Attendees:
Fujitsu: James Davidson, Mark Gordon, Graham Welsh, Stephen Long
Post Office: Dave Hulbert, Andrew Jacques, Kevin Lenihan

Background

The following notes and actions were recorded as a response to the major incident on Wednesday 1st February. A review meeting with Mike Young Long preceded this meeting within which a number of challenges were issued.

The incident on 1st February: - Until approximately 11:15, the incident impacted Card Account across the entire estate and 1% of AP transactions at was caused by a reference data change which was successfully tested, but between the data being tested and it being enlivened, the Horizon produ due to Release 5.5.

In July 2011 a reference data change (unrelated) impacted the pin pads across all Post Office branches. Two other major service impacting incidents September & 12 December 2011.

Key challenges arising from the meeting with Mike, Lesley & Stephen

1	Ensure that testing is rigorous and robust	
2	Introduce business services checks prior to the start of each business day	
3	Improve the clarity of the incident communications between Fujitsu and Post Office service teams	
4	Hold off doing anymore reference data changes until corrective actions have been taken	
5	Reduce the volume of reference data changes	
6	Stop issuing reference data in advance so that it sits dormant for a period of time	

Actions			Update W/C 13-Feb	Update W/C 20-Feb	Update W/C 27-Feb
1	Determine which forthcoming reference data changes can be held back (short change freeze) and which can't	Kevin L	Current position - assessment undertaken and requirement for tabulation of the data types & impacts to be created	Fujitsu Update - Validation undertaken and no issues uncovered on the initail Snapshot. Subsequent validation check did uncover an issue similar to that experienced on the 1st Feb for Data that was to be enabled 1st April. Two code updates have been applied to live to correct the identified issue of System enablement time stamping (MDM - Seconds & RDDS - Days)	
2	Provide a brief summary of the 300 checks of reference data that currently take place every few hours	Graham / Kevin M	Is included in the Ref Data paper Ver 0.4 issued 9th Feb, section Data validation - Yellow man (A2, A11)	Closed	
3	Produce or review a set of reference data rules/protocols that we should be working to	Graham /Kevin M	Defined in approved - joint documentation. Request to challenge the current approach and review against best practice in Retail or Banking	Ongoing - focus has been applied to other identified actions this week.	
4	Change the test processes to ensure that any ref data changes in the live estate that haven't been enlivened are re-tested following an "R" release Or the test environment is set to how the live environment will be at the point of enlivenment	Graham & Pete T	Work in Progress - Summary to be issued. Plus snapshot of current Ref Data and Counter Release activity. Revist the roles / tasks of Verfication vs Regression Testing	RDT Rigs have been updated to refelct Live. The week bewteen LST Sign Off and release to Live has been re-inforced; plans updated to refelct this.	
5	Obtain additional POL testing resources (as outlined in Tonnvane's paper) to provide verification tests independent of the reference data team	Dave H	Testing Resources and Rigs - update to follow - Progressing (May relate to Pinpad July11)		
6	Conduct an independent review of the test environments	Pete T	Ongoing	No Update	
7	Propose reference data categories that could be used to bundle changes together	Kevin L	Links to 1 & 3		
8	Propose options for changing the ways in which reference data is sent to the live estate (eg Bundling)	Graham & Kevin L	Outcome of 3	Due to "Half Term" resouces limited limited progress achieved	
9	Propose a list of transactions that would represent a good sample to check C:\Users\welshg\Desktop\Regressio	Andy J	Combined list to be created based on the MO Regression Transactions (embedded) and "Key" Transaction types to be identified		
10	Establish what needs to be done to get the model office set up to perform daily checks (early am, 7 days a week) Include test materials, controls to remove test transactions, staffing etc	Andy J	In Progress -		
11	Determine what daily checks/routines could be automated and what information could be readily shared with the Post Office teams	Graham	This activity is progresssing with the initail approach focusing on a tactical position of validation of a RDT "Branch" being run 24hrs in advance of live.	ransactionsAssuranceTest-V0-2.pdf ReferenceDataReview0-5.pdf	
12	Make changes to the Fujitsu service bridge with a view to improved communications to Post Office	James / Mark G	Focus on Business Impact & clear communication thereof.		
13	Make changes to the Post Office input & attendance to the service bridge	Dave H	Ongoing with Dave		
14	Conduct a walkthrough scenario test of the joint incident management process	Mark & Andy	Target in 1 Mth for Walk Through		
15	Set up weekly meetings to review the progress against this action plan	James D	Friday 15:00 Proposed & completed	Closed	

POL 1 FEB MI Action Tracker

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1 Why was POCA impacted by an AP change
Because of the masking error in the AP tokens, POCA cards were being incorrectly associated to the highlands council acco

2 Why did a change that successfully exited testing still cause a service issue
It is now understood that the Monthly Refdata Token update was validated on pre 5.5 release enviroments. To ensure the Data is deployed to all counters prior to the enablement it has been usual practive to commence the delivery in advance of the go live date.

In this case the deployment of this Ref Data update commenced on the 26th Jan with an enablement date of the 1st Feb.

Live data centre migration to release 5.5 took place on 29th Jan. It is now acknowledged that the 5.5 Release introduced

3 Why did it take so long to determine the service impact i.e. confusion about whether other banks services were impacted and whether/which AP clients were affected
In our view the initial service impact to the POCA service was very quickly identified. The secondary impact to AP transactions is acknowledged to have taken longer to understand due to the nature of the incident, and the low volume of AP transactions impacted (<1%)

The nature of the error resulted in detailed analysis being required to identify the transactions affected and the associated Clients both at a detail and summary level.

We did communicate that we had reports that AP transactions were being impacted. At the time, this initially generated a similar level of confusion, given that the linkage between POCA & general AP transactions could not easliy be identified - as they should be different.

4 Why wasn't the communication process between IMT and POL Service Desk effective (my perception)
It is acknowledged that communications were not as effective as we would like, given your perception. We believed that we did follow the lessons previously identifed in the joint communications workshop, chaired by Gary Blackburn prior to his move to the NTP, and subsequent reviews held with Tony Jamasb.

In future the Service Bridge will be attended by Mark Gordon or in his absence either Peter Thompson or Graham Welsh will stand in.

5 What pre-start of day checks can be introduced, and what improvements in monitoring can be made to avoid us being told about issues by branches (e.g. yesterday again it was branches calling HSD that triggered action)   As a result or previous MI actions & processes had been put in place, however we are concerned that the process was not followed Point 2 Point
This is subject to several streams of thought / activity - the focus is split between Ref Data automated checks and what could be achieved via Counter tooling. Initial view is that Ref Data is the easier route and that Counter would require a more substantive investigation and validation study.

6 What can we do within Fujitsu and across our teams to better protect the live environment from service failures; particularly
Currently as outlined in separate documents we are evaluating tactical options to protect live service.

The nature of this incident and the link to Reference Data results in limitations as to how effective these will be, as the operational business needs of Post Office push the existing windows for updating the live environment, the result of which increases the element of risk.

The containment activity against the risk needs to be agreed jointly, and as such we would wish to propose a joint risk