

Witness Name: Andrew George Hayward

Statement No.: WITN08160100

Dated: 11/05/2023

POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY

FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF: Andrew Hayward

I, Andrew George Hayward, will say as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. I am a former employee of Post Office Ltd. and held various positions within the business over a 31 year period, culminating in Senior Security Operations Manager when I left the company in July 2015.
2. This witness statement is made to assist the Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry (the “**Inquiry**”) with the matters set out in the Rule 9 Request dated 06/04/2022 (the “**Request**”).

BACKGROUND

3. I have been asked to set out my professional career whilst employed by Post Office Ltd (“**POL**”) where I was employed.
4. Postman: 1984-1985: Delivery of mail
5. Post Office Counter clerk: 1985 – 1986: Operational duties, serving customers and back-room duties.

6. Supply Chain Manager: 1986 – 2000: Various operational and management roles including cash, stock, coin, finance and culminating in Cash Centre manager, Birmingham, with responsibility of end-to-end supply chain for services to Network & external banking customers.

7. Security Team Leader/manager 2000 – 2008: Various roles within Physical crime team including Security Advisor, Team Leader, and temporary Senior Security Manager. Investigation, statement taking and interviews under PACE. Responsibility of leading team of security managers to mitigate threat of external crime against POL Network & Supply Chain.

8. Senior Security Fraud Risk Programme Manager 2008-2010: Responsible for a range of fraud prevention programmes to mitigate fraud risks and losses. Senior lead on fraud risk; communications plan, crime & offender profiling and product fraud. Crime analysis; identification of merging patterns and trends.

9. Senior Security Operations Manager: 2010 – July 2015: Asset protection; Circa 11,500 Post Office Crown and branch network and CVIT supply chain estate operations. Management of operational fraud risk programmes, including prevention and detection strategies to meet changing threats. Management of fraud investigations, including criminal prosecutions, support of conduct & contractual matters, conduct of investigations, including training and development. External crime prevention activities to prevent, detect and mitigate threats, including situational crime prevention methodologies. Manage and develop a team

of direct reports and security managers to manage and mitigate fraud and external crime risks. Critical threat, crisis management; kidnap, hostage and serious incidents.

Law enforcement and Security Industry engagement. Senior Authorising Officer for POCA Restraint and Confiscation Orders.

RECRUITMENT OF SPMS

10. In respect of the October 2008 Feasibility Report “RS1707 Agency Recruitment Policy” (POL00005670), previous to this policy I was requested by the Head of Security (John Scott / “**JS**”), to undertake a project to review security investigation casework files to identify any mitigating factors in better identifying fraud. One of the main findings and as noted in the report was that SPMS with 0-5 years' service were more likely to commit fraud and secondly the POL recruitment process for spms was not robustly managed. Enhanced credit checks and better management of the recruitment process would help identify and mitigate fraud losses. I can confirm that I left POL in July 2015 and enhanced processes had not been introduced.

11. In respect of point 8/page 35 of POL00084977 I can confirm and as noted in paragraph 10 above the previous review of casework identified a lack of robust management of new SPMS. Enhanced credit checks would have identified risks at an earlier stage. POL was unable to undertake these checks independently, with the aim being to conduct checks in conjunction with a third-party supplier (Callcredit) and the bank of Ireland. On leaving the business in July 2015 enhanced processes had not been introduced.

THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY TEAM AND THE POLICIES/PRACTICES IN PLACE

12. In respect of the period of time I worked in the security team, to the best of my knowledge POL/Royal Mail had Direct Public Authority (DPA) status to enable them to undertake criminal investigations. I had no direct involvement in the writing of these policies, nor the practise or rationale of undertaking private prosecutions.

13. On leaving the business in July 2015 to the best of my knowledge POL were still undertaking financial recovery where authorised, although this had been greatly reduced due to the Horizon Integrity issues identified.

Policies governing the conduct of criminal investigations

14. In respect of Policies governing the conduct of criminal investigations by the Security team and organisational structure I have no knowledge of the policies mentioned¹, other than Post Office Ltd Financial Investigation Policy (version 2, February 2011) (POL00104853) and Post Office Ltd Anti-Fraud Policy (February 2011) (POL00104855). The aim was to reinforce the security team structure and aims to the wider business and the fraud prevention approach adopted. This was driven and directed by the Head of Security, JS.

