1 Wednesday, 20 September 2023 2 (10.00 am) 3 MR BLAKE: Good morning, sir. 4 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Morning. 5 MR BLAKE: Can I call Ms Cumberland, please. 6 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, of course. 7 DAVLYN CUMBERLAND (sworn) 8 Questioned by MR BLAKE 9 MR BLAKE: Thank you very much. Can you state your 10 full name please? 11 A. Davlyn Cumberland. 12 Q. Thank you, Ms Cumberland. You should have in 13 front of you a witness statement with the URN 14 WITN09130100. Do you have that in front of you? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. Thank you. Can I ask you to look at page 12 of 17 that witness statement. You should see there 18 a signature. Can you confirm that signature is 19 yours? 20 A. Yes, it is my signature. 21 Q. Thank you. Is that statement true to the best 22 of your knowledge and belief? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. Thank you very much. That witness statement 25 will go into evidence and it will be published 1 1 on the Inquiry's website shortly. 2 I'd like to begin briefly by your 3 background, you started working for the Post 4 Office in 1990 as a counter clerk; is that 5 right? 6 A. Correct. 7 Q. I think you've worked in various different 8 positions until 1999, when you became a Horizon 9 Field Support Officer? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Is that right? We've heard about it in previous 12 phases but can you briefly remind us what 13 a Horizon Field Support Officer was? 14 A. It was the programme where -- the Horizon 15 implementation programme, where Post Office 16 branch accounts were migrated from the old 17 manual accounting system onto the Horizon 18 System, so they were going electronic, and 19 I worked on the field support team, where the 20 accounts would be migrated onto the electronic 21 system. 22 We would then stay on site with the 23 postmaster or the branch manager, maybe for -- 24 I think, it might have been three or four days, 25 and we would come to support them and we would 2 1 complete the first weekly balance with them. 2 Q. Thank you very much. In 2001, you joined 3 a programme called the Retail Line Review trial. 4 Can you tell us briefly what that was and, in 5 particular, how you became involved in something 6 called the Suspense Account team? 7 A. From what I remember, the Retail Line Review 8 trial was where they centralised all the 9 regional helplines to the Network Business 10 Support Centre, that was then based in Barnsley. 11 The -- they had -- they separated the network of 12 Post Office branches into commercial branches 13 and rural branches. The rural branches were 14 supported by an area manager and the commercial 15 branches were -- I think they were called Retail 16 Line Managers, if I remember rightly. 17 The Suspense Account team was evolved from 18 this restructure of centralising, managing -- 19 I suppose you would call it managing losses and 20 gains. Previously it had been managed locally 21 by the area offices and they were centralising 22 that to the Network Business Support Centre so 23 the Suspense Account team was basically to 24 manage the losses and gains that were held in 25 branch suspense accounts. 3 1 Q. I think you worked in that position from 2001 2 until 2004? 3 A. Yes, from what I remember, yes. 4 Q. Then you subsequently held a number of different 5 roles in the Post Office and you continue to 6 work in the Post Office -- 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. -- now. I think you're involved in on site 9 training or part of the on site training team 10 now; is that correct? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. That's nothing to do with Horizon or does it 13 involve Horizon? 14 A. The team I work on now? 15 Q. Yes. 16 A. Yes, oh yes. I do deliver on site training to 17 newly-appointed subpostmasters and their staff. 18 So we would be training them on the Horizon 19 System. 20 Q. So, in fact, from the rollout of Horizon to the 21 present day, you've had various roles often 22 involving use of the Horizon System? 23 A. Correct, yeah. 24 Q. I don't think your background is in computing 25 though, is it? 4 1 A. No, no. 2 Q. How would you describe your knowledge of 3 computing when it comes to, for example, the 4 identification of bugs, errors or defects in the 5 system? 6 A. I'm not -- no expert with computing. I'm not -- 7 in fact, I'm not good with technology at all so 8 I don't know anything about bugs or anything 9 like that. 10 Q. Presumably, back in the early 2000s, you were 11 perhaps even less knowledgeable about computers 12 than you are now? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. I want to ask you about suspense accounts and 15 what they involve. We've heard about suspense 16 accounts in previous phases. They were 17 a facility to temporarily transfer apparent 18 short falls into a separate account. I'd like 19 to take you through a couple of those policies 20 that related to the suspense account, but that's 21 a fair description of the suspense account? 22 A. Yes, the suspense account is where either losses 23 or gains would be held awaiting to be cleared. 24 Q. Can we look at POL00075026, please. Thank you 25 very much. This is a policy from 2003, so 5 1 approximate to the period that we're going to be 2 discussing today. "Accounting Losses Policy for 3 Agency Branches", can we look at page 4, please. 4 Is this policy familiar to you? 5 A. Should I be able to see it? 6 Q. Yes, you should, sorry. Is it not coming up on 7 the screen in front of you? 8 A. No. 9 Q. Ah, we may have to take a very short break. Can 10 you tell us what is on the screen in front of 11 you? 12 A. Nothing, it is just blank. 13 MR BLAKE: Okay. 14 Sir, perhaps we could just take a very short 15 five-minute break to resolve that issue. 16 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, of course. Just for you to 17 know, it is on my screen, all right? 18 MR BLAKE: Thank you very much. 19 (10.09 am) 20 (A short break) 21 (10.10 am) 22 MR BLAKE: Sir, can you hear me? 23 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, I can. Do you want me to 24 come back on screen? 25 MR BLAKE: Yes, please, thank you very much. The 6 1 solution it seems, was pressing the "on" button! 2 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Okay, fine. 3 MR BLAKE: Thank you. 4 You should have in front of you -- sorry, if 5 we can turn back to the first page. Thank you. 6 This is the "Accounting Losses Policy for Agency 7 Branches". Is that a policy that's familiar to 8 you. 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. Thank you. Can we turn to page 4, please. I'll 11 just read and highlight the second and third 12 paragraphs of this policy, it says: 13 "Under certain exceptional circumstances 14 losses can be held in the suspense account for 15 a maximum of 8 weeks. These circumstances 16 require the agent to justify the reasons for not 17 making the loss good immediately." 18 Pausing there, "agent" is effectively 19 subpostmaster, isn't it? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. Yes: 22 "Before any authority to move a specific 23 loss to the suspense account is given therefore, 24 the agent must have completed their own 25 investigation and be able to show that an error 7 1 notice is likely to be issued for that loss or 2 an element of the loss. 3 "Authority to hold an accounting discrepancy 4 must be sought via the National Suspense Account 5 Team at the Network Business Support Centre." 6 Is that the team you were working in? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. "The loss needs to be identified against a known 9 error that has been made and the likelihood that 10 an error notice will be issued. If there is no 11 known error (and, therefore, no error notice 12 likely to be issued), authority will not be 13 given." 14 So authority won't be given unless there's 15 a known error. That can come down, thank you. 16 Can you assist us with what you understood 17 a known error to be? 18 A. An accounting error where perhaps they had done 19 a miskey with the transaction, you know, if 20 they'd put through maybe £150 instead of £15 for 21 a bill payment; it could be where they'd put 22 a deposit through as a withdrawal for Girobank; 23 or a withdrawal through the deposit or National 24 Savings Bank; they could maybe have put settled 25 cheques to cash or settled cash to cheque, and 8 1 sent their cheques off incorrectly. So it would 2 have been a known error in their accounts. 3 Q. In fact, in your witness statement I think you 4 describe it as a "known accounting error"? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. Is that to distinguish it, for example, from 7 a software error? 8 A. Yes. Not a software error, an actual mistake, 9 where they had actually entered something 10 incorrectly on the system. 11 Q. To your knowledge, did, for example, Fujitsu 12 play any part in defining a known error? 13 A. Not to my knowledge. I wouldn't have known 14 that, no. 15 Q. In terms of software errors then, it seems as 16 though that's not, on your evidence, covered in 17 that policy? 18 A. No. 19 Q. Were there briefings in your team as to software 20 errors when they were discovered? 21 A. No. 22 Q. To your knowledge, did those who carried out the 23 job of examining whether there were said to be 24 accounting errors, at that stage, have access to 25 Fujitsu's audit records, what we know as, for 9 1 example, ARQ reports or Fujitsu's raw audit 2 data? 3 A. Not to my knowledge. 4 Q. It seems from the policy that the burden was on 5 the subpostmaster to identify the error, the 6 agent to identify the error? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. It said in that policy that the agent must have 9 completed their own investigation. Typically, 10 what did that involve? 11 A. Well, we would ask them to check -- or back 12 then, if I remember rightly, there would have 13 been -- a lot of the accounts were still paper 14 based, so there would have been a docket for 15 every transaction. For example, if there was 16 a banking deposit into Girobank, there would 17 have been a docket, or a giro withdrawal, there 18 would be a docket. 19 So we would ask them to check all their 20 dockets against what they had entered onto the 21 system. So we would ask them to make -- double 22 check their cash, check that they had remitted 23 cash incorrectly, check if they'd sent any cash 24 back to the cash centre, that they'd checked 25 that they'd sent it back correctly, that it 10 1 matched the figures they had on the docket that 2 they'd sent and that matched what they'd put 3 onto Horizon. 4 So it was really checking everything that 5 they had in paper form matched what they'd put 6 onto their Horizon System. 7 Q. I'm going to look at another policy and that can 8 be found at POL00088867. A similar policy, this 9 is the "Liability for Losses Policy". Again, 10 it's a 2003 policy. Is this a policy that's 11 familiar to you? 12 A. I think so. 13 Q. Perhaps if we turn to page 5, that may assist. 14 This addresses authority to hold losses. Just 15 like the policy before, I'll read the second and 16 third paragraph there: 17 "Under circumstances where the exact cause 18 of the loss is known and a compensating error is 19 expected to be returned, losses may be held in 20 the suspense account, with authority, providing 21 that the agent has completed their own 22 investigation [that's the investigation I think 23 you've just been referring to] and is able to 24 show that an error notice is likely to be issued 25 for that loss or an element of that loss (ie the 11 1 agent must be able to detail a specific error 2 that occurred for a specific client on 3 a specific date and be able to provide 4 documentary evidence eg from the Horizon 5 transaction log). 6 "Before moving a specific accounting 7 discrepancy to the suspense account, authority 8 must be sought from the Agents Debt Team 3, via 9 the [NBSC]. If there is no clearly defined 10 evidence of a known error (and, therefore, no 11 error notice likely to be issued), authority 12 will not be given." 13 Can you recall any situation where an agent 14 provided evidence of a known error when it comes 15 to a software error? 16 A. No. 17 Q. Realistically, was that because a subpostmaster 18 couldn't be expected themselves to identify what 19 is a complex software matter? 20 A. I don't know because software errors weren't 21 anything that we were involved with at all on 22 our team. Software errors didn't even -- it was 23 never even discussed. 24 Q. So if a subpostmaster was saying, "I have money 25 that is held in the suspense account that's 12 1 because of a software error, I consider that to 2 be an error that meets the test for 3 authorisation under this policy", what would 4 happen? 5 A. Well, that never happened. I never had that 6 conversation with a subpostmaster. 7 Q. Can we look, please, at POL00081490_046, thank 8 you very much. This is the witness statement of 9 Elizabeth Morgan in the Lee Castleton case. 10 We'll come on to Lee Castleton's case shortly. 11 Can you briefly tell us: who was Elizabeth 12 Morgan? 13 A. She was a work colleague on the Suspense Account 14 team. 15 Q. So if we scroll down on that page, she describes 16 the policy as follows, it's paragraph 4, the 17 last sentence, and the bullet points below: 18 "The subpostmaster might be given permission 19 to transfer the shortfall from the Cash Account 20 to the Suspense Account where it could 21 legitimately remain for up to 8 weeks provided 22 either: 23 "(a) they provided a sufficiently detailed 24 and acceptable explanation for the discrepancy; 25 (b) they submitted a hardship form which 13 1 shod that they could not afford to make good the 2 shortfall in the cash account; or ..." 3 Then we have: 4 "(c) exceptionally, their Retail Line 5 Manager authorised it." 6 Is that a fair explanation of the policy so 7 far as you understood it? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. When it came to a bug, error or defect in 10 Horizon, it seems from (a), (b) and (c) then and 11 the explanation you've just given that that 12 simply wouldn't have been covered? 13 A. No. 14 Q. We know from the High Court proceedings, that 15 during the time you were involved in the 16 Castleton case and the Castleton case was in 17 those early stages of where you were involved, 18 there are a number of bugs, errors or defects in 19 Horizon: Callendar Square bug; reversals bug; 20 data tree build; failure discrepancies; Girobank 21 discrepancies; counter replacement issues; 22 phantom transactions; reconciliation issues; 23 concurrent log-ins; transaction correction 24 issues; bugs, errors or defects introduced by 25 previously applied PEAK fixes. Were those known 14 1 in your team, the people who were dealing with 2 the suspense account, were those kinds of issues 3 known within that team? 4 A. No. 5 Q. I think, in fact, at paragraph 45 of your 6 witness statement -- we don't need to bring that 7 onto screen -- I think you said you simply 8 weren't aware of any bugs, errors or defects in 9 Horizon? 10 A. No. 11 Q. Looking back, where a subpostmaster experienced 12 what they considered to be an unexplained loss, 13 do you think that there was sufficient 14 investigation, particularly at that technical 15 level, to fully understand the cause of that 16 loss? 17 A. Sorry, could you repeat that? 18 Q. Yes, absolutely. Looking back, where there was 19 a subpostmaster who experienced what they 20 considered to be an unexplained loss, and 21 perhaps they considered it to be a software 22 issue, was there, so far as you could tell, 23 sufficient investigation on a technical level to 24 fully understand the cause of that loss? 25 A. Well, I never had any conversation with 15 1 a subpostmaster where it was ever suggested that 2 there was a technical fault. So that scenario 3 didn't arise because it was never suggested that 4 there was a technical fault. So it didn't 5 even -- never occurred to me. 6 Q. If we put to one side the Lee Castleton case, 7 looking back, do you consider that the policies 8 that we've just been looking at placed too much 9 of an evidential burden on the subpostmaster, 10 particularly knowing now that there were indeed 11 software issues? 12 A. Quite possibly, yeah. 13 Q. I want to ask you about your involvement in the 14 Lee Castleton case. Can you remember the first 15 involvement that you had with Lee Castleton's 16 accounts and how you became involved? 17 A. I've no recollection at all of being involved 18 with the Lee Castleton case. I have got -- 19 I don't remember any of it. 20 Q. Perhaps I can take you to some documents and 21 that might help refresh your memory. You have 22 set out in your witness statement some 23 recollection based on these documents. Can we 24 look at POL00070758, please. This is a decision 25 paper that was written by Ms Oglesby. Can you 16 1 assist us with who she was? 2 A. I think Cath Oglesby at the time was the Retail 3 Line Manager. 4 Q. What was your relationship with her? 5 A. I don't recall having any relationship with Cath 6 Oglesby. I only know from reading the documents 7 that have been provided to me that she was the 8 Retail Line Manager at the time. 9 Q. I'll just read a few paragraphs from this 10 decision paper. This is following an interview 11 with Lee Castleton on 10 May 2004. She says: 12 "My thoughts after the interview with Lee 13 are that he could not provide any evidence of 14 a computer problem." 15 Next paragraph, she says, final sentence: 16 "He and his assistant, Chrissie, have said 17 that they spent hours checking transaction logs, 18 but found nothing to back up the claims of 19 computer error." 20 Pausing there, would you expect a computer 21 error to be shown just by looking at transaction 22 logs? Do you think that would be sufficient to 23 identify a computer error? 24 A. Well, I don't know anything about computer 25 errors but, if I was to hazard a guess, I'd say 17 1 no. 2 Q. So it says: 3 "Lee would not even listen to the suggestion 4 that a member of his staff may be taking the 5 money. In my opinion, if you know yourself that 6 you haven't taken anything, it must be someone 7 else. So you would be open to suggestions and 8 not discount anything. Lee has always 9 maintained that it must be a software problem." 10 If we scroll down a little bit further, that 11 final paragraph on the screen at the moment: 12 "Lee has asked for a lot of information, 13 some of which cannot be provided. I have 14 endeavoured to help him and provide as much 15 information as possible. There has been nothing 16 to suggest any problem with the computer 17 system." 18 Next paragraph, and this, insofar as your 19 involvement was concerned, is the significant 20 paragraph. She says: 21 "Lee asked me to explain the discrepancies 22 at the top of the final balance. I have asked 23 for assistance from colleagues for this. Copies 24 have been sent to Liz Morgan and Davlyn 25 Cumberland, they have help me explain the 18 1 figures on his balance. They did not feel 2 anything was wrong with Horizon." 3 Can you tell us, who was Liz Morgan? 4 A. Liz was a colleague who I worked with on the 5 Suspense Account team. 6 Q. The statement there, "They do not feel anything 7 was wrong with Horizon", we see -- and I'll take 8 you in due course to the various 9 documentation -- that, I think, you've corrected 10 that in due course, that that, in fact, wasn't 11 your position; is that right? 