1 Thursday, 16 November 2023 2 (9.58 am) 3 MS PRICE: Good morning, sir, can you see and hear 4 us? 5 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, I can, thank you. Before 6 you begin the evidence session, was price, 7 I wish to make an announcement, all right. 8 MS PRICE: Yes, sir. 9 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: It is with considerable regret 10 and frustration that I have to announce that the 11 session scheduled for Monday and Tuesday next 12 week will have to be postponed. That is 13 Mr Jarnail Singh will not be called to give 14 evidence next Monday and Tuesday. I have 15 reached the decision that his giving evidence 16 next week is not possible because there is every 17 likelihood that the Post Office will, in the 18 course of the next either hours or days, 19 disclose many documents which are relevant to 20 him. 21 My current understanding is that these 22 documents may number in the hundreds and it 23 would clearly be impossible for Mr Singh to 24 receive those documents in time for him to give 25 evidence on Monday and Tuesday since, as yet, 1 1 the Inquiry does not have them. 2 We had been promised by the Post Office that 3 there would begin the disclosure of those 4 documents, or disclosure of those documents 5 would begin, rather, yesterday, but that has not 6 occurred and I am unclear, as I speak, as to 7 when disclosure will begin. 8 Fairness demands that Mr Singh sees those 9 documents before he gives evidence. Fairness 10 also demands that Core Participants see those 11 documents before Mr Singh gives evidence and, as 12 I have said, the Inquiry is not yet in 13 a position to process those documents and 14 disclose them to Mr Singh and Core Participants. 15 Hence, to repeat, the sessions on Monday and 16 Tuesday will not take place. 17 It is also with considerable regret and 18 frustration that I inform everyone that 19 Mr Gareth Jenkins will not begin his evidence on 20 30 November. In the case of Mr Jenkins, the 21 Post Office has disclosed 3,045 new documents, 22 I believe, yesterday to the Inquiry. The 23 Inquiry will need to process those documents and 24 then disclose them to Mr Jenkins and all other 25 Core Participants. 2 1 Mr Jenkins, as the Inquiry was informed by 2 his leading counsel, Ms Dobbin, has made a draft 3 witness statement in respect of his evidence due 4 to be given on 30 November, but that witness 5 statement has not yet been signed and it would 6 be unreasonable of me to expect that Mr Jenkins 7 sign that witness statement until he has had the 8 opportunity to digest all these new documents. 9 I have taken the decision that it is 10 practically impossible for the Inquiry to be 11 ready to receive Mr Jenkins' evidence on 12 30 November, given this late disclosure. 13 It may be -- and I stress "may" -- that the 14 four days during which Mr Jenkins was due to 15 give evidence, beginning on 30 November, can be 16 used for other witnesses. I will update 17 everyone about that possibility as soon as 18 I know whether that is a realistic possibility. 19 So I would ask all participants in the 20 Inquiry to keep open the possibility that we 21 will sit on the days designated between 22 30 November and 6 December, albeit that we won't 23 be hearing from Mr Jenkins. 24 I should also say that, given the obvious 25 importance of Mr Jenkins to my Inquiry, that 3 1 I have decided that there should be 2 a substantial period of time which should now 3 elapse before I try to reschedule Mr Jenkins. 4 I cannot contemplate what has occurred so far 5 recurring, namely that shortly before Mr Jenkins 6 gives his evidence there is a flurry of activity 7 which includes the late disclosure of documents. 8 Accordingly, I have decided that some months 9 are likely to go by before I call Mr Jenkins to 10 give evidence, because I want to be absolutely 11 certain, or at least as certain as I can 12 reasonably be, that every single relevant 13 document relating to him has been disclosed to 14 all relevant parties before his evidence begins. 15 As I have said, therefore, it may be some 16 months before Mr Jenkins appears to give 17 evidence at this Inquiry. That is a source of 18 frustration to me. I'm sure it will be a source 19 of frustration to many Core Participants and 20 perhaps a source of frustration to Mr Jenkins 21 himself. But I think everyone who has followed 22 this Inquiry will appreciate that it is crucial 23 that Mr Jenkins' evidence is heard with the 24 benefit of all documents which is relevant to 25 that evidence. 4 1 To repeat, I am sorry to have to have made 2 this announcement this morning but I felt it 3 necessary to do it orally, as opposed to simply 4 sending out a notice so that (a) everyone is 5 clear about what I am saying and (b) those who 6 are watching can see for themselves how 7 frustrated I have become by all that is going on 8 in relation to disclosure. 9 Thank you, Ms Price. You can now call your 10 witness. 11 MS PRICE: Thank you, sir. Can we please call 12 Mr Whitaker. 13 PAUL GRAHAM WHITAKER (affirmed) 14 Questioned by MS PRICE 15 MS PRICE: Could you confirm your full name, please, 16 Mr Whitaker. 17 A. Paul Graham Whitaker. 18 Q. You should have in front of you a hard copy of 19 a witness statement in your name, dated 20 8 October this year. If you can turn, please, 21 to page 42 of that statement, do you have a copy 22 with a visible signature? 23 A. I do. 24 Q. Is that signature yours? 25 A. It is. 5 1 Q. Are there any corrections that you wish to make 2 to the statement? 3 A. I'd just like to add that, on recent disclosure, 4 documents have become known to me. In this 5 statement, I initially say that I wasn't aware 6 of any challenge to Horizon right up until the 7 time I left Post Office Limited in January 2012. 8 However, as I say, these recent disclosures have 9 shown that I was aware of some action in regard 10 to questioning the integrity of Horizon, 11 particularly in sub post offices in North Wales, 12 actually before I left, and it wasn't until 13 I saw those documents that that refreshed my 14 memory. 15 Q. With that correction made, are the contents of 16 that statement true to the best of your 17 knowledge and belief? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. For the purposes of the transcript, the 20 reference is WITN05050100. 21 Thank you for coming to the Inquiry to 22 assist it in its work and for providing the 23 witness statement that you have. As you know, 24 I will be asking questions on behalf of the 25 Inquiry. Today, I'm going to asking you about 6 1 issues which arise in Phase 4 of the Inquiry, 2 focusing on your involvement as an Investigator 3 within the Security and Investigation Team in 4 the relevant criminal prosecutions, including 5 the prosecution of David Blakey. 6 You joined the Post Office in 1985 as 7 a postal cadet; is that right? 8 A. Correct, yes. 9 Q. From 1986 to 1994 you worked as a postman 10 delivering and processing the mail? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Between 1994 and 1998, you worked within Royal 13 Mail Letters, dealing with postal franking 14 machines in the main? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. Then in September 1998 you joined the Post 17 Office Security and Investigation Service, as it 18 then was? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. Your role was initially that of an Assistant 21 Investigation Officer; is that right? 22 A. Correct, yes. 23 Q. Can you explain, please, the three separate 24 entities which existed at that time under the 25 Royal Mail Group corporate umbrella? 7 1 A. There was Post Office Limited, Royal Mail 2 Letters and Parcelforce. 3 Q. You say in your statement at paragraph 8 that 4 Royal Mail Letters and Post Office Limited each 5 had their own investigation function but 6 Parcelforce did not. So in 1998, the Post 7 Office Security and Investigation Service had 8 Parcel Group sections, which dealt with 9 investigations into crime within the Parcelforce 10 network; is that right? 11 A. That's correct. 12 Q. You deal with your role within the Post Office 13 Security and Investigation Service at 14 paragraphs 9 to 11 of your statement to the 15 Inquiry. Could we have those on screen, please, 16 page 3 of Mr Whitaker's statement WITN05050100. 17 Starting at paragraph 9, you say this: 18 "On joining POSIS I recall that I had 19 an initial period of induction training which 20 covered relevant aspects of investigation, 21 eg law, principles of investigation, evidence 22 gathering, PACE etc, before being assigned to 23 an established officer for 'on the job' 24 training. Further training modules were 25 complete over the following year in subjects 8 1 such as witness interviewing and suspect 2 interviewing, etc. As I recall, I received no 3 specific training to do with POL work at this 4 time, as, within Parcel Group I was not expected 5 to undertake or assist with any POL 6 investigations." 7 You go on at paragraph 10: 8 "In 1999 Parcelforce introduced its own 9 investigation function, and in September of that 10 year POSIS Parcel Group (North) was disbanded. 11 Its operational staff in Leeds were then 12 compulsorily transferred to different Royal Mail 13 investigation functions. Some staff went into 14 Parcelforce, and others to Royal Mail Cashco 15 (the Royal Mail Group's cash carrying function). 16 Despite having a background in mails work and no 17 previous POL experience, I was sent to work for 18 POL, initially based at their regional 19 headquarters in Leeds in September 1999." 20 Going to paragraph 11, please: 21 "I had no say whatsoever in where I was 22 placed at this time." 23 How did you feel about being sent to the 24 Post Office Security and Investigation Team in 25 1999? 9 1 A. I recall a certain amount of apprehension for 2 the reasons stated in the statement. I'd not 3 worked behind a Post Office Counter at that 4 time. However, obviously, I was happy to go 5 wherever they sent me. 6 Q. You worked as a Post Office Investigation 7 Manager, later named a Security Manager, from 8 1999 until January 2012, save for a brief period 9 when you were a temporary team leader for the 10 South Investigation Team, in around 2009; is 11 that right? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. Then in 2012, you took up the role of 14 Investigation Manager with Royal Mail Letters? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. You say in your statement at paragraph 13 that 17 when you were a Post Office Investigation 18 Manager, Post Office Security was split into 19 three areas: East, West and North; is that 20 right? 21 A. That's as I recall it, yes. 22 Q. Which was your area when you first started as 23 an Investigation Manager? 24 A. The North. 25 Q. Where were you based at first? 10 1 A. Initially I was based in Leeds. 2 Q. What part of the country were investigations run 3 from the -- apologies. 4 What part of the country were investigations 5 covering out of the Leeds office? 6 A. It was the investigations in the counties in the 7 sort of north-eastern quadrant of England. So 8 up to the Scottish Borders around Berwick and 9 down as far as just south of Sheffield, that 10 sort of area, and across to the east coast. 11 Q. Who did you report to when you were based at the 12 Leeds office? 13 A. Initially my first team leader was a gentleman 14 named Les Thorpe. 15 Q. He was based in Durham; is that right? 16 A. I think it was Peterlee, yeah, County Durham, 17 yeah. 18 Q. Mr Thorpe, in turn, reported to a Senior 19 Investigation Manager based in Glasgow, Rashid 20 Sarwar; is that right? 21 A. As I recall, yes. 22 Q. Who, in turn, reported to the North Area Head of 23 Security, also based in Glasgow, and you say 24 that was a man called Duncan McFadyen? 25 A. I believe so, yes. 11 1 Q. You say in your statement that the Security 2 Department was split into physical Security and 3 Investigation departments, and it was the latter 4 of these which you worked within, that being the 5 teams responsible for the investigation of 6 suspected criminal losses to the Post Office? 7 A. Correct. 8 Q. You say in your statement at paragraph 16 that 9 perhaps a year after you joined the Post Office, 10 the security function within the Post Office 11 began a period of rapid change. Can you 12 explain, please, the key changes which were 13 brought in at that stage? Please do feel free 14 to refer to your statement if you need to. 15 A. If I may, yeah. Yeah, as I recall, there was 16 a number of geographical boundary changes and 17 staff changes as well, movement of staff. 18 I mean, I do recall, actually, at that time 19 I spent some time doing some investigations in 20 the northwest and, in terms of hierarchy, as 21 I say, at the time, Tony Marsh headed it, and 22 Phil Gerrish became his Head of Investigations. 23 So I believe at that time Mr Thorpe went and 24 I recall the sort of line for Investigations 25 became more sort of centred around Mr Gerrish 12 1 being the Head of Investigation function. 2 I can't recall Mr McFadyen or Mr Sarwar having 3 such input around that time. 4 As I say, I can't recall specifics but I do 5 recall that there seemed to be plenty sort of 6 happening, as it were. 7 Q. As a result of those changes, you moved from 8 being based in Leeds to being based in 9 Sheffield; is that right? 10 A. Yes. But that was -- I was on my own in 11 Sheffield. It wasn't that there was an office 12 in Sheffield that moved from Leeds; it's just 13 that I happened to work from an office in 14 Sheffield. 15 Q. Is it right that your manager was never based in 16 the same location as you in Sheffield? 17 A. No, that's correct. 18 Q. But you say you saw them regularly and were in 19 contact by email and telephone? 20 A. That's correct, yes. 21 Q. You recall Tony Marsh leaving the Post Office to 22 become head of Royal Mail Group Security in 23 around 2007 -- 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. -- and Phil Gerrish leaving shortly thereafter 13 1 to join Royal Mail Letters as Head of 2 Investigation? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. How did the Post Office Security Team change 5 under the leadership of John Scott, who replaced 6 Tony Marsh? 7 A. John Scott brought in more of an ethos of 8 analysis in regard to losses. It was more 9 proactive and on the front foot, looking at ways 10 to stop losses, and less focus on reactive 11 investigation once losses had occurred. Within 12 that, he again, he reorganised, he was -- he 13 brought in sections that, as I say, looked at 14 forecasting, if you like, and using techniques 15 to be able to anticipate where losses might 16 occur, as opposed to just straight investigating 17 losses reactively once the loss had occurred. 18 Q. You say in your statement that you also noticed 19 a change in the type of experience which your 20 Investigation colleagues had. Can you explain 21 the nature of this change, please? 22 A. Yeah, I think Mr Scott wanted to bring in 23 Security Managers that were potentially dual 24 trained, so they were not just Investigators. 25 As I say, they had more background in looking 14 1 at -- proactively looking into losses and also 2 into physical security, so we were looking at 3 dual training the managers. And I think during 4 that time, because of the people that he bought 5 in, who may have been more attuned to that new 6 type of role, I think we lost a lot of 7 experience in regards to actual Investigators 8 and people who were able to work to reactively 9 investigate a loss. 10 Q. What happened to the geographical remit of the 11 Security team in general and in relation to your 12 team in particular under John Scott? 13 A. It just widened. It went from just being in the 14 north. I was coming down to London. I was 15 taking on investigations in Wales. So it just 16 widened. I think there were -- at different 17 times, different geographical barriers were 18 brought in but they did change quite a lot. 19 Q. You say at paragraph 22 of your statement that 20 the remit expanded into Scotland and Northern 21 Ireland as well? 22 A. Certainly, yeah. I did investigations or 23 assisted with the investigations in Northern 24 Ireland and in Scotland. 25 Q. You deal at paragraphs 23 and 24 in a bit more 15 1 detail with some of the changes in approach to 2 investigation brought in by John Scott. Could 3 we have those paragraphs on screen, please, it's 4 page 7 of WITN05050100. You say here: 5 "I feel that Mr Scott focused more on 6 bringing to POL Security a data driven model to 7 proactively analyse and seek out risk and loss 8 within post offices as opposed to using the POL 9 Investigation Team to investigate losses 10 reactively. Mr Scott brought in much more data 11 analysis in his loss management strategy and set 12 up a dedicated team to do this, I recall Helen 13 Rose being part of that team but unfortunately 14 cannot recall other names." 15 What and who do you understand was driving 16 the new approach of proactively analysing and 17 seeking out risk and loss within post offices, 18 rather than investigating reactively? 19 A. Certainly Mr Scott was driving that: John Scott. 20 His reasons why he was doing that, I'm only 21 speculating in that potentially an Investigation 22 Team were expensive, essentially what -- he 23 could have looked at what value they did 24 actually bring to the organisation. POL was 25 changing very, very quickly around that time, 16 1 I recall. The network was shrinking, they'd 2 lost number of contracts. They were examining 3 how they worked and where they sat within the 4 country, and how they were to operate going 5 forward. 6 So I think it was -- I think -- and, again, 7 it's only my speculation of how I looked at 8 it -- I think it was to do with that and looking 9 at repositioning the organisation and, as I say, 10 an Investigation Department, purely 11 Investigation Department, was an expensive tool, 12 perhaps. 13 Q. At paragraph 24 of your statement you say this: 14 "Mr Scott also brought in a team to try to 15 recoup losses through the Proceeds of Crime Act 16 and some Investigators were trained as financial 17 investigators. From memory, I recall these 18 included Ged Harbinson, Graham Ward, Helen 19 Dickinson and Paul Southin." 20 Do you recall where the agenda for recouping 21 losses through criminal enforcement proceedings 22 came from? 23 A. Again, it could be speculation because I don't 24 recall ever being told, but I believe that 25 obviously, in order to enact the Proceeds of 17 1 Crime Act and to use the Proceeds of Crime Act, 2 there has to initially be a crime committed. So 3 I think it was -- in fact, that was probably one 4 of the reasons why elements of the Investigation 5 Team remained. 6 But, ultimately, I think Mr Scott was all 7 about, you know, affecting the bottom line of 8 the organisation and trying to stop losses. So 9 that was a strategy brought in, in regard to 10 that. 11 Whilst I understand that, in terms of the 12 proceeds of crime, you know, an element of that, 13 any recouped would go to the Government. Also, 14 some would not. 15 Q. You refer to the bottom line of the business. 16 Did you ever feel that the interests of the 17 business, particularly financial interests, 18 influenced the way Investigators did their job? 19 A. It certainly didn't influence me at all. 20 I never gave it a thought. 21 Q. Going over the page, please, to paragraph 28 of 22 the statement, you say this: 23 "I felt that within the tenure of Mr Marsh 24 as Head of Security, I found the line management 25 within POL investigation to be supportive and 18 1 experienced, with many of the managers having 2 come through 'the ranks', as it were. They knew 3 the Investigators' role and the challenges it 4 brought. However, I feel that when Mr Marsh, 5 and others left POL, my line management under 6 the leadership of Mr Scott, though reasonable in 7 so much as they were someone to manage staff, 8 many lacked the experience and understanding 9 within the investigation and criminal justice 10 fields. Managers I remember and consider in 11 respect of that statement were Andrew Daley and 12 Alison Drake." 13 Did this lack of experience and 14 understanding within the investigation and 15 criminal justice fields have an impact on the 16 fairness and adequacy of investigations, in your 17 view? 18 A. Not personally, I don't think, because I think 19 when that came in, I was -- not of a standing, 20 but I had enough experience of the job to be 21 able to, you know, work through that. But 22 anybody who came in, into an Investigator's role 23 or a role that had an investigation element, 24 they may have felt -- they may have struggled 25 somewhat with line management and leadership, 19 1 who didn't fully understand the role. 2 Q. How did the various investigation teams 3 operating across the country communicate with 4 each other about any matters of concern arising 5 on their patch? 6 A. All sort of communication tended to come from 7 the centre, as it were. We did get together 8 occasionally for conferences and suchlike, at 9 which, you know, things would be chatted 10 through, and I did feel that I could speak to 11 Investigators throughout the country if I wanted 12 to and ring them up. 13 But, essentially, a lot of the information 14 of which you speak there would come from the 15 centre, so it would feed in from someone on the 16 South Coast or something and it would get up, if 17 relevant -- if deemed relevant by whoever was 18 disseminating it, it would get disseminated out 19 to everyone else. 20 Q. Why did you leave the Post Office to go to Royal 21 Mail Letters? 22 A. I think I was getting a bit disillusioned with 23 Post Office Limited. I was not particularly 24 a fan of the leadership. As I say, the 25 organisation was going through a lot of change. 20 1 I thought there was slightly more job security 2 in Post Office Limited and a job came up in 3 there, so I applied for it and got it. 4 Q. Turning to the training you received in the 5 conduct of investigations, please. Before you 6 joined the Post Office Security and 7 Investigation Service in 1998, did you have any 8 experience in criminal investigations or 9 criminal law? 10 A. Not directly. Elements of the job within 11 franking machines, there was elements of 12 inspection and that linked into elements within 13 POSIS but not directly as an Investigator or 14 within that sort of field. 15 Q. We have seen from paragraph 9 of your statement, 16 which we had on screen earlier, that you had 17 some initial induction training when you first 18 joined the Post Office Security and 19 Investigation Service in 1998. How much time 20 did the initial induction training take up? 21 A. I recall it was two weeks' residential training 22 in Croydon. 23 Q. You say in paragraph 34 of your statement that 24 this was classroom-based learning. Who was it 25 who provided this training? 21 1 A. It was -- I think there was an in-house training 2 group within POSIS and it was their trainers 3 that did that. 4 Q. You've said already that the training did not 5 cover Post Office investigation work, as within 6 the Parcel Group you were not expected to 7 undertake or assist with any POL investigations, 8 but you say there were further modules covered 9 over the course of that first year in 10 investigations when you were allocated to Parcel 11 Group work. You give examples of the topics 12 covered in your first year as suspect 13 interviewing, witness interviewing, searching 14 and report writing in your statement. 15 Did any of the training you did in your 16 first year cover disclosure? 17 A. I don't recall that it did. 18 Q. You say at paragraph 9 of your statement that 19 you were assigned to an established officer for 20 'on the job' training. How long did this on the 21 job training last for? 22 A. It lasted for a year, I believe. 23 Q. Can you recall now what kind of work the person 24 you were shadowing was doing in that first year 25 when you were still with Parcel Group work? 22 1 A. He was leading investigations into, in the main, 2 Parcelforce losses. 3 Q. How did Parcelforce losses differ from those you 4 dealt with later with the Post Office? 5 A. They were very much losses from the course of 6 post, so examining the theft of parcels, from 7 course of post. In fact, that was the main body 8 of the work, the old charge of delaying the 9 mail. That was one that was looked at. There 10 were a couple, I think, because part of the 11 remit of Parcel Group was also to do group 12 enquiries. So anything that came under the 13 Royal Mail Group that didn't fall within 14 Letters, or anything like that, tended to get 15 sort of handed to Parcel Group to pursue. But 16 there was certainly nothing that was in any way 17 accountancy based or anything like that. 18 Q. You say in your statement at paragraph 35 that, 19 when you were moved to Post Office 20 Investigations in 1999, you were given some 21 counter clerk's training on the counter clerk 22 role and Post Office working practices, and that 23 was before the introduction of the Horizon 24 system, wasn't it? 25 A. I recall that it was, yes. 23 1 Q. When you were moved to Post Office 2 Investigations in 1999, were you given any 3 training, in particular on your duties as 4 an Investigator working on Post Office, as 5 opposed to Parcel Group investigations? 6 A. I don't recall any specific training where I was 7 taken to one side and said, "This is the 8 training that you're about to receive". I was 9 placed under the sort of tutorship, if you like, 10 of a longstanding Investigator and another 11 Investigator who were very experienced, and 12 I was sort of mentored, if you like -- though it 13 was never officially called mentoring -- in 14 regard to those sort of taking me along and 15 introducing me to the work. 16 Q. Who were those more experienced investigators? 