1 Thursday, 28 September 2023 2 (10.00 am) 3 MR BLAKE: Good morning, sir. Can you see and hear 4 me? 5 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: I can. Thank you. 6 MR BLAKE: Thank you very much. This morning we're 7 going to hear from Mandy Talbot. 8 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes. 9 MANDY TALBOT (sworn) 10 Questioned by MR BLAKE 11 MR BLAKE: Thank you very much. Can you give your 12 full name, please? 13 A. Mrs Mandy Talbot. 14 Q. Mrs Talbot, you should have in front of you 15 a witness statement? 16 A. That's correct. 17 Q. That has your name on the front, dated 31 May 18 2023; is that correct? 19 A. Correct. 20 Q. Can I ask you to turn to the final substantive 21 page on that witness statement, that's page 36. 22 Is that your signature at the bottom of that 23 page? 24 A. It is. 25 Q. Thank you very much. Is that statement true to 1 1 the best of your knowledge and belief? 2 A. It is as, at the time. 3 Q. Thank you. I believe there are some small 4 changes that you would like to add now? 5 A. That is correct. 6 Q. Please do feel free to make those amendments 7 now. 8 A. If I may, I wish to make some additional 9 comments, having received 1,661 pages of further 10 disclosure that affects my original statement. 11 I'm now aware that I was updated on the case of 12 Wolstenholme in March 2004 by Mr Jim Cruise. 13 This was after Mr Coyne's initial review and his 14 comments upon the response from Fujitsu had been 15 received. As can be seen from the documentation 16 now disclosed to me, Mr Cruise had concerns 17 about the case and Mr Coyne's initial opinion 18 and response to Fujitsu. It was for that reason 19 that counsel was instructed by agents. 20 I've now also seen FUJ00121724, email to 21 Colin Lenton-Smith, and report on Cleveleys, 22 FUJ00080715, of Mr Holmes. I was very surprised 23 by the contents of the former and agree that, if 24 Fujitsu had been brought into the matter 25 earlier, it could have resulted in a possible 2 1 preservation of relevant data and a more 2 conducive engagement with Mr Coyne. 3 Paragraph 24 of my statement, refers to my 4 request to Bond Pearce not to issue cases 5 involving Horizon. It meant cases where 6 subpostmasters had alleged that the Horizon 7 System was at fault in response to an action to 8 recover debt. As now disclosed to me from 9 September 2005 at POL00107426, email to David 10 Smith of POL, I was seeking to set up 11 an appropriate system for compiling data and 12 investigating cases prior to the business 13 sending matters out to civil litigation agents. 14 Despite pressing, this was ultimately rejected 15 on the basis of cost. 16 Q. Thank you very much Mrs Talbot, that statement, 17 which is WITN08500100 will be published by the 18 Inquiry in due course. Those amendments have 19 been made because, as you've said, the witness 20 statement was taken some time ago now. 21 I will take you thematically through various 22 things and if any of those points jump out at 23 you at any relevant time then please do feel 24 free to say as well. 25 Thank you. You are here today because you 3 1 were lawyer at the Post Office. One thing that 2 isn't entirely clear from your witness statement 3 is whether you qualified as a solicitor and when 4 that was. Are you able to assist on that? 5 A. Ooh, I am qualified as a solicitor. I joined 6 the Post Office in 1990, I believe I qualified 7 about 18 months before that. I can't, after 8 this period of time, recall the precise date. 9 Q. You've said in your statement that you worked at 10 Cameron McKenna and Wilde Sapte? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Were those training as a solicitor or some other 13 role? 14 A. No, that was as a junior solicitor. I did my 15 training contract or articles, as it was then 16 referred to, at Douglas-Jones Mercer of Swansea, 17 a provincial firm. 18 Q. Thank you. You joined the Post Office in 1990 19 as a legal assistant; is that right? 20 A. Correct. 21 Q. You were in the Civil Litigation department? 22 A. Correct. 23 Q. During your time, it became Royal Mail Legal 24 Services as well? 25 A. Yes. 4 1 Q. I think you spent over 20 years in the 2 department; is that correct? 3 A. Correct. 4 Q. Briefly, can you tell us what kinds of cases 5 that you were involved in, working for the Post 6 Office, other than the kinds of cases that we're 7 going to be talking about today? 8 A. A whole range. Usually small County Court 9 matters under the Postal Services Act, 10 injunctions, giving training courses, issuing 11 proceedings on debt actions, but I'd also done 12 personal injury work, rent arrears cases. Also 13 used to assist the chairman's office if they 14 wanted information and Freedom of Information 15 action cases. 16 Q. In 2011, you became part of the regulation team 17 at the Royal Mail Group? 18 A. Correct. 19 Q. Was that something different? 20 A. Entirely. I no longer functioned as 21 a solicitor. I became -- within Legal Services 22 Department, I was somebody with legal knowledge 23 working for Royal Mail Group itself, in a team 24 set up to arrange for the flotation of Royal 25 Mail Group as a company. 5 1 Q. I think you took redundancy in 2014? 2 A. In the September, yes. 3 Q. Yes. Did you work elsewhere after that, or ...? 4 A. No, unfortunately for family reasons it was 5 necessary for me to help support my 6 father-in-law, my mother and, ultimately, other 7 relatives. 8 Q. Thank you. I want to begin by looking at the 9 structure of your team. During Mr Castleton's 10 case, you've been described, I think, as the 11 litigation team leader or, at one point, 12 principal lawyer. 13 A. Mm. 14 Q. Can you assist us with that role? 15 A. Prior to 2004, Legal Services had a large number 16 of in-house solicitors. In 2004, the then 17 solicitor, who was, in effect, the Head of Legal 18 Services, offered everybody and anybody who 19 wanted it redundancy on quite good terms. 20 I think, to the best of my recollection, 21 only four members of staff in the whole of Legal 22 Services were prevented from accepting the offer 23 of redundancy. There was no structure involved 24 at all and so teams were, in effect, decimated. 25 So that was 2004. 6 1 I had been a team leader in the Postal 2 Services team which, as the name suggests, dealt 3 primarily with matters pertaining to the Postal 4 Services Act, items lost in the post, County 5 Court actions, some debt action against parties 6 who had contracted with Royal Mail for postal 7 services. But, after 2004, in effect, although 8 I had the title, the number of people working 9 within Legal Services meant the title was 10 a nonentity. 11 Q. So you had general counsel, did you? 12 A. She was referred to, this is Catherine 13 Churchard, as "the" solicitor but, in effect, 14 performed the role of general counsel, though 15 I don't believe she ever had a permanent 16 position on the board. 17 Q. Underneath the general counsel, would it be 18 right to say you were the principal lawyer 19 dealing with civil matters? 20 A. No, that's not correct. There was the Head of 21 Civil Litigation and I was never the Head of 22 Civil Litigation. 23 Q. Who was that, sorry? 24 A. At the beginning, Mr Joe Ashton, Clare Wardle, 25 Biddy Wyles, Rebekah Mantle, so I was there for 7 1 a long time, and then when I was a team leader, 2 I was on a direct report to Joe Ashton but, 3 after that role disappeared, I was on a direct 4 report to Clare Wardle, Biddy Wyles, Rebekah 5 Mantle and they, in turn, would report upwards. 6 Q. So although described as the litigation team 7 leader or principal lawyer, it was, in fact, the 8 case that you weren't the leader at all? 9 A. No. 10 Q. Was there somebody in an equivalent position 11 dealing with criminal matters? 12 A. The -- equivalent to myself? There were -- 13 prior to the reduction in headcount, there were 14 many caseworkers like myself in the Criminal Law 15 Department, but the Head of Criminal Law was Rob 16 Wilson. 17 Q. Who would his equivalent have been in your team? 18 A. That would have been Joe Ashton, Clare Wardle, 19 Biddy Wyles and Rebekah Mantle. 20 Q. The impression that you've given is that those 21 who remained in the team after 2004 were few in 22 number and quite stretched; is that fair? 23 A. That is correct. 24 Q. Do you know why the redundancies were offered at 25 that stage? 8 1 A. To the best of my recollection, this is probably 2 my opinion, in 2004 there was a desire on the 3 part of the corporation to have a reduction in 4 headcount and I believe that is the reason for 5 the offer of mass redundancy. 6 Q. In respect of actions against subpostmasters, 7 whether they be criminal or civil, was there 8 anybody in the team that had an overview of the 9 work that was going on? 10 A. Neither in the -- not in Civil Litigation or -- 11 this just speculation -- or Prosecution team, 12 because prosecution was an entirely different 13 specialism. 14 Q. In the Civil Litigation Team, we're going to see 15 that you were involved in a number of actions 16 against subpostmasters. Did anyone have 17 oversight or a general view of all of those 18 cases? 19 A. No. 20 Q. In terms of Horizon, did you receive any 21 training on the system? 22 A. I received a one-hour training course very, very 23 early on with people trying to explain lots of 24 moving parts on a whiteboard, and that was it. 25 Q. Do you think that was a similar experience of 9 1 your colleagues within the team? 2 A. Within Civil Litigation, yes. I can't speak as 3 to any of the other teams. 4 Q. I want to talk about your knowledge of bugs, 5 errors and defects in the system. You've said 6 this morning you've been receiving a number of 7 different documents before today. But apart 8 from the corrections that you made this morning, 9 are you content with the words that are in your 10 witness statement? 11 A. Generally, yes. 12 Q. Did you give consideration to terms that were 13 used? For example, you have described, in 14 respect of the Horizon System, that it was 15 "infallible". Is that something that you were 16 told? 17 A. Possibly not the word "infallible" but I was 18 given the distinct impression that it was 19 a perfect system and that any minor bug or 20 glitch was quickly identified, its footprint 21 made plain and that these were things that 22 Fujitsu would search for if we ever asked them 23 for information as to the running of 24 a particular branch. 25 Q. "Infallible" is quite a strong word? 10 1 A. It is. 2 Q. Were you given such a strong assurance and who 3 by? 4 A. I cannot put a name but I got the distinct 5 impression that this was a system of which 6 Fujitsu were incredibly proud and, as I say, 7 anecdotally in my statement, there was 8 a suggestion that they were so proud that there 9 was a desire to sell it to other organisations. 10 Q. You said you got the impression. Where did that 11 impression come from? 12 A. Numerous dealings with Fujitsu over the years. 13 Q. Who, in particular, did you deal with at 14 Fujitsu? 15 A. Usually, when I dealt with Fujitsu, it would be 16 in respect of a particular piece of litigation 17 or case but, also, as you can see from the 18 correspondence, they were copied in to numerous 19 matters that I was dealing with, both with 20 themselves and POL. 21 Q. Who in particular do you think gave you the 22 impression that the system was "infallible"? 23 A. I would be lying if I tried to put a name to it 24 after this period of time. I'm very sorry. 25 Q. Can I take you to your witness statement, that's 11 1 WITN08500100, please. It's page 27 of that 2 statement. It's paragraph 62. Thank you. 3 You say there, at the bottom of the page: 4 "Looking back, I obviously have concerns 5 about the cases I was involved in knowing now 6 that there were problems with the Horizon System 7 but that is with hindsight and the knowledge 8 that has come into the public domain. At the 9 time when Civil Litigation was instructed to 10 obtain repayment of money by POL via legal 11 agents, we genuinely believed the position 12 adopted by Fujitsu." 13 Can you tell us when it is that you have 14 obtained -- you say "with hindsight", with the 15 information from the public domain, since -- 16 since when did you know that it was not 17 infallible. 18 A. The case of Bates, and the increasing amount of 19 publicity about the Horizon System in the press. 20 Q. Do you really think that it was not until Bates 21 that you didn't have sufficient information to 22 cast serious doubts on the reliability of the 23 Horizon System? 24 A. I left Civil Litigation in January 2011 to go 25 into a very different world, a very labour 12 1 intensive job. I didn't really think anything 2 about Horizon, from the time I entered Royal 3 Mail Group as a non-lawyer to the time of the 4 eventual class action. 5 Q. During the years that you were working in Civil 6 Litigation though -- 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 7 2008, 2009, 2010 -- did you not feel you had 8 enough information to cast doubt on the 9 reliability of the Horizon System? 10 A. I really, really didn't. In 2010, looking at 11 the additional documentation that's been 12 supplied, I believe -- and this is just my 13 opinion -- that concerns were maybe arising 14 within POL itself but, you know, even through to 15 the summer of 2010 with the Rod Ismay report -- 16 and I know there has been serious criticism of 17 that -- we were still being assured that the 18 system was robust and fit for purpose. 19 Q. Who by? 20 A. Well, there were -- there was Mr Rod Ismay 21 himself and the other senior partners to which 22 his report were copied to. 23 Q. Okay, we'll get to that report in due course but 24 is it your evidence then that, internally within 25 the Post Office, you were being convinced that 13 1 the Horizon System was robust? 2 A. I can only speak as to the situation within 3 Civil Litigation. I cannot speak as to the 4 actual position in Post Office Limited at the 5 time. 6 Q. But you spoke earlier of being reassured by 7 Fujitsu and now you've mentioned Mr Ismay. So 8 was it from outside and also within that you 9 were being reassured about the robustness of 10 Horizon? 11 A. From within Post Office Limited and Fujitsu. 12 Yes. 13 Q. I want to begin with the Cleveleys case that we 14 looked at before the summer break. Can we look 15 at POL00118236, please. We're here in March 16 2004. Could we scroll down, please. There's 17 an email from Jim Cruise to you. Can you tell 18 us who Jim Cruise was, please? 19 A. He was a member of my team. Formerly, he had 20 been a member of the Prosecution team and, very 21 unusually, a number of years earlier, he had 22 transferred from that specialism over into Civil 23 Litigation. 24 Q. He is there summarising the case of 25 Mrs Wolstenholme. He says that it started back 14 1 on 17 January 2001. He says there in the first 2 paragraph: 3 "At that time the losses were £14,000 and 4 the [subpostmistress] was refusing to make them 5 good blaming the losses on the Horizon System 6 which had been introduced in February 2000 at 7 her office." 8 If we look at the third paragraph, the final 9 sentence there, it says: 10 "[Mrs Wolstenholme] asked for proof that the 11 losses were her fault and caused by computer 12 failure. She also asked for copies of all error 13 notices but Chesterfield said that these were 14 not available." 15 Can we go over the page, please. The second 16 line there says: 17 "The CC [that's the counterclaim] is that 18 the contract was wrongly terminated; the 19 computer system was unfit for its purpose and 20 throws in the Human Rights Act", and other 21 regulations as part of the counterclaim. 22 If we go down to the fourth paragraph he 23 summarises there at the end of that paragraph, 24 he says: 25 "She declined to settle saying the losses 15 1 were not accepted as her fault but let [the Post 2 Office] remove all the equipment other than the 3 computer equipment." 4 The next paragraph, if we could scroll down 5 slightly, thank you very much, says: 6 "Since then ..." 7 So this about an offer to settle: 8 "... the report of the computer expert, Best 9 Practice [Limited], based on the available call 10 logs has been received and as you are all aware 11 is unfavourable and unflattering to Fujitsu if 12 not actually hostile. In light of the report, 13 which cannot really be challenged, I do not 14 think that POL will be able to prove, even on 15 the balance of probabilities that the losses 16 were the fault of the [subpostmistress] and our 17 agents are still concerned about the lack of 18 evidence for the losses." 19 Next paragraph, he says the advice that he 20 is going to give the Post Office, he says, about 21 halfway down that final paragraph: 22 "I intend therefore to advise that [the Post 23 Office] should pay [Mrs Wolstenholme] or pay 24 into court the figure of 3 months' remuneration 25 plus interest on the basis that although it is 16 1 unlikely that POL can now prove the losses were 2 her fault alone, as per the contract for 3 services, [the Post Office] can give 3 months' 4 notice without giving reasons and this is all 5 she will be able to obtain by way of damages in 6 any event if she takes the matter to trial." 7 So you were aware, in March 2004, that there 8 was this case against Mrs Wolstenholme and that 9 it was her case that the Horizon System was at 10 fault; is that right? 11 A. Yes, correct. 12 Q. And also that there was an expert report that 13 was unfavourable to the Post Office? 14 A. Correct. 15 Q. Why is Mr Cruise updating you in this email? Is 16 this your first involvement in that case? 17 A. I believe it was my first involvement and it 18 would have been part of Jim's preparation for 19 leaving Legal Services via the mass redundancy. 20 Q. So is he passing the case on to you? 21 A. The case was actually out with Weightmans who 22 were one of the firms of external agents. In 23 effect, he was passing on to me the in-house 24 role in respect of the case. 25 Q. That somewhat minimises the role of the Post 17 1 Office, though, because you are instructing 2 Weightmans, aren't you? 3 A. At that time, because of the mass redundancy, 4 Post Office Limited were entitled to take 5 matters directly out to our external legal 6 agents, without referring the matter to in-house 7 solicitors. This case, I believe, might be 8 slightly different in that, I believe, from 9 the -- from this document that Jim himself had 10 issued proceedings for the return of Post Office 11 Limited property at her branch and it was only 12 thereafter that it was referred out to 13 Weightmans, our agents. 14 Q. Trying to understand how things would operate in 15 the generality of cases, are you saying, then, 16 that the external law firms had significant 17 discretion as to how they carried out their 18 practice and were not instructed? 19 A. There was this massive redundancy, followed by 20 quite a lot of work that wasn't conducted by 21 myself, setting up agreements with a network of 22 external agents, under which Post Office Limited 23 could give instructions directly to external 24 agents and, insofar as we within civil 25 litigation were usually involved, it was 18 1 a matter of keeping an eye on the costs and, if 2 anything unusual or untoward occurred, we would 3 then try and assist the external agents to the 4 best of our ability to achieve a successful 5 resolution for POL. 6 Q. Is it, therefore, your evidence that you weren't 7 in some way directing the actions of the law 8 firm, with regards to, for example, settlement. 9 A. Until such time as this email, I would have had 10 no involvement in this case whatsoever. 11 Thereafter, given the concerns expressed, 12 I probably would have endorsed their decision to 13 go to external counsel. 14 Q. Can we look at the actual report from Best 15 Practice Group, that's Mr Coyne's report. It is 16 WITN09020115. It's a report that's well known 17 to the Inquiry. We've heard from Mr Coyne. If 18 we look at page 2, please. He says: 19 "I have been contacted by Weightman Vizards 20 a law firm representing 'Post Office Counters 21 Limited' and Mrs Julie Wolstenholme, 22 an individual ..." 23 Were you aware that Mr Coyne had been 24 instructed jointly both by the Post Office and 25 Mrs Wolstenholme? 19 1 A. Not at the time of the email that we previously 2 looked at. Not at the time I made my original 3 statement but, with the additional disclosure, 4 I am now aware. 5 Q. Were you aware at the time? I mean, this report 6 is January 2004. Presumably, you would have 7 received this report? 8 A. Personally, no, not until such time as 9 I received the email communication from Jim 10 Cruise. Then I would have been made aware of 11 this report. 12 Q. So on receiving his email of the 17 March 2004, 13 did you then read the expert report? 14 A. I did. 15 Q. You did. Were you, therefore, aware that it was 16 a jointly-appointed expert report? 17 A. At that time, I would have been, yes. 18 Q. Were you aware of what that meant in respect of 19 the importance of it, in respect of the fairness 20 of it? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. What did you understand by the importance of it 23 and the fairness of it? 24 A. That the report or initial observations, as he 25 actually terms it, would have been created for 20 1 the assistance and benefit of the court. 2 Q. Can we scroll down the page, please. I'll just 3 highlight some parts of this report. We've 4 already looked at them. This is where Mr Coyne 5 refers to the statement from Ms Elaine Tagg, the 6 Retail Network Manager, and it's a section from 7 her witness statement in those proceedings, 8 where she said: 9 "Mrs Wolstenholme persisted in telephoning 10 the Horizon System Helpdesk in relation to any 11 problems which she had with the system 12 generally, these problems related to the use and 13 general operation of the system and were not 14 technical problems relating to the system." 15 Mr Coyne then says: 16 "This, in my opinion is not a true 17 representation on the evidence that I have had 18 access to. Of the 90 or so fault logs that 19 I have reviewed, 63 of these are without doubt 20 system related failures. Only 13 could be 21 considered as Mrs Wolstenholme calling the wrong 22 support helpdesk requesting answers to 'How do 23 I ...?' type training questions." 24 He says: 25 "The majority of the systems issues were 21 1 screen locks, freezes, and blue screen errors 2 which are clearly not a fault of 3 Mrs Wolstenholme's making, but most probably due 4 to faulty computer hardware software, interfaces 5 or power. In fact, on a detailed view of call 6 11021413, dated 2 November 2000, Ms Tagg may 7 have witnessed firsthand the style of system 8 problems that Mrs Wolstenholme experienced in 9 her operation of the system. The fault log 10 notes that: 'Elaine reports that one of the 11 counters has a blue screen with the message [and 12 it gives the message]' and was advised by the 13 operator to 'reboot'." 14 Could we go over the page, please. He then 15 gives his opinion. He refers, for example, to 16 system freezing: 17 "'System freeing' which is most probably due 18 to either the hardware or interfaces crashing; 19 or alternatively fully saturated communication 20 lines." 21 If we scroll down to the final three 22 paragraphs on that page, he says: 23 "It is interesting and certainly warrants 24 further examination that in November 2000 the 25 'system freeing' is reported again with the 22 1 support operator stating: 'They all freeze, but 2 if it gets bad give us a call and we will 3 investigate'. 4 "From 31 October ... there seems to be 5 a number of logs which talk of 'large 6 discrepancies' in stock figures, trial balances 7 with 'all sorts of figures showing minus 8 figures' ..." 9 He references a call log and he says: 10 "... there is a comment noted by the support 11 operative that '[the postmistress] advised that 12 this is an intermittent problem occurring since 13 the counters were upgraded ...' Although the 14 documents do not list an upgrade taking place, 15 it does seem that these 'large' reported 16 discrepancies occur very frequently and shortly 17 after the noted upgrade." 18 If we go over the page, please, he then 19 summarises his opinion and he says: 20 "From a computer system installation 21 perspective it is my opinion that the technology 22 installed at the Cleveleys sub post office was 23 clearly defective in the elements of its 24 hardware, software or interfaces." 25 "Clearly defective" is quite a strong term, 23 1 isn't it? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. Did that not surprise you at the time? 4 A. Mr Coyne had created this report, or so 5 I believe, on the basis of a review of the 6 pleadings and the HSH logs. Subsequent to this 7 document being received, Fujitsu then took the 8 opportunity to comment upon the same. 9 I believe, though I haven't been shown a copy, 10 but Mr Coyne then commented upon their opinion 11 and, ultimately, Fujitsu wrote to Legal 12 Services, again disputing the conclusions 13 reached by Mr Coyne, but being open to inviting 14 him to come and visit engineers and their 15 facilities, to take him through the Horizon 16 System. 17 Q. You, at this stage, a qualified solicitor, who 18 had been practising for some time, you receive 19 an independent expert's report, jointly 20 appointed, that says that the technology 21 installed was clearly defective. Did that not 22 cause you to pause a little on your view of the 23 robustness of the Horizon System? 24 A. It was expressed to be an initial report, and 25 I took the view that Fujitsu being so open to 24 1 inviting him in to discuss the matters further 2 was further evidence of their conviction of the 3 robustness of their system. 