12 A. I don't have any recollection of this at all. 13 Sorry, I don't remember this. 14 Q. If we go over the page, she says there that: 15 "To summarise terminate Lee Castleton's 16 contract for services. Due to large unexplained 17 losses at his office. There is no evidence to 18 support his theory of software problems." 19 Can we please look at POL00071073. This is 20 an email from Stephen Dilley, he was a solicitor 21 at Bond Pearce, and you can see there that 22 yourself and Liz Morgan are included in that. 23 I mean, you have refreshed your memory from 24 documents before coming to the hearing today, 25 haven't you? 19 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. Yes. Does this jog your memory about the fact 3 that you were involved with a legal case 4 relating to Lee Castleton? 5 A. No, it doesn't. I don't have any recollection 6 of it at all. 7 Q. If we look at this document, he says that he 8 acts on behalf of the Post Office. He 9 summarises the case. He says: 10 "Mr Castleton's defence is that the apparent 11 shortfalls are nothing more than accounting 12 errors arising from the operation of the Horizon 13 computer system. 14 "Mr Castleton was suspended on 23 March 15 2004. On 10 May 2004, Cath Oglesby (then the 16 Retail Line Manager) interviewed Mr Castleton. 17 After the interview, she sent copies of the cash 18 and suspense accounts to you and you confirmed 19 to her that you could not see anything wrong 20 with the way that the computers were working." 21 Do you think you would have been in 22 a position to have said one way or another 23 whether there was something wrong with the way 24 that the computers were working? 25 A. No. 20 1 Q. So although you may not recall this particular 2 incident, reading that, does that sound like 3 something that you would have said to Cath 4 Oglesby? 5 A. If somebody had asked me to look at the branch 6 accounts, at the cash account as it was then, to 7 have a look over it to see if I could see if 8 there were anything that stood out to say that 9 there'd been an error, I would probably have 10 said -- I would probably look at it and, if 11 I could see something, I would say and, if there 12 wasn't, I would say I can't find anything. But 13 that doesn't indicate anything to do with 14 a software problem. 15 Q. Perhaps we can look at POL00072707. This is 16 a telephone attendance note that appears to have 17 been written by or on behalf of Stephen Dilley, 18 dated 2 October 2006. He says there: 19 "I had a telephone conversation with Davlyn 20 Cumberland. She was returning a call I had left 21 on her telephone voicemail in relation to what 22 was meant and it was said that they were unable 23 to finding anything that was 'wrong'. She meant 24 the word unusual and I have already amended the 25 witness statement to reflect [this]. Saying 21 1 that I had emailed it to her and asking her to 2 review it, if she is happy with to approve it by 3 printing two copies", et cetera. 4 So it seems there that he asked you what you 5 meant by the word "wrong" and that, in fact, you 6 meant the word "unusual". Does this is you at 7 all? 8 A. No. I still can't remember. 9 Q. It may assist if I take you to your witness 10 statement from those proceedings. It is 11 LCAS0000566. This is your statement that was 12 provided in the Lee Castleton case. Can we look 13 at paragraph 3, please. This may assist with 14 the role that you undertook in relation to Lee 15 Castleton accounts. 16 Perhaps I'll read that paragraph and I'll 17 take you through it stage by stage. It says: 18 "In around May 2004 ..." 19 So two and a half years before this 20 statement was actually written: 21 "... I was asked by my colleague Elizabeth 22 Morgan to examine various Cash Accounts that she 23 had received from Catherine Oglesby (who at the 24 time I am informed was Mr Castleton's [I think 25 that's 'Retail'] Line Manager) for 14 South 22 1 Marine Drive, [et cetera]. 2 "Given that 2 and a half years have passed 3 since I examined them, I cannot now remember 4 what exactly it was in the Cash Accounts or 5 which weeks that I looked at. However, at the 6 time I was used to carrying out the exercise for 7 [Retail Line Managers], so I believe that 8 I would have reviewed the figures in the Stock, 9 Receipts and Payments in the Cash Accounts and 10 looked for anything unusual such as whether 11 particular figures varied significantly from 12 week to week, or whether they were unusual for 13 the type of transaction concerned." 14 Just pausing there, you say, "However, at 15 the time I was used to carrying out the 16 exercise", I think you said in your witness 17 statement it wasn't officially part of your 18 role. 19 A. No, it wasn't. 20 Q. Can you assist us with why you would have been 21 used to carrying out that task and what it may 22 have involved? 23 A. Well, in fact, it wasn't something that happened 24 often. It was quite rare, on a few, maybe 25 a handful of occasions where we may have been 23 1 asked to look at some branch accounts from 2 somebody from the Retail Line. It wasn't often 3 and I do have a vague recollection of Liz asking 4 me to assist her to look at some branch accounts 5 that had been sent to her but I honestly 6 couldn't say which Post Office it was for or 7 which subpostmaster it was. I do have 8 a recollection of her asking me to help her look 9 at some branch accounts. 10 Q. So, although it says there "I was used to 11 carrying out this exercise", in fact, it was 12 rare? 13 A. It was rare and -- yeah, it was rare, and it was 14 more done as a favour, you know, "Would you mind 15 casting your eye over this to have a look?" It 16 wasn't an official part of our role. 17 Q. Can you assist us, the words "I was used to 18 carrying out" might that be the words of the 19 solicitor rather than yourself -- 20 A. Well, I don't have any recollection of -- to be 21 honest, when I saw this I was shocked because 22 I had no recollection of it at all and, I mean, 23 clearly I must have done it because it's there 24 in and it's legal, so I must have done it but 25 I don't remember doing it. 24 1 Q. Can you assist us with the actual task, 2 reviewing figures of stock, receipts and 3 payments in the cash accounts. Would that have 4 been reviewing the Horizon printout? 5 A. Yes. The hard copy printout. 6 Q. Yes, so everything you would have been looking 7 at would have been generated by Horizon? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. If we read on, it says: 10 "I do remember that we were unable to find 11 anything unusual or anything to suggest that the 12 losses were not real losses." 13 Now, the word "unusual" there, we've seen 14 from that conversation with Mr Dilley that it 15 seems as though you may have corrected the word 16 "wrong" to the word "unusual"; does that assist 17 you at all? This form of words, does that sound 18 like you? 19 A. No. 20 Q. The words "anything to suggest that the losses 21 were not real losses", is that a phrase that you 22 understand? 23 A. I understand it but I don't remember writing it, 24 or saying it. But, yeah, I understand it. 25 Q. Do you think you were in a position definitively 25 1 to say whether alleged discrepancies were 2 genuine losses for the Post Office? 3 A. No. 4 Q. Perhaps, if we look at the statement of 5 Elizabeth Morgan, I took you to an unsigned 6 version of that statement and perhaps we'll look 7 at that again. That was POL00081490. Thank 8 you. If we can look at the second page of that 9 statement, at paragraph 9, the unsigned version 10 of that statement says, in the final sentence: 11 "I do remember asking my colleague Davlyn 12 Cumberland to assist and that we were unable to 13 find anything wrong. I reported this to 14 Catherine Oglesby." 15 So that's the unsigned version and now I'll 16 take you to the signed version of Ms Morgan's 17 statement. That is POL00074062. 18 If we look over the page, please, 19 paragraph 9. She says there, about halfway 20 down: 21 "However, given that at the time I was used 22 to carrying out this exercise for RLMs, 23 I believe that I would have reviewed the figures 24 in the Stock, Receipts and Payments in the Cash 25 Accounts. I would have looked for anything 26 1 unusual such as whether particular figures 2 varied significantly from week to week in the 3 Cash Accounts or whether they were unusual for 4 the type of transaction concerned. I do 5 remember asking my colleague Davlyn Cumberland 6 to assist and that we were unable to find 7 anything out of the ordinary or anything that 8 suggested that the losses were not real losses. 9 I reported this to Catherine Oglesby." 10 Does this assist you at all in -- you'll see 11 there, for example, that the original wording 12 has been changed, now it reads "anything out of 13 the ordinary" -- 14 A. Yeah. 15 Q. -- and it includes the words "anything that 16 suggested that the losses were not real losses". 17 Does that assist you with identifying where that 18 phrase came from at all? I mean, do you think 19 the wording was yours, the solicitors, 20 Ms Morgan's, or somebody else's? 21 A. I don't know. I'm sorry, I don't know. 22 Q. But it's not a phrase that you think you would 23 have used? 24 A. No. 25 Q. Can we now look at LCAS0000609, please? 27 1 If we go over the page, this is the 2 statement of Catherine Oglesby. If we look at 3 the final page -- or penultimate page even, 4 sorry, page 14, if we scroll down we can see 5 that this is the signed statement from 6 21 January 2006. So that's before the 7 conversation that appears to have been recorded 8 between yourself and Mr Dilley. Could we, 9 please, look at page 13, paragraphs 42 and 43. 10 So at 42, she says: 11 "I explained to Mr Castleton that the 12 Horizon System is a double entry accounting 13 system and that everything I had checked worked 14 through. The evidence does not support 15 Mr Castleton's theory that the Horizon system 16 went wrong when he entered the stock remittances 17 onto the system. 18 "Post interview 19 "43. After the interview, I sent copies of 20 the cash and suspense accounts to Elizabeth 21 Morgan and Davlyn Cumberland in Leeds who were 22 the two people very experienced in dealing with 23 the suspense account. Neither of them could see 24 anything wrong with the way the computers were 25 working." 28 1 As I say, that was signed before your 2 conversation with Mr Dilley but, in light of 3 that subsequent conversation and your evidence 4 today, is it right to say that that, in fact, 5 was not an accurate statement, insofar as you 6 didn't see anything wrong with the way that the 7 computers were working? Do you think that 8 accurately reflects the position at the time? 9 A. You mean -- 10 Q. So this is Ms Oglesby's statement -- 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. -- from January 2006, and it says there -- it 13 refers to you and Ms Morgan and it says neither 14 of you could see anything wrong with the way the 15 computers were working. Considering the 16 evidence you've given and also the email, the 17 note from Mr Dilley, for example, is that 18 an accurate statement, in fact, of -- 19 A. No, probably not. 20 Q. You say "probably not". Why "probably"? 21 A. Well, because we wouldn't know if there was 22 a problem with the computers. We wouldn't have 23 known that. 24 Q. If you were -- were you aware -- it may be that 25 you simply can't remember this but were you 29 1 aware of that phrase having been included in 2 a witness statement that -- 3 A. No. 4 Q. Do you think you would remember an event like 5 that or is it simply passage of time and you 6 can't remember -- 7 A. I think it's just so long ago, I can't -- I've 8 no recollection of it whatsoever. 9 Q. I want to now ask you about your response to -- 10 or the response to various issues with Horizon. 11 Can we look at your witness statement, please. 12 That's WITN09130100, page 11. It's 13 paragraph 46. So at 45 you talk about bugs, 14 errors or defects and you say that you weren't 15 aware of any in the Horizon System. 16 46, I think you say you did become aware of 17 some subpostmasters taking legal action and then 18 you say this, you say: 19 "I recall that senior management at the time 20 provided us with a standard response (although 21 I don't recall the specific wording) to any 22 questions raised by branch staff while we were 23 outperforming our daily roles." 24 Can you assist us with -- you may not be 25 able to recall the specific wording but can you 30 1 recall what that standard response was? 2 A. Yeah, I have got this email somewhere on my 3 laptop but -- and I've searched for it but I've 4 just not been able to find it. It was 5 a response that was -- it was more of a dos and 6 don'ts in what we should and shouldn't be 7 saying, if -- the terminology that we should use 8 while we're out on site, because we work out in 9 the field on site with subpostmasters and their 10 staff and it was, if we should ask -- be asked 11 any questions or it was who to refer them to, 12 which was mainly the Network Business Support 13 Centre, which is now the Branch Support Centre. 14 It was more about what we should never say, 15 what we could and couldn't say. It was more 16 about that, really. It was a guide. It was to 17 guide us through what potentially could have 18 been quite a difficult time for us, being out on 19 site all the time. 20 But, strangely, I was never required to use 21 it. So that's probably why I put it to the back 22 of my mind. 23 Q. Can you recall who may have sent it to you? 24 A. No. 25 Q. An approximate time period? 31 1 A. It would have been probably around about 2019, 2 I think. 3 Q. As late as 2019? Because we see there that you 4 started working for the Post Office again at 5 2012, I think you took a short break. But your 6 thoughts are that it was as late as 2019? 7 A. It could have been. It could have been, or it 8 could have been before. I can't exactly 9 remember. I did try and look for it because 10 I know I wouldn't have deleted it, and I just 11 couldn't find it. 12 Q. Can you recall any headline points from that as 13 to what you shouldn't be saying to 14 subpostmasters? 15 A. It was not -- you know, if anybody was to ask 16 about the problems with the Horizon System, we 17 were to refer them to the Branch Support Centre. 18 We weren't to really get -- engage in any kind 19 of conversation about it and it was that -- 20 sometimes it was how we spoke to subpostmasters 21 to treat them respectfully and talk to them 22 respectfully, which I've always done anyway. It 23 was kind of a guide, really. I can't think of 24 anything specific. 25 Q. Thank you very much. We can ask the Post Office 32 1 for a copy of that if they hold it. Thank you 2 very much, Ms Cumberland. I don't have any 3 further questions. 4 There may be questions from Core 5 Participants and, sir, do you have any questions 6 at all? 7 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: No, I don't think I need -- yes, 8 I'll just ask the question. 9 Questioned by SIR WYN WILLIAMS 10 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Ms Cumberland, you made a witness 11 statement in the Lee Castleton case and you've 12 given me your evidence about that. My 13 impression is that you didn't actually give 14 evidence at his trial; is that correct? 15 A. That's correct. I think, if I had have given 16 the evidence at the trial, I think I would have 17 remembered it. I think that is something that 18 I would have definitely remembered. 19 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Well, that's the impression I've 20 formed but I just wanted to be clear about it. 21 Thank you. 22 Yes, I have no further questions. 23 MR BLAKE: Thank you. Yes, Ms Page has. 24 Questioned by MS PAGE 25 MS PAGE: Thank you, sir. 33 1 Ms Cumberland, I act for a number of the 2 subpostmasters, including Mr Castleton. 3 Did you sign witness statements often in 4 your roles, any of your roles? 5 A. No. 6 Q. So your complete lack of memory of what was 7 a rare event, looking back, do you think it can 8 have been made clear to you that this was 9 an important document? 10 A. Sorry, could you say that again? 11 Q. Well, a witness statement for the High Court is 12 an important document and you've explained to us 13 that this was a rare event, perhaps even 14 a one-off? 15 A. Yeah. 16 Q. Do you think it can have been made clear to you 17 how important this was, given that you don't 18 remember it at all? 19 A. Yeah, I can't remember. I don't know. I would 20 say it should have probably been made clear to 21 me how important it was but I don't remember it 22 so I can't, I don't know how to answer that, 23 really. 24 Q. You now feel that some of the phrases within it 25 were not your own and things that you wouldn't 34 1 have said. Can you give us any idea how you 2 think that could have come about? 3 A. I don't know. 4 Q. No. All right. Well, can I then ask you just 5 a couple of things that are more about what you 6 would have and could have done. You've 7 explained that you didn't have access to 8 anything other than the Horizon printouts -- 9 A. Correct. 10 Q. -- and all you'd have been able to spot is 11 perhaps something like a large mistake in 12 processing a cheque or a cash transaction? 13 A. Correct. 14 Q. If Horizon had failed to record a payment out 15 that had, in fact, been paid, the Horizon figure 16 for cash on hand would, therefore, be higher, 17 wouldn't it -- 18 A. Yeah. 19 Q. -- than, in fact, the actual quantity of cash -- 20 A. Yeah. 21 Q. -- in the branch, that's not something your 22 check would have been able to spot? 23 A. No, no. 24 Q. No. Similarly, if on receipt of a cheque, 25 Horizon had failed to register the cheque and 35 1 had perhaps recorded it as cash in error, the 2 system would say that there was more cash in the 3 branch than, in fact, there was, wouldn't it? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. Indeed, at the end of the day, branch staff 6 needed to reconcile physical cheques with the 7 Horizon list; is that right? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. If the cheque had not registered as a cheque, it 10 wouldn't be on that list, would it? 11 A. No. 12 Q. So the branch staff may have seen that the 13 cheque was not there and entered it again; is 14 that fair to say? 15 A. Yes, that's fair to say. 16 Q. Under those circumstances, the sum of money 17 would have registered both as cash from the 18 mistake earlier on, the Horizon mistake earlier 19 on, and as a cheque, when the branch staff were 20 then going through the cheques list, they see 21 it's not there, and they enter it as a cheque? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. So you can see how in those circumstances -- 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. -- Horizon may have recorded that sum of money 36 1 twice? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. Again, that's not something your check would 4 have been able to identify? 5 A. No, no, not just by us looking at the branch 6 cash account, no. 7 Q. Was anyone from your team part of the decision 8 or feeding into the decision to remove local 9 suspense accounts? 10 A. No. 11 Q. No? 12 A. Not to my knowledge. 13 Q. Presumably, once that was a facility that was 14 removed, your team was disbanded, was it? 15 A. Yes. Our team was disbanded and I believe they 16 moved -- it was moved to Chesterfield and it's 17 what became known as the Agent Debt Team in 18 Chesterfield. 