

Fujitsu Services Secure Support Role Definitions for SECURENT Build Ref: RS/REQ/023

**COMPANY IN CONFIDENCE**

Version: 4.0  
Date: 04/12/04

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**Document Title:** Secure Support Role Definitions for SECURENT Build

**Document Type:** Requirement Definition

**Release:** BI3S75 through to BI3S80

**Abstract:** The ACP requires that access to POA systems be controlled by the use of pre defined roles to which users can be assigned. Such roles will allow users to access only those parts of the system, with associated tool sets, they need in order to complete the tasks associated with that particular role. This document summarises the requirements and defines the roles specifically engaged in support activities, with associated objects, domains and access requirements.

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**Internal Reviewers:** See section 0.2

**External Reviewers:** None

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## 0.0 Document Control

### 0.1 Document History

Version No.	Date	Reason for Issue	Associated CP/PinICL No.
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0.2	19/10/02	Updated with comment received from PVCS review cycle.	CP3283
0.3	04/02/03	Updated to reflect minor implementation changes to the solution	CP3283
0.4	15/07/03	Updated with new Riposte tools for counters.	CP3482
1.0	08/08/03	Updated to APPROVED with appropriate comments from PVCS review cycle addressed. from	CP3482
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3.1	10/08/04	Updated to record relaxation of Administrator access within the PWYSAS domain. These changes were made during release S60 live operation due to Tivoli software distribution problems. Covers access to new standalone Signing Server.	PC105116 CP3815/S60R
4.0	04/12/04	Updated to APPROVED following PVCS review cycle.	PC105116 CP3815/S60R

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## 0.2 Review Details

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### 0.3 Associated Documents

Reference	Tag	Version	Date	Title	Source
PA/TEM/001	[1]			This document is created from this version of PA/TEM/001	PVCS
RS/POL/003	[2]			Access Control Policy	PVCS
RS/FSP/001	[3]			Security Functional Specification	PVCS
DE/HLD/002	[4]			OpenSSH Auditing and Logging Server	PVCS
TD/ION/029	[6]			FTMS Configurations for AP Clients at CSR+	PVCS
RS/REQ/020	[7]			Implementation of Anti-Virus Requirements	PVCS
RS/DES/075	[8]			Communication Monitoring System DMZ Security Overview	PVCS
RS/DES/080	[9]			BI3 NT Domain Design	PVCS
RS/DES/081	[10]			BI3 Implementation Guide for NT Platforms	PVCS
RS/DES/082	[11]			BI3 NT Server and Workstation Names	PVCS
RS/REQ/022	[12]			BI3 Secure Role Definitions for SECURENT Build	PVCS
SMG/DES/017	[13]	0.1		Terminal Server Document	SMG
RS/DES/093	[14]	0.3		HLD for CHAP Password Handling	PVCS

Unless a specific version is referred to above, reference is made to the current versions of the documents.

### 0.4 Abbreviations/Definitions

Abbreviation	Definition
BDC	Windows NT Backup Domain Controller Server
BI3	Release Banking Increment 3
CP	Change Proposal
CSR+	Core Services Release +
DCS	Debit Card Services
DRS	Data Reconciliation Services
ISD	Abbreviation associated with Core Services staff
Local	Access via the console attached directly to an NT platform
NWB	Network Banking
PDC	Windows NT Primary Domain Controller Server
SAS	Secure Access Server
SSE	Secure Support Environment
SSH	Secure Shell



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SSHC	Secure Shell Client
SSHD / SSH Server	Secure Shell Server
TS	Terminal Server

## 0.5 Changes in this Version

Version	Changes
3.0	Updated to APPROVED
3.1	PWYSAS access for standard Windows NT Administrator relaxed.

## 0.6 Changes Expected

Changes
For BI3S80, any CP raised that affects the security configuration could result in this document being amended.  SAS access to PWYKMS and PWYCSM domains remain as To Be Designed.

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## 1 Introduction

The nature of the POA Horizon system requires that access to the counters and core systems should be strictly controlled. [ACP] states that effective control depends on having a clear definition of the roles and the responsibilities of all personnel who need some form of access to the system. Users will gain access by being assigned to these roles. This will be core to POA implementing the principles of least privilege as described in [SFS]. POA will translate the human roles detailed in [ACP] into securely configured roles, known as secure roles.

**RS/REQ/022** defines the requirements for all POA human secure roles (except for Support Roles) that access the POA data centre systems via an access point, which is usually an NT workstation. These requirements are translated by IPDU Secure Builds and IPDU PIT in order to generate a secure desktop for each role.

**RS/REQ/023**, this document defines the requirements of the human secure roles involved with providing support of the POA Horizon solution. It describes for each of the POA support groups the menus and tool sets required and the secure support environment desktop access method used to connect to remote counters and data centre systems.