4 Q. It didn't cause you to be worried in any way 5 about the impact that this might have? 6 A. I was advised by Fujitsu that the system in 2004 7 was very different to the system in 2000, under 8 which -- the 2000 system -- data was disposed 9 of, I believe, after a period of 18 months. The 10 system in 2004, I was assured was much more 11 robust. 12 Q. Who told you that? 13 A. That would have been the people I was speaking 14 to in Fujitsu. 15 Q. Can you please give their names? 16 A. Oh. After this period of time, I'm sorry, 17 I can't. 18 Q. Okay, well, perhaps over the lunch break you can 19 look at the papers you've been given and you 20 might -- 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. -- recall more. But, in respect of say, the 23 period, then, 2000 to 2004, were you not worried 24 about the impact that this opinion may have had? 25 A. No, because I was assured it was on a unique set 25 1 of facts that had occurred in 2000 and, in 2004, 2 it simply couldn't happen. 3 Q. So you weren't at all worried, no? 4 A. No. 5 Q. Well, can we look at FUJ00121637, please. This 6 is an email from Jan Holmes of Fujitsu to Colin 7 Lenton-Smith, and he says: 8 "Jim Cruise has taken early retirement so 9 I ended up speaking to Mandy Talbot, who was his 10 boss." 11 Now, you're described there as Jim Cruise's 12 boss; is that right? 13 A. Correct. 14 Q. That's correct. 15 "The [postmistress] rejected the offer that 16 was made to her some time ago and a trial date 17 has been set ... [The Post Office] are still 18 taking advice as to how best to deal with this 19 and Mandy's view/belief was that the safest way 20 to manage this is to throw money at it and get 21 a confidentiality agreement signed. She is not 22 happy with the 'Experts' report as she considers 23 it to be not well balanced and wants, if 24 possible, to keep it out of the public domain. 25 This is unlikely to happen if it goes to court. 26 1 "She was talking about taking the option to 2 admit the report and concede the contents are 3 an accurate reflection of what happened (the 4 [Horizon System Helpdesk] transcripts are 5 an accurate reflection of what happened it's 6 just the 'Expert' opinion is the problem). The 7 liability question is removed and it's then just 8 about 'how much to go away and keep your mouth 9 shut'." 10 Now, Stephen Dilley's evidence to this 11 Inquiry is that you speak in a way that is 12 "eminently quotable", was his words. Now, are 13 your words that are quoted there, "how much to 14 go away and keep your mouth shut"? 15 A. It's a minute created -- sorry, it's 16 a communication created by Jan Holmes. It 17 really doesn't sound like me. Possibly, I am 18 "eminently quotable" but I really don't think 19 I'd have expressed myself in those terms. 20 Q. Why would that be the best approach if you 21 weren't at all worried about the report from 22 Mr Coyne? 23 A. We had a situation with the original 24 documentation in Castleton -- I'm sorry, the 25 original documentation with Mrs Wolstenholme was 27 1 relating back to 2000. The original 2 documentation, plus the original records on the 3 Horizon System, were no longer available. All 4 that was left was the HSH logs. 5 We had members of Fujitsu who were happy to 6 create witness statements to go to court to 7 adduce to the effective working of the system, 8 but we did also have a jointly-appointed expert, 9 albeit creating only a preliminary view. 10 I took the view that, if the matter went to 11 court, it was unlikely that the evidence of 12 Fujitsu would be persuasive. As such, the 13 effective way of dealing with such a litigation 14 is try to resolve it by making an economic 15 settlement. 16 Q. That all sounds very reasonable, Mrs Talbot, if 17 I may say. But why confidentiality agreement? 18 Why "keep your mouth shut"? Why would you want 19 to hide what had happened in this case? 20 A. I had absolutely no desire to hide what had 21 happened in this case. If the matter was 22 settled, there would be no need for the expert's 23 report to be disclosed in court. If the matter 24 were not capable of being settled, then it would 25 have been disclosed in court. 28 1 Q. It was an unhelpful statement. You are 2 describing here to Mr Holmes that you would like 3 Mrs Wolstenholme to sign a confidentiality 4 agreement and the words there, whether they're 5 exactly the phrase you used or not, are 6 effectively to silence her. If this was simply 7 a matter of not having the right documentation 8 to prove the case, why would that have been 9 necessary? 10 A. The settlement negotiations, I believe, were 11 dealt with by Weightmans. I'm not certain how 12 much more involvement I had in this matter after 13 this time. 14 Q. So you did not mind if publicity were shined 15 upon this case? 16 A. No. I mean -- 17 Q. Nothing to hide? 18 A. In effect, if it had gone into court, at that 19 time, then it might well have had an impact upon 20 POL and its relationship with Fujitsu but so be 21 it. 22 Q. Absolutely nothing to hide? 23 A. No. 24 Q. Didn't want to hide it from the public view? 25 A. No. 29 1 Q. Can we please look at POL00118229, please. This 2 is an advice on evidence and quantum. If we 3 turn to the final page, page 18, if we look at 4 the bottom of the page, we can see it's written 5 by counsel at 9 St John Street in Manchester. 6 Can we turn back, please, to the beginning and 7 perhaps we can start at page 2, paragraph 4. 8 26 July 2004. The author, counsel, writes: 9 "The Horizon computer system did not operate 10 smoothly at all times, and a support help line 11 was set up manned by personnel from the company 12 which supplied the system. 13 "Mrs Wolstenholme claims that she had 14 enormous difficulties with her computer system, 15 and that it frequently malfunctioned, causing 16 inaccuracies in stock and other figures to 17 arise. She claims that she repeatedly contacted 18 both the helpline and the Post Office about 19 problems she was encountering, but little 20 effective was done to assist. 21 "In November 2000, Mrs Wolstenholme became 22 so disillusioned with the computer system that 23 she decided to stop using it. This was in 24 breach of her obligations to the Post Office and 25 she was duly suspended." 30 1 "Prior to this point, a number of errors 2 and/or deficiencies had arisen in relation to 3 Mrs Wolstenholme's Post Office accounts." 4 If we continue over the page to 5 paragraph 10, please. Counsel continued: 6 "Mrs Wolstenholme has defended the 7 proceedings, claiming the computer system 8 installed by the Post Office was defective and 9 this was, in fact, the cause of the losses 10 recorded within her accounts." 11 Paragraph 11: 12 "The trial of this matter is now about one 13 month away. A joint computer expert's report 14 has been obtained. This report concludes, from 15 the limited records available, that the computer 16 system installed by the Post Office did appear 17 defective." 18 Over the page, please, to paragraph 13: 19 "I am asked to advise in relation to quantum 20 and evidence. I am asked to take into 21 particular account that the Post Office is 22 anxious for the negative computer experts' 23 report to be given as little publicity as 24 possible." 25 Now, that is directly contrary to the 31 1 evidence that you have just given. Why do you 2 say that was not your instruction? 3 A. I did not instruct counsel in this matter. It 4 would have been our external agents. It's true 5 that adducing the report in court would have not 6 been great for Post Office Limited but, 7 ultimately, if it had to happen, it had to 8 happen. 9 Q. If your view at the time was nothing to hide -- 10 A. Mm-hm. 11 Q. -- why on earth would your solicitors have got 12 the impression that the Post Office is anxious 13 for the negative computer expert's report to be 14 given as little publicity as possible? Where do 15 you say that was coming from? 16 A. I can't comment. 17 Q. You did nothing to give them that impression 18 that that was your instruction? 19 A. I genuinely cannot remember, after this period 20 of time, I'm sorry. 21 Q. We'll continue going through the report and 22 perhaps some of that might refresh your memory. 23 Can we look at paragraph 17, please: 24 "In view of the negative expert's report in 25 this case regarding the computer system in 32 1 place, Mrs Wolstenholme's suggestion that the 2 errors that arose were the result of defects in 3 the computer system must be taken seriously. It 4 is sufficient to place genuine and significant 5 doubt on the evidence relied upon by the Post 6 Office." 7 Was that communicated back to you, counsel's 8 position that there was genuine and significant 9 doubt on the evidence being relied upon by the 10 Post Office? 11 A. I cannot recall. 12 Q. Can we look at paragraph 49, please. That's the 13 bottom of page 15, top of page 16. It says 14 there: 15 "On the basis of the above it can be 16 concluded that the Post Office claim against 17 Mrs Wolstenholme will fail, save for the return 18 of the equipment which she has possibly 19 retained. Her claim against the Post Office in 20 respect of failure to give proper notice is 21 likely to succeed. What is the appropriate 22 course of conduct in the circumstances, 23 particularly given the desire of those 24 instructing me and the Post Office to avoid, if 25 possible, publication of the negative experts' 33 1 report in the public arena?" 2 Now, if the Post Office had as much 3 confidence in the Horizon System as your 4 evidence has been earlier today, why on earth 5 would they want to avoid publication of that 6 expert's report? 7 A. Because I think it might have affected the 8 relationship between Post Office Limited and 9 Fujitsu, but that is purely my opinion. I can't 10 speak to Post Office's intentions. 11 Q. Having read Jim Cruise's email, having read the 12 expert report, at this point in time was it not 13 dawning on you that the Horizon System might not 14 be as infallible as you indeed thought? 15 A. I can categorically say no. At that time, it 16 certainly didn't. 17 Q. I'm going to move on to the case of Lee 18 Castleton. I'm going to start in 2005. Can we 19 look at POL00107423, please. Thank you. Can we 20 start at page 7 of this. It's a chain of 21 emails. Thank you. At the bottom of that page 22 we have an email from Stephen Dilley to Cheryl 23 Woodward and copied to you. Can we just scroll 24 slightly above that, please, just to see who 25 it's to and from. Can you tell us the 34 1 relationship, why Cheryl Woodward and I think -- 2 is it to Cheryl Woodward and copied to you? 3 A. Cheryl Woodward worked in one of the departments 4 in Post Office Limited that were entitled to 5 instruct regional agents, like Bond Pearce, 6 directly. Ergo the instructions to issue 7 proceedings against Mr Castleton were authorised 8 by Ms Woodward. 9 Q. So that's a direct instruction from somebody 10 within the Post Office who is not a lawyer -- 11 A. Correct. 12 Q. -- but copied to you, who is a lawyer? 13 A. No. This is a communication from Stephen Dilley 14 after he had taken over conduct of the Castleton 15 matter going back directly to his original 16 instructing -- to his firm's original 17 instructing party, Cheryl Woodward, copied in to 18 me because of the concerns over his firm 19 permitting judgment in default on a massive 20 potential counterclaim being issued. 21 Q. You were a lawyer involved in civil litigation 22 in the Post Office -- 23 A. Correct. 24 Q. -- being copied in to an email from Mr Dilley, 25 who was acting for Bond Pearce, the law firm 35 1 instructed in this case -- 2 A. Right. 3 Q. -- presumably copied in because you were 4 a lawyer; is that right? 5 A. I was copied in because of the fact that they 6 had permitted judgment to be entered in default. 7 This meant that it wasn't being dealt with as 8 business as usual. They had to come back to us 9 at Legal Services and explain what had occurred. 10 For that reason, I was now being copied in. 11 Q. So was there a threshold of seriousness before 12 which it wouldn't get to the legal team but 13 beyond which it would have to be copied in or 14 the legal team involved in some way? 15 A. I had nothing to do with setting up the 16 contracts for outsourcing. But, by any ream, 17 permitting a potential counterclaim of £250,000 18 to be entered against your client would justify 19 contacting Legal Services, yes. 20 Q. We're here in October 2005, was this the first 21 involvement that you had with the Castleton 22 case? 23 A. There's a possibility that I might have been 24 asked for contact of people within Post Office 25 Limited via the solicitor who was dealing with 36 1 the case prior to Mr Dilley. 2 Q. If we look at the first paragraph in his case 3 summary, he says: 4 "The Post Office's claim is for 5 approximately [£27,000] plus interest and costs 6 in respect of net losses. Clearly, Mr Castleton 7 is contractually responsible for any losses that 8 the Post Office makes caused by negligence or 9 error. However, the real issue is whether there 10 has been any real shortfall, or whether this 11 shortfall has really been generated by computer 12 error. To win, the Post Office must show that 13 there has been a real shortfall." 14 If we go over the page, he summarises some 15 reports that -- sorry, over one more page, thank 16 you, to page 9. There's a blank page that 17 follows but it's over the page, thank you. 18 He refers to some reports that have been 19 obtained by Mr Castleton, one from Bentley 20 Jennison and one from White and Hoggard, and he 21 says about halfway down that bottom paragraph 22 that: 23 "Mr Castleton's Defence, 'appears to hold 24 potential merit based on the limited 25 documentation' ..." 37 1 This is a quote from Bentley Jennison in 2 their report. He is passing on that information 3 to you. He says: 4 "White and Hoggard reach a similar 5 conclusion in their report." 6 Can we go back, please, to higher up the 7 email chain, page 5. At the bottom of page 5, 8 please, this seems to be you forwarding that 9 email to various people. Can you assist us with 10 who the recipients are? Carol King, Nicky 11 Sherrott, Jennifer Robson. 12 A. Clare Wardle was my immediate line manager at 13 the time. Nicky Sherrott was, I believe, Head 14 of Commercial, might even have been performing 15 the role of Acting Head of Legal. John Legg and 16 Carol King were Post Office Limited employees. 17 Q. I'm going to read from your covering email, if 18 we could scroll down the page over to page 7, 19 please. 20 It'll be over the page again. I think these 21 were original hard copies, which were 22 photocopied, which explains the blank pages. 23 You say: 24 "This is a case where the adequacy of the 25 evidence which [the Post Office] has in support 38 1 of it case against Castleton is being challenged 2 and his counterclaim dwarfs the size of the 3 claim. The adequacy of the records obtained 4 from the Horizon System is being challenged. As 5 the business chose to give summary termination 6 instead of three months' notice it is required 7 to physically prove the loss. If the Horizon 8 evidence is not up to the job this will have 9 serious ramifications for the business." 10 You were recognising there that, if there 11 was a successful challenge to the Horizon 12 System, it would have serious ramifications; is 13 that right? 14 A. Correct, yes. 15 Q. Yes. Is that following your experience from the 16 Cleveleys case, where the Horizon case was -- 17 the reliability of Horizon was called into 18 question? 19 A. No, it really wasn't. I mean, my major concern 20 about the matter of Castleton was the sheer size 21 of the counterclaim, £250,000, and the cost of 22 putting a full defence together, because I was 23 concerned the proceedings had been issued in the 24 first place because the paper documentation that 25 should have been in place prior to proceedings 39 1 being issued wasn't. 2 Q. But the final sentence there: 3 "If the Horizon evidence is not up to the 4 job this will have serious ramifications for the 5 business." 6 It seems as though your concern, actually, 7 is about the adequacy of the Horizon System and 8 the ramifications that that may have; is that 9 wrong? 10 A. That's what I said at the time but, in reality, 11 it was the sheer size of the counterclaim and 12 the cost and expense that we knew we would be 13 put to in defending a full challenge. 14 Q. We've seen before counsel's advice about the 15 Post Office wishing to avoid publicity. We saw 16 that time and again in relation to the Cleveleys 17 case. Isn't this much of the same thing? 18 A. No. 19 Q. Can we look at the first page of this chain, 20 please, and the bottom of the first page. We 21 have there an email from Dave Hulbert to Carl 22 Marx -- not the Karl Marx, a different Carl 23 Marx. Can you tell us who they were? 24 A. I have no idea who Carl Marx was, which is 25 surprising, given his name. Dave Hulbert, 40 1 I believe, worked in -- I believe worked in 2 Fujitsu or was a liaison between POL and 3 Fujitsu. 4 Q. We also have there Keith Baines. That's higher 5 up the chain, in effect. 6 A. I can't remember their title. 7 Q. He was the Horizon Contract Manager at the Post 8 Office; do you recall that? 9 A. (The witness nodded) 10 Q. Looking at that bottom email, though, can we 11 scroll down, please. Carl to Dave, it says in 12 the second paragraph: 13 "I've also copied below a response you 14 provided some weeks ago relating to a different 15 case, (Smallbridge) about the system creating 16 discrepancies and it would be worth having your 17 view on whether this provides useful supporting 18 evidence, particularly in countering the 19 Experts' Reports (referred to in Stephen 20 Dilley's email)." 21 Now, do you recall a case of Smallbridge, 22 where there were discrepancies? 23 A. Absolutely not but what you have to appreciate 24 is that there was never, ever an overriding 25 system that gave Civil Litigation visibility of 41 1 all Post Office Limited matters. 2 Q. If we look at the top, if we go back a page to 3 page 1, we see Carol King at the Post Office, 4 Jennifer Robson, Debt Recovery Section Manager. 5 They're all in receipt of this chain of emails. 6 A. Mm-hm. 7 Q. Was that not something that was ever bought to 8 your attention? 9 A. I cannot recall after this period of time. 10 Q. If we stick with page 3, please, we can see at 11 the bottom of page 3, this is Carol to Dave, and 12 he says that he's copied certain wording from 13 the Smallbridge case, and it says there at the 14 bottom: 15 "In summary, the system is very robust. In 16 our experience it very seldom loses transactions 17 unless equipment is physically removed from 18 site; if it does lose transactions Post Office 19 procedures should quickly identify discrepancies 20 and they should be followed through with 21 Helpdesk assistance within a week." 22 Now, do you know where that draft wording 23 came from? Are you able to assist? Is that 24 a phrase that you heard, a form of words that 25 you heard repeated? 42 1 A. No. It's not. 2 Q. At this time, were you telling people about, for 3 example, the Cleveleys case that you had, where 4 a joint expert had said that that simply isn't 5 right? 6 A. I wasn't telling people about the Cleveleys 7 case. As far as we were concerned, that had 8 been concluded. 9 Q. You had an independent jointly-appointed expert 10 who was saying that describing it as robust 11 simply wasn't right. Do you think it might have 12 been worth, during that period of time, to have 13 told more people within the Post Office? 14 A. It was expressed to be a preliminary report. 15 I viewed it as a case in isolation. 16 Q. Can we look at POL00070574, please. This is 17 7 November 2005, so we're still in 2005, 18 an email from Stephen Dilley to Stephen Lister, 19 and he summarises much the same. He says: 20 "As you are the relationship partner for the 21 Royal Mail, I thought it would be helpful to 22 update you in relation to a case I am dealing 23 with for them in case Mandy Talbot mentions it. 24 I recently inherited this case from Denise 25 Gammack when she left the firm, who in turn 43 1 inherited it from [somebody else]." 2 If we scroll down to the third paragraph, 3 please, he says there that: 4 "[Mr Castleton] has obtained 2 experts' 5 reports which conclude that the [Post Office's] 6 Horizon computer System, despite the suspense 7 account entry, has failed to recognise the entry 8 on the daily snapshot and that Mr Castleton's 9 Defence, 'appears to hold potential merit based 10 on the limited documentation' they have so far 11 reviewed." 12 They say further down the page: 13 "We take instructions from Cheryl Woodward, 14 Agents Debt Team, Chesterfield but Mandy Talbot 15 is copied in on emails. I spoke to Mandy last 16 week to take instructions and her first question 17 was why Bond Pearce had issued the claim when 18 reliability was unclear." 19 So it seems clear that you did provide 20 instructions to Stephen Dilley, from that 21 phrase? 22 A. At that stage, yes. 23 Q. "I informed Mandy that my colleagues had 24 expressed concern to Cheryl about issuing." 25 Then, if we could scroll down, there's 44 1 a paragraph there about snapshots missing, 2 certain information missing, and then it says 3 this, it says: 4 "Mandy's next comment was that Cheryl may 5 not have had authority to tell Laura to issue 6 a claim but I was able to tell Mandy that Cheryl 7 had referred this question to her Managers 8 before instructing Laura to proceed. 9 "In any event, Mandy has instructed me to 10 put forward an offer of mediation to try to 11 settle the claim." 12 Now, did your previous experience in the 13 Cleveleys case influence you in some way on 14 receiving that email, on receiving that 15 information, to want to settle this case as 16 quickly as possible? 17 A. No, we wanted to settle the claim because it was 18 one where a counterclaim had been issued for 19 £250,000 and, even in 2005, that was a serious 20 amount of money. I was also concerned by the 21 fact that, when proceedings had been issued, the 22 paper in support of the claim wasn't in 23 apple-pie order. That was why I was concerned 24 that instructions had been issued given to issue 25 proceedings in the first place. 45 1 Q. So it continues to be your evidence that the 2 Cleveleys case was in no way relevant to your 3 thinking -- 4 A. That was my evidence. 5 Q. -- in the Castleton case? Can we look at 6 POL00072402, please. We're still in November 7 2005. This is an attendance note made by Bond 8 Pearce. JMS1 is Julian Summerhayes. I believe 9 he is from Bond Pearce. It says there: 10 "JMS1 want to know whether there was any 11 evidence at all of the monies that were alleged 12 by Royal Mail to be outstanding? MT [that's 13 you, I believe, Mandy Talbot] indicating that 14 she had gone through the file but was certainly 15 not able to find any manual documents to confirm 16 this. JMS1 talking through a few of the issues 17 in the Reply and Defence to Counterclaim and 18 saying he had slightly amended that from the 19 version that had been sent through earlier." 20 It ends on this, it ends: 21 "She was still not sure why the firm had 22 been given instructions to issue. She will 23 revert soonest." 24 In fact, it also says: 25 "MT [that's you] talking about getting tired 46 1 with this case." 2 Why were you tired with this case at that 3 time? 4 A. It was taking up an awful lot of resource. 5 Ordinarily, subpostmasters' cases, for me 6 personally, would take up one/two hours a week 7 maximum. This case was beginning to take up 8 substantial periods of time. 9 Whether I expressed being tired with it, 10 it's quite possible I did use that word. 11 Q. Was it that Mr Castleton wasn't accepting 12 a payout at that stage, like in the Cleveleys 13 case? 14 A. Absolutely not. 15 MR BLAKE: We're going to move now to 2006. 16 Sir, that might be an appropriate moment to 17 take our mid-morning break. It's slightly early 18 but I think it is a natural break. Perhaps we 19 could -- 20 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: That's fine, Mr Blake what time 21 shall we resume? 22 MR BLAKE: If we resume at 11.30, please. 23 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Okay, yes. 24 (11.08 am) 25 (A short break) 47 1 (11.30am) 2 MR BLAKE: Thank you, sir. 3 Mrs Talbot, before we broke -- I'm going to 4 summarise the position as far as I understand 5 it -- on Cleveleys, your evidence is you didn't 6 have anything to hide; is that right? 7 A. Correct. 8 Q. In respect of Castleton, you wanted to settle 9 Castleton because of the size of the 10 counterclaim; is that correct? 11 A. And because of missing paper documentation. 12 Q. But in respect of Castleton, like Cleveleys, is 13 it your evidence you had nothing to hide? 14 A. Absolutely nothing to hide. 15 Q. Can we look at POL00072669, please. This is 16 an attendance note we looked at with Mr Dilley, 17 24 February 2006. He summarises a telephone 18 conversation that he had with you. Can we 19 scroll down a little bit, I'll just read those 20 two paragraphs. 21 He's recalling a discussion with you. He 22 says: 23 "Internally the Post Office feels conflicted 24 about which direction to go in with the 25 Castleton case. The Post Office believes the 48 1 Horizon System is robust, but the downside is 2 the cost (in Post Office's time and money) in 3 proving a negative (ie that there are no faults) 4 and that is expensive. For example, Mandy would 5 need to get a report from Fujitsu (who 6 apparently have difficulty writing in plain 7 English) and get someone in the Post Office to 8 review Fujitsu data to see if there are any 9 anomalies." 