19 Q. So it was a rather different operation because 20 it was no longer about suspense accounts, it was 21 about following up debt? 22 A. I think so. I wasn't part of that, I actually 23 moved onto a different team before the suspense 24 account was disbanded, so I can't say. 25 Q. You're not entirely sure. All right. 37 1 MS PAGE: Well, thank you, those are my questions. 2 Thank you, sir. 3 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Thank you, Ms Page. 4 Thank you very much, Ms Cumberland, for 5 giving your witness statement and for coming to 6 give evidence to the Inquiry. I'm grateful to 7 you. 8 MR BLAKE: Thank you, sir. 9 For logistical reasons, could we take 10 a break until 11.30, please, before the next 11 witness? There will be plenty of time for the 12 next witness. 13 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes. Of course. So 11.30 we'll 14 resume the hearing. 15 MR BLAKE: Thank you very much. 16 (10.51 am) 17 (A short break) 18 (11.31 am) 19 MS PRICE: Sir, can you see and hear us? 20 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, I can, thank you. 21 MS PRICE: May we please call Mr Wise. 22 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes. 23 ANDREW WISE (sworn) 24 Questioned by MS PRICE 25 MS PRICE: Can you confirm your full name, please, 38 1 Mr Wise? 2 A. Andrew Wise. 3 Q. You should have in front of you a hard copy of 4 a witness statement in your name dated 31 May 5 2023; have you got that there? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. If you turn to the last page of that, please, 8 that is page 31, do you have a copy with 9 a visible signature? 10 A. Yes, I do. 11 Q. Is that your signature? 12 A. Yes, it is. 13 Q. Are the contents of that statement true to the 14 best of your knowledge and belief? 15 A. Yes, they are. 16 Q. For the purposes of the transcript, the URN is 17 WITN09090100. There's no need to display that 18 now. 19 Thank you for coming to assist the Inquiry 20 with its work and for providing the witness 21 statement you have. We are very grateful. As 22 you know, I will be asking questions on behalf 23 of the Inquiry, and today I'm going to be asking 24 you about issues which arise in Phase 4 of the 25 Inquiry, focusing on your involvement in the 39 1 proceedings brought by the Post Office against 2 Mr Castleton relating to the alleged losses at 3 Marine Drive Post Office branch. 4 You joined the Post Office in 1991 as 5 a counter clerk in a directly managed branch, 6 also known as the a Crown Office branch; is that 7 right? 8 A. Yes, that's right. 9 Q. You were in that role for eight years? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. You joined the Horizon project in 1999 as 12 a Horizon Field Support Officer; is that right? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. That role involved you migrating Post Office 15 branches from a manual accounting system onto 16 the Horizon System? 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. You say at paragraph 3 of your statement that 19 following a branch migration, you would spend 20 the next two days in branch providing support to 21 the subpostmaster and their staff and that 22 involved providing balance support to the branch 23 on their first balance day; is that right? 24 A. That's right, yes. 25 Q. In 2001 you joined the Network Business Support 40 1 Centre as a Service Support Advisor working on 2 Tier 2; is that right? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. A role you held until 2004? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. That role involved providing support to Post 7 Office branches and their staff when contacting 8 the NBSC with a variety of problems, including 9 problems balancing, using the Horizon System, 10 didn't it? 11 A. Yes, that's right. 12 Q. Then from 2004 to 2007 you worked in the 13 training delivery team where you were a training 14 manager, providing classroom training to new 15 subpostmasters and their staff? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. Was that training on the Horizon System? 18 A. It was, yes. 19 Q. In 2007 you moved to the sales team? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. You were a transitional manager with no specific 22 designated role between 2008 and 2010? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. During that time in 2010, you worked on the 25 Horizon Online project. Can you please clarify 41 1 what that role involved? 2 A. I was in charge of a team of schedulers that 3 would schedule the POL resource that attended 4 branches on the day of the migration. So around 5 300 branches a day would be migrated onto 6 Horizon Online and we had a pool of hundreds of 7 people that would carry out the roles to support 8 branches. 9 So we would match up the people with the 10 branches based on geography and make sure that 11 every branch being migrated onto Horizon Online 12 had the support and that support involved them 13 turning up in the afternoon, when the Post 14 Office closed, that's when the branch would be 15 migrated over onto Horizon Online and then they 16 would turn up the next morning and provide 17 a morning's worth of support and then move on to 18 the next branch that they would support in the 19 afternoon. 20 So the job of the schedulers were to make 21 sure that the POL resource was in that branch to 22 assist and migrate the branch over. 23 Q. So is it right to say that was really about the 24 logistics of providing the support? 25 A. My role was, yes. 42 1 Q. In 2011 you joined the Security team as Security 2 Manager; is that right? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. You held that role until you moved into the 5 Security Intelligence Team in 2015 as a Security 6 Intelligence Analyst? 7 A. Yes, that's right. 8 Q. Are you still in that role with the Post Office? 9 A. I am, yes. 10 Q. When you joined the Horizon project in 1999, 11 what were you told about the history and the 12 development of Horizon? 13 A. I don't think I was told a great deal. I had 14 followed a little bit of the design of it and my 15 understanding was -- and I'm not sure where this 16 understanding came from -- that the Horizon 17 System was designed around the DWP work for 18 pension books, and that's why it had such 19 security on it, firewalls and the protection. 20 That was the standard that the DWP wanted, so 21 the system was designed specifically for 22 pensions and allowances, and the DWP, at some 23 point, changed their mind and wanted to move to 24 an online banking where pensions were paid into 25 bank accounts. 43 1 So my understanding was we were left with 2 a system that was built for one specific reason 3 but then had to be kept and used because they 4 were so far down the line with that system. 5 I don't know really a great deal more about the 6 history than that. 7 Q. Were you aware of any problems during the 8 rollout of Horizon? 9 A. Not specifically with the actual serving and 10 using the Horizon System. I think there was 11 a lot of challenges in the logistics of setting 12 the system up in branches, so as an HFSO we 13 would turn at 4.00 in the afternoon, the 14 postmaster would balance and then we would 15 migrate all the figures from that balance onto 16 the Horizon System. 17 Quite often, your work would be what we 18 called "aborted". You'd get a phone call to 19 say, "You're not going to that migration because 20 they've not been able to put the kit in or 21 there's been a problem putting the kit in the 22 branch", so that would fall off your schedule. 23 They'd look for other work for you to do or you 24 might just then have to wait for your next 25 branch that was migrated. 44 1 But I wasn't aware of any problems using the 2 system and I didn't experience any problems 3 personally but it -- there was a lot of 4 migrations cancelled and aborted because of the 5 issues putting the actual system in the Post 6 Office branch. 7 I'm not aware what those issues were, we'd 8 just get told, "You don't need to attend this 9 branch" because they'd not got the computer 10 system set up. 11 Q. In your role on the Horizon project from 1999 to 12 2001, did you have regular contact with anyone 13 from Fujitsu? 14 A. I remember there was a team from -- well, it was 15 ICL Pathway then, it wasn't Fujitsu. But there 16 was a team from ICL Pathway that would go out 17 and monitor you doing the migration. Little was 18 understood for why they was there. They'd just 19 stand there and watch you. We didn't really 20 interact. They didn't provide support to us, 21 but they was just there. 22 From a support point of view, we may contact 23 the Horizon System Helpdesk, mainly if a printer 24 wasn't working, if the computer needed 25 rebooting, if there was a screen freeze, so we 45 1 may contact the Horizon System Helpdesk 2 frequently but that wasn't a direct link as 3 an HFSO. That was as a branch location 4 contacting them to report an issue. 5 Q. What training were you given on the Horizon 6 System before you went out to branches to 7 provide support in relation to migration to the 8 system? 9 A. We -- I'm not 100 per cent sure. I think it's 10 two weeks. It could have been three weeks but, 11 thinking about it more, I think it was two 12 weeks. We were actually on -- I'll call it 13 an in-house course in Doncaster, so we were two 14 weeks in a hotel. Within that hotel we had the 15 training on Horizon. So we received the 16 equivalent training to what postmasters would 17 receive and then we received additional training 18 on how to actually migrate the branch. 19 So probably a week of that two-week course 20 was around the actual physically migrating the 21 branch and how to do that. 22 Q. Given the experience you gained in your role as 23 a Horizon Field Support Officer, would it be 24 accurate to say that you brought a good 25 understanding of the balancing procedures which 46 1 subpostmaster and branch staff were required to 2 follow when you moved them to the Network 3 Business Support Centre? 4 A. I would say I had a very good understanding. 5 When I moved on to the Horizon project, I had 6 a good understanding of the balancing process. 7 I'd worked in a Crown Office for eight years. 8 Part of that was manually balancing and then 9 part of that was on the system called ECCO+, and 10 Horizon was relatively similar to -- the 11 physical process was similar to ECCO+. So when 12 I joined NBSC I would say I was very familiar 13 with the balancing process. 14 Q. You've set out a summary of the daily and weekly 15 balancing procedures which existed in the early 16 years of Horizon and you say still applied in 17 2004 in your witness statement to the Inquiry. 18 For the record, the relevant paragraphs are 19 paragraphs 25 to 37 of WITN09090100. 20 Could we have Mr Wise's statement on screen, 21 please, that is the reference I've just given, 22 at page 9 of that document, please. At 23 paragraph 27, please. This paragraph describes 24 in broad terms the daily reports which needed to 25 be completed as follows: 47 1 "Branches had a set of procedures they had 2 to complete daily which involved the account and 3 dispatch of various documentation. This 4 included reports such as the daily cheque 5 listing, Girobank deposits and withdrawals, 6 National Savings deposits and withdrawals, TV 7 licences, personal banking and automated payment 8 transactions. For each of these products the 9 branch would produce a daily report, check the 10 counterfoils, which they have kept in the 11 counter till, agrees with the number and value 12 on the report and then despatch in the relevant 13 envelope. The actual procedure on Horizon would 14 be to go into the counter daily report screen, 15 select the report they wish to look at and then 16 select print. Once the branch was satisfied 17 that they had a counterfoil for each transaction 18 they would select the cut-off option on the 19 Horizon screen. Cutting off the report just 20 meant that it would reset to zero for the next 21 day." 22 Going over the page, please, down to 23 paragraph 30. You then deal with the daily cash 24 declaration here. So: 25 "Another daily procedure was the daily cash 48 1 declaration. Each branch was required to 2 complete an accurate daily cash declaration each 3 day on the Horizon System as close to closing as 4 possible. This was a mandatory process and 5 enabled the Post Office Cash Management teams to 6 track how much cash was in the network and 7 request excess cash back." 8 You then deal with the weekly reports which 9 needed to be completed at paragraph 31 and then 10 starting at paragraph 32 over the page, please, 11 you deal with the actual balance process. 12 Have I understood correctly that this 13 balance process involved a number of steps which 14 were these, and please correct me if I'm wrong 15 at any stage: once the daily and weekly reports 16 were printed and reconciled, the next step was 17 a check of the physical stock on hand and 18 whether this agreed with the figures on Horizon. 19 Just pausing there, you deal at paragraph 32 20 of your statement with what a subpostmaster or 21 branch staff member could do, if that was not 22 the case, don't you? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. About halfway down there, you say: 25 "Any differences found in either of these 49 1 ways should be corrected by either adjusting 2 their stock in the adjust stock screen or making 3 a sale or completing a reversal against the 4 stock item. Making the sale would reduce the 5 system held stock figure (this is where the 6 branch physically has less stock than Horizon 7 shows) add completing a reversal would increase 8 the system held stock figure (this is where the 9 branch physically has more stock than Horizon 10 shows). The last way a branch could check their 11 stock against Horizon would be to make a stock 12 declaration, the branch would type in the value 13 of every stock item they have, and Horizon 14 overwrites the existing stock figures with the 15 newly declared stock figures." 16 Then you say this: 17 "The declare stock option was rarely 18 recommended for branches to do as it could often 19 cause confusion and leave the branch struggling 20 to balance." 21 Could you please expand on why the declare 22 stock option could cause confusion? 23 A. Okay. So Horizon kept a track of all these 24 stock items and, in a particular Post Office 25 branch, they would have dozens and dozens from 50 1 different types of envelopes, overseas items, 2 philatelic items, First, Second Class stamps, 3 stamp books, so they had, you know, a lot of 4 different stock items. The system would track 5 that, so every time a stock item was sold it 6 would reduce the number of that item and should 7 give that stamp. So if you sell a First Class 8 stamp, Horizon reduces by one and you give 9 a First Class stamp to the customer. 10 So when you check your stock at the end of 11 the week, what you physically have should agree 12 with what Horizon says and you can check that 13 quite easily by doing a balance snapshot or 14 going into the adjust stock screen. 15 The function for declare stock was for you 16 to tell Horizon what stock items you had and so 17 it wiped clear everything it thought you had by 18 tracking it, and was just overwriting those 19 figures with what you've told it. 20 So if I forget about a batch of stamp books 21 in my cupboard and I don't declare them it wipes 22 them completely off the system, which any stock 23 item like that that you delete off the system, 24 it would give you a cash discrepancy, 25 ultimately. So if it were £100 worth of stamp 51 1 books, you would get a cash discrepancy to say 2 he's £100 short and he may not understand where 3 that discrepancy has come from. 4 Another thing that was quite common with the 5 declare stock, a postmaster would go into it, 6 and think "Ooh, I don't want to be in here", so 7 he'd confirm it and come out, and that would set 8 everything to zero. So it's as though he's told 9 the Horizon System that every single stock item 10 is zero, so if he's got £10,000 worth of stock 11 that would then translate into a £10,000 loss. 12 Now, it's rectifiable and can be resolved 13 but it's quite a complicated process and 14 subpostmasters get very good at doing what they 15 do every single day, every single week. When 16 they have to do something on Horizon that's new 17 and they've never done before, then that's when 18 they can experience quite serious problems that 19 will get them into a mess. 20 Like I said, nothing like that is 21 unresolvable. We could always correct it. But 22 it's quite difficult, especially over the 23 telephone at NBSC, to talk through a process to 24 get back to a position where the postmaster is 25 balancing. So that's -- so as an HFSO as 52 1 a trainer, as an NBSC advisor, I would never 2 recommend a branch to declare the stock. It's 3 one of the pitfalls, as I call it, in the 4 system. You know, it's the way the system is 5 designed, but it can get that postmaster into 6 a little bit of a mess. 7 Q. How would subpostmasters or branch staff know 8 that the declare stock option could cause 9 confusion and leave the staff struggling to 10 balance? Were they trained on that? You 11 referenced you as a trainer? 12 A. Myself as a trainer, I would make it clear in 13 the classroom not to do that and, equally, as 14 an HFSO, I would make it clear not to do that. 15 It's so much simpler doing it one of the other 16 two ways, rather than declaring stock. Now, the 17 design was around, if you've got two stock 18 units, and they were what are called shared 19 stock units and two people with their own supply 20 of stock, each of those two clerks could make 21 a stock declaration for their little bit of 22 stock and the system adds that together and, in 23 theory, it all balances. But, in practice, it 24 just wasn't that simple. 25 So it was easier to count my stock and your 53 1 stock and add the numbers together, and then do 2 a balance snapshot and check the numbers agree. 3 Q. Was this a common problem, a mismatch between 4 the count for physical stock on hand and the 5 figure generated by the Horizon System, from 6 your experience when you were an advisor on 7 Tier 2? 8 A. I wouldn't say common. I would say it happened 9 a notable(?) time, but I wouldn't say common. 10 Q. You go on to set out the next step after the 11 physical stock check, which was a stamp 12 declaration, then the foreign currency on hand 13 figure and then finally the cash declaration, 14 which you say involved entering the value of 15 each denomination of note and coin. You deal 16 with this at paragraph 35 of your statement. 17 This is page 12, please. 18 In the last sentence on this page, you say 19 this: 20 "It was important that the balance cash 21 declaration was the last thing to be done as 22 making changes in any of the steps before this 23 could alter the system derived cash figure and 24 a new declaration would have to be made." 25 You deal with the final stages of the 54 1 balancing process at paragraph 36 over the page, 2 please. You say this: 3 "Once the cash declaration is made the 4 branch would make a variance check which would 5 show any discrepancies (this is for shared stock 6 units only, individual stock units would get 7 a message after declaring the cash informing 8 them of any discrepancies). The branch would 9 then proceed to printing the trial balance 10 report, it is at this point that the Horizon 11 System commits any discrepancies, and the loss 12 or gain would show at the top of the trial 13 balance report. The branch would then roll the 14 stock unit over into the next cash account 15 period and a final balance report would be 16 produced." 