## 2 Scope

This document only addresses the human user roles defined for use by the support groups involved with supporting the POA Horizon solution systems. These support roles are to be implemented as part of the POA central NT systems and access rights assigned to each role. Each support role specified within this document access counters and the data centre NT systems through the POA NT Domain Structure referenced in [9] and in accordance with the security configuration referenced in [10]. SMC and SMG support roles that authenticate in the SYSMAN domain are not described in terms of their Secure Desktops. For these roles it is assumed that their desktops include Terminal Server Client and that Terminal Server Client provides these roles with access to the Secure Support Environment implemented within the POA NT Domain Structure. Document reference [13] describes the configuration for SYSMAN secure roles.

Non support roles used by SMC, SMG and Girobank are specifically excluded from this document as they are authenticated on separate NT systems which form part of a third party managed service. These roles are excluded from accessing the Secure Support Environment.

This document does not describe the implementation or configuration of OpenSSH components on the NT data centre systems or counters. This information is described fully in reference [4].

### 3 Requirements

The requirement to implement a secure role based access control system emanates from [ACP]. [ACP] further defines the roles that are required for access to the POA Systems and the responsibilities of these roles.

Release BI3 Network Banking and release BI3S30 Debit Card System introduced more stringent requirements regarding support access to counters and the data centre NT systems. To satisfy these new requirements, a Secure Support Environment is being introduced and as a result new user desktops and access mechanism are required for the support groups. This document defines the new authentication processes, desktops, and tool sets available to the support groups.

#### 3.1 Affected Support Roles

The POA support roles affected by CP3283 are:

- PWYDCS\SSC Apps SUP
- PWYDCS\SSC Apps MAN
- PWYDCS\Operational MAN
- PWYDCS\Application SUP

In addition to the above two roles that authenticate in the SYSMAN third party supplier domain are also affected. These two roles are:

- SYSMAN\SMC
- SYSMAN\MSS

#### 3.2 New Support Roles

At Release BI3S55 a new privileged role is introduced for ADSL CHAP Password Handling. See RS/DES/093 for more details concerning the use and procedures associated with this new role. The role is named:

- PWYDCS\PWYLoad

At Release BI3S60 a new support role is introduced for Fujitsu Consulting staff who will provide support for the new SAP financial system being introduced to the Horizon data centres at BI3S60. This new will provide this group of support staff access to the SAP Host via the SAS servers and SSH. The role is named:

- PWYDCS\SAPSUP

#### 3.3 Redundant Support Roles

None of the existing support roles are made redundant.

---

### **3.4 New Change Proposals**

CP3652: This CP requires additional support tool subsets to be added to the following platforms:

- Counters
- Counters and Data Centre Servers
- SAS Servers

CP3653: This CP requires that Riposte be installed onto the six SAS servers.

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## 4 Implementation

For the four POA support roles, each support role will be set up as a Secure Role. Secure Roles will be mapped very tightly on to the Group concept within NT. Individual users will be assigned to these Groups in which access to objects, domains, servers and associated privileges will be controlled. Reference [10] describes in more detail the rules and methods for applying Secure Roles onto the NT Group concept. These Secure Roles are defined in Section 7.

Secure Roles use defined access points that have an accompanying Physical Platform Design Specification (PPDS) document. Access to objects will be made available to each role at the relevant access point. This document specifically covers the Secure Support Roles accessing the data centres and counters.

The definition of the Secure Support Roles is maintained in a spreadsheet by IPDU Secure Builds, this spreadsheet is converted to produce automated NT command files. These command files will be made available to ITU PIT. The command scripts will be incorporated into the POA SECURENT build process and into the specific platform configuration builds by ITU PIT for deployment into test and live estate environments.

Secure Support Roles, as defined in this document, will be implemented using automated command scripts. By doing this, it will simplify the implementation and maintenance of the roles.

Human user accounts created from the defined roles may only be members of one Role/Group definition. This is required to ensure the user is only provided with one appropriate tool set. Implementation of the menu structure for each Group will ensure that users assigned to that Group will be able to access the application set necessary for them to fulfil their duties.

### 4.1 NT Administrator User

The Windows NT operating system is provided with a super user known as the 'Administrator'. This user has full administration and configuration privileges which is exercised at both system/server and domain level. This capability cannot be removed from Windows NT. POA recognises the power that this user has and the ability that a human user, using the administrator user, has to interfere with the day to day operation of the POA solution.

To address this issue, POA will limit and restrict the use of the NT Administrator User. This will be achieved by:

- Renaming the Administrator User on all NT Servers so that it is hidden from the system. The account name and password will be specified by the POA Security Manager, which will be strictly controlled and stored in a secure safe.
- Restrict full administrator privileges to the 'Operational Management' role. Use of this role will be subject to the management and procedural controls set out in the 'POA Code of Practice', PA/STD/010.



