welcome from your annual leave and your 12 assistance advice in the past prosecution cases 13 and I understand you are assisting my colleagues 14 at present. I need your urgent [I think that's 15 supposed to say 'assistance']. Judge has this 16 morning ordered the prosecution to have the 17 following report ready to be served within seven 18 days. 19 "On [I think that's 'advice'] Post Office 20 Limited have appointed one of their 21 investigators, Helen Rose, as disclosure officer 22 dealing with Horizon challenges. She has 23 prepared a document/spreadsheet detailing all 24 such cases, past and present, approximately 20 25 in total, although none thus far successfully 73 1 argued in court. Post Office have been advised 2 to obtain an experts report from Fujitsu UK, the 3 Horizon System developers, confirming the system 4 is robust. Post Office maintain the system is 5 robust, but in the light of adverse publicity, 6 from legal viewpoint is that defence should be 7 given opportunity to test the system, should 8 they still wish to do so, on consideration of 9 our report." 10 You see that it says that the Post Office 11 has appointed one of its investigators, you, as 12 its disclosure officer dealing with Horizon 13 challenges. 14 A. Yes -- 15 Q. Were you appointed as the disclosure officer? 16 A. I've seen that report in the documentation 17 that's been sent to me but I don't recall being 18 appointed as a disclosure officer but, clearly, 19 that's what they called it. 20 Q. Did you ever receive any training in the role of 21 a disclosure officer in a criminal investigation 22 or prosecution? 23 A. No. 24 Q. At this time, you were seemingly aware of 25 a number of cases where there had been 74 1 challenges to the integrity of Horizon data. 2 Was this the first time you were aware of 3 Fujitsu being contacted to provide an expert 4 report confirming that the system was robust? 5 A. I can't answer that. I don't think I was in 6 that email, was I? 7 Q. No. 8 A. No. 9 Q. But you, according to this, had prepared 10 a document or spreadsheet detailing cases. Can 11 you remember having been asked to do that? 12 A. I've seen that report in the documents. I can't 13 actually remember producing it but I have 14 actually seen a document in the evidence pack. 15 Q. Can we look, please, at FUJ00156648. This is 16 a summary of information seemingly reviewed by 17 you. It appears to be one iteration of the 18 document summary circulated to Mr Jenkins in 19 advance of a report that he wrote. 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. If we look at page 5, please, and scroll down -- 22 and a bit more, please -- we can see that it's 23 authored by you, a member of the Post Office 24 Security Team, on 30 August 2012? 25 A. Yes. 75 1 Q. Is that how you would that have regarded 2 yourself as at August 2012. Although you were 3 performing analytical roles, you were part of 4 the Security team? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. If we go back to the first page, please. You 7 say, in "Overview": 8 "Over the years some post offices under 9 investigation for losses have claimed that the 10 Horizon System is at fault. As the Post Office 11 is dependent on the reliability of our system to 12 be able to prosecute offenders; we have to be 13 able to defend our system in the courts." 14 Is that a reasonably accurate representation 15 of your belief at the time? 16 A. At the time, yes. 17 Q. What research did you undertake in order to 18 compile this list of, in this instance, five 19 cases? 20 A. I actually don't remember writing this report, 21 but looking at it and reading it, I would 22 summarise that I pulled reports up, audit 23 reports or even investigation reports. 24 Q. Was that done in any systematic way? 25 A. I couldn't answer that. 76 1 Q. What was the purpose of writing the report? 2 A. I presume somebody must have asked me to pull 3 some things together. I honestly can't 4 remember. As I say, I can't actually remember 5 writing this report. Although my name is on it, 6 I can't remember writing it. 7 Q. You would want to know the purpose of the report 8 and what was going to be done with it before 9 writing it, presumably? 10 A. I must have understood why it was wanted at the 11 time, yes. 12 Q. Would you have understood that it was meant to 13 be a complete and comprehensive list of 14 challenges to the integrity of Horizon data? 15 A. I couldn't comment on that, without seeing what 16 the request was before the report was written. 17 Q. At the time of writing this report, which is 18 August 2012, were you were of any of the 19 following bugs, errors or defects, that they had 20 been attributed names that broadly described the 21 problems, something called the receipts and 22 payments mismatch bug? 23 A. No. 24 Q. The Callendar Square or Falkirk bug? 25 A. No. 77 1 Q. The suspense account bug? 2 A. No. 3 Q. The Dalmellington or branch outreach bug? 4 A. No. 5 Q. The remming in bug? 6 A. No. 7 Q. The remming out bug? 8 A. No. 9 Q. The local suspense account bug? 10 A. No. 11 Q. The reversals bug? 12 A. No. 13 Q. The data tree build bug? 14 A. No. 15 Q. The Girobank discrepancies bug? 16 A. No. 17 Q. So what did you do? Did you just search through 18 some old case files and look for cases where 19 Horizon had been called into question? 20 A. I potentially did. As I say, I don't remember 21 writing this but that looks like what I've done. 22 Q. Just look at the brief summaries of some recent 23 challenges, Yetminster, "Brief overview": 24 "This case came ... from a tip-off made by 25 a holiday relief postmistress. It was 78 1 established that Miss Tracey Merritt also 2 operated the outreach Post Office at Chetnole. 3 Both these offices were audited on Thursday 29 4 September 2011. At audit Yetminster was 5 reported to be [£8,000-odd] short and Chetnole 6 Outreach [£3,000-odd] short, giving a total 7 overall shortage of [nearly £12,000]. 8 "During interview, Miss Merritt produced 9 a large document regarding an ongoing enquiry by 10 Shoosmiths solicitors in respect of the Justice 11 for SubPostmasters Alliance stating that she 12 believed that the Post Office Horizon equipment 13 was the actual cause of this loss. 14 "At the start of the interview, Miss Merritt 15 blamed the Horizon System and stated she had 16 problems with transferring cash from Yetminster 17 to Chetnole outreach. Halfway through the first 18 tape Miss Merritt states 'because there are 19 issues with your computers and I know the Post 20 Office are not going to admit it but there is'. 21 "6 minutes into the second tape Miss Merritt 22 says 'I'm not trying to blame the Horizon 23 System, I am saying that my office kept coming 24 up with losses'. Towards the end of the second 25 tape transcript Miss Merritt admitted that the 79 1 losses had been accumulating since the end of 2 July 2011 and she had not been putting money in 3 for these losses, simply rolling the losses and 4 inflating the cash. 5 "Mr Gary Thomas, lead Officer in this case 6 commented at the end of his report that it 7 should be noted that this case is likely to be 8 a further challenge toward the integrity of 9 [Horizon]." 10 Then "Outcome", scrolling down: 11 "Recoveries ... 12 "3 charges of False Accounting ... Letter 13 sent to Miss Merritt ..." 14 Then there appears to be a cut and paste of 15 the letter to her, can you see that in the last 16 bullet point? 17 Then, over the page: 18 "Post Office Limited remains entirely 19 satisfied as to the evidential strength of its 20 case against you ..." 