Page 1 of 3

Thomas Penny

From:

Jenkins Gareth GI

Sent:

28 November 2005 12:43

To:

Lowther Neneh; Thomas Penny

Subject: RE: CS Witness Statement

Neneh / Penny,

I've added in some comments.

Not really sure how to progress this any further. I suggest we wait until we have a case that actually requires analysis of Network Banking etc and worry about it then rather than trying to put together something generic now.

Regards

Gareth

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Gareth Jenkins Distinguished Engineer Applications TDA Post Office Account

Fujitsu S	ervices
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Lovelace R	oad, Bracknell, Berkshire, RG	12 8SN	 	
Tel:	GRO)		
Mobile:	GRO	0		
email:	GRO			
Web:	http://uk.fujitsu.com			


Fujitsu Services Limited, Registered in England no 96056, Registered Office 26, Finsbury Square, London, EC2A 1SL

From: Lowther Neneh

Sent: 22 November 2005 10:50

To: Jenkins Gareth GI

Subject: CS Witness Statement issues



As per our discussion.

PSA copy of our current WS. Penny Thomas has marked up some areas that need attention for us to be able to provide further WS to the PO. It has only come to our notice that quite a few things have changed eg OBCS, TMS since June 05 and we would like the WS to reflect these.

Please could you look at this when you've got some time and let me know when it's convenient for you to discuss.

Kind regards,

Page 2 of 3

Neneh

----Original Message---From: Jenkins Gareth GI
Sent: 17 November 2005 14:53

To: Lowther Neneh

Subject: RE: CS Witness Statement Amendment

Neneh,

I've updated the Witness Statement as discussed.

I'm left some of the Networking bit highlighted in Blue, since I can't say that I know it is true (but it probably is). It may be OK just to delete that bit. What is left in that section may be sufficient (I guess it depends upon what the issue is!) I've removed the blue highlighting from the rest of the document.

I've used "Revisions" so that you can see what I've changed. I've highlighted the Date etc in yellow to remind us to update it for the final version.

Happy to discuss further.

Regards

Gareth

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Gareth Jenkins
Distinguished Engineer
Applications TDA
Post Office Account

Fujitsu Services

Lovelace Road, Bracknell, Berkshire, RG12 8SN

Tel: GRO

Mobile: GRO

email: Gareth.Jenkins GRO

Web: http://uk.fujitsu.com

Fujitsu Services Limited, Registered in England no 96056, Registered Office 26, Finsbury Square, London, EC2A 1SL

From: Lowther Neneh

Sent: 15 November 2005 13:40

To: Jenkins Gareth GI

Subject: CS Witness Statement Amendment

Hi, Gareth,

Just a little note to remind you of the above for sometime on Thursday or Friday. Thank you

Kind regards,

Neneh Lowther

Page 3 of 3

Customer Services - Post Office Account- Security

Fujitsu Services, Forest Road, Feltham, Middlesex, TW13 7HJ

Tel	GRO
Mob:	GRO
Fax	GRO
ner	neh:lowther GRO

Web: http://services.fujitsu.com

Fujitsu Services Limited, Registered in England no 96056, Registered Office 26, Finsbury Square, London, EC2A 1SL

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(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss 5A(3)(a) and 5B, MC Rules 1981, r 70)

Penny,

I've added in thoughts / comments as revisions in this colour.

Gareth

Brian

You asked for my comments on this witness statement – here they are. Anything highlighted means:-

have read this, but I have no firsthand or background knowledge I have made some comment in the text

Also, OBCS is now dead and network banking has taken its place. I believe that any witness statement relating to data since network banking started to replace OBCS (date unknown) should have a narrative explaining that process. Any statement relating to data after OBCS ceased (I believe end May 05) should not contain OBCS statements.

Network Banking was introduced on 1st April 2003. From that point onward, DWP went through an exercise of moving Benefits Claimants to receiving money directly into a Bank Account. Post Office then supported Cash Withdrawal from certain Bank Accounts (through Network Banking). This process took about 2 years and eventually the OBCS application stopped being used operationally in May / June 2005 and the desktop buttons that allowed staff access to it were removed. The underlying databases are being removed in January 2006.

Statement of

Penelope Anne Thomas

Age if under 18

Over 18

(If over 18 insert 'over 18')

This statement (consisting of pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe true.

Dated the

day of

20

Signature

Α

I have been employed by Fujitsu Services, Post Office Account, formally ICL Pathway Ltd.,

Signature

Signature witnessed by

CS011A (Side A)

(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss 5A(3)(a) and 5B, MC Rules 1981, r 70)

Continuation of statement of

Penelope Anne Thomas

since 20 January 2004 as an Information Technology (IT) Security Analyst responsible for audit data extractions and IT Security. I have working knowledge of the computer system known as Horizon, which is a computerised accounting system used by Post Office Ltd. I am authorised by Fujitsu Services to undertake extractions of audit data held on the Horizon system and to obtain information regarding system transaction information processed on the Horizon system.

В

Horizon's documented processes relate to each Post Office outlet. They state that at each Post Office, there are counter positions which each have a computer terminal, a visual display unit and a keyboard and printer. This individual system records all transactions input by the counter clerk working at that counter position. Each clerk logs on to the system by using their own unique password. The transactions performed by each clerk, and the associated cash and stock level information are recorded by the computer system in a stock unit. Once logged on, any transactions performed by the clerk must be recorded and entered on the computer and are accounted for within the user's allocated stock unit.

C

The Horizon system provides a number of daily and weekly records of all transactions input into it. It enables Post Office users to obtain computer summaries for individual clients of Post Office Limited e.g. National Savings Bank, Girobank, Driving Vehicle Licence Agency and the Department of Working Pensions (DWP). The Horizon system also enables the clerk to produce a weekly periodic balance of cash and stock on hand combined with the other transactions performed in that accounting period. (Balancing is now done monthly rather than weekly as a result of changes introduced by Impact for S80. The change over varied from branch to branch but was between September and November 2005.)

D

Where local reports are required these are accessed from an icon on the desktop menu. The user is presented with a parameter driven menu, which enables the report to be customised to requirements. The report is then populated from transaction data that is held in the local database and is printed out on the tally roll printer. The system also allows for information to be transferred to the main accounting department at Chesterfield in order for the office accounts to be balanced. I have never seen a report generated by Horizon nor the method for obtaining

Signature

(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss 5A(3)(a) and 5B, MC Rules 1981, r 70)

Continuation of statement of

Penelope Anne Thomas

one Also, some reports (particularly Office reports) are produced on a single back office printer rather than on the tally roll printer.

Ε

The Post Office counter processing functions are provided through a series of counter applications: the Order Book Control Service (OBCS) that ascertains the validity of DWP order books before payment is made; the Electronic Point of Sale Service (EPOSS) that enables Postmasters to conduct general retail trade at the counter and sell products on behalf of their clients; the Automated Payments Service (APS) provides support for utility companies and others who provide incremental in-payment mechanisms based on the use of cards and other tokens and the Logistics Feeder Service (LFS) which supports the management of cash and self-stock movements to and from the outlet, principally to minimise cash held overnight in outlets. The counter desktop service and the office platform service on which it runs provides various common functions for transaction recording and settlement as well as user access control and session management. I have seen a Horizon terminal in a test environment at Bracknell but I have never seen these applications on the system. These applications do not actually appear as separate applications. In some cases the distinction is very artificial as a result of the wording of the original contract between ICL and POCL. OBCS has now been removed, however we now have some new applications which you may need to be aware of:

- Network Banking
- Settlement to Debit / Credit cards
- Bureau de Change

As before these applications are fully integrated into the Horizon counter and are not really visible as separate applications to the user.

