



**POST OFFICE LIMITED
RISK AND COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE**

Minutes of a Risk and Compliance Committee ("RCC") meeting held via Microsoft Teams
on 06 May 2020 at 14:00

Present:	Alisdair Cameron (Chair) (AC)	Group Chief Financial Officer	
	Ben Foat (BF)	Group General Counsel	
	Amanda Jones (AJ)	Group Retail and Franchise Network Director, Interim	
	Lisa Cherry (LC)	Group Chief People Officer.	
	Jeff Smyth (JS)	Group Chief Information Officer, Interim	
	Julie Thomas (JT)	Operations Director	
	Andrew Goddard (AG)	Payment Propositions Director (deputising for Owen Woodley)	
In Attendance:	Johann Appel (JA)	Head of Internal Audit	
	Mark Baldock (MB)	Head of Risk	
	Jonathan Hill (JH)	Compliance Director	
	Tom Lee (TL)	Head of Finance, Financial Accounting and Controls	
	Rebecca Whibley (RW)	Assistant Company Secretary	
	Tony Jowett (TJ)	Chief Information Security Officer	Item 5
	Sherrill Taggart (ST)	Legal Director, Interim	Items 6 & 7
	Barbara Brannon (BB)	Procurement Director	Item 8
	Rod Williams (RW)	Head of Legal, Dispute Resolution & Brand	Item 9
Apologies	Nick Read, Group CEO		
	Owen Woodley, Group Chief Commercial Officer		

1. Welcome and Conflicts of Interest

Actions

- 1.1 The Chair opened the meeting and advised that all papers would be taken as read. No conflicts of interest were declared.
- AC noted there were four issues that were being managed under legal supervision and which would be discussed at ARC:
1. An independent review of suspense accounts as part of the GLO work;
 2. An independent review on stamps and whether there were GLO implications;
 3. A CBRE performance issue that had been uncovered; and
 4. Work ongoing to validate historical final salaries for the defined benefit pension scheme.

2. Minutes and Action Lists

- 2.1 The minutes of the RCC meeting held 9 March 2020 were **APPROVED**.
- 2.2 Progress on completion of actions as shown on the action log was **NOTED** and the actions assigned to SH (Shikha Hornsey) were to be reassigned to JS. The following action updates were provided:
- Action 3.3 from 14 March 2020 relating to FRES Audit would be completed before the next RCC and the action remained **open**.
 - Action 3.3 from 4 March 2020 relating to guidance from the National Cyber Security Centre was **closed**, the guidance having been shared with the Group Executive (GE) and Board.
 - Action 4.12 from 14 March relating to the Ofcom Information Requests was **closed**.
 - Action 6.6 from 14 March relating to the issues being flagged to the RCC or ARC was questioned as to its context and it was requested that more information was provided as it was not enough to simply say that it was not raised. The action remained **open**.
 - Action 6.18 from 14 January 2020 relating to Payment Services Directive was **closed**.
 - Action 10.6 from 14 January 2020 relating to Money Laundering Reporting Officer (MLRO) Annual Report had been delayed due to scheduled meetings being postponed. The action remained **open**.
 - Action 3.2 from 7 November 2019 relating to supplier contracts out of governance (SSK) remained **open**.
 - Action 3.3 from 7 November 2019 relating to supplier contracts out of governance (Brands/RAPP) remained **open**.

To do: RW

RW



- Action 4.1 from 7 November 2019 relating to the PCI-DSS Update and final pricing deadlines from Ingencio was **closed** as this item had become a regular RCC agenda item.
- Action 5.3 from 7 November 2019 relating to major incident testing remained **open** and JS advised he would obtain an update.
- Action 5.3 from 7 November 2019 relating to Joiners/Movers/Leavers and third party access remained **open** and TS was asked to provide an update.
- The following actions from 7 November 2019 were otherwise **closed**: 5.3 Cyber Security relating to Joiners/movers/leavers and the contract review, 5.3 Cyber Security relating to Joiners/movers/leavers being added to the Internal Audit Plan, 6.14 relating to Data and Analytics Excellence (Programme Assurance) and 7.5 relating to Contracts Management Framework.
- Action 5 from 3 September 2019 relating to GDPR was **closed** as JH advised that contracts had been identified and the GDPR programme was due to be completed at the end of June 2020.