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## 4.2 TSadmin Role

CP3283 introduces a new administrator role known as TSAdmin. This new role will be responsible for day to day operations and administration of the PWYSAS domain and the Secure Access Servers. The security configuration will be setup to prevent PWYDCS roles from administering PWYSAS. PWYSAS\Administrator was restricted from accessing the C:\ and D:\ drives in order to prevent any possibility of tampering with the SSH log files. However this restriction has proved to be preventative of normal day to day system management tasks such as software distribution and during Release BI3S60 the live estate was updated via OCPs. At Release BI3S75 the SecureNT configuration files have been updated in line with these OCPs. Security configuration for the TSAdmin role has not been changed and should continue to be used for PWYSAS Domain and Server updates.

The TSAdmin role will be allocated to senior Core Services NT staff and will be limited to no more than three individuals at any one point in time. It is this role that will create and manage the terminal server user accounts. These individual accounts will be created from the pre-defined TS user templates. Each individual user will be mapped to a TS profile and will have a defined user home directory. Customer Services Security will be responsible for TSAdmin user accounts are allocated, created and managed.

## 4.3 SSHAdmin Role

This new role is introduced for the purpose of managing the configuration of the SSH Client and SSH Server components. Like the TSAdmin role, this new role will be limited for use by senior Core Services NT staff and will be limited to no more than three individuals at any one point in time. This role will only be able to administer the Secure Shell configuration files. Only this human role will be granted access control permissions greater than Read and Execute. Customer Services Security will be responsible for SSHAdmin user accounts are allocated, created and managed.

## 4.4 PWYLoad Role

This is a special role introduced for use by the Customer Services Security Management team. The purpose of the role is to load obfuscated passwords into the CHAP Password database. The role accesses the CHAP Password database by logon at Release BI3S55 at the BootLoader Server console. Once logged on, an executable is called to provide a GUI interface that enables passwords to be loaded into the database. At Release BI3S60 the role will also be able to logon at the ADSL Radius Servers and FRIACO/Dialled Radius Servers console.

---

## 5 Support Role Users

### 5.1 PWYDCS Users

SSC support staff and Core Services operational management staff who access the POA Horizon systems must have an individual user account registered in the PWYDCS domain. Each user account is created from a pre-defined user template which is described in Section 7 of this document. Associated with each NT user account registered in PWYDCS is a SecurID Token and four digit PIN.

Existing support user accounts remain unchanged within the SSE. New support user accounts will be created using the existing and current processes.

User templates exist for the following support roles:

- Users assigned to SSC Apps SUP role have user accounts created from user template 'zzSSC Apps Sup'
- Users assigned to SSC Apps MAN role have user accounts created from user template 'zzSSC Apps MAN'
- Users assigned to Operational MAN role have user accounts created from user template 'zzOPSMAN'
- Users assigned to Application SUP role have user accounts created from user template 'zzAPPSUP'
- Users assigned to SAPSUP role have user accounts created from user template 'zzSAPSUP'

### 5.2 HUTHTIP, PDRTIP Users

Both HUTHTIP and PDRTIP domains which contain the Remote TIP Gateway systems at Post Office sites are authentication domains. Both are configured with identical support roles to those described for PWYDCS Users above. Access to these remote domains/systems using SSHD will require support staff to login and authenticate using user accounts created in the HUTHTIP and PDRTIP domains.

### 5.3 PWYKMS Users

TBA following input from POA CS Security Management team.

### 5.4 PWYCSM Users

TBA following input from Infrastructure Design.

---

## 5.5 SYSMAN Users

User accounts registered in this third party supplier managed domain must comply with the security policies defined in [ACP].

From the requirements specified in CP3283 the following support roles from this domain are relevant to the SSE:

- SMC
- MSS

## 5.6 Secure Access Server Users

Changes to the solution implementation mean that user templates and user accounts are no longer required within the PWYSAS domain and Secure Access Servers.

## 5.7 Counter Access Users

CP3283 specifies that only the SSC support group will be granted access to counters using SSE.

At the counter only a common/shared user account is required. SSH Client will capture the logon username from the Terminal Server Client session and will record this user name in the command log files that SSH Client generates. The user account defined for the SSC support group is:

- susses

## 5.8 NT Data Centre System Access Users

Access to Data Centre NT systems will in the main be achieved by support staff logging on via SSHD using their PWYDCS user account. Exceptions to this will be HUTHTIP and PDRTIP remote TIP FTMS Gateway domains, PWYKMS and PWYCSM domains. Access to these four domains will be achieved by using equivalent user accounts created in these domains.

## 6 Support Authentication Process

### 6.1 Logon at Desktop

All support users that logon with a PWYDCS user account will specify their unique username and associated password. The system will then prompt for SECURID logon using their assigned PIN with the token value displayed at the time of logon.

The same logon and authentication process should be followed for all support users who authenticate in the SYSMAN domain.