F

Information from counter transactions is written into a local database and then replicated automatically to databases on all other counters within a Post Office outlet. The information is then forwarded over ISDN (or other communication service) to databases on a set of central Correspondence Servers at the Fujitsu Services data centres. This is undertaken by a messaging transport system within the Transaction Management Service (TMS), Various systems then transfer information to Central Servers that control the flow of information to

Signature

Signature witnessed by

CS011A

(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss 5A(3)(a) and 5B, MC Rules 1981, r 70)

Continuation of statement of

Penelope Anne Thomas

various support services. Details of outlet transactions are normally sent at least daily via the system. Details relating to the cutlet's stock helding and each account are sent weekly. Details are then forwarded daily via a file transfer service to the Post Office accounting department at Chesterfield and also, where appropriate, to other Post Office Clients. — I could not describe TMS or explain how it works

G

An audit of all information handled by the TMS is taken daily by copying all-new messages to archive media. This creates a record of all original outlet transaction details including its origin—butlet and counter, when it happened, who caused it to happen and the outcome. The TMS fournal is maintained at each of the Fujitsu Services Data Centre sites and is created by securely replicating all transaction records that occurred in every Outlet. They therefore provide the ability to compare the audit track record of the same transaction recorded in two places to verify that systems were operating correctly. All exceptions are investigated and reconciled. Records of all transactions are written to audit archive media. I'm not aware of the two audit tracks being compared. However I agree that there are two independent audit tracks that ought to be equivalent!

(HA)

The system clock incorporated into the desktop application on the counter visual display units is configured to indicate local time. This has been the situation at (INSERT PO) (FAD) since (INSERT INSTALLATION DATE) when the Horizon system was introduced at that particular Post Office. May also be worth adding, that any variation in the clock time is compared with that at the data centre and should it differ by more than 60 seconds, the clock will be corrected. The clocks at the data Centre are kept in synchronisation with the radio controlled clocks at Rugby (I'm not sure about the gory details of this.)

tag/

i

The Order Book Control System (OBCS) software, linked to the Horizon system was developed in conjunction with the DWP. OBCS provides details of DWP order books on the national stop payment list, and, enables data regarding the movement of order books, and, encashments to

Signature

(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss 5A(3)(a) and 5B, MC Rules 1981, r 70)

Continuation of statement of

Penelope Anne Thomas

be captured on their behalf. Each Horizon terminal at a Post Office counter has access to the national stop list through OBCS, when a barcoded DWP order book is scanned at the Post Office counter, or the order book details are manually keyed into Horizon at the Post Office counter. Each night, the national stop payment list is updated from information supplied electronically from the DWP computer centre. National stop payment list data is held centrally within the Horizon system, and is available to all Post Offices. However, certain information from the national stop payment list is also downloaded to individual Post Offices for faster access; this download process is called polling. The polling of individual Post Offices also involves receiving details of order book movements and encashments at Post Offices, centrally within Horizon, for onward transmission to the DWP. I have never seen this – but presumably most of this is no longer valid All this was correct, but as you say we removed the buttons that invoked this functionality on counters in May / June 2005 and DWP then stopped sending updates to the stop list (and we stopped sending them transactions!)

Κ

I have access to reports that monitor faults, polling failures, equipment failures and calls for advice and guidance logged by the Horizon System Helpdesk. During the ??? to ???, there were ?? calls from name & fad code to the Helpdesk. None of these calls relate to faults which would have had an effect on the integrit. the information held on the system. — I am not an engineer and I have no guidelines to support this statement.

L

When information relating to individual transactions is requested, the data is extracted from the audit archive media via the Audit Workstations (AW's). Information is presented in exactly the same way as the data held in the archive although it can be filtered depending upon the type of information requested. The integrity of audit data is guaranteed at all times from its origination, storage and retrieval to subsequent despatch to the requester. Controls have been established that provide assurances to Post Office Internal Audit (POIA) that this integrity is maintained. What are these controls? I don't know the details. Alan Holmes would have been the person to describe these. Perhaps Simon Fawkes can also describe this.

Signature

(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss 5A(3)(a) and 5B, MC Rules 1981, r 70)

Continuation of statement of

Penelope Anne Thomas

During audit data extractions the following controls apply: I can't really comment on any of this.

- 1. Extractions can only be made through the AWs, which exist at Fujitsu Services, Forest Road, Feltham, Middlesex, Fujitsu Services, Lovelace Lane, Bracknell, Berkshire and the two Fujitsu Services Data Centres. These are all subject to rigorous physical security controls appropriate to that location. Specifically, the Feltham and Bracknell AWs where most extractions take place are located in a secure room subject to proximity pass access within a secured Fujitsu Services site. who has access to the AWs at the datacentres? Who checks whether they have been used? Also, I assume the FEL01 room will soon close!
- Logical access to the AW and its functionality is managed in accordance with the Fujitsu Services, Post Office Account Security Policy and the principles of ISQ 17799. This includes dedicated Logins, password control and the use of Microsoft Windows NT security features.
- All extraction's are logged on the AW and supported by documented Audit Record Queries (ARQ's), authorised by nominated persons within Post Office Ltd. This log can be scrutinised on the AW.
- 4. Extractions are only made by authorised individuals.
- 5. Upon receipt of an ARQ from Post Office Ltd they are interpreted by CS Security. The details are checked and the printed request filed.
- 6. The required files are identified and marked using the dedicated audit tools.
- 7. Checksum seals are calculated for audit data files when they are written to audit archive media and re-calculated when the files are retrieved.
- 8. To assure the integrity of the audit data while on the audit archive media the checksum seal for the file is re-calculated by the Audit Track Sealer and compared to the original value calculated when the file was originally written to the audit archive media. The result is maintained in a Check Seal Table. I'm told that checksum seals are an algorithm but I have no idea how they work

Signature

(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss 5A(3)(a) and 5B, MC Rules 1981, r 70)

Continuation of statement of

Penelope Anne Thomas

- 9. The specific ARQ details are used to obtain the specific data.
- 10. The files are copied to the AW where they are checked and converted into the file type required by Post Office Ltd.
- 11. The requested information is copied onto removal CD media, sealed to prevent modification and virus checked using the latest software. It is then despatched to the Post Office Ltd Casework Manager using Royal Mail Special Delivery. This ensures that a receipt is provided to Fujitsu Services confirming delivery.

Μ

ARQs 111-120/0506 were received on 18 May 2005 and asked for information in connection with the Post Office at Rose Hill (FAD 173137). I produce a copy of ARQs 111-120/0506 as Exhibit PT/01. On various dates and at various times between 18 May 2005 and 24 May 2005 I undertook extractions of data held on the Horizon system in accordance with the requirements of ARQs 111-120/0506 and followed the procedure outlined above. I produce the resultant CD as Exhibit PT/02.

Ν

The report is formatted with the following headings:

ID - relates to counter position

User – Person Logged on to System

SU - Stock Unit

Date - Date of transaction

Time - Time of transaction

SessionId – A unique string relating to current customer session

TxnId - A unique string relating to current transaction

Mode - e.g. SC which translates to Serve Customer

ProductNo - Product Item Sold

Qty - Quantity of items sold

SaleValue - Value of items sold

Entry method - Method of data capture for OBCS Transactions (0 = barcode, 1 = manually

Signature

(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss 5A(3)(a) and 5B, MC Rules 1981, r 70)

Continuation of statement of

Penelope Anne Thomas

keyed, 2 = magnetic card, 3 = smartcard, 4 = smart key)

State – Method of manual keyed Entry Method (4 = encash, 5 = non-barcode)

IOP - Order Book Number

Result – Order Book Transaction Result (1 = OK, 2 = impound, 3 = unreadable, 4 = invalid) Foreign Indicator – Indicates whether OBCS payment was made at a local or foreign outlet (0- Local, 1- Foreign). The foreign indicator defaults to a '0' for all manually entered transactions.