21 Then at the end of the letter: 22 "Any such allegations will be robustly 23 defended. Post Office continues to have 24 absolute confidence in the text of the Horizon 25 computer system and its branch accounting 80 1 processes." 2 Did you take any steps to satisfy yourself 3 as to the accuracy of what was being set out 4 here, ie yourself -- 5 A. No. 6 Q. -- to investigate or cause to be investigated 7 whether the Horizon System and its branch 8 accounting processes had integrity? 9 A. No, I think this report looks like I've taken 10 summaries from case files, so these would have 11 been what had been documented in the case files. 12 Q. So in respect of all of the five branches there, 13 all you're doing is really transferring from 14 a case file what is said there into a shorter 15 document? 16 A. For summary. That's what it looks like, yes. 17 Q. Okay, in which case, I won't ask you about the 18 other four, save for the last one, Seema Misra, 19 which is on page 4, please. "West Byfleet": 20 "An audit took place on 14 January ... which 21 revealed a shortage of [£74,000]. 22 "[Mrs Misra] informed the auditors that the 23 account would be short by between £50,000 and 24 £60,000. She completed a handwritten signed 25 statement to the auditors blaming previous staff 81 1 for the shortage. 2 "Summary. 3 "Mrs Misra admitted during the interview 4 that she knew the office accounts would be 5 short. 6 "[She] continued to blame old staff ... 7 "Mrs Misra said the office had been running 8 short of cash for about a year and she had been 9 trying to reduce the loss by putting in money 10 from her own shop business. 11 "At no point during the audit or interview 12 was any Horizon integrity issue raised ... 13 "Comment from legal [memorandum] from 14 25 March 2009: The Defence have also asked the 15 question which I set out here verbatim: 'When 16 was it that the Post Office first became aware 17 that there were irregularities with regard to 18 the accounts? Was it when the final audit had 19 been carried out or had there been concerns at 20 an earlier stage?' 21 "This was the first time that the integrity 22 of the Horizon System was mentioned. 23 "In May 2009, Mrs Misra's defence team 24 offered a plea to false accounting but not to 25 theft. 82 1 "... Post Office prosecution team did not 2 accept the reduced please. 3 "An expert witness was put forward by the 4 defence to challenge the integrity of the 5 Horizon System." 6 Then "Outcome", at the bottom of the page: 7 "After a lengthy trial at Guildford Crown 8 Court ... the jury came to a verdict ... when 9 they found the Defendant guilty of theft. The 10 case turned from a relatively straightforward 11 general deficiency case to an unprecedented 12 attack on the Horizon System." 13 Is that your language or are you cutting and 14 pasting that from somewhere else? 15 A. No, I would say that was cut and paste from the 16 case file. 17 Q. "We were beset with [an unparallelled] degree of 18 disclosure requests by the Defence. Through the 19 hard work of everyone, Counsel Warwick Tatford, 20 Investigation Officer Jon Longman and through 21 the considerable expertise of Gareth Jenkins of 22 Fujitsu we were able to refute all suggestions 23 made by the Defence that the Horizon System was 24 faulty." 25 Again, is that cut and pasted or is that 83 1 your judgement? 2 A. I'd say that's cut and pasted. 3 Q. "It is to be hoped the case will set a marker to 4 dissuade other Defendants from jumping on the 5 Horizon bashing bandwagon." 6 Again, is that cut and pasted? 7 A. I would say so, yes. 8 Q. "Mrs Misra was wound guilty of theft and 9 sentenced to 15 months imprisonment. 10 "[And] also found guilty of false accounting 11 and sentenced to 6 months imprisonment 12 [concurrently]." 13 Then your conclusions. Presumably, this is 14 your writing, rather than being cut and pasted? 15 A. Like I say, I can't remember writing this report 16 but it does look as though -- that I did. 17 Q. "Although there have been attempts to discredit 18 the Horizon System via the courts, to date the 19 Post Office have been able to defend the 20 integrity of the Horizon System at all levels." 21 Is that how you viewed this? Attempts to 22 discredit the Horizon System in the courts, 23 rather than people accused of crime defending 24 themselves? 25 A. I can only read what was put there. At the 84 1 time -- 2 Q. We can all read what's put there? 3 A. Absolutely. 4 Q. But I'm asking you, is that how you viewed it -- 5 A. At the time. 6 Q. -- this wasn't people trying to defend 7 themselves, these were attempts to discredit 8 Horizon? 9 A. At the time, I was not aware of any Horizon 10 Issues, and the bugs that you've mentioned, 11 I was obviously not aware of them. 12 Q. "When questioning the integrity of the Horizon 13 System the defence solicitors are making similar 14 disclosure requests, indicating that disclosure 15 requests in future challenges will be similar to 16 those made in past Horizon integrity challenges. 17 "Depending on where the loss was identified 18 this can sway the disclosure requests slightly 19 into requiring further details and operating 20 procedures around specific transactions 21 including background processes, ie the 22 processing of cheques once they have left the 23 office and electronic funds transfer records. 24 "There have also been requests for 25 information on training materials and training 85 1 records, including call logs to NBSC. In the 2 Misra case the defence questioned a lot of 3 technical aspects of the data held at Fujitsu, 4 these challenges were refuted by Gareth 5 Jenkins." 6 Then "Future actions", were these your ideas 7 here? 8 A. I can't answer, I don't know. 9 Q. Well, it looks like -- 10 A. Whether -- 11 Q. -- it, doesn't it? 12 A. If looks like it but I don't know whether that 13 was in liaison with anybody else or just purely 14 my comments. 15 Q. The first part of the process had already been 16 put in place: 17 "... where there is any possible challenge 18 [to Horizon, this] will be ... reported in the 19 48-hour offender report." 20 Was the purpose of this to alert the Post 21 Office to, as you call them, attacks on 22 Horizon's integrity? 23 A. No, I would have -- I read that as it is trying 24 to understand if there is any further questions 25 on it. 86 1 Q. What was the process, then? 2 A. Ooh, I can't remember. I can't remember what 3 the process was back then. 4 Q. Your report continues: 5 "All operational personnel have been asked 6 to report directly to me when at any point 7 throughout the interviews/court process that the 8 integrity of the Horizon System has been 9 mentioned. 10 "This will be continually monitored/updated 11 to ensure that we are aware of any Horizon 12 integrity challenges at the earliest opportunity 13 and are prepared for any future challenges at 14 all stages of the investigation and prosecution 15 process." 16 In taking on this is role, other than 17 looking at some past case files, did you take 18 yourself any steps to satisfy yourself as to the 19 integrity of the Horizon data? 20 A. No, other than gathering information. 21 Q. Were you asked to commission any expert or 22 independent review of Horizon integrity? 23 A. Not that I can recall, no. 24 Q. Did you speak to any IT experts, whether within 25 or outside the Post Office? 87 1 A. Not that I can recall, no. 2 Q. Did you ask what Fujitsu knew about any bugs, 3 errors or defects in Horizon? 4 A. No, not that I can recall at this time. 5 Q. Did you ask what work had previously been done 6 to test the integrity of the system? 