Once the identification and authentication process has completed the user is presented with their usual desktop with an array of tools as specified in Section 7. One of the tools available from this desktop is the Terminal Server Client. Executing the Terminal Server Client tool will result in the system opening a new window at the workstation that results from a connection to a Secure Access Server located in PWYSAS domain. This new Terminal server window will display a prompt for a user name and password. At Release BI3S30, Support Users can still access counters and NT data centre systems using their pre BI3S30 desktops and tools. However from BI3S30 the only approved and authorised support access method to counters and NT systems in the PWYPUB and DCSSERV resource domains is via the Terminal Server/Secure Shell access route.

### 6.2 Logon at SAS Terminal Server

At the Terminal Server window login prompt the support user should re-enter their individual terminal server user account created in PWYDCS domain and its associated password.

Successful logon will result in the SAS desktop being made available to the user. From this desktop the Secure Shell Client (SSHC) will be available.

### 6.3 Logon to SSH Server

The user can invoke the SSHC by typing:

```
ssh -l <user name> <target-address>
```

where:

<user name> will equate to the support group users individual user account name created in PWYDCS domain or the other authentication domains referred to in section 5 for NT data centre systems or user account sussc for counters.

<target-address> will equate to the IP address of the target counter or NT system.


Execution of the above causes the SSHC to make a connection with the SSH server running on the target system. The user account specified will be authenticated at the target-system and if successful a SSH session will be initiated. The SSHC will log



each command executed during the session recording the PWYDCS domain (or other domain) logon user account name that has initiated the SSH session.

## 6.4 Process Summary

See diagram below.



## **7 Support Role Desktops**

### **7.1 Standard Secure Role Desktop**

This section describes the desktop menu and tool set provided to the four POA Support Roles as a result of logging on with their PWYDCS, PWYKMS, (HUTHTIP, PDRTIP) user account, password and Securid Token. This logon will be conducted at their normal access point workstation or server.



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### 7.1.1 SSC Apps MAN

Group Name to be Implemented	SSC Apps MAN
Last Updated	
Secure Role Type	Privileged Full Administrator capable
Desk Top Type	Restricted Desktop Menu
NT Servers	All NT Servers, also needs access to Post Office Outlet Counters and access to Sequent UNIX Servers
Access Rights	Read, Write, Execute
Requires SecurID Authentication	Yes
Authentication Domain	PWYDCS, PWYHQ, PWYFTMS, HUTHTIP, PDRTIP
Resource Domain Access	All resource domains and NT data centre systems via SSH Client access method
Access Point	SSC NT Client PC SD/DES/172
ACP Equivalent	Application Support (SSC)
Change Triggers	
Menus and Tools	➤ Tivoli Remote Console
	➤ Relient
	➤ Rconsole
	➤ Terminal Server Client
	➤ RiposteGetMessage.exe
	➤ RiposteIndex.exe
	➤ RiposteNode.exe
	➤ RiposteObjectSecurity. Exe
	➤ RiposteObject.exe
	➤ RipostePing.exe
	➤ RipostePriorityMessage.exe
	➤ RiposteQueryUK.exe
	➤ RiposteNextMessage.exe
	➤ RipostePutMessage.exe
	➤ RiposteScanMessage
	➤ RiposteStatus.exe
	➤ RODBClient.exe
	CMD prompt
	➤ ExCeed for Windows NT (V 6.1)
	➤ Visual Basic I.D.E



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	➤ Telnet
	➤ FTP (To Host Sequent, and other POL Services)
	Microsoft Diagnostics
	NT Event Viewer
	WinZip/Pkzip
	CD Rom writing software
	Textpad
	Microsoft Word
	Microsoft Excel
	Microsoft Access
	Microsoft Explorer
	Internet Explorer (c/w SSC default links page)
	Full NT Control Panel
	Performance Monitor
	Registry editor
	TIP Repair
<u>In-house Utilities</u>	➤ Archive Viewer
	➤ Expiry Reporter
	➤ Stops Reporter
	➤ Formatted File Utility
	➤ MessageStore Utility
	➤ EndOfDay Reporter
	➤ MessageStore Sort Utility
<u>VPN Utilities</u>	➤ VPNDiagClient.exe
	➤ SVPNTSTN.exe
Athene Utilities	Athene Analyst Analyst ViewDB Storage
	Athene Automatic Reporting Define A Report Schedule Editor View Processed Reports
	Athene Client-Server Client-Server
	Athene CustomDB CustomDB Schedule Editor Web Log Parser
	Athene Explorer Define A Report Explore Reports

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	Athene Planner  Build Baseline Model Calibrate Baseline Model Delete Models Edit Baseline Model Edit Reference Tables Edit Thresholds Evaluate Model Modify Model View Results
	Athene Sentinel  Alert Summary Sentinel
Requires Access to	All systems

User Template	Is a member of	Global Group	Is a member of	Local Group
ZzSSCAPP_MAN				
	Yes	SSC Apps MAN		
	Yes	Domain Admins	Yes	Administrators
	Yes	Domain Users	Yes	LSSC Apps MAN
			Yes	LconfineLogin