The Event report is formatted with the following headings:

Groupid - FAD code

ID - relates to counter position

Date - Date of transaction

Time - Time of transaction

User - Person Logged on to System

SU - Stock Unit

EPOSSTransaction.T - Event Description

EPOSSTransaction.Ti - Event Result

Р

The CD (Exhibit PT/??) was sent to the Post Office Investigation section by Special Delivery on DATE 2005.

Q

There is no reason to believe that the information in this statement is inaccurate because of the improper use of the computer. To the best of my knowledge and belief at all material times the computer was operating properly, or if not, any respect in which it was not operating properly, or was out of operation was not such as to effect the information held on it I hold a responsible position in relation to the working of the computer — I do not hold a responsible position in the working of the Horizon system. I hold a responsible position in relation to the AW,

Any records to which I refer in my statement form part of the records relating to the business of Fujitsu Services. These were compiled during the ordinary course of business from information

Signature

Signature witnessed by

CS011A

(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss 5A(3)(a) and 5B, MC Rules 1981, r 70)

Continuation of statement of

Penelope Anne Thomas

supplied by persons who have or may reasonably be supposed to have personal knowledge of the matter dealt with in the information supplied, but are unlikely to have any recollection of the information or cannot be traced. As part of my duties, I have access to these records.

Thomas Penny		
From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject:	Thomas Penny 23 November 2005 11:56 'graham.c.ward GRO Pinder Brian RE: Another statement please	
Hi Graham		
Hope you are well.		
to update any other necess	re are currently updating the witness statements to accommodat sary information. As soon as we've done this we will send you a Il this will probably the mid-back end of next week.	e the demise of OBCS and a copy for review - bearing in
Kind regards Penny		
Original Message From: graham.c.ward GRO Sent: 22 November 2005 1 To: Fujitsu GRO Subject: Another statemen		
Morning all		:
Can I please request a stat	tement for the following 4 ARQ's (Dumfries)	
(Embedded image moved	to file: pic27401.jpg)	
omit para's H(b) J and K		
Thankyou		
Regards		
Graham		
Casework Manager Post Office Ltd Investigatio	on Team	
PO BOX 1, CROYDON, CR	R9 1WN	
Postline: N/A, STD Phone: N/A, Mobex: External Email: graham.c.w	GRO GRO	
addressee only. If you are disclose, reproduce, copy of figure that in the disclose is a second that in the disclose is a second that it is a seco	ments are confidential and intended for the not the named recipient, you must not use, or distribute the contents of this communication. n error, please contact the sender and then system.	• .

Thomas Penny				
From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject:	Thomas Penny 22 November 2005 12:17 Pinder Brian Sewell Peter (FEL01); Lowther FW: Another statement please	Neneh		
Importance:	High			
pic27401.jpg Hi Briar				
Another request for a witne	ess statement here - the timefram	nes are 25 Aug to 7 Sep 04	and 14 Feb to	18 Apr 05.
Kind regards Penny				
Original Message From: graham.c.ward GRO Sent: 22 November 2005 To: Fujitsu GRO Subject: Another statemer	GRO 11:36			•
Morning all				
Can I please request a sta	tement for the following 4 ARQ's	(Dumfries)	-	
(Embedded image moved	to file: pic27401.jpg)			
omit para's H(b) J and K			,	
Thankyou	•			
Regards				
Graham				
Casework Manager Post Office Ltd Investigation	on Team	•	•	
PO BOX 1, CROYDON, C	R9 1WN			
Postline: N/A, STD Phone: N/A, Mobex: External Email: graham.c.v	GRO	VoiceMail:		
addressee only. If you are disclose, reproduce, copy	ments are confidential and intende not the named recipient, you must or distribute the contents of this contents of the contents of the sender	st not use, communication.		

Thomas Penny

From:

Thomas Penny

Sent:

15 November 2005 11:16

To:

Pinder Brian

Subject:

FW: Witness Statement Mark-up

Importance:

High

Hi Brian

I know you get a lot of mail - I just wanted to bring this to the top again.

Kind regards

Penny

----Original Message From:

Sent:

Thomas Penny 08 November 2005 10:03

Pinder Brian

Subject:

RE: Witness Statement Mark-up

Thanks, Brian. But please note that the replacement description for OBCS is needed now - this should be applied to the next witness statement requested.

Kind regards

Penny

----Original Message----From: Pinder Brian From:

Sent:

04 November 2005 08:31

Cc: Subject:

Thomas Penny Sewell Peter (FEL01); Lowther Neneh RE: Witness Statement Mark-up

Penny

Noted, I will review this in slow time see what we can do to resolve.

Regds Brian

From:

Thomas Penny

Sent:

31 October 2005 09:00

To: Cc:

Pinder Brian

Subject:

Sewell Peter (FEL01); Lowther Neneh

Witness Statement Mark-up

Hi Brian

You asked me to mark up the standard witness statement with any concerns/comments I may have. This I have done and attach.

<< File: Penny's template - marked.doc >>


Kind regards

Penny

Penny Thomas

Customer Services - Post Office Account- Security

Fujitsu Services, Forest Road, Feltham, Middlesex, TW13 7HJ



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Thomas Penny

From:

Thomas Penny

Sent:

08 November 2005 10:03

To:

Pinder Brian

Subject:

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Kind regards Penny

From:

---Original Message----rom: Pinder Brian ent: 04 November 2005 08:31

Sent:

To:

Thomas Penny
Sewell Peter (FEL01); Lowther Neneh
RE: Witness Statement Mark-up

Subject:

Penny

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Regds Brian

From:

Thomas Penny

Sent:

31 October 2005 09:00

To:

Pinder Brian

Cc:

Sewell Peter (FEL01); Lowther Neneh

Subject:

Witness Statement Mark-up

Hi Brian

You asked me to mark up the standard witness statement with any concerns/comments I may have. This I have done and attach.

<< File: Penny's template - marked.doc >>

Kind regards Penny

Penny Thomas

Customer Services - Post Office Account- Security

Fujitsu Services, Forest Road, Feltham, Middlesex, TW13 7HJ



Web: <<hr/>
<http://services.fujitsu.com>></h>
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Thomas Penny	
From: Sent: To: Subject:	graham.c.ward GRO 28 November 2005 13:43 Fujitsu GRO Statement request
	ment in respect of ARQ (Embedded image moved to file: erwell. Usual please omitting just para's H(b) and K.
Thankyou	
Regards	
Graham	
Casework Manager Post Office Ltd Investig	gation Team
PO BOX 1, CROYDON	
Postline: N/A <u>, STD Pho</u> N/A, Mobex: External Email: grahan	one: GRO VoiceMail: GRO n.c.ward GRO
This email and any atta addressee only. If you disclose, reproduce, co	achments are confidential and intended for the are not the named recipient, you must not use, opy or distribute the contents of this communication.

Page 1 of 1

* 0405/494 *

Page 1 of 2

Thomas Penny

From:

Thomas Penny

Sent:

24 November 2005 11:53

To:

Jenkins Gareth GI

Cc:

Lowther Neneh; Pinder Brian; Sewell Peter

Subject: FW: CS Witness Statement Amendment

Hi Gareth

Neneh has said that you have kindly agreed to look at my mark up of the witness statement.

A lot of my comments relate to my general ignorance of how things work - Brian Pinder is dealing with these issues.

My immediate concerns are that I am not convinced that the statement is factually correct. I know about the demise of OBCS, but I dont know when it was rolled out to the estate, did it happen overnight or was there are phasing out period? I don't understand how network banking works (I did look at the procedures you suggested but I was unable to put the picture together) let alone provide the narrative. Is this something you could help us with?

