From:	efence Legal	(Chris Jay)[GRO				
Sent: T	hur 08/02/2018	3 11:49:18 AM (UTC)				
	eddon Dave (E	3RA01)	GRO	GRO Newsome		<u>e</u>	
	ete	GRO	; Bansal Steve		GRO	Porte	
	lulme Jon <u>[</u> steven	GRO GRO	Thomas Aı Simpkins Jo		GRO GRO	Forte	
	Sodeseth Torste	·	GRO	<u> </u>	<u> </u>		
Subject: F		mble: Bit corrup	otion wrong format ta	ng - Legally P	rivileged and Cor	nfidential	
IMPORTANT - This email or att circumstances for which Lega Pete (N), Dave, all,						ovided in	
Thanks for your time yes	sterday and rur	nning with this.					
Could I request strict co correspondence, as well your email. Suggest you	as the "Legally	/ Privileged and	Confidential Comm		•	bject" bar of	
As a reminder, any area in the foot") should this process		•	,		-	-	
This is because Litigation banner is all about – to perform the Plaintiffs lawyers, as a Company of the Company	protect against	such discovery) is not a 100% guar	antee of exen	nption from disco		
Hope this is clear.							
Many thanks.							
Best Regards							
Christopher Jay, Senior	Counsel						
FUJITSU							
Jays Close, Viables Busin	ess Park, Basir	ngstoke, Hamps	hire, RG22 4BY				
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Reshaping ICT, Reshaping Bus		n with ET com					
Please consider the environ		•	nail?				
From: Seddon, Dave (BR	A01)	GRO					
Sent: 08 February 2018							
To: Newsome Pete	GRO		Bansal Steve (BRA0	1)	GRO	; Defence	
Legal (Chris Jay)	GRO		me Jon {	GRO	Thomas And	drew	
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GRO Godeseth Torstein GRO
Subject: RE: Bit corruption wrong format tag - Legally Privileged and Confidential Communication

To answer "We need evidence on how many hard disk faults are occurring especially in the base unit in question here":

The office rolled stock unit SP1 from TP7 BP2 to TP7 BP3 on 30/8/2017 on counter 4. The same physical counter is still in place so I've been able to pull back the windows system events from it. Fortunately the event log hasn't wrapped yet so it is possible to see all the system events registered since the counter was installed at the office on 11/3/2017.

The following 'disk' events have been raised...

11/4/2017 00:13:05 The file system structure on the disk is corrupt and unusable. Please run the chkdsk utility on the device with label "".

4/5/2017 00:33:26 The file system structure on the disk is corrupt and unusable. Please run the chkdsk utility on the device with label "".

18/5/2017 14:58:34 The file system structure on the disk is corrupt and unusable. Please run the chkdsk utility on the device with label "".

1/12/2017 10:31:22 The file system structure on the disk is corrupt and unusable. Please run the chkdsk utility on the device with label "".

25/1/2018 13:27:26 The file system structure on the disk is corrupt and unusable. Please run the chkdsk utility on the device with label "".

6/2/2018 07:33:29 The file system structure on the disk is corrupt and unusable. Please run the chkdsk utility on the device with label "".

...and although none were raised on 30/8/2017 their existence is indicative of the disk not being healthy.

There are also a number of 'bugcheck' events...

24/6/2017 05:18:38 The computer has rebooted from a bugcheck. The bugcheck was: 0x00000000 (0x000000010, 0x000000002, 0x00000001, 0x8012a729). Microsoft Windows NT [v15.1381]. A full dump was not saved.

4/7/2017 09:22:08 The computer has rebooted from a bugcheck. The bugcheck was: 0x00000050 (0xc76b5390, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000). Microsoft Windows NT [v15.1381]. A full dump was not saved.

19/7/2017 18:14:26 The computer has rebooted from a bugcheck. The bugcheck was: 0xc000021a (0xe133cc48, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000). Microsoft Windows NT [v15.1381]. A full dump was not saved.

14/10/2017 04:39:36 The computer has rebooted from a bugcheck. The bugcheck was: 0x00000000a (0x0079b020, 0x000000002, 0x00000000, 0x80126d5e). Microsoft Windows NT [v15.1381]. A full dump was not saved.

 $10/11/2017 \qquad 06:03:59 \qquad \qquad \text{The computer has rebooted from a bugcheck. The bugcheck was: } 0x00000000a \\ (0x6851e059, 0x0000000ff, 0x000000000, 0x8010882d). \ \ \text{Microsoft Windows NT [v15.1381]. A full dump was not saved.}$

24/11/2017 11:33:53 The computer has rebooted from a bugcheck. The bugcheck was: 0xc000021a (0xe1371be8, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000). Microsoft Windows NT [v15.1381]. A full dump was not saved.

2/12/2017 06:30:17 The computer has rebooted from a bugcheck. The bugcheck was: 0xc000021a (0xe1326528, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000). Microsoft Windows NT [v15.1381]. A full dump was not saved.

30/12/2017 14:13:50 The computer has rebooted from a bugcheck. The bugcheck was: 0x0000001e (0xc0000005, 0x8011225a, 0x00000000, 0x00000008). Microsoft Windows NT [v15.1381]. A full dump was not saved.

As far as I know these system events are not captured by Tivoli and are therefore not available in audit. You have to look at the actual event log on the counter.