17 That can come down now, thank you. 18 In 2004, if there was a discrepancy showing 19 at the top of the trial balance report which 20 a subpostmaster or branch staff member wanted to 21 question, what options were available to them? 22 A. The first thing would suggest they would do was 23 recount the cash and stock before they took any 24 options to contacting anybody. Often cash was 25 miscounted or stock hasn't been checked 55 1 correctly, so I would have expected a postmaster 2 to revert to that, first of all. But their 3 option would be to contact the NBSC. NBSC was 4 set up as a single point of contact for branches 5 before Horizon, and before NBSC the helplines 6 were regional. The business brought that 7 together as one centre at Dearne House in 8 Barnsley, and that was the main contact point 9 for branches. 10 So any queries really like that, they would 11 ring through to NBSC. 12 Q. Could the branch carry on trading in the next 13 cash account period if they did not roll over 14 the stock unit and commit the trial balance to 15 a final balance report? 16 A. No. Well, yes, they would be trading in the 17 same cash account period and that couldn't go on 18 for very long because there was a team, and I'm 19 not sure which team it fell under, but one of 20 the teams as part of NBSC would contact branches 21 that hadn't rolled over because, I believe, if 22 a branch hadn't rolled over within -- I don't 23 know whether it was 60 days or 90 days, then 24 that data potentially could be lost. So there 25 was a team specifically to contact branches that 56 1 hadn't rolled over and to get them to roll over. 2 So if a branch chose to carry on serving in 3 the same cash account period they would get that 4 contact from somebody at NBSC. 5 Q. Moving on to your time at the Network Business 6 Support Centre, there were a number of teams 7 within the NBSC, weren't there? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. You set those out in your statement but your 10 role was as a Tier 2 Service Support Advisor 11 within one of the service support teams? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. Can you explain the difference between the roles 14 of Tier 1 and Tier 2 advisors, please? 15 A. The Tier 1 advisor was pretty much a call centre 16 call handler. They would deal with the simple 17 issues. We had branches phoning up just for 18 telephone numbers or asking if they could send 19 certain mail items to certain countries. A 20 Tier 1 advisor had access to all that 21 information via the Knowledge Base and the 22 remedy system, and they could answer those 23 queries relatively quickly. 24 If the Tier 1 advisor couldn't find the 25 answer on the Knowledge Base, then generally 57 1 that would be passed over to Tier 2, and the 2 Tier 2 advisor had more experience, they 3 received more training. A lot of the advisors 4 had come from other areas of the business, such 5 as the old helpline, such as directly managed 6 branches. So they knew more than what the 7 Tier 1 advisor knew. So they could spend more 8 time looking at the problem and finding 9 a resolution for the postmaster. 10 Q. You've mentioned the Knowledge Base. Can you 11 just explain what was covered, broadly speaking, 12 in the Knowledge Base, what type of issues? 13 A. Every single type of issue you could think of, 14 really. There would be a Knowledge Base article 15 covering off the answer to that query. There 16 was a system in place where, on Tier 2, we had 17 the option to close a call down to own 18 knowledge. So we knew that this was the correct 19 course of action to take. So there's no 20 Knowledge Base article that covers that but 21 we've obtained the answer. It could be by 22 speaking to a member of the product team, it 23 could be speaking to colleagues. 24 So if a case was closed down to own 25 knowledge and wasn't linked to a Knowledge Base 58 1 title, the Knowledge Base team would look at 2 that and look at implementing a page on the 3 Knowledge Base to cover off that question. So 4 every time a new question came up that hadn't 5 been asked before, that wasn't on the Knowledge 6 Base, it would then be put on to the Knowledge 7 Base for the other advisors and future calls. 8 Q. You have explained at paragraph 10 of your 9 statement that the type of queries which the 10 NBSC would deal with ranged vastly from simple 11 questions such as requesting a telephone number 12 for a particular person to more complicated 13 questions, including questions around how to 14 balance. 15 Were balancing problems generally referred 16 to Tier 2 Support Service Advisors like 17 yourself? 18 A. Not generally. Tier 1 had the process on the 19 Knowledge Base that gave the basic checklists: 20 have they declared the cash; have they checked 21 the stock? So it would probably be the basic 22 check steps for them to go through and sometimes 23 Tier 1 would resolve that balancing query, so it 24 wasn't passed through to Tier 2. 25 If they couldn't resolve it then, generally, 59 1 they would always be passed through to Tier 2. 2 Q. You say at paragraph 19 of your statement to the 3 Inquiry that, on average, Tier 2 advisors would 4 deal with around four or five calls in an hour, 5 whereas the number of calls for Tier 1 advisors 6 would be much higher as their calls were a lot 7 quicker. So is it fair to say that Tier 1 8 advisors didn't have very much time to deal with 9 the queries that were coming in? 10 A. That's right, and their -- Tier 1 and Tier 2 was 11 managed by different companies. So we were all 12 under Royal Mail Group and, part of Royal Mail 13 Group, there was a company called -- I think it 14 were Customer Management and they managed all 15 Royal Mail's contact centres. So Tier 1 were 16 employed by Customer Management whereas Tier 2 17 were employed directly by Post Office Limited, 18 still under the umbrella of Royal Mail Group. 19 And at Tier 1, they had quite stringent targets 20 to achieve on the calls per hour and the amount 21 of time after a call ends for them to wrap up 22 that call, so it could be typing up the response 23 in the case and closing it down on the system. 24 So their targets were quite strict, compared to 25 what Tier 2 targets were. 60 1 But Tier 2 equally had targets and it were 2 averaged out, based on how much time you spent 3 in admin and that's the time you would spend 4 investigating or finding an answer for a query, 5 how much time in wrap-up, that's the call -- the 6 time immediately after a call has ended where 7 you're updating the log and putting a resolution 8 in and closing the case down. 9 And even the amount of time you go for 10 comfort breaks to the toilet, you know, it were 11 all measured through the phone system, so each 12 month you would sit down with your line manager 13 and he'd say "Well, you know, you've been in 14 comfort break for five hours this week, what 15 have you been doing", you know, and it could be 16 you'd forgotten to press the button on the phone 17 system or -- you know, so it was monitored and 18 we did have our targets but they certainly 19 wasn't anywhere near as strict as what Tier 1 20 was. 21 Q. Did those limits mean you felt somewhat under 22 pressure to deal with queries quite quickly? 23 A. Yes and no. At the point of dealing with that 24 call, you was focused on finding a resolution, 25 and you wasn't focused on, you know, worrying 61 1 about how much time you were spending on it. 2 You might have a word with your team leader and 3 just say, "Look I'm going to have to spend some 4 time with this". 5 On saying that, when you got your monthly 6 figures, and you're told your admin time is such 7 a percentage above the average for Tier 2 8 advisors, then that certainly put pressure on 9 you thinking, "Oh, well", you know, so you might 10 find ways to move it into wrap-up a little bit 11 more, you know, to play the figures, perhaps, to 12 bring your admin time down but you'd push -- 13 it's robbing Peter to pay Paul, you'd push that 14 into wrap-up time, just so that at the end of 15 the month when you have your one-to-one you're 16 not getting in trouble for being too much or -- 17 they measured it on the average time across the 18 Tier 2, so, you know, if you were above that 19 then they would ask you questions on why. 20 Q. In contrast to the Network Business Support 21 Centre, which was staffed by Post Office 22 employees, the Horizon System helpline was 23 staffed by employees from ICL Pathway, as it was 24 at the time. 25 A. Yes. 62 1 Q. Is that right? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. The Horizon System helpline teams were in 4 a separate location? 5 A. That's right. 6 Q. The Horizon System helpline was the technical 7 support team for Post Office branches to contact 8 with issues relating to the Horizon computer 9 system; is that right? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. It was the Horizon System helpline which dealt 12 with technical issues, such as equipment faults 13 or faults relating to the Horizon System, that's 14 what you say in your statement? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. You say in your statement to the Inquiry at 17 paragraph 23 that the Network Business Support 18 Centre would interact with the Horizon System 19 helpline and often callers were transferred 20 through from one service to the other. From 21 a Network Business Support Centre point of view, 22 if a caller claimed that they were experiencing 23 issues with their Horizon System, you would 24 transfer them to the Horizon System helpline. 25 That's what you say in your statement at 63 1 paragraph 23? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. You deal with this -- may we please have the 4 statement back up on the screen, it's 5 WITN09090100, page 7, please. Could we have 6 paragraph 23, please, towards the bottom. Right 7 at the bottom you say: 8 "I do recall that [it goes over the page] 9 sometimes callers would get passed backwards and 10 forwards between NBSC and HSH, particularly 11 where a branch had losses and queried where 12 there was an issue with the Horizon System. 13 I do recall that often it was difficult to get 14 HSH to take ownership of calls where branches 15 were experiencing losses as their main criteria 16 for investigating a system issue for a branch 17 was whether they had a receipts and payments 18 mismatch when the branch balanced. From memory 19 I do not recall any branches I dealt with having 20 a receipt and payment mismatch. In situations 21 where callers were passed back and forth, the 22 NBSC advisor would speak to their Team Leader 23 who may in turn speak to their counterpart at 24 HSH to try to get an agreement on who should 25 have ownership of the call." 64 1 That can come down now. Thank you. 2 Can you explain what you understood at the 3 time by a receipts and payments mismatch? 4 A. The Horizon System is based on a double entry 5 bookkeeping accounts system. So, in the days of 6 manual balancing, you had a great big ledger 7 document, a daily one and a weekly one, and you 8 had your receipt transactions which, generally 9 speaking, were transactions where money were 10 coming in and payment transactions where money 11 was going out. 12 So the way Horizon was designed was the 13 double entry bookkeeping, everything would have 14 a counter entry. So if money was coming in, 15 then on the other side cash would go up and, 16 likewise, if money was going out on the other 17 side cash would go down. 18 So the receipts and payments, when the trial 19 balance is produced, had to agree, because every 20 transaction has its counterpart. 21 If the receipts and payments mismatched and 22 they didn't agree, that was an indication that 23 something has happened in the accounts that 24 perhaps shouldn't have happened. We probably 25 didn't think of it as a bug, as such, but for 65 1 want of a better word, we can call it a bug, but 2 it just indicated that there was an issue, 3 something had gone in the accounts to cause that 4 mismatch. 5 And what would happen from that, the branch 6 wouldn't be able to roll over and proceed to 7 cash account and they would have to go to 8 Fujitsu to get them to remedy whatever the issue 9 was. So -- and if they didn't ring NBSC, then 10 the process I described earlier about a team 11 ringing branches serving in the same cash 12 account period, they would ring the branch to 13 find out why they'd not rolled over. So it 14 really wouldn't get missed. 15 They would either -- the branch would ring 16 NBSC at the time they experienced the mismatch 17 or somebody would contact the branch if they'd 18 not done that because they'd be serving in the 19 same cash account period. 20 But that was the main indicator that 21 something had happened on the system because 22 there were never a scenario where the receipts 23 and payments would not agree. 24 Q. How did you come to understand that the Horizon 25 System helpline would use this as their main 66 1 criteria of accepting ownership of a call. 2 A. I'm not 100 per cent sure. I don't know if it 3 stems from my days working on the Horizon 4 project or that was what we was told as part of 5 the training package for NBSC. I can't recall 6 which it was but that was my understanding and 7 my memory was that that was a general 8 understanding across advisors. 9 Q. In terms of the information that you as a Tier 2 10 advisor within the Network Business Support 11 Centre had access to, you had access to the 12 Knowledge Base, we've touched on that, you also 13 had access, you say in your statement, to all 14 counters operations, manuals and Horizon user 15 and balancing guides? 16 A. Yeah. 17 Q. But you say you did not have access to any 18 branch Horizon transactional information; is 19 that right? 20 A. That's correct, yes. 21 Q. So you were reliant on what someone calling you 22 told you over the phone -- 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. -- save that you sometimes asked branches to fax 25 or post paperwork through to you? 67 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. Speaking in general terms, is it right that your 3 evidence to the Inquiry is that when the Network 4 Business Support Centre looked at branch cash 5 accounts to assist a postmaster, you were 6 looking to see if any mistakes became apparent? 7 That's the wording you've used in your 8 statement. 9 A. Yeah, that's correct. 10 Q. You say at paragraph 47 of your statement to the 11 Inquiry -- we need not turn that up now -- that 12 the Network Business Support Centre would not 13 have been able to identify if there were any 14 issues caused by the Horizon System. This would 15 have to be investigated by the Horizon System 16 helpline? 17 A. That's correct. 18 Q. You say in your statement to the Inquiry at 19 paragraph 56 -- again, we need not turn it up 20 for now -- while you were at the Network 21 Business Support Centre you dealt with numerous 22 branches who had balancing issues or 23 discrepancies? 24 A. That's correct. 25 Q. Turning then, please, to your involvement in 68 1 dealing with the calls made by Mr Castleton to 2 the Network Business Support Centre between 3 December 2003 and April 2004. In the statement 4 you provided for the purposes of the litigation 5 brought by the Post Office against Mr Castleton 6 a statement dated 13 October 2006, you provided 7 an overview, didn't you, of all the call logs 8 from the Marine Drive branch in this five-month 9 period? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Could we have that statement on screen, please. 12 The reference is LCAS0000110. It's page 9 of 13 that document, please, paragraph 35. You say 14 here: 15 "As appears from the above call logs below, 16 there were a total of 88 NBSC call logs relating 17 to the Marine Drive branch for the period 18 December 2003 to April 2004. Out of these 88 19 calls, 62 calls appear to be concerned with 20 minor issues. Of the remainder for the period 21 from December 2003 to 23 March 2004: 22 "11 calls [and I won't go on to specify all 23 those dates] appear to relate purely to the 24 issue of losses; 25 "11 further calls ... appear to relate 69 1 purely to computer issues of various sorts; and 2 "4 further calls ... appear to raise issues 3 relating to both the losses and computer system. 4 "None of the call logs themselves revealed 5 the existence of any computer faults, although 6 the subpostmaster did in some calls say that he 7 thought he was having computer problems." 8 One of the calls which you categorised as 9 relating purely to the issue of losses was dealt 10 with by you, wasn't it? The call on 22 January 11 2004. 12 A. I believe I dealt with one of the calls. 13 I can't recall the date. I think I referenced 14 it in my statement. 15 Q. You deal with this at paragraph 55 of your 16 statement to the Inquiry. We needn't turn that 17 up now but could we have on screen, please, the 18 table setting out details of the 88 calls made 19 in the relevant period. This was part of the 20 documentation produced for the trial in the case 21 against Mr Castleton and the reference is 22 LCAS0000365, and it's page 29 of that document, 23 please. 24 The entry on this page relates to the call 25 that it appears you dealt with on 22 January 70 1 2004. In the column in the middle, the incident 2 log column, we can see the call being allocated 3 to "wisea_"; is that you? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. We can see the date in the first column and 6 a brief description which says "Discrepancy", in 7 the third column. In the "Activity" column, 8 four from the right, we see it says, "Cash 9 Account Discrepancy". 10 There's a more detailed description in the 11 fourth column there: 12 "PM has a loss of #4000, he was in the 13 office until 11.00 last night and could not find 14 anything." 15 Then there's the resolution in the fifth 16 column. Is this the entry made by you? 17 A. I can't see the resolution on the screen. 18 Q. It's the fifth column in? 19 A. Oh, yes. Yeah, I can see that. Yeah, the -- 20 what normally happened, Tier 1 would put quite 21 basic information in. So I may well have 22 changed the detailed description to be a little 23 bit more descriptive and the resolution would 24 have been written by myself who closed the call 25 down. 71 1 Q. The resolution reads: 2 "Went through all the balance cheques with 3 PM, he had checked the rems in and out, his cash 4 stock and P&A and he was unable to find the 5 loss. Advised I would pass through to 6 suspense." 7 Looking at these notes of the actions you 8 took, what information do you think you had to 9 work with when you were going through this with 10 Mr Castleton? 11 A. From that call, I believe it would all be verbal 12 over the telephone. So it would be me drawing 13 out information, asking him to check various 14 reports, going into various declarations, asking 15 him to check his cash again. So it would be me 16 talking him through everything on the telephone. 