Someone mentioned to me that reporting to the accounts department was no longer happening as we state do you know if this is the case?

If you could highlight anything in the statement which is not factually correct you would be doing us a great service.

Kind regards and many thanks Penny

----Original Message----From: Lowther Neneh

Sent: 22 November 2005 10:25

To: Thomas Penny

Subject: FW: CS Witness Statement Amendment

----Original Message----From: Jenkins Gareth GI **Sent:** 17 November 2005 14:53

To: Lowther Neneh

Subject: RE: CS Witness Statement Amendment

Neneh,

I've updated the Witness Statement as discussed.

I'm left some of the Networking bit highlighted in Blue, since I can't say that I know it is true (but it probably is). It may be OK just to delete that bit. What is left in that section may be sufficient (I guess it depends upon what the issue is!) I've removed the blue highlighting from the rest of the document.

I've used "Revisions" so that you can see what I've changed. I've highlighted the Date etc in yellow to remind us to update it for the final version.

Happy to discuss further.

Regards

Page 2 of 2

Gareth

This e-mail is only for the use of its intended recipient. Its contents are confidential and may be privileged. Fujitsu Services does not guarantee that this e-mail has not been intercepted and amended or that it is virus-free.

Gareth Jenkins
Distinguished Engineer
Applications TDA
Post Office Account

GRO GRO	
L	
i UKU i	
http://uk.fujitsu.com	
Fujitsu Services Limited, Registered in Englandno 96056, Registered Office 26, Finsbury Squa	rę London, EC2A 1SL
From: Lowther Neneh	
Sent: 15 November 2005 13:40	
Fo: Jenkins Gareth GI Subject: CS Witness Statement Amendment	• •
Hi, Gareth,	
Just a little note to remind you of the above for sometime on Thursday or	Friday Thank you
(ind regards	
Kind regards,	
Kind regards, Neneh Lowther	**
Neneh Lowther	••
Neneh Lowther	••
Neneh Lowther Customer Services - Post Office Account- Security Fujitsu Services, Forest Road, Feltham, Middlesex, TW13 7HJ	
Neneh Lowther Customer Services - Post Office Account- Security	
Neneh Lowther Customer Services - Post Office Account- Security Fujitsu Services, Forest Road, Feltham, Middlesex, TW13 7HJ	•
Neneh Lowther Customer Services - Post Office Account- Security Fujitsu Services, Forest Road, Feltham, Middlesex, TW13 7HJ Tel: GRO Mob: GRO	
Neneh Lowther Customer Services - Post Office Account- Security Fujitsu Services, Forest Road, Feltham, Middlesex, TW13 7HJ Tel: GRO	

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Page 1 of 2

Thomas	Pe	n	n	٧
--------	----	---	---	---

From:

Lowther Neneh

Sent:

22 November 2005 10:25

To:

Thomas Penny

Subject: FW: CS Witness Statement

Penny,

PSA from Gareth. Let me know what you think.

Gareth's just called me back. He's on his way to Sheffield for meetings at the moment and won't be back till Thursday.

He'll be picking up his mails so I've sent him a copy of ur 'marked up WS' to look at when he's got some time and he's promised to discuss further by Friday.

Kind regards,

Neneh

----Original Message-----

From: Jenkins Gareth GI

Sent: 17 November 2005 14:53

To: Lowther Neneh

Subject: RE: CS Witness Statement Amendment

Neneh,

I've updated the Witness Statement as discussed.

I'm left some of the Networking bit highlighted in Blue, since I can't say that I know it is true (but it probably is). It may be OK just to delete that bit. What is left in that section may be sufficient (I guess it depends upon what the issue is!) I've removed the blue highlighting from the rest of the document.

I've used "Revisions" so that you can see what I've changed. I've highlighted the Date etc in yellow to remind us to update it for the final version.

Happy to discuss further.

Regards

Gareth

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Gareth Jenkins Distinguished Engineer Applications TDA **Post Office Account**

Fujitsu Services

Lovelace Road, Bracknell, Berkshire, RG12 8SN

Tel: GRO Mobile: **GRO** email: GRO Web: http://uk.fujitsu.com

Page 2 of 2

Fujitsu Services Limited, Registered in Englandno 96056, Registered Office 26, Finsbury Square London, EC2A 1SL

From: Lowther Neneh

Sent: 15 November 2005 13:40

To: Jenkins Gareth GI

Subject: CS Witness Statement Amendment

Hi, Gareth,


Just a little note to remind you of the above for sometime on Thursday or Friday. Thank you

Kind regards,

Neneh Lowther

Customer Services - Post Office Account- Security

Fujitsu Services, Forest Road, Feltham, Middlesex, TW13 7HJ



Web: http://services.fujitsu.com

Fujitsu Services Limited, Registered in England no 96056, Registered Office 26, Finsbury Square, London, EC2A 1SL

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(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss 5A(3)(a) and 5B, MC Rules 1981, r 70)

Statement of

Beatrice Neneh Lowther Gareth Idris Jenkins

Age if under 18

Over 18

(If over 18 insert 'over 18')

This statement (consisting of 0.7 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe true.

Dated the

3rd

day of

October

2005

Signature

I have been employed by Fujitsu Services, working on the Post Office Account, formally ICL Pathway Ltd., since 1996 as a Customer Solutions Architect, involved in many aspects of design and implementation 9th June 2003 an Information Technology (IT) Security Analyst responsible for audit data extractions and IT Security. I have working knowledge of the computer system known as Horizon, which is a computerised accounting system used by Post Office Ltd. I am authorised by Fujitsu Services to undertake extractions of audit data held on the Horizon system and to obtain information regarding system transaction information processed on the Horizon system.

Horizon's documented processes relate to each Post Office outlet. They state that at each Post Office, there are counter positions which each have a computer terminal, a visual display unit and a keyboard and printer. This individual system records all transactions input by the counter clerk working

Signature

FUJ00122134 FUJ00122134

Witness Statement

(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss 5A(3)(a) and 5B, MC Rules 1981, r 70)

Continuation of statement of

Beatrice Neneh Lowther

at that counter position. Each clerk logs on to the system by using their own unique password. The transactions performed by each clerk, and the associated cash and stock level information are recorded by the computer system in a stock unit. Once logged on, any transactions performed by the clerk must be recorded and entered on the computer and are accounted for within the user's allocated stock unit.

The Post Office counter processing functions are provided through a series of counter applications: the Order Book Control Service (OBCS) is was one of these applications and it ascertaineds the validity of DWP order books before payment is was made. The counter desktop service and the office platform service on which it runs ran provides various common functions for transaction recording and settlement as well as user access control and session management.

Note that the Order Book Control Service was withdrawn from Live use in June 2005.

Information from counter transactions is was written into a local database and then replicated automatically to databases on all other counters within a Post Office outlet. The information is was then forwarded over Internet Services Digital Network (ISDN) (or other communication service) to databases on a set of central Correspondence Servers at the Fujitsu Services data centres. This is was undertaken by a messaging transport

Signature

(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss 5A(3)(a) and 5B, MC Rules 1981, r 70)

Continuation of statement of

Beatrice Neneh Lowther

systems within the Transaction Management Service (TMS). Various systems then transfered information to Central Servers that controled the flow of information to various support services. Details of outlet transactions are were normally sent at least daily via the system. Details relating to the outlet's stock holding and cash account are were sent weekly. Details are were then forwarded daily via a file transfer service to the Post Office accounting department at Chesterfield and also, where appropriate, to other Post Office Clients. In this respect DWP as a Post Office Client.

