

Comments on TOG's Witness Statement 27.09.18

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1. Introduction

Unfortunately, the latest copy is a scanned document and so rather than converting it to Word I have put my comments in this separate note.

2. Detailed Comments

They are:

1. Para 12: My recollection is that the role out took 2 or 3 years and so was not just 1999 to 2000. (The previous draft I saw said 1999 to 2002.) Probably not important. Can we check this out?
2. Para 18: Probably worth mentioning the "Opening Figures" that are generated by the Balancing process that are used in the calculation of the current cash position.
3. Para 34: I actually worked for ICL from 1973. I'm not sure exactly when ICL became Fujitsu, but I believe it was around 2002. I worked for the Post Office account in ICL / Fujitsu from 1996 until I retired in 2015 and I have been retained as a consultant since then.
4. Para 36: May be worth clarifying that such users would have been either in SSC (3rd line support) or possibly in the Ops team in Belfast (not sure about their access rights). Also, following discussions with SSC wrt the Richard Rolls WS, it appears that on occasions they would inject messages at the counter. Such messages would be indistinguishable from those generated by the SMPR other than any identifying info added by the SSC staff. Normally such messages would relate to missing EOD markers or perhaps "orphaned" transaction retrieved from a failed counter's hard disk. However they had the ability to inject any transaction, but should not have done so. As Torstein says in Para 11, he is concentrating on what the system is designed to do and not any malicious misuse of the system. Such malicious misuse makes most things possible as with any other IT system.
5. Para 40: A corrupt CRC usually implied a Hardware issue such as a Disk error, and when such errors were detected, then SSC would need to recreate the message store on that counter as discussed wrt the Richard Rolls WS.
6. Para 46: NB Horizon Online still has the capability of retrieving audit data from Legacy Horizon and carrying out these checks.
7. Para 48: At the time it was called OPTIP in then evolved into POL MI as part of Impact around 2005. Not really important though. Also Horice doesn't

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access BRDB, but a read only copy known as BRSS. BRSS holds data for longer than BRDB.

8. Para 57: I disagree with this. This only refers to Horizon Online. With Legacy Horizon there was a capability to inject transactions which the SSC did use on a number of occasions. Such injection should have been authorised and logged by the OCP process (pre-cursor to MSCs). SSC can perhaps provide more detail on this as it clearly relates to the Richard Rolls WS. There was no capability to Edit or Delete (other than archiving after the message's Expiry date as described separately) transactions – just to insert new ones. (This was a feature of Riposte.)
9. Para 58.10: It would appear that this is incorrect. I have come to understand that in some circumstances the SSC needed to inject data at the counter. I am not clear as to exactly why this was necessary (other than for EOD Markers – which are not transactional data), and it is likely that any transactions that were injected would have been done at the CSs. Perhaps SSC can clarify this point as it is important in relation to Richard Roll's witness statement.
10. Para 59.1: Is it worth noting that should such changes be made, then this would result in the Branch data differing from the Audit data and that this could be detected if the calculations for the next balance were recalculated based on the audit data? Sorry, I see that this is addressed in 59.3

11.