7 A. No. 8 Q. Were you asked by the Post Office to take any 9 steps to better understand any weaknesses in the 10 system and consider -- 11 A. No. 12 Q. -- what ought to be disclosed in response to any 13 defence disclosure request in your role as 14 disclosure officer? 15 A. Not that I can recall, no. 16 Q. Instead, were you willing to accept the stock 17 line that Horizon was robust? 18 A. At the time of writing this, yes. 19 Q. Can I turn to a report that you authored in June 20 2013. That document can come down, please -- 21 relating to transaction logs at the Lepton sub 22 post office. Can we start by looking at 23 FUJ00086811. Thank you. 24 You've been shown a copy of this report when 25 you were making your witness statement earlier 88 1 in the year, yes? 2 A. I vaguely remember this report, yes. 3 Q. Yes. You'll see that it's said to be version 1 4 of the report -- 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. -- last edited by you on 12 June 2013. If we go 7 to page 3, please, and look at the foot of the 8 page, just a bit further down, please. We can 9 see that it was authored by you on 12 June 2013. 10 A. Yeah. 11 Q. You were still within the Security team but you 12 were described as a Fraud Analyst by then? 13 A. Yeah. 14 Q. This report explains a problem at the Lepton 15 Branch that was an issue that was quoted again 16 and again over the next decade or so, 17 essentially, and I want to ask you about how you 18 came to be commissioned to write this report. 19 Something about the content of it and the 20 consequences of you writing it. But just going 21 back to that first page, please, we'll see that 22 it's said to be "Draft". 23 A. Mm. 24 Q. Do you know whether it remained a draft? 25 A. I don't. I don't know. 89 1 Q. If it wasn't finalised, can you think of 2 a reason for that? 3 A. I can't, no, no. 4 Q. You'll see that it's said to be "Confidential 5 and legally privileged" at the top of that page 6 and, indeed, all other pages. Did you include 7 that, "Confidential and legally privileged"? 8 A. I would have probably been advised to put that 9 on but I couldn't tell you who asked me to put 10 it on. 11 Q. Do you know in what circumstances the legal 12 privilege that you're referring to there arose? 13 A. I don't, no. 14 Q. What type of person, performing what function, 15 would have advised you to include the words 16 "Confidential and legally privileged"? 17 A. I have no recollection of who would have advised 18 me to put that on. 19 Q. If we go over the page, please, to page 1. 20 Looking at the "Executive Summary": 21 "A transaction took place at Lepton [sub 22 post office with the FAD code 19320] on 23 4 October at 10.42 am for a British Telecom bill 24 payment for £76.09; this was paid for by 25 a Lloyds TSB cash withdrawal for £80 and change 90 1 given for £3.91." 2 So two transactions there; is that right? 3 A. That's what it looks like, yes, yeah. 4 Q. A customer needing to pay their BT bill for 5 £76-odd, taking £80 out of a cash account with 6 Lloyds and being given change of £3.91, yes? 7 A. Yeah. 8 Q. Then: 9 "At 10.37 on the same day the British 10 Telecom bill payment was reversed out to cash 11 settlement." 12 Can you explain what "reversed out to cash 13 settlement" means? 14 A. From memory, it -- the transaction would have 15 been reversed out of the system. 16 Q. Yes, what does that mean? 17 A. Taken back out of the system, cancelled, 18 I guess, if that's the right word to call it. 19 Q. So the BT element of the two transactions was 20 reversed out, meaning -- is this right -- that 21 the system showed that there was a reversal so 22 that -- 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. -- the BT bill was not paid -- 25 A. Yes. 91 1 Q. -- and in fact £76.09p was withdrawn from the 2 system -- 3 A. Yeah. 4 Q. -- and paid out as cash? 5 A. Yeah. 6 Q. So you've got an unpaid BT bill? 7 A. (Unclear), yeah. 8 Q. Exactly: 9 "The branch was issued with a Transaction 10 Correction for £76.09, which they duly settled; 11 however the postmaster denied reversing this 12 transaction and involved a Forensic Accountant 13 as he believed his reputation was in doubt." 14 A. Mm. 15 Q. So, in short, this subpostmaster is saying 16 "Although I paid the shortfall of £76.09, I am 17 adamant that I didn't make the reversal, 18 I didn't get the money back out". 19 A. Yeah. 20 Q. Is it right that the overall conclusion was 21 that, although a reversal could appear in the 22 Credence data as though it had been done by the 23 subpostmaster, in fact it was the system and not 24 the subpostmaster that had created the reversal? 25 A. That's what it turned out to be on this case, 92 1 yes. 2 Q. Thank you. That gives the context for the 3 issue. 4 A. Yeah. 5 Q. Can you help us, in relation to the 6 commissioning of the report, why were you tasked 7 with producing this report? 8 A. I can't remember who asked me to do the report, 9 I can't actually remember who asked me to look 10 into it but, clearly, somebody did, and I looked 11 at the data, and -- 12 Q. Irrespective of who asked, can you remember why 13 would it fall to you, given your job as a Fraud 14 Analyst in June 2013? 15 A. I must have been asked to look at it, look into 16 it, to see if I could understand what had 17 happened. 18 Q. Did you, for example, hold particular expertise 19 in the analysis of Horizon transactions? 20 A. I did use to look at odd ones, yes. 21 Q. Had you previously had experience of 22 investigating discrepancies shown on the Horizon 23 System? 24 A. At the time I used to look at a lot of the 25 Horizon System data, yes. 93 1 Q. I'm thinking about discrepancies in particular, 2 ie shortfalls. 3 A. Some, yes. 4 Q. Can I turn to your methodology. Can you 5 remember what your method was, how you went 6 about investigating this issue? 7 A. I can't, no, other than what I can read in the 8 report. 9 Q. On reading what's in the report, does it appear 10 that you essentially asked a series to of 11 questions to Mr Gareth Jenkins in email form? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. He replied and you, essentially, cut and paste 14 your questions and the substance of his answers 15 into the report? 16 A. I did, yes. 17 Q. Can we look at a couple of documents side by 18 side. On the left side can we have FUJ00086811, 19 at page 3. On the right-hand side, POL00097481, 20 at page 3. Page 3 of each document, please. 21 Thank you very much. 22 On page 3 of the report, that's the 23 left-hand side document, you say about halfway 24 down the page: 25 "I can see where this transaction is and now 94 1 understand the reason behind it. My main 2 concern is that we use the basic ARQ logs for 3 evidence in court and if we don't know what 4 extra reports to ask for then in some 5 circumstances we would not be giving a true 6 picture." 7 A. Mm. 8 Q. Then if we look at the right-hand side page, 9 your email to Mr Jenkins, at the top of the 10 page, ignoring the first four words: 11 "I can see where this transaction is now and 12 understand the reason behind it. My main 13 concern is that we use the basic ARQ logs for 14 evidence in court", et cetera. 15 Yes? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. We can see that you've cut and pasted the bold 18 text in the report -- 19 A. I am -- 20 Q. -- from your question to Mr Jenkins, yes? 21 A. Mm-hm, yeah. 22 Q. Then if we, on the left-hand document go back -- 23 sorry, on the right-hand document go back to 24 page 2, you see Mr Jenkins' reply: 25 "I understand your concerns. 95 1 "It would be relatively simple to add 2 an extra column into the existing ARQ report", 3 et cetera. 