10 It goes on to say: 11 "It is Mandy's view that the Post Office 12 must not show any weaknesses and even if this 13 case will cost a lot, there are broader issues 14 at stake than just the Castleton claim: if the 15 Post Office are seen to compromise on Castleton, 16 then the 'the whole system will come crashing 17 down' ie it will egg on other subpostmasters to 18 issue speculative claims." 19 Pausing there, is that what you told Stephen 20 Dilley in February 2006? 21 A. It may have been, as expressed in paragraph 1, 22 Post Office genuinely believed that Horizon was 23 a robust system and it felt -- I believe Post 24 Office felt the need to demonstrate that it 25 would take a firm line with any and all 49 1 challenges to Horizon. 2 Q. We have there in speech marks, so similar to the 3 speech marks we saw earlier in respect of 4 "keeping your mouth shut" it says, "the whole 5 system will come crashing down". It says: 6 "Mandy knows that Mr Castleton is talking to 7 Barjarge (the other subpostmaster bringing 8 a Horizon based claim). The Post Office's clear 9 line to the industry must be that we are taking 10 a firm line with Castleton. She even said she 11 thought it might be damaging to settle the claim 12 on confidential terms rather than fight it and 13 lose." 14 So there seems to be a strengthening of the 15 line towards Mr Castleton. We've gone from 2005 16 potential settlement to now making an example of 17 Mr Castleton. 18 A. Yes, that is correct. It went from being 19 a case, to the best of my recollection, that 20 started off small subpostmaster deficiency, 21 massive potential counterclaim, based on, so we 22 believed, unsupported allegations about the 23 Horizon System. 24 By February 2006, however, it had sort of 25 morphed into a test case on Horizon, despite 50 1 itself. We believed that it was a pure 2 accountancy issue, in effect, but because of 3 publicity sought, as I say, it was becoming 4 a test case on Horizon, even though our -- that 5 is not what we believed the case was about. 6 Q. If you had such confidence in Horizon and 7 nothing to hide, why would you need to take such 8 a hard line against Mr Castleton? 9 A. It wasn't necessarily against Mr Castleton. 10 I really do think it was driven by the size of 11 the potential counterclaim and that, if he had 12 accepted any of the offers to mediate, I think 13 things could have been resolved on a round table 14 basis. 15 Q. Where there does it refer to the counterclaim 16 being your motivation, driving force, in your 17 case strategy? 18 A. This is a document created by Mr Stephen Dilley 19 and the disclosure to this Inquiry has been very 20 partial. I don't know whether, in February 21 2006, I was in the position of expressing 22 strategy. There was no litigation strategy 23 within the Civil Litigation Department on how to 24 deal with these cases. There was no strategy 25 coming down from on high, from Post Office 51 1 Limited, on how to deal with these cases. 2 Q. Doesn't paragraph 2 there precisely set out the 3 strategy that you wanted to adopt in 4 Mr Castleton's case? 5 A. In this instance, this particular piece of 6 litigation. 7 Q. Where were you getting those instructions from? 8 A. It says here I was getting them from Post Office 9 Limited. 10 Q. Who was telling you that you needed to send 11 a message to the industry? Was this your own 12 view? Did it come from somewhere else? 13 A. I think it was coming from Post Office Limited. 14 But it was a very long time ago. 15 Q. Post Office Limited is a company name, it must 16 have come from an individual. Who was it coming 17 from -- or individuals? 18 A. I can't recall after this period of time, as 19 I hadn't had the advantage of having access to 20 full sequential documentation. 21 Q. There is a conversation between yourself and 22 Stephen Dilley in February 2006, where he is 23 quoting what he considers to be your view that 24 the Post Office must not show any weakness. Is 25 the strategy coming from you? I mean, it's 52 1 quite a significant strategy that has 2 implications for somebody's life. Can you try 3 and assist with where the strategy is coming 4 from? 5 A. I believe it was coming from Post Office 6 Limited, as expressed through me, and it was not 7 personal, it was just dealing with an individual 8 litigation case. 9 Q. You have no recollection whatsoever where that 10 direction was coming from? 11 A. No. 12 Q. Can we look at POL00070811, please. We are now 13 in May 2006, an email from Stephen Dilley to 14 you: 15 "Dear Mandy, 16 "I refer to our telephone conversation this 17 afternoon and attach our draft cost schedule, 18 for your information. As discussed, this is 19 partly a tactical document: Mr Castleton wants 20 to postpone mediation. The estimate should 21 bring home the costs implications of doing 22 that." 23 If we continue to scroll down -- sorry, if 24 we can scroll up to the top, you're the only 25 name from the Post Office that's in the 53 1 addressees there. 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. Yes. So he seems to be discussing tactical 4 approaches to the litigation with you; is that 5 a fair summary of what this email is aimed at? 6 A. In this document, though I may well have sought 7 instruction on it from my line manager and/or 8 POL. 9 Q. If we scroll down to number 4 and 5, please, 10 thank you, he says there: 11 "I've estimated the total global costs at 12 nearly £223,000 including VAT and disbursements. 13 As discussed, the costs will be disproportionate 14 to the amount of the claim [which is circa 15 £27,000] but not as it currently stands the 16 counterclaim which is unspecified but put at not 17 more than £250,000. However, I would value the 18 counterclaim as much lower. There is a risk 19 therefore that if the [Post Office] win, 20 a significant proportion of costs may be 21 disallowed on assessment because of 22 proportionality." 23 So disproportionate costs may be being spent 24 on this litigation. He says: 25 "As previously discussed [presumably with 54 1 you], even if [the Post Office] wins, you may 2 well find it difficult to enforce any judgment 3 because of Castleton's asset position which is 4 at best unclear. However, from the [Post 5 Office's] view there are importance broader 6 implications at stake such as the message it 7 will send out to other subpostmasters if the 8 [Post Office] settle or are seen to pursue it 9 vigorously." 10 So, once again -- the earlier message was 11 from February, we're now in May -- a message to 12 other subpostmasters being sent out in this 13 litigation. Is that your recollection of the 14 tactical approach that was being taken to that 15 litigation at that time? 16 A. At this stage, it had morphed, I think, from 17 becoming a technical test case to an actual test 18 case and, therefore, that is the position and 19 the message that POL wished to put out. 20 Q. Had you and the Post Office lost sight, by that 21 point, of the fact that Mr Castleton, 22 an individual, was involved in this case? 23 A. I don't believe so because I seem to recall 24 that, at the beginning of the litigation, he did 25 have insurance cover. I do not know whether 55 1 that had expired by this time. 2 Q. But you are clearly spending what might be 3 disproportionate costs on a case in order to 4 pursue it for a wider goal. Is that a fair 5 summary of the tactical approach that was being 6 taken? 7 A. This is still potentially a counterclaim for 8 £250,000 where Horizon had now been put in to 9 question, therefore POL thought it was the 10 appropriate tactic to take. 11 Q. Paragraph 5 suggests that, actually, the 12 counterclaim isn't the real important matter 13 that was at stake but it was sending a message 14 out to subpostmasters? 15 A. The counterclaim had not been amended at that 16 stage. 17 Q. Can we look at POL00090437, please. This is 18 a pile of different documents. So it's not 19 in -- I know the first page says, "Advice" but 20 if we look at page 65, there's an email chain 21 that appears there. 22 At the bottom of page 65, please. We're now 23 on 21 August 2006 and this is an email from Tom 24 Beezer of Bond Pearce to yourself, copied to 25 Stephen Dilley. Again, you're the only Post 56 1 Office name at this stage that's being copied in 2 to these emails. Are we to read into that that 3 you had a significant handle on this case by 4 that time? 5 A. I was the person within Civil Litigation that 6 was dealing with the matter vis à vis Bond 7 Pearce but I was seeking instructions upwards 8 from senior officers within Post Office Limited 9 and keeping my line manager copied into relevant 10 communications. 11 Q. Are you still unable to name any of those senior 12 managers? 13 A. Well, I've already given you the raft of 14 managers within Civil Litigation. 15 Q. But in terms of who was providing you with the 16 significant instructions to pass to Tom Beezer 17 and Stephen Dilley, who was that? 18 A. I would have to go through what little 19 disclosure there is to see who I was getting 20 instructions from, if that correspondence hasn't 21 already been disclosed. 22 Q. If we scroll down over to the next page, please, 23 this is the contents of Tom Beezer's email. It 24 says: 25 "As we discussed last week I am writing to 57 1 update you on certain points that came out of my 2 discussions on the Castleton case with Richard 3 Morgan of Maitland Chambers." 4 He gives an "Overview" and he says: 5 "A further point made by Richard Morgan was 6 that we should endeavour to move the main area 7 of focus in the case away from the Horizon 8 System if possible." 9 He then addresses, further down the page, 10 Fujitsu. He says: 11 "In this matter, Fujitsu are clearly going 12 to play a role. I understand that Fujitsu are 13 currently looking at the matters raised in 14 a letter of 25 July 2006 from Castleton's 15 lawyers ... One of the pivotal issues in this 16 matter will be the arithmetic used throughout 17 and I would like to go the answer from Fujitsu 18 as soon as possible to the points raised by 19 Castleton's lawyers. Is there any pressure you 20 can bring to bear upon Fujitsu to cause them to 21 answer this letter in the near future? I would 22 be most grateful if you would consider this. 23 "One other point raised by Richard was the 24 integrity of the Fujitsu product generally. 25 Just to confirm, I understand that Royal 58 1 Mail/Post Office know of no issues with the 2 Fujitsu system and are confident that it 3 operates correctly. Please discuss this with me 4 if you have a different view." 5 Did you at this point say, "Well, I had this 6 case, the Cleveleys case, a joint expert was 7 instructed independently and he questioned its 8 integrity"? 9 A. No, I did not. 10 Q. Why at this stage did the Cleveleys case seem to 11 simply be forgotten about? 12 A. Because I was of the opinion that the 13 preliminary view by Mr Coyne was created in 14 a unique set of circumstances, given that the 15 original data was no longer available. I didn't 16 consider it to be a full report because the 17 offer from Fujitsu for him to come and visit 18 their sites and look all over the data was never 19 communicated to him. So I didn't consider that 20 it was a full and comprehensive report. 21 Q. Did you consider that only a full and 22 comprehensive report would have been sufficient 23 to require passing on to your lawyers, who were 24 dealing with a complaint about the Horizon 25 System? 59 1 A. In all events, that full and comprehensive 2 report never came into creation. 3 Q. And anything less than a full and comprehensive 4 report you didn't think was sufficient to pass 5 on to your legal advisers? 6 A. That's correct. 7 Q. They had asked you directly here whether -- 8 well, he says there: 9 "... I understand that Royal Mail/Post 10 Office know of no issues with the [Horizon 11 System]." 12 Did you not think at that point "Well, maybe 13 I should be raising some issues with the Horizon 14 System that I've learnt about in my experience 15 of other cases"? 16 A. There isn't any communication in the document 17 that has been -- documents that have been 18 disclosed in which any conversation between 19 myself and Stephen on that point is itemised. 20 I do not believe, to the best of my 21 recollection, that I did mention the case of 22 Wolstenholme to him. 23 Q. Can we now POL00069592, please. This is 24 a document I took Mr Dilley to. I know you saw 25 Mr Dilley's evidence and you've had sight of 60 1 this document today. 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. It's dated 5 September 2006. It's from BDO Stoy 4 Hayward, who were instructed in the Castleton 5 case on behalf of the Post Office. Could we go 6 to the final page there, please. Sorry, if we 7 could scroll up to the previous page, thank you, 8 it's that paragraph there, "Early indications of 9 problems with the Horizon System". 10 So it's on 5 September that they contact 11 Mr Dilley and say: 12 "We have found that there is some indication 13 of possible problems with Horizon from our 14 initial review of the electronic information you 15 sent us." 16 Was that communicated to you at the time? 17 A. I have no recollection of this document at all, 18 until a hard copy of it was handed to me this 19 morning. 20 Q. In terms of the BDO report, I'll take you to 21 that shortly -- you ultimately saw the BDO 22 report, didn't you? 23 A. In the additional disclosure, yes. 24 Q. So you hadn't seen it before this Inquiry? 25 A. I cannot recall seeing it. 61 1 Q. I'll get to the report shortly. But you are 2 seen here on a number of different emails 3 between the solicitors acting for the Post 4 Office and you. Is it likely that, on receiving 5 a letter of this significance from BDO, that 6 they would have passed on or summarised that 7 information for you? 8 A. I can't answer that. 9 Q. Can we look at POL00113909, please. If we 10 scroll to the bottom, we're now in November, 11 9 November 2006. There's an email from you. 12 Can you assist us with that distribution list 13 and why you would have been sending information 14 about the Castleton case to that distribution 15 list? 16 A. Okay. Biddy Wyles by this time was my immediate 17 line manager; Clare Wardle, head of Civil 18 Litigation; Rod Ismay has already given evidence 19 to this Inquiry. I used to communicate with 20 these people regularly but, after so many years, 21 I'm afraid I can't assist. 22 Q. Are you able to assist, not with what their 23 specific roles or duties were but simply why it 24 is that you would have chosen that group of 25 individuals? Was there a particular group 62 1 dealing with subpostmaster cases, was there 2 a particular group that was interested in 3 Horizon cases or something else? 4 A. I cannot recall after this period of time why 5 this selection. I can only conclude that they 6 are people who had shown an interest and it was 7 for that reason -- shown an interest or possibly 8 participated because I recall that Keith Baines 9 had given witness evidence, and so I felt that 10 they were an appropriate selection of parties to 11 contact to communicate this information. 12 Q. You haven't so far named any individuals who 13 were providing you with instructions to pass on 14 to the Post Office's solicitors. Does this 15 assist in any way with identifying who it may 16 have been who was providing you with the 17 instructions or information or direction in the 18 Castleton case? 19 A. There would have been a whole selection of 20 people who, in turn, would have raised it 21 further on up their reporting structures. So it 22 was, to a certain extent, a movable feast. 23 Q. No individuals stand out in particular there? 24 A. Not particularly. 25 Q. Could we go over the page, please. You're 63 1 passing on some good news -- and, over the page 2 again, thank you -- about the Castleton case. 3 It's about the potential of settlement in that 4 case. We're in November 2006. This settlement 5 doesn't ultimately happen but can we go over to 6 page 5, please. Thank you. It's the second 7 paragraph there. You say there, about halfway 8 down: 9 "The benefit of having a judgment against 10 him [against Mr Castleton] in the full amount is 11 that we will be able to use this to demonstrate 12 to the network that despite his allegations 13 about HORIZON we were able to recover the full 14 amount from him. It will be of tremendous use 15 in convincing other postmasters to think twice 16 about their allegations." 17 So again, that seems to be a significant 18 driving factor in respect of the Post Office's 19 approach to this report. 20 A. By this time, it had become, in fact, a test 21 case. Therefore, if a judgment were obtained, 22 it would have been of benefit to Post Office 23 Limited. 24 Q. We saw a moment ago that in September 2006, BDO, 25 the accountants, had written their initial 64 1 concerns and sent a letter to Mr Dilley. You're 2 not sure whether you received that or not but, 3 at this time, when you were talking about using 4 his case as a message to other subpostmasters, 5 do you think it likely that, in fact, you knew 6 that there may, in fact, be problems with the 7 Horizon System, as highlighted by BDO Stoy 8 Hayward? 9 A. Excuse me, can you just scroll back as to the 10 date of this? Oh, this is November, isn't it? 11 Q. Yes, this is 9 November 2006. The BDO letter 12 was 5 September 2006. If it assists -- and I'm 13 going to take you to it shortly -- the actual 14 report from BDO, the draft report, was received 15 on 29 November. So the final report was shortly 16 after this email correspondence but there had 17 been correspondence from BDO to Mr Dilley. 18 A. Excuse me, can you repeat the question again you 19 want me to answer? 20 Q. At this time, the strategy seems to be 21 convincing other postmasters to think twice 22 about their allegations. Might you, by this 23 stage, have known that, in fact, your own 24 experts had raised an issue with the Horizon 25 System, very similar to the Cleveleys case? 65 1 A. An issue but we had a whole selection of witness 2 statements from Fujitsu employees who were 3 confident that their evidence was going to be 4 persuasive. 5 Q. Can we, please, look at POL00069775, please, 6 10 November. So this is the day after that 7 email. 8 A. Mm-hm. 9 Q. Can we please look at page 3. So if we scroll 10 slightly up the bottom of page 2 we have 11 an email from you, 10 November, to that 12 distribution list, so we have names such as Rod 13 Ismay on there. If we scroll down, you are 14 proposing that Mr Castleton signs a form of 15 words and the proposal there is as follows, for 16 him to say: 17 "I Mr L Castleton the former postmaster at 18 Marine Drive Post Office admit that a sum of 19 money was owed by me to Post Office Limited as 20 a result of errors which arose whilst I was the 21 postmaster at the above office. I had [must be 22 'thought'] that this debt arose due to 23 a malfunction of the HORIZON System but I now 24 accept that I was mistaken and the debt arose 25 out of human error. I declare that the HORIZON 66 1 System did not contribute to the errors in any 2 way and formally withdraw all statements I made 3 to the contrary." 4 So there is a form of words there that 5 clearly suggests that the Horizon System didn't 6 contribute to the errors. It says that the debt 7 arose out of human error. What evidence was 8 there that the debt arose out of human error? 9 A. The evidence of the witnesses from Fujitsu and 10 Post Office Limited who had recreated the 11 accountancy side of this debt action. 12 Q. Why do you say "human error", though? Why is it 13 not something else? How can you be sure, have 14 sufficient certainty, that the debt arose out of 15 human error? First of all, how can you be sure 16 that there was a debt at all? If there was 17 a wrong button pressed, for example, how could 18 you be sure that there was an actual loss to the 19 Post Office? 20 A. Because Post Office Limited staff had gone 21 through the accounts and the materials at the 22 branch and recreated various cash accounts and 23 other documentation to demonstrate that there 24 was a valid debt. 25 Q. There may have been figures showing that there 67 1 was a debt but, in terms of an actual loss to 2 the Post Office, how could be sure of that? 3 A. If they were of the opinion that there was 4 a valid debt and there was sufficient 5 documentary evidence in support, I was prepared 6 to accept that position. 7 Q. You mentioned earlier that the case was about 8 the size of the counterclaim and that's why you 9 wanted to settle the case. If it was about the 10 counterclaim, why would you be seeking to get 11 Mr Castleton to sign up to this statement? 12 A. Because, as I've said earlier, by this time, it 13 had become, due to publicity, a test case in its 14 own right. 15 Q. Was it very much like the Cleveleys case: that 16 you wanted to silence him? 17 A. No. 18 Q. Why get him to sign up to a statement such as 19 that if you didn't want to silence? 20 A. Because it would have -- I didn't seek silence. 21 It would have been of use to Post Office Limited 22 in dealing with other suggestions that there 23 might be issues with the Horizon System. 24 Q. Isn't that entirely consistent with, for 25 example, counsel's advice in the Cleveleys case 68 1 that I took you to earlier about the Post Office 2 seeking to avoid publicity? 3 A. I don't accept that. 4 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Whose idea was it to ask 5 Mr Castleton to use those form of words? Was it 6 yours or was it someone else and, if so, who was 7 it? 8 A. I genuinely can't remember after this period of 9 time. Supporting the Horizon System was very 10 important to Post Office Limited at the time. 11 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: But -- 12 A. On the balance of probabilities, I think it was 13 something that emanated from Post Office Limited 14 but that's purely my opinion. 15 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Like Mr Blake, the expression 16 "Post Office Limited" doesn't give me very much 17 information because, ultimately, there must have 18 been a person or persons within Post Office 19 Limited. So is your evidence to me that 20 probably this form of words was suggested to you 21 and you acted, in effect, as the go-between in 22 passing it on but you can't remember who it was 23 that suggested the form of words to you? 24 A. I'm very sorry but I can't assist you any 25 further on this. 69 1 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: All right. 2 MR BLAKE: Mrs Talbot, it may assist, if we look at 3 the email again, if we go to the top of the 4 email with the distribution list -- sorry, it's 5 the bottom of page 2. We have there the 6 distribution list. So it's an email from you to 7 various people within the Post Office. 8 A. Mm-hm. 9 Q. Were those people, on the whole, more senior to 10 you, less senior? 11 A. Biddy Wyles and Clare Wardle, certainly within 12 Legal Services. I think that Mr Ismay, Richard 13 Barker were more senior to me. I don't know the 14 status about the others. 15 Q. If we scroll down, we can see, you say above the 16 highlighted passage: 17 "I have prepared a short statement but would 18 be very grateful for any improvements which you 19 can suggest." 20 So it certainly seems as though that form of 21 words was your drafting. 22 A. It may well -- it -- it's a possibility. 23 Q. Would you have said, "I have prepared a short 24 statement", if somebody else had drafted it? 25 A. Probably not. 70 1 Q. If we go to the first page, we then have 2 Mr Dilley commenting on it and he seems to want 3 to strengthen it further. I think the additions 4 he has, for example, are "unreservedly withdraw 5 the untrue allegations" and also, the words at 6 the bottom: 7 "... allegations about the Horizon System 8 and/or its functioning." 9 Do you remember having any views as to that 10 form of words? 11 A. No, it was just an alternative draft. 12 Q. Knowing what you already knew from, for example, 13 the Cleveleys case, did you think that then 14 might have been an appropriate time to raise any 15 concerns you had about the functioning of the 16 Horizon System? 17 A. As I've said previously, I draw distinction 18 under the Cleveleys case and I did not think 19 that that was the time to draw distinction. 20 Q. Ultimately, the approach there and the approach 21 in the Cleveleys case was similar, in that you 22 were getting somebody to effectively "shut up", 23 to use the words from -- or "keep their mouth 24 shut", I think was the expression in the 25 Cleveleys case. Was this again an attempt to 71 1 get Mr Castleton to keep his mouth shut? 2 A. No. It was a way of drawing litigation to 3 a conclusion on the best possible terms for Post 4 Office Limited. 5 Q. Would Mr Castleton have been free to continue 6 saying that the Horizon System was not 7 functioning properly? 8 A. If he had been prepared to sign the Tomlin 9 Order, that is maybe something we would have 10 taken into consideration later. As it was, he 11 instructed his solicitors that he wasn't 12 prepared to sign the Tomlin Order. 13 Q. Had he signed up to that, would he have been 14 free to say that the problem was the Horizon 15 system? 16 A. I can't tell. That's not a situation that 17 occurred. 18 Q. You've said that it wasn't intended to shut him 19 up but, in reality, if he had signed what you 20 were asking him to sign, would he have been 21 free, in reality, to continue to make 22 allegations -- 23 A. It's a hypothetical. It didn't occur. 24 Q. I agree but can you answer the question? 25 A. It didn't occur. 