17 A. John Hart was the most experienced one and then 18 John Hart, who -- sorry, and John Downie, he was 19 an Assistant Investigation Officer at the time 20 with, as I say, John Hart being the lead 21 Investigator, if you like. 22 Q. You say at paragraph 36 of your statement that, 23 when the Horizon system was introduced, you 24 recall going on a course over a week or so on 25 the Horizon system; is that right? 24 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. That training was not specifically for 3 Investigators, there being other Post Office 4 staff on the course, including subpostmasters? 5 A. Yeah, I recall it was -- I was sat amongst 6 subpostmasters, other Post Office staff. It 7 wasn't exclusively investigation based. 8 Q. Did you have any training on the Horizon system 9 after this? 10 A. Not that I can recall. 11 Q. You say in your statement at paragraph 32 that 12 in around 2006 you completed a Level 4 National 13 Vocational Qualification in investigation 14 management. Can you recall what topics you 15 covered during that qualification, of relevance? 16 A. Again, it was a vocational qualification so it 17 was demonstrating competency in interviewing, 18 witness interviewing, managing investigations, 19 those sort of modules. Again, there was nothing 20 specific about Horizon or anything in there. 21 Q. You also say that, before you left the Post 22 Office, in 2010 you started a post-graduate 23 diploma in security and risk management at 24 Leicester University, which you completed after 25 you had moved to Royal Mail. 25 1 Again, can you remember any topics you 2 covered when doing that training? 3 A. In regards to investigation, there was a topic 4 around the law but it wasn't specifically 5 an investigation-based course, it was security 6 and risk management, so it was more in keeping 7 with, I suppose, Mr Scott's view about looking 8 at risk management within the organisation. 9 Q. Turning, then, to policies and guidance 10 applicable to the work of Post Office 11 Investigators, were any investigation or 12 prosecution policies provided to you during the 13 training you had in your first year as 14 an Investigator, in 1998? 15 A. I recall policies were -- would have been 16 available. I don't recall an online -- I don't 17 recall a sort of repository. So I would imagine 18 they would be available for us to look at and 19 expected that we, you know, had a knowledge of 20 them. 21 Q. You say you think they would have been 22 available. Where do you think they were 23 available? 24 A. I'm just trying to think because, 1999, it may 25 not have been online. In 1999 when I was 26 1 working in Parcel Group, we were actually in 2 an office, and there was a number of us in 3 there. So they may have been available in there 4 but possibly in binders or something like that. 5 But I can't recall, to be perfectly honest. 6 Q. Were any investigation or prosecution policies 7 provided to you when you moved to Post Office 8 Investigations in 1999? 9 A. Not specifically. Again, because I was working 10 in Leeds, which was a sort of regional office, 11 they may have been available within the office 12 somewhere but I don't specifically recall that, 13 yes, they were in the third cabinet from the 14 left, or anything like that. 15 Q. Could we have on screen, please, paragraph 38 of 16 Mr Whitaker's statement. That's page 11 of 17 WITN05050100. You say here at paragraph 38: 18 "... I don't recall there being a 'central 19 repository' or such where Investigators could 20 specifically view policies. The dissemination 21 of information contained within policy, as 22 I recall and understand, was mainly through 23 training, team meetings and special directives 24 called 'Investigation Circulars' which would be 25 sent via email to Investigation staff." 27 1 Can you recall when email Investigation 2 Circulars were first introduced? 3 A. It was very, very early on. It may have been 4 around 1999. It may have been earlier but I do 5 recall them occasionally coming out and saying, 6 you know, "Investigation Circular D15", or 7 whatever, and whatever it referred to. 8 Q. These circulars, were they summarising what was 9 in a new policy, for example, or were they 10 attaching the policy itself? 11 A. I seem to recall that they were summarising. It 12 would be new policy or changes within the law, 13 or I suppose anything that -- because I think 14 they were issued centrally through Group 15 Security. So it would have been anything that 16 Group Security felt the need to disseminate 17 officially in one of these documents. 18 Q. Can we have on screen, please, document 19 reference POL00104762. This is a document 20 entitled "Disclosure of Unused Material -- 21 Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 22 Codes of Practice", and it is dated May 2001. 23 This is one of the policy documents which was 24 sent to you by the Inquiry for the purposes of 25 preparing your witness statement. Have you had 28 1 an opportunity to read this document? 2 A. Yeah, I've looked at the document, yeah. 3 Q. Had you seen this document before the Inquiry 4 sent it to you? 5 A. I don't recall. However, if I had, it would 6 have been almost 20 years ago. 7 Q. Under "Purpose", this document explains that: 8 "The aim of this policy is to ensure that 9 Security Managers know and understand the 10 Investigation Procedures in relation to the 11 Disclosure of Unused Material as described in 12 the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 13 1996 Codes of Practice, which must be adhered to 14 by all Consignia staff undertaking 15 investigations." 16 Just pausing there, you listed the Criminal 17 Procedure and Investigations Act as governing 18 your role as an Investigator at paragraph 39 of 19 your statement. Were you aware, in 2001, that 20 there was a CPIA Code of Practice which Post 21 Office Investigators were required to adhere to, 22 in addition to the Act itself? 23 A. I'm not sure if you'd have asked me at the time 24 that I'd be able to say, "Yes, I am adhering to 25 the CPIA Code of Practice". However, my 29 1 understanding was that -- generally, that we 2 would. I don't know if that makes sense, you 3 know. If someone were to have asked me then, 4 "Are you adhering to this?", I would say, "Well, 5 I believe I am", but if they'd asked me to stand 6 there and recite the Act, I don't think I would 7 have been able to do it. 8 Q. The introduction at 3.1 in the first two bullet 9 points identifies the Act, so the Criminal 10 Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, and then 11 also covers the Attorney General's Guidelines on 12 the disclosure of unused material. It may be 13 that you can't say but in 2001 were you aware of 14 the existence of the Attorney General's 15 Guidelines on disclosure of unused material? 16 A. Well, I can't say. However, in 2001, I would 17 have probably been sort of 15 months into the 18 role and quite new. So there's a strong chance 19 that I wouldn't have been. 20 Q. Going further down the page, please, to the 21 general principles section, there is a section 22 on "Investigators and Disclosure Officers", and 23 at bullet point 1 an Investigator is defined: 24 "An Investigator is a person involved in the 25 conduct of a criminal investigation involving 30 1 Consignia. All Investigators have 2 a responsibility for carrying out the duties 3 imposed on them under this Code, including in 4 particular recording information, and retaining 5 records of information and other material." 6 Then at the second bullet point, we have 7 this: 8 "Investigators and Disclosure Officers must 9 be fair and objective and must work together 10 with prosecutors to ensure that disclosure 11 obligations are met. A failure to take action 12 leading to proper disclosure may result in 13 a wrongful conviction. It may alternatively 14 lead to a successful abuse of process argument 15 or an acquittal against the weight of the 16 evidence." 17 Then at bullet point 3, we have this: 18 "In discharging their obligations under the 19 statute, code common law and any operational 20 instructions, Investigators should always err on 21 the side of recording and retaining material 22 where they have any doubt as to whether it may 23 be relevant." 24 Moving, then, to the second bullet point on 25 this page: 31 1 "The Disclosure Officer is the person 2 responsible for examining material retained 3 during an investigation, revealing material to 4 Legal Services during the investigation and any 5 criminal proceedings resulting from it, and 6 certifying to Legal Services that he has done 7 this. Normally the Investigator and the 8 Disclosure Officer will be the same person." 9 Just pausing there, you've addressed in your 10 statement your understanding of your role in 11 relation to disclosure at the time of your 12 involvement in Mr Blakey's case, that is in 13 2004. Could we have on screen, please, 14 paragraph 139 of Mr Whitaker's statement, that's 15 page 33 of WITN05050100. That's 139. You say 16 this: 17 "Regarding disclosure, without really 18 knowing it I was the Disclosure Officer in the 19 case. Within POL Investigations, if you were 20 the officer in the case, you were also 21 Disclosure Officer, exhibits officer, report 22 writer, witness liaison, and all the other roles 23 combined to support an investigation. As such, 24 when it came time to review evidence and produce 25 disclosure schedules for a criminal prosecution, 32 1 it was down to each Investigator to do this." 2 You say you were the Disclosure Officer 3 without really knowing it. Do you mean by that 4 that it fell to you to complete the disclosure 5 schedule as one of number of tasks Investigators 6 did but you gave no conscious thought to the 7 fact that you had an additional but distinct 8 role as a Disclosure Officer. 9 A. No, what I meant by that was that, basically, 10 you were expected to do everything. It was 11 never said to me that "You are the Disclosure 12 Officer", but I knew I had, you know -- 13 disclosure fell under the remit of what I was 14 expected to do. So it was simply that I -- you 15 know, as a Post Office Investigator, you were 16 expected to do everything. 17 I know in other roles, in other 18 organisations, the roles that I've mentioned 19 there, exhibits officer, report writer, would 20 often be someone different and an Investigator 21 would stand to one side of them, leading the 22 investigation. But within every one of my Post 23 Office Investigations, no matter how big or 24 small or how complicated or how simple, I -- 25 those roles were expected to be completed by the 33 1 Investigation Manager. 2 Q. So you knew that you had a disclosure task but 3 were you consciously aware that you had 4 a distinct role with applicable additional 5 duties as a Disclosure Officer? 6 A. I don't think it was ever pointed out to me that 7 "You are Disclosure Officer". It's not a role 8 or a term that I probably would have been 9 familiar with. However, as you say, I knew 10 I had a role in regards to providing disclosure 11 and considering disclosure all the way through 12 an investigation. 13 Q. Going back, please, to the May 2001 Disclosure 14 of Unused Material Policy, that's POL00104762, 15 page 2 of that document, please. The third 16 bullet point on this page, about halfway down, 17 deals with a Section 9 statement and underneath 18 that, underneath the paragraph in bold, it is 19 explained: 20 "In meeting the obligations in paragraph 6.9 21 and 8.1 of the Code, it is crucial that 22 descriptions by Disclosure Officers in 23 non-sensitive schedules our detailed, clear and 24 accurate." 25 Then this at the next bullet point: 34 1 "Disclosure Officers must specifically draw 2 material to the attention of the Prosecutor for 3 consideration where they have any doubt as to 4 whether it might undermine the prosecution case 5 or might reasonably be expected to assist the 6 Defence disclosed by the accused." 7 At the time you were an Investigator, did 8 you understand that, because you were also the 9 Disclosure Officer, you had a duty specifically 10 to draw material to the attention of the 11 prosecutor where you were in any doubt as to 12 whether it might undermine the prosecution case 13 or assist the defence? 14 A. I recall that -- I would have been aware of that 15 because in filling in the disclosure schedules, 16 you know, it specifically mentions that. So 17 I think it's safe to say that I would have had 18 an understanding that that was something 19 I should have been doing. 20 Q. The bullet point below says this: 21 "Disclosure Officers must seek the advice 22 and assistance of prosecutors when in doubt as 23 to their responsibility, and must deal 24 expeditiously with requests by the prosecutor 25 for further information on material which may 35 1 lead to disclosure." 2 Who was the prosecutor in cases you 3 investigated on behalf of the Post Office? 4 A. It would have been Legal Services, Royal Mail 5 Group Legal Services. 6 Q. Is it Legal Services, the Criminal Law Team, 7 that you would have gone to, if you were in 8 doubt about your responsibilities relating to 9 disclosure? 10 A. Probably in the first instance, if I had any 11 doubts about it I may have chatted it through 12 with team leader or something like that, or 13 a colleague. My view with regard to it was 14 essentially that my role was to, in 15 disclosure -- or certainly a role in disclosure 16 was to list everything. It was going to get 17 reviewed and, if there was anything that 18 shouldn't have been there or was on the wrong 19 schedule, or any issues like that, the reviewing 20 lawyer would get back to me, and it would be -- 21 you know, it would be discussed and put right. 22 That's how I viewed the process, or I seem 23 to recall how I viewed the process. 24 Q. It is not referenced in this document, but were 25 you aware, when you were an Investigator, that 36 1 there was an obligation on a criminal 2 investigator to pursue lines of inquiry which 3 pointed away from the guilt of the suspect? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. In terms of the legislation you list at 6 paragraph 39 of your statement, which you say 7 governed your investigations -- and do feel free 8 to refer to that if you want to -- where would 9 you have found these documents if you wanted to 10 refer to them? 11 A. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act Codes of 12 Practice, they were in a book that we carried 13 around with us. The Criminal Procedure and 14 Investigations Act, potentially as it went 15 along, they could have been along -- sorry, they 16 could have been held electronically. The Human 17 Rights Act, I recall when that came in, we went 18 on a course. But, again, I would imagine they 19 would have been held somewhere, the specific 20 Acts, or you could get them from, you know, from 21 open sourcing on the Government website. So 22 a number of places they would be available to be 23 viewed. 24 Q. Apart from the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 25 which you say you carried around with you, did 37 1 you ever go directly to the other legislation 2 for guidance? 3 A. Potentially, maybe the Proceeds of Crime Act. 4 But I would probably be more inclined, if I had 5 a query that fell within those, I would have 6 rang Legal Services, I would have rung a lawyer. 7 My view was that they were the experts, if I'd 8 got a query in regards to specifics of the law, 9 I would ring them. 10 Q. You have recently been provided with some 11 documents by the Inquiry relating to training 12 provided very shortly before you left the Post 13 Office to join Royal Mail, in November 2011, and 14 that was training on legal advices and 15 disclosure which was provided by Rob Wilson, who 16 was Head of Criminal Law at that time, and 17 counsel from a set of chambers specialising in 18 criminal law, hosted externally by that set of 19 chambers. 20 Could we have on screen, please, the email 21 invitation to this training. The reference is 22 POL00167351. We can see this is an invitation 23 from Graham Brander to a session planned from 24 11.00 am to 3.00 pm, on 14 November 2011. So 25 I think you left the Post Office in January 38 1 2012; is that right? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. So some two months later. As far as you can 4 recall, did you go to this training session? 5 A. I vaguely recall coming down to -- I think it 6 was held in chambers close to the Royal Courts 7 of Justice In London. I'm not sure whether 8 it -- that was this course or another, but I've 9 got no reason to believe that I wasn't, that 10 I didn't attend, if I was invited to. 11 Q. Can you recall being on a training course where 12 disclosure was specifically discussed? 13 A. Again, I think I'll have to refer back to what 14 I've just said. I do recall having some sort of 15 training within Bells Yard (sic) but I was not 16 entirely sure that it was disclosure. It could 17 have been something else. 18 Q. Can you recall attending any training 19 specifically on disclosure at any time before 20 this, whether provided internally by the Post 21 Office or otherwise? 22 A. I don't but, again, that's not to say that there 23 wasn't. There could have been something right 24 at the very, very beginning. But I think -- and 25 I don't know whether, you know, it's something 39 1 that'll be mentioned later. I do think, you 2 know, that the provision for training in respect 3 of disclosure within Post Office Limited was not 4 what it should have been. 5 Q. So are we right to understand that you have 6 a memory of there being some training provided 7 by an external provider? 8 A. Not specifically disclosure training. I do 9 remember that from time to time external 10 providers would give us training and, as I say, 11 I do remember some training in Bells Yard 12 chambers. However, I genuinely cannot recall if 13 it was disclosure training, if it was training 14 on something else. Unfortunately, the reason 15 I do remember it, because I do recall that we 16 were shown around the Royal Courts of Justice 17 afterwards. So I do recall we were down there 18 and I recall that happening, but the actual 19 content of the training, I can't recall if that 20 was disclosure training or not, unfortunately. 21 Q. Setting aside the content of the training, is 22 there only one occasion you remember where you 23 were given training by an external provider? 24 A. Yeah, probably, yeah. 25 Q. We need not have them up on screen unless you 40 1 wish to go to them, Mr Whitaker, but among the 2 documents recently provided to you are two 3 emails sent to you and others after this 4 training, which included the PowerPoint 5 presentation from the session, an extract from 6 the Criminal Procedure Rules, the Code for Crown 7 Prosecutors and the CPIA Code of Practice, as 8 well as links to other CPS resources including 9 the Attorney General's Guidelines on disclosure. 10 As far as you can recall, do you remember 11 receiving those documents by email? 12 A. I don't remember receiving those documents but 13 if they were sent to me I would have received 14 them. 15 Q. Can you recall ever being sent those kind of 16 resources before this? 17 A. What, specific to disclosure? 18 Q. Well, the resources I've just referred to, and 19 in particular, the Attorney General's Guidelines 20 on disclosure, the CPIA Codes of Practice, the 21 Code for Crown Prosecutors. You were being sent 22 these documents after this training. Do you 23 remember those documents ever being sent to you 24 before? 25 A. No. 41 1 Q. You say in your statement at paragraph 33 that 2 you felt the training in respect of the 3 investigation role you held was adequate, that 4 you were trained to a reasonable standard in 5 investigation skills and any specific major 6 change to the law, policies or techniques would 7 be communicated through training courses. But 8 your assessment of the training relating to 9 disclosure is somewhat different. 10 Could we have on screen, please, 11 paragraph 140 of Mr Whitaker's statement, that's 12 page 34 of WITN05050100. You say here: 13 "An issue ... that I feel there was, was 14 that there was no regular refresher training on 15 the subject ..." 16 That subject being disclosure; is that 17 right? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. "... often the line managers were equally as 20 poorly equipped to deal with disclosure, and 21 because as POL cases were rarely committed for 22 trial, consideration and production of schedules 23 was something that investigators rarely did. 24 I can recall in my time at POL investigators 25 with substantial service who had never assembled 42 1 what was known as a 'committal file' and 2 therefore had never produced disclosure 3 schedules." 4 Does this remain your view: that because 5 there was no regular refresher training on 6 disclosure and because Post Office cases were 7 rarely committed for trial, Investigators and 8 their line managers were poorly equipped to deal 9 with disclosure? 10 A. I would agree with that. I mean, reading out 11 the policy, essentially, Post Office Limited 12 said, "This is the policy that, you know, you're 13 adhering to and, obviously, the law with regard 14 to what you're adhering to with disclosure". 15 However, there was never any -- or I don't 16 recall any checking of understanding of that. 17 It was never something that was really 18 pushed, as it were, and I don't know whether 19 that is because we were, as I said in the 20 statement, we were rarely called to put together 21 schedules and, actually, seriously consider 22 disclosure ahead of proceedings. 23 I think the general feeling was that -- with 24 disclosure is that we were -- you know, we had 25 a duty to retain, we had a duty to review but, 43 1 actually, putting the schedules together was 2 something that was rarely done and I don't 3 recall getting any feedback. You know, when 4 they were sent in to review, I don't recall 5 getting any feedback to say, "Oh yeah, they're 6 fine", or, you know, "They're not what we 7 should -- what they should be". 8 So, essentially, that's the knowledge that 9 I've sort of drawn to make the statement that 10 I've made in the -- in my statement. 11 MS PRICE: Sir, I am about to move to a larger 12 topic. I wonder if we might take the morning 13 break slightly earlier. 14 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes. By all means, Ms Price. So 15 what time shall we start again? 16 MS PRICE: 11.30. 17 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, fine. Thanks. 18 MS PRICE: Thank you, sir. 19 (11.07 am) 20 (A short break) 21 (11.30 am) 22 MS PRICE: Hello, sir, can you see and hear us? 23 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, thank you. 24 MS PRICE: Mr Whitaker, I'd like to turn to 25 investigation casework compliance. Should we 44 1 take it from your statement that there was, 2 throughout your time as a Post Office 3 Investigator, a requirement that certain 4 information was set out in the case files in 5 a uniform way? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. One document which the Inquiry sent you for the 8 purposes of preparing your statement was 9 a document entitled "Casework Management", and 10 there are two versions of that, one is dated 11 March 2000 and one is dated October 2002. It's 12 right, isn't it, that you don't recall being 13 provided with either version of this document 14 before they were provided to you by the Inquiry? 15 A. I don't think they were provided to me. I don't 16 know whether I would have been able to access 17 them but they were not actually provided. 18 Q. Is their content familiar to you? 19 A. Yeah, yeah. 20 Q. This document sets out the need for two separate 21 reports: one, the conduct report, to go to the 22 discipline manager; and another, the legal 23 report to go to the Criminal Law Team. 24 Sensitive information should only be included in 25 the legal report and not the conduct report, and 45 1 there are also paragraphs in this document 2 dealing with both operational and procedural 3 failures identified during an investigation. 4 Is that a fair summary of the nature of the 5 document? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. You've provided in your statement your 8 understanding of the guidance given in that 9 document and that is at paragraph 72 to 73 of 10 your statement. Is it right that your 11 understanding of the guidance now, contained 12 within that document, is this: within 13 disclosure, the organisation should take care, 14 as evidence and unused material may contain 15 commercially sensitive information that should 16 not be in the public domain? 17 Do you want to have a look to your 18 statement? This is paragraph 72. We can have 19 this on screen, if that's easier. WITN05050100, 20 page 19. This is a document that the Inquiry is 21 familiar with. If you'd like to refresh your 22 memory, I can bring that up on screen for you, 23 as well, or are you content to go from your 24 statement? 25 A. No, I'm content to go from my statement, yeah. 46 1 My understanding of the guidance, and how it was 2 applied at the time, was, as I've said in my 3 statement there, that the commercial 4 sensitivities were to do with customers of the 5 Post Office and how their transactions moved 6 through sub post offices. And my understanding 7 was that, you know, anything commercially 8 sensitive from that point of view was what this 9 guidance was aimed at. I didn't take it that 10 this guidance was aimed at the relationship 11 between Fujitsu and Post Office Limited. 12 I thought purely it was to do with -- 13 I think I've mentioned it in the statement -- 14 such things as the Benefits Agency and how their 15 products were processed through post offices. 16 Q. In terms of your understanding at the time you 17 were an Investigator, did you think that, 18 because something was commercially sensitive, 19 that alone and of itself, meant that it did not 20 need to be disclosed? 