## 7.1.2 SSC Apps SUP

Group Name to be Implemented	SSC Apps SUP
Last Updated	
Secure Role Type	Privileged Full Administrator capable
Desk Top Type	Restricted Desktop Menu
NT Servers	All NT Servers, also needs access to Sequent UNIX servers
Access Rights	Read, Execute
Requires SecurID Authentication	Yes
Authentication Domain	PWYDCS, PWYHQ, PWYFTMS, HUTHTIP, PDR TIP
Resource Domain Access	All resource domains and NT data centre systems via SSH Client access method
Access Point	SSC NT Client PC SD/DES/172
ACP Equivalent	Application Support (SSC)
Change Triggers	
Menus and Tools	➤ Tivoli Remote Console
	➤ Rclient
	➤ Rconsole
	➤ Terminal Server Client
	➤ RiposteGetMessage.exe
	➤ RiposteIndex.exe
	➤ RiposteNode.exe
	➤ RiposteObject.exe
	➤ RipostePing.exe
	➤ RipostePriorityMessage.exe
	➤ RiposteNextMessage.exe
	➤ RiposteQueryUK.exe
	➤ RiposteScanMessage.exe
	➤ RiposteStatus.exe
	➤ RODBCClient.exe
	CMD prompt
	➤ ExCeed for Windows NT (V 6.1)
	➤ Visual Basic I.D.E.
	➤ Telnet



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	➤ FTP (To Host Sequent, and other POL Services)
<u>NT utilities</u>	Microsoft Diagnostics
	Event Viewer
	WinZip/Pkzip
	CD Rom writing software
	Textpad
	Microsoft Word
	Microsoft Excel
	Microsoft Access
	Microsoft Explorer
	Internet Explorer (c/w SSC default links page)
	Full NT Control Panel
	Performance Monitor
	Registry editor
	TIP Repair
<u>In-house Utilities</u>	➤ Archive Viewer
	➤ Expiry Reporter
	➤ Stops Reporter
	➤ Formatted File Utility
	➤ MessageStore Utility
	➤ EndOfDay Reporter
	➤ MessageStore Sort Utility
<u>VPN Utilities</u>	VPNDiagClient.exe
<u>Athene Utilities</u>	Athene Analyst
	Analyst
	ViewDB Storage
	Athene Automatic Reporting
	Define A Report
	Schedule Editor
	View Processed Reports
	Athene Client-Server
	Client-Server
	Athene CustomDB
	CustomDB
	Schedule Editor
	Web Log Parser
	Athene Explorer
	Define A Report
	Explore Reports

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	Athene Planner  Build Baseline Model Calibrate Baseline Model Delete Models Edit Baseline Model Edit Reference Tables Edit Thresholds Evaluate Model Modify Model View Results
	Athene Sentinel  Alert Summary Sentinel
Requires Access to	All systems

User Template	Is a member of	Global Group	Is a member of	Local Group
ZzSSCAPP_SUP				
	Yes	SSC App SUP		
	Yes	Domain Admins	Yes	Administrators
	Yes	Domain Users	Yes	LSSC Apps SUP
			Yes	LconfineLogin



### 7.1.3 Operational MAN

Group Name to be Implemented	Operational MAN
Last Updated	
Secure Role Type	Privileged
Desk Top Type	Restricted Desktop Menu
NT Servers	All NT Servers Access to Sequent UNIX Servers
Access Rights	Full Administrator
Requires SecurID Authentication	Yes
Authentication Domain	PWYDCS, PWYHQ, PWYFTMS, HUTHIIP, PDRTIP
Resource Domain Access	All resource domains and NT data centre systems
Access Point	Core Service NT Client PC Third Party Supplier PC NT server console
ACP Equivalent	Operational Management Core Services Role
Change Triggers	
Menus and Tools	➤ Compaq systems reference library
	➤ Insight Manager
	➤ Terminal Server Client
	➤ SQL Server Admin
	➤ Technet
	➤ Microsoft Office
	➤ NT Resource Kit
	➤ Onnnet (telnet/ftp)
	➤ Patrol v3.2.05
	➤ Legato Administrator
	➤ nt srvtools
	➤ Tivoli desktop
	➤ IE5.5 for access to Tivoli web
	➤ NT resource kit remote console server
	➤ PC Xware
	CMD prompt
	➤ VPNDiagClient.exe

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	➤ Notepad
	➤ SVPNTSTN.exe (Utimaco API Function Tool)
Athene Utilities	Athene Analyst Analyst ViewDB Storage
	Athene Automatic Reporting Define A Report Schedule Editor View Processed Reports
	Athene Client-Server Client-Server
	Athene CustomDB CustomDB Schedule Editor Web Log Parser
	Athene Explorer Define A Report Explore Reports
	Athene Planner Build Baseline Model Calibrate Baseline Model Delete Models Edit baseline Model Edit Reference Tables Edit Thresholds Evaluate Model Modify Model View Results
	Athene Sentinel Alert Summary Sentinel
Requires Access to	Floppy disc drive Locally connected printer