72 1 Q. I'm trying to get to your thinking behind this 2 form of words. You've said that it wasn't to 3 shut Mr Castleton up. Surely, if he had signed 4 it, he could not have criticised the Horizon 5 System, so the effect was intended to shut him 6 up, was it not? I'm asking about your thinking 7 behind the effect of asking him to sign up to 8 such a stringent form of words. 9 A. If he had signed it, which he didn't, the 10 litigation would have concluded. He would not 11 have been able to comment further upon the 12 Horizon System and Post Office Limited would 13 have been free to comment upon the Castleton 14 situation as it chose. 15 Q. Do you not see parallels between the strategy 16 that was adopted in the Cleveleys case and the 17 strategy that is being adopted here, that you 18 are effectively ensuring that somebody does not 19 publicly criticise the Horizon System? 20 A. There was no diktat from on high dictating 21 strategy within these two separate litigation 22 cases. 23 Q. So you were an individual who was involved in 24 both cases; the strategy seems to be the same. 25 Was that therefore coming from you? 73 1 A. I dealt with both cases separately and 2 individually and came to the same advice in 3 both. 4 Q. Was it entirely a coincidence that the strategy 5 adopted in both was to try to prevent public 6 criticism of the Horizon System? 7 A. Post Office Limited was concerned to preserve 8 the integrity of the Horizon System. There is 9 no doubt about that. 10 Q. As the Chair has said, "Post Office Limited" is 11 not a very helpful description of who it was 12 that was concerned. You were involved in both 13 of these cases. Was this your strategy? 14 A. It is, I believe, the strategy of Post Office 15 Limited -- though I cannot speak to Post Office 16 Limited -- communicated through myself as the 17 solicitor dealing with these two litigation 18 cases. 19 Q. Can we please look at POL00069955, please. This 20 is the draft report from BDO Stoy Hayward and 21 it's page 4. You'll have seen this is 22 a document that I took Mr Dilley to. We have 23 the summary there and the very first of BDO's 24 conclusions is: 25 "The only indications of possible computer 74 1 problems that apparent from the accounting 2 records are three very small differences in the 3 cash account ..." 4 So having identified there that there are 5 possible computer problems, were you aware of 6 that? 7 A. I would have seen a copy of this report at the 8 time it was created. 9 Q. Is that in some way consistent with the expert 10 report in the Cleveleys case of possible 11 computer problems? 12 A. Based on two wholly different sets of facts, BDO 13 Stoy Hayward were ostensibly a firm of 14 accountants, not IT experts. 15 Q. Two cases in two years, two expert reports, both 16 identifying possible computer problems. Did 17 that not cause you to pause for thought? 18 A. At the time, no. 19 Q. Why wasn't this report ultimately disclosed to 20 Mr Castleton? 21 A. I've seen an email exchange between Stephen 22 Dilley and myself and I've wracked my brains and 23 I cannot recall why it wasn't disclosed. 24 Q. Did you discuss that report with anybody at the 25 Post Office? 75 1 A. I genuinely cannot recall, after this period of 2 time. 3 Q. Did that report not make you question whether 4 the infallibility of the Horizon System was now 5 in question, in doubt? 6 A. The sums in the report are tiny in the extreme 7 and we had become aware of potential glitches 8 but were assured by Fujitsu that they were rare, 9 unusual, extreme, capable of being identified 10 and, therefore, excluded when Fujitsu were asked 11 to look at Horizon data. 12 Q. Given that there were potential glitches, do you 13 think it was right to be trying to get Lee 14 Castleton to sign an undertaking not making 15 allegations about the Horizon System when your 16 own expert had identified at least one issue 17 and, as you say, Fujitsu themselves had accepted 18 that there were potential glitches? 19 A. At that time, I was tasked with obtaining 20 a satisfactory resolution of this litigation 21 from the perspective of Post Office Limited. 22 Q. Were you personally satisfied that that was the 23 correct approach, the ethical approach, for 24 example? 25 A. It was the approach I adopted at the time. 76 1 Q. We know you adopted that approach but did you 2 think it was right at the time? 3 A. I don't think I considered it. 4 Q. Do you now, looking back at it, think it was the 5 right approach? 6 A. Given the information that has become aware in 7 the public arena since the Bates trial, I do not 8 any longer consider that that was the right 9 approach to have adopted but then, given the 10 information that's become public since Bates, 11 I think it was wrong the proceedings were ever 12 issued against Mr Castleton. 13 Q. Bates, of course, was much later. 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. You're here in 2006. You've got the BDO report. 16 You've got, as you said, acceptance from Fujitsu 17 that there were potential glitches. Looking 18 back at it then, with the information you had 19 then, do you consider that it was right to try 20 to get Lee Castleton to try to sign 21 an undertaking not making allegations about the 22 Horizon System, in light of the information you 23 had at that time? 24 A. I believe that it was because my job was to 25 conclude litigation in a satisfactory fashion as 77 1 far as Post Office Limited were concerned. 2 Q. Can we look at POL00070160, please. We're now 3 on 5 September 2006, so quite close to the trial 4 in the Castleton case we have there an email 5 from yourself to Stephen Dilley talking about 6 a case called Brown and you say: 7 "Apparently Brown is going to be a problem 8 because it is a case where [the Post Office] 9 admitted there was a problem with the system and 10 replaced it. I am hoping this is a one-off 11 event like a power outage or something of the 12 like. I will investigate further tomorrow." 13 Very close to trial, did this cause you to 14 pause for thought at all? 15 A. The consequence of the list of parties, 16 including Mr Brown, who I believe Mr Castleton 17 had indicated he was going to call to trial, and 18 some information about what they were likely to 19 say, made me go to Post Office Limited and 20 Fujitsu to try to investigate, to acquire as 21 much information about these cases as I could 22 and to relay what information I acquired to 23 Mr Dilley. 24 Q. I'm going to move on to a different topic and 25 that's the topic of costs. Can we please go 78 1 back to a document we've already looked at, 2 which is POL00070811. This was the email, 3 I think you'll recall, from Stephen Dilley to 4 you and, at the bottom, where he says that, as 5 previously discussed, essentially, costs would 6 be disproportionate but there will be broader 7 implications. 8 This is just to refresh your memory of that 9 particular document. I'd now like to go to 10 POL00119897. This is a documents from 18 August 11 2006, from Cheryl Woodward to Stephen Dilley. 12 She says: 13 "I've passed the case on to a Senior Manager 14 who is going to speak to Mandy Talbot regarding 15 not being happy about the costing of this matter 16 going to trial." 17 Do you remember about the costing -- you not 18 being happy about the costs? 19 A. No, I -- I'd never seen this email before 20 disclosure. 21 Q. Okay. I'm going to look at a policy. It comes 22 later, it's POL00084977. This is a policy 23 that -- the copy that we have, the version that 24 we have -- post-dates this particular case. 25 It's December 2009. I'd like to take you to 79 1 page 17 of this. Is this a document that you're 2 familiar with at all? 3 A. I have no recollection of this document 4 whatsoever and, although the coversheet is 5 December '09, if you look at the date at the 6 bottom of most of the appendices, it is August 7 2010. 8 Q. Yes. 9 A. Therefore, I have no knowledge whether this was 10 actually ever implemented at all. 11 Q. There's something I'd just like your view on, 12 it's page 17. 13 A. Mm-hm. 14 Q. If we scroll down, it says there: 15 "The write-off authority levels are fairly 16 transparent ... The decision-making process to 17 write-off debt is usually where the cost of 18 recovery outweighs the debt (ie very high legal 19 costs) and/or the debt is unrecoverable 20 (eg insufficient evidence, legalities, 21 [et cetera]). It is important to note that 22 every case is unique, and therefore all cases 23 are assessed on a case by case basis." 24 It seems to suggest that certainly 25 a consideration in writing off debt is whether 80 1 the case would be very high legal costs and 2 whether the debt was unrecoverable. Were those 3 considerations that you were asked to take into 4 account in relation to Mr Castleton's case, 5 irrespective of the fact that this policy comes 6 later, but those considerations, do they feature 7 in your thinking at all? 8 A. No. On the basis that the case and having 9 a judgment that would be beneficial to POL was 10 considered to be so important to the business. 11 The document you've just referred to was, in my 12 opinion, the very first attempt by Post Office 13 Limited to, in effect, take an overview as to 14 the whole subpostmaster estate. I think before 15 that, there was no single strategy behind 16 anything. 17 Q. So there was no policy in place about, for 18 example, the expenditure of disproportionate 19 costs in a case? 20 A. No. 21 Q. Was there no policy on when matters needed to be 22 raised with senior management within the Post 23 Office? 24 A. No. Although I had worked for two City firms 25 for a very short period of time, I didn't really 81 1 have any experience of management. When I first 2 came into Post Office Legal Services, I wasn't 3 aware of the lack of structure that would be 4 apparent in most firms and most organisations, 5 in terms of reporting matters upwards, or 6 obtaining instructions coming downwards. It 7 just wasn't there. 8 Q. So what was your view of the Post Office as 9 an organisation, in the way it was run in 10 respect of the bringing of actions, management 11 of actions against subpostmasters? 12 A. This is my own personal opinion. I could never 13 understand why, in some cases, actions were 14 taken because, as I've said, the way the system 15 was set up enabled departments to go out 16 straight to external lawyers without referring 17 to in-house legal assessment at all. And why, 18 on other occasions, the appropriate thing 19 considered was to get the Security teams 20 involved and, thereafter, refer it to the 21 Prosecution or Criminal Litigation department. 22 Q. I want to move on to a different topic, which is 23 Mr Castleton's health and costs and issues of 24 bankruptcy? 25 A. Mm-hm. 82 1 Q. Can we look at POL00069766, please. Thank you. 2 If we go to the bottom email, please. We have 3 an email from Mark Turner, solicitor in the 4 commercial group of Rowe Cohen solicitors and he 5 is emailing Stephen Dilley and this is forwarded 6 on to you. He says: 7 "I have just tried to speak to Mr Castleton 8 but have been informed by his wife that he is 9 rather unwell, is in bed on his doctor's 10 instructions, and is on some pretty strong 11 medication to treat the stress-related condition 12 that led to his hospitalisation last week. As 13 a result of the medication, he is somewhat 'out 14 of it' and apparently not in any fit state to 15 provide me with instructions." 16 That's 15 November 2006 and, if you scroll 17 up, you can see that Stephen Dilley forwarded 18 that to you by way of an update. 19 There's another email POL00069722, two days 20 later, 17 November. This is when settlement was 21 being discussed with Mr Castleton's solicitors. 22 If we look at the email at the bottom, it says: 23 "Dear Mandy, 24 "Please see below from Castleton's 25 solicitors. I have spoken to him and chased him 83 1 to sign the content order. He is going to call 2 Mr Castleton's GP today to check that Castleton 3 has the mental capacity to give him instructions 4 ..." 5 Then if you look at the top email from you 6 to Stephen Dilley, you say: 7 "Noted. It's frustrating given that 8 hopefully the settlement will be concluded 9 shortly." 10 Were you aware of any policies within the 11 Post Office addressing what to do if a party was 12 hospitalised through stress? 13 A. I wasn't aware of any policy within Post Office 14 Limited itself relating to the physical or 15 mental health of a party. 16 Q. If we look at POL00070210, please. There is 17 an agreement between the Post Office and Bond 18 Pearce, and this is called a "Subpostmaster and 19 Commercial Litigation Protocol"; do you remember 20 this document? 21 A. I didn't until the additional disclosure. 22 I don't know if this was created before the 23 Castleton case or as a consequence of the 24 Castleton case. I just can't remember the date 25 of it. 84 1 Q. It has you down as the Legal Services 2 representative? 3 A. For subpostmaster cases. 4 Q. Yes. So does that suggest that you were 5 responsible within the Post Office for 6 subpostmaster cases? 7 A. Within my small area of Civil Litigation, I was 8 the liaison between Bond Pearce over these 9 matters. Whether I was the liaison with all of 10 the other regional firms on subpostmaster cases, 11 I can't recall. 12 Q. Could we go down to the second page, the bottom 13 of the second page. There's reference there to 14 "Significant/Sensitive Cases", and it says that: 15 "Bond Pearce shall notify the client and 16 [you] of all significant and sensitive cases 17 ..." 18 Then it gives some examples. 19 Now "stress/bullying/harassment", am I right 20 to understand that that is not in the context of 21 the litigation? That means the topic of the 22 litigation, whether it's -- 23 A. I'm trying to recall whether Bond Pearce dealt 24 with employment cases, where a provision like 25 that would have been far more relevant. 85 1 Q. If we scroll down the list of significant and 2 sensitive cases, do you consider the Lee 3 Castleton case to have been a significant or 4 sensitive case, falling within any of those 5 criteria? 6 A. As it developed, yes. 7 Q. Which one would that be? 8 A. Although it refers to case values in excess of 9 500,000, I actually am of the opinion that any 10 case involving £250,000 is also something that 11 should have been reported on. 12 Q. We know that you were, of course, aware of this 13 particular case. 14 A. Mm-hm. 15 Q. I mean, if we scroll up, all this agreement 16 means is that you would be notified. Was there 17 an equivalent policy within the Post Office to 18 notify those within management, for example, of 19 those kinds of cases? 20 A. No, there wasn't, that I am aware of. 21 Q. I want to address now his bankruptcy. Can we 22 look at POL00113487, please. It's page 7 of 23 this pack of documents. Page 7., thank you. 24 It's that middle email from yourself to Martyn 25 Mitchell of the Post Office. Do you recall who 86 1 that was? 2 A. I assume someone within the Error Resolution 3 Team because I think that, as a subpostmaster 4 deficiency, theirs would have been the 5 department tasked with recovering the 6 deficiency. 7 Q. Thank you. We're now in 2007, so it's after the 8 original court case in the Castleton case, and 9 you say there: 10 "He has declared himself bankrupt which was 11 expected and we are still awaiting details of 12 the valuation. After a year if he has not sold 13 the property the rights of his kids to have 14 a house over their heads becomes an irrelevance 15 and as the largest creditor we can put the 16 property up for sale through a trustee in 17 bankruptcy." 18 You say there it was expected that he would 19 declare himself bankrupt. Was that something 20 that you were aware of during the proceedings? 21 A. During the proceedings? 22 Q. Yes. 23 A. No. I think in the period after the trial, it 24 was suggested. 25 Q. Given the value of the claim and given the 87 1 strategy that the Post Office adopted, which was 2 to essentially, as you've accepted, make 3 an example of Mr Castleton for wider purposes to 4 dissuade other subpostmasters from bringing 5 actions, did you think it was proportionate for 6 the Post Office to seek to recover its costs 7 through the sale of Mr Castleton's home? 8 A. There had been opportunities at the time of the 9 proposed Tomlin Order to have settled the matter 10 without the then additional costs of the trial. 11 As we had been -- as Post Office Limited had 12 been put to the cost of the trial, it was just 13 normal litigation tactic to try to recover 14 whatever costs we could using legal methods. 15 Q. There's an email from Stephen Dilley that I can 16 take you to. It's POL00072206. This is even 17 later. This is now 2009. You may recall from 18 Mr Dilley's evidence, it's the bottom email, 19 where he says: 20 "It is frustrating that there is no 21 financial recovery in this instance although we 22 knew that the prospects were slim particularly 23 after he was made bankrupt. Post Office 24 Limited's main goal in pursuing Mr Castleton was 25 achieved in that we have a good judgment 88 1 precedent which helps us to defend the Horizon 2 System." 3 Do you think it was fair to bankrupt 4 Mr Castleton in pursuit of that wider goal? 5 A. Mr Castleton chose to bankrupt himself but it 6 was a legitimate -- it was legitimate on the 7 part of Post Office Limited as the major 8 creditor to seek to recover what costs it could. 9 Q. You've been very frank about this in your 10 witness statement and I'd like to turn that up, 11 please. So could we have a look at 12 WITN08500100. That's Mrs Talbot's witness 13 statement. It's page 19 I'd like to look at. 14 It really draws the themes that I've been 15 exploring just now of cost and bankruptcy 16 together. It's page 19 of the witness 17 statement. Thank you. 18 At the end, at the bottom of that page, 19 please. You say there at the bottom, it begins 20 at the very last line: 21 "The tactic of [the Post Office] was to draw 22 the costs position to the attention of 23 Mr Castleton ... then to overwhelm Castleton 24 with evidence and preserve the trial date of 25 early December. I refer to the telephone 89 1 attendance note [et cetera]. These would have 2 been standard tactics in high ... litigation 3 cases." 4 Pausing there, do you see the Post Office as 5 in any way different to a normal litigating 6 partner? 7 A. I don't think that I do see it as different to 8 any other client. 9 Q. Can we go on to the next paragraph, in fact 10 paragraph 44, page 21 -- sorry, it's 43, in 11 fact. Thank you. 12 You say at the top of that page, page 21, so 13 over to the next page, please. You say: 14 "A Defendant's wellbeing was not considered 15 by [the Post Office] as relevant to the manner 16 in which litigation was conducted unless or 17 until the Defendant or those acting on his 18 behalf made a relevant application to the Court 19 assuming that litigation had already commenced." 20 Can you assist us with what you mean there? 21 Did at no stage the Post Office consider the 22 wellbeing of a party, unless that party had made 23 an application to the court? 24 A. I can't speak as to Post Office Limited but, 25 within Civil Litigation, we wouldn't, unless and 90 1 until the defendant or those acting for him had 2 made the appropriate formal application to the 3 court. I don't know what consideration POL took 4 before deciding to send the matter out to 5 external solicitors to issue proceedings. 6 I just don't know whether they took somebody's 7 physical or mental health into consideration. 8 Q. So if we look at paragraph 44 below, you say: 9 "In general the physical or mental wellbeing 10 of a subpostmaster may well have been considered 11 a relevant factor prior to the decision to refer 12 a matter out to agents but that was a matter for 13 [the Post Office]. I would not have been aware 14 of any decisions taken in this respect and do 15 not know if this was considered in this case. 16 Civil Litigation were never asked to the best of 17 my knowledge ..." 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. So to try to understand the process, you would 20 receive a case from somewhere within the Post 21 Office. Where, in particular, would you receive 22 a case relating to a subpostmaster? 23 A. It could have come from the teams dealing with 24 subpostmaster deficiency debt. In the case of 25 Mr Castleton, it was already sent out by 91 1 Ms Woodward to Bond Pearce without us in-house 2 solicitors having any knowledge of it. 3 Q. So would the in-house solicitors not have a say 4 as to whether the physical or mental wellbeing 5 of a subpostmaster was a relevant factor in 6 continuing a case? 7 A. Continuing with the case? 8 Q. Yes. 9 A. As I referred into my statement several 10 paragraphs before, it would only have become 11 an issue if a formal application had been made 12 to the court. I never knew of a case where we 13 were asked by Post Office Limited to keep them 14 apprised of what may be happening with 15 a physical or mental condition of a defendant. 16 Q. Do you think you did or didn't keep people 17 appraised of Mr Castleton's wellbeing in the 18 broader -- 19 A. I was never asked to do so specifically and it 20 would not have been normal in general high value 21 litigation. 22 Q. Can we look at POL00072991, please. It's the 23 second page. We have an email there from Joseph 24 Napier, who was a partner in Napier & Sons. 25 We're now in December 2010, so further on, 92 1 a year on. 2 A. Mm-hm. 3 Q. He says there, in the second paragraph: 4 "I have had discussions with [this is 5 somebody called Katherine McAlerney, with her 6 solicitor]. They're still making some noises 7 [regarding] the Horizon System but I am not 8 getting the impression that they expect their 9 arguments to bring them very far. 10 "McAlerney is in financial difficulty. She 11 is trying to sell land", et cetera. 12 Then your response above is: 13 "Joe 14 "Thank you for the update in this matter. 15 We recently won a prosecution of 16 a subpostmistress by the name of Misra and as 17 a result we anticipate that the complaints about 18 the Horizon System may decline. I presume that 19 her complaints about Horizon are generic rather 20 than specific." 21 This is a later case, dealing again with 22 complaints about Horizon, and there is mentioned 23 in that email from the solicitor about financial 24 difficulties. Am I right to read into that that 25 Mr Castleton's case was not unusual in the 93 1 respect of the ultimate result causing 2 significant financial difficulties to 3 a subpostmaster? 4 A. I have no idea. We were never tasked with 5 keeping any sort of financial record or any 6 other sort of record about subpostmaster 7 deficiency cases, until such time as the Andy 8 Greening document, end-to-end postmaster debt, 9 in the August 2010 and, even then, I don't know 10 whether that was ever properly implemented. 11 Q. So, throughout your years in the legal 12 department at the Post Office, did you not 13 yourself see trends rising in relation -- 14 A. I was never asked to look for trends. 15 Q. You weren't asked to look for trends but did you 16 not sense any trends yourself? 17 A. As I said earlier, ordinarily, when I wasn't 18 dealing with cases like Mr Castleton, that were 19 truly extraordinary, I would spent one maybe two 20 hours a week on these matters, subpostmaster 21 deficiency. It was a very, very small part of 22 my caseload. 23 Q. I'm going to move on to a different topic. 24 Sir, I think I'll continue. We have 25 20 minutes before 1.00. I think I'll press on. 94 1 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: By all means. You take it as you 2 think appropriate, Mr Blake. 3 MR BLAKE: Thank you. 4 Involvement in criminal cases. You address 5 this in your witness statement. It's 6 paragraph 54 of your statement, where you say: 7 "Civil Litigation solicitors would have no 8 interest or involvement in a criminal case until 9 it had been concluded." 10 Can you assist us with how those teams were 11 separated? Were they physical separations? 12 A. When I first joined Legal Services, we were in 13 a tower block in Croydon and the Legal Services 14 Departments were spread out on two separate 15 corridors, two separate floors. The Criminal 16 Department was down another corridor, in effect 17 physically separated from the general Civil 18 Litigation Team and, by about 2006 -- and I'm 19 basing this on disclosure that was made on 20 Tuesday -- the Prosecution criminal team was 21 based in Victoria in Central London. 22 So we were geographically in separate places 23 for the middle to latter portion of 2000 to 24 2010, and physically separated in terms of being 25 two separate ends of a divided corridor, when we 95 1 were all working together in Impact House. 2 There is a sort of landing with two sets of 3 double doors and Criminal and Prosecution were 4 down one end and Civil down the other end. 5 Q. Did you share any joint meetings? 6 A. I think it extremely unlikely, until possibly 7 the 2000s, because -- 8 Q. Do you mean 2000s or do you mean post-2010? 9 A. No, sorry, 2010. Because from 2000 to the end 10 of 2009, and possibly way in to 2010, our only 11 real connection with Prosecution was cases where 12 they had not been able to achieve recovery of 13 outstanding debt. Therefore, they would 14 prosecute an individual and if they forgot to 15 apply for a compensation order or the court 16 wasn't minded to grant it then, and only then, 17 would a case from Prosecution be referred to 18 ourselves. 19 Q. How about management? Did you share the same 20 management structure? 21 A. As I say, I worked to either my team leader or 22 to the Head of Civil Litigation. Criminal and 23 Prosecution worked to Mr Rob Wilson. So we 24 didn't share a management structure in that 25 respect. 