JS

3. Combined Risk, Compliance and Audit Update Risk

- 3.1 MB explained that since the last RCC on 14 March 2020, his team's focus has been on the COVID-19 crisis and fortnightly risk updates were being provided to the COVID-19 SteerCo, which was included in the paper to the RCC. This work had been undertaken in two phases. The first was to undertake the industry-wide and sectorial analysis of the typical emerging COVID-19 risks and was completed by 31 March 2020. The second phase was to discuss the risks that had been identified with the business to confirm relevance and to assess their respective impacts, likelihood and proximity. It was concluded that there was one single overarching COVID-19 enterprise risk, 13 intermediate thematic risks (operational, strategy, legal, financial etc.) and 56 specific low level risks. One major risk was having insufficient change funding available to deliver planned change activity and it as noted that this was due to be discussed at the Board.
- 3.2 Work was now moving to merge existing risk work with the COVID-19 risks due to the wide scope of these risks. The team was also continuing to implement Archer and MB explained that all risks were due to be entered into Archer by the end of next week (15 May 2020) and the system was to be rolled out to the wider business from 31 May 2020.
- 3.3 MB also highlighted that his team had produced a risk appetite statement for COVID-19, but that this had evolved into a wider enterprise risk statement and he would be requesting that this statement be considered at the GE in June 2020 (MB to request a GE agenda slot with Veronica Branton, Company Secretary).

MB

Compliance

- 3.4 **Telecoms:** JH noted that the regulators have indicated they would not be stepping back from compliance but were being more understanding on the timing for compliance. As an update to the paper, JH explained that his team were now required to provide a weekly update to Ofcom as to our COVID-19 response and they have indicated they are happy with our progress as we are able to do the end of contract notifications, which other providers are still having issues with. Further, we have also just signed up to the Department of Culture, Media and Sport's (DCMS) commitments, including free and low cost calls for vulnerable customers, working with customers who may be struggling with debt and removal of data caps. A statement via DCMS would be released over the weekend. In response to a question from the Chair, JH and AG confirmed (having checked with Meredith Sharples) that there was no financial impact arising from vulnerable customers being unable to pay their bill.
- 3.5 **PSD2:** JH explained that Fujitsu had now confirmed that they will put in place a fully compliant solution but this would not be the most expensive solution by the beginning of August 2020. There would be a minimal increase in cost, but this was a regulatory requirement. Once in place, we could then apply for an Electronic Communications Exemption (ECE), although we were not being chased to do this.
- 3.6 **European Electronic Communications Code (EECC):** JH noted that this would impose new regulatory obligations on all providers. It presented a big challenge for Post Office and had cost implications. Clarity as to what was required was expected from Ofcom but that the DCMS has indicated that it expected providers to meet the implementation deadline of 21 December 2020. The concern was that any clarity from Ofcom may come after this deadline, but it was hoped there may be some leeway. Al noted that if clarity was not forthcoming, we could approach the Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) to support us in seeking this clarity and/or asking for leeway on the implementation deadline. It was also noted that similar changes made to the switching process in the energy industry by Ofgem had led to less switching of providers by customer and therefore there could be retention opportunities for Post Office.