15. In respect of the structure, security team had "Strands", all reporting to the Head of Security. These were; (i) Commercial-leading on POL products and services such as credit card/banking etc. (ii) The Information Technology Team (IT), leading on IT within the business (iii) The Operational team, leading on internal fraud, external crime (robbery, burglary) (iv) The Physical team, leading on areas including, alarms, buildings, vehicles (v) The Crime Risk/Admin team (re-named

¹ POL00030578, POL00104812, POL00104806, POL00031004, POL00031003, POL00030580, POL00030579, POL00026573, POL00031008, POL00104853, POL00104855, POL00030786, POL00104929, POL00105226, POL00030602, POL00031005, POL00027863, POL00030902.

Grapevine; date unknown), leading on risk analysis and administration matters for the security team. I am not aware of any major changes to these teams during my time in the security team. For the record I was never the Head of Security.

16. In respect of conducting criminal investigations (and the Inquiry's question as to who would determine how an investigation would be conducted), the policies and procedures gave direction to this. The Head of Security had overall responsibility for this.

17. I have been asked about the role of the financial investigation unit. The aim was to recover financial losses in line with the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. There were financial levels adopted, from memory I believe a £15k threshold was the level set for intervention, however I cannot confirm if this is still the case.

18. In respect of other teams within the Post Office being involved in criminal investigations and prosecutions, the legal team gave overall direction and authority to proceed in prosecutions. The Network and audit teams liaised with the security team on investigations, providing supporting evidence and witness statements where required and where prosecutions were not deemed appropriate, any outcomes such as contractual matters would be passed to the Network teams as they had the lead responsibilities for this.

19. In respect of legislation, policies, guidance and / or principles governing the conduct of investigations conducted by the Security team during the period I worked within it were directed by legislation, including the Police and Criminal Investigation Act 2002(PACE), Regulation and Investigation Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), Criminal Procedures and Investigation Act 1996 and the Human Rights Act 1996 (HRA). Any changes would be directed by legislation. In respect of fraud there

was a change of direction when the Head of Security (JS), came which still adhered to the legislation but adopted a fraud risk approach, aimed at prevention and detection of crime against POL.

20. In respect of dealing with complaints regarding an investigation, the initial point of contact would be to the line manager, thereafter, raised to the wider business helpline.

21. In respect of supervision the investigation manager reported to his/her line manager who had oversight of the individual cases, which were reviewed on an ongoing/monthly basis. Overarching this was a monthly review undertaken by the senior security fraud team and Head of Security of investigation casefiles.

22. In respect of POLs approach to suspected fraud, losses were identified via planned audits undertaken by the Network teams. Depending on the type or amount of loss, this would be dealt with either by the Network team as a contractual matter or by the security team as a criminal investigation. The security team would also conduct analysis under fraud risk programmes to identify potential fraud and/or losses.

23. In respect of POLs policy and practice regarding investigation and prosecution of Crown Office employees differing from the policy and practice regarding investigation and prosecution of SPMs, from a security perspective there was no difference in dealing with as a criminal investigation, which to the best of my knowledge did not change during my time.

24. In respect of POL00104900 I am not aware that this had any impact on either business as they operated and were directed by legislation processes as noted in framework documents.

25. In respect of the rationale behind the development of a Post Office specific "Conduct of Criminal Investigations Policy" in 2013 I did not undertake this and have no recollection of any contribution to this policy.
26. In respect of the draft "Post Office Fraud and Loss Prevention Policy" from 2013 at POL00038603 I am not aware if this was finalised or approved.
27. In respect of the document entitled "Security Team Objectives 2013 – 2014" dated April 2013 at POL00105025 my understanding is that the loss reduction board was the business wide committee to oversee all activities undertaken by the whole business and the loss reduction programmes were individual activities undertaken by specific teams to support this. From a security team perspective, the fraud risk programmes would have fed into this to enable activities and financial benefits to be tracked.