96 1 Q. Did their managers share a manager, if you're 2 able to assist us with that? 3 A. I believe that Rob Wilson -- if I can go back to 4 the early days, I believe that Rob Wilson and 5 Joe Ashton, who were respectively Head of 6 Criminal and Head of Civil Litigation, reported 7 directly to Catherine Churchard, who was the 8 solicitor to the Post Office at that time. And 9 I believe that that's a structure that was 10 maintained subsequently. 11 Q. Thank you. Can we look at POL00083161_002, 12 please. It's page 2 of that document. Again, 13 I'm going to take this broadly chronologically, 14 looking at involvement in criminal cases. If we 15 could look at the bottom email. There is 16 an email forwarded by you, but it's originally 17 from Graham Ward, who was Graham Ward? I think 18 if we scroll down, we can actually -- 19 A. There's possibly his title on the next page. 20 Q. There is. It says "Casework Manager, Post 21 Office Limited Investigation Team"? 22 A. Yeah. 23 Q. So he was part of the Investigations team, was 24 he? 25 A. Yes, and they worked primarily on criminal 97 1 cases. 2 Q. Thank you. If we go up to the bottom of the 3 page before, so the bottom of page 2, a little 4 bit further, so the bottom of that page. Thank 5 you. He says: 6 "Mandy (Keith -- for info) ..." 7 That's Keith Baines? 8 A. Mm-hm. 9 Q. "As discussed yesterday ... please find attached 10 the statement from Jan Holmes which was used in 11 a prosecution of a counter clerk at Camberwell 12 Branch Office in 2002." 13 Pausing there, we know that was Tracy 14 Felstead, who was 19 years old at the time and 15 her conviction has subsequently been overturned. 16 A. Mm-hm. 17 Q. It says: 18 "I would suspect that Jan Holmes' statement 19 is more or less exactly what you'll need should 20 the 'Castleton' case proceed all the way 21 (however I seem to recall that at the time, as 22 it was out of the normal this statement did cost 23 us an 'arm and a leg' ... but I maybe wrong)." 24 Did you on occasion, therefore, have sight 25 of statements and other documents that were used 98 1 as evidence in criminal proceedings? 2 A. Very, very rarely. At this time, we were 3 trying, and Stephen Dilley was trying, to obtain 4 witness statements and I think Graham thought it 5 might be of assistance if Stephen got in touch 6 with Jan Holmes because he had prepared 7 a witness statement in another case. Looking at 8 it, it appears possibly the witness statement 9 from Jan Holmes was attached to this email -- 10 oh, yes, it was: "Revised witness statement, Jan 11 Holmes". Yes, so I would have seen a copy of 12 that witness statement at the time. 13 Q. Was this particular to you in your role that you 14 are being involved or sent matters relating to 15 criminal prosecutions? You've said that your 16 team had little involvement? 17 A. No, this was as a consequence of Stephen trying 18 to identify people within POL and Fujitsu who 19 were capable of giving witness statements on 20 this type of case. 21 Q. So is this relatively isolated, then? 22 A. Oh, yes, absolutely. 23 Q. Can we look at POL00067487, December 2006. So 24 before we were December 2005, so a year later. 25 We have a letter and it's relating to Josephine 99 1 Hamilton, sent to Cheryl Woodward in the Agents 2 Debt Team and it says, as follows -- if we could 3 go halfway down the page to that middle 4 paragraph it says: 5 "Ms Hamilton is likely to allege that she 6 was inadequately trained on the Horizon System. 7 It is possible that she may also contend that 8 there were errors with the Horizon software 9 although her Solicitors have not specifically 10 said so. Her letter does however hint at it. 11 In light of that I am copying this letter to 12 Mandy Talbot." 13 Now, these were the criminal proceedings 14 against Josephine Hamilton, again another case 15 that we know has subsequently been quashed. It 16 was written, in fact, the day before she first 17 appeared in a Magistrates Court and it refers 18 there to her potentially challenging Horizon, 19 and copied to you in light of that. Why would 20 matters challenging Horizon be copied to you? 21 A. I'm not 100 per cent certain, though as this is 22 Cheryl Woodward and she was the lady who gave 23 instructions to begin proceedings in Castleton, 24 she may have thought it appropriate to tell Hugh 25 James to keep me copied in for that reason. 100 1 This was something that was referred to me 2 for information, as far as I was concerned. No 3 more. 4 Q. I mean, sorry, if we could zoom out slightly. 5 This is a letter from Hugh James. The fact that 6 they knew that you would be interested in cases 7 relating to errors within the Horizon software, 8 shall we not read anything into that? 9 A. Hugh James had informed me of the possibility of 10 an embryonic class action. As such, I may have 11 been copied in on that basis. 12 Q. Were you starting, at this point, to coordinate 13 cases? 14 A. No, no. 15 Q. This is precisely the time when, of course, the 16 Castleton case was going on. Did you tell Hugh 17 James that you had a similar case, 18 Mr Castleton's case: a similar case where 19 Horizon software was being challenged? 20 A. I believe that I asked Bond Pearce to liaise 21 with Hugh James and any -- by implication, any 22 other external agents on subpostmaster cases, 23 because I wanted to ensure that proceedings were 24 not issued again where the documentary evidence 25 wasn't in apple-pie order and that we wouldn't 101 1 be able to prove on the arithmetic that losses 2 had been sustained at individual branches. 3 Q. Undoubtedly a serious matter, Ms Josephine 4 Hamilton being prosecuted, shortly before her 5 appearance in court. You're being told about 6 it. 7 A. Mm-hm. 8 Q. Did you think at that stage to raise, for 9 example, that you had, by then, received two 10 expert reports where allegations were being made 11 about the Horizon System or concerns were being 12 raised about the Horizon System? 13 A. No, I did not. 14 Q. Did you tell them, for example, that you had 15 that Cleveleys case, where the independent 16 expert had raised concerns about the Horizon 17 System? 18 A. I believe I merely read the letter and probably 19 filed it. 20 Q. Did you think, with criminal cases being brought 21 to your attention, that you had any duties of 22 disclosure in respect of those cases of your -- 23 in respect of your knowledge of any problems 24 with the Horizon System? 25 A. No, at the time, I dealt with each and every 102 1 case on its particular facts and as a singular 2 item. 3 Q. Can we please look at POL00053778, please. 4 Thank you. Can we turn to page 5, the bottom of 5 page 5. An email from you to, is it Michele? 6 A. Michele. 7 Q. Michele Graves. Who was Michele Graves? 8 A. Somebody within Post Office Limited but, 9 unfortunately, I cannot remember which 10 department after this period of time. 11 Q. The subject there is an Eleanor Dixon. We're in 12 January 2010, and you say this. You say: 13 "As you know, the business is prosecuting 14 a former subpostmistress who is adducing all 15 sorts of statements and comments from former 16 postmasters in support of the contention that 17 Horizon is the cause of all evil and that they 18 were perfect postmasters." 19 A. Mm. 20 Q. Is that a little sarcastic? 21 A. I do very much regret the language I used in 22 this and, as I've said in my statement, with 23 perfect hindsight, they were right to so adduce. 24 Q. You say: 25 "I attach a statement from Dixon along those 103 1 lines. Please can you locate any material which 2 [the Post Office] may still have on this lady so 3 we can assist the barrister who is prosecuting 4 the case on our behalf." 5 So having said that getting involved in 6 criminal cases was quite rare, we again have 7 another case here where you seem to be involved 8 in the -- 9 A. I believe what I said was it was quite rare 10 until 2010. If I didn't say that -- 11 Q. Yes, I think you're absolutely right. Why was 12 it in 2010 that you became involved in criminal 13 proceedings? 14 A. In 2010, the Criminal department began the 15 prosecution of Ms Misra and, for the first time 16 I can ever recall, I was approached by a clerk 17 in the prosecution team, on behalf of a criminal 18 barrister, and asked to provide him with 19 information about civil cases that had been 20 dealt with in the civil courts where Horizon was 21 challenged or, alternatively, he may have 22 provided me with a list of cases that he wanted 23 additional information on. I can't quite recall 24 which of those approaches were taken. 25 Q. I have a document that may assist you in that 104 1 regard. It's POL00055212. This is 2 September 2 2010. Can we scroll down, please. This is the 3 case of the Crown v Gurdeep Dhale, and it's 4 Jarnail Singh writing to you. Jarnail Singh, 5 the senior lawyer in the Criminal Law Division, 6 writing to you and saying: 7 "I have [this case]. Can the Defendant have 8 identified previous cases where the Horizon case 9 system has been criticised, namely Lee Castleton 10 Jo Hamilton, Noel Thomas, Amar Bajaj, Alan 11 Bates, Alan Brown and Julie ford. 12 "I understand that you and Counsel Warwick 13 Tatford looking at a number of cases in similar 14 circumstances in my case of Misra and I would be 15 grateful if you could give me details of that 16 and whether you can identify any other cases 17 listed above as to there were any questions or 18 criticisms of the Horizon System." 19 Does that assist you? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. Can you tell us then what it was you were being 22 asked to do or what you understood the task to 23 involve? 24 A. I believe that Mr Phil Taylor of the Criminal 25 Law Department contacted me, it would either 105 1 have been very late December 2009 or early 2 January 2020, and asked me for information, 3 I believe, on the Castleton case, and I tried to 4 retrieve what information we had and supplied 5 that to the barrister. 6 I think, from other internal documentation, 7 that the barrister may even have spent a couple 8 of days at our office looking at materials on 9 the case of Castleton. 10 Now, Jo Hamilton, as you say, was 11 a Prosecution case, so I would never have had 12 any information on that. 13 Callendar Square, the only information I had 14 was that provided by yesterday's witness about 15 a particular glitch that, you know, became known 16 as the Callendar Square issue, Callendar Square 17 problem. 18 So, although Mr Singh has asked me for 19 information across all of these cases, I would 20 only ever have been able to provide information 21 about civil actions to him and I believe that my 22 ultimate response in December 2010 was along the 23 lines of "I would have thought you already had 24 this material as your barrister in the case of 25 Misra spent a number of days with us". 106 1 Q. Those are all specific named cases. I think he 2 also says "whether you can identify any other 3 cases listed above and whether there are any 4 questions or criticisms of the Horizon System". 5 Did you at that point carry out any exercise to 6 look back at the cases you had been involved in 7 over the years to see if there had been any 8 issues involving the Horizon System that might 9 be disclosable in those criminal cases? 10 A. No, I didn't. 11 MR BLAKE: Sir, I think that's an appropriate time 12 to pause for lunch. 13 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes. 14 MR BLAKE: Can we come back at 2.00, please? 15 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, of course. 16 MR BLAKE: Thank you very much. 17 (1.00 pm) 18 (The Short Adjournment) 19 (2.00 pm) 20 MR BLAKE: Good afternoon, sir. 21 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Good afternoon. 22 MR BLAKE: Thank you. 23 Mrs Talbot, when we left off before the 24 break we were on POL00055212 and that was 25 a letter from Jarnail Singh in relation to the 107 1 case of Dhale, requesting certain information 2 from you. That should be brought up on the 3 screen. Thank you. Do you recall that letter, 4 yes? 5 A. Yes, I do. 6 Q. Thank you. I'm going to move on but I'll come 7 back to that particular topic shortly but can 8 we, before I do that, go to POL00107242 and it's 9 page 3. It this is 9 December 2010 and an 10 email from yourself to all and it says: 11 "Dear All, 12 "Now that the Misra prosecution has 13 concluded we now have to pick up civil Horizon 14 cases to see whether or not we should be 15 bringing proceedings in respect of them." 16 Had civil cases been paused pending the 17 decision in the Seema Misra case or the 18 judgment -- the verdict even, in the Seema Misra 19 case? 20 A. I think some had, yes. 21 Q. Looking down to a message to Dave, you say 22 there: 23 "This was a chap who worked as a postmaster 24 2007 to 2008." 25 This is about David Bristow, 108 1 a subpostmaster: 2 "He refuses to believe that he has done 3 anything wrong and that it was the fault of 4 Horizon which led him to be threatened with 5 summary termination -- he eventually resigned." 6 You say halfway through the next paragraph: 7 "He has jumped on the Postmasters for 8 Justice Bandwagon. I appreciate that the 9 complete printout would be very expensive. 10 Given your knowledge of Fujitsu, can you 11 estimate what the cost would be or suggest 12 whether there is any other way of proving that 13 the system was working correctly and that 14 therefore the losses it showed were real 15 losses?" 16 You seem there to be getting slightly tired 17 of the "bandwagon"; is that a fair summary of 18 your mindset at that time? 19 A. Within Civil Litigation, I was beginning to feel 20 frustrated and I think I've alluded to that in 21 my statement, because Fujitsu and POL were 22 constantly assuring us that there was absolutely 23 nothing wrong with the Horizon System and, yet, 24 every time -- well, every time a matter was 25 referred to Civil Litigation -- and this would 109 1 only have been a tiny proportion of postmaster 2 deficiency cases -- the response was becoming 3 regular that the subpostmasters were not at 4 fault, it was Horizon. 5 So we were frustrated because we'd been 6 given assurances there's nothing wrong on one 7 side and yet people are claiming there's 8 something wrong on the other. 9 Q. You say there it would be expensive to get 10 a complete printout. I mean, by that stage were 11 you having so many cases brought by 12 subpostmasters or so many complaints about 13 Horizon being brought that you didn't want to 14 waste money on it? 15 A. No, that's -- pardon me. No, that's not what 16 I mean at all. I'm not a commercial lawyer but, 17 under the contract between POL and Fujitsu, 18 Fujitsu were only obliged to provide their 19 services in analysing cases 100 times a year. 20 Now, I'm not a prosecutor but I did come to 21 know that Prosecution would, in their own 22 investigations, utilise an awful lot of that 100 23 opportunities. Therefore, if you're dealing 24 with a civil case and you want an analysis of 25 data from Fujitsu, you would then have to go 110 1 back to POL the business and get them to 2 authorise that they were prepared to pay for the 3 same. So that's why I'm talking about cost in 4 that particular extract. 5 Q. At this stage, you've said you were frustrated. 6 It seems as though it seems all a bit of 7 a bandwagon to you and you don't want to go 8 through the expense of having to get information 9 from Fujitsu? 10 A. No, I was asking for Dave's opinion as to what 11 he thought and I think this is probably Dave 12 Hulbert, what he thought Fujitsu would charge to 13 obtain that information. I wasn't rejecting it 14 at all. I wanted information. 15 Q. At this stage, 2010, were you aware of, for 16 example, the article in Computer Weekly? That 17 was a 2009 article? 18 A. I didn't read it personally but I have seen 19 additional disclosure making reference to it. 20 Q. Can we move on to POL00055894, please. When we 21 just started after lunch I took you back to that 22 document, where it was a request in the case of 23 Dhale, that request was the 2 September 2010, 24 and this was, I think, your response, dated 25 16 December 2010. Do you recall why it took 111 1 such a long time to respond to Jarnail Singh? 2 A. I think it's because there was another exercise 3 going on within Legal Services this time, to try 4 to reduce headcount and, during that process, 5 I was informed there was no more role for me 6 within Legal Services and it is on that occasion 7 that I moved over in the following January to 8 Royal Mail Group, the business. 9 Q. So, by that stage, how small had the legal team 10 within the Post Office become? 11 A. In terms of permanent members of staff, quite 12 small, because a process had begun under which 13 the -- some of the regional agents but certainly 14 a lot of the London agents would provide lawyers 15 for a period of six to nine months to come and 16 work with the in-house team, ergo reducing the 17 actual employee numbers. 18 Q. I don't quite understand that, sorry. 19 A. Sorry. There was an exercise going on to reduce 20 headcount within Legal Services -- 21 Q. Yes. 22 A. -- and I think, as part of trying to fulfil 23 obligations to our clients, in place of some of 24 us who were going, a process began under which 25 our external legal agents began to supply 112 1 members of their firms to come and work within 2 Legal Services for a period of time, I think 3 a minimum of six months, sometimes longer. 4 Q. So a secondment of some sort? 5 A. A secondment, that's the word I was -- 6 Q. So they were reducing the size of the legal team 7 and replacing people who were experienced in 8 dealing with these kinds of cases with external 9 lawyers for a temporary period of time? 10 A. That's correct. 11 Q. You say in that response: 12 "I thought that your barrister on the case 13 of Misra would have copies of everything which 14 he considered to be relevant from the time he 15 spent two days here. I only have email folders 16 on Lotus Notes insofar as they can be retrieved 17 and in Outlook but you are welcome to come over 18 and search them. 19 "There are numerous boxes in respect of 20 Castleton most of which are still with Stephen 21 Dilley ... who can let you know how much it 22 would cost retrieve them from their storage 23 facility." 24 Then you say this: 25 "There are ongoing cases every month which 113 1 raise the issue of Horizon so it's a movable 2 feast. I'm endeavouring to pull together a list 3 of those cases currently with us where 4 allegations have been made in respect of 5 Horizon. Most of these cases have been on hold 6 awaiting the decision on Misra. The transcript 7 of that case is now being created and should be 8 with us shortly ..." 9 Why was it that Misra was so significant at 10 this time? 11 A. Misra was significant for the business. It was 12 a criminal case, so, logically, looking back, it 13 shouldn't have had an impact on civil matters at 14 all. I can only conclude that a decision was 15 made that any embryonic subpostmaster deficiency 16 civil cases should be stayed pending that 17 decision -- pending the conclusion of the Misra 18 case, sorry. 19 Q. I'll go on to draw your attention to a number of 20 other documents relating to the Seema Misra case 21 but, before I do that, might it be the case that 22 like Lee Castleton, Seema Misra's case was being 23 held out as an example to dissuade future 24 claims? 25 A. It was a criminal prosecution, so I can't 114 1 comment on that. 2 Q. But the fact that cases seem to have been 3 stayed, on hold, awaiting a decision on Misra 4 sounds as though Misra would have been very 5 significant for the Post Office? 6 A. I think it was significant to the Post Office, 7 yes. 8 Q. "There are ongoing cases every month which raise 9 the issue of Horizon ..." 10 Was that not indicative of a wider problem 11 with Horizon at that stage? 12 A. The Mr Greening document that we referred to 13 this morning, if that had begun to be 14 implemented, would have required us to begin 15 reporting on subpostmaster cases and there's 16 a possibility that I might have been concerned 17 about numbers arising out of that. But, as 18 I say, that document was created in August 2000. 19 We're still only in December 2000. Probably -- 20 Q. 2010. 21 A. 2010, sorry. Probably hadn't got off the ground 22 as yet. 23 Q. We have quite serious criminal proceedings going 24 on against Mr Dhale and Ms Misra. Do you know 25 if they were told that there were ongoing cases 115 1 every month which raised issues of Horizon? 2 A. I don't know. 3 Q. By this time, 2010, you knew about the report in 4 Cleveleys, you knew about the BDO report in the 5 Castleton case. You knew about complaint after 6 complaint about the Horizon System, so much so 7 it seems that cases were put on pause awaiting 8 a decision in the Misra case. Was all that 9 knowledge that you had relevant to the Misra 10 case and what was to become a precedent? Did 11 you feel any burden on yourself knowing that 12 this significant case was taking place to 13 provide information about your knowledge of the 14 complaints that had been made about the Horizon 15 System over the years? 16 A. I didn't see that as my role at the time. 17 I think I assumed, and this is only a personal 18 assumption, that Criminal would have been aware, 19 given their involvement with Security, Fujitsu 20 and POL. 21 Q. You've said that the Criminal Divisions and the 22 Civil Divisions were kept very much apart? 23 A. They were. 24 Q. You seem here to be a conduit for information in 25 some ways to the Criminal team. Did you see any 116 1 responsibility on yourself to inform the 2 Criminal team about, for example, the Coyne 3 report in the Cleveleys case or the doubts that 4 were raised in the Castleton case or other 5 complaints, civil complaints, that you had 6 received in relation to the functioning of 7 Horizon? 8 A. I didn't. 9 Q. Was there any process in place for drawing all 10 of those civil strings together and providing 11 that information to the Criminal team? 12 A. No, there wasn't. 13 Q. Can we look at POL00055716. I think this is 14 a letter here -- is this from you or -- yes, if 15 we look over the page, it's a letter from you to 16 Guildford Crown Court. If we go to page 1, you 17 write to enquire whether the court will be 18 prepared to authorise the release of the tapes 19 of the hearing to arrange for them to be 20 transcribed: 21 "We need the transcript to us in other cases 22 where Fujitsu and the Horizon System are 23 challenged on similar facts. If the Judge is 24 prepared to release the tapes to us or the 25 transcribers for this purpose I would also want 117 1 them to include details of the sentencing 2 hearing." 3 It does seem to some extent that you were 4 a conduit for these criminal matters and 5 gathering evidence to use against postmasters 6 who were involved in civil claims. 7 A. I don't think I was a conduit for civil -- for 8 criminal matters. I had other clients within 9 the business and I believe, if I was a conduit 10 for anybody, it was to provide information to 11 them, parties such as Mr Rod Ismay and Mike 12 Granville, who was Head of Regulatory 13 Relationships. 14 I can't now recall whether or not any order 15 was made for Misra to pay over any money to Post 16 Office Limited, so, therefore, it may be that 17 part of the reason for me writing to Guildford 18 Crown Court was to obtain this documentation 19 with a view to taking further civil proceedings, 20 but -- 21 Q. You're there writing to the Crown Court and you 22 say: 23 "We need the transcript to us in other cases 24 where Fujitsu and the Horizon System are 25 challenged on similar facts." 118 1 So it does seem, like the Castleton case, 2 that this was an important case for the Post 3 Office to win to dissuade others that were 4 waiting in the wings. 5 A. This was a criminal case and therefore I have 6 very limited information about it. I believe -- 7 I know that I was asked to apply to the 8 Guildford Crown Court for the transcript. For 9 what use it was going to be put to, other than 10 that -- other than to be of benefit to Post 11 Office Limited, I can't really comment. 12 Q. Who asked you to do that? 13 A. I'm very sorry but, without access to my papers, 14 I can't tell you. 15 Q. You recall being asked to do it. It wasn't of 16 your own volition -- 17 A. Oh -- 18 Q. -- but you don't recall who asked you? 19 A. I would never have written a letter like the one 20 on the screen at my own volition. 21 Q. But you can't remember who asked you? 22 A. Not without additional disclosure. 23 Q. I'm going to move on to a different topic, which 24 is the awareness or involvement of the Post 25 Office leadership and senior management. Can we 119 1 please look at WITN04600211, please. I'm going 2 to start with Keith Baines who was the contract 3 manager with Fujitsu. So we're moving now far 4 back in time back to where we started today, the 5 Wolstenholme case, 4 August 2004. Can you 6 assist us with what involvement Keith Baines had 7 in the Wolstenholme case and these cases more 8 broadly? 9 A. I can only conclude from this that Keith Baines 10 had access to a statement that would have been 11 in general form useful in terms of creating 12 a witness statement specific to the facts of the 13 Cleveleys case. 14 Q. Do you recall Keith Baines having been involved 15 in the early development of the Horizon project? 16 A. I don't know anything about the early 17 development of the Horizon project. 18 Q. Did Keith Baines ever raise with you any 19 concerns he had about the functioning or 20 reliability of the Horizon System? 21 A. Never. 