17 Q. You said you were going to pass through to 18 suspense. Did that mean you were going to refer 19 the case to the suspense team? 20 A. Yeah, so what would normally happen, I would 21 close this call down because that's my call and 22 my stat, and then I would create a new call that 23 would be allocated to the suspense account team 24 for them to look at whether they would authorise 25 the loss or not. I'm not sure what their 72 1 processes were but the main thing was he had 2 a £4,000 loss that probably couldn't afford to 3 put in, so the suspense account team would look 4 at whether he could hold that loss in his 5 suspense account to give time to see if anything 6 came back from Chesterfield as a transaction 7 correction or to see if anything else came back 8 that would account for the £4,000 loss. 9 Q. Would the suspense team do analysis further 10 investigation? 11 A. I'm not entirely sure. I know they'd linked in 12 with the Retail Line Managers because often 13 authorisation would come from the Retail Line 14 Manager to decide whether it could be held in 15 suspense and I think the hardship side of it was 16 driven by the Retail Line Manager. But I'm 17 unsure of any work the Suspense Account team 18 would undertake. 19 Q. Could we have on screen, please, the document at 20 FUJ00120934. This is a PEAK incident management 21 system log. Who would create these? 22 A. This would be created at Horizon System 23 Helpdesk. 24 Q. I understand you've recently been provided with 25 a copy of this log; is that right, did this make 73 1 it through to you? 2 A. Yes, it did. 3 Q. Just to be clear, this log does not relate to 4 calls made to the Network Business Support 5 Centre by Mr Castleton but the reporting of this 6 issue to the Horizon System helpline took place 7 on 13 January 2004, shortly before you dealt 8 with the call from Mr Castleton on the 9 22 January 2004. 10 I'm looking at the second box down, please, 11 the entry at 15.23, and this is three lines down 12 in the box. We can see: 13 "Call details have been taken from Andrew 14 Wise at NBSC on telephone number stated above. 15 PM has a discrepancy with his cash account for 16 the last few weeks." 17 Then in the box further down, this three 18 lines down again under "Information": 19 "The NBSC have been through the checks with 20 the PM feel there is a software error as the PM 21 has negative figures which he would not have 22 been able to enter." 23 This is an example, isn't it, of you 24 considering that a cash account discrepancy 25 might be being caused by a problem with the 74 1 Horizon System software; is that right? 2 A. I would pitch it more as there was something in 3 the account that didn't look usual and I know on 4 the line at 15.25 that it refers to he "can only 5 declare the holding amount or 0 not a negative 6 figure", so that would indicate that it's to do 7 with either a cash, stamp or stock declaration 8 that wasn't doing what you'd expect it to do. 9 So in that instance, our only course of 10 action would be to pass that over to HSH for 11 them to look at, to come up with a resolution or 12 a fix or whatever that may be. 13 Q. Had you known of cases prior to this one where 14 a cash account discrepancy had been caused by 15 a problem with the Horizon system? 16 A. I'm not aware. I'm not sure if it's a case of 17 I don't remember or if that never occurred. The 18 problem was so with this particular incident 19 here, once that were passed over to HSH, I would 20 close my call down and move on to the next, so 21 I would never get any feedback to say whether 22 it's a technical issue or not. We pass it over 23 and they look at it, and I guess this is kind of 24 showing the system working. 25 We pass it to HSH because we spot something 75 1 that doesn't seem normal and we can justify the 2 reason for passing it to them. So, on the 3 previous call we looked at, where it was just 4 a £4,000 loss, that's all we've got. We've done 5 our checks and, in those circumstances, it was 6 pretty much next to impossible to get Fujitsu to 7 take that on because there's no indication of 8 anything going wrong, whereas, in this instance, 9 the reference to the negative figures at 10 declaration is that foot in the door to be able 11 to get HSH to take that on, which they have done 12 and investigated that. 13 Q. In the situation with Mr Castleton where you 14 also weren't being presented with information of 15 a user error, did you consider whether the 16 problem might have been caused by the Horizon 17 System? 18 A. I don't think I did. I don't think that was 19 a consideration that had come in. We were 20 focused on solving the problem and the 21 assumption was that it was a mistake. So we're 22 looking for where that mistake has been made. 23 Q. Were you told about the outcome of this issue, 24 not Mr Castleton but the one we have on screen 25 at the moment, at the time? 76 1 A. No. 2 Q. Going back to your involvement in the issues 3 being raised by Mr Castleton in early 2004, do 4 you have any independent recollection now of 5 assisting Ms Pennington with analysis of the 6 problems being experienced by Mr Castleton in 7 late January and February 2004? 8 A. I don't have any recollection of the specific 9 interaction, no, I don't. 10 Q. You addressed this involvement in your statement 11 for the litigation bought against Mr Castleton 12 by the Post Office, that's the statement dated 13 13 October 2006, could we have this on screen 14 please. That's LCAS0000110, at page 7, please. 15 Paragraph 26 here reads as follows: 16 "Sarah Pennington (who has since left the 17 Post Office) was the Tier 2 advisor who dealt 18 with some of the calls raised by this office at 19 around the end of January 2004. At that time 20 and during these calls she discussed the issues 21 with me. I do not now remember all of the 22 details of this case but had refreshed my memory 23 from reviewing the NBSC call logs and the email 24 dated 20 April 2004 from Andrew Price (NBSC) to 25 Catherine Oglesby (who was then Mr Castleton's 77 1 Retail Line Manager) (page 13)." 2 Did you have an independent recollection of 3 the analysis you did and the conclusions you 4 reached when you provided this statement in 5 October 2006? 6 A. Honestly, I don't know because the memory 7 becomes do I remember the event of the trial and 8 knowing I read the email, which refreshed my 9 memory, or -- so it kind of gets a bit muddled 10 up to what I'm actually remembering. Am 11 I remembering what happened in 2006 based on 12 what were presented or am I remembering actually 13 the interaction in 2004. 14 So I'm not sure if at the time I remembered 15 it. It was only two years after the interaction 16 with Sarah Pennington and my memory is generally 17 quite good, so it could be at that time I had 18 a vague recollection of that but the sheer 19 numbers of calls we dealt with, and also being 20 one of the more experienced advisors with 21 balancing, quite a lot of colleagues would come 22 and ask me questions and ask me to review things 23 because they couldn't find an answer and they 24 knew my experience was greater. 25 So as well as my own calls that I was 78 1 dealing with, I were getting asked a lot of 2 questions, as well. So I couldn't say for sure 3 if I remembered in 2006 what had happened in 4 2004 or not, unfortunately. 5 Q. In terms of the provenance of the email you 6 refreshed your memory from, could we go over the 7 page, please, to paragraph 33 of the statement, 8 and towards the bottom of the page now. You say 9 here: 10 "I can see from the NBSC call logs that on 11 4 March 2004 Mrs Oglesby asked NBSC for 12 information of calls made to the NBSC from the 13 Marine Drive branch relating to losses when 14 balancing and what investigations were 15 undertaken by NBSC during those calls. I helped 16 Sarah Pennington to prepare an email that Andrew 17 Price (NBSC) could (and did) forward to 18 Mrs Oglesby on 20 April 2004 to explain what 19 investigations had by that time already been 20 carried out." 21 Can we look, please, to that email of 22 20 April 2004, which appears on the last page of 23 this document, page 30, please. 24 Andrew Price, whose name appears in bold as 25 the sender and at the bottom of this email, says 79 1 at the start of the email that he asked 2 Ms Pennington and you to provide a form of words 3 and actions taken whilst dealing with the PM at 4 the above branch. 5 So does it follow that, after the 6 punctuation there -- and it's quite a bad copy 7 but it looks like we have a dash and a colon -- 8 is that the wording prepared by you and 9 Ms Pennington? 10 A. I believe so. It certainly reads like that. 11 Q. That wording reads as follows: 12 "When I spoke to the PM at Marine Drive he 13 was unsure what was causing these errors. He 14 told me that he has been using the slave machine 15 for his rems and I assured him that wouldn't 16 cause a problem as long as he was attached to 17 the correct stock unit. 18 "The PM thought there would be some errors 19 relating to National Lottery. I phoned the 20 lottery team at Transaction Processing who 21 confirmed that there were some errors relating 22 to Lottery, but for every charge error there was 23 a corresponding claim error, this was due to the 24 lottery figures being entering on Horizon in the 25 wrong CAP. 80 1 "PM was also concerned that when entering 2 the lottery figures, it was as though the 3 terminals were not communicating, but if that 4 was the case the PM would have large number of 5 errors on every report and product. 6 "The PM sent cash account information to 7 NBSC and it was looked at by Andrew Wise, he was 8 unable to find any errors. The only amount 9 questioned was a large amount on the cheques to 10 processing centre which Andrew was able to 11 confirm was a cheque payment for the purchase of 12 Premium Bonds. The PM was advised there was 13 nothing more we could do and we suggested he 14 works a manual system at the side of Horizon to 15 see if any problems were highlighted. 16 "Also when doing the rems the PM should take 17 a snapshot before and after to see if any 18 problems were occurring when doing 19 a remittance." 20 The line underneath this says: 21 "Andrew Wise and I both feel that the 22 Horizon System is working properly and we are 23 unable to help the PM any further." 24 Just to clarify, was this Andrew Price 25 saying that you and he felt that the Horizon 81 1 System was working properly. 2 A. I believe so, yes. 3 Q. Going back to what you said in your statement 4 for the litigation about this email, this is 5 page 8 of the document we're currently looking 6 at, paragraph 32, about two-thirds of the way 7 down: 8 "Although I do not now recall it, our email 9 suggests (and I believe) that we concluded that 10 the Horizon System was working properly and did 11 not appear to be the cause of the unauthorised 12 losses incurred." 13 Before going into any more detail about the 14 substance of your conclusions there, I'd like to 15 ask you, please, a little bit about the process 16 by which this statement for the litigation was 17 prepared, if I may. You deal with the 18 circumstances in which you came to provide 19 a statement for the litigation at paragraph 50 20 of your statement to the Inquiry. There's no 21 need to have that up on screen at the moment. 22 You were approached by Bond Pearce who were 23 acting for the Post Office in the litigation; is 24 that right? 25 A. Yes. 82 1 Q. Could we have up on screen, please, the document 2 at POL00070822. If we could scroll down, 3 please, the email dated 21 April 2006, this 4 appears to be the first contact made with you by 5 Bond Pearce; is that right? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. This email is from Stephen Dilley, a solicitor 8 with Bond Pearce? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. We see at point 1 a summary of the dispute. 11 Over the page, please, at point 2, a summary of 12 the assertions being made about the computer 13 systems by Mr Castleton. At point 3, further 14 down the page, about halfway through that 15 paragraph, Mr Dilley says: 16 "I would like to arrange to meet and 17 interview you at Capston House in June to 18 understand what involvement you had at the time 19 and what you make of Mr Castleton's assertions. 20 Based on our discussions, I will then prepare 21 a short Witness Statement for you to approve and 22 sign." 23 After you met with Bond Pearce, is it right 24 that a first draft of the statement was provided 25 to you -- 83 1 A. Yes, I believe so. 2 Q. -- and there were some further amendments made 3 following correspondence between you and Bond 4 Pearce? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. Was it explained to you at the time you were 7 making the statement the importance of ensuring 8 that everything in the statement was accurate to 9 the best of your knowledge and belief? 10 A. To be honest, I'm unsure. At that point, I'd 11 never given evidence in court before or never 12 provided a statement before. So I really was in 13 their hands. I don't recall what advice they 14 give me. I do remember they'd come up to where 15 I worked in the building at Capston House in 16 Salford Quays and I think there were two people 17 that come, one being Stephen and somebody else, 18 but I can't fully remember. 19 And I do remember that we sat down together 20 and they asked me questions and I think, from my 21 knowledge of processes, that's why the statement 22 grew beyond just being about Mr Castleton's case 23 and growing into processes on balancing, things 24 like that. I think it had become apparent to 25 them that I had quite a good knowledge of 84 1 processes. 2 I don't recall -- because I know from the 3 jobs I've done subsequently the importance of 4 statements. I've attended court. I don't 5 recall any advice as such around that, but 6 I don't know if it's just I don't remember or 7 a case they didn't. I can't answer that, I'm 8 sorry. 9 Q. You gave evidence at the trial in the Castleton 10 case on 11 December 2006; is that right? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. You confirmed the contents of your written 13 statement for the litigation in oral evidence. 14 Could we have on screen, please, your statement 15 for the litigation at LCAS0000110. It's page 21 16 of that document, please. This is your 17 concluding paragraph, at paragraph 115. I think 18 the numbering is somewhat out there because we 19 go from 122 to 115 but, at the bottom of the 20 page, you say this: 21 "Having reviewed the email dated 20 April 22 2004, I can see that we did not find anything to 23 suggest that the Horizon System was not working 24 properly or causing the unauthorised losses. 25 The NBSC call logs do not themselves reveal the 85 1 existence of any computer faults." 2 Can we compare this, please, with what you 3 said earlier in your statement at paragraph 32. 4 This is page 8 of the document, please. You say 5 here: 6 "Although I do not now recall it, our email 7 suggests (and I believe) that we concluded that 8 the Horizon System was working properly and did 9 not appear to be the cause of the unauthorised 10 losses incurred." 11 I go back to that not to be repetitious but 12 you do, don't you, go one step further in 13 paragraph 32 than your concluding paragraph. So 14 you're saying here that you believe you 15 concluded the Horizon System was working 16 properly and did not appear to be the cause of 17 the unauthorised losses incurred, as opposed to 18 saying, in effect, there was no evidence of 19 a problem. 20 A. There being no evidence of a problem would 21 logically lead me to the conclusion, you know, 22 that I concluded it was working properly. So 23 I believe one thing would lead to the next. It 24 might be worded different. I think the point of 25 it -- trying to make is the same point that 86 1 I didn't consider there were an issue with the 2 Horizon System. Worded slightly differently but 3 I think one would lead to the next, if that 4 makes sense. 5 Q. Can we go, please, to your statement to the 6 Inquiry at WITN09090100. This is page 16, 7 please, paragraph 47, about two-thirds of the 8 way down the page. You say here: 9 "In the email from Andrew Price dated 10 20 April 2004 ... he writes that 'Andrew Wise 11 and myself both feel that the Horizon System is 12 working properly and we are unable to help the 13 PM further'. In my witness statement from 2006 14 ... I comment that I did not recall saying that 15 and I still do not recall a conversation with 16 Andrew Price where this was discussed. 17 Generally, when NBSC looked at branch Cash 18 Accounts to assist a postmaster we were looking 19 to see if any mistakes become apparent. NBSC 20 would not have been able to identify if there 21 were any issues caused by the Horizon System, 22 this would have to be investigated by HSH. The 23 only indication for NBSC to establish whether 24 there was an issue with the Horizon System would 25 be a Receipts and Payments mismatch when the 87 1 branch tries to balance. From reviewing the 2 documentation provided I cannot see any evidence 3 of a receipts and payments mismatch occurring at 4 Marine Drive Post Office, my assumption now 5 would be the lack of a receipt and payment 6 mismatch, would be the basis of the comment in 7 Andrew Price's email ..." 8 It's quite an important point, isn't it, 9 that the Network Business Support Centre would 10 not have been able to identify if there were any 11 issues caused by the Horizon System and that 12 this would have to be investigated by the 13 Horizon System helpline? 14 A. Yes, it's important. 15 Q. Because if that's right, it would be difficult 16 for the NBSC, as opposed to the Horizon System 17 helpline, to conclude that the Horizon System 18 was working properly? 19 A. It would be but NBSC would never have sight of 20 the full machine, if you like. We were a small 21 cog and, you know, there were suspense accounts 22 teams, there were Horizon, there were the area 23 managers, there were the other teams that would 24 look at it. We were just a small cog. So 25 within scope of what NBSC could do, I'm 88 1 answering that, within that scope of what we 2 look at, we can't identify any losses. 3 So I'm not giving a blanket statement for 4 the whole business, for the whole HSH, I'm 5 saying within the scope of what I can look at, 6 I cannot see anything that would indicate 7 a Horizon loss. That -- like you said, that 8 would have to go to Fujitsu ultimately to 9 determine that. 10 Q. This caveat, if I can call it that, as to what 11 NBSC could and couldn't do, doesn't seem to 12 appear, at least not in these terms, in your 13 statement for the litigation. Can you remember 14 ever suggesting that it was included? 15 A. I can't remember suggesting that. 16 Q. Can you see that, without this caveat, the 17 reader of paragraph 32 of your statement for the 18 litigation might have thought that the network 19 business support centre was in a position to 20 draw the conclusion on its own that there were 21 no issues caused by the Horizon System? 22 A. Yes, I can see how that could be perceived. 23 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Ms Price, would you take the 24 witness back to that paragraph, and the 25 misnumbered 115 again, just for me to be precise 89 1 in my mind about what they say? 2 MS PRICE: Of course, starting with 115, sir? 3 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes. 4 MS PRICE: That's LCAS0000110, page 21, towards the 5 bottom, 115. This is the concluding paragraph, 6 which is in slightly different terms to the 7 paragraph we went to earlier. 