How and when the Security team became involved in an investigation

28. In respect of the circumstances in which an auditor would be sent to conduct an audit at a Post Office branch to the best of my understanding there would be two specific circumstances. Firstly, the Network Audit teams conducted planned yearly audits at branches. Secondly, if the security or associated Conformance/Compliance/Cash management teams identified branches that were deemed a risk due to analysis, then an audit would be requested.
29. In respect of the document "Condensed Guide for Audit Attendance" (version 2, October 2008) (POL00084813) to the best of my understanding an investigator would attend an audit of a branch or after an audit has been conducted if there was a loss identified. I have no recollection on the specific amounts of loss. If in attendance the investigator's role would be to ensure all evidence is secured in

accordance with PACE and where required arrange and/or conduct interviews under PACE.

30. In respect of a shortfall being identified during an audit of a branch, the level of loss would dictate who the auditor reported that shortfall or discrepancy to. I believe the auditor would report it to the Helpline within the Network. Losses would also be reported to the Security Administration team.

31. In respect to the documents POL00104929 and POL00105226 and Appendix 1 to POL00104825 where a shortfall was identified following an audit of a SPM's branch: i) The amount or type of loss would determine whether an investigation into potential criminality was to be conducted by the Security team or the case was taken forwards as a debt recovery matter by the Financial Services Centre and / or the relevant legal team. This would be agreed between the Network and security team. I am not aware that this process changed during the period I worked within the Security team. ii) The SPM's local contract manager would have input into this decision-making process in conjunction with his/her line manager and/or the security team. I am not aware that this changed during the period I worked within the Security team iii) Given the timescales since I left POL, I cannot recollect the triggers / criteria for raising a fraud case following the identification of a shortfall / discrepancy in a SPM's branch. To the best of my knowledge the triggers / criteria for raising a theft or false accounting case were not different and did not change.

32. In respect of the memo dated 15 December 2009 sent by myself and Dave Posnett to the Security team (POL00104825), given the timescale (2009 to current), to the best of my knowledge, the rationale for conducting cash verification exercises in all branches "(except Crowns)" ahead of the migration to Horizon online was that

in terms of historical fraud loss data, branches would have been deemed a higher risk than Crown managed branches. I have no knowledge of the impact of this requirement and the migration to Horizon online more broadly on the work of the Fraud team. In respect of Appendix 2 within POL00104825 regarding the three levels of officer status for members of the Security team due to the timescale (2009 to present) I have no recollection on the decision-making process and impacts on the fraud team, other than level 1 managers had greater experience in investigation matters.

Involvement of the Security team in the suspension process

33. In respect of the suspension process, the documents at POL00104809 and POL00105231 refer to Royal Mail not POL. To the best of my knowledge if a shortfall was discovered by an audit then the security team would discuss with the line manager or the contracts manager who if deemed appropriate would undertake the suspension. The process would not differ between branches or Crown staff.

The process followed by Security team investigators when conducting a criminal investigation following the identification of a shortfall

34. In respect of conducting criminal investigations following a shortfall, from my understanding the document POL00105223 was written to support investigators in the full process in gathering evidence to support the investigating officer in a specific POL case. Previous to this the Royal Mail documents were written to cover both Royal Mail and POL investigations, but did not detail the specific elements covered by POL. All Royal Mail and POL cases did not differ in reference to

adhering to the legislative framework set out in the documents noted at footnote 1 of this statement.

Decisions about prosecution and criminal enforcement proceedings

35. I have considered a number of policies identified by the Inquiry². In respect of the policies referred to I have no recollection of involvement in the development of the policies. All Royal Mail documents would have been written by Royal Mail employees. The POL documents would have been updated to reflect POL following the separation of the two businesses. The POL prosecution policy was written to protect the business and its employees and agents from criminal activity and set out the legislative framework to follow in conducting any investigations. I am not aware of any specific changes to this during my service in the security team. Decisions on whether to raise a case would be taken between the relevant parties involved (such as contracts or line managers), with any decisions on prosecution and/or confiscation proceedings decided by the Criminal Law team in conjunction with external lawyers (Cartwright King).