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User Template	Is a member of	Global Group	Is a member of	Local Group
zzOPS_MAN				
	Yes	Operational MAN		
	Yes	Domain Users	Yes	Loperational MAN
			Yes	LconfineLogin

## 7.1.4 Application SUP

Group Name to be Implemented	Application Sup
Last Updated	
Secure Role Type	Privileged
Desk Top Type	Restricted Desktop Menu
NT Servers	Access to Sequent UNIX Servers
Access Rights	Read, Write, Execute
Requires SecurID Authentication	Yes
Authentication Domain	PWYDCS, PWYHQ, HUTHTIP, PDRTIP
Resource Domain Access	PERFMAN
Access Point	Core Services NT Client PC Third Party Supplier PC
ACP Equivalent	Application Support Core Services Role
Change Triggers	
Menus and Tools	➤ Discoverer 2000
	➤ PC Xware
	➤ Microsoft Office
	➤ Onnnet (telnet/ftp)
	➤ Patrol v3.2.05
	➤ Legato Administrator
	➤ IE5.5
	➤ SQL Server Admin
	➤ Terminal Server Client
	CMD prompt
Athene Utilities	Athene Analyst Analyst ViewDB Storage
	Athene Automatic Reporting Define A Report Schedule Editor View Processed Reports
	Athene Client-Server Client-Server



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	Athene CustomDB CustomDB Schedule Editor Web Log Parser
	Athene Explorer Define A Report Explore Reports
	Athene Planner Build Baseline Model Calibrate Baseline Model Delete Models Edit baseline Model Edit Reference Tables Edit Thresholds Evaluate Model Modify Model View Results
	Athene Sentinel Alert Summary Sentinel
Requires Access to	Floppy disc drive Locally connected printer

User Template	Is a member of	Global Group	Is a member of	Local Group
ZzApplication_SUP				
	Yes	Application SUP		
	Yes	Domain Users	Yes	Lapplication SUP
			Yes	LconfineLogin

---

### 7.1.5 PWYLoad

Group Name to be Implemented	PWYLoadGroup
Last Updated	08/01/04
Secure Role Type	Privileged Administrator access capable
Desk Top Type	Restricted Desktop Menu
NT Servers	Access to BootLoader Server , ADSL Radius Servers and FRIACO/Dialled Radius Servers
Access Rights	Read, Write, Execute
Requires SecurID Authentication	Yes
Authentication Domain	PWYDCS
Resource Domain Access	BBOOT, WBOOT and PWYRAD systems via direct logon at server console
Access Point	Server Console for BootLoader Servers, ADSL Radius Servers and FRIACO/Dialled Radius Servers
ACP Equivalent	None
Change Triggers	CP3584
Menus and Tools	
	CMD prompt
	Microsoft Diagnostics
	NT Event Viewer
	WinZip/Pkzip
	Textpad
	Microsoft Word
	Microsoft Excel
	Microsoft Access
	Windows Explorer
	Full NT Control Panel
	Registry editor
<u>In-house Utilities</u>	➤ Password Loader executable (maps onto C:\RADIUS_CFG\Bin\RcapPwdLoader.exe on the Bootloader server)
Requires Access to	All systems in BBOOT, WBOOT and PWYRAD domains. Requires access to floppy disc drive.



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User Template	Is a member of	Global Group	Is a member of	Local Group
ZzPWYLoad				
	Yes	GPWYLoadGroup		
	Yes	Domain Users	Yes	LPWYLoadGroup
			Yes	LconfineLogin

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### 7.1.6 SAPSUP

<b>Group Name to be Implemented</b>	<b>GSAPSUP</b>
Last Updated	26/02/04
Secure Role Type	Privileged Administrator access capable
Desk Top Type	Restricted Desktop Menu
NT Servers	Access to SAP Host via dedicated SAS Servers MBOSAS03 or MWISAS03
Access Rights	Read, Write, Execute
Requires SecurID Authentication	Yes
Authentication Domain	PWYDCS
Resource Domain Access	PWYSAS
Access Point	Fujitsu Consulting Support Workstation + SecurID ACE Agent
ACP Equivalent	None
Change Triggers	CP3640
Menus and Tools	
	Terminal Server Client
	SAP GUI Interface (maps onto an executable that needs to be supplied by Fujitsu Consulting staff, may require FJC to complete an installation to obtain this piece of information.
	FTP Client. Notes: 1, the SAP Host will be configured with FTP Server Service and the FJC SAP Support user group on the Solaris SAP Hosts must be granted permissions to access and execute FTP. 2, the DMZ firewalls must be configured to allow inbound and outbound FTP traffic for this support group.
<u>In-house Utilities</u>	➤ None requirements specified.
Requires Access to	FTP capability between SAP Hosts and FJC SAP Support Workstations.