8 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: But on the face of it, Mr Wise -- 9 and if I'm taking it out of context please say 10 so -- that does appear to me, hopefully reading 11 it objectively, to be an assertion that the 12 Horizon System had not caused any unauthorised 13 losses, which is a very broad statement, is it 14 not? 15 A. It is quite a broad statement. That was my view 16 based on what we could do at NBSC and that's -- 17 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: But as was pointed out to you, in 18 your evidence to me you're making it clear that 19 what you could do at NBSC was much less than 20 that statement might lead a reasonable reader to 21 conclude; would you agree with that? 22 A. I would agree with that, yes. 23 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Thank you. Do you have any 24 recollection of actually drafting those words 25 yourself? 90 1 A. I don't recall drafting the words. I know the 2 statement was written on my behalf and sent to 3 me to read through and I think there were 4 several drafts of it which I read through. The 5 things I tended to look at changing were likely 6 things like processes that were not quite 7 correct that had been put in there. 8 So having -- speaking to the two people that 9 came up to Capston House to see me, they went 10 away and wrote the statement based on that 11 conversation, which I think there were two or 12 three emails to and fro asking questions, or me 13 reading through and changing things that I felt 14 necessary to change. 15 I don't think I wrote these words and, 16 looking back at -- knowing what I know now, 17 looking back at a statement from 2006 that was 18 written on my behalf, it does make me cringe 19 a little bit, for want of a better word, and 20 I would look at that and think "Well, ooh, 21 I wouldn't have necessarily pitched it like 22 that", but that's with the knowledge I've gained 23 over the years and the jobs I've done more 24 recently to be able to look at it and think 25 that. 91 1 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: I follow. Thank you. 2 Sorry for interrupting, Ms Price. 3 MS PRICE: Not at all, sir. 4 Coming back to the level of calls being made 5 by Mr Castleton between December 2003 and 6 April 2004, this was a man, wasn't it, who was 7 desperately seeking help to understand why he 8 was experiencing discrepancies? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. If we can turn, please, to page 21 of your 11 statement to the Inquiry, so this is 12 WITN09090100, page 21, please, at paragraph 58, 13 a little further down the page, please. You 14 reviewed some of the Horizon System helpline 15 call logs provided to you by the Inquiry and you 16 draw this conclusion in your last sentence: 17 "Although I am not familiar with the layout 18 of these HSH logs, and I am not familiar with 19 the some of the technical terms and jargon it is 20 clear that Mr Castleton made numerous attempts 21 to request HSH look at his Horizon system as he 22 was experiencing large and frequent losses." 23 Then this at paragraph 59: 24 "As I mentioned earlier in this statement, 25 broadly speaking the Service Support Team in 92 1 NBSC was responsible for dealing with 2 transaction and process related queries, this 3 included the balancing process and supporting 4 with losses. HSH was responsible for dealing 5 with technical related issues. My memory of my 6 time at NBSC was that it was always difficult to 7 get HSH to investigate balancing type issues as 8 they deemed these NBSC responsibility and unless 9 there was a receipts and payments mismatch, they 10 deemed it an NBSC issue." 11 Could we go, please, to page 23 of this 12 document and paragraph 63. You say this: 13 "Having familiarised myself with the 14 documents provided to me by the Inquiry 15 (importantly the NBSC call logs and Fujitsu call 16 logs) I can see that Mr Castleton (or a member 17 of his staff) repeatedly reached out to both 18 helplines requesting support regarding his 19 balancing and the losses he was experiencing. 20 This was probably on a more frequent level than 21 you would expect from branches although this 22 would not have been known at the time of taking 23 the call as the Service Support Advisor would 24 not have full visibility of all the 25 information." 93 1 You then conclude at paragraph 64 at the 2 bottom of the page: 3 "However, after reviewing the call logs I do 4 think that Mr Castleton was left out on a limb 5 and numerous calls were concluded by sending him 6 to another team. This meant that Mr Castleton 7 was bounced between NBSC and HSH, which looking 8 back at that now I do not think that was helpful 9 for Mr Castleton." 10 These are obviously your reflections on 11 matters now. You say at paragraph 65 that you 12 did not really form any conclusions of causes of 13 losses when assisting branches, so at the time. 14 But at the time you were involved in the 15 litigation as a witness, did you ever question 16 the basis on which the Post Office was pursuing 17 Mr Castleton for the apparent losses in 18 question, in circumstances when Mr Castleton 19 himself had repeatedly sought help from the 20 helplines to get to the bottom of the cause. 21 A. I think during the litigation in 2006, I was 22 just focused on the evidence I was giving. 23 I wasn't really exposed to a lot of things that 24 I'd been exposed to since. I understood from my 25 experience that Post Office would go after all 94 1 losses, you know, postmasters were responsible, 2 and that was the line "You're responsible for 3 the losses", and they pursued that, I understood 4 that. I didn't really give thought -- I didn't 5 have the full picture to think that this poor 6 man, he's reached out all these times and now 7 we're going after him for the money. 8 I was there focusing on my little piece of 9 evidence because it was quite new to me, it were 10 quite daunting. So I didn't think I had the 11 capacity, if that makes sense, to broaden that 12 at quite a stressful time to go down to London, 13 to go to court, to do all the work with the 14 solicitors. 15 So I think that was my focus, rather than 16 thinking broader than that. 17 Q. Did you ever ask yourself whether there was 18 an actual loss to be recovered? 19 A. No, I don't think I did. 20 Q. Reflecting on things now, do you think it was 21 right that the Post Office pursued Mr Castleton 22 for the apparent losses in the litigation in the 23 way it did? 24 A. It's a difficult one to answer that. My 25 thinking lately, with everything that's going 95 1 on, has been around -- the Post Office has had 2 this contract, say, for 300 years. You know, 3 that's as long as Post Office has existed. It 4 was a very archaic contract and very harsh on 5 postmasters and what I tend to think about is at 6 what point that should have changed. Should 7 that have been in the '90s? Should that have 8 been in 2006? Should that have been in 2019 9 when things did change because of the Group 10 Litigation? 11 So I tend to reflect more on that to try to 12 rationalise in my own head at what point it was 13 appropriate to stop being like that and I don't 14 know if that was in 2006 when they were pursuing 15 Mr Castleton for this. Certainly, thinking back 16 now, it feels very harsh, you know, and like you 17 said, he was crying out for help. He were 18 making calls in there and, regardless of the 19 reason for the loss, my view, looking back, is 20 Post Office should and could have intervened 21 sooner rather than later, than let it get to 22 where it sat. 23 So there's a lot of thoughts around it, and 24 I wouldn't say I've had a thought thinking "Oh, 25 they shouldn't have gone off after Mr Castleton 96 1 for the money", because I don't think I have. 2 It's more a broader thought around how Post 3 Office Limited operated, how it treated 4 postmasters and one of my roles was the Business 5 Development Manager role, which was a sales 6 support role and I dealt face-to-face with 7 branches and I had branches who were on the 8 sharp end of Post Office. You know, it might be 9 they cashed a fraudulent green Giro cheque and 10 Post Office were saying "Right, you've cashed 11 that, you owe us £300". 12 So my thoughts are Post Office is very harsh 13 and was very harsh but I try at to reflect more 14 on when, as a business, that should have 15 changed, similar to smoking. 30 years ago you 16 could sit in a pub and come back smelling of 17 smoke. Now that's inappropriate. Was that the 18 right time to stop that or should it have been 19 stopped earlier? 20 And that's how I view it. At what point 21 should Post Office have looked at its contract 22 with subpostmasters and said "No, this isn't 23 acceptable in this day and age, we need to 24 change that"? 25 MS PRICE: Sir, those are all the questions I have 97 1 on the Mr Castleton case. There are some other 2 questions that I have on different issues. 3 Would that be a convenient moment to break for 4 lunch? 5 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: It would, but let me just ask 6 a question that's been going around in my mind 7 because it relates to the Castleton case, and 8 then we'll break, all right? 9 MS PRICE: Of course, sir. Apologies. 10 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: No, no, that's fine. 11 Mr Wise, will you assume for the moment, 12 because there may be a debate about it, but will 13 you assume for the moment that some of the 14 evidence which you gave in writing, in your 15 witness statement for the litigation, and some 16 of the oral answers which you may have given 17 when you gave evidence before the judge was what 18 lawyers call opinion evidence, all right? Were 19 you ever given any advice by any lawyer acting 20 for the Post Office about the duties involved or 21 the duties imposed upon persons who give opinion 22 evidence, as opposed to factual evidence? 23 A. I don't think I was, no. 24 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: All right, thank you. 25 Let's have our break. When shall we start 98 1 again, Ms Price? 2 MS PRICE: We are 12.55 now, so shall we say 2.00, 3 sir? 4 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Certainly. That's fine. 5 2.00, everyone. 6 (12.52 pm) 7 (The Short Adjournment) 8 (2.00 pm) 9 MS PRICE: Good afternoon, sir. 10 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Good afternoon. 11 MS PRICE: Can you see and hear us? 12 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: I can indeed, yes. 13 MS PRICE: Mr Wise, I'd like to ask you about your 14 move to the Security team in 2011 and becoming 15 a security manager. This was quite a different 16 role to those you had held previously. How did 17 you find the change? 18 A. I was very conscious of the role and what it 19 undertook and I did think quite hard about 20 particularly the investigation side of that and, 21 you know, dealing with criminality because 22 that's not something I was used to. You know, 23 my role had always been quite supportive and, 24 thinking about it, I wasn't sure if that would 25 be the role for me, if that made sense. 99 1 So I did think about it but I went for the 2 job because it was out in the network, it were 3 dealing with postmasters. I had a lot of 4 knowledge and experience I could bring to that 5 role and I was successful. 6 So it was quite different but I had the 7 support of years of knowledge and experience to 8 be able to apply to that role, so I knew I could 9 take that with me and be quite useful in the 10 role. 11 Q. What training were you given for the role? 12 A. When we initially started, it was just on the 13 physical aspect of the role for the first few 14 months, which were dealing with branches: 15 robberies, burglaries, crime prevention, things 16 like that. The plan -- I think I started in the 17 January and in the March was when the training 18 was booked for the investigation side of the 19 role. So from starting in January up to March, 20 we was given online learning around PACE and the 21 Codes of Practice and other various things that 22 we had to complete online, and we did that on 23 the run up until the course in the March. 24 And I think it was a three-week residential 25 course which was based down at Coton House in 100 1 Rugby, which Royal Mail held as like a business 2 centre. We had our own hotel on site and 3 meeting rooms. Everything was done in-house on 4 site. 5 On the first day of the course we had to sit 6 an exam based on the last three months of 7 learning around PACE and I think it was -- we 8 had to achieve 70 per cent or 78 per cent to be 9 able to continue to sit the course. If you 10 didn't achieve that mark, then you wouldn't be 11 able to continue on the course. And then it 12 were the -- I'm sure it was three weeks because 13 the middle week -- the reason I say that is 14 I drove myself the first week, the second week 15 my line manager took me down and I'm sure 16 I drove the third week because Lesley wasn't 17 available, so that's why I think it were 18 a three-week course. But I'm thinking back, you 19 know, to 2011 now, so -- but that's the reason 20 I think it was three weeks. 21 Q. Who provided the training? 22 A. It was in-house from the Security team. So we 23 had two people who trained us. There was 24 a gentleman called Paul Southin, who was one of 25 the financial investigators within the Security 101 1 team, and he was supported with an investigator 2 called -- he were called Paul, I can't quite 3 remember his -- Paul Whittaker. So it were the 4 two of them who worked within the Security team 5 that delivered the training. 6 Q. As you have said in your statement for the 7 Inquiry, you had some involvement in the 8 criminal investigation of Grant Allen and 9 Khayyam Ishaq, whose cases the Inquiry will be 10 exploring further in future hearings. You say 11 in your statement provided to the Inquiry that 12 you had some limited involvement in the cases as 13 second officer in the case and attended their 14 interviews. Can you just explain for the Chair 15 what the role of second officer involved in 16 an investigation? 17 A. Okay. So when a case is raised, it's assigned 18 to an investigator and it's the team leader that 19 makes that decision, based on workload and 20 geography. So they would assign the case to 21 that particular investigator and they would be 22 first officer. So they would undertake the 23 investigation. They would have all contact with 24 the subpostmaster and make all arrangements. 25 Now, that first officer would choose 102 1 a second officer, again based on workloads. 2 Within the north team there were four of us that 3 worked out of Manchester, it later moved to 4 Bolton. So the lead investigator would decide, 5 you know, who would go along and be second 6 officer. 7 And that was just really a role for on the 8 day of the interview. So before the interview 9 we would probably get a little bit of prep on 10 the background of the investigation and, you 11 know, the circumstances around why they were 12 being interviewed. It were very much setting up 13 the room, greeting the person and the 14 representatives, you know, making sure everybody 15 were comfortable. During the interview you were 16 there as support, so if you felt there were 17 a question that needed to be asked, you could 18 interject with that question or you would wait 19 for the first officer to open up and ask you if 20 you had anything to add or if you had any 21 questions to add. 22 So it really was case-by-case dependent how 23 much input you had in the interview, depending 24 on what the first officer had covered off in his 25 question. And the first officer would have 103 1 an interview which he would share with you so 2 you had an idea of the questioning and the lines 3 it was going to go down. 4 Q. After you completed your training, was there 5 a period of time when you only did second 6 officer investigation work before you were 7 elevated, so to speak, to being first officer in 8 the investigation? 9 A. When we finished our training, we were mentored 10 probably, I would say, at least for 12 months, 11 if not for two years and I remember, within two 12 or three months after coming out of the 13 training, I was -- I'll say tentatively given 14 the first officer role but closely monitored by 15 the mentor, who -- you know, whereas in a normal 16 investigation the first officer would do the 17 investigation, whereas your mentor, who would 18 generally be the second officer for you, 19 supported in that. So you weren't left to do it 20 all by yourself. 21 So I think it was a mix. We were second 22 officer for more than what we were first officer 23 for but there wasn't a period of solely doing 24 second officer. It was case dependent on the 25 type of case, the complexity of that case, on 104 1 whether you would be given the first officer for 2 that. 3 Q. Can you recall now the interviews with either of 4 the individuals that I just referenced? 5 A. Not specifically. I can recall certain aspects, 6 such as I remember going to Bradford Mail Centre 7 where the interview took place. I think 8 Mr Allen's interview took place at our actual 9 offices in Salford but I can't remember 10 specifics of the case or what questions were 11 asked. 12 Q. You've been provided with some further documents 13 relating to their cases fairly recently by the 14 Inquiry. Has that assisted your recollection at 15 all? 16 A. I've briefly looked through them because in the 17 number of documents provided I've not been able 18 to, you know, read -- you know, spend 19 a particular amount of time reading them. It 20 did prompt a few things. I can remember, when 21 I read it, I think it was the case with Mr Allen 22 where the interview was stopped because he 23 indicated he didn't want legal representation, 24 then he suggested he might do and, because of 25 that, we had to stop the interview and get 105 1 agreement from a senior member of the Security 2 team to proceed and I believe I read that that 3 occurred in that. 4 So it bought back a little bit because I can 5 remember we had to contact -- at the time 6 I think it were Dave Pardoe who were the Head of 7 Security Operations to get authority to proceed, 8 because Mr Allen said "Oh no, we will continue, 9 I don't want legal representative", but we 10 couldn't just do that. We had to get sign-off 11 from somebody more senior to allow us to 12 continue because of those circumstances. 13 I can't remember much about the case or the 14 loss or what he was accused of and similarly for 15 the other gentleman. I seem to remember the one 16 in Bradford, it were to do with stock, and him 17 adjusting or manipulating his stock figures but, 18 again, it's all quite vague, to be honest. 19 Q. To the best of your recollection, did you have 20 any involvement in their cases after the 21 interview stage? 22 A. No. The only involvement would probably be 23 writing a witness statement to say I was there 24 attending as second officer but I wouldn't have 25 any other involvement in the progression of that 106 1 case. 2 Q. You say in your statement to the Inquiry that 3 you never had any concerns about the criminal 4 cases you were involved in while you were in the 5 Security team. Does that remain your position? 6 A. I think it does, yeah. I will say my current 7 position is on the fence, if that makes sense, 8 because there's been an awful lot of talk and 9 evidence coming out about bugs and how flawed, 10 in particular, the original Horizon was. 11 I acknowledge that and I can see that but what's 12 not happened is the business haven't come to us 13 and said, "This bug, this branch; here's the 14 bug, here's the data, here's how it materialises 15 in the data". 