4 A. Mm-hm. 5 Q. Then on the left side, you can see: 6 "Answer -- I understand your concerns", 7 et cetera, et cetera. 8 Can you see that? 9 A. Yeah. 10 Q. So it appears that the way you'd gone about 11 things is ask Mr Jenkins a series of questions, 12 cut and paste the substance of what you've asked 13 and the substance of his reply into the report, 14 yes? 15 A. Correct, yes. 16 Q. That's aside from the recommendations part, 17 which I'll come back to in a moment. Can I ask 18 you some questions about the substance of what 19 you said to Mr Jenkins and his replies. Let's 20 start with the email that we're looking at and 21 just go back to page 3. You say at the top of 22 the page: 23 "I can see where this transaction is ..." 24 That's the reversal transaction shown by 25 some data that has been provided, some ARQ data? 96 1 A. Mm-hm. 2 Q. "... and now understand the reason behind it." 3 You say: 4 "My main concern is that we use the basic 5 ARQ logs for evidence in court and if we don't 6 know what extra reports to ask for them in some 7 circumstances we would not be giving a true 8 picture." 9 A. Mm-hm. 10 Q. Would you agree that this suggests that you 11 understood the significance of the data that 12 Mr Jenkins had given you? 13 A. Um, I would say that it made me realise there 14 were -- there was more data available than what 15 came through in the basic logs. 16 Q. But it's a bit more than that, isn't it? 17 Firstly, you realise the significance not only 18 for the branch at Lepton but, more generally, 19 for criminal actions being pursued by the Post 20 Office, the criminal proceedings being pursued 21 by the Post Office? 22 A. Yeah. 23 Q. Because you say: 24 "... we use basic ARQ logs for evidence in 25 court. If we don't know what extra reports to 97 1 ask for then in some circumstances we would not 2 be giving a true picture." 3 That means we may not be presenting a true 4 picture in evidence to the court, doesn't it? 5 A. Yes. Either way, yes. 6 Q. That would obviously be a significant concern 7 for you, that the Post Office is not presenting 8 true evidence in court, wouldn't it? 9 A. Yes, which is probably why I put it in there, 10 yeah. 11 Q. It would be a significant concern for the Post 12 Office, wouldn't it? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. Did you consider that if there was a discrepancy 15 between what could be understood in the ARQ data 16 that you received and in the raw data, there 17 were likely to be cases where a prosecution had 18 proceeded without a true picture being presented 19 to the court? 20 A. On the data I looked at here, it was just to do 21 with reversals of transactions. 22 Q. This is raising a wider point though, isn't? 23 A. Potentially -- 24 Q. "We get basic ARQ logs, if we don't know what 25 extra reports, ie the reps you've now shown me, 98 1 Mr Jenkins, show, we may not be presenting true 2 evidence to a court"; that's what you're saying, 3 isn't it? 4 A. Yes, it's just saying, "Make us aware of other 5 things that we can ask for". 6 Q. So that the Post Office can give true evidence 7 to a court? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. You carry on in your email: 10 "I know you are aware of all of the Horizon 11 integrity issues and I want to ensure that the 12 ARQ logs are used and understood fully by our 13 operational staff that have to work with this 14 data both in interviews and in court." 15 Does this suggest that by February 2013, you 16 were aware of "all of the Horizon integrity 17 issues"? 18 A. No, not all of them. I would be aware that 19 questions were being questioned on Horizon, 20 which is probably why I needed to understand 21 what had happened here. 22 Q. What were you referring to when you said, 23 "I know that you are aware of all the Horizon 24 integrity issues"? 25 A. I believe I would have just been referring to 99 1 the fact that we needed explanations on this 2 particular case, rather than anything indicating 3 bigger issues that I wasn't aware of. I just 4 needed to understand this one. 5 Q. Mrs Rose, that sentence is not talking at all 6 about data in this case. It's talking about 7 a broader point, isn't it? You're saying to 8 Mr Jenkins, "I know you are aware of all the 9 Horizon integrity issues". It's not talking 10 about different species of ARQ logs, is it? 11 A. I think it was just meaning we needed to get 12 an understanding of what had happened. 13 Q. It doesn't say that, does it? It says, "I know 14 you're aware of all the Horizon integrity 15 issues" and my questions are what Horizon 16 integrity issues were you aware of and what 17 Horizon integrity issues did you know that 18 Mr Jenkins was aware of? 19 A. I didn't know that he knew of any and this was 20 the first real difference that I'd come across. 21 Q. If you didn't know that he was aware of any 22 Horizon integrity issues, why did you email him 23 and say, "I know you're aware of all of the 24 Horizon integrity issues"? 25 A. Because there would probably be talk going 100 1 around and I guessed he would have been aware of 2 it. 3 Q. So it's just referencing the rumour-mill, is it? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. Can we look at page 1 of the same chain, please. 6 If we see here you're referring the email string 7 to Angela van den Bogerd and Elaine Spencer, and 8 you say: 9 "For information. 10 "Email string may be of interest. I'm not 11 really sure where to take this. Happy to try 12 for a change request if you would like me too 13 but at this moment in time I don't want to 14 tackle one small issue when we may need to 15 challenge deeper issues with the way we see data 16 from Fujitsu/Credence." 17 You appear by this time to have understood 18 how significant it was that there were -- if it 19 was the case, that there were things that could 20 appear differently in the underlying audit data, 21 as opposed to the ARQ logs that you were being 22 given, correct? 23 A. That's what it looks like, yes. 24 Q. You were sufficiently concerned to escalate this 25 to Angela van den Bogerd? 101 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. Can you recall following up this to see whether 3 or not the recommendations that you made in your 4 report at the foot of the page, on the left-hand 5 side, were followed? 6 A. I don't recall following that up. 7 Q. You say: 8 "I do believe the system has behaved as it 9 should ..." 10 I'm going to come back to that in a moment: 11 "... and I do not see this scenario 12 occurring regularly and creating large losses 13 [I'll come back to that too]. However, my 14 concerns are that we cannot clearly see what has 15 happened on the data available to us and this in 16 itself may be misinterpreted when giving 17 evidence and using the same data for 18 prosecutions. 19 "My recommendation is that a change request 20 is submitted so that all system created 21 reversals are clearly identifiable on both 22 Fujitsu and Credence." 23 A. Mm-hm. 24 Q. Are you aware whether that change request was 25 ever submitted? 102 1 A. I'm not aware whether it was or wasn't. 2 Q. In your mind, did this, what you had identified, 3 call into question the consistent position of 4 the Post Office by this time, that the Horizon 5 System and the data it produced, was robust? 6 A. I believe on this occasion, the system -- the 7 Horizon System behaved as it should have done. 8 Reading that, my concerns were that we couldn't 9 actually see -- we could see the reversal but it 10 wasn't -- it didn't indicate that it wasn't done 11 by the postmaster, as opposed to a system 12 reversal. 