Training, instructions and guidance to investigators within the Security team

36. In respect of training, all investigators undertook in-house training carried out by previously trained security managers. This involved all aspects of legislature appropriate to investigations, sections of PACE appropriate to interviewing and searches. Training was also undertaken in conjunction with Police Law enforcement (such as searches). Following training all investigators were subject to an exam with a pass rate set. I am unable to recollect the specific pass rate.

² POL00030659, POL00030800, POL00031011, POL00030580, POL00031008, POL00030598, POL00030685, POL00031034, POL00104929, POL00105226, POL00030602, POL00030686 and POL00030811.

Following this all investigators were supported by experienced investigators on an ongoing basis.

37. I have considered a number of documents identified by the Inquiry³. In respect of the documents referred to in this section to the best of my knowledge the documents would have been referred to as part of the training modules for investigators which in summary would have included the specifics of how to undertake tape recorded interviews, how to take and manage witness statements, guidelines to follow during an investigation, how to conduct an interview with key points to cover for a criminal investigation in relation to the theft act, how to fully manage a case file investigation, correct procedures to follow in gaining evidence, including evidence from third parties such as Fujitsu data and an understanding of disclosure, dealing with defence solicitors, complaints, report writing and the decision making process for criminal investigations. From a personal perspective I was trained over 20 years ago and I have no further detailed knowledge of this area.

Analysing Horizon data and requesting ARQ data from Fujitsu

38. I have been asked to consider POL00105223 and POL00105213. In respect to analysing Horizon data this was not within my specific remit and was undertaken by other members of the security team. I have no detailed knowledge on this and am unable to assist with this or the date of the document POL00105213.

³ Appendix 2 of POL00104825, POL00104805, POL00104932, POL00104944, POL00104945, POL00104948, POL00104953, POL00104952, POL00104986, POL00104989, POL00105002, POL00105008 and POL00105099 and, separately, POL00104818, POL00104836, POL0014867, POL00104859, POL00104861, POL00104875, POL00105225 and, separately, POL00104827, POL00104826 and, separately, POL00104828, POL00104849 and, separately, POL00104891, POL00104848 and POL00104893 and, separately, POL00104881 and POL00104879.

39. I have been asked to consider POL00004708 (which concerns Barkham PO). In respect to the SPM in question, the matter was dealt with by other members of the security team and as such I have no recollection or knowledge regarding this particular case.

Cases against SPMS

40. I have been provided with a list of cases⁴. In respect of the cases noted regarding criminal cases I did not have any direct dealing with any of these cases and cannot recollect anything. I am not aware that I had any role as an investigator in prosecutions relating to the public inquiry. Looking back at the time I had no concerns with criminal cases of which I was involved.

Challenges to the integrity of Horizon

41. In respect of challenges to the integrity of Horizon that came to light this was not within my remit and was dealt with by the Information Security team.

Involvement in work/reviews relating to Fraud and in-branch losses

42. In respect of the Fraud Forum, this was set up to ensure that all appropriate internal stakeholders were 'joined-up' with the approach to fraud risks within the business, with the aims being on prevention and detection of risks within the POL portfolio of products and services. This included Security, Product and Branch Accounting (P&BA), Cash Management and Network teams. Previous to this there was more of an individual team approach. From a security perspective analysis was undertaken by the team in conjunction with other forum teams on identified risk

⁴ Nichola Arch, Susan Hazzleton, Lisa Brennan, David Yates, Carl Page, David Blakey, Tahir Mahmood, Oyeteju Adedayo, Hughie Thomas, Suzanne Palmer, Janet Skinner, Jo Hamilton, Pauline Stonehouse, Susan Rudkin, Julian Wilson, Peter Holmes, Seema Misra, Allison Henderson, Alison Hall, Joan Bailey, Lynette Hutchings, Grant Allen, Khayyam Ishaq, Angela Sefton and Ann Neild.

areas (such as cash losses, accounting/product irregularities). Planned programme activities were then undertaken, including audits, conformance visits, investigations where required, with report/result findings reported upwards to relevant stakeholders within the business for information and further action where deemed necessary.