21 A. No. 22 Q. You say at paragraph 76 of your statement that, 23 towards the end of your time with the Post 24 Office, you recall there being a push on 25 casework compliance -- 47 1 A. Yeah. 2 Q. -- and you recall a compliance checklist being 3 sent out and files being scored against that 4 checklist by a Compliance Manager? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. You recall that compliance manager to have been 7 Ged Harbinson? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. Could we have on screen, please, document 10 reference POL00118096. The email about halfway 11 down the page on this document, please -- 12 a little further down. This is an email from 13 Dave Posnett to a number of Security team 14 recipients, including you, and it's dated 23 May 15 2011. The subject of the email is "Casework 16 Compliance", and the email reads as follows: 17 "All, 18 "Most of you are aware that case files 19 submitted for legal advice will become subject 20 to compliance checks. This process is due to 21 commence in June and is designed to raise 22 standards of files submitted (including their 23 contents -- reports, taped summaries, appendix 24 enclosures, recoveries, stakeholders, etc) and 25 ensure there is a consistent approach across the 48 1 team. It is also probably an opportune time 2 given that we have recently recruited new people 3 to the team. 4 "I've associated relevant documents that 5 feed into the compliance process. Please 6 familiarise yourself with these documents." 7 A number of compliance documents were 8 attached to Mr Posnett's email in a zip file. 9 Presumably, given the instruction in 10 Mr Posnett's email to "familiarise yourself with 11 the documents attached", you read them when you 12 received his email, did you? 13 A. Though I can't recall reading them, I can't 14 think of a reason why I wouldn't have. 15 Q. One of those documents was the "Guide to the 16 Preparation and Layout of Investigation Red 17 Label Case Files". Could we have that on 18 screen, please. The reference is POL00118101. 19 Just scrolling down a little. 20 Did you read this document at the time it 21 was sent to you by Mr Posnett, or can't you say? 22 A. Is it possible to scroll down a little further 23 because I can just see a blank page? 24 Q. We can look over to the second page and that may 25 give you a bit more content. 49 1 A. Right. As I say, I can't think of a reason 2 I wouldn't have, although if you asked me to 3 tell you what date, what time I read it, 4 I wouldn't be able to tell you. 5 Q. This document deals with the content of the 6 offender report and the discipline report. So 7 we discussed just now that the separate reports 8 that were required by the "Casework Management" 9 document, one being the one for the Criminal Law 10 Team and the other being the conduct report, so 11 the terminology is a little different, but it is 12 the offender report which goes to Legal and the 13 discipline report which goes to the Discipline 14 Manager, in the sense of this document. 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. This was provided to you by the Inquiry. Have 17 you had a chance to read it? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. You addressed this document at paragraph 78 and 20 79 of your statement. So please do have those 21 in front of you if you need to refer to them. 22 Can we turn, please, to page 10 of this 23 document. Scrolling down a bit, please, so that 24 2.15 is visible. 25 To put this in context, this is the second 50 1 section of the report dealing with the content 2 of the discipline report, as opposed to the 3 confidential offender report. Paragraph 2.15 4 reads as follows: 5 "Details of failures in security, 6 supervision, procedures and product integrity. 7 This must be a comprehensive list of all 8 failures in security, supervision, procedures 9 and product integrity it must be highlighted 10 bold in the report. Where the investigator 11 concludes that there are no failures a statement 12 to this effect should be made and highlighted in 13 bold." 14 So this seems to relate to the instruction 15 to include a comprehensive list of failures in 16 this report. 17 Then, over the page, please, there is this 18 exception: 19 "Significant failures that may affect the 20 successful likelihood of any criminal action 21 and/or cause significant damage to the business 22 must be confined, solely, to the confidential 23 offender report. Care must be exercised when 24 including failures within the Discipline Report 25 as obviously this is disclosed to the suspect 51 1 offender and may have ramifications on both the 2 criminal elements of the enquiry, as well as 3 being potentially damaging to the reputation or 4 security of the business. If you are in any 5 doubt as to the appropriateness of inclusion or 6 exclusion you must discuss with your Team 7 Leader." 8 Could we have on screen, please, 9 paragraph 78 of Mr Whitaker's statement. That's 10 page 20 of WITN05050100, towards the bottom of 11 the page, please. Just to clarify, the 12 understanding of the paragraph we've just looked 13 at, 2.15, that you're addressing here at 14 paragraph 78, is that your understanding now, 15 reading this document with the benefit of your 16 current understanding of disclosure obligations, 17 or is that how you understood the document at 18 the time? 19 A. No, I think it was how I understood the document 20 at the time. As I said, I was always aware in 21 regard to disclosure that the duty was to have 22 an eye on it and -- you know, from the very, 23 very beginning, and make sure that anything that 24 passed the disclosure test was highlighted. 25 Q. So what you say is this: 52 1 "In regard to my understanding of 2 paragraph 2.15 ... I would say that any failing 3 of the types identified in the document should 4 be drawn to the attention of the prosecution 5 decision maker in the report by the 6 Investigation Manager, highlighting them in bold 7 type." 8 Over the page, please: 9 "Similarly, should a matter be progressed 10 through the criminal courts it would be 11 reasonable to expect that matters highlighted in 12 this way would be included on the relevant 13 disclosure schedule. If there was evidence of 14 Horizon system bugs errors or defects I feel 15 that this evidence would clearly be relevant to 16 the case and would pass the disclosure test in 17 that it would be reasonably considered capable 18 of undermining the prosecution case or assisting 19 the defence." 20 In essence, and do correct me if 21 I paraphrase wrongly, you conclude that any 22 serious failures would be highlighted in the 23 offender report, even if not in the discipline 24 report. They would be highlighted to the 25 prosecution decision maker, who would consider 53 1 it in the context of whether the prosecution 2 test was met and decide whether the matter 3 should be disclosed. 4 So, as such, you see no problem with 5 paragraph 2.15; is that right? 6 A. I think that sums it up. 7 Q. Could we have back on screen, please, 8 paragraph 2.15. That's POL00118101. Again 9 page 10 of that document, please. To the bottom 10 of the page, please, and going over, actually, 11 to page 11. Looking at this wording again, do 12 you think there was a risk that using the 13 wording of the sort used here, under a heading 14 of "Failures in Product Integrity", might be 15 interpreted by some Investigators to mean that 16 relevant product integrity failures should not 17 be disclosed because they might affect the 18 success of any criminal action? 19 That is, of course, the opposite of the test 20 for disclosure. 21 A. I can't really comment on someone else's 22 understanding of that. I think, speaking 23 personally, from the very, very beginning, 24 fairness in regards to investigations was 25 something that I always considered. You know, 54 1 ultimately -- well, specifically, in regard to 2 disclosure, if something were to undermine 3 a crucial or assist the defence, it needed to 4 be -- it needed to be disclosed and it was my 5 job, as an Investigator, to gather the evidence, 6 and put it forward. It was someone else's 7 decision to what they did with that, 8 essentially. So, speaking from a personal point 9 of view, that seems clear to me. 10 Again, unfortunately, I can't speak for 11 other people and their understanding of it. 12 Q. Turning, please, to another document which 13 Mr Posnett asked recipients of his email to 14 familiarise themselves with, the "Identification 15 Codes" document, you've had an opportunity to 16 see that document, to read it? 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. I don't think we need to display it on the 19 screen at the moment. Did you read this 20 document as you were asked to do when Mr Posnett 21 sent you his email? 22 A. I don't recall specifically reading it but, if 23 he sent me the email, there's no reason to 24 suggest that I wouldn't have read it. 25 Q. Do you recall having any concern about 55 1 an "Identification Codes" document when you were 2 an Investigator? 3 A. No, because I seem to recall -- and I think I've 4 mentioned as much in my statement -- that it was 5 just something that we completed. As I say, 6 I used a different one to the one that 7 Mr Posnett put forward. I never used that 8 document and, you know, the terms on it are 9 offensive, outdated and, as I say, I don't 10 recall it at all. 11 But, that said, I don't recall putting up 12 any -- you know, sending it back in and saying, 13 "What's this?" which, you know, obviously, if it 14 happened today, I would like to think I would 15 do. 16 Q. You say at paragraph 81 of your statement that 17 you recall as an Investigator being required to 18 include identity codes in casework reporting, 19 which you understood to be required in the 20 context of recording crime data and statistics 21 to the police. 22 A. I believed it was something to do with that, 23 yeah. Essentially, it was -- as we go on, we've 24 just been talking about compliance, it was 25 a section that had to be filled in on the 56 1 offender report, so, you know, rightly or 2 wrongly, I filled the section in. 3 Q. Setting aside for a second the offender report, 4 do you recall there being a specific form used 5 by the Post Office, as a non-police agency, to 6 notify the police of criminal proceedings? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. It was called a form NPA01? 9 A. Yes, there was, yeah. 10 Q. Can we have on screen, please, document 11 reference POL00118374. This is a blank copy of 12 the form NPA01 and we can see the agency name on 13 the top left, Post Office Limited. We can see 14 at the top, the title "Non-Police Agencies 15 (Notification of Proceedings to Police)". Then 16 there are boxes for various identifying details 17 of the person being charged or summonsed. 18 About halfway down the page, we can see the 19 "Prosecuting Agents" listed as "Post Office 20 Limited Legal Services, Criminal Law Team". 21 Then, over the page, please, right at the 22 top, we see there are number of options for 23 ethnic appearance. There are seven boxes: 24 "White European", "Dark European", "Afro 25 Caribbean", "Asian", "Oriental", "Arab" and 57 1 "Unknown". 2 Is this the form you used to notify the 3 police of proceedings and to identify the 4 identification code which applied in any given 5 case. 6 A. This was the form that we filled in and I think 7 it went to a Prosecution Support Office and they 8 actually dealt with the notification to the 9 police, but it was our responsibility to fill 10 the form in. 11 Q. But is this the way that you notified police of 12 identification codes by reference to those 13 options on this form? 14 A. It looks to be on the form, so obviously the 15 question is why was it on the offender report? 16 Q. So no reference to the identification codes 17 document circulated by Mr Posnett in May 2011 18 was necessary to provide identity code 19 information to the police, was it? 20 A. It doesn't look to be the case, no. 21 Q. Turning back then to Mr Posnett's zip file of 22 compliance documents, could we have document 23 reference POL00118101. This is, again, the 24 "Guide to the Preparation and Layout of 25 Investigation Red Label Case Files", covering 58 1 offender reports and discipline reports. 2 Starting on page 4 of that document, please, 3 scrolling down a little, we see a preamble for 4 the policy template of an offender report. You 5 see there at 1.2, "Preamble as policy template". 6 Going to the top of the next page, please, 7 at the top right, we see "Identification Code" 8 and in brackets "Numbers 1 to 7 only". So 9 Investigators were being instructed to enter 10 an identification code limited to options 1 to 11 7; is that right? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. They were being provided with the 14 "Identification Codes" document sent in the same 15 compliance zip file, which you described as 16 containing offensive and outdated terms. Was 17 there any other way for Investigators receiving 18 Mr Posnett's suite of compliance documents to 19 interpret the instruction, other than, "Use this 20 identification codes document to complete the 21 identification codes space on the offender 22 report"? 23 A. As I say, I didn't use Mr Posnett's information 24 that he sent. I seem to recall I'd been 25 an investigator for some time now and I had 59 1 numbers that corresponded with the identity 2 codes used in the police. And it had -- it 3 remained in my -- what we termed a tackle kit, 4 from an early period and I don't recall ever 5 changing it. 6 As I say, some of the descriptions in 7 Mr Posnett's document were -- came -- it came as 8 a shock to me when I saw that because I don't 9 recall ever seeing it previously. As I say, if 10 I got these -- this suite of documents with 11 this, I can only think that I did recall them. 12 But I didn't use it. I don't remember using 13 those terms on there at all. 14 Q. Given that it was not necessary to use this 15 document, the "Identification Codes" document, 16 for police notification purposes, because the 17 options were there on the face of the form, can 18 you help us with why it was being used to 19 populate the offender report? It may be that 20 the answer is no. 21 A. I don't have any idea whatsoever. It certainly 22 wasn't required. But I can say that it 23 pre-dated Mr Posnett's -- or this document, 24 certainly, because I do recall -- I mean, as 25 I say, I started filling in reports back in 1999 60 1 and I do recall it being on there then, and 2 I recall it being on there ever since. 3 Q. I'm sorry, what do you recall being on there 4 then? 5 A. The space on the -- in the report preamble for 6 identity code. 7 Q. It's apparent from your statement that you can't 8 assist on who might have drafted that document 9 or how long ago that might have been? 10 A. I can't, I'm afraid. I'm sorry. 11 Q. Turning, please, to lines of inquiry in cases 12 where a shortage was being attributed to the 13 Horizon system, could we have on screen, please, 14 page 22 of Mr Whitaker's statement, 15 paragraph 84. 16 You deal here with the situation when 17 someone being investigated attributed 18 a shortfall to problems with the Horizon system, 19 and you say this: 20 "It is difficult to state what analysis was 21 done by Investigators of Horizon data when 22 someone attributed a shortage to Horizon. It 23 depended on what had been said during the 24 interview. If someone had stated that a loss 25 had just appeared and offered nothing else, it 61 1 was difficult to begin to find a place to start 2 any analysis." 3 You go on at 85: 4 "I can't specifically recall the steps 5 I would have taken but if the subpostmaster 6 could provide any relevant information about the 7 loss being as a result of a particular product, 8 or transaction, then I feel that some analysis 9 would have to be done in the area named." 10 Then at 86: 11 "In regard to analysis, I always viewed that 12 my personal role was not to provide intricate 13 analysis of systems and usually I would ask 14 someone better qualified, perhaps 15 a representative of a particular product within 16 the National Business Support Centre, a POL 17 security analyst, or on occasions Fujitsu 18 representative to perform analysis." 19 Should we take it from the paragraphs here 20 that, unless a subpostmaster could pinpoint 21 a loss being down to a particular product or 22 transaction, then, as a matter of practice, you 23 would not request data or analysis of data from 24 Fujitsu as part of your investigation? 25 A. I don't think that I would have, at the time. 62 1 Q. Also, in general terms, is it right that you 2 would only carry out fairly basic analysis of 3 data produced by Horizon, such as comparing cash 4 on hand figures to previous cash accounts or 5 declarations? 6 A. I would. 7 Q. You say at paragraph 88 of your statement that: 8 "... early on after Horizon was introduced 9 [you] had to send away for Horizon information 10 ..." 11 What kind of information are you referring 12 to here? 13 A. I recall, just sending away for more detailed 14 analysis of Horizon, I think on specific 15 datasets and things like that. It depended what 16 was -- what I was looking into at the time. As 17 I say, my role was to gather evidence, so 18 I thought, you know, if someone had said in 19 interview that there was the -- the loss stemmed 20 from Post Office card account, or whatever, 21 I would -- you know, I would sort of follow that 22 trail and say "Right, well, we need to have 23 a look at Post Office card account, you know, 24 what did you -- what specifically are you 25 looking at?" and then send away for that 63 1 information and see if there were any anomalies 2 that would -- you know, support a line of 3 inquiry. 4 Q. In the context of paragraph 88 here, you say 5 that that changed in that you, at some point, 6 gained remote access to Horizon information via 7 a portal on your computers, where information 8 could be downloaded directly to you. 9 A. Yes. We could examine cash accounts. I can't 10 recall whether -- how up to date they were. 11 They might have been a week behind, or something 12 like that, but I do recall being able to 13 certainly have a look at cash accounts, through 14 this portal on our laptops. 15 Q. Just to be clear, by remote access, do you mean 16 that you could download and view data, rather 17 than alter that data in any way? 18 A. Yes, I -- it was just viewing what had already 19 been put on the system. 20 Q. In respect of ARQ requests, you deal with this 21 at paragraphs 90 and 91 of your statement -- 22 over the page, please, to page 23. Should the 23 Chair understand from these paragraphs -- and 24 perhaps we'll read those out. Paragraph 90: 25 "I cannot recall arrangements between POL 64 1 and Fujitsu in respect of the provision of ARQ 2 requests, though I do not feel that they were 3 provided as a matter of course for losses 4 attributed to an unexplained Horizon shortage. 5 I vaguely recall also that Fujitsu may have 6 charged POL for provision of some ARQ 7 information after a certain number of requests, 8 however I don't not recall what the number of 9 requests before that cost began. Also, I don't 10 recall that I ever consciously considered this 11 in any ARQ request that I might have made." 12 At 91: 13 "I recall that ARQ data might be required if 14 a case was committed for trial following a 'not 15 guilty' plea at Magistrates Court. It may have 16 been requested at this stage perhaps by the 17 reviewing lawyer in their advice. If this ARQ 18 data was part of the evidence then I feel that 19 it would be disclosed to the subpostmaster's 20 legal team at the relevant point prior to the 21 trial as part of the evidence." 22 Should the Chair understand from this that, 23 generally speaking, ARQ data would not be sought 24 as part of an investigation, but might be if 25 a case was committed to trial following a not 65 1 guilty plea? 2 A. In the main, yes. I don't think exclusively so, 3 and I can only speak from the investigations 4 that I did. Specifically if you were looking -- 5 if an Investigator, potentially, was looking at 6 an office for -- that they suspected of doing 7 certain things, before an interview took place, 8 they may want to get some information so they 9 could have sent away for those ARQs. 10 I would say that, in the main, though, it -- 11 that sort of information would generally wait 12 until we had to put together a committal file 13 and rely on the evidence and then, obviously, 14 the -- any evidence that we relied upon would be 15 disclosed to the defence. 16 Q. At paragraph 92, you say this: 17 "That said I feel that in investigating 18 cases, if it sufficed, I often would be 19 satisfied with a 'catch-all' statement to say 20 that the Horizon system was in good working 21 order at the time and did not throw up 22 anomalies. If then directed to obtain something 23 in more detail by Legal Services I would go 24 ahead and obtain whatever they had requested." 25 Who would provide this kind of catch-all 66 1 statement and in what context? 2 A. I recall it was always someone within Fujitsu. 3 I think the person changed throughout the time 4 and, as I say, from my point of view, I was 5 an Investigator, I was gathering the evidence. 6 I -- against the backdrop of believing that 7 Horizon was robust anyway, so I would make the 8 request to -- I think through a single point of 9 contact within our organisation, I would make 10 the request to Fujitsu and they would provide 11 what I've termed a "catch-all" statement, which 12 is a statement to say that the Horizon system at 13 a particular office appears to be in good 14 working order and there's no reason that it 15 should throw up anomalies. 16 That sort of -- that's the sort of -- it 17 wasn't for me to request that statement. It was 18 for them to give me that statement, you know. 19 Q. In cases where you obtained a catch-all 20 statement, did this mean that no case-specific 21 analysis of the available data was conducted by 22 anyone from Fujitsu? 23 A. I don't know what Fujitsu did to produce the 24 statement. As I say, I would ask that in the 25 first instance, in putting together a file 67 1 potentially for a committal -- putting together 2 a committal file. As I say, if that had been 3 reviewed by the reviewing lawyer or by counsel, 4 and they felt that it wasn't specifically what 5 they wanted, in how they were going to run the 6 case, then they would come back to me and 7 I would make the request for a statement to -- 8 if a statement could be obtained, to say 9 whatever was required. 10 Q. You say at paragraph 93 that you recall Andy 11 Dunks being someone that was called upon to 12 assist in prosecutions; is that right? 13 A. Do, I recall Andy Dunks and I think since 14 writing this statement I do recall Penny Thomas, 15 I think, may have been someone else. 16 Q. I'd like to turn, please, to your involvement in 17 the prosecution of David Blakey. You drew the 18 distinction in your witness statement to the 19 Inquiry between the shortfall cases where 20 someone could provide relevant information about 21 the loss as a result of something particular, 22 a particular product or transaction, in which 23 case you might have done some further analysis, 24 and cases where someone was only able to say 25 that a loss appeared, and they could not explain 68 1 it, in which case you would not, generally 2 speaking. 3 David Blakey's case was one where he could 4 not explain how the loss had appeared, wasn't 5 it? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. Do you remember Mr Blakey and his case now? 8 A. From reviewing the documentation, I've certainly 9 got an understanding of it. In regards to the 10 events, I do recall attending Riby Square post 11 office in Grimsby. I recall certain aspects of 12 it but certainly not a full narrative of every 13 aspect of it. 14 Q. You deal with your involvement in this case 15 starting at paragraph 124 of your statement to 16 the Inquiry. Do feel free to refer to that 17 statement, if you need to. You first became 18 aware of the case on 13 May 2004, on the day 19 an audit was conducted at the Riby Square 20 branch; is that right? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. Am I pronouncing that branch correctly? 23 A. I've always known it as Riby Square, yes. 24 Q. You've set out the circumstances in which this 25 case was allocated to you in the offender report 69 1 you authored, dated 25 May 2004. Could we have 2 that on screen, please. The reference is 3 POL00044818. Turning to page 6 of that 4 document, please, and scrolling down, we can see 5 your name at the bottom of the report. Going 6 back to page 2 of the document, please, we see 7 the subpostmaster's name, Gillian Blakey. That 8 was Mr Blakey's wife -- 9 A. That's correct. 10 Q. -- and the date you wrote the report little 11 further down, 25 May 2004. In terms of the 12 circumstances leading up to your involvement, 13 you said this: 14 "On 13 May 2004, members of the Audit Team 15 attended Riby Square SPSO Grimsby FAD Code: 16 202/311. The Audit Team gained entry to the 17 office at approximately 0820 hours. At this 18 time Gillian Blakey, the subpostmaster and 19 person named in the second preamble to the 20 report, was asked to produce all cash stock and 21 vouchers proper to the audit. 22 "As the Audit Team were awaiting the opening 23 of the office safe, David Blakey, Gillian 24 Blakey's husband, and offender named in the 25 first preamble to this report, attended and 70 1 spoke to all three members of the Audit Team. 2 At this time he informed them that there would 3 be a shortage of cash in the post office of some 4 £60,000. He said that this was due to cash 5 going missing from the office over the last few 6 months. 7 "Glen Morris then asked Mr Blakey to write 8 and sign a brief statement outlining what he had 9 just told them. The members of the Audit Team 10 then contacted their management, relayed the 11 information of the morning to that point and 12 continued with the audit." 