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User Template	Is a member of	Global Group	Is a member of	Local Group
ZzSAPSUP				
	Yes	GSAPSUP		
	Yes	GSAPSUP	Yes	LPWYSUP
	Yes	Domain Users	Yes	LSAPSUP
			Yes	LconfineLogin



## **7.2 Terminal Server Client Desktop**

This section describes the desktop available to each of the Support groups provided with Terminal Server access to the SSH Client.

### **7.2.1 SSC Support Group**

Access provided to SSH Client. The SSH Client can be used to access counters and data centre NT systems.

### **7.2.2 SMC Support Group**

No access to SSH Client provided.

### **7.2.3 MSS Support Group**

No access to SSH Client provided.

### **7.2.4 Operational Management Support Group**

Access provided to SSH Client. The SSH Client can only be used to access data centre NT systems.

### **7.2.5 Fujitsu Consulting SAP Support Group**

Access provided to SSH Client. The SSH Client can only be used to access the SAP Host in the data centres.

## 8 Support Tools

### 8.1 Tool Set Location and Access

The support tool set will be installed at the same location on all NT platforms.

The 'root' directory is known as:

- C:\Support

Underneath this directory is the following structure:

- C:\Support\Tools\Generic
- C:\Support\Tools\Generic\Cygwin
- C:\Support\Tools\Generic\Ntreskit
- C:\Support\Tools\Admin (only on Secure Access Servers)

As the directory names imply, Generic means that the tools are common and available to all support groups. The Cygwin directory holds all the GNU tools generated and delivered into PVCS by IPDU Estate Management Development team. The Ntreskit directory holds all Windows NT resource kit utilities. These are made available to all support groups.

In addition to the above 'common' directories, each support group will have a dedicated directory to hold bespoke developed tools. The directories are:

- C:\Support\Tools\SSCSUP
- C:\Support\Tools\SMCSUP
- C:\Support\Tools\SYSMANSUP
- C:\Support\Tools\OPSMANSUP
- C:\Support\Tools\SAPSUP

Each support group will be able to access tools located in their directory. They will not be able to access the directories of the other support groups. All support group access will be configured as Read and Execute. Only administrator privileged users will be able to update the above directories and add further tools to the tool set.

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## 8.2 Riposte Tools on Counters (CP3482)

The following tools are added to all counters via the PIT build at Release BI3S40R as a result of CP3482. The tools are located in directory **C:\Counters\Bin**.

RiposteConfig.exe  
RiposteGetMessage.exe  
RiposteListen.exe  
RiposteNextMessage.exe  
RiposteNode.exe  
RiposteObject.exe  
RipostePutMessage.exe  
RiposteScanMessage.exe  
RiposteStatus.exe

## 8.3 Additional Riposte Tools on Counters (CP3652)

The following tools are added to all counters via the PIT build at Release BI3S70 as a result of CP3652. The Riposte tools are located in directory **C:\Support\Tools\SSCSUP**. Note: this directory has been mandated by POA CS Security Manager. Access to these tools is specifically restricted to SSC Support staff.

RiposteGroups.exe  
RiposteConfigurationSecurity.exe  
RiposteIndex.exe  
RipostePriorityMessage.exe  
RiposteVolume.exe

The following tools are added for all support groups to use. These tools will be located in directory **C:\Support\Tools\Generic\Cygwin\Bin**.

Stty.exe  
Split.exe  
Tr.exe  
Strings.exe  
Getopt.exe  
Xargs.exe

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Vim.exe

FTP Client only

## 8.4 Additional Tools on Data Centre Servers (CP3652)

The following tools are added to all Data Centre servers via the PIT build at Release BI3S70 as a result of CP3652. The tools are located in directory **C:\Support\Tools\Generic\Cygwin\Bin.**

Stty.exe

Split.exe

Tr.exe

Strings.exe

Getopt.exe

Xargs.exe

Vim.exe

FTP Client only

The above tools will be installed onto all SAS servers. In addition to the above tools, the following tool will be added to all SAS servers. This tool will not be available on Counters or other Data Centre servers. This tool is located in directory **C:\Support\Tools\Generic\Cygwin\Bin.**

Rxvt.exe

## 8.5 Tools Available

A full list of the tools available is given in a table in Appendix A. This appendix will be kept update as further tools are added in the future.

## 8.6 Updating the Tool Set

There are two situations in which the support tool set can be updated. These are 'normal' and 'exceptional' circumstances.

### 8.6.1 Normal Circumstances

This section gives a brief overview of the process that should be followed in normal circumstances in order to add new tools to the tool set.