The Order Book Control System (OBCS) software, linked to the Horizon system was developed in conjunction with the DWP. OBCS provideds details of DWP order books on the national stop payment list, and, enableds data regarding the movement of order books, and, encashments to be captured on their behalf. Each Horizon terminal at a Post Office counter hads access to the national stop list through OBCS, when a barcoded DWP order book is—was scanned at the Post Office counter, or the order book details are—were manually keyed into Horizon at the Post Office counter. Each night, the national stop payment list is—was updated from information supplied electronically from the DWP computer centre. National stop payment list data is—was held centrally within the Horizon system, and is—was available to all Post Offices. However, certain

Signature

(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss 5A(3)(a) and 5B, MC Rules 1981, r 70)

Continuation of statement of

Beatrice Neneh Lowther

information from the national stop payment list is—was also downloaded to individual Post Offices for faster access; this download process is called polling. The polling of individual Post Offices also involveds receiving details of order book movements and encashments at Post Offices, centrally within Horizon, for onward transmission to the DWP.

All OBCS transactions are—were normally initiated by scanning in the barcode from the Order Book. Each Order Book is-was associated with a National Insurance Number (NINO) which identifies the person to whom the Order Book hads been (or is-was about to be) issued. The Horizon Central database maintaineds a list of every Post Office outlet at which that NINO hads been used by the OBCS application. This information is was also held in the local outlet database. All information received from DWP associated with withdrawn or stopped Order Books is was passed to all branches at which the associated NINO hasd-been used (if any). If an OBCS transaction is was carried out in an outlet and the NINO associated with the Order Book is was not found in the local database, an enquiry is was made to the Central database as to the state of all Order Books associated with the NINO. That outlet is-was then registered as being associated with that NINO for all future Order Book control information. Thus over a period of time a number of branches becaeme associated with each NINO. If the NINO is was not found in the local system the enquiry for

Signature

Witness Statement

(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss 5A(3)(a) and 5B, MC Rules 1981, r 70)

Continuation of statement of

Beatrice Neneh Lowther

OBCS information associated with that NINO is was carried out in real time. Such an enquiry will would only happen once for any NINO in a given outlet. All other OBCS transactions are were batch.

Post Office outlets are identified by Post Office Ltd with a FAD Code. These identifiers are passed from Post Office Ltd to Horizon when a Branch is first Opened (or migrated to Horizon in many cases). When a Branch is first opened (or migrated to Horizon), Post Office defines the number of Counter Positions required (including any Back Office positions). These are then allocated Counter positions from 1 (which is the gateway counter used to communicate to the Data Centre) up to the number of counters. The Counter position is fixed and is associated with a Physical terminal when it is installed in an outlet.

Post Office branches are mainly connected to the BT public wide area network using either the Analog Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) or Internet Services Digital Network (ISDN) technologies. In addition there are 147 a number of branches connected to the Hughes satellite dish network using Virtual Satellite (VSAT) technology. The ADSL, ISDN and VSAT traffic is then transported across the Energis network which is shared with their other customers including domestic internet users, government departments and B&Q superstores. The Energis network traffic is delivered

Signature

(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss 5A(3)(a) and 5B, MC Rules 1981, r 70)

Continuation of statement of

Beatrice Neneh Lowther

via dedicated links to Fujitsu's datacentres in Wigan and Bootle. Sites are linked into the datacentres across Zirgo boxes using Ramputan encryption. The algorithms, encryption devises and techniques used are those approved by Her Majesty's Government's (HMG) Communications Electronic Security Group (CESG). Hardware and software based encryption technology is used, where appropriate, to provide integrity and confidentiality protection on links between the Horizon system and its partners. Software encryption is used for all traffic between outlets and the campuses. The key used to encrypt traffic to and from a particular outlet has the additional benefit of acting as an authentication of the outlet Encryption is also used to 'seal' important data items that may be transferred over several links, and where the end-to-end of the data is important. The recipient can then verify the integrity of the sealed data by using an appropriate public key. Most file transfers are sent from Wigan and Bootle datacentres across authenticated ISDN connections directly to Fujitsu servers in the destination buildings. The data is then passed across a local area network to the recipient's server.

A check is carried out at the end of the day in each Post Office Outlet, that all counters are communicating with the "gateway" counter that communicates with the datacentre. Should this check be successful and End of Day record is written to the local database identifying all records

Signature

(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss 5A(3)(a) and 5B, MC Rules 1981, r 70)

Continuation of statement of

Beatrice Neneh Lowther

associated with that day's trading. The Horizon Central systems will only process data from Post Office outlets for which an End of Day record has been successfully replicated to the datacentre. Missing End of Day records can occur for one of two reasons:

1/ The End of Day record was not produced in the outlet – usually due to the gateway being unable to communicate with one of the other counters – for example it has failed or been switched off.

2/ The end of Day record has not been successfully replicated from the Post Office outlet to the datacentre – usually due to a communications problem.

End of Day Records will eventually be generated and communicated to the datacentre when the initial problems are resolved and the transactions associated with these "late End of Day" records will be communicated to other systems when they are available. In such cases the data transmitted to clients (such as DWP) will be more than 24 hours old. Such transactions will have the original timestamps from when they took place.

(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss 5A(3)(a) and 5B, MC Rules 1981, r 70)

Continuation of statement of

Beatrice Neneh Lowther

Signature

Thomas Penny

From:

Pinder Brian

Sent:

06 November 2005 18:26

To: Cc:

Subject:

Thomas Penny Sewell Peter (FEL01) FW: Witness Statement Mark-up

Penny

Apologies I seem to have missed you from this one, please note for your awareness of my views on the way ahead with prosecution support / ARQ's / witness statements etc.

It is basically in response to Neneh's email to you re her comment to "cover for your absences and nothing more." and in view of this comment I may need to fine tune the role however (see below) although I will add I do not envisage anything major here or contentious arising from this, as we must cater for all eventuallities.

Regds Brian

From:

Pinder Brian

Sent:

04 November 2005 08:29

To: Cc:

Lowther Neneh

Sewell Peter (FEL01)

Subject:

RE: Witness Statement Mark-up

Neneh

ci Peter for info only


I note your concerns and agree we do need to review our liabilities particularly regarding submission of these statements, but as per the Org Chart which Bill Mitchell produced to all some months ago, most roles are geared to overlap to cater for leave and sickness and any increased workload.

However in both yours & Penny's areas (which are of particular importance) I do envisage some job sharing as the workload dictates, it is only prudent to be multitasking in areas of such importance and visability to the customer and obviously this will be made easier once we are all based at Bracknell.

Hope this is helpful and beneficial but happy to discuss.

Regds Brian

Post Office Account Security -



From:

Lowther Neneh

Sent:

01 November 2005 11:28

To:

Thomas Penny; Pinder Brian Sewell Peter (FEL01)

Cc: Subject:

RE: Witness Statement Mark-up

Hi, Penny,

I have looked at the WS and basically there is a lot of it you have issues it.

As you are the person doing the job now, I am happy to work with the final product when the amendments have been made as I'm only hoping to cover for your absences and nothing more.

Kind regards,

Neneh

----Original Message----From: Thomas Penny

Sent: 31 October 2005 09:00

To: Pinder Brian

Cc: Sewell Peter (FEL01); Lowther Neneh **Subject:** Witness Statement Mark-up

Hi Brian

You asked me to mark up the standard witness statement with any concerns/comments I may have. This I have done and attach.

<< File: Penny's template - marked.doc >>

Kind regards Penny

Penny Thomas Customer Services - Post Office Account- Security

Fujitsu Services, Forest Road, Feltham, Middlesex, TW13 7HJ



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÷

Thomas Penny

From:

Thomas Penny

Sent:

31 October 2005 09:00

To: Cc: Pinder Brian Sewell Peter (FEL01); Lowther Neneh Witness Statement Mark-up

Subject:

Hi Brian

You asked me to mark up the standard witness statement with any concerns/comments I may have. This I have done and attach.