16 So my view is there's a potential for bugs, 17 which means is it appropriate for convictions to 18 be overturned? Then I would say yes, because 19 that the legal system and if there's a potential 20 for bugs then that has to be explored but, 21 equally, there's a potential for it not to be 22 a bug, so I would say I'm on the fence at the 23 moment. 24 Q. Just in terms of your position at the time, so 25 when you were involved in those cases, does it 107 1 remain the position that you didn't at that time 2 have concerns? 3 A. I didn't at that time have concerns, definitely. 4 Q. Could we go, please, to your statement to the 5 Inquiry that is WITN09090100, page 30, 6 paragraph 87, please. On the question of your 7 knowledge of bugs, errors or defects in the 8 Horizon System, you say this: 9 "I have been asked by the Inquiry whether 10 I had, or was aware of, any concerns regarding 11 the robustness of the Horizon System IT system 12 during my time working for the Post Office. To 13 my knowledge in all my career working for the 14 Post Office I have never witnessed a bug, error 15 or defect while using the Horizon System and 16 I have never had any concerns. When I joined 17 the Post Office Security Team in 2011, I became 18 aware that a group of subpostmasters were 19 claiming that Horizon was responsible for the 20 losses they had suffered in branch. However, 21 the message from the business was always that 22 there were no issues with Horizon and even 23 during the start of the Group Litigation the 24 theme from the business was that POL would be 25 successful in proving there was no issue with 108 1 the system." 2 We've talked about receipts and payments 3 mismatch being the main criteria for the Horizon 4 System helpline accepting ownership of a call. 5 We talked about that earlier. Did you 6 understand this to be a reference to a bug, 7 error or defect in the system or not? 8 A. It's interpretation on what I mean by bug, error 9 and defect and what other people may mean by 10 bug, error or defect and I liken it to my work 11 laptop. The screen will freeze, I have to log 12 out of Teams and log back in. I have to reboot 13 my computer. I get a blue circle which means my 14 memory's completely full and I have to get IT to 15 resolve that. They're glitches that you live 16 with. I wouldn't phone Microsoft up and say, 17 "What's going on with my computer? It's full of 18 bugs". It happens, it gets resolved, it doesn't 19 have a detriment on what I'm doing. 20 So when I refer to bugs, errors or defects, 21 I'm kind of referring to -- I may have seen 22 a screen freeze, I may have been in branch and 23 had to reboot the base unit but they're not what 24 I mean for bugs, errors or defects. I may have 25 seen something at NBSC that doesn't look quite 109 1 right or I can't explain, but that's passed over 2 to HSH. 3 That -- what I'm saying is that's not -- 4 concerns me, that's not give me reason to think 5 "Oh, there's something wrong with Horizon", 6 because that's technology and I trusted, and 7 I think we -- a lot of people in the Post Office 8 trusted the assurances that Horizon wasn't doing 9 what we're saying it's doing now, you know, and 10 I've got to work on that trust from the 11 business. You know, I can only go off what 12 they're assuring me. 13 For example, if I buy a new BMW, I'm not 14 going to ring up BMW the day after I pick it up 15 and say, "Can you assure me that my engine is 16 going to turn on when I get in the car? Can you 17 assure me that the lights will come on?" I buy 18 it with that expectation that it's fit for 19 purpose and that's what coming down from the 20 business, that Horizon is fit for purpose. 21 So when I refer to bugs, errors or defects 22 these are the big bugs that I would say is 23 capable of causing a loss and that's what I mean 24 in I've never come across -- you know, I may 25 have come across the smaller ones, I may have 110 1 referred postmasters to HSH because I couldn't 2 understand what was being presented to me, you 3 know, through that postmaster, but that never 4 gave me any cause to doubt the system and that, 5 coupled with the assurances from the business, 6 you know, it just meant I had no reason to 7 dispute that. 8 Q. You've just referred to whether or not the 9 system could cause a loss. But is it fair to 10 say you knew from your time at the Network 11 Business Support Centre that software issues 12 with Horizon could cause discrepancies on the 13 basis that at least one case we've looked at, 14 you referred it with that possible suggestion? 15 A. I don't know if I was aware -- and still now I'm 16 not aware of a lot of the bugs and how they 17 materialise in the data or in the system and, 18 certainly then, I don't think I was aware or 19 fully understood whether they could or couldn't. 20 We would review what was in front of us, and 21 that didn't follow the pattern to what we would 22 expect. So I didn't know if that was causing 23 the loss or not and that would be referred over. 24 So I don't think I've thought about it that 25 deeply then. Everything was on face value. You 111 1 know, we took what was in front of us and, if we 2 thought something didn't look right, we would 3 pass it over to HSH. 4 Q. You talk in your statement, and you've mentioned 5 it again just now, of the message from the 6 business being that there were no issues with 7 Horizon, even during the start of the Group 8 Litigation. Can you help the Chair with who 9 this message was coming from? 10 A. A lot of the time from our Head of Security at 11 the time but, even going wider than that, while 12 the Group Litigation was going on I remember 13 there was quite a large meeting in Chesterfield 14 with some very senior managers, I think one was 15 Julie Thomas, possibly Angela van den Bogerd, 16 and they were assuring us that they expected 17 that they would win on most of the counts at the 18 Group Litigation, and this is at the start of 19 the litigation. 20 Within the Security team, I think July 2013, 21 when the Second Sight report was published, 22 that's kind of one of the trigger points from 23 when prosecutions were -- we'll say frozen and, 24 even then, the information coming out of 25 Cartwright King, the legal team, the Head of 112 1 Security, was we need to get a new subject 2 matter expert. Once we get the new subject 3 matter expert, we will carry on business as 4 usual prosecuting, because that's the stance 5 they took, "We can still prosecute, there's no 6 issues with it, we just need to get that new 7 subject matter expert". 8 And year after year, meeting after meeting, 9 that subject matter expert never materialised 10 but the message was still the same. All the 11 team meetings, all the meetings with the whole 12 Security team, it was always that message: that 13 we need the subject matter expert and we'll 14 start prosecuting again. Until that point, the 15 cases were stacked and classed as inactive. 16 I don't know for a good period of time. 17 MS PRICE: Thank you, Mr Wise. Those are my 18 questions. Sir, do you have any questions for 19 Mr Wise before I turn to CPs? 20 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: No, thank you, Ms Price. 21 MS PRICE: There may be some questions from Core 22 Participants represented by Hudgells, Howe+Co 23 and HJA? No? 24 Ms Page? If I can come to you first. 25 Questioned by MS PAGE 113 1 MS PAGE: Mr Wise, I act for a number of the 2 subpostmasters including Mr Castleton, who sits 3 to my right. When you gave evidence in the 4 trial, Mr Castleton asked you some questions; do 5 you remember that? 6 A. I have some recollection and I've refreshed my 7 memory through the transcripts from the trial. 8 Q. Well, it may be, then, that we don't need to go 9 to the transcripts, if you can remember that 10 Mr Castleton asked you whether it was possible 11 to perform transactions on Horizon without first 12 logging in? 13 A. That's correct, yeah. 14 Q. Do you remember that? 15 A. Yeah. 16 Q. You confirmed for him that that was not 17 possible? 18 A. Correct, yes. 19 Q. That's obviously still correct, yes? 20 A. To my belief, yeah. You can't process 21 a transaction if you're not logged on or if the 22 system isn't logged in, yeah. 23 Q. Can you help with this: if the system had 24 crashed or there had been a screen freeze, which 25 meant that you had to reboot, would you then 114 1 have to log in again before you could perform 2 any transactions? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. Thank you. 5 Then turning to another subject and the last 6 one I'll ask you about, we looked at that cash 7 account issue that you successfully transferred 8 to the Horizon Helpdesk. A little earlier 9 Counsel to the Inquiry put it on the screen for 10 you. You'll probably be able to take it from 11 me, I hope -- I can certainly show you if 12 necessary -- that that took place, that call 13 took place on 13 January 2004. What we also saw 14 earlier -- and again we can go to it if 15 necessary -- is that, when you dealt with 16 Mr Castleton's call in the March, you and your 17 colleague who had originally dealt with him, 18 Ms Pennington, saw his cash accounts, and they 19 went back to a few weeks earlier, yes? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. Indeed, that first one that it went back to 22 was -- or at least the first time he had 23 a problem with a discrepancy, was on 14 January 24 2004, so in other words within a day of the cash 25 account problem that you referred to the 115 1 Helpdesk? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. Presumably there was no way for you at the NBSC 4 to put those two things together? 5 A. No. 6 Q. So, barring somebody having a miraculous memory, 7 "Oh, I remember that same day I took another 8 call with a cash account discrepancy involving 9 cheques", those two calls would never be joined 10 up? 11 A. No, and if I explain, at NBSC, particularly on 12 a Wednesday afternoon into Thursday morning, it 13 was call, after call, after call relating to 14 balancing issues, some with discrepancies, some 15 with issues where they couldn't achieve 16 a balance because they'd not followed process. 17 So even a day apart, that could be 50 calls 18 apart. So I could try and look at linked calls 19 to Mr Castleton's branch and see if I can look 20 through to see previous calls, but it would give 21 me everything that Mr Castleton had raised, so 22 I might look through that and try and see if 23 I could see any others. But I certainly 24 couldn't cross-reference that to another branch. 25 There'd be no way, unless I -- like you 116 1 said, I thought, "Well, this is very similar to 2 one I dealt with the previous day. But I would 3 say that didn't happen and was quite unlikely to 4 happen. 5 Q. Yes, I see. So the fact that in that call that 6 was transferred to the Helpdesk, the fact that 7 there seems to have been an update that came out 8 in the November before that was causing the bug, 9 that's not something that would have fed back or 10 been shared around other branches experiencing 11 similar problems, is it? 12 A. Not that I'm aware of, no. 13 MS PAGE: No. Thank you. Those are my questions. 14 Thank you, sir. 15 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Thank you, Ms Page. Anyone else? 16 MS PRICE: I think there's a question or two from 17 Mr Jacobs. 18 Questioned by MR JACOBS 19 MR JACOBS: Thank you, I have couple of questions 20 for you. I ought to say that I act for 156 21 subpostmasters in this Inquiry. 22 Ms Price asked you about paragraph 87 of 23 your statement where you spoke about the message 24 from the business and you say that the position 25 of the business, the message from the business 117 1 was always that there were no issues with 2 Horizon, and then you go on to say that, even at 3 the start of the Group Litigation, and you 4 mentioned Angela van den Bogerd and I think 5 Julia Thomas reinforcing that. 6 In relation to "always", when did you first 7 hear the message from the business that you 8 speak of? 9 A. I would say from joining security in 2011, 10 because that was the point at which I become 11 aware of the group of subpostmasters that were 12 claiming Horizon had lost their money. So in 13 2011, I became aware of that but with that was 14 the messages to say, you know, there's not 15 an issue here, and we were even given 16 instructions from Cartwright King on, if 17 a postmaster raises an issue to do with Horizon, 18 you cover off by asking -- I think it were 19 asking what training they'd receive, specifics 20 on the issue. So it were all geared around 21 disproving, if that makes sense. 22 So those are the types of messages I'm 23 referring to. It's not an email that says 24 "There is no issues". It's more minute than 25 that. It's lots of things coming through. It's 118 1 reading between the lines even, sometimes, that 2 they don't directly say "There's no issues with 3 Horizon", it's "Right, this is what we've got to 4 do to, you know, proceed to prove this". 5 So it's not one message, it's lots of 6 messages coming from different people within the 7 business, different people within the Security 8 team. 9 Q. Well, I understand that as a Security Manager 10 you were conducting investigations from 2011 to 11 2015; is that right? 12 A. When Second Sight landed in July 2013, 13 investigations still continued but none really 14 progressed to prosecution. So it's always 15 slightly confusing on the timeline on what 16 happened when but, for me personally, I was 17 an investigator when I started in Security in 18 2011 after my training until I joined the 19 Intelligence team in 2015. 20 Q. The point of my question is that you were 21 specifically instructed to be dismissive of 22 subpostmasters' allegations about the Horizon 23 System in the conduct of your investigations 24 because of the message from the business; is 25 that right? 119 1 A. I wouldn't -- 2 Q. It must be right, surely? 3 A. I wouldn't say dismissive. I would say they 4 tried to give us tools to get round those 5 messages from postmasters. So to be able to 6 challenge them. So we were told "You must do 7 this, this and this if a postmaster says there's 8 an issue with Horizon", and then that -- so, as 9 an investigator, ultimately we are the fact 10 finder. 11 We pull all the information together. That 12 goes to the Criminal Law Team who ultimately 13 make that decision. So we present the facts as 14 we know it and they make that decision. So 15 I don't think we were told to be dismissive. 16 I think we were told to be guarded, you know, 17 and cautious when postmasters were raising these 18 issues, but the -- as I said, the instruction 19 was to cover off various aspects within the 20 interview, if a postmaster does raise that. 21 Q. But we know now, don't we, that the message from 22 the business was untrue, so this message tainted 23 your investigations, didn't it? 24 A. It certainly did and, from my point of view, 25 that does cut quite deep because, you know, had 120 1 the business had been honest and open with what 2 was going on with Horizon, then it could be said 3 that we could address that in the courts 4 appropriately but, as an investigator, we didn't 5 get opportunity to be able to do that because of 6 the messages that were coming down. 7 Q. Now, one of the answers that you gave to 8 Ms Price a few moments ago when you were asked 9 who delivered this message from the business, 10 you said, "Our Head of Security at the time". 11 Now, one of my clients, Mr Kelly, is here today, 12 and he's very interested to know what 13 individuals were responsible. Can you tell the 14 Inquiry who was your Head of Security in 2011, 15 please? 16 A. When I joined in 2011, John Scott was Head of 17 Security. Underneath John Scott, who was Head 18 of Security Operations, which was the strand 19 Investigation sits under, it were a gentleman 20 called Dave Pardoe and then, underneath Dave 21 Pardoe, there were the three operational team 22 leaders. They changed so frequently I'm not 23 sure who was team leader when. 24 I think John Scott left the business in 25 around 2016 and the Security team was broken up 121 1 and fragmented so Financial Crime went under one 2 directorate, Physical Security went under with 3 the Property teams, and Security Operations fell 4 under the Network team. And the Head of 5 Security from then on was a gentleman called 6 Mark Raymond, who's the current Head of Security 7 Operations. 8 Q. Thank you. That's helpful. You also say that 9 this message was disseminated in team 10 meetings -- 11 A. Yeah. 12 Q. -- and it would appear more than one team 13 meeting. Do you have any written records, memos 14 or agendas of those meetings that the Inquiry 15 could see? 16 A. Between 2011 and 2013, at least once, possibly 17 twice a year, we had meetings with Cartwright 18 King, who were the Criminal Law Team, to all 19 intents and purposes, and they produced 20 workbooks and, you know, before the meeting, 21 you'd have your handouts and your workbooks. So 22 there is workbooks that have been produced from 23 those meetings with Cartwright King. 24 I'm not entirely sure -- so we'd have those 25 meetings would be purely for the investigators. 122 1 At least once a year we'd have a big team 2 meeting with the whole of John Scott's Security 3 team so that were probably 50-odd people. I'm 4 not sure if there's any agendas, you know, from 5 those type of meetings and then we had our 6 individual team meetings so there were the North 7 team, South team, Midlands team, so we would 8 have a North team meeting with our own team 9 leader and I don't know if any agendas from that 10 would be available. 11 But certainly from the meetings with 12 Cartwright King, which were generally held at 13 their offices in Birmingham, they would produce 14 a work booklet for everything that is covered 15 off. 16 Q. These meetings where the message from the 17 business came out, how many people attended 18 those meetings? 19 A. Again, the small team meeting would be -- so in 20 the North team, probably seven investigators and 21 the team leader. If it was across the whole 22 security operations with Cartwright King, three 23 teams of seven, so 21 people. If it's a big 24 security meeting and all John Scott's area, 25 there would be 50 people plus at those meetings. 123 1 MR JACOBS: Okay, well, thank you. I'm just going 2 to ask if there's anything else I need to ask 3 you. 4 I don't have any questions for you. Thank 5 you very much. 6 Questioned by SIR WYN WILLIAMS 7 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Mr Wise, just one more from me, 8 please. By the time you became part of the 9 Security team, I think your evidence is that you 10 then knew that there was a group of 11 subpostmasters who were suggesting that the 12 losses weren't caused by anything they had done 13 or their staff but was actually caused by 14 Horizon? 15 A. Yes, that's correct, yes. 16 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: I take it from your evidence 17 that, from time to time between 2011 and 2015, 18 you were part of what I will call the interview 19 team, either perhaps as lead investigator or 20 second investigator, who interviewed some 21 postmasters under caution? 22 A. Correct. 