ICL PATHWAY ACTIONS FOLLOWING ACCEPTANCE INCIDENTS RESOLUTION WORKSHOP 27/28 JULY 1999

Incident Category	Description	
1	PWY/POCL Agree Severity = medium	
2	POCL agree severity = low	
3	To be considered at TIP meeting	
4	Closed and to be monitored	
5	Closed	
6	Closed pending PWY action	
7	Closed pending POCL action	
8	Closed pending joint action	
9	Further review (T2)	
10	Dispute	

Incident No	Incident Category	POCL Description	Action Required	By Whom	Date Completed
220	2	The acceptance criterion requires states that:"If for any reason it is no possible to - or it is decided by POCL not to - make EPOSS functionality immediately available on commencement of Roll Out the Service Infrastructure, BES/APT functionality shall be available and operational with no adverse system or operational impacts. In effect it shall be requirement to isolate EPOSS functionality so that it cannot inadvertently be used/misused to the detriment of Customer service and POCL accounting needs."The documentation provided for Acceptance Review demonstrates that the EPOSS functionality can be removed, but it does not explain how this can be done with no adverse system or operational impacts. Specific questions which must be addressed are: how will administration, balancing and reporting operate in isolation of EPOSS transactions? Wha procedures must be adopted by counter staff to operate BES/APT only in this way? Can such procedures be implemented without adverse system of operational impact?	quote new soln and the ability to supress EPOSS.		
224	6	Responses from Help Desk are slow. Post Masters are waiting in excess of 2 hours without any response.	Al form to revised by PWY covering changes introduced to the HD service.	P Curley	
240	8	The requirement / criterion specifies that the contractor is responsible for ensuring that a contingency plan is in place to cater with any Help Deslincidents. Contingency arrangements have not been demonstrated.			

288	6	The Authorities felt that this did not address how data integrity is maintained PWY will work with POCL to give whateverD Cooke in failure scenarios or subsequent remedial action that may be required to maintain integrity. Clarity is sought on how data integrity is maintained in a failure situation. This has been discussed to include coverage of marker based accounting and application rules regarding what functions are available and the underlying design guidelines.
294	6	Criteria [467/3] requires that it shall be possible to identify whether data from OPS has been received by TMS or not and criteria [472/3] requires that an audit trail of interactions with OPS shall be maintained. The data acknowledgement specification (TSC/AGT/065) only details a possible design of what may be implemented. It does not give a definitive description of implemented system features that would satisfy POCL business imperative of knowing whether data has moved between an outlet and data centre. Therefore it is not currently possible to agree the criteria.
297	9	Evidence from the Live Trial offices shows that the counter system is PWY to provide analysis form by week end, D Cooke unstable, presenting inappropriate or unintelligible error messages to theincluding comment on frequency (reduction) clerk and eventually requiring the terminal to be re-started. The error explanation as to why etc. messages received by clerks include: "Out of Virtual Memory", "Virtual Memory Low - Please close down some applications" "Mutex Failure" "Heap Failure" "Doctor Windows"The immediate effect of this problem is in terms of the reliability of the Service Infrastructure's input devices. However, once the underlying reasons for the problem are identified, this could change the perception. At least 13 such occurrences have been identified on the LTSC log between the start of the Core Observation Period on 31st May and the 28th June. However, as such problems should be reported directly to the HSH, it is likely that this number represents only a small proportion of the total in which case, this problem would be widespread. Consequently, POCL's initial assessment is that this incident is likely t

	-	
298	9	Evidence from the Live Trial shows that the counter system is subject to PWY to provide analysis form, including D Cooke "lockups" and "screen freezes", where the system halts in mid-processing comment on frequency (reduction) giving the user no opportunity to take any corrective action. This is either explanation as to why etc. To be provided by exhibited by the system hanging or presenting a blank blue screen. The week end. user is forced to ring the HSH and is advised to reboot the system. The immediate effect of this problem is in terms of the reliability of the Service Infrastructure's input devices. However, once the underlying reasons for the problem are identified, this could change the perception. At least 25 such occurrences have been identified on the LTSC log between the start of the Core Observation Period on 31st May and the 28th June. However, as such problems should be reported directly to the HSH, it is likely that this number represents only a small proportion of the total in which case, this problem would be widespread. Consequently, POCL's initial assessment is
		that this incident is likely to be more than low severity.
300	4	Evidence from the Live Trial indicates that should the printer fail during Analysis to be completed by Richard B, sent Brunskill operation, the system may lock up rather than handling the error normally to POCL and will be reconsidered at next. This has been observed even when the printer has only run out ofweeks meeting. paper. The immediate effect of this problem is in terms of the reliability of the Service Infrastructure's peripheral and input devices. However, once the underlying reasons for the problem are identified, this could change the perception. Several occurrences have been identified on the LTSC log between the start of the Core Observation Period on 31st May and the 28th June. As such problems should be reported directly to the HSH, it is likely that this represents only a small fraction of the total, in which case this problem would be widespread. Consequently, POCL's initial assessment is that the severity of this incident is likely to be greater than low severity.
301	4	Evidence from the Live Trail indicates that if a process fails due to a printer PWY to revise analysis form and send to D Cooke failure, the accounting data within the office may suffer a loss of POCL. integrity. The principal effect is a loss of accounting data integrity. Other effects include: considerable extra work by the counter (and potentially support staff) to resolve problem; loss of confidence in the system; undermining of evidential quality of system outputs. Several occurrences have been identified on the LTSC log between the start of the Core Observation Period on 31st May and the 28th June. As such problems should be reported directly to the HSH, it is likely that this represents only a small fraction of the total, in which case this problem would be widespread. Consequently, POCL's initial assessment is that the severity of this incident is likely to be greater than low severity.
303	6	At the review meeting, Pathway undertook to provide details of contingency Al form to be revised with adjusted wording to J Pope arrangements specifically for Migration. The requirement is about duringread for example: if a system when delivered and after roll-out. No such details were provided. Therefore no evidencewas unserviceable, if migration has not has been provided that contingency arrangements are available for allcommenced then migration is delayed, if