13 Q. So just dealing with the "I do believe that the 14 system behaved as it should", what your report 15 describes is that a transaction reversal was 16 generated by Horizon without any input at all by 17 the subpostmaster, correct? 18 A. Correct. 19 Q. The transaction reversal was entirely a creation 20 of Horizon, it was a transaction done by, 21 generated by the system and nothing to do with 22 him, correct? 23 A. Correct. 24 Q. Yet the system appeared to suggest to the 25 outside world that the subpostmaster himself had 103 1 generated the reversal? 2 A. The basic system did, yes, but, once Gareth 3 provided the data, it proved that it had been 4 some kind of a failure in the, I believe it was 5 the Internet, the telecom link. 6 Q. How, in any possible world, is that the system 7 behaving as it should? 8 A. The -- I believe that Horizon created -- it 9 should have reported that the reversal was 10 a system reversal, not a -- is it an existing 11 reversal, I can't remember -- which was clearly 12 identified in the Fujitsu data but not on the 13 ARQ logs. 14 Q. There was no separate code -- 15 A. Yeah. 16 Q. -- which identified that this was the system at 17 work and not the subpostmaster at work, correct? 18 A. That was a fault I found on this occasion, yes. 19 Q. Additionally, the Credence data was inadequate 20 to show what had actually happened. Indeed, not 21 only was the data inadequate, would you agree, 22 it made it look as if the subpostmaster had done 23 something -- 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. -- that he or she had not done -- 104 1 A. Correct. 2 Q. -- and which the system had done? 3 A. Correct. 4 Q. In what respect is that a system behaving as it 5 should? 6 A. Because when we got the underlying data, it 7 actually showed what had happened. 8 Q. Yes, but that's a question of: how visible is it 9 if we pick away at it? My question is: how is 10 it the system behaving as it should, that it 11 created a transaction reversal of its own motion 12 without any input by the subpostmaster? 13 A. That was clearly my findings on the day. 14 Q. Yes, but why? 15 A. I can't see that -- that's what I believed at 16 the time, that the system had done -- how it 17 should. 18 Q. But looking back, how could it be? A system had 19 shown money paid back to the subpostmaster that 20 was invisible to him. In what respect is that 21 a system behaving as it should? 22 A. That -- well, I can only look at what -- I put 23 recommendations back in 2013, and that was 24 obviously my belief at the time. 25 Q. You say you do not see this scenario occurring 105 1 regularly. On what basis did you reach that 2 judgement? 3 A. I seem to remember vaguely that it was to do 4 with a failure in the connections between the 5 bill payments going through. So unless the bill 6 payments failed all the time, then it wouldn't 7 happen. 8 Q. How did you know whether they did or they 9 didn't? 10 A. Well, you wouldn't, would you, unless someone 11 like Lepton brought it up and said "I'm having 12 losses and these are the reversals that 13 I haven't done". 14 Q. And they commission a forensic accountant to 15 back them up even though it was only a loss of 16 just under £80? Did you make any recommendation 17 that a backwards look take place considering -- 18 A. I -- 19 Q. -- integrity of any evidence that had been given 20 in criminal prosecutions? 21 A. I don't recall doing on this occasion. 22 Q. Or the integrity of civil actions taken against 23 individual subpostmasters for debt recovery? 24 A. I wouldn't have done, I don't think, no. 25 MR BEER: Sir, I wonder whether we could take the 106 1 second break of the morning there. It's 11.55 2 now, I wonder if we can break until 12.15? 3 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, we can. 4 But there's -- just that last sentence of 5 that document, Mr Beer, sorry to interrupt 6 again -- or not interrupt, add again. 7 You've been asked questions, Mrs Rose, by 8 Mr Beer about how this could be the system 9 working properly and you sought to answer them. 10 But I'm puzzled by your last sentence: 11 "My recommendation is that a change request 12 is submitted so that all system created 13 reversals are clearly identifiable on both 14 Fujitsu and Credence." 15 Now, my understanding of that language -- 16 and I hope I'm not being to linguistic about 17 this -- is that you are acknowledging that 18 a system created request has occurred which 19 should not have occurred and so you want some 20 change made so that, if it happens again, it 21 will be clearly and obviously visible to anybody 22 who looks for it. Now, is that a fair 23 interpretation of what you've written? 24 A. I would say so, yes. 25 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Right. Fine. Thank you. 107 1 Now we can have our break, Mr Beer. 2 MR BEER: In fact, we're going to follow that up 3 a little bit after the break too. 4 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: I thought you might. But 5 I couldn't resist it. I'm sorry. 6 MR BEER: Thank you very much, sir. 7 (11.55 am) 8 (A short break) 9 (12.15 pm) 10 MR BEER: Good afternoon, sir, and Mrs Rose can you 11 see and hear me? 12 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, thank you. 13 THE WITNESS: Yes, thank you. 14 MR BEER: You should still have on the screen two 15 documents. Can you confirm that's the case? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. Thank you. I just want to revisit on the 18 left-hand side the conclusion of your report. 19 To start with, just to go back and give you the 20 opportunity to comment on this, the sentence 21 that says, "I do believe that the system has 22 behaved as it should"? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. By that, are you meaning that, because there was 25 a power outage or an Internet failure or some 108 1 communications difficulties, the transaction 2 wasn't completed -- 3 A. Exactly. 4 Q. -- and the system generated a transaction 5 reversal -- 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. -- and, in that respect, the system was behaving 8 as it should? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. Overall, the system was not operating well, 11 though, in two respects, would this be right: 12 because firstly there shouldn't be that kind of 13 communication breakdown in which the need for 14 a transaction reversal arises; and, secondly, 15 there was a concern about the visibility of what 16 had happened, and the implication that this was 17 the postmaster's actions that had done it? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. Is that yes to both parts of that question? 20 A. Yes, I don't think the issue was with the way 21 the Horizon behaved considering what happened; 22 the issue was with what the data presentation 23 and what we could see in the basic logs. 24 Q. Now then, on the right-hand side of the page 25 back in February, because you had already been 109 1 emailing Mr Jenkins about this, you concluded 2 this chain by telling senior managers, including 3 Angela van den Bogerd, that firstly you "Look at 4 this chain", but you say: 5 "I don't want to tackle one small issue when 6 we may need to challenge deeper issues with the 7 way we see data from Fujitsu/Credence". 8 A. Yeah. 9 Q. By that, were you meaning, "Look, on this 10 occasion, this was a transaction correction that 11 we couldn't see that it was system generated but 12 there may be other issues, deeper issues, that 13 we are also not sighted on"? 