43. In respect of the involvement in reducing cash losses and fraud reduction my involvement centred around fraud risk programmes (such as cash losses POL00085769). Having identified the respective risks to the business activities were agreed with various stakeholders as set out in paragraph 42 above. In relation to the report undertaken reference POL00042081, my only input to this was to provide information on current activities undertaken by the security team, primarily from a fraud perspective. I am not aware if any of the recommendations were progressed following this report. POL00105041 referred to actions from a security Operations lead team meeting of which I was a member. Activities such as fraud risk programmes were noted in this document for onward activity as noted in paragraph 42 above.

The Security team's role in relation to debt recovery

44. In respect of documents POL00084977, POL00084996, POL00085008 and POL00085009 both my role and the Security team's role in relation to recovery of debt from current and former SPMs was to deploy the fraud risk programmes to identify, prevent, investigate and where required recover assets through criminal prosecutions and financial recovery. My recollection of the 2009 review into agent debt was that the current security fraud risk and investigation activities fed into the wider business activities on sub postmaster debt to identify future and enhanced

processes to better manage this. I provided information to this from the security team, with the report and overall ownership being led by the Network Back Office Efficiency Programme. The fraud risk programmes and investigations continued as part of this wider review

45. In respect of the document POL00038367 relating to Fraud Investigation and prevention, my recollection was that the business was greatly reducing headcount (including members of the security team), and was looking to explore additional means of debt recovery other than criminal investigations/prosecutions. Whilst notwithstanding the need to continue with investigations as set out in the document, it was suggested that other areas of recovery could be explored, including contractual and civil actions.

46. In respect of the document POL00091483 my recollection is that the branch support programme was looking at business wide cost reductions and as a stakeholder the security team played a role in this. As I left the business in July 2015, other than the ongoing fraud risk activities, investigations and the enhanced credit check vetting project I do not believe I had further involvement and cannot provide further information on this matter.

Knowledge of bugs, errors and defects in the Horizon system

47. In respect of POL00095547 I was made aware of issues raised regarding Horizon Integrity, although I had no direct involvement in dealing with these matters from an operational/IT perspective. This was being led by other teams within the business. With regards to the Security team, updates were provided via the Head of Security (JS), in summary these being that the Horizon Integrity issues were being reviewed. From an investigation perspective we were instructed by JS that

any investigation case files that were subject to Horizon integrity challenges be passed to the Criminal Law Team/Cartwright King for review and decision on progression. JS also requested that All case files were passed to himself for personal review. I cannot recollect specific cases in relation to this.

48. In respect of section 6 of the “Post Office Ltd – Security Policy: Accounting losses policy for agency branches” (version 1, February 2003) at POL00086845) and the same section in the “Post Office Ltd – Security Policy: Liability for losses policy (for agency branches)” (version 1.7, September 2003) (POL00088867), the suggestion that system faults with Horizon were “very rare” corresponded with my understanding of the position in 2003.

Post Office Investigations

49. I have been asked about my involvement in any investigations carried out by the POL into the integrity of Horizon and / or the investigation, advice or reports into the Horizon IT system or its impact on prosecutions that were carried out by the following (my answer follows each category):

- a. Second Sight; No involvement.
- b. Cartwright King; Communication to transfer files for comment/authorisation.
- c. Simon Clark (of Cartwright King); No involvement.
- d. Brian Altman KC; No involvement.
- e. Jonathan Swift KC; No involvement
- f. The Bates & Others Group Litigation. No involvement.

50. In respect of any other matters, I do not wish to bring anything further to the attention of the Chair of the Inquiry.

Statement of Truth

I believe the content of this statement to be true:

Signed:

GRO

Dated: 11 May 2023

Index to First Witness Statement of Andrew George Hayward

No.	URN	Document description	Control No.
1	POL00005670	POL Agency Recruitment Policy Feasibility Report, version 2	VIS00006738
2	POL00084977	Post Office, Former SPM End to End Debt Review v.0.5	POL-0082035
3	POL00030578	S02 Royal Mail Group Criminal Investigation and Prosecution Policy December 2007	POL-0027060
4	POL00104812	"Royal Mail Group Ltd Criminal Investigation and Prosecution Policy"	POL-0080444
5	POL00104806	Royal Mail Group Security – Procedures and Standards: Standards of behaviour and complaints procedure No.10-X v2	POL-0080438
6	POL00031004	RMG Policy - Crime and Investigation (S2) - version 3.0	POL-0027486
7	POL00031003	Royal Mail Group Crime and Investigation Policy v1.1 October 2009	POL-0027485
8	POL00030580	Post Office Ltd - Security Policy: Fraud Investigation and Prosecution Policy v2	POL-0027062
9	POL00030579	Post Office Ltd Financial Investigation Policy, May 2010	POL-0027061