		Outlets during Roll Out of EPOSS to such Outlets.	migration has commenced then the system would be replaced in accordance with service levels in ?10.	
314	9	The above criteria refer to the requirement for Pathway to supply detailed technical documentation which will allow POCL to procure applications from a third party supplier. At the time the POCL Infrastructure Acceptance Specification was being agreed it was recognised that the technical documentation to support it did not exist. Therefore POCL agreed that Pathway could provide the documentation at a later date. Furthermore it was understood that Pathway were allowed to put forward their proposal as to how this criteria would be met in the future. The main document cited was the 'ICL Pathway External Applications Procurement Policy' which detailed an approach as to how they would work with a third party supplier. However this document still does not meet the criteria as they stand today.	POCL to consider PWY analysis and business impact. PWY requested specifics requirements from POCL by Friday noon. Pathway to review specifics when received.	
		Furthermore the other cited references, 'Counter Hardware Design Specification', 'OPS Architecture Document' and 'TMS Architecture Document' do not meet the criteria as being clearly defined technical documentatio	e	

340	9		POCL to consider PWY analysis, business impact and report back to PWY with specific details prior to T2. PWY to review when received.		
		The Token technology specifications clearly request 'method of Payment' to be operating at the token level, such that, one or more 'methods of payment' can be associated with individual tokens. This is only possible within the current pathway system if a non-acceptable artificial 1 to 1 relationship always exists between the 'item' and the 'token', effectively setting up the 'Item' and 'Token' to be synonymous.			
		The Token technology specifications clearly request the association of multiple 'Method of Payment'. Currently regarding authorised methods of payment Pathway only supports 'Cash' and 'Other', with no means of sub categorising 'Other'.			
		In terms of the contractual requirement that has not been met we cite the following documents: à POCL TOKEN TECHNOLOGY SPECIFICATION APS MAGNET			
341	1	The ARM comments re. the new POCL invoice were - "no information provided on how integrity is assured and how audit trails are provided. The view is that the invoice is at summary level with no apparent means of easily validating the information it contains". The reconciliation of services with charges is not agreed and is understood to be the subject of commercial negotiations between POCL and Pathway.	will be able to sign-off and close incident. Ongoing discussion to occur between ATM's (Dave & Liz) to resolve how quickly doc can		
342, 359, 361, 363, 376, 377, 378, 379	3		PWY staff to attend meeting with POCL to discuss incidents.	D Hollingsworth & others	
343		For example, mapping transaction data from counter to counter summaries/cash account is not covered by any of the documentation. There is no definitive "list" showing the different levels of holding, maintaining or transferring items and how these activities are controlled to	Test condition met, additional info supplied. POCL accept that the test was successful. Close incident and meeting to take place between POCL and PWY to discuss ongoing concerns in detail. Meeting to be setup asap, via Bob Booth & JD.		

344	2	Pathway (John Dicks) stated at the ARM that data acknowledgement for changes e.g. product price changes will be resolved through the introduction of the 'Acknowledgement Agent'. There has been insufficient detail provided of how this is planned to work and as the solution is not to be introduced until CSR+ then it must be assumed that the current design is deficient. Additionally there is still no clear evidence as to how Pathway control the dissemination of data to specific outlets only - ie. where has this	CSR+. Al to be resubmitted advising details of AA etc	
366	T2	been tested and precisely how does the process. ICL Pathway failed to inform POCL via Business Service Management of a number of software fixes which were sent down to the live outlets in NR2 but prior to Live Trial 2. These included a fix to prevent unmatched reversed transactions PinICL 26260 and a	end.	D Cooke
368	T2	The computer room at Lytham St Annes, supporting the ICL Outsourcing Tivoli operation, is not physically secure. In particular, the air conditioning arrangements for the room are based on leaving the window open, and even when closed, the window offers inadequate security for the nature of the contents. Note: We understand that steps are now being taken to rectify this defect, with the installation of security mesh over the window, however we are told that this work will not be completed until after the end of the Core Observation Period."		D Jones
		Various KPR entries	PWY to print all KPR entries and supply to POCL asap.	J Dicks