14 A. My understanding of that email -- I can't 15 remember writing it but my understanding of that 16 email is basically what you've just said. Yes, 17 we can see that one but we'd need to understand 18 were there other changes that needed to take 19 place, so are there other reasons why the system 20 does auto reversal so we could see everything 21 all in one go? 22 Q. So, although this may have been a transaction 23 reversal arising because of a communications 24 glitch, or whatever, you were making a broader 25 point that there's a class of data that we're 110 1 not seeing here. That's what the deeper issue 2 is? 3 A. I guess we just needed to understand was it 4 an issue? Were there other things that we 5 couldn't see? 6 Q. You say that you're happy to try for a change 7 request? 8 A. That's what I put in there, yes. 9 Q. By that, you mean a formal contractual 10 submission that would alter the relationship 11 between Fujitsu and the Post Office, concerning 12 the data that it was -- Fujitsu was obliged to 13 supply? 14 A. That's what I believed a change request would 15 have done, yes. I don't recall ever putting one 16 in, to be honest, but I -- 17 Q. No, we're going hear evidence later in the 18 Inquiry from Mr Jenkins that no change was ever 19 submitted. 20 A. Fine, fair enough, yes. 21 Q. But that's in February you're saying that? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. Then in June, your document on the left-hand 24 side of the same year, in the last paragraph, as 25 the Chairman has pointed out: 111 1 "My recommendation is that a change request 2 is submitted so that all system created 3 reversals are clearly identifiable on both 4 Fujitsu and Credence." 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. By "all system created reversals" is that the 7 wider or deeper issue that you were referring 8 to? 9 A. I would only have referred to the issues that 10 I was aware of, so I guess I would have only 11 been referring to the system failure, you know, 12 the system connection issues as opposed to 13 anything else. 14 Q. Well, here, you say that your recommendation is 15 that all system created reversals -- 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. -- are visible to you? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. This report is dated June 2013. At the time of 20 writing, you were obviously aware that 21 subpostmasters had been prosecuted on the basis 22 of Horizon data for over a decade before this? 23 A. Yes, potentially, yes. 24 Q. What do you mean, potentially? 25 A. I can't quote any that I was aware of, but 112 1 I would think I probably would have been aware 2 of some at that stage. 3 Q. You must have been aware that subpostmasters 4 were being audited, including by you, 1,400 5 times, and sometimes that turned into 6 a prosecution? 7 A. It did but, at that time, I wouldn't have known 8 of any particular -- 9 Q. I'm not asking for names, I'm just saying you 10 would have been aware -- 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. -- that subpostmasters would have been 13 prosecuted? 14 A. That's right. 15 Q. Yes? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. They had been prosecuted on the basis of Horizon 18 data? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. You were aware that civil actions had been 21 brought against subpostmasters also reliant on 22 the integrity of Horizon data? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. The concern that you express here is about 25 future prosecutions, isn't it? 113 1 A. It's about being able to see the data -- 2 Q. It's about looking to the future, isn't it? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. You didn't make any recommendation to revisit 5 cases in the past, did you? 6 A. Not on this report, I didn't, no. 7 Q. Did you, other than on this report, make any 8 recommendations about revisiting past cases 9 reliant on Horizon data? 10 A. I can't recall if I did. 11 Q. Do you know whether that issue was raised by 12 Ms van den Bogerd or anyone else? 13 A. I wouldn't know. 14 Q. Was that raised with you? 15 A. Not that I can recall, no. 16 Q. Did you remain involved in work about Horizon 17 data integrity following the completion of this 18 report? 19 A. I'm not sure. I can't recall if I did or not. 20 Q. Well, in the three years that you'd got left to 21 serve until you left in 2016, what did you do? 22 A. I think the final two-plus years I dealt with 23 external crime reporting. So that would be 24 robberies, burglaries, gas attacks. So 25 completely away from this. 114 1 Q. Can we look, please -- both those documents can 2 come down, please -- at POL00006357. Thank you. 3 This is an advice written by a man called Simon 4 Clarke, an in-house barrister employed by a firm 5 of solicitors called Cartwright King, who the 6 Post Office used at this time to prosecute many 7 criminal charges against subpostmasters. If we 8 just go to page 14, please, and look at the foot 9 of the page, you'll see that it's dated 15 July 10 2013, so a month or so after your report that 11 we've just looked at. 12 A. Mm-hm. 13 Q. If we just go back to paragraph 1, please. 14 Mr Clarke says: 15 "I am asked to advise [the Post Office] on 16 the use of expert evidence in support of 17 prosecutions of allegedly criminal conduct 18 committed by those involved in the delivery of 19 Post Office services to the public through sub 20 post office branches. By and large these 21 allegations relate to misconduct said to have 22 been committed by [subpostmasters] and/or their 23 clerks." 24 So that's the purpose of the document. If 25 we go to page 5, please, at paragraphs 14 and 115 1 15. Mr Clarke says: 2 "For many years both [Royal Mail Group] and 3 latterly [the Post Office] has relied upon [he 4 calls him Dr Gareth Jenkins] for the provision 5 of expert evidence as to the operation and 6 integrity of Horizon. Dr Jenkins describes 7 himself as an employee of Fujitsu Services 8 Limited and its predecessor company ICL since 9 1973. He holds a number of distinguished 10 qualifications in relevant areas. He has worked 11 on the Horizon project since 1996; he is 12 accordingly a leading expert on the operation 13 and integrity of Horizon. 14 "Dr Jenkins has provided many expert 15 statements in support of [Post Office Limited 16 and Royal Mail Group] prosecutions; he has 17 negotiated with and arrived at joint conclusions 18 and joint reports with defence experts and has 19 attended court so as to give evidence on oath in 20 criminal trials." 21 Then page 18, please -- sorry, page 8. My 22 mistake it's page 9. Starting with the heading, 23 "Helen Rose draft report dated 12 June", this 24 your report that's being referred to here: 25 "This report is based on a series of emails 116 1 passing between Helen Rose, a [Post Office] 2 Security Fraud Analyst. The emails appear to 3 have been sent/received over the period of 4 30 January to 13 February 2013. The essence of 5 the contact is a 'question and answer' process 6 between Helen Rose [and then he calls him 7 Dr Jennings -- I think that's reference to 8 Mr Gareth Jenkins] in circumstances where Helen 9 Rose is enquiring into a reversals issue at the 10 Lepton [office]. I again extract a number of 11 paragraphs ..." 12 I'm not going to read those, we've looked at 13 them already: 14 "27. Ms Rose's ultimate conclusion is that 15 this is not an issue which suggests a failing of 16 Horizon itself; rather it is an issue of data 17 presentation, ie the problem appears to be that 18 the ARQ logs do not distinguish between system 19 generated and manual reversals, the answer being 20 to create a new column in the ARQ log to 21 facilitate that distinction. The report however 22 does allude to Horizon issues: the 30 January 23 email is suggestive of the proposition that 24 Dr Jennings does not know what went wrong; and 25 the 13 February comment is suggestive of the 117 1 fact that Dr Jenkins knows of other Horizon 2 Issues." 