- 3.7 **Branch Registration Fees:** JH explained that Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC) have confirmed that we could defer payment for Branch Registration fees (amounting to circa £3m) until 1 December 2020 (from 30 June 2020). However they have advised that they would calculate the fee based on the June branch data, rather than the December data. This does not go far enough and we would continue to lobby against the decision via BEIS, Her Majesty's Treasury (HMT) and HMRC directly to get HMRC to allow the calculation to apply from 1 December 2020. It was hoped that a positive response would be received soon.
- 3.8 **Cookies:** JH confirmed he was speaking to Henk van Hulle to try and achieve quicker and cheaper compliance.
- 3.9 **Belfast Data Centre Exist and move to the Cloud:** The Chair questioned who was having the client conversations and it was highlighted that there should be engagement with client management owners. JH was asked to pick this up with the Commercial team and JS was asked to check with the IT Project Team. JH/JS
- 3.10 **Whistleblowing:** The Chair asked that he was provided with information as to the kind of issues that were being raised by whistleblowers, insofar as it would not breach any confidences. He also questioned whether it was appropriate to be putting investigations on hold. JH explained that these investigations had been put on hold as they required the physical movement of people which was not possible during lockdown. The Chair requested that the investigations were reviewed on a case-by-case basis with HR and challenge the assumption that the investigation had to be paused. If a major issue was subject to the complaint, the response needed to be balanced. JH
- 3.11 **External Threats – Lottery:** The Chair questioned the wording regarding the Post Office provision of the Lottery having been previously assessed as low risk and JH confirmed that it had been assessed and no issues had been identified. Payzone services were yet to be assessed but AG explained that he did not view it as high risk. The wording of the section would be reviewed before submission to the Audit, Risk and Compliance Committee (ARC) so that it was clearer. JH
- 3.12 **Dangerous Goods:** The Chair noted that overall performance for P12 had dropped to 46% and therefore had got worse. However the Voice of the Customer survey suggested that the question was being asked 75% of the time. IT was noted that the Board may be concerned about the risk of low compliance in this area. Amanda explained that a project had been initiated to place the onus on the customer to confirm what was in their parcel via a validation on the Pin Pad (to reflect the SSK process). The Chair requested that this section of the paper be updated prior to submission to the ARC to better outline this project. JH/AJ
- Internal Audit**
- 3.13 **2019/20 plan progress:** JA explained that the completion of the 2019/20 internal audit programme has progressed well, however, the final five reviews (three in Post Office and two in Post Office Insurance) were postponed in response to COVID-19 and reprioritisation of the Change Portfolio. Five audits were completed since the March ARC meeting, with the last two reports awaiting management comment. These related to branch sales which had been given a "needs improvement" rating, but the issues raised were not contentious and savings products, which has been given a "green" rating. AG was asked to chase the Commercial Team to ensure that management comment was provided as soon as possible to enable the complete reports to be ready for the ARC on 19 May 2020. Otherwise, the 2019/20 plan was complete (except for the reviews postponed due to COVID-19). AG
- 3.14 **2020/21 plan progress:** JA explained that the plan was due to be approved by the ARC on 19 May 2020 but in the meantime, three of the top five reviews had been started: COVID-19 Assurance Programme, Maintain Minimum Control Standards and Cyber Security Maturity.
- 3.15 **Internal Audit reviews completed:** JA noted that the outcomes of the three final reviews:
- Postmaster on-boarding: This was rated as satisfactory and the new process was deemed effective with recommendations from GLO having been implemented.
 - Vetting and Fit & Proper: This was rated as needs improvement due to the very fragmented processes that were in place and the lack of clear ownership. Fit & Proper was slightly better than vetting and improvement on vetting was expected when the ownership issues were resolved. It was explained that accountability had been split between the Operations team, HR and Compliance. It has been agreed to bring accountability into the Operations team within clear oversight from Compliance. The Fit & Proper policy was also being updated and LC was asked to ensure that HR were involved in this update. JH confirmed he had a new Vetting and Oversight Assurance Manager starting on 11 May 2020. LC
 - Change Control Framework: This was rated as needs improvement. The Chair noted that he felt elements of the report were confusing and needed to be clearer. JA explained that this was a follow up review following a review last year which looked at gating, benefit realisation and second line assurance activity and outlined the need to establish a control framework for change activity.



The purpose of the present review had been to assess to what extent the previous recommendations had been implemented. It was noted that most findings had arisen from the self-assessment process (the Strategic Portfolio Office (SPO) had been quite conservative in its ratings) and that 29 out of 37 controls were assessed as partly effective. This sounded more serious that it was because this rating had been given if only one programme in the test had failed. JA was asked to ensure this context was clearer in the report.

JA

- 3.16 **Status of Audit Actions:** JA noted that five actions were due at the end of April which had been harder to close due to other priorities relating to COVID-19. Some actions may need to be extended but any extensions would be agreed prior to the ARC on 19 May 2020. AG requested that JA send him any outstanding actions relating to the Commercial Team.

To do: JA

- 3.17 Subject to the amendments as outlined, the Combined Risk, Compliance and Audit Update was **NOTED for onward submission to the ARC.**

4. Internal Audit Plan

- 4.1 JA explained that audit plans had become dynamic against moving targets due to the COVID-19 crisis and that he has been webinars with other heads of audit. This has shown that the Post Office approach has been similar to other organisations and a key element was that there may need to be some compromise on the maintenance of controls during the COVID-19 crisis. The top five priorities were outlined as:

- COVID-19 Programme Assurance/Support;
- Maintain Minimum Control Standards;
- Cyber Security Maturity;
- Health & Safety response to COVID-19 crisis; and
- Effectiveness of Second Line during COVID-19.