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- The Support group identifies new tool(s).
- The Support group subject the tool(s) to local testing to ensure the tool(s) is/are fit for purpose.
- The Support group raise a CP to introduce the new tool(s), indicating whether it is/they are generic tool(s) or specific to the support group and identifying the target release.
- POA development impacts the CP. If the CP is approved
- IPDU Secure Build update this document [RS/REQ/023] and publish on PVCS review cycle.
- The Security TDA and POA Security Manager are both Approval Authorities. In addition each Support group will also have an Approval Authority for this document. The IPDU PIT Manager will also be an Approval Authority.
- Once this document has gained the necessary approval signatures, the IPDU PIT Manager will authorise IPDU PIT to progress the updates necessary to add the tool(s) to the tool set directories. IPDU Secure Build will adjust the security configuration as necessary.
- The work packages are subjected to testing by IPDU System Test and on completion of testing the new work packages are added to the SUPPORT TOOLS platform configuration build for release to the live estate systems.
- The new tools are delivered and installed onto the NT platforms using Tivoli.

### 8.6.2 Exceptional Circumstances

There will always be emergency situations that will require new tools to be made available urgently. At this point in time, no process for handling exceptional circumstances has been identified. Simon Fawkes is leading the investigation into how this situation will be dealt with and will identify the proposed solution once known.

## 8.7 Installation of Riposte on SAS Servers

CP3653 calls for the installation of Riposte and only installation onto all SAS servers. Riposte will be installed in directory **D:\RTOOLS**.



## 9 Appendix A – Support Tool Set

This appendix lists the GNU tools available as part of the Support Tools platform Configuration SPBV. This SPBV is known as COMSECNT.

The following detail is associated with the table on the next page.

The tools identified in the table are located in directory:

**C:\Support\Tools\Generic\Cygwin** (on all platforms)

A 'Yes' in the following column indicates that the program is to be executable by members of the support group, while 'No' indicates that permission to execute the commands is not to be granted.

The commands shown in the table do not have the '.exe' suffix. The '.exe' suffix will be present for all executables when delivered to PVCS and installed on the platform.

Selected and where required, security approved NT Resource kit utilities provided by Microsoft at Release Supplement 4 are made available in directory:

**C:\Support\Tools\Generic\NTreskit** (on all platforms)

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Table 1

Commands	Support groups at Data Centre					User groups at Counters				
	SSC	ISD	MSS	Tivoli	Maestro	SSC	ISD	MSS	Tivoli	Maestro
basename	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
bash	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
cat	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
chgrp	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
chmod	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
chown	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
chroot	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
cmp	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
cp	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
cut	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
cygpath	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
date	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
dd	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
df	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
diff	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
dirname	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
du	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
echo	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
egrep	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
expr	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
false	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
find	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
fold	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
gunzip	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
gzip	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
head	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
hostname	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
kill	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
less	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
ln	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
login	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
ls	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
md5sum	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
mkdir	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
mount	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
mv	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
nawk	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
nice	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
nl	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
od	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
paste	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
printf	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
ps	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
pwd	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
regtool	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
rm	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
rmdir	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
sed	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
sleep	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
sort	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
tail	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
tar	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
tee	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
test	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
touch	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
tput	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
true	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
tset	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
umount	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
wc	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes

Table 2



**Fujitsu Services** Secure Support Role Definitions for SECURENT Ref: RS/REQ/023  
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	Support groups at Data Centre					User groups at Counters				
Commands	SSC	ISD	MSS	Tivoli	Maestro	SSC	ISD	MSS	Tivoli	Maestro
stty	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
split	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
tr	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
string	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
getopt	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
xargs	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
vim	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
ftp client only	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
compreg	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
disksave	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
dumpel	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
getmac	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
getsid	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
kill	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
pulist	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
rkill	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
robocopy	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
sc	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
scanreg	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
sclist	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
scopy	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
showacl	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
showdisk	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
showgrps	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
showmbrs	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
shutdown	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
sleep	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
tlist	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
xcopy	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes



## 10 Appendix B – CP3815 Secure Signing Server Access

CP3815 introduces a standalone Signing Server for the purposes of signing PinPad Software Updates. The new server will be introduced during Release BI3S60R. This server will be located within the Secure Room at FEL01 operated by the POA CS Security Management Team. After the relocation to BRA01 in 2005 the server will be located in an equivalent or more secure environment. RS/DES/082 has been updated to define the new Server Name.

As the new Signing Server will be a standalone work group server, the usual Secure NT roles will not be effective. Neither will SecurID authentication. The proposed solution for user and support access is to create standard Windows NT user accounts for each individual who will require access.

Users of the Signing Server will automatically be created and added to the Users built-in group. These users will be provided with access to the floppy disc drive and CD-ROM/DVD-ROM drive, having read and write access to all drive types. Therefore the floppylocker service will not be required for the standalone server build.

Support access will be limited to Core Services Operational Management staff. User accounts created for this group of staff will be added to the local machine administrators group and therefore will be granted full administrator capability.

The audit policy must be configured to record all user log-on and log-off event records and the Security Event Auditor will need to review the Security Event Log maintained by the server on a regular basis following existing processes.