3 So your report featured as part of the 4 material relied on to reach the conclusions that 5 Mr Clarke did. If we go on to page 14, 6 please -- sorry 13, my mistake -- and just look 7 at "Conclusions": 8 "What does all this mean? In short, it 9 means that Dr Jennings has not complied with his 10 duties to the court, the prosecution or the 11 defence." 12 Reading on, 38: 13 "The reasons as to why Dr Jenkins failed to 14 comply with this duty are beyond the scope of 15 this review. The effects of that failure 16 however must be considered. I advise the 17 following to be the position: 18 "Dr Jenkins failed to disclose material 19 known to him but which undermines his expert 20 opinion. This failure is in plain breach of his 21 duties as an expert witness. 22 "Accordingly Dr Jenkins' credibility as 23 an expert witness is fatally undermined; he 24 should not be asked to provide evidence in any 25 current or future prosecution. 118 1 "Similarly, in those current and ongoing 2 cases where Dr Jenkins has provided an expert 3 witness statement, he should not be called upon 4 to give that evidence. Rather, we should seek 5 a different, independent expert to fulfil that 6 role. 7 "Notwithstanding that the failure is that of 8 Dr Jennings and, arguably, of Fujitsu, being his 9 employer, this failure has a profound effect on 10 [the Post Office] and [Post Office] 11 prosecutions, not least because by reason of 12 Dr Jenkins' failure, material which should have 13 been disclosed to defendants was not disclosed, 14 thereby placing POL in breach of their duty as 15 a prosecutor. 16 "By reason of that failure ... there are now 17 number of convicted defendants to whom the 18 existence of bugs should have been disclosed but 19 was not. Those defendants remain entitled to 20 have disclosure of that material notwithstanding 21 their convicted status." 22 I'm not going to read the rest of it. 23 Were you informed that in July 2013, the 24 Post Office had been advised that Mr Jenkins had 25 not complied with his duties to the court to the 119 1 prosecution or the defence? 2 A. No. 3 Q. Was that brought to your attention in the 4 remaining three years of your service with the 5 Post Office? 6 A. No. 7 Q. Was there discussion, after this date in July 8 2013, that the Post Office had been advised that 9 Mr Jenkins was in breach of his duty as 10 an expert witness -- 11 A. No, not that I can recall. 12 Q. -- and that he couldn't provide evidence in any 13 current or future prosecutions? 14 A. Not that I can recall, no. 15 Q. This must have been -- or would you agree that 16 this is quite significant news in the Security 17 team, isn't it? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. It was in part based on your June 2013 report? 20 A. It appears to be, yes. 21 Q. Do you remember whether the contents of your 22 report created quite a stir at the time in the 23 Security department? 24 A. Not -- no, not really. I can remember sending 25 it through line managers but I don't know who 120 1 saw it or what happened with it. 2 Q. Sorry, just picking you up on that last answer, 3 you said you can remember sending it through 4 line managers. Who would that be, the June '13 5 report? 6 A. I'd have to go back over the emails to see who 7 was line manager and who I sent it on to. 8 I don't know where it's forwarded on after that, 9 by anybody. 10 Q. Were you ever made aware, in the remaining three 11 or so years that you were in the Post Office, 12 that your report had had these consequences? 13 A. No. 14 Q. Was the last thing that you therefore heard of 15 in relation to your report the submission of it, 16 and that was the end of the matter? 17 A. From memory, yes. 18 MR BEER: Thank you very much, Mrs Rose, they're the 19 only questions that I ask of you. 20 Sir, I know that at least one other Core 21 Participant has some questions to ask. In fact, 22 only one Core Participant has questions to ask. 23 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: All right. Well, let those 24 questions be put, then, please. 25 MR BEER: Thank you. It's the Hodge Jones & Allen 121 1 team. I don't know if it is Ms Page. It is 2 Ms Page. Thank you. 3 Questioned by MS PAGE 4 MS PAGE: Thank you. I ask questions on behalf of 5 Lee Castleton, amongst other subpostmasters in 6 the Inquiry. 7 Now, we have understood from your witness 8 statement that you moved to the Security team in 9 2004, so not long after the audit of the Marine 10 Drive branch; is that right? 11 A. Correct, yes. 12 Q. By the time of the trial and preparing your 13 witness statement, you had been there in the 14 Security team for about two years? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. Could we take a look, please, at POL00070763. 17 This is a phone note by Stephen Dilley, the 18 solicitor who acted for the Post Office in the 19 trial of Lee Castleton. He has made this note 20 having had a telephone conversation with you. 21 We can see that there at the top: 22 "SJD3" -- 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. -- "having a conversation with Helen Rose (née 25 Hollingworth) ..." 122 1 Yes? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. If we scroll down, we can see that he covers the 4 content of your witness statement. He's about 5 to talk to you about your witness statement. He 6 says in paragraph 1 that you're 7 an investigations manager, and so forth, and 8 describes that you've moved. But if we go down 9 a bit further and we go to the top of page 2, he 10 says, summarising what you've obviously said to 11 him: 12 "In layman's terms her conclusions were that 13 Mr Castleton was fiddling the books. She had 14 never seen the Horizon System cause the problems 15 that Mr Castleton said it was causing. She 16 thought in her words that he was 'shifty'." 17 Do you recall saying those sorts of opinions 18 to Mr Dilley? 19 A. I can't recall that conversation whatsoever. 20 Q. If we go to the final paragraph as well: 21 "My impression of Helen is that 22 understandably her memory has faded over time 23 and that she will need to rely heavily upon her 24 audit to refresh her memory of events. She 25 doesn't remember some details that we would 123 1 like, for example, about how long the safe was 2 left open for and why and what Mr Castleton said 3 about it." 4 Just pausing there, that suggests, doesn't 5 it, that he actually spoke to you about the safe 6 being left open, and that was something which 7 we've now agreed was simply irrelevant and 8 wasn't what had happened. Your colleague had 9 ticked the box saying that the safe had been 10 left as it should, hadn't it? 11 A. I can't recall the audit at all. I'm sorry. 12 I can see what you're explaining but I don't 13 have any recollection of it. 14 Q. Well, what we can see here is that the solicitor 15 has actually asked you to consider the issue of 16 the safe. You had the same paperwork that we've 17 all seen and you knew that the safe had actually 18 been left as it should. Why didn't you tell the 19 lawyer that? 20 A. I can't recall. 21 Q. You appreciate, don't you, that your witness 22 statement, signed by you as true, said something 23 that was incorrect about that, didn't it? 24 A. It obviously said what I thought at the time but 25 I have no recollection of it at this moment in 124 1 time. 2 Q. All right. Well, the final sentence: 3 "However, she did come away with the strong 4 impression that he was fiddling." 