- 4.2 The medium priority reviews were outlined as:

- GLO Operations Improvement Programme;
- Postmaster Reporting;
- BCP Post-crisis assessment;
- Branch Hub; and
- Stamp Stock (relating to inventory controls).

BF noted that it would be helpful to have an external view of Stamp Stock and it was agreed that BF and JA would pick this up. JA explained that his internal review would only take place after the external review into stamps and whether management had led to systemic agent losses. Similarly the review into the GLO Operations Improvement Programme would be done after the planned external GLO response review. It was noted that this was a case of timing and consideration as to whether an end-to-end external review was required as the Norton Rose review was simply a gap analysis. JA was asked to look at this in conjunction with BF and JT. Regarding the COVID-19 Assurance Programme, MB questioned whether this would extend to the scope of Project Neo and risk and JA explained that this was not presently included but that he would discuss with MB. JA further noted that he had issued an interim report to Caroline Scott on the review of phase 1 of the COVID-19 Programme. In response to a questions from AJ regarding Postmaster Reporting, JA confirmed that he would discuss the scope of the review with her and her team nearer to Q3.

JA/BF

JA/BF/JT

JA/MB

- 4.3 The Internal Audit plan, including the internal audit priorities during the COVID-19 crisis, was **NOTED for onward submission to the ARC.**

5. PCI-DSS and Cyber Security Update PCI-DSS Programme Update

- 5.1 **Ingencio CEO call:** JS explained that CEO to CEO dialogue between Ingencio and Post Office had been established as requested by the ARC and there was diarised meetings between the Global Vice President of Ingencio for retail and banking and Nick Read. Written reports from the calls were provided to JS. It was noted that Ingencio were not reporting any direct implications for their services owing to COVID-19 at present.

- 5.2 **Integrated Programme Plan:** It was expected that the programme would obtain Ingenico final banking software deliverables in early February 2021 and branch rollout would commence in late March 2021. Branch rollout would be completed in May 2021 and formal PCI-DSS accreditation would be achieved by June 2021. The team has also held a deep dive into the plan itself and work was ongoing to see if the delivery plan timeline could be improved further. The business case for £15.8m would be presented to the Investment Committee and Board in May.