22 Q. We've seen his name on a few documents today. 23 A. Mm-hm. 24 Q. What was his level of involvement generally in 25 these civil proceedings against subpostmasters? 120 1 A. I'm sorry, this is 2004. I dealt with thousands 2 of managers over the 23 years I was working for 3 Royal Mail Group. I can't recall his specific 4 function. 5 Q. Okay. I'll move on, then, to Rod Ismay and 6 others. Can we start by looking at POL00107426, 7 please. Can we look at page 3 of this document. 8 We have an email there from yourself to David 9 Smith, Jennifer Robson, Tony Utting, Rod Ismay, 10 and copied to certain people. In this, you 11 summarise the facts of the Castleton case. Can 12 you recall why this distribution list was being 13 used to summarise the facts of the Castleton 14 case in 2005? 15 A. I believe that David Smith was the most senior 16 officer on that list. Tony Utting was Head of 17 Security. Rod Ismay, you've already heard of. 18 Jennifer Robson, I think, was within the 19 subpostmaster deficiency collection team. 20 Q. Was this a group that you communicated regularly 21 with? 22 A. No, these groups, as I've said before, they 23 really were a movable feast. People would move 24 in and out of these contractor lists. 25 Q. I mean, there are some names that crop up time 121 1 and time again in documents we've seen, such Rod 2 Ismay. Is there a particular reason why these 3 kinds of emails were going to him? 4 A. I can't remember what his title was at the time. 5 Q. I'd like to read you briefly from this email. 6 A. Mm-hm. 7 Q. It goes: 8 "Summary of Facts 9 "Castleton." 10 Perhaps we could scroll down a little bit 11 further. He says at the bottom of that, bottom 12 paragraph: 13 "As part of the claim the solicitors for 14 [Lee Castleton] have stated in the allocation 15 questionnaire that they intend to call evidence 16 from other existing and former postmasters about 17 the problems with the Horizon System. They have 18 asked for disclosure of data about all calls or 19 complaints logged from postmasters about the 20 Horizon System, presumably from the inception of 21 the system. They have called for disclosure of 22 all documents removed from the Branch Office 23 during the investigation. There is an issue 24 over locating all of those documents." 25 Then you summarise the case of Bajaj, and 122 1 perhaps we can look at the final paragraph on 2 that page. It says: 3 "Mr Bajaj has taken the step of writing 4 an article in the SubPostmaster November 2005 5 edition, seeking information from other 6 postmasters in a similar situation." 7 Then you highlight there "Issues": 8 "In each case the postmasters are 9 challenging the validity of data provided by the 10 Horizon System and the cases became litigious 11 before that evidence could be properly 12 investigated. 13 "In each case it was known that Horizon was 14 going to be challenged but there was no 15 procedure in place to 16 "(a) acquire the necessary data 17 "(b) identify somebody with the relevant 18 knowledge and capacity to interpret the data and 19 report on the same. 20 "If the challenge is not met the ability of 21 [the Post Office] to rely on Horizon for data 22 will be compromised and the future prosperity of 23 the network compromised." 24 What did you mean by "the future prosperity 25 of the network compromised"? 123 1 A. POL's ability to rely upon the Horizon System 2 was absolutely crucial for the continuation of 3 POL as a business. 4 Q. So you had challenges from subpostmasters, here 5 Castleton and Bajaj, that you were concerned 6 about. The future of the network was at stake 7 and you make five suggestions, and I'd just like 8 to take you through those suggestions. The 9 first: 10 "A robust procedure is set up and 11 communicated to all relevant parties for 12 extracting necessary data from Horizon at 13 an early stage in all cases leading towards 14 possible termination of contract in each case 15 where the Horizon data is challenged." 16 Second, you talk about: 17 "... identifying a small team and training 18 them in interpretation and investigation 19 techniques." 20 Third: 21 "Fujitsu and the [Post Office] to liaise on 22 identifying a number of individuals or 23 specialist computer firms who could provide 24 a professional and independent report upon the 25 Horizon System in general and in the two cases 124 1 to hand if necessary." 2 Just pausing there, the evidence this 3 morning was very much that you took each case as 4 it came, each case individually, you weren't 5 coordinating the various cases. This is quite, 6 it seems, a significant suggestion that the Post 7 Office and Fujitsu should identify an external 8 firm to carry out an independent report. Do you 9 recall making that recommendation? 10 A. This is my communication. I wish to ensure that 11 for each and every case that we always litigated 12 on a purely independent basis and, by that, 13 I mean on the facts of every single case, that 14 we would be in the best possible position to 15 litigate by having all relevant data. I was 16 somewhat frustrated by the fact that proceedings 17 had been issued in the matter of Mr Lee 18 Castleton without all appropriate data being 19 present. 20 I was seeking, therefore, to try to persuade 21 the powers that be within POL -- I can't now 22 recall to whom entirely this communication 23 went -- but I was trying to persuade the 24 business that they really should put procedures 25 in place that would give solicitors, such as 125 1 myself, a better chance of being able to 2 litigate successfully. But I was just a case 3 worker. 4 Q. If we look at page 3, that has the recipient 5 list that we've already been through. You say 6 you can't recall, but -- 7 A. Mm. 8 Q. -- whose responsibility within that list would 9 it have been to take forward the recommendation 10 of identifying an independent external firm who 11 could carry out an investigation of Horizon? 12 A. I think, this is just to the best of my 13 recollection and opinion, that David Smith was 14 the most senior person on that list of contacts. 15 Q. As at the end of 2005, going into 2006, 2007, 16 was that independent report commissioned? 17 A. No. 18 Q. Were you concerned that it wasn't commissioned? 19 A. Of the, I think, five or so recommendations that 20 I made, I was less concerned about the 21 commission of an independent report than I was 22 about the creation of a team or even 23 an individual who would gather sufficient 24 knowledge of the system so as to be able to give 25 proper instructions on each case to external 126 1 solicitors, so that we didn't end up in another 2 situation where proceedings were issued without 3 all the relevant material being present. 4 Q. Was that coordinating role established as at 5 2005/2006 and onwards? 6 A. It was -- it -- the nearest it ever got was 7 an offer by Mr Tony Utting, who is third or 8 fourth on the communication list, who said that 9 he was prepared to do so, but then -- I think he 10 referred to it as "the sting in the tail", his 11 department had been tasked with reducing 12 headcount by a percentage. So, ultimately, no 13 such position was ever created and I think that 14 late on in 2000, when Andy Greening was trying 15 to get a grip of the whole subpostmaster estate, 16 that was still outstanding. 17 Q. Thank you. If we look, just to complete this 18 document, on that page you were on before, 19 page 5, there were two other recommendations 20 there. The fourth and fifth, if we scroll down, 21 thank you: one was investigating whether or not 22 they hold any data of the number of complaints; 23 and the fifth was identifying members of staff 24 who can provide witness statements. 25 Can we move on to POL00070496, please. This 127 1 is a similar time, this is a couple of days 2 earlier. If we look at the bottom email from 3 Tom Beezer. This is updating various 4 individuals about the position of the Lee 5 Castleton case and he outlines there some 6 concerns you had. It says: 7 "I spoke to Mandy. She is ... a little 8 disturbed that this matter has wide implications 9 ..." 10 This I talking about the default judgment 11 and it references there: 12 "As we were talking about this morning, Hugh 13 James are trying to contain an embryonic and not 14 yet issued class action relating to the Horizon 15 System. 16 "A judgment in relation to it is currently 17 very bad news." 18 Then there are requests from you and it 19 says: 20 "Mandy has made a number of requests that 21 I feel we MUST comply with ... 22 "1) that [you are] kept fully informed on 23 [the Castleton] matter ... 24 "2) that [you] be sent a full set of 25 proceedings ... and a full set of 128 1 correspondence ... 2 "3) due to the matters handled by Hugh James 3 relating to Horizon, Mandy asks that we speak to 4 them to ensure we are all pulling in the same 5 direction. This is even more important given 6 the threatened class action. Who makes this 7 call is partly dictated by how many Horizon 8 related cases we currently have. More on this 9 below." 10 Then 4: 11 "Mandy asks that we NEVER issue proceedings 12 on a claim based on Horizon evidence ... without 13 her specific consent." 14 Now, that role not having been created, the 15 Horizon co-ordination role, were you in some way 16 filling the vacuum and fulfilling that role? 17 A. In respect of cases that were being dealt with 18 by Bond Pearce, yes. But that was purely in 19 respect of litigation. It was not my role to 20 coordinate anything on behalf of POL or Fujitsu. 21 This was just my concern as a litigator to 22 understand what -- which cases Bond Pearce were 23 already instructed to issue proceedings upon. 24 I did not want another repeat of Castleton. 25 Q. At 4, you asked that they never issue 129 1 proceedings without your specific consent. Why 2 was that? 3 A. Because, as I've just said, I didn't think it 4 was appropriate on the case of Castleton, under 5 proceedings had hadn't been issued before 6 without -- with missing documentation in place, 7 leading to a very expensive defence of 8 a counterclaim. If they were to issue 9 proceedings on a subpostmaster case, I wanted to 10 make certain that all the appropriate 11 documentation was going to be in place and I was 12 still hoping at this time that it would be 13 possible for POL to commission a team to, you 14 know, facilitate that going forward. 15 Q. You've described in your evidence earlier that 16 you were just a case worker. 17 A. I was. 18 Q. This doesn't sound much like the role of a case 19 worker. It sounds as though you were applying 20 some management of the Horizon cases; is that 21 fair? 22 A. I was never a manager of the Horizon cases. 23 I just tried to deal with cases that came into 24 my inbox. 25 Q. Who were you doing this for? 130 1 A. Usually Error Resolution Team at Chesterfield. 2 Q. They're specific and quite -- the language used 3 is rather mandatory. Was this you on your own 4 asserting control or were you acting on somebody 5 else's behalf in instructing Bond Pearce in this 6 way? 7 A. No, this was me trying to fill my role as 8 a solicitor, in-house solicitor for Post Office 9 Limited in this case. This -- yes, this was me 10 acting to try to ensure that a repetition of 11 issuing proceedings in a Castleton situation 12 didn't occur again. 13 Q. Can we look at POL00090437. It's page 63. This 14 is a bundle of papers that we've looked at 15 already. Can we look at page 63, please. Still 16 sticking with the theme of management knowledge, 17 page 63 is an email from you to a very similar 18 list of names, common names that we've seen 19 before. David Smith, Rod Ismay, et cetera. 20 This is you passing on the good news about the 21 Castleton case. It's a document I think we 22 looked at earlier and it's where you update them 23 about the progress of the negotiations. 24 Why this particular list on this particular 25 occasion? It's quite a detailed note of 131 1 negotiations. It's not a summary of what's 2 happened. It's very much contemporaneous: this 3 is happening. Why would people in other parts 4 of the Post Office's business be interested in 5 that or why would they have received that? 6 A. This is really rather similar to the list of the 7 document we looked at two documents back. 8 Q. Yes. 9 A. Therefore, these were individuals who had 10 an interest in the case of Mr Castleton. 11 Q. Do you know why they were particularly 12 interested in the case of Mr Castleton? 13 A. I can't speak to that, I'm sorry. 14 Q. Can we look at page 33 of the same document. 15 It's the second half of the page. Sorry, the 16 bottom page, even. You're there updating the 17 entire group, 2007 now: 18 "This is just to let you know that we have 19 been completely successful in defending all the 20 allegations made by Mr Castleton. You will 21 recall that he contended that no genuine losses 22 occurred whilst he was a postmaster and that any 23 losses were manufactured by the HORIZON System. 24 The judgment has entirely vindicated the HORIZON 25 system." 132 1 Again, similar, if not the same, 2 distribution list. Was it common for updates of 3 cases to be sent to this distribution list or is 4 there something particularly special about the 5 Castleton case? 6 A. The importance of the Castleton case was the 7 size of the counterclaim and the, in effect, 8 attack on the Horizon System. 9 Q. If we look above, we have a response from Rod 10 Ismay. Rod Ismay there says: 11 "Thanks Mandy -- great news." 12 Then in the next paragraph: 13 "What can we do on a proactive comms front 14 here? We've watched the various inflammatory 15 letters in the SubPostmaster letters page and 16 wanted to be able to assure branches and clients 17 that they can rely on the integrity of Horizon. 18 "Any thoughts on comms following this case?" 19 What role did Rod Ismay have in respect of 20 comms, communications? He was the head of 21 Product and Branch Accounting, would you have 22 understood it to be part of his job to be 23 promoting communications there? 24 A. I don't know what the extent of his function was 25 at the time. It may well have included comms. 133 1 There was a Comms team at Royal Mail Group 2 Headquarters. 3 Q. Let's look at a document that makes a similar 4 point. It's POL00113488. We're now on 5 20 February 2007 and this is where Mr Castleton 6 has agreed to pay the costs. If we scroll down, 7 please, to the second half of the page. Similar 8 names on this distribution list. Keith Baines, 9 John Cole, Rod Ismay, et cetera. It says: 10 "Castleton has ... agreed our total bill for 11 costs in writing which means that we do not have 12 to go to Court to have them taxed which incurs 13 additional legal costs in its own right. This 14 response also indicates that Castleton has no 15 intention of appealing against the decision of 16 the Court and that the judgment is the final 17 comment on the matter. 18 "As such, we need to get on with making as 19 much use of the judgment as possible. Stephen 20 Dilley has asked for permission to publish 21 an article in a legal journal about the case 22 which I have no objection to as long as we 23 maintain editorial control as the more publicity 24 the case is given, the greater should be its 25 effect upon postmasters who take legal advice 134 1 about defending claims for repayment. 2 "Outstanding matters are: 3 "communicating the matter to the Fed -- 4 agreeing a suitable form of words possibly with 5 the assistance of external relations. 6 "arranging a meeting with Fujitsu -- 7 [proposed form of words]. 8 "agreeing with the auditors that they will 9 formally ask for, examine and refer to at least 10 three months worth of branch trading statements 11 [in future cases]", et cetera. 12 Do you think it was appropriate for somebody 13 who describes themself as "just a case worker" 14 to be making suggestions on how to publicise the 15 result of a court case? 16 A. It wasn't, in retrospect. I can only assume 17 that that has something to do with the document 18 that we looked at previously. 19 Q. In 2007, you hadn't moved on to your 2010 role 20 in the wider Post Office. You were still 21 managing Civil Litigation at this stage? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. Why do you think you were drawn into making use 24 of the judgment and commenting on ways in which 25 it would be publicised? 135 1 A. I don't know. I can only assume there is 2 a missing minute of a conversation where 3 possibly I was asked to assist on this matter. 4 I agree with you, this is not the role of 5 an ordinary civil litigator and this was 6 possibly the one and only time that this ever 7 occurred. 8 Q. Do you think it was inappropriate to be doing 9 that? 10 A. As an ordinary civil litigator, yes, it was but 11 I can only conclude that I was asked to do so by 12 some of the parties to whom that communication 13 is addressed. 14 Q. You were asked to, you say, by one of those 15 people, but -- 16 A. I assume. 17 Q. You assume. Did you ever raise any concerns 18 with anybody about the position that you were 19 being put in? 20 A. No. 21 Q. Can we please look at POL00104618, please. 22 We're now in August 2008. Can we please look at 23 the second page, at the bottom half of the 24 second page. We have an email from Andrew Winn 25 and we'll see in due course that this is 136 1 forwarded to you. Do you recall Andrew Winn? 2 A. I don't recall Andrew Winn and I don't believe 3 I ever dealt with this email, as the writing on 4 it isn't mine. It could well have been dealt 5 with whilst I was away on annual leave. 6 Q. Let's just have a look at what it says. It 7 says: 8 "Coms to branches 9 "I think we still do not have clear sign-up 10 around who would be communicated to. My 11 understanding is that the business only wants to 12 contact branches who have reported the 13 discrepancy or who have suffered financial loss 14 by making good an inflated amount." 15 We'll see in due course through the later 16 email what this is all about. It's about 17 a software glitch within Horizon and this email 18 is a discussion about who to tell about the 19 software glitch, whether you tell the individual 20 branches who have suffered the glitch or whether 21 you communicate it more widely. Do you recall 22 this at all? 23 A. No. I believe it could have been dealt with by 24 my line manager, given the manuscript comments 25 on the document. 137 1 Q. It says there: 2 "This accepts the risk that other branches 3 may raise the issue with [the Post Office] at 4 a later date. 5 "In terms of communication script I would 6 have thought something on the lines of -- 7 Singleton makes good loss -- 'Your branch 8 received a software change to Horizon. This has 9 caused a stock unit discrepancy to be calculated 10 incorrectly and as a result you have made good 11 a loss of [X amount] whereas the correct 12 loss/gain should have be [Y amount]. 13 "Post Office Limited need to compensate you 14 for the loss and will send you cheque for the 15 above amount. Can I confirm [the name that is 16 required]." 17 Then over the page, if we could scroll down, 18 so we can just see the top of the page before. 19 Where a branch has actually made a gain, the 20 proposal there is: 21 "Post Office do not intend to recover the 22 gain." 23 If we go to page 1 of this document, 24 please -- sorry, if we go over the page to 25 page 2 we have an email from Rod Ismay who says 138 1 there: 2 "Hi Andy -- before anyone sends any comms 3 anywhere please can you get confirmation that 4 Mandy Talbot/Biddy Wyles in Legal have seen and 5 are OK with proposed wording." 6 Now, why was Rod Ismay suggesting that you 7 comment on wording that was sent to branches, 8 following the identification of a software 9 glitch? 10 A. My reading of these communications is a request 11 by Rod Ismay for myself or Biddy, who was my 12 line manager at the time, to look at the 13 drafting of the letter. It's headed "Comms" but 14 I would have interpreted it as a letter that 15 they proposed to send to individual branches who 16 had suffered from this particular glitch. It 17 was really -- it was also part of our function, 18 although we were a Civil Litigation Department, 19 to assist many departments within POL and Royal 20 Mail Group with drafting correspondence if they 21 felt they needed assistance. 22 Q. Did Rod Ismay put your name forward in 23 particular because he knew that you were dealing 24 with issues relating to the Horizon System? 25 A. I think you would have to ask him on that point. 139 1 Q. Is it something that you would typically be 2 asked about, irrespective of your involvement in 3 the Horizon System or is it more likely that 4 this was being provided to you because of your 5 knowledge of the Horizon System? 6 A. We were asked to draft, in some cases, comment 7 and edit letters from all different departments 8 in the whole of Royal Mail Group. 9 Q. Let's look at the first page. This is the email 10 that is sent to you. So it's sent to you and 11 Biddy Wyles. It says: 12 "Not sure if you are the right people to 13 contact regarding this. 14 "Basically, we recently suffered a software 15 glitch within the Horizon System which resulted 16 in various over/under payments (both actual and 17 virtual) to certain (but definitely not all) 18 [Post Office] branches. 19 "We are trying to come up with suitable 20 wording to use in explaining these over/under 21 payments and how we intend on correcting them, 22 and were wondering if you are the right legal 23 people to run this past first?" 24 Is it your evidence that you never saw this 25 email, despite it being sent to you? 140 1 A. If I were away on holiday but my line manager 2 Biddy -- whose handwriting I think I recognise 3 on the documents that were disclosed to me -- 4 had already dealt with it, I would have been 5 very grateful that that was something I didn't 6 have to look at. 7 Q. Do you recall in 2008 it being brought to your 8 attention that there was a software glitch with 9 Horizon, which resulted in various over/under 10 payments? 11 A. Until such time as this material was disclosed, 12 no, I do not. I've no recollection of it. 13 Q. Are you aware of any similar references to 14 software glitches around this time that was 15 communicated throughout the department or 16 throughout senior figures within the Post 17 Office, for example? 18 A. I can't speak as to senior members of the Post 19 Office. Legal Services were a distinct unit in 20 their own right. I can only speak as to what 21 I personally knew. 22 Q. You're not aware of that having been 23 communicated amongst your team? 24 A. No. 25 Q. Can we look back at a document that we have 141 1 already looked at today, and that is 2 POL00053778, and can we look at page 5, please. 3 Thank you. It's the bottom of that page. So we 4 saw there, that is the email from you to Michele 5 Graves and others about the prosecution of 6 a former postmistress and allegations about the 7 Horizon System. If we turn to page 1 of this 8 document, we have an email being forwarded from 9 you to Warwick Tatford and it says: 10 "Warwick 11 "I have made enquiries of our Chairman's 12 Office team which deals with high profile 13 correspondence and they know nothing of 14 Mrs Nixon or Dixon of Highcliffe." 15 It's signed by you there. I think now it 16 says "Dispute Resolution, Company Secretary's 17 Office". By this stage were you in a different 18 team? 19 A. I was in exactly the same department, it's just 20 we'd stopped becoming litigators and we were now 21 dispute resoluters. 22 Q. You're there mentioning enquiries of the 23 Chairman's Office? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. How often was it part of your job to liaise with 142 1 the Chairman's Office? 2 A. It wasn't -- it was not part of my job to liaise 3 with the Chairman's Office, but quite often we 4 would receive requests for assistance from the 5 Chairman's Office and, therefore, I knew the 6 names of people to ask in the Chairman's Office 7 who did indeed deal with high profile 8 correspondence sent to the group. I knew their 9 identities so I knew who to contact there to see 10 if they had any record of Mrs Nixon or Dixon. 11 Q. Who, in particular, would you liaise with in the 12 Chairman's Office? 13 A. In this instance, it appears to be Michele 14 Graves. But, again, there were lots of 15 different team members over the 20-odd years 16 I was dealing with the Chairman's Office. 17 Q. If we stick to 2010, who, in particular, would 18 you deal with in the Chairman's Office? 19 A. Well, on this occasion, I think it's apparent 20 that it was Michele Graves. 21 Q. Was there anybody else who you liaised with in 22 the Chairman's Office during this period? 23 A. I cannot recall. Possibly if there's other 24 emails, I might recognise the names. 25 Q. In this period, to your knowledge, was the 143 1 Chairman's Office aware of complaints from those 2 who were being prosecuted about the Horizon 3 System? 4 A. I cannot speak to what the Chairman's Office or 5 their staff knew. This is merely an example of 6 me seeking information from them. 7 Q. Do you think it's likely that, when you were 8 seeking information from them, you would have 9 told them that there is a case ongoing that is 10 making a complaint about the Horizon System? 11 A. It's possible. 12 Q. Do you recall what the enquiries were that you 13 were making at that time? 14 A. This was in connection with the case of Misra, 15 judging by the time period. 16 Q. Thank you. I'm going to move on to another 17 document, POL00106867, please. This is a pile 18 of correspondence and I'm going to go through 19 three or four emails within this pile. Can we 20 start, please, with page 27. Thank you. Can we 21 scroll down to the bottom half of that page. 22 You're not, at this stage, copied in, although 23 you are within the chain and I'll take you to 24 the relevant email. But this is an email from 25 Andrew Daley to Jason Collins, Graham Brander. 