13 Just pausing there, did it concern you to 14 find that the auditor had, on the spot, asked 15 Mr Blakey to write up and sign a statement. 16 A. It didn't concern me. I'm not an auditor and 17 never have been an auditor but I think I recall 18 that being their standard procedure. If 19 a disclosure was made in relation to the one 20 such as Mr Blakey was making, I believe that 21 their instruction was to write that down and get 22 the person making the disclosure to them to 23 sign, to say as much. 24 Q. So it was practice to seek a signed account from 25 someone before they'd had the opportunity to 71 1 consider the position or take legal advice? 2 A. It was not something that we'd asked -- 3 specifically asked anybody to do, as far as 4 I recall. I don't. But it was something that 5 auditors did. 6 Q. The auditors aren't trained, are they, in the 7 conduct of criminal investigations? 8 A. The auditors are auditors. 9 Q. So the safeguards of an interview aren't present 10 in those circumstances, are they? 11 A. No, but I wouldn't say that it was an interview. 12 In respect of that, whatever the auditors took 13 would then be taken into the interview where 14 Mr -- in this case, Mr Blakey would have had the 15 provisions of the caution and the provisions of 16 having a solicitor present if they wished to. 17 So, at that stage, it was -- you know, it 18 was just a piece of paper that had been written, 19 albeit an important piece of paper. It became 20 obviously more important when introduced into 21 evidence and discussed after the caution. 22 Q. What were you told about the circumstances in 23 which this note came to be written? 24 A. Just what was reported in the report. I say, 25 I don't recall specifically but I don't doubt 72 1 what was written in the report at the time, that 2 it appears the auditors asked for all cash and 3 stock to be produced, which was something they 4 would normally do, and, at that time, Mr Blakey 5 offered his disclosure that the cash-on-hand 6 figure had been inflated and he'd been doing 7 that, he'd been inflating the cash-on-hand for 8 some time. 9 Q. It may or may not be relevant for Mr Blakey's 10 case but did you ever give any consideration to 11 the possibility that an auditor may have done or 12 said something that made a written signed note 13 unreliable and, potentially, a subsequent 14 interview based on that note unreliable? 15 A. Potentially, that could be the case, certainly 16 but, again, that, as I've said, you know, 17 before, my job is to gather the evidence. 18 Certainly, I would view that as a strong piece 19 of evidence and if that piece of evidence was to 20 be tested down the line in court as any piece of 21 evidence would be. That's fair enough, and it 22 would be for the court to decide whether, you 23 know, whether that evidence met the test. 24 So if the auditor had been called to court 25 and asked certain questions, then it may have 73 1 made that unreliable but, at that stage with the 2 knowledge that I had at the time, as 3 an Investigator, I felt that I -- it was 4 reasonable for me to include that piece of -- 5 that -- Mr Blakey's statement, as it were, 6 within the interview and, as I said, put it 7 forward in my investigation and see where it 8 led. 9 Q. Can you recall who it was who called you about 10 the situation? So you say, in the next 11 paragraph: 12 "The same morning I received a telephone 13 [I assume that's a telephone call] apprising me 14 of the situation and, along with Helen Dickinson 15 of this Department, I attended the office." 16 Do you remember who called you? 17 A. I don't specifically remember who called me at 18 this time. It would more than likely have been 19 either my team leader at the time or it could 20 have been the auditor themselves, because 21 often -- because we worked quite closely with 22 certain Audit Teams, particularly at that time 23 in 2004. Sometimes you would get a call and 24 say, "Oh, you know, we've just turned up at 25 a certain office and this has happened", and 74 1 they would just let you know the circumstances. 2 Q. Do you recall what they told you about what had 3 happened that morning? 4 A. I don't specifically recall what they said but, 5 as I say, I don't doubt what's written in the 6 report there. 7 Q. What happened when you arrived at the branch? 8 Do feel free to refer to your report or your 9 statement, as you wish. 10 A. Well, again, I can speak in general terms. What 11 would normally happen, I'd speak -- I'd go to 12 the office, I would perhaps speak to the auditor 13 to see if anything had altered, you know, if the 14 money had been found or anything else had -- you 15 know, if somebody else had come forward and 16 offered a different account. 17 According to the report here, I asked Glen 18 Morris that when I turned up, Glen Morris being 19 the auditor. He told me that nothing had 20 changed but they were close to reaching a final 21 figure, which indeed backed up what Mr Blakey 22 had said to him. And, at that time, it appeared 23 Mr Morris handed me the statement written by 24 Mr Blakey. 25 Q. What documents did you consider before you 75 1 interviewed Mr Blakey? 2 A. It would have been the -- well, certainly the 3 statement he gave to the auditors, it would have 4 been cash accounts that were on hand at the 5 office for previous weeks and anything that the 6 auditors felt relevant, you know, overnight cash 7 holdings, evidence of that, those sort of 8 things. 9 Q. So no attempt was made at that stage to check 10 the audit trail with Fujitsu, as opposed to look 11 at the paperwork which was available in branch? 12 A. No, this would have been -- we were very much 13 encouraged to undertake an early interview and 14 I would imagine that -- well, it was not unusual 15 to attend an office, have a quick briefing from 16 the auditor and be in an interview as soon as 17 possible, and sometimes that could be as little 18 as an hour after you turned up at the sub post 19 office. So there was certainly no time at that 20 point to make any substantive enquiries beyond 21 what was immediately to hand at the audit. 22 As I say, we were very much encouraged to 23 perform early interviews. 24 Q. Indeed, you interviewed Mr Blakey on the same 25 day as the audit, with the interviewing 76 1 commencing at 1308 hours, that's the time on the 2 record of taped interview, and the interview 3 took place onsite at the branch, didn't it? 4 A. Yes, I believe so. 5 Q. We have a record of the tape recorded interview, 6 which is in two parts. The first half of the 7 interview lasted 42 minutes, according to that 8 record, and recommenced for a further 9 32 minutes. Can we have on screen, please, the 10 record of the first part of the interview, that 11 reference is POL00044830. We can see from this 12 record that you are listed as the interviewing 13 officer and also Helen Dickinson as second 14 interviewer. 15 Looking towards the bottom of the first 16 page, please, it appears here "PW", three lines 17 up, that you cautioned Mr Blakey at the outset 18 of the interview. 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. Going over the page, please, looking down that 21 page, you went through Mr Blakey's legal rights 22 with him? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. Going over to page 3, please, and looking at 25 that page, what was Mr Blakey's decision on 77 1 whether to have a solicitor present? 2 A. I think he actually says, "No, I'm fine 3 honestly". 4 Q. Page 4, please, towards the top, what was his 5 decision on whether to have a friend present? 6 A. He declined the officer of a friend to attend 7 the interview. 8 Q. This was the first time he was being told that 9 he was the subject of a criminal 10 investigation -- 11 A. Mm-hm. 12 Q. -- by the Post Office. Several hours after the 13 audit had commenced and he was required, wasn't 14 he, to take a decision on whether to have 15 a solicitor present pretty much on the spot, 16 wasn't he? 17 A. Well, it was explained to him that he could have 18 a solicitor present, if he wished. So ... 19 Q. What would the alternative have been to the 20 interview going ahead then, immediately? 21 A. If Mr Blakey had decided that he wanted 22 a solicitor present and he expressed that to us, 23 we would have halted the interview at that point 24 until such a time as he'd taken legal advice, at 25 which point, you know, a decision would be then 78 1 made whether we could continue after having that 2 legal advice, or wait until a time when 3 a solicitor came over, or rescheduled to another 4 time. 5 Q. Do you recognise that the situation Mr Blakey 6 found himself in was a difficult one, being 7 criminally interviewed by his employer, that he 8 might have felt under pressure to just press on 9 and explain the situation as best he could? 10 A. I recognise that being interviewed for 11 a criminal offence is potentially very 12 distressing -- I do -- and difficult. However, 13 I would suggest that, you know, the alternative 14 would be, you know, should Mr Blakey have 15 committed an offence anywhere else, you know, 16 potentially, he could have been taken to the 17 police station, booked into custody, and 18 interviewed there. 19 So it's never -- you know, it's never 20 anything other than a distressing situation. 21 What I would say is that Mr Blakey was 22 interviewed at his premises, he was interviewed 23 in a room where people that he knew were the 24 other side of the wall and he was given, you 25 know, every right that he should have been 79 1 given, and, as I've said before, I do understand 2 that it is very, very distressing, but I was 3 there to investigate a criminal offence. 4 I had reasonable grounds to suspect 5 Mr Blakey of committing that offence and, 6 therefore, I think I'd reasonable grounds to 7 interview him. As I say, the Post Office 8 require -- well, requested that we interview as 9 early as possible, and Mr Blakey could have said 10 that "I don't want that to happen now". 11 And I would have -- if he had said that, 12 I would have postponed it. However, he didn't 13 so the interview carried on. 14 Q. Going back to the record of interview, the 15 majority of this page on screen is a record of 16 the account given by Mr Blakey about the 17 background to the audit. He explains that, 18 although his wife was the subpostmistress, he 19 would attend the office every day after he 20 finishes work and helped out by doing the 21 cut-off and by balancing the office on 22 a Wednesday. 23 About halfway down the page, Mr Blakey 24 explained that he always entered the figures 25 onto Horizon and produced the office cash 80 1 account. Then he, at 10.38, covered the 2 circumstances surrounding the audit that 3 morning, including him telling auditors that 4 they were going to find a discrepancy. 5 Then at 11.36 minutes you raise the written 6 account requested from Mr Blakey by the 7 auditors, and you got him to read that out. So 8 starting at the bottom of the page, he says: 9 "Yes this is the one ... About three months 10 ago money started to go missing I covered this 11 up hoping to replace it. My wife had been ill 12 ... I can go into more detail about that later 13 on if you wish ... I've got an appointment with 14 the bank manager next week I was hopefully going 15 to take out a loan to replace it, where or how 16 the money's gone I don't know. I was hoping 17 there was an error but it does not appear to be 18 the case. And I wrote that briefly this morning 19 while I was still shaking." 20 So straightaway in the note Mr Blakey had 21 written for the auditors, he was saying that the 22 money had been going missing for about three 23 months, that where or how the money had gone, he 24 didn't know; that's right, isn't it? 25 A. Yes. 81 1 Q. At 12.55, further down the page, please, there 2 is a summary here of what Mr Blakey was saying. 3 So, given this is not a transcript of interview, 4 it's a record, some bits are word for word and 5 some bits are paraphrased. 6 At 15.05 you ask where Mr Blakey thinks the 7 money has gone, and he says: 8 "I honestly don't know. Goodness knows ... 9 I wish I did." 10 You ask if he thinks it is a member of staff 11 stealing. He says no, he trusts them 100 per 12 cent. 13 You ask if it was errors from his staff's 14 incompetence. He says this is a possibility. 15 Then, at the bottom of the page: 16 "I can't really see where the hell it's 17 gone." 18 Over the page, please, there is some 19 discussion of Mr Blakey's attempts to speak to 20 the bank to get a loan to repay the money. At 21 17.30, we have you summarising what Mr Blakey 22 had told you and noting his reluctance to point 23 the finger at members of staff. 24 Then at 17.40 you say this: 25 "I don't think you're telling me the truth 82 1 there, are you, David?" 2 He says: 3 "Well ... 4 "PW: I don't think you're telling me the 5 truth. 6 "DB: It's time ago, to be honest with you 7 ... 8 "PW: Not particularly about that. You know 9 where the money's gone because you've been 10 taking it, haven't you, David?" 11 Mr Blakey says: 12 "No way. Honestly, as God is my witness, 13 no, not a chance." 14 What was the basis for you accusing 15 Mr Blakey of taking the money at this stage? 16 A. I think probably at that stage because Mr Blakey 17 was the one who'd been doing the accounts, he'd 18 admitted covering the shortage up, I think. He 19 didn't offer anything in regard to any of his 20 members of staff, and what he was saying to me 21 at that time -- obviously, now is different -- 22 but, at that time, I thought the system was 23 robust. I thought we were looking at a large 24 amount of loss and what he said to me didn't 25 ring true. 83 1 And, to be perfectly honest, sometimes when 2 you are interviewing people, a phrase such as 3 that, "I don't think you're telling me the 4 truth", would often sort of focus the person's 5 mind that, you know, it was an interview where 6 accounts would be challenged. And, sometimes, 7 in past interviews, having said that, some 8 people would open up. Some people wouldn't but 9 some people would open up, and the interview 10 would go in a different direction. 11 Q. Was there anything other than the Horizon data 12 that suggested money was stolen by Mr Blakey? 13 A. Well, it was the audit report. It wasn't 14 specifically the Horizon data. I trusted the 15 Horizon data. At that point in 2004, I think 16 Horizon had just rolled out fully across the 17 Post Office Limited estate and, as far as we 18 were told, as far as we knew, as far as we 19 accepted, the Horizon system was a system that 20 was infallible, as it were. So I took the audit 21 report that there was that amount of money gone. 22 So I trusted that. 23 Q. The audit report was confirming a difference, 24 wasn't it, between what was actually there -- 25 A. Yeah. 84 1 Q. -- and what the Horizon reports were saying -- 2 A. Yeah. 3 Q. -- should be there? 4 In circumstances where the only basis for 5 there being a loss was that Horizon data, did 6 you consider looking at the detail of the data 7 over the last three months to analyse how the 8 losses had built up to the audit figure before 9 accusing Mr Blakey of theft? 10 A. I wouldn't have done that in this occasion, no. 11 But, as I say, this was very, very much at the 12 start of Horizon. Well, in answer to your 13 question, no. No, I wouldn't. 14 Q. You go on: 15 "So you're saying that £60,000 has gone in 16 a matter of months and you've not drawn it to 17 the attention of anyone, not even your wife? 18 "DB: No, that's [not] true. 19 You say: 20 "That's not true, you don't run a business 21 like that David ..." 22 So Mr Blakey maintains his denial that he's 23 taken any money. There's some discussion of the 24 cash-on-hand figure and, going over the page, 25 please, slightly further down the page, there's 85 1 some discussion of the figures, and you ask why 2 the figures have been steadily climbing and why 3 he's not drawn that to anybody's attention. He 4 says: 5 "That's my mistake." 6 Then at the bottom of the page, you say 7 this: 8 "I can that you've probably got your wife's 9 welfare at heart. But the size of the in 10 respect of this. You can't expect me to believe 11 that you didn't know or you didn't do something 12 about it. If it's not you ... if it's not you 13 that's doing it you've got no reason to shield 14 anybody from it. I can understand for health 15 reasons your wife. But you can't shield this 16 from your staff because if it's not you stealing 17 and you don't suspect your wife. Then it's got 18 to be your staff's incompetence or it's got to 19 be your staff's dishonesty and I can't believe 20 that you haven't got them together before this 21 point before now and if it hasn't been you and 22 you've not said to them, "Look we're losing 23 money at this Post Office, one of you is at it", 24 or, "You are all incompetent", or something in 25 that respect so that just doesn't ring true." 86 1 He says: 2 "You're right I know." 3 Further down the page, you suggest, and this 4 is PW, a little way down from 27.40: 5 "Is it something that your wife doesn't know 6 about? I mean we turn up on a Thursday morning 7 to lots of places, sub post offices, and the 8 stories we've heard you wouldn't believe a lot 9 of them. But I know people get into trouble 10 with various things ... with gambling ..." 11 Mr Blakey says: 12 "Oh no." 13 What was the basis for your suggestion that 14 Mr Blakey was stealing to cover up gambling? 15 A. As I've said there, there's any number of 16 reasons that someone steals, gambling being one 17 of them. And, even at that point, I was 18 probably five years into my Post Office Limited 19 career, I'd heard any number of reasons why 20 people had stolen money, and that's not in 21 Horizon losses, or anything like that. It's 22 just, you know, people's motives for stealing 23 are very wide and very varied. 24 Certainly, with gambling being one of them, 25 with debts in private side of shops. Everything 87 1 I put to Mr Blakey as a challenge, as it were, 2 or as an attempt to potentially for him to open 3 up to me about this loss that he said he'd got 4 no idea about, was based in other cases that I'd 5 done or other cases that I'd heard about, and 6 motives that people had given me and others in 7 the past. 8 Q. You go on: 9 "... Things that their wives or their 10 husbands don't know about ... secret lives, 11 secret mistresses ..." 12 Then Mr Blakey laughs at this suggestion. 13 Mr Blakey had spent a good deal of the interview 14 to this point talking about his concerns for his 15 wife's health. What basis did you have for 16 suggesting Mr Blakey was having an affair? 17 A. I was putting out suggestions there and what's 18 missing from this is nuance, in regard to the 19 interview. It's in black and white there. As 20 you can see there, Mr Blakey laughs. I don't 21 know in what context, in what way it was 22 delivered, other than it being in black and 23 white on there. But, again, in the past, I'd 24 interviewed people and -- interviewed people 25 where this had been a motive for stealing 88 1 because they'd got a secret life. 2 So I was putting it there as an option. 3 I was challenging his account, because his 4 account, to that point, was simply that "I don't 5 know where it's gone", and that nobody knew 6 about it other than him. 7 Q. The next section is not a word-for-word attempt 8 at transcription but is paraphrased and it's you 9 warning Mr Blakey that it's not only you and 10 Ms Dickinson that he had to convince, and that 11 the court could draw its own inference if the 12 matter goes that far. What was the reason for 13 saying this to Mr Blakey? 14 A. I suppose it was a reminder of the caution, that 15 I'd spent -- what time was it there -- half 16 an hour speaking with Mr Blakey. As I said, at 17 that point, it's safe to say that I didn't 18 believe what he'd told me. And, as I say, it's, 19 in effect, me reaffirming the caution to him, 20 that, you know, it's quite happy for him to give 21 those answers to me but, ultimately, if it does 22 go that far, somewhere down the line, you know, 23 a court can draw an inference. 24 Q. You say: 25 "If you're quite happy to sit there and say 89 1 that you've not stolen the money but you've 2 covered up for it knowing full well that it's 3 going missing. You've not said anything to 4 anybody, and you're quite happy to stick to that 5 story." 6 Mr Blakey says: 7 "I am quite happy to stick to that. That is 8 the truth." 9 Mr Blakey consistently resisted the 10 suggestion he was lying throughout the 11 interview, didn't he? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. Over the page, please, to page 10 of this 14 document. At 38.34, we have this: 15 "PW goes through who can be ruled out of the 16 equation, and states to DB that his wife cannot 17 be ruled out at this stage. PW states that he 18 feels the discrepancies are down to dishonesty, 19 and that to be thorough he may have to see all 20 members of staff including DB's wife. However 21 PW states that he feels that this can be avoided 22 as he feels that DB has something he may wish to 23 tell PW." 24 Mr Blakey says: "No". 25 Was this is an attempt to put pressure on 90 1 Mr Blakey to say he had taken the money to avoid 2 you speaking to his wife? 3 A. I think at that stage, as I say, I didn't 4 believe what Mr Blakey was telling me, and let 5 me state now, obviously that was a thought at 6 the time. You know, in knowing what I know now, 7 you know, absolutely and rightly so, Mr Blakey's 8 conviction has been overturned. 9 However, at that time, I didn't believe him. 10 I could tell that he cared about his wife and, 11 again, I just thought I'd give him 12 an opportunity to tell me, because I thought 13 he'd stolen the money, I did think he'd stolen 14 the money. So I thought I'd give him 15 an opportunity, a last opportunity, I suppose, 16 if you like, if he wanted to consider that. 17 Q. Towards the bottom of this page, please, 18 Mr Blakey accepts what you put to him about the 19 cash account. You say: 20 "So this account is a false account? 21 He says: 22 "It is." 23 So, at this stage, you had an admission of 24 a false account but on the basis that Mr Blakey 25 was experiencing unexplained discrepancies, from 91 1 what he was saying. 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. Were you conscious, at the time of the 4 interview, that without an admission of theft, 5 theft, in this case, would be hard to prove? 6 A. I think that's safe to say, yes. Yeah, yeah. 7 Q. Did that inform your approach to the interview 8 in any way? 9 A. Well, I think it's -- from an investigations 10 point of view, rightly or wrongly, you probably 11 always feel a little bit better if you get 12 an admission on tape under caution, because 13 obviously that -- the evidence of that is pretty 14 compelling evidence. 15 So yes, I mean an admission of theft would 16 have -- from the Post Office's point of view, 17 wouldn't have hurt. 18 Q. Could we have back on screen, please, 19 Mr Whitaker's report of 25 May 2004. The 20 reference is POL00044818. It's page 5 of that 21 document, please. You deal on this page with 22 the further steps that you took after 23 interviewing Mr Blakey. In summary, is it fair 24 to say that the further steps in the 25 investigation consisted of interviewing 92 1 Mrs Blakey, two members of Mr Blakey's staff, 2 Mr Blakey's mother, who helped out with the 3 private side of the business, and a recently 4 retired member of staff. Do take a moment to 5 look down that page if you need to, we can 6 scroll down. 7 A. As I say, I don't recall but, if that's what the 8 report says, I've got no reason to doubt that. 9 Q. In addition, you started making enquiries to see 10 whether Mr Blakey was attempting to get a loan, 11 so going over to the top of the next page, 12 please. So this is the penultimate paragraph 13 here. You were making enquiries with the Royal 14 Bank of Scotland to establish the Blakeys' 15 financial position and if David Blakey had 16 approached them for a loan, and you were also 17 seeking to establish whether Mr Blakey had been 18 made redundant. 19 In terms of the members of staff you 20 interviewed, it's right, isn't it, that none of 21 them could shed any light on where the money had 22 gone? 23 A. I don't recall that they did, no. 24 Q. In terms of Mrs Blakey, we have a summary of key 25 points from her interview, rather than a fuller 93 1 record of tape recorded interview. Could we 2 have that summary on screen, please. It's 3 POL00044829. This is a one-page summary of 4 an interview which, scrolling down to the 5 bottom, please, appears to have taken nearly 6 42 minutes; is that right? 7 A. That looks to be right, yeah. 8 Q. One of the points recorded at 22.54 is 9 summarised in this way: 10 "GB states that David has never approached 11 her to tell her of money missing, and she was 12 under the impression that the office was having 13 some superb balances. One thing that did 14 surprise her was one week when the office got 15 around £1,000 back from a giro error but upon 16 checking the account it showed a nice balance." 17 Then at 24.50: 18 "GB states that she does worry when the 19 office receives large error notices." 20 Just pausing there, did you understand what 21 she was referring to by "error notices", at that 22 time? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. Then at 29 minutes: 25 "GB states that she doesn't think David has 94 1 stolen the money as she feels that she would 2 have seen £60,000 added to their lifestyle." 3 Do you recall now these issues being 4 discussed in the interview? 5 A. I don't recall, I don't recall the interview at 6 all but, as I say, I've got no reason to 7 question what's been written on the document 8 there. 