- 5.3 **PED rollout programme:** JS noted that this programme was presently on pause due to the COVID-19 crisis and the present thinking was that this would recommence in July, subject to the Government announcement on lockdown expected on 10 May 2020.
- 5.4 **Santander:** JS noted that most other organisations were compliant but that there had been some delays with Santander. The Chair questioned whether Post Office would have any recourse if we could not be compliant due to them. JS explained that the target operating model included the ability to pay Santander credit cards and that this could be a point of leverage, but at present, we were not setting out to utilise this. The issues Santander were facing seemed genuine and Nick Read had already been on a series of calls to try to resolve.
- 5.5 The PCI-DSS Programme Update was **NOTED for onward submission to the ARC.**
- Cyber Security**
- 5.6 **Cyber Security Maturity:** TJ outlined that the maturity score was averaging 2.4 in mid-April and he hoped this would improve to 2.45. This figure was an estimate and it would be retested by Deloitte and Jonathan Acres from Post Office from 11 May 2020. This retest would allow the reassessment target maturity due to recent events. A new change programme was being developed to close any gaps identified and an update would be provided to the next RCC.
- 5.7 **COVID-19 risk, issues and threats:** The team has been working with Data Protection and IT Operations to enable people to work from home, but they were also ensuring that any exemptions to our usual policies were being closed down rapidly. Data loss was also being monitored, although a slightly softer approach was being taken to enable home working. Work had also been completed to ensure the IT Service desk can communicate with colleagues securely. It was noted that the team was feeding into and monitoring the National Cyber Security Centre's (NCSC) work on COVID-19 threats. The main threats were fake Post Office websites and phishing. During the COVID-19 crisis, security threat activity was up between 25% and 55% depending on the type of activity which included money mules and password attacks.
- 5.8 **Social media presence:** TJ outlined that in response to the RCC action the guidance on protecting ourselves on social media had been shared with the Board and GE. Links to the guidance were available in the paper.
- 5.9 The Chair requested that a more extensive update on the Joiners/movers/leavers programme was included in the paper for the ARC on 19 May 2020 and that a draft should be reviewed by the Chair. Subject to the amendment as outlined, the Cyber Security Update was **NOTED for onward submission to the ARC.**
- 6. Progress Update on the Pilot Implementation of the Contract Management Framework**
- 6.1 BF explained that 142 top material contracts had been identified. By the end of the pilot (19 May 2020), it was expected that 60 material contracts would have been uploaded to Web3.0 having had their obligations mapped at a cost of £100,000. The balance of 82 material contracts would take a further month to upload at an additional cost of £26,000. There were also 1,500 other contracts which have not been uploaded to Web3.0 and had their obligations mapped. It was recommended that due to the current commercial environment, the pilot should work to complete the upload and mapping of obligations for the top 142 material contracts but that the other contracts should not be uploaded as part of the pilot and should be uploaded during the natural contract lifecycle (as amendments or extensions arise). It was proposed that the accredited external training which had been budgeted for at a cost of £80,000 was not pursued, releasing this money back to the business and for £26,000 to be reallocated to support the mapping of the outstanding material contracts. The Chair requested that BF discuss the approach with Carla Stent, ARC Chair, prior to submitting the paper to the ARC to get a steer as to whether this approach would be acceptable.
- The RCC NOTED the paper and APPROVED the following for onward submission to the ARC,** subject to BF gaining steer from the ARC Chair as to whether this approach was acceptable:
- While internal training has been provided, accredited external training will not be provided to identified contract managers for material contracts, accepting the risk that this may result in a baseline level of capability not being established amongst this group of individuals.
 - Reallocating £26,000 of the £80,000 originally included in the budget to provide external training in order to complete the upload and mapping of all remaining contracts identified by GE as being material in terms of strategic and financial value by the end of June 2020 ("Material Contracts").
 - It is proposed that the implementation of CMF across those contracts not identified as being material by the GE ("Other Contracts") be done outside of this project through the natural 'lifecycle of a contract' e.g. as they are renewed, cease or new agreements are entered into. This will take significantly longer, through BAU resource and processes, but release c£700k from the 20/21 Change Portfolio Budget.

TJ

BF



7. Horizon Scanning Update

- 7.1 BF explained that this was a new report for the RCC and had been presented to assist in the enhance of the legal maturity of Post Office by ensuring that the Board and Executive team were proactively managing legal and regulatory risks as they develop. This was supplemented by regular Law In Trends forums which were cross-functional and looked a legal and regulatory changes on the horizon and discussed how Post Office might need to respond. The Chair complimented the paper and BF confirmed that the paper would be developed over time to include a Red/Amber/Green (RAG) status against each element. The Horizon Scanning Update was **NOTED for onward submission to the ARC.**

8. Supplier Contract out of Governance

- 8.1 BB explained that there were no contracts out of Governance that required approval as all approvals had been addressed at the Board on 8 April 2020. The Chair requested that the paper be reorganised to cover new requests first, then any future contracts on the horizon and then any past approvals. **BB**

- 8.2 On the future contracts that were high value and at risk of being awarded or extended non-compliantly, BB outlined the following:

- End User Computer services (EUC) (value of £10m): Discussions were still being held between IT and the Change project team as to whether there would be sufficient funding to run a procurement. A paper regarding this project was being prepared for the GE on 13 May 2020.
- Common Digital Platform (CPD) (value of £5m): There was an option for a six month extension to December 2020 on a short term basis to allow for cloud migration and long term strategy adoption. This was already being discussed with the supplier to enable an extension whilst a procurement process is run.
- Brands/Rapp (value of £1.3m): The sourcing process has not been agreed with the business and their appetite to migrate the service was limited. Funding was also an issue.
- ATM support (value £350,000): There were a number of contracts expiring in August 2020 which may need to be extended non-compliantly whilst the tender process continued.
- Identity Services (value of £5m): A full sourcing plan has been agreed to be funded out of OPEX Identity budget, but this has been derailed by the COVID-19 crisis. Discussions were ongoing between Martin Edwards, Digidentity and Legal to ensure extension to March 2021 which would give more latitude to manage the OJEU required and would give the business more time to review other options. In the interim, discussions were ongoing with the Commercial team as to whether our approach needed to be changed given COVID-19 crisis.