144 1 We have Andy Hayward bcc'd in. Andy Hayward was 2 from the Security team. Do you remember him? 3 A. It's a name I recognise. 4 Q. It says: 5 "Jason/Graham, 6 "Andy called me and asked whether you guys 7 ... could put together some stats on these cases 8 where the accused's defence was/is the Horizon 9 data is unreliable for any amount of reasons 10 given the accused." 11 He attaches there an article which is titled 12 there "Horizon blamed.pdf". This is February 13 2010. I mean, this sounds like much kind of 14 thing that you were recommending in 2005, wasn't 15 it? 16 A. I was -- I was recommending in 2005 that 17 a sensible process be put up to assist us with 18 civil litigation cases. 19 Q. This is 25 February, 11.49. Can we now turn to 20 page 25 in the bottom email. We have the same 21 date now, 4.10 pm, and it says: 22 "Andrew/Jason 23 "I'm aware of two ongoing cases at West 24 Byfleet ... & Orford Road ... and also some 25 historical cases ... but as FIs ..." 145 1 Do you understand what that means at all? 2 A. For information, possibly. 3 Q. "... we wouldn't have Horizon disputed cases 4 other than those reported by the investigators, 5 who will have far more details on the issues 6 than us." 7 Then he says this: 8 "I have attached an article from an IT 9 magazine which may have brought this issue to 10 the fore in the 1st place and which may be of 11 interest to Ian." 12 Do you remember the article that's referred 13 to in this correspondence at all? 14 A. I've seen reference to it but I can't remember 15 ever reading it. 16 Q. Can we please look at page 3 of this chain. 17 Thank you. If we look at the bottom half, we're 18 now at 26 February and Andy Hayward has included 19 you as the first recipient of this email. I'm 20 going to take you through it. Do you recall 21 receiving this email? 22 A. Not until it was disclosed, no. 23 Q. It says, as follows: 24 "All, 25 "Following our conference call today, below 146 1 is a brief summary of the agreed key activities 2 to progress the next steps in relation to the 3 above piece of work ..." 4 The above being the subject, "Challenges to 5 Horizon". Do you recall that conference call 6 taking place? 7 A. I don't. 8 Q. "AH & MT ..." 9 Presumably the "MT" is you, Mandy Talbot. 10 A. I believe so. 11 Q. "AH" is presumably Andy Hayward; is that right? 12 A. I assume so. I think there is a list of our 13 initials at the end of this document. 14 Q. Absolutely. If we scroll down, we can see 15 exactly who was in attendance. It's over the 16 page. Then we have: MT, Mandy Talbot; RI, Rod 17 Ismay; RM, Rebekah Mantle; Dave King; Sue 18 Lowther; Dave Posnett; Andy Hayward. 19 So if we go back, it has you providing 20 information on past and present cases with 21 reference to the Horizon challenges, and it 22 says: 23 "Note: I have asked the fraud team to review 24 [approximately] the past 2-3 years case file 25 although these challenges are of a more recent 147 1 nature." 2 Do you recall the decision to review two to 3 three years of case files? 4 A. No. All that would have concerned me, on 5 receipt of this email, is to try to provide 6 Andy, on behalf of Sue, with any information 7 I had that could assist them with this piece of 8 work. 9 Q. The case of Castleton, for example, and the case 10 of Cleveleys, they were older than two to three 11 years. 12 A. Mm. 13 Q. Do you recall, around the 2010 time, talking to 14 these individuals about the Cleveleys case or 15 about the Castleton case? 16 A. No, and I wouldn't have. I would only have 17 provided what information I had about civil 18 litigation cases. The reference to the fraud 19 team there, they were the investigators that fed 20 into the Prosecution department. So that really 21 wouldn't have involved me. 22 Q. Then: 23 "Information Security ... to conduct initial 24 investigations and provide Terms of Reference 25 outlining remit and requirements to carry out 148 1 full investigation." 2 So the proposal seems to be that the 3 Information Security team conducted an initial 4 investigation but that is then followed by 5 what's called a full investigation. Do you 6 recall that? 7 A. I don't recall the conference call but, as it is 8 recorded on this document, then that must be 9 what happened. 10 Q. If we look at the third piece of work: 11 "Subject to agreement of 2 above, conduct 12 full investigations into integrity issues, with 13 conclusions/report provided. Once investigated 14 and conclusions drawn, gain external 15 verification to give a level of 'external 16 gravitas' to the response to these challenges 17 (Recommend Ernst & Young as most suitable 18 partner to complete this)." 19 Was there in fact a full investigation into 20 integrity issues that was verified in some way 21 by an external firm? 22 A. If that ever occurred, I was never made aware of 23 it. 24 Q. In fact, you don't recall this meeting? 25 A. I don't, but I suspect that it was probably 149 1 a telephone conference call and we had lots and 2 lots of those. 3 Q. Do you recall, in February 2010, the discussion 4 about a full investigation into integrity 5 issues? 6 A. I cannot recall it but, as it is recorded on 7 this document, it must have occurred. I can't 8 unfortunately assist the Inquiry any further on 9 this point than what is already written on the 10 document. 11 Q. Isn't that entirely consistent with your 12 recommendation back in 2005, that there be 13 a full investigation? 14 A. And that is why I was very happy to support it. 15 Q. What did you do in respect of supporting it? 16 A. I believe, though I would have been prepared to 17 provide what information I had about civil 18 subpostmaster deficiency cases to Sue Lowther 19 but I do not think, because of an intervention 20 by the Head of Criminal Law, that this piece of 21 work proceeded any further. But that is just my 22 opinion. 23 Q. Being consistent with your suggestion in 2005, 24 do you recall having spoken out in favour of 25 this full investigation into integrity issues? 150 1 A. Given that I had originally suggested something 2 similar in 2005, although I cannot recall it, 3 I suspect that I probably did. 4 Q. Do you recall any conversations? 5 A. I'm sorry, I can't. 6 Q. Can we look at page 1. This is the email, the 7 intervention that you've referred to. Actually, 8 sorry, if we look at the bottom of page 1 you'll 9 see that Dave Posnett there forwards the earlier 10 chains to Rob Wilson, and he says: 11 "Can we please ensure that Rob Wilson (Head 12 of Criminal Law, [Royal Mail Group]) is kept 13 appraised of the situation ..." 14 If we scroll up, this is his response. Do 15 you recall why Rob Wilson wasn't invited to that 16 original meeting? 17 A. No, I don't. As I say, I don't actually recall 18 the telephone -- I really do suspect that it 19 probably was a telephone conference. I've no 20 idea why he wasn't invited to that original 21 conference. 22 Q. Having been what you described as just a case 23 worker up until this point, was it not 24 significant to you that you were being drawn 25 into what was quite a significant step on behalf 151 1 of the Post Office? 2 A. Well, both I and my line manager, Rebekah 3 Mantle, were litigators and, in effect, we had 4 an interest in the business being able to 5 litigate as efficiently as possible and, given 6 my recommendations in December 2005, I wasn't 7 too surprised to be involved in this. 8 Q. Is it not something that you would have had 9 quite a good recollection of, given that it was 10 one of the more recent incidents, 2010 -- we're 11 not going to back to 2005 now -- and that you 12 were being involved in what is quite 13 a significant enterprise on behalf of the Post 14 Office? 15 A. I wish my memory were that good. I'm sorry, 16 I can't assist any further. 17 Q. Can we look at the top of page 1, and this is 18 the email response from Rob Wilson. I'm going 19 to read from quite a lot of it. It says: 20 "Dave, 21 "If it is thought that there is a difficulty 22 with Horizon then clearly the action set out in 23 your memo is not only needed but is imperative. 24 The consequence however will be that to commence 25 or continue to proceed with any criminal 152 1 proceedings will be inappropriate. My 2 understanding is that the integrity of Horizon 3 data is sound and it is as a result of this that 4 persistent challenges that have been made in 5 court have always failed. These challenges are 6 not new and have been with us since the 7 inception of Horizon as it has always been the 8 only way that Defendants are left to challenge 9 our evidence when they have stolen money or 10 where they need to show that our figures are not 11 correct. 12 "What is being suggested is that an internal 13 investigation is conducted. Such 14 an investigation will be disclosable as 15 undermining evidence on the defence in the cases 16 proceeding through the criminal courts. 17 Inevitably the defence will argue that if we are 18 carrying out an investigation we clearly do not 19 have confidence in Horizon and therefore to 20 continue to prosecute will be an abuse of the 21 criminal process." 22 Pausing there, is that something that you 23 recall being said to you in these discussions? 24 A. I don't remember the discussions and this is the 25 opinion of a criminal prosecutor. 153 1 Q. The concern that appears to be being raised in 2 this email is that, by carrying out 3 an investigation, that will be disclosable as 4 undermining evidence. Would you not remember 5 something that significant? 6 A. I'm afraid I don't. 7 Q. If we continue, the third paragraph: 8 "To continue prosecuting alleged offenders 9 knowing that there is an ongoing investigation 10 to determine the veracity of Horizon could also 11 be detrimental to the reputation of my team. If 12 we were to secure convictions in the knowledge 13 that there was an investigation, where the 14 investigation established a difficulty with the 15 system we would be open to criticism and appeal 16 to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal 17 will inevitably be highly critical of any 18 prosecutor's decision to proceed against 19 Defendants in the knowledge that there could be 20 an issue with the evidence." 21 Again, quite, you might think, a significant 22 statement, that it could be detrimental, that if 23 they secure convictions in the knowledge that 24 there was an investigation where the 25 investigation established a difficulty, they'd 154 1 be open to criticism. This is 2010. So quite 2 a long time before the Court of Appeal 3 ultimately heard these cases. Given the 4 significance of such a statement, do you still 5 not recall receiving this, discussing it? 6 A. I'm afraid I don't, but I can see that the 7 second person to whom this document is 8 addressed, Mr Doug Evans, was the solicitor at 9 the time. 10 Q. There is, of course, reference below to civil 11 litigation. It says: 12 "What we really need to do is impress on 13 Fujitsu the importance of fully cooperating in 14 the provision of technical expertise and witness 15 statements to support the criminal and civil 16 litigation now and in the future. 17 "Given the nature of the discussions that 18 took place on 26 February, I am staggered that 19 I was not invited to take part in the 20 conference." 21 In light of the implications of this 22 potential report, I think you said that it 23 wasn't ultimately pursued, the independent 24 investigation and you linked it in some way to 25 this email. Can you assist us with how you link 155 1 the two? 2 A. Given the concerns raised by Mr Wilson, this is 3 only my opinion, I assume that this dissuaded 4 the Information Security Department from 5 proceeding with their original intention. But 6 that is just my opinion. 7 Q. We can look at another email you were copied 8 into on page 9 of this chain. It's an email 9 from Susan Lowther of the Information Security 10 team, and she says: 11 "All, 12 "As was discussed on the conference call and 13 taking into account Rob's comments to confirm 14 that what we're looking at is a 'general' due 15 diligence exercise on the integrity of Horizon, 16 to confirm our belief in the robustness of the 17 system and thus rebut any challenges." 18 Looking back at that original email where 19 the discussion had been taking place to carry 20 out an exercise, is that a fair description of 21 what seems to have been discussed at the 22 original meeting? That it was simply going to 23 be a general due diligence exercise? 24 A. I'm afraid, as I've said before, I cannot 25 remember the original conference call meeting. 156 1 Q. There's one final document that I'll take you to 2 in this pack and I'll leave it at that. It's 3 page 15. The final. Thank you very much. Dave 4 King, Security Architect, continues on this 5 email chain. You're still copied in, 8 March, 6 3.27 pm. 7 "As discussed, I can confirm that we are in 8 no way questioning/investigating the financial 9 integrity of Horizon, or of the accounting 10 system as a whole. The Information Security 11 review is to look at the ways in which messages 12 are sent at a system level ..." 13 Again, is that consistent really with what 14 was being proposed at the meeting at which you 15 attended? 16 A. I'm afraid I cannot recall the precise detail of 17 that meeting. I'm sorry, but I can't assist 18 further. 19 Q. Okay. Eventually, we have something that we 20 refer to as the Ismay report. Can we look at 21 POL00026572. You're copied into this report 22 from Mr Ismay. The date is 2 August 2010. You 23 may not be able to assist us but is this 24 something that arose out of that meeting or is 25 this something else? 157 1 A. I do not know whether this document arose 2 directly out of the original Sue Lowther 3 proposal just discussed. 4 Q. Were you involved in the drafting of this report 5 in any way? 6 A. No. I may have been asked for information by 7 Mr Ismay, but I had no involvement in the 8 drafting of it whatsoever. 9 Q. All of the things that we've been talking about 10 today, the Cleveleys case, the report from Jason 11 Coyne, the Castleton case, the report from BDO, 12 all of the various reports to you over the years 13 where people were complaining about the Horizon 14 System, are these matters that you passed on to 15 Rod Ismay as part of his investigation? 16 A. If he had asked for information as broadly as 17 you've just defined it then I would have 18 provided that to him. But, after this period of 19 time, and with no documentary evidence recording 20 what I sent or did not send to him, I cannot 21 assist further. 22 Q. Your evidence today was that you dealt with each 23 case individually. 24 A. That is correct. 25 Q. Do you think you took that attitude in respect 158 1 of enquiries that were made by Rod Ismay? 2 A. I don't know. It all depends what he asked me 3 for. I would have done my best to provide him 4 with what information I had. 5 Q. Can we please now look at POL00055418. We're 6 still in 2010. We're now in October, 8 October 7 2010. This is an email from you to Jarnail 8 Singh, copied to Mike Granville and Rod Ismay. 9 The subject is "The Horizon trial". It seems as 10 though this may be the Seema Misra case. It 11 says: 12 "Mike and Rod are very interested in any 13 developments at the trial next week which impact 14 on Horizon. You promised to let me know if 15 anything unfortunate occurred in respect of 16 Horizon. Please can you copy Rod and Mike into 17 any messages. Incidentally, I assume that you 18 have briefed external relations. Can you let us 19 know who you have briefed because Mike and Rod 20 may wish to have input into any story relating 21 to Horizon. They may give you call on [and it 22 gives a number]. Incidentally Postmasters for 23 Justice met with the Minister this week and were 24 accompanied by Issy Hogg and the lady from 25 Shoosmiths." 159 1 We spoke earlier about whether it was 2 appropriate to get involved in matters relating 3 to publicity, et cetera. What exactly was your 4 role here in relation to the Horizon System and 5 in relation to more senior members of the Post 6 Office? 7 A. I didn't recall this document until it was 8 disclosed. I believe, to a large extent, I was 9 just performing the role of being a conduit 10 between more senior members of the POL business 11 and Mr Jarnail Singh, who was dealing with the 12 case of Horizon, which had become the next -- 13 the case of Misra, which had become the next 14 test case on the Horizon System. 15 Q. Was Misra -- I think we've discussed this 16 already -- very much seen as that test case, 17 very similar to Castleton in that respect? 18 A. I believe that it was, although I had much less 19 knowledge about it, simply because it was 20 a prosecution not a civil action. 21 Q. Do you think here you're once again being used 22 in a policy role, rather than a legal role? 23 A. I have never been involved in a policy or 24 a strategy role. I can only assume that I had 25 been asked by Mike Granville and Rod Ismay to 160 1 keep them updated with developments in this 2 case. 3 Q. You've told us that you weren't involved in 4 criminal prosecutions and rarely came across 5 them. Why are you, in particular -- why were 6 you dealing with this on behalf of Mike and Rod? 7 A. This was an unusual case, because, as I referred 8 earlier, the barrister in the case of Misra had 9 been in touch personally to ask for information 10 and, therefore, I believe, on this case alone, 11 I was performing that conduit function. 12 Q. Can we move on to POL00062075, please. Here 13 we're in 2014, so you now are in your regulatory 14 role -- 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. -- and you're receiving information relating to 17 a criminal prosecution. 18 A. Excuse me. If I can interrupt. I suspect that 19 I was copied in to that by mistake. I assume 20 I was on original template and they just never 21 bothered to remove me. I would have had nothing 22 to do with any prosecution case in 2014. I was 23 firmly embedded in the compliance team within 24 Royal Mail Group by then. It might have had my 25 CC on it, but I would never have come across 161 1 this document. 2 Q. But even in 2005/2006, or onwards, prior to your 3 moving roles, why would you be copied into a -- 4 the result of a criminal case? 5 A. I would have been copied in to the result of 6 a criminal case in the pre-POCA days, where 7 there'd been a failure to obtain an order for 8 compensation, so that Civil could assess on 9 behalf of the business whether there was any 10 viability of bringing civil proceedings to 11 achieve a recovery. 12 Q. Thank you. I have two more topics to address. 13 I should finish them hopefully before the break 14 otherwise we'll take a break and I'll finish the 15 final topic. There will then be a small number 16 of questions on behalf of Core Participants. 17 I want to briefly address the general 18 strategy that was pursued against Mr Castleton. 19 Can we look at POL00072432. This is 20 an attendance note that we saw that I went 21 through with Mr Dilley and it's paragraph 3, 22 about halfway down, that I'd like to look at. 23 It's 16 October 2006. It says there: 24 "Counsel therefore wants to play some 25 brinkmanship with the other side, ie push for 162 1 a December trial, but preserving our ability to 2 get that adjourned if they serve a late report 3 that we need to deal with. I said that we could 4 prepare for a December trial if necessary and 5 I was happy to do so, but I was concerned to 6 make sure that we could reply to any expert 7 reports served by Castleton. I also think that 8 our Counsel was effectively trying to ambush the 9 other side because he thinks that when we serve 10 these fifteen witness statements on them, they 11 will be knocked reeling a bit. Mandy 12 appreciates the tactics of this. She said that 13 the only thing with a December trial is that the 14 Post Office get very busy", et cetera. 15 Were you happy with the general approach 16 that was taken in Mr Castleton's case? 17 A. As detailed in the paragraph we're looking at, 18 yes, I was. 19 Q. It seems there as though Stephen Dilley 20 certainly thought that you were providing 21 instructions. I think the answer is going to be 22 no because we've been over this a few times 23 today, but can you recall who in the Post 24 Office, other than yourself, who driving this 25 strategy? 163 1 A. I'm afraid I can't. I would have obtained 2 instructions, but after this period of time, I'm 3 sorry, I can't assist. 4 Q. Can we look at POL00069453, please. This is 5 another attendance note. This time the 18th, so 6 two days after. It says: 7 "I had a conversation with Mandy Talbot. 8 She has spoken with Claire and Catherine at the 9 Post Office. They are happy to follow counsel's 10 advice and go for a December trial purely as 11 a tactic, even though acknowledging that it is 12 an unlikely event." 13 Et cetera. 14 Does that assist you with identifying who at 15 the Post Office, at least in respect of that 16 particular strategy, was providing the 17 instructions? 18 A. This was a reference to Clare Wardle, my 19 immediate line manager in Legal Services, and 20 Catherine Churchard, who was the solicitor to 21 the Post Office, as the whole organisation was 22 known as back at that time. 23 Q. Does that assist you in respect of any of the 24 evidence that you've already given today? 25 I know you asked to be pointed to specific 164 1 documents. Does that assist you? 2 A. This is an example of me escalating up within 3 civil litigation the advice that I'd been given 4 to ensure that they were satisfied with the 5 same. I would imagine that there would have 6 been a similar escalation within the POL side of 7 the business at the same time. But I -- 8 Q. You say the POL -- 9 A. I can't assist with the identity of those 10 parties after this period of time. 11 Q. Okay. The final topic before we take a break is 12 the difficulty or issues relating to obtaining 13 information from Fujitsu. 14 Can we look at POL00082080. And it's 15 page 6. This is an email from Stephen Dilley to 16 yourself. 17 A. Mm-hm. 18 Q. If we could scroll down, please, it says: 19 "Both 20 I copied you into my epic email ... but the 21 response to the same has been limited in the 22 extreme. 23 "I attach the responses of Graham C Ward and 24 David Hulbert. I have also been contacted by 25 John Cole asking for assistance in preparing 165 1 a spec for external expert or experts but 2 I think this is of limited use until we have 3 reports completed by Fujitsu on the system and 4 POL on the data provided. However in respect of 5 an external expert from the field of computer 6 systems and accounting can you suggest any 7 names ..." 8 Then it says: 9 "Stephen 10 "In the collation of evidence did you come 11 across anyone who you believe could actually 12 interpret the information which was obtained 13 from Fujitsu via Graham or the paper documents 14 which were available from the Post Office. As 15 you can see I am still getting the run around on 16 these cases by people who are not prepared to 17 assist." 18 Do you recall any issues with getting people 19 to assist and if so, who? 20 A. In the matter of Castleton, I believe that 21 Stephen Dilley was able to eventually provide -- 22 obtain assistance and witness statements from 23 persons within Fujitsu. However, I've alluded 24 to the fact that in ordinary civil cases, it 25 could be very challenging to obtain information 166 1 and evidence from Fujitsu. 2 Q. There's a message passed on it's forwarding 3 a message from Graham, the casework manager at 4 the Post Office. If we scroll down a little 5 bit, and this is addressed to you, Mandy, and it 6 says there, at the bottom: 7 "With regards to my knowledge of Horizon, 8 I can obtain data as and when required being the 9 SPOC between [Post Office] and Fujitsu, but I do 10 not have the working knowledge of the system to 11 analyse data and comment on whether Horizon was 12 working correctly or not, or whether 13 transactions have been processed correctly and 14 may still affect the office balance. I know 15 Tony U has agreed to have a look at the 16 Marine Drive data, but he is still waiting to 17 hear exactly what information needs analysing." 18 Over the page it says: 19 "Fujitsu should be able to offer a technical 20 perspective of the system working properly. 21 I have searched my records of previous 22 statements received and have found one where 23 Brian Pinder's predecessor Bill Mitchell 24 provided a statement (see below)" -- and we'll 25 see that below -- "commenting on individual 167 1 calls to the [Helpdesk] and then including 2 a general paragraph stating that 'None of these 3 calls would have had an effect on the integrity 4 of the data on the system ...'." 5 If we scroll down, he says at the top there 6 "Presumably Dave will" -- sorry, no. If we 7 scroll up to the top of the page, sorry, he 8 says: 9 "Perhaps I should ask Fujitsu to provide 10 a similar type of statement in respect of 11 Marine Drive ... what do you think?" 12 Then if we scroll down to the bottom, near 13 the bottom of this email, it's a little 14 confusing as to who everything in this email 15 comes from, but he says: 16 "Fujitsu's responses thus far haven't really 17 helped answer the questions posed in each case, 18 their written responses have been brief to say 19 the least. 20 "My own opinion therefore is that PO Ltd 21 needs to cover off all questions relating to 22 office misbalancing and transaction details ... 