9 Q. Mrs Blakey has given a witness statement to the 10 Inquiry and in it she covers her interview with 11 you. Could we have Mrs Blakey's statement on 12 screen, please. The reference is WITN02310100. 13 Page 8 of that document, please, starting at 14 paragraph 39. She says: 15 "I was interviewed the same day, straight 16 after my husband's interview. Mr Whitaker first 17 asked me how I was doing, whether I was all 18 right. I told him that I was okay, but in fact 19 I was miserable. He then asked if I thought my 20 husband had stolen the money. I told him, 21 emphatically, that David had not stolen 22 anything." 23 Then at 40: 24 "Mr Whitaker suggested that David may have 25 had a secret life, and that he may have been 95 1 gambling, and suggested that he may have been 2 unfaithful. I did not process the suggestion at 3 the time, as I was simply despairing. David has 4 since told me that Mr Whitaker had suggested to 5 him that he had been having an affair." 6 Do you recall making that suggestion to 7 Mrs Blakey? It may follow from your earlier 8 answers that you don't. 9 A. Again, I don't recall, but there was evidence 10 certainly that I've said it to Mr Blakey, and 11 I don't recall, in Mrs Blakey's -- the document 12 that showed Mrs Blakey's interview, whether it's 13 in there. But, you know, based on what's been 14 said, I've got no reason to doubt that some 15 enquiries were made along that line. 16 Clumsily, and not very good, and if it 17 helps, I apologise for that now. But I'm sure 18 it doesn't help but, as I say, based on my role 19 there and what I was there to do, Mrs Blakey had 20 been employed by Post Office Limited to 21 safeguard public money. The evidence available 22 to me at that time suggested that over £60,000 23 of that money was no longer there. The replies 24 that I were getting that -- you know, it may 25 have been staff it may not have been staff. So 96 1 I tried to follow those -- I tried to follow 2 that evidence. 3 But, essentially, it was Mr and Mrs Blakey 4 who were the figure heads and the ones that 5 ultimately ran that office and, essentially, 6 they were the ones that, if it had have been 7 a member of their staff, as Mr Blakey was doing 8 the accounts, it perhaps would have been known 9 to him. So the only -- the only avenue that 10 I could go down was that it was either Mr Blakey 11 or Mrs Blakey, or them together, that's how 12 I felt, and, as I say, Mr Blakey very resolutely 13 and very rightly said -- denied it all the way 14 along, as did Mrs Blakey. So, essentially, 15 that's where the investigation went. 16 But to explain a little bit, my view was 17 that, or how I tried to approach these sort of 18 losses or losses within the Post Office, or -- 19 is that, you know, £60,000 in this case was 20 a lot of money, and somebody has to actually 21 physically take that out from the Post Office 22 drawer, presumably secrete it somewhere, get it 23 out of the building, and then use it. 24 So I always tried to have that at the back 25 of my mind, and I think I've talked in my 97 1 statement about means, motive and opportunity. 2 Certainly, the means and the opportunity were 3 there for Mr and Mrs Blakey and, again, I had to 4 explore a motive. 5 As I've said, just said, very, very clumsily 6 and regrettably now, and I hope that I wouldn't 7 do that now, but at the time, I did, which 8 I apologise for. 9 Q. At paragraph 41, Mrs Blakey says this: 10 "I asked Mr Whitaker it could be any 11 problems in Horizon, or computer error. He gave 12 me a long, surprised, look, and simply said 13 'no'. Mr Whitaker told me that 'no, someone has 14 stolen it'." 15 Do you recall Mrs Blakey asking whether 16 there could be any problems in Horizon or 17 computer error? 18 A. I don't recall that at all but I've got no 19 reason to suggest that she didn't and my reply 20 from that would be consistent, as I say, from 21 the line that I was told within Post Office 22 Limited, that the system was not at fault and 23 was never at fault. 24 Q. Did it occur to you at any point that there 25 might not be a real loss in this case? 98 1 A. I would say at that time, definitely not and 2 that's based on, as I say, the line that was 3 given to us that Horizon was not -- was 4 certainly without fault. Sorry. 5 Q. Did you, at any stage in your investigation, 6 request more detailed audit data from Fujitsu or 7 ask Fujitsu to investigate to get a clearer 8 picture of how the final apparent shortfall 9 figure had been reached? 10 A. I can't recall. I don't think I would have done 11 because, as I mentioned in my statement, as 12 well, we were encouraged to get an early 13 interview, and, going back to compliance, one of 14 the things that very, very soon after 15 an interview, we were expected to get a file in, 16 and that was for an early -- for early advice. 17 Quite often, you know, that could be stalled 18 if you had investigations, probably like this -- 19 where you had to go out and speak to witnesses. 20 But I would imagine that I would have got the 21 file in very, very quickly and then waited for 22 any advice to come back from the Legal Services. 23 And if nothing came back from the Legal 24 Services, with regard to obtaining any other 25 information or to pursue any other lines of 99 1 inquiry, I don't think I would have. 2 Q. Do you accept that it was a reasonable line of 3 inquiry in this case to look more closely at the 4 audit data? 5 A. In hindsight, absolutely. At the time, I would 6 say no. Again, the audit data -- I trusted the 7 Audit Team. They were professionals. I got 8 a statement from the Audit Team, I seem to 9 recall, like I normally would, producing the 10 audit and saying that the audit was -- you know, 11 the results of the audit were as they were. 12 So as regards the auditors, again, as I say, 13 my role was to gather evidence. I wasn't 14 an auditor, so I spoke to the auditor, I got 15 a statement from the auditor to give me that 16 evidence. And, again, that evidence would have 17 been challenged in court had it got that far and 18 that evidence would have been tested, and the 19 auditor's account would have been tested. 20 But I saw my role as to gather all these 21 different strands of the investigation together 22 and present that, the audit being one of them. 23 And if the auditor has said the audit was fine, 24 I wasn't an auditor, so why would I suggest that 25 it wasn't? 100 1 Q. You say at paragraph 60 of your statement that 2 you were bound by timescales for completion of 3 a case file, and you think it may have been two 4 weeks, or thereabouts, from interview to the 5 expected date that the file was submitted for 6 charging advice. Did this, whether in relation 7 to Mr Blakey's case or any other case, ever 8 impact upon your decision making in terms of 9 sufficiency of investigation? 10 A. No, because I think, to hit compliance, that was 11 the -- you know, they expected the case to be in 12 under those tight timescales. However, if it 13 was obvious that you had significant enquiries 14 to perform, I think you were given time to do 15 that. Although I'm just trying to recall, it 16 might be that you put the file in anyway and 17 then just listed that you still had other stuff 18 to do. 19 So I just recall that, as I say, in terms of 20 compliance and the importance that was being put 21 on compliance, we had to -- we were encouraged 22 to get the file in within the timescales that 23 they'd said. But there was provision if it ran 24 over, sorry. 25 MS PRICE: Sir, I have five more minutes on 101 1 Mr Blakey's case and I do have several other 2 short topics to cover. I am in your hands as to 3 whether I finish that five minutes before we 4 take the lunch break. 5 I'm sorry, sir, I think you were on mute. 6 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, finish the five minutes. 7 MS PRICE: Thank you, sir. 8 After you sent your report to the Criminal 9 Law Team, it appears that Jarnail Singh provided 10 advice on the case by way of a memo dated 11 23 June 2004. Could we have this on screen, 12 please. The reference is POL00044835. 13 This memo was sent to "S&A Casework", can 14 you explain, please, which team that was? Was 15 it simply the casework team? 16 A. I think it's just the casework. It was whatever 17 it was called at that point, unfortunately. 18 Q. It was copied to you. Was that standard 19 practice that the legal advice would be copied 20 to the Investigator in the case? 21 A. Yes, I think it was. 22 Q. The first paragraph of this reads as follows: 23 "In my opinion there is sufficient evidence 24 to afford a realistic prospect of conviction for 25 Mr Blakey for an offence of theft with a low 102 1 prospect of success and for false accounting 2 with a high prospect of success. Clearly in the 3 absence of any admissions from Mr Blakey for 4 theft of the £64,435.24, then we will need to 5 eliminate the involvement of Mrs Blakey and 6 other members of staff, and they will need to 7 give evidence (if they can do so) to implicate 8 Mr Blakey in the preparation of the inputs of 9 all the daily figures for the Office on the 10 Horizon system and that each week he completes 11 the Office balance and subsequently produces and 12 signs the weekly cash account and the other 13 members of staff do not perform any of the 14 accounting procedures at the Office. This has 15 been accepted by David Blakey. This fact needs 16 to be confirmed in witness statements. The 17 witnesses will need to confirm that they did not 18 steal cash or falsify the accounts. Once we can 19 get these statements, then I would confirm that 20 there would be a good prospect of success to 21 prosecute Mr Blakey for theft. The case will 22 further be strengthened by further enquiries 23 which are in hand in relation to his finances." 24 So based on the evidence to that date, 25 Mr Singh was saying there was a low prospect of 103 1 a theft conviction. In the event, Mr Blakey was 2 prosecuted for theft and six charges of false 3 accounting. What was your role in relation to 4 the prosecution? 5 A. I think that answers something that I was 6 speaking about just now, in that it looks like 7 I got the file in to Mr Singh and he came back 8 and asked for evidence from assistants and 9 I believe, in this case, I went out and took 10 statements from assistants. So I would have got 11 those and submitted them back to Mr Singh, who 12 would have assessed that evidence, based on 13 those witness statements and suggested a theft 14 charge along with the false accounting charges. 15 I think then it was normally up to the 16 investigator to lay the information at court to 17 obtain summons and serve summons, and then after 18 that, if -- once the case was reviewed by 19 counsel, whether there were anything that the -- 20 any further enquiries or any other information 21 that counsel required, it was probably up to the 22 Investigator to obtain that. 23 And then at court, it would have been -- 24 I would have attended court just in a support 25 facility there, to ask -- sorry, to answer any 104 1 questions as required. Obviously, if I was 2 a witness, I'd have to sit outside of the court. 3 So it was just a supporting role, really. 4 Q. You were informed of the outcome of the case by 5 way of a memo dated 24 March 2005. Could we 6 have that on screen, please. The reference is 7 POL00044357. Scrolling down a little, we can 8 see from this document that Mr Blakey pleaded 9 guilty to the six false accounting charges, that 10 is Counts 2 to 7, and the theft charge was left 11 to lie on the file. 12 Going, please, to page 2 of this document 13 towards the bottom, there are some comments: 14 "Although the judge stated that the 15 Defendant will have to repay the £64,000 to the 16 Post Office at some point, no formal order for 17 compensation was made." 18 Over the page, please: 19 "The Defendant was ordered to pay 20 prosecution costs of £1,000 at the rate of £50 21 per month the first payment to be 4 weeks from 22 25 February 2005. 23 "Civil recovery of the outstanding amount 24 should be considered." 25 This memo is signed off by Phil Taylor, 105 1 a legal executive within the Criminal Law 2 Division. 3 You say at paragraph 168 of your statement 4 to the Inquiry that, during prosecution, at 5 an early stage, the Post Office appeared keen to 6 take a plea deal where the false accounting 7 charges were admitted, with the theft charge not 8 being taken forwards. You then suggest at 9 paragraph 169 of your statement that 10 a subpostmaster being convicted of any criminal 11 charge would mean that the Post Office was able 12 to dismiss the subpostmaster and recoup their 13 perceived loss under the subpostmaster's 14 contract without evidence of the robustness of 15 the Horizon system ever being truly tested. 16 Was the prospect of civil recovery a factor 17 which impacted upon decision making on the 18 charges which were pursued in this case, as far 19 as you were aware? 20 A. I can't say it was, as far as I was aware. 21 I made those observations in my statement just 22 from the amount of times that it happened. It 23 seemed to be a regular occurrence but I was 24 never involved in any of the sort of background 25 work with regard to what was accepted, what was 106 1 not accepted, in regard to pleas. 2 But it just seemed to me that it happened 3 lots and lots and lots, and, you know, the Post 4 Office always had the fallback that the 5 a subpostmaster convicted of a criminal charge, 6 you know, they could be dismissed and, again, 7 the extra fallback of, under the terms of the 8 contract, they would be able to recoup losses. 9 Q. You have included, at paragraph 158 of your 10 statement, some reflections on Mr Blakey's case. 11 Is there anything you want to say now about 12 those reflections? 13 A. Well, essentially, what I've said there. 14 I recognise that it must have been extremely 15 distressing for Mr Blakey and his family, for 16 him to hear my dismissal of his now known to be 17 truthful explanation. 18 But, I mean, I go on in the statement to 19 explain why I did some of the things I did in 20 regard to him, particularly in regard to, you 21 know, challenging him and challenging his 22 account. But they were genuinely -- as I've 23 said in my evidence prior to this, they were 24 genuinely reasons that I'd heard before. So 25 again, reflecting on that, perhaps, you know, 107 1 this bias, albeit unconsciously, may have been 2 in play as I investigated the incident and, as 3 I say, I apologise for the way that you were 4 treated. 5 MS PRICE: Sir, those are all the questions I have 6 on Mr Blakey's case. Shall we take lunch at 7 that point? 8 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: We shall but I'll just ask one 9 question, if I may, that's occurred to me. 10 Mr Whitaker, in the memorandum which you 11 were shown a few minutes ago, I think it was 12 from Mr Jarnail Singh -- it may have been 13 Mr Taylor, but I think Mr Jarnail Singh -- there 14 was reference to investigation of Mr Blakey's 15 financial affairs, all right? 16 A. Sir, yes. 17 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: I've assumed that that was 18 because -- well, I've assumed there were two 19 strands to that: (1) to check whether what he 20 had said about applying for a loan was accurate; 21 but, secondly, to see whether there was any 22 possibility of tracing the money which you 23 believed had been stolen? 24 A. Sir, in regard to 2004 when this incident 25 happened, I don't think I would have had an eye 108 1 on the proceeds of crime or anything like that. 2 I think -- I recall that, in his interview, 3 Mr Blakey had said that he'd made attempts to 4 get a bank loan to feed money back into the Post 5 Office to cover the losses, and I believe my 6 investigations with the bank, at that time, 7 would have been solely to examine that line of 8 inquiry. 9 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, well, it wasn't proceeds of 10 crime, so much, I had in mind when I used the 11 word "trace", the best way of proving that 12 Mr Blakey or, for that matter, anybody else had 13 stolen the money is, if you were able to 14 discover some or all of it. So I wondered what, 15 if any, steps you took in order to find the 16 money? Because, as you've correctly observed, 17 £60,000 or thereabouts in 2004 was a very 18 substantial amount of money. 19 A. Yes, sir, quite often, again, speaking 20 historically with regard to a lot of Post Office 21 cases, quite often, it was through business 22 failings, paying staff, things getting on top of 23 people and -- 24 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Sorry to interrupt you. 25 A. Sorry, sir. 109 1 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: I'm not asking about the motive 2 for it, I'm actually talking about investigating 3 where the money had gone, and the possibilities 4 are -- there are a number of them and you 5 mentioned some of them interview. But what 6 I want to know is whether you or anybody else in 7 the investigative team followed up on that and 8 tried to find out where the money, which you 9 believed had been stolen, had actually ended up. 10 A. I think there may have been questions asked of 11 witnesses to see about lifestyle changes, and 12 that sort of thing, but probably beyond that, 13 I'm afraid not, sir. 14 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: All right. Thank you very much. 15 Yeah, we'll take lunch now. What time shall we 16 start again, Ms Price? 17 MS PRICE: I'm looking over at the stenographer, if 18 we were to have 55 minutes, would that be -- if 19 we come back at 2.10, in that case, sir? 20 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: All right, thank you very much. 21 MS PRICE: If my watch is right and it's now 2.15. 22 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: All right. So 2.10, everyone. 23 (1.12 pm) 24 (The Short Adjournment) 25 (2.10 pm) 110 1 MS PRICE: Good afternoon, sir. Can you see and 2 hear us? 3 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, thank you. 4 MS PRICE: Mr Whitaker, moving, please, to your 5 knowledge of the Lee Castleton case. Is it 6 right that you have no independent recollection 7 of this involvement now? 8 A. That's correct. 9 Q. But you've had an opportunity to look at the 10 papers that have been sent to you by the 11 Inquiry -- 12 A. I have. 13 Q. -- and you've addressed this at paragraph 99 of 14 your statement, and the paragraphs on from 15 there. So please do feel free to refer to that 16 statement if you need to. 17 Can you explain, please, having reviewed the 18 documents, how you came to provide advice to 19 Catherine Oglesby in relation to Mr Castleton's 20 case in early 2004? 21 A. As far as I can recall, looking at the 22 documents, Cath Oglesby contacted me for advice. 23 I would imagine she would have explained the 24 situation to me and asked for a view in regard 25 to the case. 111 1 Q. What did she tell you about the case? 2 A. I understood that Mr Castleton had been 3 experiencing losses in his accounts, that he -- 4 he wasn't aware of where they were coming from. 5 He'd contacted her at an early stage and she'd 6 got involved in regard to that and was working 7 with him to understand why these losses had 8 occurred in the accounts of his post office. 9 Q. What advice was she seeking from you? 10 A. I think she was a view whether it would be taken 11 on by the Investigation Team as an investigation 12 case. 13 Q. You say in your statement you felt this was not 14 a matter for criminal investigation. Can you 15 explain why you thought that was the case? 16 A. Well, from how it was explained to me by Cath 17 Oglesby, Mr Castleton had discovered shortages 18 in his account and he wasn't sure where they'd 19 come from. He had sort of spoken to her at 20 a very, very early stage and was looking to work 21 with her to understand why that had happened, 22 and what could be done about it, and 23 essentially, he'd -- he brought the issue to her 24 at a very, very early stage, looking for 25 resolution. 112 1 Q. Did you have any further involvement in the Lee 2 Castleton case after that discussion with 3 Catherine Oglesby? 4 A. Well, I told her that I didn't think I'd was 5 something for the criminal Investigation Team to 6 get involved with and, after that, I don't 7 recall any involvement whatsoever. 8 Q. Turning to your involvement in the criminal 9 prosecution of Allison Henderson, it's right, 10 isn't it, that you were the second interviewer 11 to Christopher Knight in an interview with 12 Ms Henderson which took place on 11 March 2010? 13 A. Yeah, from the records I can say that I was. 14 Q. Again, do you recall that interview now? 15 A. Not specifics of it. I recall going to -- 16 travelling to Norwich and I recall an interview 17 in the -- I think it was in Royal Mail premises 18 in Norwich but the specifics of the interview 19 I don't recall. 20 Q. Is it right that your understanding at the time 21 of the interview, as you say in your statement, 22 was that Mrs Henderson could not explain the 23 loss at her branch but you were not aware of any 24 specific allegations relating to the Horizon 25 system? 113 1 A. From the documents that I've seen, that would be 2 the case, yeah. 3 Q. You were, as far as you're aware, not involved 4 in any decision making in respect of 5 Mrs Henderson's case? 6 A. No, I wasn't. 7 Q. Nor did you have any further involvement? 8 A. I didn't, no. 9 Q. In respect of the criminal prosecution of Alison 10 Hall, you were the second interviewer, again, to 11 Christopher Knight in Mrs Hall's case; is that 12 right? 13 A. According to the records I was, yeah, although 14 I don't specifically recall it. 15 Q. So you don't specifically recall that interview 16 but you've had a chance to look at the documents 17 that have been sent to you about your 18 involvement? 19 A. Yes, similarly, I to a recall travelling to 20 Cleckheaton and an interview at a solicitors 21 office in Cleckheaton but, beyond that, I don't 22 recall. 23 Q. That's the interview that took place on 24 28 September 2010; is that right? 25 A. Yeah. 114 1 Q. You say in your statement that, to the best of 2 your knowledge, you were not aware of any 3 allegations made by Ms Hall about the Horizon 4 system; is that right? 5 A. I don't believe so at the time and, again, I'm 6 just going through the transcripts of the 7 interview and the documents that I've been 8 shown, but, based on that, I don't believe 9 I would be. 10 Q. To the best of your knowledge, were you involved 11 in any decision making in relation to Ms Hall's 12 case? 13 A. No, I wasn't. 14 Q. Did you have any further involvement apart from 15 the interview that you're aware of? 16 A. I think I produced a statement later but it was 17 essentially a production statement, I think, in 18 relation to the interview. 19 Q. Turning, please, to your knowledge of Horizon 20 Issues, you didn't, at least at the time of 21 making your statement, recall any specific 22 dealings with Gareth Jenkins; is that right? 23 A. That's correct, yeah. 24 Q. You have very recently been provided with 25 an email dated 8 March 2010, which was sent by 115 1 Steve Bradshaw to you and others, enclosing 2 a report prepared by Gareth Jenkins? 3 A. Yeah. 4 Q. Have you had an opportunity to look at that 5 email and the attached document? 6 A. Briefly. It was only sent very, very recently. 7 Q. Could we have that on screen, please, so the 8 email reference is POL00167364. We can see the 9 other recipients there, yourself among them, and 10 an explanation in the body of the email that the 11 attached document had been sent by Jon Longman. 12 Do you remember Jon Longman? 13 A. Yeah, I recall Jon Longman, yeah. 14 Q. Who was he? 15 A. Jon was a Post Office Limited Investigation 16 Manager working -- I think he was sort of in the 17 Hertfordshire/London area. 18 Q. Can you recall anything about the circumstances 19 in which you received this email? 20 A. No. 21 Q. Going, then, to the attachment, could we have 22 that on screen, please. It is POL00167365. We 23 can see that the author of this document is 24 Gareth Jenkins. It is marked "Final Draft" and, 25 scrolling down to the bottom of this page, 116 1 please, there is a date at the bottom right of 2 the 2 October 2009. The "Abstract", going 3 further up again, please, is as follows: 4 "This document describes the measures that 5 are built into Horizon to ensure data 6 integrity." 7 Do you recall reading this document at the 8 time you were sent it? 9 A. I don't recall the document at all, I'm afraid. 10 Q. Does it follow that you can't help with what you 11 understood its purpose to be? 12 A. I'm afraid I can't. 13 Q. Could we have on screen, please, document 14 reference FUJ00225899. Going, please, to page 8 15 of this document first and scrolling down, 16 please, this is an email from you to Jane Owen, 17 dated 9 June 2011. You say this: 18 "Jane, 19 "I currently have a police liaison inquiry 20 centred on St John Green sub post office, 21 Rotherham. 22 "Briefly the office was audited and found to 23 be approximately 11K short and a clerk is 24 suspected and has been interviewed. The case 25 has been reviewed and the police officer has 117 1 asked me to get a statement demonstrating the 2 robustness of the Horizon system at the branch. 3 "The case is unusual as the branch is 4 operated by a charity ... and because of this we 5 were asked to get involved at the outset in 6 order to possibly mitigate the adverse publicity 7 of us demanding our money back from them." 8 Going back, please, to page 7, and scrolling 9 down a bit further down that page. We see Jane 10 Owen forwarding your email to Penny Thomas, also 11 on 9 June: 12 "Hi Penny 13 "Just wanted to run this by you before 14 I make any kind of formal request. I assume 15 that we will just request a statement as normal 16 but would need to put it around some dates? 