It was further noted that otherwise the procurement pipeline was very quiet. This was thought be to because feedback had gone to the business explaining that risks would not be excepted and because of the spending freeze.

- 8.3 Subject to the outlined amendments, the Supplier Contracts out of Governance Update was **NOTED for onward submission to the ARC.**

9. Cooperation with Law Enforcement Agencies and Addressing Suspected Criminal Misconduct Policy

- 9.1 BF explained that this was a policy to cover how Post Office dealt with suspected criminal misconduct covering private prosecutions and cooperation with third party law enforcement agencies, regulators and industry accredited bodies. The policy sought to balance the following risks: safeguarding the integrity of HNG-A so that it is not unnecessarily undermined or brought into question without the proper governance around the release of information against being seen to support and cooperate with law enforcement agencies. The approach would be that we would support third parties to investigate criminal misconduct if there were mandatory requirements. Where it was not mandatory, we could exercise discretion as to whether to assist but it was a question of who within the business would have the authority to authorise the release of information. We have taken risk based approach: where the data would not rely solely on integrity of the Horizon system (i.e. other evidence such as CCTV existed), and therefore the integrity of HNG-A was unlikely to be brought into question, we would provide the data to the requesting body. BF further outlined that there was a risk with the policy in that it could not prevent potential law enforcement proceedings if they struck at the heart of the Horizon system and this could mean that the integrity of the current Horizon system was called into question. Therefore work still needed to be done with IT to be able to substantiate that there were no known bugs and this needed to become a BAU process.

- 9.2 BF noted that the team would undertake an "optical review" of the policy before it was presented to the ARC. This was because, although such documents would not usually be discoverable, it could do so in the future. As such the policy needed to be reviewed to consider how it may be viewed by the public. BF further outlined that the policy would prohibit Post Office from engaging in private prosecutions without the



- express consent of the Board. It was also noted that any data provided from legacy or HNG-X Horizon would be provided with a health warning given the findings of the Horizon judgment.
- 9.3 JS cautioned that there would be a cost to operationalise this policy as a process would need to be in place to deal with any approaches from law enforcement agencies, regulators or registered industry bodies. We needed to ensure that we had the skills, capacity and money to deliver. BF explained that the policy included a process map but that he would highlight this at GE to ensure that the consequences of the policy were understood. BF
- 9.4 It was further noted that requests for data may not be easy to fulfil if it required cooperation from third parties including Fujitsu and Ingenico. JS explained that it needed to be recognised that this involved some very comprehensive relationships. BF concurred but noted that this would be mitigated by general law cooperation clauses within contracts. AG noted that the paper was very “Horizon-specific” but that the policy had a much broader systems reach. BF explained that the policy was designed to cover all requests, but that HNG-A was an area of particular sensitivity. It would be supported by a cross-functional team including compliance and IT security. As such, support would be provided to the business. JT suggested that a list should be compiled of colleagues who could provide information to law enforcement agencies, regulators and industry bodies to ensure compliance.
- 9.5 The Criminal Misconduct and Cooperation with Law Enforcement Agencies paper and attached draft policy entitled “Cooperation with Law Enforcement Agencies and Addressing Suspected Criminal Misconduct” was **APPROVED for onward submission to the ARC**. In approving the draft policy, the RCC also:
- decided that Post Office’s policy should be to cooperate with mandatory requirements and voluntary requests by law enforcement agencies where the risk to undermining the integrity of HNGA is low or low/medium;
 - approved, with respect to the Tools supporting the Policy:
 - a. the process for determining what information can be provided to law enforcement agencies for intelligence purposes (Tool 1);
 - b. the process for determining when evidence can be provided to law enforcement agencies (Tool 2); and
 - c. the process for proactively disclosing to law enforcement agencies disclosable material in criminal cases where Horizon-derived data is being used (Tool 4);
 - decided that Post Office’s policy should be not to conduct any private prosecutions at present; and
 - decided that Post Office should report internal criminal misconduct to the police and ask Post Office operators to advise Post Office if they make a victim crime report.
10. **Review of draft Audit, Risk and Compliance Committee meeting agenda for 19 May 2020**
The draft ARC agenda for 19 March was **NOTED** and RW was requested to confirm with Carla Stent (ARC Chair) and JS the scope of the “broader Fujitsu update” and to add a noting paper for the Supplier Contracts out of Governance update. To do: RW
11. **Any other Business**
There was no other business.