23 and that Fujitsu should provide us with 24 a general statement for each case (as per the 25 statement above from Bill Mitchell) detailing 168 1 calls estimate to the [Helpdesk]." 2 Did you have any concerns about using 3 a generic form of words in these cases, such as 4 the one that is at the top of this page? 5 A. I don't think we did use a generic form of 6 words. I think they were prepared to begin with 7 a generic, and then make it specific to the 8 events at Marine Drive. 9 Q. So the suggestion at the top, if we could go to 10 the top, is that there was some general form of 11 words. And we may or may not, during the course 12 of this Inquiry, come to a number of statements 13 that look very similar in how they're 14 formulated, certain forms of words. Do you have 15 any recollection of general statements being 16 used in witness statements? 17 A. No. This may have been something that was 18 utilised in the prosecution's sphere, but they 19 were tailored and unique insofar as we were 20 dealing with civil litigation. 21 Q. Can we look at POL00072692, please. This is the 22 last document that I'll take you to myself, and 23 the last document before the break. This is the 24 attendance note of 7 April 2006 from 25 Stephen Dilley. It's a document that we have 169 1 seen before. It says: 2 "Before the Post Office joined the call, 3 Stephen Dilley and Tom Beezer had a telephone 4 conversation with Ian Herbert. Agreeing that 5 [Post Office] ... had difficulty obtaining 6 information from Fujitsu and that the strategy 7 should be to identify key individuals at Fujitsu 8 who could provide the relevant information ..." 9 It then says: 10 "The [Post Office] joined the telephone 11 conversation and Tom Beezer outlined our 12 proposal to Mandy Talbot. Mandy broadly 13 agreed ..." et cetera. 14 Do you recall problems obtaining information 15 from Fujitsu? 16 A. As I mentioned earlier, prosecution was entitled 17 to 100 reports or analyses per year. We were 18 left in a situation where, if they hadn't 19 utilised that 100, we were entitled to request. 20 Anything over and above that, Fujitsu would 21 charge. And sometimes POL, I suspect, was not 22 prepared to bear that cost. 23 Q. Did you understand the difference in various 24 types of information that was available from 25 Fujitsu, such as ARQ data, audit trail, raw 170 1 audit data, enhanced ARQ? 2 A. I'm not an expert in that field. I knew there 3 were four lines of calls that a subpostmaster 4 could make to various help desks, et cetera, and 5 I knew that there was a data that only Fujitsu 6 had access to, but I didn't know the detail and 7 I couldn't distinguish one type of data from 8 another. 9 Q. And contractually I think it's your evidence 10 that essentially the Civil Litigation Team were 11 an afterthought in respect of -- 12 A. Correct. 13 Q. -- the ability to obtain it? 14 A. Correct. 15 MR BLAKE: Thank you. 16 Sir, we do have some questions from 17 recognised legal representatives. Not a huge 18 amount, but, if you're content, I think this may 19 be the appropriate moment to take a 20-minute 20 break. 21 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Twenty minutes would take us 22 to 3.50. 23 MR BLAKE: Sorry, 15-minute break, sorry. 24 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Well, okay, 3.45. 25 I just want to give notice to everyone that 171 1 just as in the case of Mr Dilley, I do find it 2 difficult to retain proper levels of 3 conversation (sic) after about 4.15, so those 4 questions need to be tailored with that in mind. 5 I can see you, Mr Blake. What's the 6 reaction amongst your fellow barristers? 7 MR BLAKE: A fair few smiles. They agree. 8 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: All right. Fine. So 15 minutes 9 then, between 3.45 and 3.50. Yes. 10 (3.32 pm) 11 (A short break) 12 (3.46 pm) 13 MR BLAKE: Thank you, sir, we have questions from 14 Ms Page and Mr Stein. 15 Questioned by MS PAGE 16 MS PAGE: Mrs Talbot, I act for a number of the 17 subpostmasters in this case, including 18 Mr Castleton. There would be little point in 19 putting documents to you and asking you who gave 20 you instructions in the Castleton case because 21 you won't tell, will you? 22 A. It's not that I won't tell, it's that I cannot 23 recall, after this period of time, and it was 24 a revolving selection of managers within Post 25 Office Limited. 172 1 Q. Well, somebody needed to approve the expenditure 2 of £321,000 in legal costs for the sake of 3 a precedent. Which department? Will you tell 4 us at least that, which department of POL could 5 have possibly justified that? 6 A. I cannot after this period of time, I'm sorry. 7 Q. There was a clear advantage to your own 8 department, wasn't there, because by bankrupting 9 Mr Castleton, you could threaten other 10 subpostmasters who disputed Horizon shortfalls 11 and you could threaten them with the same fate, 12 couldn't you? 13 A. I didn't run a department, and it was an 14 advantage for Post Office Limited, not myself or 15 my colleagues. 16 Q. But it was your job, wasn't it, to use the 17 precedent that you had achieved? 18 A. I don't personally ever recall using the case of 19 Castleton as a precedent. 20 Q. Well, it was a very expensive precedent. It 21 must have been used sometimes? 22 A. I assume it was, by Post Office Limited and 23 departments in that. 24 Q. Do you recall Mr Morgan gave an advice at the 25 end which was of use as a precedent for POL? 173 1 A. Excuse me, Mr Morgan gave an advice? 2 Q. That's right. 3 A. Yes, I do recall that and I remember feeding 4 recommendations back to POL. 5 Q. So at least that was of use to them, wasn't it? 6 A. Correct. 7 Q. What about the cases of Mr Bajaj and Mr Bilkhu? 8 What did you instruct your external lawyers to 9 say to them about the Castleton case? 10 A. I don't recall instructing external agents on 11 Bajaj or Bilkhu. I suspect that Post Office 12 Limited would have sent those cases directly out 13 to our external agent. 14 Q. Do you think they were authorised to refer to 15 the bankruptcy proceedings as well as just 16 relying on the judgment? 17 A. I have no idea. 18 Q. I'm just going to refer you to one document, one 19 document only. It's part of the large document 20 POL00090437. And when we get there, if we could 21 just straddle pages 33 and 34, please, there's 22 an email there. We've looked at it in part 23 already. I'm just going to draw your attention 24 to one bit. 25 If we scroll down a little bit and we sort 174 1 of spread over the pages of 33 and 34, this was 2 you telling a group of ten people within POL 3 about the great news, the successful result in 4 the Castleton trial, and that the judgment had 5 entirely vindicated the Horizon System. 6 If we scroll down a little bit further, the 7 final paragraph of your email was: 8 "Mr Castleton appeared to be stunned by the 9 result and did not apply for leave to appeal 10 against the decision." 11 "Stunned". Why do you think you would have 12 mentioned that? 13 A. I wasn't present in court at the case involving 14 Mr Castleton, so this would have been based on 15 a report given to me by Bond Pearce. 16 Q. And why did you feel that those ten people 17 needed to hear that Mr Castleton was "stunned"? 18 A. I was just recording the report as had been 19 provided to me by external agents. 20 Q. The next point is: 21 "[He] ... did not apply for leave to appeal 22 against the decision." 23 That was a piece of good news, wasn't it? 24 A. Yes, because it meant, as far as Post Office 25 Limited was concerned, that that was the end of 175 1 the matter. 2 Q. And he had been told that he would need to lodge 3 some £50,000 in order to appeal, hadn't he? 4 A. That I cannot recall. I believe that that may 5 have had something to do with -- 6 Q. Security for costs; yes? 7 A. Security for costs, that's correct. 8 Q. Exactly. So this was good news, and it seems, 9 from the way that you've written this email, 10 that you expected your audience of ten, your 11 readership of ten, to be pleased to hear that he 12 was stunned, that he was completely overcome, 13 that he was unable to appeal and that was that. 14 A. I think they were more interested in the fact 15 that we had brought the case to a satisfactory 16 conclusion, as far as POL was concerned. That 17 last paragraph is just me reporting verbatim 18 from a report which I received from Bond Pearce. 19 Q. Yes. You reported that he was overpowered, 20 utterly defeated, and that that was what POL 21 wanted, wasn't it? 22 A. No, that was not POL's objective. 23 Q. It was part of a culture at POL? 24 A. Abs -- 25 Q. Those who stood up to the institution must be 176 1 utterly overcome and defeated? 2 A. Absolutely not. 3 Q. Your task was effectively, metaphorically, to 4 put Mr Castleton's head on a spike. And you did 5 that, didn't you? 6 A. Absolutely not. 7 Q. And it was somebody's idea, not yours, wasn't 8 it? Somebody in POL came up with that idea, did 9 they not? 10 A. No. This began as a small, relatively small, 11 deficiency case. It expanded out of all 12 proportion because of the size of the 13 counterclaim, and then became a virtual and then 14 actual test case due to the allegation that 15 there were substantial defects with the Horizon 16 System. 17 Q. Do you still maintain that this case was about 18 the counterclaim by this point? 19 A. It was about the counterclaim up until the time 20 the counterclaim was reduced to the level of 21 about £11,000 or so. Thereafter, it was indeed 22 about the desire on the part of POL to have 23 a substantial judgment dealing with allegations 24 about the Horizon System. 25 Q. That's what you delivered for them, wasn't it? 177 1 A. Yes. 2 MS PAGE: Thank you. 3 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Mr Stein? 4 Questioned by MR STEIN 5 MR STEIN: Mrs Talbot, my name is Sam Stein, 6 I represent a very large number of 7 subpostmasters and mistresses. 8 You've mentioned in your evidence, and 9 I just read at a little bit of what you were 10 saying this morning, you said, I think at about 11 11.30, 11.35, you believed that the "Post Office 12 felt the need to demonstrate that it would take 13 a firm line with any ... challenges to Horizon". 14 Then you've answered a number of questions 15 from Mr Blake, and then, more recently, on the 16 question of whether you have any evidence that 17 you can tell us about, about where that 18 direction came from, that firm line. 19 Again, you said this earlier: no idea where 20 that direction would have come from. 21 Now, Mrs Talbot, you don't come across, if 22 I may say so, as someone that seems to be having 23 any problems with your memory. So the large 24 number of people that I represent are finding it 25 very hard to believe that you cannot recall 178 1 where you got this direction from. Is it your 2 evidence that you simply can't remember who told 3 you what the POL line was? Is that actually 4 your evidence? 5 A. The line would have come from POL as an 6 organisation. There were many different 7 managers in that organisation, and I was given 8 instructions by many people during the course of 9 litigation. Can I put my hand on my heart and 10 come up with a name of a person? I'm afraid 11 I can't. I wish I could, for the subpostmasters 12 who you represent. 13 Q. Okay. So no one single name comes to your 14 recollection? 15 A. No. 16 Q. Not one? 17 A. I'm sorry. 18 Q. Okay. If I can take you to your statement, 19 please, which you should have there. 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. It's WITN08500100. If we can have on screen 22 paragraph 7, which is page 2. If you can scroll 23 down to paragraph 7, I'll be very grateful. 24 Right. 25 Now, here we have you saying that: 179 1 "By 2004 I was the Team Leader of the Postal 2 Litigation team within the Civil Litigation 3 Department. At no time did the team work 4 predominantly for the Post Office Ltd ... or on 5 cases involving Sub Post Masters, that was 6 a small proportion of the work." 7 Then you go on to say in the next sentence 8 that: 9 "... the Postal Litigation team ceased to 10 exist and was absorbed into the Dispute 11 Resolution Department which was the new name of 12 the Civil Litigation Department." 13 Now let's concentrate on the next couple of 14 sentences: 15 "There was no formal structure for upward 16 report within the Department although my line 17 managers operated an open-door policy. We were 18 never provided with guidance on what issues 19 should be reported." 20 Okay. So let's see if you can help us 21 understand the way this worked. 22 A. Sure. 23 Q. You're saying clearly in your statement that 24 there was no formal structure reporting upwards? 25 A. Correct. 180 1 Q. Right. But you're also saying in your evidence 2 that there was a structure for you getting the 3 line or the policy from POL in relation to 4 subpostmasters. You said repeatedly, as you did 5 to me a few minutes ago, that POL made it clear 6 what their attitude was toward issues with the 7 Horizon System. So are you saying in your 8 statement no upwards policy or guidance system 9 but there certainly was a downwards one? 10 A. My paragraph 7 describes the position purely 11 within the Civil Litigation Department. There 12 was neither a formal upwards escalation for 13 seeking guidance, neither was there a downwards 14 sequence of guidance from the solicitor down to 15 caseworkers. 16 What you're describing I believe is on the 17 Post Office Limited side of affairs, and during 18 the duration of the Castleton litigation, the 19 identity of the parties that you've seen in the 20 correspondence to whom I was reporting 21 backwards, in effect developed. Day 1, 22 Castleton legislation, there was merely 23 Ms Woodward from the Error Resolution Team at 24 Chesterfield. 25 Q. I see. Well, let's then turn to the last part 181 1 of that paragraph, paragraph 7. Page 3 of your 2 statement. Let's go through the people that we 3 have here. See if this helps you. 4 So we've reached the end of the sentence: 5 "We were never provided with guidance on 6 what issues should be reported." 7 Then you go on to say: 8 "My first line manager in the Civil 9 Litigation Department was Joe Ashton ..." 10 Okay, let's just go through these people and 11 see if you can help. 12 A. Sure. 13 Q. Did you get the steer about the Post Office and 14 its line towards people doubting the Horizon 15 System through your line manager, first of all 16 Joe Ashton? 17 A. No. 18 Q. Right. Clare Wardle, same question. 19 A. No. 20 Q. No? 21 A. No. 22 Q. Right. Biddy Wyles? 23 A. No. 24 Q. Right? Rebekah Mantle? 25 A. No. 182 1 Q. Right. So you are saying very clearly none of 2 those individuals provided you the POL line; is 3 that right? 4 A. Well, they couldn't because they were members of 5 the Civil Litigation Department. 6 Q. Were they your managers? 7 A. Each and every one of them was my manager. 8 Q. Right. 9 A. Sequentially. 10 Q. Right. So, these individuals, which were your 11 managers, sequentially, over the period of time 12 when you were dealing with litigation, none of 13 those provided you with the POL line you've been 14 asked many questions about? 15 A. No. 16 Q. So it didn't come through them? 17 A. No. 18 Q. And you remember very clearly it didn't come 19 through them? 20 A. They were my colleagues who I worked with on 21 a daily basis. 22 Q. Do you remember, as clearly as the rest of your 23 apparent -- the rest of your evidence, that this 24 POL line didn't come through them? Is that what 25 you're saying? 183 1 A. I genuinely do not believe it came from them. 2 Q. Right. So, eliminating those, as far as we can, 3 it's come from some other source; is that 4 correct? 5 A. That would be logical, yes. 6 Q. Yes, okay. 7 Now, can I take you then please to how 8 things developed in relation to 2010. I'll take 9 you to the document which is the Rod Ismay 10 report, it's been called generally a whitewash 11 report. 12 That's POL00026572. Very grateful. If we 13 can just enlarge the top. Thank you. 14 Now you described yourself in your evidence 15 as being a conduit. Our understanding of what 16 you're trying to say there is you're a conduit 17 for the wishes of the Post Office. Yes? 18 A. Correct. 19 Q. I assume you're not trying to portray yourself 20 as some sort of evil robot? 21 A. Absolutely not. 22 Q. No, okay. So you're a conduit for the 23 Post Office's intentions and wishes in relation 24 to the way that matters are dealt with regarding 25 Horizon. Is that what you're trying to say? 184 1 A. I think what I said was by 2010 I was performing 2 some conduit actions in respect of information 3 about the Misra case, and relaying that back to 4 Mike Granville and Rod Ismay. 5 Q. Okay. Let's have a look at the heading of this 6 particular part of what becomes the 7 Ismay report. Now, obviously under the word 8 "Confidential" it's got that it's going to 9 Dave Smith, managing director. It's from 10 Rod Ismay. And then the other people that are 11 referred to here. 12 Now we see yourself referred to: 13 "Mandy Talbot, Principal Lawyer (Civil)" 14 Yes? 15 A. Mm-hm. 16 Q. Was that a title you gave yourself? 17 A. No, it was a title that emerged. 18 Q. Yes, because it's "Mandy Talbot, Principal 19 Lawyer (Civil)", which is distinguishing itself 20 from "Rob Wilson, Head of Criminal Law"? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. So it appears, so far as we can tell in this 23 document, that you are being portrayed as the 24 principal lawyer in the civil department? 25 A. That is incorrect. That is incorrect. 185 1 Q. Your boss at this time, was that -- 2 A. That -- 3 Q. Rebekah -- 4 A. Rebekah Mantle at this time, yes. 5 Q. She's not on this email, is she? 6 A. No. 7 Q. No. Can you help with why it is that she would 8 have been not referred to within this email 9 chain? 10 A. I'm afraid I can't. 11 Q. Because the report that follows the Ismay report 12 is a report that looks at the question of 13 whether there should be a review or 14 investigation into the Horizon System. Why 15 isn't your boss involved in that? 16 A. I didn't create the report. I cannot give you 17 any information about the distribution list. 18 Q. You see, this suggests, as does other evidence 19 that you've gone through with Mr Blake, who 20 asked you questions first of all, that in fact 21 you're taking a principal lawyer role in 22 relation to Horizon errors, issues. It's 23 correct, isn't it? 24 A. No, it's not. That is merely a title that was 25 attached to my name. You will see me referred 186 1 to as "Mandy Talbot, Principal Lawyer" without 2 the "Civil" in brackets in some internal 3 correspondence. In the same way that Royal Mail 4 Group at one time became Consignia, it was quite 5 open to changing titles. 6 Q. Mrs Talbot, you've made reference a couple of 7 times in your evidence to the limitations on the 8 disclosed material you've seen. You've 9 commented on it being partial. You've commented 10 on the fact that if any you had access to your 11 own files, electronic files and electronic data. 12 Mrs Talbot, are you trying to say that somewhere 13 within all this missing material there might be 14 a document that would portray you in a more 15 sympathetic light? Is that what you're trying 16 to say? 17 A. No, I think the documentation that has been 18 disclosed portrays me in an accurate light. 19 MR STEIN: Well, Mrs Talbot, there I think my 20 clients would agree. 21 Thank you. 22 Questioned by THE CHAIR 23 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Mrs Talbot, when you used the 24 word "partial" in relation to disclosure, do 25 I understand that to mean incomplete as opposed 187 1 to selectively left out? 2 A. I think I used the word "partial" only in 3 respect of the initial report created by 4 Mr Coyne. 5 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Well, I may have misunderstood 6 that so let me be clear about it. Let me try 7 and get to it in this way. When you either 8 sought instructions about a course of action 9 where you felt the need to seek instructions 10 either from your line managers or from some 11 other department within the Post Office, did you 12 generally seek those instructions in writing or 13 orally? 14 A. It would have been a combination of both. 15 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Well, that I'm prepared to 16 consider to be quite likely, at the very least. 17 So one can take it that in respect of some of 18 the things you've been asked about, where you've 19 been unable to identify personnel, there ought 20 to be at least some written exchanges between 21 you and that person about whatever it was that 22 you were then seeking instructions and receiving 23 instructions? 24 A. Undoubtedly. That's correct. 25 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: And so far as you are concerned 188 1 at least, you haven't been shown any of that 2 documentation? Do I understand you correctly on 3 that? 4 A. That is correct, though I did have to assimilate 5 a large amount of material on Tuesday of last 6 week. But to the best of my knowledge, no. 7 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: So that, for example -- and I'm 8 just using this as an example -- when the 9 strategy in Mr Castleton's case was being 10 discussed between Mr Dilley and you, can I take 11 it that, at least on occasions, you would have 12 escalated what was being discussed either to 13 your line managers or to some other department 14 before giving Mr Dilley an answer -- 15 A. Absolutely. 16 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: -- as to the strategy to be 17 followed? 18 A. Absolutely. Both internally up to -- up the 19 line within civil litigation, and across to POL, 20 the business. 21 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, and just so that -- because 22 as you know, I am enquiring, so I'd like, if 23 I could, to understand who it was that would 24 have been giving you instructions in the sense 25 of knowing who that person was. All right? 189 1 So I understand that you've said you can't 2 remember, and I'm not going to probe that any 3 further, but can you at least say, apart from 4 your line managers, what other departments might 5 you have sought instructions from? In other 6 words, commercial, security? I'm just naming 7 them at random, but can you tell me the 8 likelihood of the departments you would have 9 sought instructions from? 10 A. The answer I can give categorically is the Error 11 Resolution Team at Chesterfield. 12 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Right, so that's a department 13 that I might want to investigate. That's 14 number 1. Number 2, if any? 15 A. That is the one I can be absolutely certain 16 about, because they were the parties that sent 17 it out for litigation in the first place. 18 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, but don't worry about being 19 certain about it. In an Inquiry, you might say, 20 "Well, I think I might have done this", and then 21 it's up to me to decide if I want to follow it 22 up. Do you see what I mean? 23 A. Indeed. 24 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: So if there are other departments 25 that you think it at least likely that you may 190 1 have sought instructions from, I'd be grateful 2 if you'd name them. 3 A. I sought assistance from a lot of departments 4 like Security; information from Fujitsu. 5 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Can I just stop you there. When 6 you say you sought information from Fujitsu, did 7 you do that directly in the sense that you had 8 a contact in Fujitsu that you could contact 9 directly, or did you have to go through some 10 other process? 11 A. There were some people eventually, as the 12 litigation progressed, but initially an awful 13 lot of that material was sought by Mr Stephen 14 Dilley as a consequence of his letter addressed 15 to Fujitsu; and then people started responding 16 to that, sometimes copying me in to those 17 responses, ultimately, the material being sent 18 to Stephen. I really wish I could pin it down 19 to a department or even some persons. 20 Undoubtedly, Dave Smith was one of the most 21 senior people within POL who was fairly 22 regularly copied in to the emails. Indeed, he 23 is often first on the list on a number of those 24 early emails. And I think he was possibly 25 managing director of one of the POL departments 191 1 at the time. 2 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Well, unless I'm wrong about it, 3 there were two Mr David Smiths in Post Office in 4 the relevant period. 5 A. David X Smith -- oh, pardon, sir. David X Smith 6 is -- 7 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: No, one of them was certainly -- 8 yes. I follow. All right. Thank you very 9 much. 10 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir. 11 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: So all that remains is for me to 12 thank you for making a witness statement and for 13 coming to the Inquiry to answer a good many 14 questions during the course of the day. 15 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir. 16 MR BLAKE: Thank you very much, sir. 10.00 17 tomorrow. 18 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, fine. Thank you. 19 (4.14 pm) 20 (The hearing adjourned until 10.00 am the following 21 day) 22 23 24 25 192 1 I N D E X 2 MANDY TALBOT (sworn) ..........................1 3 4 Questioned by MR BLAKE ........................1 5 6 Questioned by MS PAGE .......................172 7 8 Questioned by MR STEIN ......................178 9 10 Questioned by THE CHAIR .....................187 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 193