10	POL00026573	RMG Procedures & Standards - Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 & Financial Investigations doc 9.1 V1	POL-0023214
11	POL00031008	RMG Ltd Criminal Investigation and Prosecution Policy v1.1 November 2010	POL-0027490
12	POL00104853	Post Office's Financial Investigation Policy	POL-0080485
13	POL00104855	Post Office Ltd. Anti-Fraud Policy	POL-0080487
14	POL00030786	Royal Mail Group Policy - Crime and Investigation (S2) v3 effective from April 2011, owner Tony March, Group Security Director	POL-0027268
15	POL00104929	"Post Office Limited: Internal Protocol for Criminal Investigation and Enforcement (with flowchart)"	POL-0080561
16	POL00105226	Undated Appendix 1 - POL Criminal Investigations and Enforcement Procedure (flowchart)	POL-0080851
17	POL00030602	POL: Criminal Enforcement and Prosecution Policy	POL-0027084
18	POL00031005	Conduct of Criminal Investigation Policy for the Post Office. (Version 0.2)	POL-0027487
19	POL00027863	Conduct of Criminal Investigations Policy v0.3	POL-0024504
20	POL00030902	Final Draft of the Post Office Conduct of Criminal Investigation Policy	POL-0027384

21	POL00104900	Undated 'Separation Project - Criminal Investigations Policy for Post Office Ltd'	POL-0080532
22	POL00038603	Post Office Fraud and Loss Prevention Policy v0.1 Draft	POL-0027914
23	POL00105025	Security Team Objectives (2013 - 2014)	POL-0080657
24	POL00084813	Condensed Guide For Audit Attendance	POL-0081871
25	POL00104825	Update from Dave Posnett and Andy Hayward re Horizon Online Cash Verification-Fraud Impact	POL-0080457
26	POL00104809	Royal Mail Group Security – Procedures and Standards: Suspension from duty No.6-X v1	POL-0080441
27	POL00105231	Royal Mail Internal Information Criminal Investigation Team: Suspension from Duty v1	POL-0080856
28	POL00105223	Security Operations Casework Review	POL-0080848
29	POL00030659	Post Office Internal Prosecution Policy (Dishonesty), Andrew Wilson December 1997	POL-0027141
30	POL00030800	RMG Policy - Prosecution (S3) Version 3.0	POL-0027282
31	POL00031011	RMG Prosecution Policy (undated) V2.1	POL-0027493
32	POL00030598	Royal Mail Prosecution Decision Procedure	POL-0027080

33	POL00030685	Royal mail Group Prosecution Policy, v3.0, April 2011 - Rob Wilson (Head of Criminal Law Team)	POL-0027167
34	POL00031034	Post Office Prosecution Policy V1	POL-0027516
35	POL00030686	Post Office Prosecution Policy England and Wales (effective from 1/11/13, review 1/11/14)	POL-0027168
36	POL00030811	Post Office Limited Prosecution Policy for England and Wales v1	POL-0027293
37	POL00105213	Fraud Risk Security Pro-forma – Guide to Obtaining Reports from Horizon - undated	POL-0080838
38	POL00004708	Email from Jason G Collins to Mark Dinsdale and others, RE FW: ARQ re- quests- Barkham Post Office 212939	VIS00005776
39	POL00104805	Royal Mail Group: Evidence and Witness Statements “E” Learning	POL-0080437
40	POL00104932	Post Office Security Team Key Skills Data- base	POL-0080564
41	POL00104944	Internal POL Email chain re: Security Team Skills Database	POL-0080576
42	POL00104945	Internal POL Email Chain re: Technical Skills of POL Security Team	POL-0080577
43	POL00104948	POL document collating responses to que- ries about technical skills of Security Team	POL-0080580