23 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Right. First of all, have you 24 got any kind of memory as to the approximate 25 number of interviews under caution you 124 1 conducted? I don't want you to be precise but 2 just some kind of feel for it. 3 A. So my time from 2011 to 2013 -- and I use '13 4 because that's the point at which the 5 prosecutions stopped -- I believe I had five 6 cases that led to prosecution. There was 7 probably five or six more that didn't. So 8 possibly ten cases where I was lead 9 investigator. 10 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: First of all, in any of those 11 cases, so far as you can remember, did the 12 person who you were interviewing raise as 13 a potential explanation for an apparent loss 14 a defect in Horizon? 15 A. I can remember one particular case and it wasn't 16 one that was prosecuted. It didn't go any 17 further for various reasons but she had issues 18 with the communication of her Horizon system. 19 I don't think in her area they had ASDL, which 20 was the broadband line. So the branch was run 21 on what we call VSAT, which were a satellite 22 link to the network, and that made communication 23 quite slow, particularly for banking 24 transactions. 25 So if a customer came in to do a withdrawal 125 1 out of their card account, it would be a few 2 seconds of the egg timer going round looking at 3 the screen while the Horizon System communicated 4 with the banking engine and back to authorise 5 the withdrawal. 6 So that particular person, you know, raised 7 that and believed that that was potentially 8 a cause of her losses. I went to the branch and 9 spoke to the staff and I actually witnessed what 10 was happening, which was communication, you 11 know, and a delay in the banking transactions 12 and, although I don't think it was a bug that 13 caused the losses, there was potential that 14 could cause a small loss if, for example, 15 a customer was withdrawing £200 and the clerk 16 paid out the £200 but, because of the delay in 17 communication, albeit only seconds, if the 18 banking engine does not approve the transaction, 19 it could be declined and the clerk's paid out 20 money. 21 So my thoughts were that there were 22 potential that mistakes could be made because of 23 the delay but I didn't believe that it -- the 24 delay in communications would cause the losses 25 that were at the branch. But that's the only 126 1 case that comes to mind where they raised issues 2 with Horizon. 3 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: All right. Thank you for that. 4 My last question or last follow-up question, 5 then, is this: what instructions were you given, 6 if any, from your superiors in the Security team 7 about how, if at all, you should investigate 8 further if a person in interview under caution 9 raised what I'll call a software issue about 10 Horizon? What did they tell you to do if that 11 happened? 12 A. We were told to ask specific questions around 13 the issue. We were told to gather further 14 information, as I said, around what training 15 they'd received. I think there were three 16 points to cover, I can't quite remember them 17 all. 18 Part of the process, what we could do is to 19 ask Fujitsu, as part of the ARQ requests, 20 whether they -- there's any issues at that 21 branch over that time period and, when the data 22 comes back, we would ask them to support that 23 with a witness statement, which they would say 24 whether there were any issues at the branch or 25 not. 127 1 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Was that instruction, if that's 2 the correct word, as to what you should do in 3 written form or was that just discussed with 4 your superiors, or what? 5 A. I think the instructions around the questions to 6 cover off were quite probably in written form, 7 and issued as an instruction, either in email 8 context or in an actual document, you know, as 9 part of the process. 10 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: All right. Well, thank you very 11 much for your help, Mr Wise. I'm very grateful 12 to you. Thank you for making your witness 13 statement and thank you for answering a good 14 many questions today. 15 MS PRICE: Sir, I believe there is, in fact, one 16 question on behalf of -- well, Mr Moloney has 17 one question, I think. 18 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: All right, sorry. I was jumping 19 the gun. 20 MR MOLONEY: Not at all, sir. I don't know if you 21 can -- yes, my microphone is on now. It arises 22 from your questions, sir, and it may be that it 23 will assist Mr Wise with his recollection in 24 respect of questions you asked, sir. 25 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Certainly. 128 1 Questioned by MR MOLONEY 2 MR MOLONEY: Thank you, sir. 3 Do you remember your involvement in the 4 investigation of Elena Herd? 5 A. Yes, I do. 6 Q. She worked as an assistant at Stockport Crown 7 Office -- 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. -- and her conviction was in 2011? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. You started in Security in 2011 and you 12 eventually interviewed her on 7 July 2011? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. She pleaded guilty to one count of fraud by 15 abuse of position on 5 October 2011? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. Then she was sentenced on 11 November to four 18 months imprisonment, suspended for two years, 19 with a requirement to carry out 200 hours of 20 unpaid work? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. Her conviction was quashed following a hearing 23 on 27 October 2022 when Post Office formally 24 conceded the appeal and accepted that the 25 reliability of Horizon data was and is essential 129 1 to her prosecution and conviction? 2 A. I understand that's the case. I wasn't aware 3 until recently but, yeah, I do understand that. 4 Q. Now, the reasons for not opposing the appeal 5 were that, although Ms Herd admitted in 6 interview to falsifying records relating to 7 postage labels -- do you remember she said that? 8 A. Yeah. 9 Q. She had explained at the time that she was only 10 doing it to conceal unexplained shortfalls? 11 A. Correct, yes. 12 Q. So that pointed to an Horizon issue, didn't it, 13 of unexplained shortfalls? 14 A. Not necessarily, no. 15 Q. Could it possibly have pointed to a Horizon 16 issue of unexplained shortfalls? 17 A. Potentially. I don't believe it did, but 18 potentially, yes. 19 Q. Yes, well, she was raising unexplained 20 shortfalls? 21 A. Yeah, she also, in interview admitted to giving 22 customers £200 too much. She admitted to having 23 £1,000 loss because of a mistake she made and, 24 when we went through the interview and worked 25 backwards, we proved at every step that she 130 1 wasn't entirely truthful with us. So I didn't 2 believe that what she was saying was truthful. 3 She was a clerk of 10-years' experience, who had 4 already approached the line manager because of 5 a loss, so I think it was not reasonable -- or 6 it was reasonable to assume that she would have 7 approached the line manager for unexplained 8 losses, instead of covering them up and 9 committing fraud to cover them up. 10 Q. Well, again, she -- what Post Office said was 11 that there was no independent evidence of actual 12 shortfalls in the accounts and it seems that 13 there was no investigation of how such losses 14 occurred? 15 A. I think what you've said is the point. There's 16 no evidence of losses in the account because she 17 was covering them up. She wasn't declaring 18 losses, so if there's no loss there to look at, 19 it's difficult to pinpoint what's happened and 20 I think one of the questions that was put to 21 her, because she did it in various stock units 22 and one of them were the Bureau de Change stock 23 unit, which was a stock unit shared by a lot of 24 team members, it's not specific only to her, and 25 when asked why you would do it in that stock 131 1 unit I think her reply was "Well, I think I were 2 balancing it, so I think there might have been 3 a loss in there". 4 So just from my experience of many years 5 working in the Crown and working with Crown 6 staff, for me, it didn't stand up to what 7 I thought a reasonable clerk -- and she had 8 proven herself to be that by raising issues in 9 the past with her line manager, so I -- my 10 thoughts were that it wasn't correct what 11 she's -- it weren't true what she was saying. 12 Q. Yeah, and you made that very clear to her, you 13 and Mr Bradshaw, didn't you? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. She was raising issues about unexplained 16 shortfalls because she was inflating the value 17 of postage labels as she maintained all the way 18 through to cover shortfalls that she couldn't 19 explain and she made that clear in the 20 interview, didn't she? 21 A. She did. She made it clear that the shortfalls 22 had been snowballing for the last few weeks. So 23 we worked backwards for the last few weeks. In 24 fact, we worked backwards for seven months, so 25 it just undermined everything she was saying. 132 1 You know, we used the data, we used the reports 2 from the branch to work backwards. 3 Q. You used Credence? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. Didn't get any ARQ? 6 A. No. 7 Q. You used Credence and you, essentially, worked 8 on the basis that she was guilty. I'll take you 9 to, if I may, just what you said to Ms Herd 10 during the course of interview. This is you and 11 Mr Bradshaw and the document is POL00011147, 12 please. If we could go to page 8 of this 13 document. 14 So when Elena Herd has been saying that 15 she'd been inflating the value of postage labels 16 to cover up shortfalls that had been occurring, 17 Mr Bradshaw said to her: 18 "You see I think you're just lying to us 19 Elena I think you're just, whatever you're 20 saying you're just saying anything that comes 21 into your mind and you're not answering the 22 questions and you think that just by giving us 23 any little old answer we'll just say fine. 24 Unfortunately what Andrew's shown you needs 25 an explanation and you know just to remind you 133 1 of the caution you know if the matter does go to 2 a Court and you give a different explanation 3 they're going to wonder why you didn't tell us 4 the truth at the beginning. So would you like 5 to tell us the truth now why you rejected these 6 labels and used them [and that's exactly what 7 she's saying] 'cos I don't believe for one 8 minute and I'm certain Andrew doesn't believe 9 for one minute that you were having a daily loss 10 of £60 so you just thought, well I'll reject 11 a few labels and leave the money. I don't 12 believe that, Andrew doesn't believe that so 13 would you like to tell us the truth now?" 14 She said, "That's the truth." 15 Then, so far as that is concerned, Mr Wise, 16 do you think that was -- you've spoken about 17 things being "harsh" in earlier days, do you 18 think that might have been harsh in any way? 19 A. An interview under caution isn't a pleasant 20 experience and we have to ask difficult 21 questions and the answers Elena were giving 22 didn't make any sense. We were proving her 23 wrong, we were undermining what explanation she 24 were giving, so I believe there Steve was 25 pushing for that explanation. 134 1 She maintained throughout that that was the 2 truth and what she was doing, just to explain, 3 because I think you've described it a little bit 4 wrong there, she were rejecting postage labels, 5 so when a customer comes into post a Special 6 Delivery letter and you put the label on the 7 item it comes up and says "Did the label print 8 correctly", and she said "No", so that rejects 9 the label but she's got a genuine label to do 10 that and then she were inflating -- she was 11 telling the system that she were paying with 12 postage stamps that she were sticking stamps on 13 and then reversing that out at the end of the 14 day. So -- 15 Q. And always to cover up shortfalls. Were you 16 dismissive of her there because you said, you 17 weren't to be dismissive when but simply to work 18 around what the training was, and so on. Were 19 you dismissive of her there, Mr Wise, in any 20 way? 21 A. I don't think so because we'd looked at what her 22 discrepancies were. We'd looked whether she 23 were having losses and there were no losses to 24 be seen. In the Crown Offices they have 25 a procedure called the losses and gains policy 135 1 to manage staff and allow them, you know, to 2 balance and that's quite a lengthy procedure. 3 You have to have a lot of losses to kick 4 that procedure off. So there was no reason that 5 Elena wouldn't raise that with her manager, you 6 know. She didn't have to put the money in like 7 subpostmasters did. Subpostmasters were forced 8 to make good the loss but Elena worked in 9 a Crown branch and she didn't have to do that. 10 So it was quite reasonable to expect her to have 11 approached the manager, as she had proven she 12 did in the past with a £1,000 loss. 13 So I wouldn't say dismissive; I would say we 14 pushed her on it and we didn't -- we wasn't 15 convinced by her explanation. We'd looked at 16 the history of losses and they just weren't 17 there. 18 Q. Of course, that was based on going to her 19 manager but it goes on, if we go on two pages, 20 please, to page 10 of this and we see there you 21 talking about the Bureau, which you've already 22 told us about, and Ms Herd said, "No, that has 23 got nothing to do with Bureau". 24 Then your comment, second comment down: 25 "But you're recollecting labels in the 136 1 Bureau stock unit. If your loss was in EE why 2 are you rejecting labels in the Bureau stock 3 unit? You see what's happening here Elena 4 you're telling us one thing and we're going back 5 and disproving that so in effect you're lying to 6 us, you're telling us one story we're moving on 7 disproving that and you're lying again and 8 again. All this is doing is picking holes in 9 your little story that you're telling us. Did 10 you take the money out of Bureau de Change stock 11 ... for these rejected labels? 12 "No. 13 "Why are you rejecting labels in the Bureau 14 de Change stock unit if your loss is in EE? 15 "'Cos Bureau had a loss. Bureau always has 16 a loss I was supposed to balance it that week 17 probably." 18 Now, you were raising shortfalls. You 19 didn't do any ARQ checks, you just relied on her 20 admissions to inflating the labels and you 21 called her a liar during the course of this 22 interview, dismissing her shortfalls 23 explanation, didn't you, Mr Wise? 24 A. We explored the shortfalls explanation but we 25 didn't believe that. 137 1 Q. No, because she didn't go to her manager to tell 2 you about it but you didn't do any ARQ 3 investigations and you did no investigations 4 beyond what you put to her in interview? 5 A. We didn't do ARQ, correct, but we did do 6 investigations beyond what was in the interview. 7 Q. To do with Horizon data? 8 A. We looked at the Credence data -- 9 Q. Credence data? 10 A. -- we looked at the transactions that were put 11 through but, if you can't identify a loss, 12 there's nothing to -- you can't identify 13 something that's not there, if there's no loss 14 there, you can't look at that and the 15 circumstances around that loss because what she 16 was saying is she was hiding and covering up the 17 losses. So unless she declares a loss and then 18 later makes it good, there would be no footprint 19 in the data, whether it's Credence data or 20 whether that's ARQ data. 21 Q. But you rejected Ms Herd's explanation without 22 going into the further data that was possible 23 and available to you, didn't you? 24 A. Yeah, we didn't proceed to get ARQ data. 25 Q. No, and that encapsulated the approach of your 138 1 investigation team in this case, didn't it? 2 A. No, not necessarily, because we'd done a lot of 3 investigation work before we got to the point of 4 interview. You know, we'd not got the ARQ data 5 but we didn't deem that necessary because we had 6 the Credence data and we had the supporting 7 reports from the branch going back to the 8 previous December. 9 Q. It was essentially that it had to be the fault 10 of the suspect, barring an obvious explanation 11 or error, wasn't it? 12 A. Sorry, just explain -- 13 Q. What had happened must be the fault of the 14 suspect, barring an obvious explanation or 15 error? 16 A. The suspect committed fraud. Whether that were 17 to cover up a loss, now I -- there could well 18 have been a loss there, I don't think it's 19 a loss that would be generated by Horizon. 20 She'd admitted to making mistakes. So, even if 21 she is making mistakes by giving a pensioner 22 £200 too much, by processing an investment 23 account deposit by £1,000 too much, you know, 24 whatever the mistake is, if it is a mistake, 25 then she's committed a criminal offence to cover 139 1 that up. 2 So my view was and still is, because I've 3 not seen anything to disprove that, is that 4 Horizon didn't cause that loss. You know, we 5 can get the data, we can look at that and go 6 through the ARQ data. It's still available, so, 7 you know, we can find out from Fujitsu how bugs 8 manifest in the data because they've still not 9 told people like me, people who are currently 10 working on Tier 2 investigations within the 11 Branch Support Centre, they've not been told how 12 the bugs were manifesting in the data. 13 But that's -- you know, we're looking at 14 case studies into branches, let's get that data 15 and find out from Fujitsu how the bugs would 16 look, you know. 17 Q. So, even without looking at the data, you're 18 convinced that this couldn't be a Horizon case? 19 A. My opinion is, knowing what I know, not, but I'm 20 open to look at that now at this point in time, 21 and I know we didn't do it then but, at this 22 point in time, we can look at that data now and 23 see. You know, and that's the same for any case 24 that's 2007 onwards, ARQ data is still 25 available. We can still request that and we can 140 1 still look at data. 2 Q. A bit late now for Ms Herd who was convicted and 3 sentenced to a suspended sentence of 4 imprisonment though, Mr Wise? 5 A. It is late for the ARQ data, yeah, but my view 6 still stands. I've not seen anything to change 7 my view on that. But I'm welcome to, you know, 8 have a look at it to see if my view will change 9 with any of them, you know. I'm an analyst. 10 I base it on the data, you know. I can look at 11 that and give my opinion. But, you're right, we 12 didn't get it in 2011. We just based it on the 13 Credence data. 14 MR MOLONEY: Right. Thank you, Mr Wise. 15 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: That concludes the questioning, 16 Ms Price? 17 MS PRICE: Yes, sir, I understand so. 18 We are back tomorrow morning at 10.00 for 19 Stephen Dilley. 20 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, all right, then. 10.00 21 tomorrow morning. 22 (2.53 pm) 23 (The hearing adjourned until 10.00 am 24 the following day) 25 141 1 I N D E X 2 DAVLYN CUMBERLAND (sworn) .....................1 3 4 Questioned by MR BLAKE ........................1 5 6 Questioned by SIR WYN WILLIAMS ...............33 7 8 Questioned by MS PAGE .......................33 9 10 ANDREW WISE (sworn) ..........................38 11 12 Questioned by MS PRICE .......................38 13 14 Questioned by MS PAGE .......................114 15 16 Questioned by MR JACOBS .....................117 17 18 Questioned by SIR WYN WILLIAMS ..............124 19 20 Questioned by MR MOLONEY ....................129 21 22 23 24 25 142