17 "Jane." 18 Then further up the page, Penny Thomas 19 replies to Jane Owen suggesting identifying the 20 time frame when the funds were reported missing 21 and asking Fujitsu to provide Helpdesk call 22 analysis. 23 Then page 6, please, a little further down 24 the page. Jane Owen gets back to you forwarding 25 Penny Thomas's suggestion. 118 1 Page 5, please. This is your response on 2 9 June: 3 "Jane, 4 "At present, the police haven't asked for 5 Horizon records although I am sure that if they 6 know we can provide them they will ask for them 7 (and then not use them). All the officer asked 8 was if we could provide a statement saying that 9 the Horizon system was operating correctly in 10 the run up to the shortage being identified." 11 Then page 4, please. This is Jane Owen on 12 10 June to you, asking whether she should go for 13 six months initially and noting that this would 14 come off your allocation, even if you were not 15 getting the transactional data. 16 Bottom of page 3, please. You appear in 17 that email to agree to six months. 18 Then further up the page, we have an email 19 from you to Maureen Moors, dated 6 July, which 20 reads as follows: 21 "Maureen, 22 "This is the stuff I want from Andy Dunks. 23 "There has not been an ARQ in respect of 24 this. All the police wanted was a statement to 25 say that the Horizon appeared to be working okay 119 1 at the branch in the run up to the audit 2 shortage. If he can't do it then I will have to 3 tell the police as such." 4 Then going to page 2, please. Your email 5 seems to be sent to Andy Dunks, who says at the 6 top of the page, please, in an email directly to 7 you: 8 "Paul, 9 "I am unable to say for definite that the 10 Horizon system was working okay. What I can do 11 is look at all calls logged by this PO during 12 the date range and state that there were no 13 faults reported by the PO to suggest any faults. 14 "If you want me to get the calls extracted 15 to examine the calls we will need ARQ numbers to 16 cover this request. 17 "Please let me know what you would like us 18 to do." 19 Then page 1, please. About halfway down the 20 page, you say this: 21 "No need for anything beyond this, Andy. 22 I have explained to the police that all you can 23 say is that no faults were logged and they are 24 happy with that." 25 Finally, Andy Dunks' response, further up 120 1 the page, and he says: 2 "Paul, 3 "I think you may have misinterpreted my 4 email ... I have not said that no faults were 5 logged. What I am saying is that if you want me 6 to extract the calls logged so that I can 7 examine them to see if there are any fault calls 8 during these dates." 9 This appears to be an example of you seeking 10 a catch-all statement from Andy Dunks in 11 relation to a case where the police had asked 12 for assurances about the Horizon system. It 13 also appears that Andy Dunks was not able to 14 provide a catch-all statement in this instance 15 and the reason he gave for that was that he was 16 unable to say for definite that the Horizon 17 system was working okay. Did you take this to 18 mean that there could be faults in Horizon with 19 the potential to affect evidence in criminal 20 cases? 21 A. I think it's difficult to say. I think around 22 this time, around just -- this is when the 23 initial sort of raising of the question of 24 Horizon reliability was sort of gathering pace. 25 As I say, my background was that it had always 121 1 been sort of infallible and, certainly, I don't 2 think it had been tested in court yet and 3 I think the sort of underlying message would 4 be -- was that, you know, until we get something 5 coming back certain to say definitely, you know, 6 Horizon's at fault, to sort of carry on in the 7 belief that it's not. 8 So I think these emails -- and, as I say, 9 I don't know because they -- whilst there was 10 a trail of them, I don't know where they sit in 11 amongst other things. I think that's probably 12 what I can say about the emails. 13 Q. Turning, please, to the document which prompted 14 your memory of subpostmasters raising Horizon 15 integrity issues before you left the Post 16 Office, the reference is POL00114310. Starting 17 about halfway down the page, this is an email 18 from you to Clive Burton, dated 17 June 2010. 19 Who was Clive Burton? 20 A. I don't recall the name but, if you scroll up 21 and I can see his job title, I might be able to 22 illuminate a little bit. 23 Q. Former Agents Debt. 24 A. Yeah, it looked like someone who in the Former 25 Agents Debt Team so when subpostmasters left the 122 1 organisation for any reason, they were the -- 2 they were the part of the Post Office that dealt 3 with debts left behind, whether anything was 4 owed to subpostmasters or whether subpostmasters 5 owed anything to the -- to Post Office Limited. 6 Q. The subject of the email was "Old Colwyn and 7 Conway Road", and you say this: 8 "Clive, 9 "I interviewed both Mrs McQuilliam and 10 Mrs McQuilliam-Jenkins and both answered 'No 11 Comment' to my questions. 12 "This case is one of a few that we currently 13 hold that really is dependent on the outcome of 14 cases whereby the integrity of the Horizon 15 system has been called into question. In effect 16 a 'test' case is being put through the course 17 relating to this and as such other cases are 18 being put on hold until its outcome. This is 19 one of the cases. 20 "Basically we are waiting to see if the test 21 case goes through with a Horizon challenge 22 before deciding what to do with some of the 23 others. 24 "Not ideal but hopefully this keeps you up 25 to speed." 123 1 What did you mean by a "test case" in this 2 email? 3 A. I think that was a term that was being used 4 around the organisation or certainly the 5 Investigation Team. As I say, I recall 6 interviewing Mrs McQuilliam and 7 Mrs McQuilliam-Jenkins, as I said in the email 8 there, and I recall that they -- you know, 9 similar to many, in regard to events at the 10 moment, they said that they didn't know -- well, 11 there were losses at the office, audit shortages 12 at the office and they didn't know where the 13 loss had come from, and I don't know whether 14 I recall that they did actually specifically say 15 that it was Horizon. Certainly, I mean -- well, 16 it looks like they answered "No comment", so 17 maybe not. 18 But I do recall them being in North Wales, 19 I recall that Mr Bradshaw, Steve Bradshaw, who 20 was an Investigator, he had a case in North 21 Wales that was being questioned. There was 22 another couple around North Wales that was being 23 questioned. So that sort of gave rise to my 24 thinking that it was possibly something that was 25 geographically based around North Wales. 124 1 And, as I say, from reading the email there, 2 it looked to be that there was talk of cases 3 going through and -- you know, and the 4 answers -- sorry, and the Horizon system 5 integrity being part of that case and being 6 questioned. 7 And, as I say, I believe that's where, it 8 was just generally referred to that a test case 9 was being put thorough, and that's the terms 10 that was used. I don't know whether that was 11 ever officially said to us, it was a test case, 12 or it was just sort of the vernacular that was 13 used in regards to what was happening at the 14 time. 15 Q. Does your email there reflect any doubt on your 16 part as to the integrity of the Horizon system? 17 A. I don't think it does. I think it's a "We'll 18 wait and see". If the challenge goes through, 19 then I think my view would have been, well, if 20 the challenge -- you know, if the evidence shows 21 that Horizon is flawed, then that's that. If, 22 you know, the challenge shows that Horizon isn't 23 flawed, then that's that. 24 Q. The response from Clive Burton further up the 25 page, please, was this: 125 1 "Paul, 2 "Thanks for the update. I will hold the 3 matter in abeyance for the time being." 4 So it appears that further action on the 5 case was held off pending the outcome of the 6 test case you refer to; is that your 7 understanding? 8 A. That's what it seems to be. 9 Q. Do you recall being made aware of the outcome of 10 the test case, as you refer to it? 11 A. I don't. I don't know whether it happened after 12 I'd gone or but I certainly don't recall the 13 result of anything. 14 Q. Turning, please, to another document which has, 15 I'm afraid, has only been provided to you very 16 recently. Could we have on screen, please, 17 document reference POL00167367. This is 18 an email from Jane Owen to a number of 19 recipients, including you, dated 29 July 2010. 20 The subject line is "Fujitsu -- Duplication of 21 Transaction Records". We can see that Penny 22 Thomas is Bcc'd in and the email begins as 23 follows: 24 "All 25 "As you are aware, due to the recent 126 1 problems with Fujitsu all ARQ requests have been 2 suspended. I can now advise that the 3 enhancement to delete duplicated records from 4 the returns has been developed and is due to be 5 tested by Fujitsu at the weekend." 6 You've had an opportunity to read this 7 email. Do you recall receiving this email, now? 8 A. I don't specifically remember receiving the 9 email. 10 Q. Do you recall being aware of this issue, the 11 duplication of transaction records? 12 A. To be fair, I'm not sure that I do. As I say, 13 I don't recall receiving the email and it's 14 certainly not something that's stuck from that 15 time. 16 Q. Could we have on screen please paragraph 159 of 17 Mr Whitaker's statement, that's page 39 of 18 WITN05050100. Page 39, paragraph 159. You say 19 here: 20 "It was my honestly held belief during the 21 time I was investigating within POL that Horizon 22 was robust and would not erroneously produce 23 spontaneous transactions that were not genuine. 24 That was the overriding narrative that I was 25 being told and accepted." 127 1 Does it remain your position, 2 notwithstanding some of the later documents 3 you've seen, that it was your belief that the 4 Horizon system would not erroneously produce 5 spontaneous transactions that were not genuine? 6 A. Yes, as I mentioned at the start of my evidence 7 this morning -- when I produced the statement 8 I thought it was across the whole of my time in 9 Post Office Limited, however I accept that, 10 towards the very, very end, one or two documents 11 pointed towards question marks over Horizon but, 12 during the vast majority of my time within Post 13 Office Limited, I thought the Horizon system was 14 robust and would not produce erroneous 15 transactions or bugs or the things that it's 16 proved to have done. 17 Q. Going, please, to page 41 of this statement, 18 paragraph 171. You say this: 19 "Reflecting on my personal performance 20 during this time, I would say that in comparing 21 the cases I investigated pre-Horizon and those 22 post-Horizon rollout I did not notice 23 a significant increase in the audit shortage 24 type cases." 25 Over to paragraph 172: 128 1 "Though I was not aware of the whole picture 2 in regard to how many cases of a similar nature 3 were being pursued by POL, I do not recall any 4 significant increase in this type of 5 investigation in the period after Horizon system 6 implementation to that which I experienced 7 before the system rollout. This may have 8 affected my thinking in respect of my 9 investigations, as if I had have noticed a sharp 10 increase in cases after the implementation of 11 Horizon it may have raised my suspicions that 12 the Horizon system was not performing as it 13 should have." 14 Notwithstanding that you did not notice 15 an increase in audit shortage type cases, did it 16 not concern you that, from at least 2010, you 17 were aware of multiple subpostmasters actively 18 alleging that apparent shortfalls were being 19 caused by the Horizon system? 20 A. I think towards the end of my career with Post 21 Office Limited -- and I don't know whether 22 subconsciously that was something that fed into 23 the picture of why I left -- but I could see 24 that there was a movement gathering pace, 25 certainly. And somewhere along the line there 129 1 would have been -- Post Office Limited would 2 have to prove one way or another whether the 3 Horizon system was robust or if it was not. So 4 towards the end of my time within Post Office 5 Limited, I think it's safe to say I sort of made 6 that realisation. 7 Q. A theme that you raise in a number of places in 8 your statement is that you and other 9 Investigators were repeatedly and continually 10 told that the Horizon system was robust. You 11 say at paragraph 137 that the certainty of the 12 message from the Post Office may have coloured 13 your judgement and that of other Investigators 14 in matters surrounding Horizon. Who was this 15 message that Horizon was robust coming from? 16 A. I think it was coming from whenever we asked for 17 statements, it always came back that the system 18 was robust. When that evidence were tested, it 19 was tested in court, if ever it was tested in 20 court, more often than not it would be that the 21 convictions went through. It was strange -- 22 just a general overall -- it's that that is the 23 system, that is the system that is used and 24 just, I suppose really, the understanding that 25 the Post Office had paid all that money for that 130 1 system and it was -- it must have been robust. 2 However, obviously, we were very, very wrong in 3 that assumption. 4 Q. You deal in the final two paragraphs of your 5 statement, and this is the bottom of page 41, 6 starting at 173, with your final reflections on 7 your involvement in investigations and 8 prosecutions where Horizon data was relied upon. 9 How do you feel about that involvement, as you 10 sit here today? 11 A. Well, as said in my statement there, the thought 12 that somebody within Post Office Limited or 13 Fujitsu had knowledge that the Horizon system 14 was flawed and didn't disclose that and kept 15 that to themselves for whatever reason, sits 16 incredibly uncomfortably with me, particularly 17 knowing that I was the face of Post Office 18 Limited when going out and seeing people and 19 essentially causing upset and destroying their 20 lives. 21 It does make me quite angry, when I think 22 about it. I think, obviously, through my 23 investigations, I've -- I feel that I've been 24 unwittingly -- albeit unwittingly, used as 25 an instrument of Post Office Limited and Fujitsu 131 1 to perpetuate the myth that Horizon was 2 faultless and, as a result, that's brought so 3 much unnecessary distress and anguish to 4 innocent people and, like I say, it doesn't sit 5 very well with me at all. 6 MS PRICE: Sir, those are all the questions that 7 have for Mr Whitaker. I'll turn to CPs to see 8 if there are any questions from others. 9 Yes, there are from Mr Moloney, sir. 10 Questioned by MR MOLONEY 11 MR MOLONEY: Thank you. 12 Mr Whitaker, you said that you thought that 13 Mrs Alison Hall, who sits next to me, didn't 14 raise the question of Horizon having anything to 15 do with the discrepancies that she experienced. 16 Are you sure about that? 17 A. I don't recall that she did and I was basing my 18 answer on what I'd seen in the documentation. 19 Apologies if she did. 20 Q. It's something that we can -- Mr Knight, in 21 fact, took the lead in the interview, didn't he? 22 A. I believe so, yes. 23 Q. It's something we can deal with with him but 24 I jut thought it best to raise with you, 25 because, and if we could put up on the screen 132 1 POL00021244, we thought we'd provided this in 2 advance, but I'll just read it to you, if I may, 3 Mr Whitaker. 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. It's at page 4 and it can be checked if 6 necessary. But Mr Knight, some 4 minutes and 7 9 seconds into the interview, says to Mrs Hall: 8 "Right, so you're adamant that the £14,000 9 is nothing that you've done criminally, 10 fraudulently, however you want to put it?" 11 Mrs Hall said: 12 "I've not taken a penny out of that post 13 office criminally, I wouldn't dare." 14 Mr Knight says: 15 "It's something to do with some sort of 16 discrepancy?" 17 Mrs Hall says: 18 "I think it's to do with discrepancy with 19 the Lottery and I'm hoping that we can come to 20 the bottom of this." 21 Mr Knight says: 22 "Right." 23 Mrs Hall says: 24 "I'll pay any money back whatsoever to the 25 Post Office Limited. I'm not a thief. I'll pay 133 1 anything back. But I just want all this to be 2 looked at in detail and because Horizon system 3 is not 100 per cent, if I've got all the details 4 here, I'd like that to be taken into account, 5 please." 6 Then she explains how it is that she's had 7 problems with the Lottery tickets and the 8 discrepancies have built up and built up and 9 built up, and she doesn't know where the 10 discrepancies come from. 11 Does that assist with your memory as to her 12 talking about unexplained discrepancies and 13 mentioning that the Horizon system is not 14 100 per cent? 15 A. It would certainly seem consistent. As I say, 16 I don't specifically recall it but I've got no 17 reason to dispute what's in the transcript. 18 MR MOLONEY: Thank you very much, Mr Whitaker. 19 MS PRICE: Sir, it doesn't appear there are any 20 other questions from Core Participants. 21 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Thank you. 22 Well, thank you, Mr Whitaker, for making 23 your witness statement and for answering a great 24 many questions today. Although the focus of the 25 questioning has not been on Mrs Hall's case, 134 1 I welcome Mrs Hall to the Inquiry and I hope 2 she's found it informative. 3 Do you want a break before the next witness, 4 Ms Price? 5 MS PRICE: Sir, I'm afraid we do need a short break 6 because the next witness appears remotely and 7 some manoeuvring needs to be done to sort out 8 the screen, I'm afraid. So we do need a short 9 break of ten minutes. I'm told my watch is 10 fast, so I'll allow you, sir, to tell me when 11 ten minutes takes us to. 12 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Well, I'll just have a look at 13 the most reliable machine I have in front of me, 14 which says 14.48. So 3.00, Ms Price? 15 MS PRICE: Thank you, sir. 16 (2.48 pm) 17 (A short break) 18 (3.04 pm) 19 MS PRICE: Good afternoon, sir. Can you see and 20 hear us? 21 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, I can. 22 MS PRICE: May we please call Ms Oglesby. 23 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Certainly. 24 CATHERINE OGLESBY (affirmed) 25 Questioned by MS PRICE 135 1 MS PRICE: Sir, we're having an issue at the moment 2 in that we can't actually see Ms Oglesby. 3 I think someone is trying to resolve that. 4 I'm sorry, sir, I think you're on mute. 5 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: I was just saying I've got the 6 advantage of you because I can see her. 7 MS PRICE: Well, that's good, sir. 8 There we are. Could you confirm your full 9 name, please, Ms Oglesby? 10 A. Catherine Oglesby. 11 Q. You should have with you a hard copy of your 12 witness statement and it's dated 4 June 2023. 13 If you can turn to page 36 of that, please. 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Do you have a copy with a visible signature? 16 A. Yes, I do. 17 Q. Is that your signature? 18 A. Yes, it is. 19 Q. Are the contents of that statement true to the 20 best of your knowledge and belief? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. For the purposes of the transcript, the document 23 reference is WITN08530100. 24 Thank you for coming to the Inquiry remotely 25 to assist it in its work and for providing the 136 1 witness statement that you have. As you know, 2 I will be asking questions on behalf of the 3 Inquiry. 4 Today I'm going to be asking you about 5 issues which arise in Phase 4 of the Inquiry, 6 focusing on your involvement in the proceedings 7 brought by the Post Office against Mr Castleton 8 relating to alleged losses at the Marine Drive 9 Post Office branch. You joined the Post Office 10 in 1982 at the age of 16 as a counter clerk; is 11 that right? 12 A. Yes, that's right. 13 Q. Five years later, in 1987, you were promoted to 14 manager of that branch? 15 A. Yes, that's right. 16 Q. At that point, you became a Retail Line Manager? 17 A. No, not at that point. 18 Q. Apologies. You say you moved roles when you 19 returned to work, so looking at your statement, 20 can you assist us, then, with when you became 21 a Retail Line Manager? 22 A. Yes, I -- from returning from maternity leave in 23 approximately 1997. 24 Q. Yes. So January 1997, you became a Retail Line 25 Manager? 137 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. Yes. You've set out an explanation of the 3 change in terminology relating to the Retail 4 Line Manager role over the years, at paragraph 7 5 of your statement, and you say the title changed 6 from Retail Line Manager to Retail Network 7 Manager and then to Area Sales Manager and then 8 Area Manager. Did the role remain substantially 9 the same, despite these changes to the title? 10 A. Yeah, substantially the same. 11 Q. You held this role from 1997 to 2005 in the 12 Postmaster Network -- 13 A. Yes, correct. 14 Q. -- 2005 to 2010 in the Directly Managed 15 Network -- 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. -- and 2017 to date, again in the Postmaster 18 Network; is that right? 19 A. Yes, it is. 20 Q. So apart from a period between 2015 and 2017, 21 when you were not working for the Post Office, 22 your entire career has been with the Post 23 Office; is that right? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. And you remain employed by the Post Office now? 138 1 A. Yes, I do. 2 Q. You've set out at paragraph 8 of your witness 3 statement some aspects of the roles you have 4 held since becoming a Retail Line Manager in 5 1997 and you go on to say that one of those 6 aspects is no longer part of the role, namely 7 suspensions and termination of contracts, and 8 you say this is now the responsibility of the 9 Contracts team; is that right? 10 A. Yes, that's right. 11 Q. But it was part of your role in 2003? 12 A. Yes, correct. 13 Q. Do you recall when suspensions and termination 14 of contracts became the responsibility of the 15 Contracts team? 16 A. No, sorry, I don't. 17 Q. You were the Retail Line Manager who took the 18 decision to terminate Mr Castleton's contract; 19 is that right? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. At the outset of your statement for the Inquiry, 22 you have expressed your sympathy to all 23 subpostmasters who were affected by Horizon 24 related issues and, in particular, Mr Castleton. 25 A. Yes. 139 1 Q. You say that when you made the decision to 2 terminate Mr Castleton's contract, this was 3 based on an understanding that the Horizon 4 system was working as it should. Should we 5 understand your evidence against that backdrop? 6 A. Yes, please. 7 Q. You also say in your statement that, during your 8 time at the Post Office, you were reassured that 9 the Horizon IT System was robust and working 10 properly; is that right? 11 A. That's right, yes. 12 Q. Who was it who was providing that reassurance? 13 A. I contacted several different places, so I was 14 getting messages back from Fujitsu and from the 15 Business Support Centre and the Horizon System 16 Helpdesk. 17 Q. Do you mean that in the specific sense of the 18 Horizon system working properly in relation to 19 Mr Castleton or, when you're talking about 20 reassurance that the system was robust and 21 working properly, do you mean that more broadly? 22 A. Both, really. So during Mr Castleton's case, 23 I was contacting them to make sure everything 24 was okay when Mr Castleton was asking me 25 questions, and in the broader sense as well, 140 1 through my career. Yes. 2 Q. Starting, please, with your understanding of 3 Mr Castleton's contract with the Post Office, 4 you say at paragraph 16 of your statement to the 5 Inquiry that, when there was a loss, it was for 6 the subpostmaster to make that loss good and, in 7 your statement, you don't qualify that. 8 Was it your understanding that 9 a subpostmaster's contract imposed an obligation 10 on a subpostmaster to make good any loss, no 11 matter the circumstances? 12 A. Could you just repeat the question in 13 a different way then, please? I'm not really -- 14 Q. Of course, if you want to look at paragraph 16 15 of your statement to the Inquiry. 16 A. Yes, I've got that. 17 Q. You say that, when there was a loss, it was for 18 the subpostmaster to make that loss good. 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. You don't, in that aspect of your statement, 21 qualify that in any way. So my question is: was 22 it your understanding that the contract imposed 23 an obligation on a subpostmaster to make good 24 any loss, no matter of the circumstances? 25 A. I think under some circumstances they wouldn't 141 1 be expected to make the loss good, so for 2 instance, perhaps, a robbery, or something of 3 that case, or a burglary, you know, if the money 4 had been stolen in a robbery or a burglary. 5 Q. Was the position adopted by the Post Office that 6 apparent shortfalls, irrespective of how they 7 came about, were the responsibility of 8 subpostmasters to make good? 9 A. In their day-to-day working, yes. 10 Q. You say at paragraph 23 of your statement that 11 the usual role of a Retail Line Manager, when 12 a subpostmaster reported a loss, was limited to 13 telling the subpostmaster to ring the Business 14 Support Centre for advice. 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. What was your understanding of what the Business 17 Support Centre could do to assist the 18 subpostmaster in these circumstances? 19 A. It would be to signpost them to try to help them 20 find where the loss might have occurred. So 21 maybe to go through and get them to check their 22 stock again, get them to add the cash up, maybe 23 contact Girobank and Savings Bank to see if any 24 paperwork that had left the office was 25 incorrect, maybe contact the Chesterfield 142 1 department to see if there was an error notice 2 pending, if anything had left the branch, to try 3 to help them in finding where the error might 4 be. 5 Q. I appreciate that it is your evidence that you 6 went beyond simply signposting Mr Castleton to 7 the Business Support Centre but do you think 8 that simply telling subpostmasters to ring the 9 Business Support Centre was sufficient support 10 from a line manager for subpostmasters dealing 11 with losses? 