5 Do you remember having that strong 6 impression? 7 A. I don't recall saying that, no. 8 Q. You, by then, were used to the way that the 9 Security team worked, weren't you? 10 A. After two years, probably, yes. 11 Q. You were used to assuming that subpostmasters 12 were "shifty" and "fiddling", weren't you? 13 A. Not all of them, no. 14 Q. That was the mindset you'd become accustomed to 15 in the Security team; is that right, Mrs Rose? 16 A. No, not all of them, no. 17 Q. It was a mindset of prejudice against the 18 subpostmasters, wasn't it? 19 A. No. 20 Q. And you were used to giving statements in 21 accordance with that mindset. That's why you 22 included everything which went against the 23 subpostmasters, even if it wasn't in your notes, 24 didn't you? 25 A. No. 125 1 Q. That's why you included things which weren't in 2 your notes which would hurt Mr Castleton, such 3 as the supposed going out for having a drink at 4 lunchtime? 5 A. No. 6 Q. It comes from a mindset of prejudice, doesn't 7 it, Mrs Rose? 8 A. No. 9 Q. And you don't include anything in the statement 10 which might support the subpostmaster's case. 11 That's, again, the mindset of prejudice, isn't 12 it? 13 A. No. 14 Q. Let's look at another document briefly which 15 arises from your time in Security. If we could 16 bring that one down and bring up POL00086843. 17 This is a report following what was obviously 18 a tragic and serious incident when 19 a subpostmaster who was accused of fraud 20 committed suicide, a Mr Michael Mann. Do you 21 recall this? 22 A. I've read the documentation which is refreshed 23 but I don't recall the investigation, no. 24 Q. You don't recall an investigation into 25 a subpostmaster who killed himself? 126 1 A. I can recall an incident; I can't recall the 2 details of the investigation. 3 Q. This happened only 10 years ago; we're not even 4 talking 20 or 30 years ago. You say that you 5 don't recall this? 6 A. No, I said I don't recall the incident -- the 7 actual investigation. 8 Q. Under the heading "Introduction and Terms of 9 Reference", we see that: 10 "This report details the findings from the 11 series of fact-finding interviews I completed 12 [this is Mr Colin Stretch] at the request of 13 [an HR officer]." 14 It says in italics below that: 15 "The Head of Fraud letter contains direct 16 allegations around the conduct of Mr Bradshaw 17 and Mrs Rose." 18 So you don't recall there being 19 an investigation into your conduct? 20 A. No. 21 Q. "These would appear proper to commit to 22 an internal fact-finding that should, to offer 23 maximum transparency, be conducted outside the 24 line." 25 Then we see below that, in the methodology, 127 1 this gentleman who conducted the report says 2 that he conducted interviews with you, Helen 3 Rose, and Steve Bradshaw, in other words the two 4 people who had been accused of misconduct. 5 Then we see further down in that first 6 bullet point, that we can see at the moment -- 7 yes, there we are: 8 "All seven people interviewed were 9 consistent in their responses that Bradshaw and 10 Rose had behaved professionally. This includes 11 the views of Bradshaw and Rose commenting on 12 their own as each other's behaviour. During my 13 interview with Bradshaw he stated he would not 14 have done anything differently, and that he 15 considered Helen Rose and himself to have 16 conducted themselves professionally." 17 So do you recall these interviews at all? 18 The interview between you and the man 19 investigating your misconduct? 20 A. I didn't know it was a misconduct. I can 21 remember there being an enquiry but I didn't 22 know it was a misconduct interview. 23 Q. Is this a situation where you and Mr Bradshaw 24 covered for each other? 25 A. Absolutely not. 128 1 Q. You gave interviews to this chap investigating 2 the misconduct and you said that each of you had 3 behaved in a perfectly professional manner, 4 didn't you? 5 A. According to that, yes. 6 Q. Is that really how you thought of Mr Bradshaw 7 and the way that he conducted investigations? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. Mrs Rose, just a couple more questions. Your 10 2013 report into the Lepton Branch -- sorry, the 11 document can come down -- your 2013 report into 12 the Lepton Branch, that was quoted again and 13 again over the next decade in support of the 14 subpostmasters, wasn't it? 15 A. I don't know. I didn't follow the case. 16 Q. They used it repeatedly throughout the Group 17 Litigation, didn't they? 18 A. I don't know. I didn't follow the case. 19 Q. Do you say that you never became aware that your 20 report was being used to help the 21 subpostmasters' cause? 22 A. No, I didn't follow the case at all. 23 Q. You literally are unaware. When did you first 24 become aware of this? 25 A. I'd heard that it had been used but I didn't 129 1 know in what context it was used because 2 I didn't follow the case. 3 Q. When did you hear it was being used in this way? 4 A. I can't remember. I remember it being mentioned 5 but I didn't know why it was being used. 6 I didn't follow the case at all. 7 Q. Who was keeping you informed? 8 A. Oh, I have no idea. No idea when it might have 9 been mentioned in passing conversation. But 10 I didn't follow the case at all, so I don't 11 know. I didn't know how it was being used. 12 Q. Why didn't you follow the case? 13 A. Because I didn't. I'd left Post Office. 14 I didn't follow the case. 15 Q. Did you leave the Post Office because this 16 report was a black mark against your name? 17 A. No, I don't believe it was a black mark and 18 I didn't leave for that reason. 19 Q. Is it something that stalled your career? 20 A. No. 21 Q. Your memory failures throughout your evidence 22 and throughout your witness statement have 23 permitted you to avoid questions about your 24 conduct over some 20 years. Are these memory 25 failures really genuine, Mrs Rose? 130 1 A. Absolutely. I left Post Office seven and a half 2 years ago. I've no recollection of a lot of the 3 things. 4 Q. Is it really an unwillingness to face the 5 unpleasant truth that your conduct has helped 6 the Post Office to victimise many, many 7 subpostmasters -- 8 A. Not at all. 9 Q. -- and Mr Castleton specifically? 10 A. No. 11 MS PAGE: Thank you. 12 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: That's it, is it, Ms Page? 13 MS PAGE: It is. Thank you, sir. 14 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: No one else wishes to ask 15 Mrs Rose any questions? 16 MR BEER: No, I don't think so, sir, unless you have 17 any questions. 18 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: No, I have no further questions. 19 Thank you, Mrs Rose, for making your witness 20 statement and for coming to give evidence. 21 I think that concludes today's session, 22 Mr Beer, yes? 23 MR BEER: It does, sir. We're back at 10.00 am 24 tomorrow, sir. 25 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes. All right, well, I'll be 131 1 present at 10.00 am tomorrow, in spirit if not 2 in body. I'll see you tomorrow. 3 MR BEER: Thank you very much. 4 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 5 (12.47 pm) 6 (The hearing adjourned until 10.00 am the following 7 day) 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 132 1 I N D E X 2 HELEN ROSE (affirmed) .........................4 3 Questioned by MR BEER .........................4 4 Questioned by MS PAGE .......................122 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 133