Regards, Dave

From: Newsome, Pe	ete
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Sent: 08 February 2018 09:59

To: Bansal, Steve (BRA01)GRODefence Legal (Chris Jay,)GROHulme, JonGROThomas, AndrewGROPorter, StevenGROSimpkins, JohnGROSeddon, Dave (BRA01)GROGodeseth, Torstein

Subject: RE: Bit corruption wrong format tag - Legally Privileged and Confidential Communication

Hi

As promised on the call last night my questions?

- Can we identify a method of checking the data extracted by Jason for this exact manifestation of the hardware error
 - o E.g. Search for 0 opening balance and then investigate
- Can we document the previously known hardware error
- We need to show how these events showed up in the audit trail
- We need evidence on how many hard disk faults are occurring especially in the base unit in question here

I am sure there were other issues brought up by the team and I am happy to add these to the list.

Thanks

Pete

Pete Newsome
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Please consider the environment - do you really need to print this email?

From: Bansal,	Steve (BRA01)				
Sent: Tuesday	, February 6, 2018 2	2:00 PM			
To: Defence L	egal (Chris Jay,)	GRO	Newsome, Pete	GRO]
Hulme, Jon	GRO	Thomas, Andrew	GRO	Porter, Steven	
{	GRO	Simpkins, John	GRO	Seddon, Dave (BRA01)	
	GRO	Bansal, Steve (BRA01)	GRO		

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Subject: Bit corruption wrong format tag - Legally Privileged and Confidential Communication

Please ensure that this email trail remains restricted to this resolver group and that our legal representative Chris is copied into all conversations as well as the wording above.

Hi Gents

We need to discuss the following issue and better understand the circumstances, look at ways of identifying if there have been any other similar occurrences that could result in a discrepancy. Discuss what safe guards are in place, check bit etc. or could be added such as html tag checking at BAL layer.

Example: Balance C/Fwd in Balance Period (02): 4124.12- is not appearing on the Next Balance Period (03) because of wrong tag (OpefingBalance)

so, Balance B/Fwd in (03) is displaying as 0.00

```
66h = f = 0110 0110

6Eh = n = 0110 1110
```

Otherwise f and n are identical. Note that the opening and closing tags are the same (have the same error) so the corruption will have been in the java.lang.String char[] for the XML element name. That would explain why both opening and closing tags are the same and wrong – the same java.lang.String is used (Strings are "intern'd" fairly efficiently – although how efficient/automatic in JRE 1.4.2 I am not sure)

Description

The issue with accounting discrepancy at Upton Heath branch (FAD 312614) occurred on 30th August 2017. This was not raised by the branch into the ATOS Service Desk at the time and no incident was passed to Fujitsu for investigation. A POL representative, Shirley Hailstones, raised the issue into the Service Delivery Team during a phone conversation in the beginning of September 2017.

On 21st September investigation was initiated by the Fujitsu POA SecOps and SSC Team. Peak PC0262558: *FAD 312614 key strokes for Balance Period Investigation* refers. It was explained the Upton Heath branch experienced an issue on whereby an accounting error occurred upon rollover from Balance Period 2 to Balance Period 3. The Final Balance Report was showing a 0.00 figure as a value for "Balance B/Fwd" incorrectly:

FAD 312614 (Upton Heath), node 4 - On 30th August, between 13:40 and 14:10, the balance period was rolled over from TP7 BP2 to TP7 BP3. There was a C/Fwd balance of £4124.26 for BP2 but after the rollover, printout for BP3 shows a B/Fwd balance of zero.

POL requested an investigation into the keystrokes to show what happened.

After the evidence was generated and made available to POL, the initial Peak was closed on 26th September with a comment *Evidence sent to POL. Closing call*.

The issue was re-opened on 24th November under Peak PC0264684: *Incorrect Balance B/Fwd in Balance Report*. The Fujitsu SSC team noted here on 29th November that:

The initial call made no specific reference to the brought forward balance in the respective Final Balance reports from 30/8 & 4/9 which have now been presented as evidence.

Furthermore, given the amount of time elapsed since the initial query critical evidence has now been lost.

Further identifying the nature of the issue, missing from the previous Peak:

What we can see from the balance reports is that the balance carried forward from TP7/BP2 (£4124.12) does not appear in the balance brought forward figure for TP7/BP3 on 4/9/17.

13:40 30/08/2017 TP: 07 BP: 02 SU: SP1

Final Balance - Office Copy

•••

Balance C/Fwd 4124.12

12:18 04/09/2017 TP: 07 BP: 03 SU: SP1

Final Balance - Office Copy

...

Balance B/Fwd 0.00

(...

The Peak PC0264684 also indicated the possible underlying cause of the issue as the lack of opening figures for stock unit for TP7 BP3.

What we should see are opening figures for stock unit SP1 for TP7 BP3 but none exist (these should be present in the BRDB_SU_OPENING_BALANCE table). This is the reason for the zero B/FWD balance.

Opening balance data for the other stock units at the branch did exist. It was also pointed out a detailed investigation was not possible as the counter logs for the period (30/8 - 4/9) had already been unavailable for analysis, as kept for 30 days.

PC0264684 was closed on 9th January 2019, making reference to a new one raised on the same date: PC0265947 *FAD:* 312614 - Incorrect Balance B/Fwd in Balance Report. The evidence data was replicated under a new Peak reference. On 10th January the Fujitsu SSC updated the Peak with a recommendation to seek advice from Service Management. Seeing that an important diagnostics tool (counter logs) were house kept and not available, they were unable to confirm exactly what happened at the branch.

Steve Bansal

Senior Service Delivery Manager Business & Application Services Post Office Account FUJITSU

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