12 A. Probably not, no, with hindsight. 13 Q. You say at paragraph 26 of your statement that 14 it was normal for most branches to have small 15 losses and gains each week and even to have 16 a large loss or gain from time to time when 17 an error had occurred. By "error", do you mean 18 error on the part of subpostmasters or their 19 staff? 20 A. Yes, I do. So that if they'd sent something 21 that had left the office and that was incorrect, 22 it would cause an error. 23 Q. You also say at paragraph 26 of your statement 24 that, where errors did not come to light, they 25 were the responsibility of the subpostmaster to 143 1 make good; is that right? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. Should we take it from your evidence in this 4 paragraph that, as far as you were concerned, 5 unless an error on the part of the subpostmaster 6 could be identified, the loss was taken to be 7 the loss, and the subpostmaster was liable to 8 pay that sum to the Post Office? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. In preparing your statement to the Inquiry about 11 your involvement in Mr Castleton's case, you 12 have refreshed your memory from a document 13 entitled "Marine Drive Post Office Summary of 14 Events". Can we have that document on screen, 15 please. The reference is LCAS0000699. 16 Going, please, to the second page of that 17 document. Is this a document that you prepared? 18 A. Yes, it is. 19 Q. When did you produce it, and why? 20 A. I can't exactly recall the exact date. I've 21 looked through several times to see if there's 22 any hint at a date when I prepared it. I think 23 I'll have probably prepared it around about when 24 I requested the audit, to make a summary of what 25 was happening, so I called recall the events. 144 1 But I don't know exactly, because I've 2 not -- I can't remember and I haven't put a date 3 on it anywhere. 4 Q. Is it right that you are reliant in your memory 5 of events on this document, and it informed your 6 witness statement prepared for the Inquiry? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. You say here on the first page at the top that 9 the first time Mr Castleton contacted you about 10 issues at his branch was between Christmas and 11 New Year 2003, to report a loss of £1,100; is 12 that right? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. This was the first time Mr Castleton had 15 experienced any major balancing issues since 16 he'd taken over as subpostmaster the previous 17 July? 18 A. Yes, that's in my notes there, yes. 19 Q. He came to you to declare this apparent 20 discrepancy, didn't he? 21 A. Yes, he did. 22 Q. What did Mr Castleton say to you about the 23 apparent shortfall? 24 A. I can't remember the conversation because it's 25 obviously a long time ago. I can just refresh 145 1 my memory from what I've written there, that 2 he'd told me he was £1,100 short in his cash. 3 Q. What suggestions did you make to Mr Castleton? 4 A. Quite a common error was when a branch was doing 5 a business deposit, so a deposit for a business, 6 they would deposit cash and cheques. It was 7 only the cash figure that should be entered on 8 to the Horizon system. The cheque figure just 9 went off separately but, quite often, the 10 customer would either add the cheques in or the 11 branch would add the cheques in by mistake, and 12 then that would create quite a large loss. 13 So, at that point, I told Mr Castleton to 14 contact Girobank, which is where the -- that 15 sort of an error would come to account, National 16 Savings, because those could be large amounts of 17 deposits into people's accounts, to see if 18 anything could come to light and bring any light 19 on the error. 20 Q. Is it right that you also asked Mr Castleton to 21 make the loss good as an error notice might take 22 up to eight weeks to arrive? 23 A. Yes, looking at my notes there, I did, yes. 24 Q. So you were, in effect, advising him to accept 25 the loss, sign off the accounts, even though he 146 1 did not think they were accurate? 2 A. Well, he would have shown the 1,100 short in his 3 account, so he would be signing to say he had 4 a shortage in the account. 5 Q. But you were encouraging him to make good on the 6 basis that it would all come out in the wash 7 with an error notice; is that right? 8 A. That's what I was hoping, yes. 9 Q. On this occasion, Mr Castleton did make good the 10 loss, didn't he? 11 A. Yes, he said he could make good the loss, yes. 12 Q. Mr Castleton balanced fine for the next three 13 weeks, you say in your note, something you noted 14 on your visit to the branch on 16 January 2004. 15 A. Yes, correct. 16 Q. When you visited the branch and found that 17 nothing had come to light to explain the 18 apparent shortfall, did you take any steps to 19 investigate this or ask anyone else to look into 20 it? 21 A. I can't remember doing so, no, but as it was 22 only three weeks or so after the loss, the error 23 notices could take a long time to come back, so 24 I didn't think anything untoward or anything at 25 that point. 147 1 Q. The next time Mr Castleton tried to balance, he 2 found an apparent shortfall of over £4,000, and 3 your advice was again to contact Girobank and 4 Savings, wasn't it, according to your note of 5 events? 6 A. Yes, it was. 7 Q. You also asked if the cash at the branch was 8 kept secure and who had access to it. 9 A. Correct, yes. 10 Q. Since Mr Castleton was unable, on this occasion, 11 to make the amount good, you told him to contact 12 the helpline to get a hardship form; is that 13 right? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Was the purpose of this so that the amount of 16 the apparent shortfall could be held in the 17 suspense account while the matter was 18 investigated -- 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. -- rather than Mr Castleton having to put the 21 money in to balance and roll over into the next 22 trading period? 23 A. Well, with the hardship fund, it gave the 24 postmaster the opportunity to pay back the loss 25 over a period of time, rather than all in one go 148 1 and he could have deductions from remuneration, 2 rather than making it good there and then. 3 Q. You say you discussed ways to double check the 4 work, leaving the office, and suggested to 5 Mr Castleton that he perform a snapshot each 6 evening and check the cash. Can you explain, 7 please, what a snapshot was and why you were 8 suggesting this? 9 A. So on the Horizon system you could print what we 10 call a snapshot, which is as it sounds. It's 11 a print-off of everything that's happened in the 12 branch at that particular time. So up to that 13 point, when you print a snapshot off, it lists 14 everything that's gone through the branch, all 15 the pension dockets, all the giro business. It 16 also prints what the system thinks the cash 17 should be in the till because, obviously, the 18 system, as you sell a stamp, it increases the 19 cash, decreases the stock, as you do a Girobank 20 deposit, it increases the cash and puts an entry 21 on there. 22 So you could double check everything up to 23 that point that you were doing, and it would 24 give you a cash figure. So when you counted the 25 cash that you physically had, if it matched the 149 1 cash on the snapshot, you know you were 2 balancing correctly. 3 If there was a difference between the cash 4 you had and the snapshot, then you either had 5 a gain or a shortfall, depending which way it 6 was. 7 Q. Could we have on screen, please, document 8 reference POL00071159. This is an email chain 9 from June 2006. Can you see that, Ms Oglesby? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. It's an email chain in the lead-up to the trial 12 in the Castleton case, and about two-thirds of 13 the way down the page is an email from Stephen 14 Dilley to Vicky Harrison, a Contracts and 15 Services Manager, and he's seeking information 16 following receipt of a letter from 17 Mr Castleton's solicitors. At point 2, at the 18 bottom of the page there, he says: 19 "Castleton states that a complete set of 20 balance snapshots for each day's trading until 21 the suspension was produced and removed from the 22 branch by Cath. Am I right in thinking that: 23 "(a) balance snapshots are not a mandatory 24 report so Castleton wouldn't have had to print 25 one for every day; 150 1 "(b) Castleton at this time not produce one 2 for every day; 3 "(c) For Cath to have collected one for 4 every day she would have had to attend the 5 branch each day to print one off (because the 6 data would have changed each minute of the each 7 day so presumably you couldn't attend the branch 8 say once a week and print out historical balance 9 snapshots); 10 "(d) Cath certainly wouldn't have had the 11 time to attend the branch every day; and 12 "(e) that the PO sent me those snapshots 13 that Cath removed (in the red folder)?" 14 Going back, please, to page 1 to the top, 15 please, this is Vicky Harrison replying to 16 Stephen Dilley with you as a recipient as well. 17 Looking, please, to the second paragraph of this 18 email. Vicky Harrison says this: 19 "Looking at the events logs from the Horizon 20 archive for Marine Drive which I also sent you, 21 a balance snapshot was printed most days and 22 some days more than once by both Christine and 23 Lee throughout Jan to Mar '04. This report was 24 not mandatory to be printed or retained, so they 25 may well have printed it off and discarded it, 151 1 as this is used as a rough guide to what the 2 cash variances were compared to the cash on 3 hand. I have never seen the balance snapshots 4 and I don't know about Cath taking them away. 5 Cath do you remember taking these??" 6 It would appear from what Vicky Harrison 7 says in this email, wouldn't it, that, contrary 8 to your recollection now, Mr Castleton did 9 balance snapshots, did create balance snapshots 10 most days and some days more than once, for the 11 period January to March 2004; would you accept 12 that? 13 A. Yes, if that's what it said on the event log. 14 Q. Could we have on screen, please, document 15 reference POL00073661. This is an email from 16 Vicky Harrison to Stephen Dilley, dated 17 7 December 2005. Scrolling down a bit, please, 18 she says: 19 "Stephen, everyone has now replied to me and 20 therefore this is a joint response to your 21 questions: 22 "Questions 1 and 2 -- Helen Rose did not 23 take away any documentation and the forms that 24 she completed on the day have been forwarded to 25 your office by Stephen Hough. Cath took the 152 1 cash accounts from the Branch and some 2 snapshots, but she is unable to recall which 3 ones. She also forwarded me some electronic 4 documents which I have attached to the bottom of 5 this email which you may or may not already 6 have." 7 So it would appear, on the basis of this 8 email, that you took away at least some 9 snapshots from the branch; do you recall doing 10 that? 11 A. I only do from refreshing my memory from some of 12 the documents and one of the interviews, where 13 I discussed those snapshots with Mr Castleton at 14 an interview, and they were noted in there. So 15 yes, from that, I do. But I don't know which 16 ones. 17 Q. Did you ever look at the balance snapshots to 18 try to understand what Mr Castleton was saying 19 about possible causes of the loss? 20 A. We looked at the snapshots in one of the 21 interviews. But I don't know -- 22 Q. Did you yourself -- sorry to stop you there, 23 before the interview, did you yourself look at 24 the documents and try to do any analysis of them 25 before you interviewed Mr Castleton? 153 1 A. I'll have looked at them. I don't think I'll 2 have tried to do any analysis, because the only 3 figures that were in -- that weren't looking 4 right was obviously the cash figure. All the 5 other figures on the snapshot would have been 6 things like the pensions, the Girobanks, the 7 Green Giros. All of those, you know, will have 8 been double checked because if they hadn't, 9 they'd have caused an error notice. 10 Q. Did you consider copying the balance snapshots 11 you had and returning them, given that you 12 thought that these were important in terms of 13 figuring out what had happened? 14 A. I think in the interview dated 10 May, 15 everything was copied and given back to 16 Mr Castleton but I don't recall it because it's 17 such a long time ago. 18 Q. Going back, please, to your summary of events, 19 could we have this back on screen, please, it's 20 LCAS0000699. About halfway down, following your 21 suggestion about balance snapshots, after 22 Mr Castleton's second apparent shortfall of over 23 £4,000, you contacted Mr Castleton following the 24 next balance, and there was an apparent 25 shortfall of £2,500; is that right? 154 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. You say here that you had a long conversation 3 about how to check the work. By that, do you 4 mean checking Mr Castleton's figures? 5 A. Yes, and checking everything that was leaving 6 the branch to make sure nothing was leaving 7 incorrect. 8 Q. Can you just clarify what you mean by that? 9 A. So at that time, there'd be things that would 10 leave the branch on a daily basis. Things like 11 any cheques that the branch had taken, any giro 12 deposits, giro withdrawals, telephone accounts, 13 Savings Bank deposits and withdrawals. All of 14 those things left each evening. So it was 15 making sure that nothing was leaving the branch 16 that hadn't had, you know, double check, and was 17 correct. 18 Q. You say here that you suggested the possibility 19 that someone might be stealing the money, and 20 Mr Castleton refuted that suggestion. 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. You suggested individual stock balancing. 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. But Mr Castleton did not favour this as the 25 office did not lend itself to individual stock 155 1 balancing; is that right? 2 A. Well, that was Mr Castleton's opinion. You 3 could do an individual stock unit balance in any 4 branch. 5 Q. The next week, Mr Castleton had an apparent 6 shortfall of £25 and, the week after, of £1,500. 7 Those are the figures that you've put in your 8 note. So, by this point, you say there was 9 a cumulative shortfall of £8,243.10, not 10 counting the £1,100 he had made good. 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Your only further suggestion at this stage was 13 to get a hardship form, at least in terms of 14 what you've recorded here on your summary of 15 events; is that right? 16 A. I did ask him to get a hardship form, yes. 17 I can't recall if we discussed to do anything 18 else. 19 Q. About two-thirds of the way down the page you 20 say this: 21 "At this point I was very concerned and 22 contacted the Investigation team. They told me 23 that as he had kept me fully informed of the 24 loss then they would not be able to prove 25 dishonesty." 156 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. "I completed an audit request." 3 What was it that you were so concerned about 4 that led you to contact the Investigation Team 5 who conduct criminal investigations. 6 A. I was looking for some help, I think, at that 7 point and some advice, because of the large 8 losses. 9 Q. What evidence did you have that Mr Castleton had 10 done anything criminal? 11 A. I didn't have any evidence that he'd done 12 anything criminal. I don't think that was in my 13 mind. I just wanted some -- you know, some sort 14 of help, really. 15 Q. Was it usual for you or other Retail Line 16 Managers to contact the Investigation Team 17 before an audit had taken place? 18 A. I don't think I'd contacted them before but I'd 19 never had anybody with large losses before. 20 I can't speak for other Retail Line Managers but 21 I don't think I had contacted them before. 22 Q. You spoke to someone from the Investigation 23 Team. Did you speak on the phone? 24 A. Yes, I believe so. 25 Q. What did you ask that person? 157 1 A. Unless it's documented anywhere to recall, 2 I can't remember the conversation. 3 Q. Can you recall what they said to you, and do 4 refer to your summary of events if it helps. Is 5 there anything over and above what you have 6 recorded here that you remember? 7 A. I don't remember anything over and above what 8 I've put on there, sorry. 9 Q. What was your reaction at the time to them 10 saying that this was not a matter for criminal 11 investigation? 12 A. I can't recall, I'm sorry. 13 Q. The next week, Mr Castleton was, you say, 14 £3,509.18 short. 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. Then you say this, in your summary: 17 "Lee told me that himself and Chrissie his 18 assistant had spent hours and hours checking and 19 double checking transaction logs and work to try 20 to prove that it was the computer equipment that 21 was changing the figures. I asked him if he had 22 founding anything. He hadn't. He is convinced 23 that since he had a processor changed around 24 about the time that the losses started it is 25 that that is causing the losses." 158 1 Mr Castleton was, at this stage, clearly 2 attributing the losses in the shortfall to the 3 Horizon system, wasn't he? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. You suggested he contact Horizon and get 6 a system check; is that right? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. Did the Post Office see it as any part of its 9 role to raise concerns about the Horizon system 10 with Fujitsu on its subpostmasters' behalf? 11 A. I can only speak from my role as a Retail Line 12 Manager, and we could also ring and ask for 13 different, you know, checks to be done, but it 14 wasn't something that was in the forefront of my 15 mind. To be honest, I wouldn't have given it 16 a thought. I had no idea that there would be 17 any problem with Horizon. 18 Q. Given what Mr Castleton was saying, did you 19 consider at this stage contacting Fujitsu 20 yourself, as opposed to directing him to contact 21 Horizon himself? 22 A. I was just trying to look and see if that -- 23 I can't see the timeline of when I actually 24 contacted them but we didn't have a direct 25 contact to Fujitsu. We would have to go through 159 1 the Business Support Centre or the Horizon 2 System -- the Horizon Helpdesk. 3 You didn't have -- there wasn't a direct 4 link, you know, to contact Fujitsu, and I'm not 5 sure at what point I made those calls as well. 6 Q. You say in your summary: 7 "I visited the office on Friday 27 February 8 2004." 9 You say this: 10 "We went over everything again. Lee was 11 very distressed and angry, Chrissie his 12 assistant was very worked up, upset and angry. 13 They felt they hadn't received any help and had 14 been left to try to prove that the computer was 15 changing the cash figures. At times they looked 16 close to tears and said they weren't sleeping. 17 On top of all this Lee's son needed an operation 18 and was going into hospital. The stress levels 19 in the office were high ..." 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. Mr Castleton was at this stage questioning the 22 checks which had been done by Fujitsu, wasn't 23 he? 24 A. I can't see in my notes where it says that. 25 Q. So we go down another paragraph: 160 1 "I asked them what ... I could do to help. 2 We had covered all the usual possibilities. Lee 3 and Chrissie kept on that they had not taken the 4 money and that I must be the Horizon kit. Lee 5 said that the Horizon System Helpline had said 6 that the checks had been okay, but what had they 7 checked?" 8 Your response was for him to ring the 9 Horizon helpline back. Again, at this stage, 10 did you consider contacting Fujitsu on 11 Mr Castleton's behalf, particularly given how 12 distressed you saw him to be? 13 A. I believe that I was also doing things in the 14 background. I maybe haven't documented on there 15 but I know I've got things from the problem 16 manager, you know, from Richard Benton, who had 17 done all the checks and sent that to Fujitsu. 18 I'd got emails back from the Business Support 19 Centre, from Andrew Price and Andrew Wise, so 20 I was doing things as well, and asking him, you 21 know, Mr Castleton, to do things, as well, so 22 that we were both doing things to try to find 23 out. 24 Everything just kept coming back that 25 everything was fine with the Horizon system. 161 1 Q. Could we have on screen, please, document 2 reference POL00071240. This is a record of your 3 interview with Mr Castleton on 10 May 2004. 4 Could we have page 3 of this document, please. 5 About halfway down the page, Mr Castleton says: 6 "He said that no one had visited from 7 Horizon to look at his problems and balances." 8 Your response is this: 9 "CO Explained that Horizon would not attend 10 his office due to poor balances, they would need 11 evidence of a problem which he was unable to 12 provide, she also mentioned that she had given 13 him advice and spent hours and hours on this 14 case and his cash accounts. She asked LC if he 15 could show her a figure that the Horizon system 16 had changed which did not make sense or could 17 prove his allegations." 18 What was the basis for the view you 19 expressed here that Horizon -- and by that we 20 can take it to mean Fujitsu -- would not attend 21 Mr Castleton's office due to poor balances, they 22 would need evidence of a problem, which he was 23 unable to provide? 24 A. If I remember correctly, I don't think there was 25 any people that would visit a branch from 162 1 Fujitsu. That just wasn't a possibility, if my 2 understanding is correct. 3 Q. Had you asked anyone from Fujitsu to attend 4 Mr Castleton's branch by this point? 5 A. I didn't, as I said earlier, I didn't have 6 a direct contact with Fujitsu. I would have 7 just gone via the Horizon Helpdesk. 8 Q. So where do you think this understanding came 9 from, that they would not attend in the 10 circumstances of Mr Castleton's case? 11 A. Just from my own experience. I'd never known 12 anybody from Fujitsu to attend a branch for poor 13 balancing. 14 Q. But this was, you said earlier, the first large 15 loss case that you had dealt with, wasn't it? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. As far as you were aware, did anyone from the 18 Post Office ever ask Fujitsu to send someone out 19 to Mr Castleton's branch to investigate what was 20 going on? 21 A. Not that I'm aware, no. 22 Q. Do you remember Anne Chambers, who gave 23 a statement for and oral evidence at 24 Mr Castleton's trial? 25 A. I remember her name. I don't actually remember 163 1 the lady herself. 2 Q. Mrs Chambers has given oral evidence to the 3 Inquiry. Could we have the transcript of her 4 evidence given on 27 September this year on 5 screen, please. The reference is INQ00000980. 6 Going, please, to page 14 of that document. 7 A. Are you able to make it any bigger, please? 8 Q. Yes, if you just give is a moment I'll help the 9 RTS people zoom in. 10 A. That's it. 11 Q. So page 14 and what we're looking for is the 12 bottom of internal page 54, if we can zoom in 13 a little bit more to make it easier for 14 Ms Oglesby. 15 A. Yes, it's quite big enough now, thank you. 16 Q. Counsel to the Inquiry is asking Mrs Chambers 17 about the limits on her investigations, and he 18 asks this, at lines 20 to 22: 19 "So your investigation didn't extent to 20 whether there was a problem with the recording 21 of the transactions beyond the extent that 22 you've said?" 23 Mrs Chambers says this: 24 "There was no indication of any problem with 25 the recording of the transactions that was 164 1 visible to me, either when I looked in 2004, 2 when obviously there was, you know, more files 3 and things to look at ..." 4 Then moving over to page 55, at line 18 5 Mrs Chambers says she could not see that without 6 some way of knowing actually what had happened 7 at the branch. 8 Counsel to the Inquiry says this, at 9 line 21: 10 "One way of doing that would be to send 11 somebody in on balancing day, for example --" 12 Mrs Chambers says: 13 "Yes, or just during normal processes." 14 Counsel to the Inquiry: 15 "-- and just watch the subpostmaster or 16 their clerk do it?" 17 Then going to the right side of the page, 18 the top of internal page 56: 19 "Yeah, and try to keep a record that you 20 could check against at the end of the day. 21 I mean, the postmaster had a lot of reports that 22 had to be printed out at the end of the day, 23 with totals on for pensions and various other 24 things, and I believe that -- but this is 25 getting into business stuff, which wasn't -- 165 1 I had less familiarity with, but they were meant 2 to add up the dockets or counterfoils, or 3 whatever they'd got, for various things and 4 compare them against the totals on the reports, 5 to make sure that what was on the system was 6 consistent with the business that they had done. 7 "But there was something that I had no way 8 of chose checking." 9 The question from Counsel to the Inquiry is: 10 "Those are two things that could be done to 11 seek to discover whether there was an underlying 12 problem and, if so, what it was?" 13 The answer is: 14 "Absolutely, and it is possible that if 15 those sort of checks had been done, it might 16 have highlighted some sort of system problem. 17 At the time, my view was that seemed very 18 unlikely, but -- or, you know, completely 19 unlikely, completely impossible, but, in light 20 of where we are now, who knows." 21 So it seems from this that Fujitsu would not 22 have required specific evidence of a system 23 problem in order to visit Mr Castleton's branch. 