Kind regards Penny

Penny Thomas

Customer Services - Post Office Account- Security

Fujitsu Services, Forest Road, Feltham, Middlesex, TW13 7HJ



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(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss 5A(3)(a) and 5B, MC Rules 1981, r 70)

Brian

You asked for my comments on this witness statement – here they are. Anything highlighted means:-

I have read this, but I have no firsthand or background knowledge

I have made some comment in the text

Also, OBCS is now dead and network banking has taken its place. I believe that any witness statement relating to data since network banking started to replace OBCS (date unknown) should have a narrative explaining that process. Any statement relating to data after OBCS ceased (I believe end May 05) should not contain OBCS statements.

Statement of Penelope Anne Thomas

Age if under 18 Over 18 (If over 18 insert 'over 18')

This statement (consisting of pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe true.

Dated the

day of

20

Signature

Α

I have been employed by Fujitsu Services, Post Office Account, formally ICL Pathway Ltd., since 20 January 2004 as an Information Technology (IT) Security Analyst responsible for audit data extractions and IT Security. I have working knowledge of the computer system known as Horizon, which is a computerised accounting system used by Post Office Ltd. I am authorised by Fujitsu Services to undertake extractions of audit data held on the Horizon system and to obtain information regarding system transaction information processed on the Horizon system.

Horizon's documented processes relate to each Post Office outlet. They state that at each Post Office, there are counter positions which each have a computer terminal, a visual display unit

Signature

Signature witnessed by

CS011A (Side A)

(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss 5A(3)(a) and 5B, MC Rules 1981, r 70)

Continuation of statement of

Penelope Anne Thomas

and a keyboard and printer. This individual system records all transactions input by the counter clerk working at that counter position. Each clerk logs on to the system by using their own unique password. The transactions performed by each clerk, and the associated cash and stock level information are recorded by the computer system in a stock unit. Once logged on, any transactions performed by the clerk must be recorded and entered on the computer and are accounted for within the user's allocated stock unit.

С

The Horizon system provides a number of daily and weekly records of all transactions input into it. It enables Post Office users to obtain computer summaries for individual clients of Post Office Limited e.g. National Savings Bank Girobank, Driving Vehicle Licence Agency and the Department of Working Pensions (DWP). The Horizon system also enables the clerk to produce a weekly balance of cash and stock on hand combined with the other transactions performed in that accounting period.

D

Where local reports are required these are accessed from an icon on the desktop menu. The user is presented with a parameter driven menu, which enables the report to be customised to requirements. The report is then populated from transaction data that is held in the local database and is printed out on the tally roll printer. The system also allows for information to be transferred to the main accounting department at Chesterfield in order for the office accounts to be balanced. — I have never seen a report generated by Horizon nor the method for obtaining one

Ε

The Post Office counter processing functions are provided through a series of counter applications: the Order Book Control Service (OBCS) that ascertains the validity of DWP order books before payment is made; the Electronic Point of Sale Service (EPOSS) that enables Postmasters to conduct general retail trade at the counter and sell products on behalf of their clients; the Automated Payments Service (APS) provides support for utility companies and others who provide incremental in-payment mechanisms based on the use of cards and other tokens and the Logistics Feeder Service (LES) which supports the management of cash and

Signature

Signature witnessed by

(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss 5A(3)(a) and 5B, MC Rules 1981, r 70)

Continuation of statement of

Penelope Anne Thomas

value stock movements to and from the outlet, principally to minimise cash held overnight in outlets. The counter desktop service and the office platform service on which it runs provides various common functions for transaction recording and settlement as well as user access control and session management. – I have seen a Horizon terminal in a test environment at Bracknell but I have never seen these applications on the system

F

Information from counter transactions is written into a local database and then replicated automatically to databases on all other counters within a Post Office outlet. The information is then forwarded over ISDN (or other communication service) to databases on a set of central Correspondence Servers at the Fujitsu Services data centres. This is undertaken by a messaging transport system within the Transaction Management Service (TMS). Various systems then transfer information to Central Servers that control the flow of information to various support services. Details of outlet transactions are normally sent at least daily via the system. Details relating to the outlet's stock holding and cash account are sent weekly. Details are then forwarded daily via a file transfer service to the Post Office accounting department at Chesterfield and also, where appropriate to other Post Office Clients. — I could not describe TMS or explain how it works

G

An audit of all information handled by the TMS is taken daily by copying all new messages to archive media. This creates a record of all original outlet transaction details including its original outlet and counter, when it happened, who caused it to happen and the outcome. The TMS journal is maintained at each of the Fujitsu Services Data Centre sites and is created by securely replicating all transaction records that occurred in every Outlet. They therefore provide the ability to compare the audit track record of the same transaction recorded in two places to verify that systems were operating correctly. All exceptions are investigated and reconciled. Records of all transactions are written to audit archive media.

(HA)

The system clock incorporated into the desktop application on the counter visual display units is

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Signature witnessed by

CS011A

Version 3.0 11/02

(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss 5A(3)(a) and 5B, MC Rules 1981, r 70)

Continuation of statement of

Penelope Anne Thomas

configured to indicate local time. This has been the situation at (INSERT PO) (FAD) since (INSERT INSTALLATION DATE) when the Horizon system was introduced at that particular Post Office.

j

The Order Book Control System (OBCS) software, linked to the Horizon system was developed in conjunction with the DWP OBCS provides details of DWP order books on the national stop payment list, and, enables data regarding the movement of order books, and encashments to be captured on their behalf. Each Horizon terminal at a Post Office counter has access to the national stop list through OBCS, when a barcoded DWP order book is scanned at the Post Office counter, or the order book details are manually keyed into Horizon at the Post Office counter. Each night, the national stop payment list is updated from information supplied electronically from the DWP computer centre. National stop payment list data is held centrally within the Horizon system, and is available to all Post Offices. However, certain information from the national stop payment list is also downloaded to individual Post Offices for faster access; this download process is called polling. The polling of individual Post Offices also involves receiving details of order book movements and encashments at Post Offices, centrally within Horizon, for onward transmission to the DWP. – I have never seen this – but presumably most of this is no longer valid.

Κ

I have access to reports that monitor faults, polling failures, equipment failures and calls for advice and guidance logged by the Horizon System Helpdesk. During the ??? to ???, there were ?? calls from name & fad code to the Helpdesk. None of these calls relate to faults which would have had an effect on the integrity of the information held on the system.— I am not an engineer and I have no guidelines to support this statement.

L

When information relating to individual transactions is requested, the data is extracted from the

Signature

Signature witnessed by

FUJ00122134 FUJ00122134

Witness Statement

(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss 5A(3)(a) and 5B, MC Rules 1981, r 70)

Continuation of statement of

Penelope Anne Thomas

audit archive media via the Audit Workstations (AW's). Information is presented in exactly the same way as the data held in the archive although it can be filtered depending upon the type of information requested. The integrity of audit data is guaranteed at all times from its origination, storage and retrieval to subsequent despatch to the requester. Controls have been established that provide assurances to Post Office Internal Audit (POIA) that this integrity is maintained. – What are these controls?

During audit data extractions the following controls apply:

1. Extractions can only be made through the AWs, which exist at Fujitsu Services, Forest Road, Feltham, Middlesex, Fujitsu Services, Lovelace Lane, Bracknell, Berkshire and the two Fujitsu Services Data Centres. These are all subject to rigorous physical security controls appropriate to that location. Specifically, the Feltham and Bracknell AWs – where most extractions take place – are located in a secure room subject to proximity pass access within a secured Fujitsu Services site. – who has access to the AWs at the datacentres? Who checks whether they have been used?