44	POL00104953	Internal POL email re: Security Team Skills Database	POL-0080585
45	POL00104952	Updated Key Skills Database for Post Office Security Team	POL-0080584
46	POL00104986	Internal POL email re: learning and development	POL-0080618
47	POL00104989	POL Security People Plan Workstream: Advanced Development	POL-0080621
48	POL00105002	Internal POL email chain re: training and development of Security Team	POL-0080634
49	POL00105008	Training and Development Record of Andy Hayward	POL-0080640
50	POL00105099	Security Manager – Training & Induction Timetable	POL-0080729
51	POL00104818	Royal Mail Group Security Investigation Circular 5-2008	POL-0080450
52	POL00104836	Royal Mail Group Security – Procedures & Standards – Written records of tape-recorded interviews 8.3 v5	POL-0080468
53	POL00104859	Appendix 1 to P&S 7.4 Interviewing suspects on tape quick reference guide England and Wales doc 7.4 v1	POL-0080491

54	POL00104861	Appendix 4 to P&S 7.4 – Interviewing suspects using notes of interview quick reference guide – England and Wales doc 7.4 v1	POL-0080493
55	POL00104875	"Royal Mail Internal Information Criminal Investigation Team: Written Record of Tape-Recorded Interviews" v1	POL-0080507
56	POL00105225	Post Office: A guide to interviewing	POL-0080850
57	POL00104827	Royal Mail Group Security Procedures & Standards: Witness Statements P&S Doc 5.4 v2	POL-0080459
58	POL00104826	Royal Mail Group Security Procedures & Standards: Appendix 2 to P&S 5.4 – Managing the witness and structure & contents of witness statements v1	POL-0080458
59	POL00104828	Royal Mail Group Security Procedures & Standards: Searching No. 7-X v5	POL-0080460
60	POL00104849	Royal Mail Group Security Procedures & Standards: Searching doc 7.5 v6	POL-0080481
61	POL00104891	Royal Mail Group Security Procedures & Standards: Appendix 1 to P&S 5.4 – Rules & Continuity of Evidence v1	POL-0080523
62	POL00104848	Royal Mail Group Security Procedures & Standards: Appendix 1 to P&S 9.5 Disclosure of Unused Material & The Criminal	POL-0080480

		Procedure & Investigations Act 1996. Version 1.	
63	POL00104893	Appendix 7 to 7.4 – Dealing with Defence Solicitors & Complaints by Suspects v1	POL-0080525
64	POL00104881	"Royal Mail Internal Information Criminal Investigation Team: Guide to the preparation of suspect offender reports, England, Wales and Northern Ireland" v1	POL-0080513
65	POL00104879	Appendix 1 to 8.2 Suspect Offender Reports, Preamble Guide England, Wales and Northern Ireland v1	POL-0080511
66	POL00085769	Business Loss Programme Board ONCH – Cash Loss deficiencies	POL-0082827
67	POL00042081	Detica and BAE Systems: Driving business benefits through the consolidation of data review - Post Office Fraud Solution	POL-0038563
68	POL00105041	Minutes of Security Operations Lead Team Meeting	POL-0080673
69	POL00084996	POL Back Office Efficiency Programme, Presentation on Debt Review Output	POL-0082054
70	POL00085008	Back Office Efficiency Programme Debt Review, Work Management Tools Terms of Reference	POL-0082066

71	POL00085009	Back Office Efficiency Programme Debt Review, Work Management Tools Terms of Reference	POL-0082067
72	POL00038367	Getting Started V.1.1 Guide	POL-0035302
73	POL00091483	Post Office Branch Support Programme - Work Stream Meeting Presentation Slides	POL-0091046
74	POL00095547	Email from Doug Brown to Andy Hayward, Sue Richardson, Alison Bolsover and others re: Scope of declarations	POL-0095130
75	POL00086845	Post Office Ltd Security Policy: Accounting Losses Policy for Agency Branches	POL-0083903
76	POL00088867	Post Office Ltd: Liability for Losses Policy for agency branches v2.0 January 2004	POL-0085925