24 Was that something that you -- can you help us, 25 knowing this, with why it was that you concluded 166 1 that there would be a need for specific evidence 2 of a system problem? 3 A. Well, I wasn't aware that Fujitsu would visit 4 a branch. That was -- that's maybe my naivety 5 but I wasn't aware of that, I hadn't heard of 6 that at any other branch but, as you say, this 7 was the only one that I was dealing with, with 8 high losses. The things about the checks around 9 the pensions and that the lady's talking about 10 there, those were the things we spoke about 11 earlier when I suggested that everything was 12 double checked against the reports before it 13 left the branch. 14 Those were the things that Mr Castleton and 15 I discussed him doing before it actually left 16 the branch every day, and he never -- I think in 17 all my notes that I've made -- he never found 18 one error, you know, that the system was making 19 that didn't correspond with the summary. 20 Q. Do you accept that someone from Fujitsu going 21 out to the branch was something which should at 22 least have been explored by the Post Office in 23 the very unusual circumstances of Mr Castleton's 24 case? 25 A. Yes, with hindsight, I think, yes, it should 167 1 have been. 2 Q. Going back, please, to your summary of events 3 and if we can have that back on screen, please, 4 LCAS0000699, page 3., and scrolling down 5 a little, please. We can see your summary here 6 of the fact that the apparent shortfalls or 7 apparent losses kept accumulating. Then 8 an audit happens on 23 March 2004 -- 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. -- and that's exactly it, the penultimate 11 paragraph there. 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. At the bottom of the page, you discuss your 14 decision to suspend Mr Castleton on the same day 15 as the audit. What was your reasoning for 16 suspending Mr Castleton at that point? 17 A. Well, the losses were -- we couldn't explain the 18 losses. Obviously, Lee was upset, and I -- the 19 only explanation Mr Castleton was coming back 20 with was that it was the Horizon equipment. So 21 I really wanted to try to take him and his staff 22 out of the equation and put somebody else in 23 there to see how the branch would balance, to 24 see if it carried on or if it stopped. 25 I wanted to, you know, safeguard Post Office 168 1 funds, as well. We were at a lot of money at 2 this point. 3 Q. The temporary subpostmaster who was put in place 4 at that stage was Ruth Simpson; is that right? 5 A. Yes, it is. 6 Q. So going over the page, please. You say about 7 three paragraphs down: 8 "I asked a very experienced postmaster if 9 she would run the office on a temp basis." 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Did you know Ruth Simpson before you asked her 12 to take up this position? 13 A. Yes. First Lane post office was one of the 14 branches in my area, so she was a postmaster in 15 my area. 16 Q. Going, please, to the top of page 5 of this 17 document, after Mrs Simpson has spent some time 18 in situ, at the top of the page, you approach 19 the Investigation Team for a second time, and 20 you say this: 21 "I spoke to Paul Whitaker from the 22 Investigation Team again. He said that they 23 didn't wish to take on the case or interview the 24 [postmaster] as he had kept me fully informed of 25 the situation on a weekly basis. Again, he said 169 1 that they needed to prove dishonesty and being 2 able to prove this looked unlikely." 3 Why did you raise the question of potential 4 criminality with the Investigation Team again? 5 A. I don't remember the exact conversation but 6 I will have been looking for some support or 7 help from somewhere, I will have been speaking 8 to the Contracts team and my line manager, as 9 well the Investigation Team. So I was looking 10 for some support, really, and some guidance. 11 Q. The Investigation Team said, again, that they 12 didn't think it was a criminal matter. After 13 this, Greg Booth took over as a temporary 14 subpostmaster, didn't he? Can you remember why 15 there was that change from Ruth Simpson to Greg 16 Booth? 17 A. Ruth had her own branch and I think she could 18 only commit to a few weeks and -- so she could 19 only commit to a few weeks, so I needed to find 20 somebody else. 21 Q. Based on the account that you've included in 22 this summary, it's right, isn't it, that both 23 temporary subpostmasters, Ms Simpson and 24 Mr Booth, had some balancing issues, albeit that 25 they were small discrepancies? Take time to 170 1 look back at your summary, if you need to. 2 A. I've written another note here. Yes, they had 3 shortages and gains, over the weeks that they 4 were there. 5 Q. Could we have on screen please document 6 reference POL00071234, and it's page 14 of that 7 document, please. This is a letter to you and 8 Mrs Joyce, dated 28 April 2004, from 9 Mr Castleton, and if we just go to the -- well, 10 we see the "L Castleton" at the top. 11 I think you've seen this document before, 12 but the last page is page 17 of that document, 13 please. Scrolling to the bottom and we can see 14 there that it's from Lee Castleton. 15 Going back to the first page, please, 16 towards the bottom, Mr Castleton says this, 17 starting on the bottom line: 18 "But would like to know whether these losses 19 actually exist or if as I believe they are 20 a figment of a computer's imagination." 21 Then he requested a number of things 22 relating to Horizon. So we have at 1: 23 "A full list of all software updates since 24 January 2004 to now, 28 April '04 ... 25 "2. List of all calls to Horizon and NBSC 171 1 from this office, since 16 January 2004 ... 2 "3. List of all calls to Horizon and NBSC 3 from any office in relation to computer balance 4 problems that seem unexplained. 5 "4. List of any Horizon problems which are 6 either ongoing or have been dealt with including 7 suspense account problems. What action was 8 taken and description of the work." 9 Then over the page, please: 10 "5. A detailed list of the requirements of 11 an RLM in such a case ... 12 "6. Contractual obligations of Horizon with 13 respect to how and when Horizon should act when 14 a fault on the system is suspected. 15 "7. What action is taken with data at 16 'Clear Desktop' within Horizon ... 17 "8. ... detailed breakdown of what is 18 checked during a Horizon system check when 19 system checks have been done on machines." 20 Further information sought there on system 21 checks: 22 "9. List of BT line faults ... 23 "10. I would also like to know if the 24 computer system has been off over the period of 25 my suspension. The reason for them being off. 172 1 The actions taken ..." 2 Just going over to the final page for 3 completeness: 4 "Any software changes or repairs required to 5 bring the system online again." 6 Your response to Mr Castleton is at page 18 7 of this document. Scrolling down a little, 8 please, from you. Going up again, please to 9 Mr Castleton, 6 May 2004, including a number of 10 documents. But it's right, isn't it, that you 11 didn't provide Mr Castleton with all of the 12 items he requested in his letter? 13 A. Yes, that's right. 14 Q. With the benefit of hindsight, do you accept 15 that the Post Office should have asked Fujitsu 16 to provide the evidence that Mr Castleton was 17 asking for? 18 A. I think I did ask for it but I just didn't 19 receive it to be able to pass it to him and, 20 yes, I do agree we should have. 21 Q. Again, with the benefit of hindsight, do you 22 think it was the wrong choice to dismiss him 23 before the questions he had about Horizon had 24 been answered? 25 A. Well, the decision to dismiss him -- because I'd 173 1 put people into the branch and there were no 2 real -- I know there were small losses and gains 3 but that's something you would expect in any 4 branch, I based, you know, part of my decision 5 on that the Horizon system was working and was 6 robust. I had no reason to believe it wasn't. 7 With hindsight now, then maybe it was premature. 8 Q. You set out the reasons for the termination of 9 Mr Castleton's contract, or a summary of those 10 at least, on the last page of your summary 11 document. If we can have that back on screen, 12 please, it's LCAS0000699. 13 It's the penultimate page, in fact, because 14 the last page is blank. About two-thirds of the 15 way down the page, you say, under the heading 16 "Monday 10 May 2004, RTU interview": 17 "At the interview Lee could only give one 18 explanation for the losses at his office and 19 that was computer software problems. He did not 20 provide any instances where the figures on his 21 cash accounts were incorrect, it was always the 22 cash figure that didn't match. He asked me to 23 explain the discrepancies at the top of his 24 final balances." 25 You go on to say: 174 1 "I sent copies to Liz Morgan and Davlyn 2 Cumberland in Leeds, two very experienced 3 suspense account people. They helped me with 4 the wording for my explanation. I sent a letter 5 to Lee on Friday 14 May, plus the interview 6 notes. Both Liz and Davlyn could not see 7 anything wrong with the way the computers were 8 working." 9 You say: 10 "I discussed the whole case with my HOA ..." 11 Can you just clarify what that acronym is? 12 A. Head of Area, my line manager. 13 Q. "... throughout. 14 "My decision is to summary terminate Lee 15 Castleton's contract for services." 16 What did you think had happened to the money 17 represented by this shortfall? 18 A. I didn't know where the money had gone and 19 that's why we were trying to look at every 20 aspect of, you know, where it could have gone. 21 Just an unexplained loss. It could have been 22 somebody, you know, taking the money, not 23 necessarily Mr Castleton. It could have been, 24 you know, the -- they were doing a really large 25 giro business deposit from a car auction, and 175 1 I know that the customer would leave a lot of 2 money there in the branch. You know, that might 3 have been the source of it. We talked about 4 that previously, making sure that was correct, 5 and things like that. 6 So I didn't know where the cash had gone. 7 I'd suggested lots of things to try to narrow it 8 down, which Mr Castleton hadn't wanted to do, 9 like the individual balancing. I'd put people 10 in the branch to try to prove to us both, 11 really, that the Horizon system was working 12 correctly. So it was just unexplained losses. 13 So I didn't know exactly where the money had 14 gone. 15 Q. So was it your view that there was a loss? Did 16 you find that, as a matter of fact, before you 17 terminated Mr Castleton's contract? 18 A. Well, it was a matter of fact that the money was 19 missing, so there was a loss. 20 Q. When it came to the civil proceedings brought by 21 the Post Office against Mr Castleton, you 22 provided a witness statement. Could we have 23 that on screen, please. It's POL00107117, and 24 it's paragraph 9 of that statement, please. You 25 say: 176 1 "At the material time, the subpostmaster 2 also had to balance the physical cash and stock 3 against the cash and stock shown on the 4 computers on a weekly basis and produce a Cash 5 Account. The Cash Account contained information 6 such as cash and stock in hand at the end of 7 that week, receipts, payments, the balance due 8 to the Post Office and whether there were any 9 discrepancies such as a surplus or shortfall. 10 The subpostmaster had to sign the Cash Account 11 and of course should not have done so unless it 12 was accurate." 13 It's right, isn't it, that subpostmasters 14 might well dispute apparent discrepancies 15 appearing on a final balance but still roll over 16 into the next trading period to enable them to 17 carry on trading? Did you come across that? 18 A. They would declare their loss or the gain, 19 though, and they're signing with the loss or the 20 gain on the account. 21 Q. But the case being run by the Post Office 22 against Mr Castleton was that the act of doing 23 that, of signing and rolling over, was 24 an acceptance that the accounts were correct, 25 and you say here: 177 1 "The subpostmaster had to sign the Cash 2 Account and of course should not have done so 3 unless it was accurate." 4 But because error notices took time to come 5 through, there might well be occasions where 6 cash accounts were confirmed and a subpostmaster 7 rolled over to allow them to continue trading, 8 when they didn't accept there was a discrepancy; 9 do you see that? 10 A. I can see what you're saying but they would 11 declare the loss or the gain on the account and 12 then sign and roll over. Is that what you're 13 saying? So they would do that, yes, but the 14 loss or the gain would be listed, you know, on 15 the account. 16 Q. So if the subpostmaster doesn't think that there 17 is a loss, they're not accepting the discrepancy 18 that's there on the draft, if we can put it in 19 that way, accounts. They don't agree that there 20 is a discrepancy. There might be an error 21 notice out there, there might not, but they 22 don't agree with that discrepancy. What you're 23 saying here is the subpostmaster had to sign the 24 cash account and, of course, he should not have 25 done so unless it was accurate. 178 1 There were often times, weren't there, when 2 subpostmasters would not think a discrepancy was 3 accurate and there was an error notice in the 4 pipeline or another reason, but they had to roll 5 over, didn't they, to carry on into the next 6 trading period? 7 A. Yes, but they'd still be signing the account to 8 say that that was accurate, the cash and stock 9 was accurate and, at that point in time, there 10 was also a discrepancy. So that would be a loss 11 or a gain. So they're signing the account, you 12 know, to say that's accurate at that point, with 13 the loss or the gain in there. 14 Q. What would have had happened if Mr Castleton had 15 refused to sign the cash account which showed 16 the loss or the apparent loss? 17 A. Well, nothing would have happened that I could 18 think of. 19 Q. Would he have been able to roll over into the 20 next trading period? 21 A. Without signing, yes, it would, yeah, he would 22 still roll the -- he would still roll the branch 23 over into the next period. It's only 24 a signature on a document. You could still 25 physically do that on the machine. 179 1 MS PRICE: Sir, those are the questions that I have 2 for Ms Oglesby. I'll turn now to Core 3 Participants to see if there are any questions. 4 Mr Henry has some questions, sir. 5 Questioned by MR HENRY 6 MR HENRY: Ms Oglesby, in the past, subpostmasters 7 were prosecuted on data, in other words the 8 books, they had generated and were responsible 9 for, which they had constructed and signed off 10 themselves, and were indisputably accountable 11 for. You agree with that, don't you, before 12 Horizon? 13 A. Oh, before Horizon? Yes, it was a book. 14 Q. Yes. Now they were being judged on data 15 generated by Horizon, which they could not 16 interrogate or control, correct? 17 A. Well, they could check the documentation that 18 Horizon then would be summarising, so that all 19 the documentation could be cross-referenced 20 against the figures on Horizon. 21 Q. But they were not in control of it? 22 A. Could you explain what you mean, please? 23 Q. Well, it was generated by Horizon itself and 24 they could not check how Horizon performed the 25 calculations. 180 1 A. But they could check -- so if we just take 2 an example, say the pension dockets, there would 3 be a counterfoil for each pension that would 4 have been inputted into Horizon, and then the 5 total on Horizon for the pensions you could 6 physically add up -- as we used to do before 7 Horizon, physically add them up and 8 cross-reference them with the figure on Horizon, 9 so you could double check all of the entries. 10 Q. But you're assuming that the system is bug, 11 error and defect free when saying that, aren't 12 you? 13 A. Yes, I am, yes. 14 Q. I'll move on. Janet Skinner, paragraph 89 of 15 your witness statement -- you recognise the name 16 Janet Skinner, didn't you? 17 A. Yes, I do. 18 Q. She worked in your area for years and, in fact, 19 you were her Area Manager at one time, weren't 20 you? 21 A. Yes, I was. 22 Q. You knew that she was an experienced 23 subpostmaster? 24 A. Well, she was an employee, I believe. 25 Q. Well, she was experienced and well regarded. 181 1 You knew that? 2 A. I don't know how long -- I can't remember 3 because it's quite some time ago, how long she'd 4 worked there, but I just know that I knew the 5 name Janet Skinner and she had been in my area 6 at one of the branches. I couldn't recall which 7 one now but I did know her. 8 Q. Fine. She was dismissed and prosecuted in May 9 2006 and you were aware of that, weren't you? 10 A. Yes, I was aware of it. I didn't know the 11 details of the case. 12 Q. As RLM in that general area, you would have also 13 become aware that the temporary SPM who came 14 after her, just like Mrs Skinner before her, was 15 investigated for stealing money. Do you 16 remember that? Wendy Lyle(?). 17 A. I don't, I'm sorry. The name doesn't ring 18 a bell at all with me. 19 Q. Well, the person who replaced Janet Skinner was 20 arrested for theft. So you had an experienced 21 member of staff, Janet Skinner, who'd suddenly 22 incurred large losses and was arrested, and then 23 you had her replacement, Wendy Lyle, who also 24 incurred large losses and was arrested. Did 25 that cause you to think that there might be 182 1 something wrong with the system? 2 A. Well, you say I knew all of this, but 3 I wasn't -- I'd moved roles in 2005, so I don't 4 I can't recall, you know, knowing that 5 information. 6 Q. I mean, you earlier accepted that you did know 7 that Janet Skinner had been prosecuted. You 8 didn't think that this was worth mentioning when 9 you gave evidence against Lee Castleton in 10 December 2006, did you? 11 A. I don't know at what point I became aware, 12 whether I would -- you know, this is going back 13 some 20 years. I don't know whether I would 14 have known at that point or not. So I wouldn't 15 like to say. If I'd have known, then I would 16 have mentioned it, so I'm presuming I didn't 17 know. 18 Q. I want to just briefly touch on the witness 19 statement. No need to put it up but do you not 20 recall that at paragraph 53 of your witness 21 statement, which was page 15 of the statement 22 that you filed in that case, you said the 23 following: 24 "Since Mr Castleton has been suspended the 25 temporary subpostmasters had worked with exactly 183 1 the same Horizon kit and the balance had 2 continued to be fine each day within expected 3 parameters. Mr Castleton had not given any 4 credible explanation for the unauthorised 5 shortfalls. In these circumstances I decided to 6 terminate summarily." 7 That wasn't accurate, was it? 8 A. Which part? 9 Q. Well, we know, don't we, that Mrs Simpson was 10 having difficulties and there were shortfalls, 11 weren't there, and there were discrepancies 12 above and below the line, weren't there? 13 A. Mrs Simpson wasn't having difficulties. She had 14 one particular error of £100, which she did have 15 an explanation for, which was -- 16 Q. Sorry, you carry on, please. 17 A. -- which she thought her staff member had left 18 an amount in the stack on Horizon and paid it 19 out a second time, which she'd previously done, 20 I believe, at her own branch. All the others 21 were -- all the other losses and gains that I've 22 noted were sort of under the £20 limit, really, 23 and some were over and some were short. 24 Q. She didn't process the Lottery transactions, 25 even though they were there from her first day, 184 1 did she? 2 A. Unless you can show me my notes, I don't recall, 3 I'm sorry. 4 Q. Well, I'm under some pressure of time, so if 5 I might just ask you to recall this. She didn't 6 use Horizon until 11.30 am on 1 April 2004, did 7 she? 8 A. I'm sorry, that's going back -- 9 Q. Because of a crash. It crashed. Do you not 10 recall her saying that it had to be rebooted, 11 and then she offered a different explanation, so 12 a mutually inconsistent explanation, that it 13 hadn't crashed but that she just decided to work 14 manually. 15 A. I can't recall that, I'm sorry. 16 Q. I suggest that there were evident problems with 17 Horizon when Ruth Simpson took over and no one 18 was being frank about it; isn't that right? 19 A. No, I don't agree. 20 Q. Could I ask you, please, to consider the answers 21 you've given to Counsel to the Inquiry, and I'm 22 going to ask if you might have been displaying 23 a degree of bias against Mr Castleton and that 24 you actually thought that he was dishonest. 25 What do you have to say to that? 185 1 A. No, I didn't think he was dishonest. I was 2 trying to find an explanation and help and 3 support him to try to find where the errors 4 were. 5 Q. Why did you speak to Mr Paul Whitaker twice in 6 the Criminal Investigation team; why did you 7 speak to Mr Paul Whitaker twice? 8 A. To try to get some support because, obviously, 9 I was very concerned at the losses. So it was 10 to try to get some help and support for that. 11 Q. But you wouldn't go to the criminal 12 Investigation Team for that, particularly since 13 he had told you emphatically that Mr Castleton 14 was not dishonest, that he had been frank about 15 the losses and had brought them to you -- 16 correct -- and he said that to you on two 17 occasions? 18 A. Yes, he did. 19 Q. Right. What I'm going to suggest is that it 20 would have far better suited your narrative, 21 made it a lot easier for you, if Mr Castleton 22 was dishonest, Horizon was robust and you could 23 have got a confiscation order against him in the 24 criminal courts. Isn't that the truth? That's 25 the way you were thinking at the time? 186 1 A. I was -- I didn't think for one minute that the 2 Horizon system wasn't robust. Every time I'd 3 asked anybody to check anything, everything came 4 back that the Horizon system was fine. So I was 5 trying to help Mr Castleton and try and find out 6 where -- and get help from other people, you 7 know, in the business. 8 Q. You see, what you ought to have done, rather 9 than calling the Criminal Investigation Team, 10 was to bombard Fujitsu with requests. That's 11 what you ought to have done, Mrs Oglesby. Don't 12 you accept that now? 13 A. With hindsight, yes, probably. 14 Q. So I put it to you again that the reason why you 15 twice contacted the Criminal Investigation Team 16 was because you hoped you could persuade them to 17 take on this case? 18 A. I was looking for help and support. That's why 19 I contacted them. 20 Q. That's your answer? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. Right. Can I ask you, please, to just deal with 23 paperwork. Did you not remove paperwork from 24 Mr Castleton during his suspension -- balance 25 snapshots, transactional logs -- purportedly to 187 1 get them analysed; do you remember that? 2 A. I believe I took them at the audit. Unless I've 3 made a note for when I took them, I think I took 4 some at the audit. 5 Q. He did exactly as you'd suggested, contrary to 6 what you say in paragraph 60 of your statement 7 to the Inquiry. He did exactly as you 8 suggested. He took repeated snapshots, balance 9 snapshots, he also annotated transactional logs 10 and they were taken away by you, weren't they? 11 A. I did take some balances and some snapshots, 12 which we discussed at his interview on 10 May 13 and which I gave him copies back of and that's 14 stated in there. 15 Q. I suggest that's not true. You did not give him 16 back copies and they were never returned to him. 17 Your memory is playing tricks. 18 A. I'm just -- if you can just have a moment to 19 find the notes from the interview, that's all 20 I'm going on, is the notes there. Just 21 a second. I might have a ... 22 I'm just looking at the notes of 10 May; 23 I won't be a moment. I'm sure it says on there 24 that we discussed them and copies were given. 25 Yes, it does. It says: 188 1 "We went on in detail to discuss the 2 balances, error notices, snapshots, and cash 3 declarations. Copies of all this information is 4 provided with a list of all the results of the 5 balance." 6 So that's what I was going on there. 7 Q. That was not provided to him. That was provided 8 to you. You were provided with his originals 9 and they were never returned. 10 A. Well, my understanding was he got copies of 11 those, and then the originals were put in the 12 file and given as part of the appeal process. 13 Everything was put together. 14 Q. Ms Oglesby, this is the subject of a complaint 15 by him -- subject of a complaint by him that he 16 hadn't had the material returned to him and that 17 it hamstrung his action against the Post Office; 18 don't you recall that? 19 A. Well, my understanding is that he got copies of 20 that. 21 MR HENRY: I see. I ask you no further questions. 22 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Does anyone else wish to ask any 23 questions? 24 MS PRICE: No, sir, no further questions from Core 25 Participants. 189 1 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Right. 2 Well, thank you, Mrs Oglesby, for making 3 your written statement and for answering 4 questions from Ms Price and Mr Henry. 5 That concludes, I believe, today's business, 6 yes, Ms Price? 7 MS PRICE: Yes, sir, we return tomorrow at 10.00 for 8 Tony Utting. 9 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, all right. Thank you very 10 much, everyone. 11 MS PRICE: Thank you, sir. 12 (4.29 pm) 13 (The hearing adjourned until 10.00 am 14 the following day) 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 190 I N D E X PAUL GRAHAM WHITAKER (affirmed) ...............5 Questioned by MS PRICE ........................5 Questioned by MR MOLONEY ....................132 CATHERINE OGLESBY (affirmed) ................135 Questioned by MS PRICE ......................135 Questioned by MR HENRY ......................180 191