 Logical access to the AW and its functionality is managed in accordance with the Fujitsu Services, Post Office Account Security Policy and the principles of ISO 17799. This includes dedicated Logins, password control and the use of Microsoft Windows NT security features.

3. All extraction's are logged on the AW and supported by documented Audit Record Queries (ARQ's), authorised by nominated persons within Post Office Ltd. This log can be scrutinised on the AW.

4. Extractions are only made by authorised individuals.

Upon receipt of an ARQ from Post Office Ltd they are interpreted by CS Security. The details are checked and the printed request filed.

6. The required files are identified and marked using the dedicated audit tools.

Signature

Signature witnessed by

CS011A

Version 3.0 11/02

(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss 5A(3)(a) and 5B, MC Rules 1981, r 70)

Continuation of statement of

Penelope Anne Thomas

7 Checksum seals are calculated for audit data files when they are written to audit archive media and re-calculated when the files are retrieved.

- 8. To assure the integrity of the audit data while on the audit archive media the checksum seal for the file is re-calculated by the Audit Track Sealer and compared to the original value calculated when the file was originally written to the audit archive media. The result is maintained in a Check Seal Table I'm told that checksum seals are an algorithm but I have no idea how they work
- 9. The specific ARQ details are used to obtain the specific data.
- 10. The files are copied to the AW where they are checked and converted into the file type required by Post Office Ltd.
- 11. The requested information is copied onto removal CD media, sealed to prevent modification and virus checked using the latest software. It is then despatched to the Post Office Ltd Casework Manager using Royal Mail Special Delivery. This ensures that a receipt is provided to Fujitsu Services confirming delivery.

M

ARQs 111-120/0506 were received on 18 May 2005 and asked for information in connection with the Post Office at Rose Hill (FAD 173137). I produce a copy of ARQs 111-120/0506 as Exhibit PT/01. On various dates and at various times between 18 May 2005 and 24 May 2005 I undertook extractions of data held on the Horizon system in accordance with the requirements of ARQs 111-120/0506 and followed the procedure outlined above. I produce the resultant CD as Exhibit PT/02.

Ν

The report is formatted with the following headings:

ID - relates to counter position

User – Person Logged on to System

SU - Stock Unit

Signature

Signature witnessed by

CS011A

Version 3.0 11/02

(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss 5A(3)(a) and 5B, MC Rules 1981, r 70)

Continuation of statement of

Penelope Anne Thomas

Date - Date of transaction

Time – Time of transaction

SessionId – A unique string relating to current customer session

TxnId – A unique string relating to current transaction

Mode – e.g. SC which translates to Serve Customer

ProductNo - Product Item Sold

Qty - Quantity of items sold

SaleValue - Value of items sold

Entry method - Method of data capture for OBCS Transactions (0 = barcode, 1 = manually

keyed, 2 = magnetic card, 3 = smartcard, 4 = smart key)

State – Method of manual keyed Entry Method (4 = encash, 5 = non-barcode)

IOP - Order Book Number

Result – Order Book Transaction Result (1 = OK, 2 = impound, 3 = unreadable, 4 = invalid)

Foreign Indicator - Indicates whether OBCS payment was made at a local or foreign outlet

(0- Local, 1- Foreign). The foreign indicator defaults to a '0' for all manually entered transactions.

The Event report is formatted with the following headings:

Groupid - FAD code

ID - relates to counter position

Date - Date of transaction

Time - Time of transaction

User - Person Logged on to System

SU - Stock Unit

EPOSSTransaction T - Event Description

EPOSSTransaction.Ti - Event Result

P

The CD (Exhibit PT/??) was sent to the Post Office Investigation section by Special Delivery on DATE 2005.

Signature

Signature witnessed by

(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss 5A(3)(a) and 5B, MC Rules 1981, r 70)

Continuation of statement of

Penelope Anne Thomas

Q

There is no reason to believe that the information in this statement is inaccurate because of the improper use of the computer. To the best of my knowledge and belief at all material times the computer was operating properly, or if not, any respect in which it was not operating properly, or was out of operation was not such as to effect the information held on it. I hold a responsible position in relation to the working of the computer. —I do not hold a responsible position in the working of the Horizon system. I hold a responsible position in relation to the AW

Any records to which I refer in my statement form part of the records relating to the business of Fujitsu Services. These were compiled during the ordinary course of business from information supplied by persons who have or may reasonably be supposed to have personal knowledge of the matter dealt with in the information supplied, but are unlikely to have any recollection of the information or cannot be traced. As part of my duties, I have access to these records.

Signature

Signature witnessed by

(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss 5A(3)(a) and 5B, MC Rules 1981, r 70)

Brian

You asked for my comments on this witness statement – here they are. Anything highlighted means:-

I have read this, but I have no firsthand or background knowledge I have made some comment in the text

Also, OBCS is now dead and network banking has taken its place. I believe that any witness statement relating to data since network banking started to replace OBCS (date unknown) should have a narrative explaining that process. Any statement relating to data after OBCS ceased (I believe end May 05) should not contain OBCS statements.

Statement of Penelope Anne Thomas

Age if under 18 Over 18 (If over 18 insert 'over 18')

This statement (consisting of pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe true.

Dated the

day of

20

Signature

Α

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В

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Signature

Signature witnessed by

CS011A (Side A)

(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss 5A(3)(a) and 5B, MC Rules 1981, r 70)

Continuation of statement of

Penelope Anne Thomas

counter clerk working at that counter position. Each clerk logs on to the system by using their own unique password. The transactions performed by each clerk, and the associated cash and stock level information are recorded by the computer system in a stock unit. Once logged on, any transactions performed by the clerk must be recorded and entered on the computer and are accounted for within the user's allocated stock unit.

C

The Horizon system provides a number of daily and weekly records of all transactions input into it. It enables Post Office users to obtain computer summaries for individual clients of Post Office Limited e.g. National Savings Bank, Girobank, Driving Vehicle Licence Agency and the Department of Working Pensions (DWP). The Horizon system also enables the clerk to produce a weekly balance of cash and stock on hand combined with the other transactions performed in that accounting period.

 Γ

Where local reports are required these are accessed from an icon on the desktop menu. The user is presented with a parameter driven menu, which enables the report to be customised to requirements. The report is then populated from transaction data that is held in the local database and is printed out on the tally roll printer. The system also allows for information to be transferred to the main accounting department at Chesterfield in order for the office accounts to be balanced. – I have never seen a report generated by Horizon nor the method for obtaining one

Ε

The Post Office counter processing functions are provided through a series of counter applications: the Order Book Control Service (OBCS) that ascertains the validity of DWP order books before payment is made; the Electronic Point of Sale Service (EPOSS) that enables Postmasters to conduct general retail trade at the counter and sell products on behalf of their clients; the Automated Payments Service (APS) provides support for utility companies and others who provide incremental in-payment mechanisms based on the use of cards and other tokens and the Logistics Feeder Service (LFS) which supports the management of cash and value stock movements to and from the outlet, principally to minimise cash held overnight in outlets. The counter desktop service and the office platform service on which it runs provides

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(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss 5A(3)(a) and 5B, MC Rules 1981, r 70)

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various common functions for transaction recording and settlement as well as user access control and session management. – I have seen a Horizon terminal in a test environment at Bracknell but I have never seen these applications on the system

F

Information from counter transactions is written into a local database and their replicated automatically to databases on all other counters within a Post Office outlet. The information is then forwarded over ISDN (or other communication service) to databases on a set of central Correspondence Servers at the Fujitsu Services data centres. This is undertaken by a messaging transport system within the Transaction Management Service (TMS). Various systems then transfer information to Central Servers that control the flow of information to various support services. Details of outlet transactions are normally sent at least daily via the system. Details relating to the outlet's stock holding and cash account are sent weekly. Details are then forwarded daily via a file transfer service to the Post Office accounting department at Chesterfield and also, where appropriate, to other Post Office Clients. — I could not describe TMS or explain how it works

G



An audit of all information handled by the TMS is taken daily by copying all new messages to archive media. This creates a record of all original outlet transaction details including its origin-outlet and counter, when it happened, who caused it to happen and the outcome. The TMS journal is maintained at each of the Fujitsu Services Data Centre sites and is created by securely replicating all transaction records that occurred in every Outlet. They therefore provide the ability to compare the audit track record of the same transaction recorded in two places to verify that systems were operating correctly. All exceptions are investigated and reconciled. Records of all transactions are written to audit archive media.

(HA)

The system clock incorporated into the desktop application on the counter visual display units is configured to indicate local time. This has been the situation at (INSERT PO) (FAD) since (INSERT INSTALLATION DATE) when the Horizon system was introduced at that particular Post Office.

Signature

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(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss 5A(3)(a) and 5B, MC Rules 1981, r 70)

Continuation of statement of


Penelope Anne Thomas

j

The Order Book Control System (OBCS) software, linked to the Horizon system was developed in conjunction with the DWP. OBCS provides details of DWP order books on the national stop payment list, and, enables data regarding the movement of order books, and, encashments to be captured on their behalf. Each Horizon terminal at a Post Office counter has access to the national stop list through OBCS, when a barcoded DWP order book is scanned at the Post Office counter, or the order book details are manually keyed into Horizon at the Post Office counter. Each night, the national stop payment list is updated from information supplied electronically from the DWP computer centre. National stop payment list data is held centrally within the Horizon system, and is available to all Post Offices. However, certain information from the national stop payment list is also downloaded to individual Rost Offices for faster access; this download process is called polling. The polling of individual Post Offices also involves receiving details of order book movements and encashments at Post Offices, centrally within Horizon, for onward transmission to the DWP - I have never seen this - but presumably most of this is no longer valid

K

I have access to reports that monitor faults, polling failures, equipment failures and calls for advice and guidance logged by the Horizon System Helpdesk. During the ??? to ???, there were ?? calls from name & fad code to the Helpdesk. None of these calls relate to faults which would have had an effect on the integrity of the information held on the system. - I am not an engineer and I have no guidelines to support this statement.



When information relating to individual transactions is requested, the data is extracted from the audit archive media via the Audit Workstations (AW's). Information is presented in exactly the same way as the data held in the archive although it can be filtered depending upon the type of information requested. The integrity of audit data is guaranteed at all times from its origination, storage and retrieval to subsequent despatch to the requester. Controls have been established that provide assurances to Post Office Internal Audit (POIA) that this integrity is maintained. -

Signature

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(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss 5A(3)(a) and 5B, MC Rules 1981, r 70)

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What are these controls?

During audit data extractions the following controls apply:

- 1. Extractions can only be made through the AWs, which exist at Fujitsu Services, Forest Road, Feltham, Middlesex, Fujitsu Services, Lovelace Lane, Bracknell, Berkshire and the two Fujitsu Services Data Centres. These are all subject to rigorous physical security controls appropriate to that location. Specifically, the Feltham and Bracknell AWs where most extractions take place are located in a secure room subject to proximity pass access within a secured Fujitsu Services site. who has access to the AWs at the datacentres? Who checks whether they have been used?
- Logical access to the AW and its functionality is managed in accordance with the Fujitsu Services, Post Office Account Security Policy and the principles of ISO 17799. This includes dedicated Logins, password control and the use of Microsoft Windows NT security features.
- 3. All extraction's are logged on the AW and supported by documented Audit Record Queries (ARQ's), authorised by nominated persons within Post Office Ltd. This log can be scrutinised on the AW.
- 4. Extractions are only made by authorised individuals.
- 5. Upon receipt of an ARQ from Post Office Ltd they are interpreted by CS Security. The details are checked and the printed request filed.
- 6. The required files are identified and marked using the dedicated audit tools.
- 7. Checksum seals are calculated for audit data files when they are written to audit archive media and re-calculated when the files are retrieved.
- 8. To assure the integrity of the audit data while on the audit archive media the checksum seal for the file is re-calculated by the Audit Track Sealer and compared to the original value calculated when the file was originally written to the audit archive media. The result is maintained in a Check Seal Table. I'm told that checksum seals are an algorithm but I

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CS011A Version 3.0 11/02

(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss 5A(3)(a) and 5B, MC Rules 1981, r 70)

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have no idea how they work

- 9. The specific ARQ details are used to obtain the specific data.
- 10. The files are copied to the AW where they are checked and converted into the file type required by Post Office Ltd.
- 11. The requested information is copied onto removal CD media, sealed to prevent modification and virus checked using the latest software. It is then despatched to the Post Office Ltd Casework Manager using Royal Mail Special Delivery. This ensures that a receipt is provided to Fujitsu Services confirming delivery.

Μ

ARQs 111-120/0506 were received on 18 May 2005 and asked for information in connection with the Post Office at Rose Hill (FAD 173137). I produce a copy of ARQs 111-120/0506 as Exhibit PT/01. On various dates and at various times between 18 May 2005 and 24 May 2005 I undertook extractions of data held on the Horizon system in accordance with the requirements of ARQs 111-120/0506 and followed the procedure outlined above. I produce the resultant CD as Exhibit PT/02.

Ν

The report is formatted with the following headings:

ID - relates to counter position

User - Person Logged on to System

SU - Stock Unit

Date - Date of transaction

Time - Time of transaction

SessionId – A unique string relating to current customer session

Txnld – A unique string relating to current transaction

Mode – e.g. SC which translates to Serve Customer

ProductNo - Product Item Sold

Qty - Quantity of items sold

SaleValue - Value of items sold

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(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss 5A(3)(a) and 5B, MC Rules 1981, r 70)

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Entry method - Method of data capture for OBCS Transactions (0 = barcode, 1 = manually

keyed, 2 = magnetic card, 3 = smartcard, 4 = smart key)

State – Method of manual keyed Entry Method (4 = encash, 5 = non-barcode)

IOP - Order Book Number

Result – Order Book Transaction Result (1 = OK, 2 = impound, 3 = unreadable, 4 = invalid)

Foreign Indicator - Indicates whether OBCS payment was made at a local or foreign outlet

(0- Local, 1- Foreign). The foreign indicator defaults to a '0' for all manually entered

transactions.

The Event report is formatted with the following headings:

Groupid - FAD code

ID - relates to counter position

Date - Date of transaction

Time - Time of transaction

User – Person Logged on to System

SU - Stock Unit

EPOSSTransaction.T – Event Description

EPOSSTransaction.Ti - Event Result

Ρ

The CD (Exhibit PT/??) was sent to the Post Office Investigation section by Special Delivery on DATE 2005.

Q

There is no reason to believe that the information in this statement is inaccurate because of the improper use of the computer. To the best of my knowledge and belief at all material times the computer was operating properly, or if not, any respect in which it was not operating properly, or was out of operation was not such as to effect the information held on it. I hold a responsible position in relation to the working of the computer. — I do not hold a responsible position in the working of the Horizon system. I hold a responsible position in relation to the AW

Any records to which I refer in my statement form part of the records relating to the business of

Signature

Signature witnessed by

(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss 5A(3)(a) and 5B, MC Rules 1981, r 70)

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Fujitsu Services. These were compiled during the ordinary course of business from information supplied by persons who have or may reasonably be supposed to have personal knowledge of the matter dealt with in the information supplied, but are unlikely to have any recollection of the information or cannot be traced. As part of my duties, I have access to these records.