1 Wednesday, 29 November 2023 2 (9.15 am) 3 MS PRICE: Good morning, sir, can you see and hear 4 us? 5 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, thank you. 6 MS PRICE: Please may we call Mr Pardoe. 7 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes. 8 DAVID JOHN PARDOE (affirmed) 9 Questioned by MS PRICE 10 MS PRICE: Can you confirm your full name, please, 11 Mr Pardoe? 12 A. David John Pardoe. 13 Q. You should have in front of you in a bundle 14 a hard copy of a witness statement in your name, 15 dated 24 October 2023. Have you got that? 16 A. Indeed. 17 Q. If you can turn to page 55 of that document, 18 please -- 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. -- you should have a copy with a visible 21 signature; is that right? 22 A. It is indeed. 23 Q. Is that your signature? 24 A. It is. 25 Q. Are the contents of that statement true to the 1 1 best of your knowledge and belief? 2 A. They are. 3 Q. For the purposes of the transcript, the 4 reference for the statement is WITN08170100. 5 Thank you for coming to the Inquiry to 6 assist it in its work and for providing the 7 witness statement that you have. As you know, 8 I will be asking questions on behalf of the 9 Inquiry. 10 Starting, please, with an overview of your 11 career with the Post Office, I understand you 12 have not had the benefit of seeing any written 13 records confirming the exact dates for which you 14 held relevant roles; is that right? 15 A. Unfortunately that's correct. 16 Q. The account of the roles you held set out in 17 your statement is you doing your best from 18 memory? 19 A. Indeed. 20 Q. Is it right that you first joined the Post 21 Office as a Crown Office counter clerk? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. Can you help with what year that was? You've 24 said how old you were in the statement. Can you 25 help with which year that was, roughly? 2 1 A. It would have been sometime in the '80s. 2 Q. You then progressed to hold a number of 3 administrative roles within the Liverpool 4 district. One of these roles was designing and 5 delivering training for subpostmasters; is that 6 right? 7 A. It was. 8 Q. What did that training cover? 9 A. So that was a significant shift, I think I say 10 in the statement that, historically, a new 11 subpostmaster had effectively sat with the 12 outgoing subpostmaster and been trained on site. 13 And the ramification of that on occasion is that 14 some bad habits were being picked up right from 15 the get-go. So it was decided that there would 16 be bespoke, classroom-driven training by skilled 17 trainers, who would then take the new 18 subpostmaster through a standard suite of 19 training requirements, and they would then 20 supplement that by onsite training. 21 So I think, from memory, there'd be a week 22 or so spent in a training facility and then 23 there would be at least one week spent working 24 each day at branch with the subpostmaster, and 25 I was one of two trainers who were actually 3 1 trialling that approach nationally on behalf of 2 the Post Office. 3 Q. There came a point when you were approached by 4 the Post Office Investigation Department to take 5 up a specific role. Before you explain what 6 that role was, can you help with the remit of 7 the Post Office Investigation Department at that 8 time? 9 A. So the Post Office Investigation Department, 10 we'd refer to them as POID at the time, and they 11 had group-wide remit. So they would conduct 12 investigations impacting Royal Mail Group and, 13 from memory at the time, that would have 14 consisted of Post Office, Royal Mail, of Cashco, 15 who were the cash-carrying arm of Post Office, 16 and Parcelforce Worldwide, as well, who were 17 obviously the parcel-carrying arm of the Post 18 Office and they would conduct the full range of 19 investigation activities on behalf of those 20 business units. 21 Q. What was the role you were offered when you were 22 first approached by the POID? 23 A. Yeah, I was approached by two gentlemen that 24 I already knew were members of POID. I think 25 ironically one had interviewed me for a counter 4 1 shortage a year or so before that, and they 2 approached me, and they outlined that there was 3 a branch in inner city Liverpool, that it was 4 a sub office branch or a modified branch, 5 I think it was referred to at the time, run by 6 a subpostmaster, that was having a series of 7 significant losses and suspected benefit book 8 payment fraud. 9 They knew the subpostmaster was not involved 10 and they asked if, effectively -- and it sounds 11 a little bit grandiose -- if, effectively, I'd 12 go undercover in that branch, run that branch on 13 behalf of the subpostmaster whilst at the same 14 time being the conduit for them to perform 15 covert surveillance. 16 And this was the day when the covert 17 surveillance couldn't be done remotely, couldn't 18 be done by IP cameras, it was simply a pinhole 19 camera in a false ceiling, connected to a video 20 recorder and my remit was to run the branch on 21 a day-to-day basis and to change the video tapes 22 and to meet one or other of the two gentlemen, 23 early morning in branch, to hand over videotape 24 product from the previous two or three days. 25 Q. You were then offered the role of the 5 1 Investigation Liaison Officer; is that right? 2 A. That's right. 3 Q. That was in around 1991? 4 A. It would have been, yes. 5 Q. What did the role involve? 6 A. So I've referenced POID as being the -- 7 obviously the group-wide body that would drive 8 investigations. So, for each business unit, 9 there needed to be some form of conduit to take 10 suspected cases of dishonesty and report those 11 cases into POID. And that liaison role, that's 12 exactly what that did. So it would take prima 13 facie cases concerning potential staff 14 dishonesty, it would put those into a reporting 15 format, submit with that outline of evidence, 16 and submit that for consideration for further 17 investigation into POID. 18 So it would not have been performing first 19 officer, certainly, would not even have been 20 performing second officer type activity; it was 21 purely an administrative role that would be the 22 conduit between the Liverpool district, as 23 I remember at the time, and National POID or 24 certainly the Liverpool branch of POID. 25 Q. Is it right that there was no formal training 6 1 for the POID interface role? 2 A. None whatsoever, and I've -- if I can go on, 3 I feel I say in the statement that I didn't feel 4 disadvantaged by that. It was purely -- I'd 5 have a report from an audit function from 6 a Regional Manager, an Area Manager and I would 7 report that into POID. It was as simple as 8 that; it was more administrative. 9 Q. Is it right that there came a point when you 10 were encouraged to become more involved in 11 investigations being submitted to the POID? 12 A. This is where I'm really going to have to search 13 back into my memory. There came a time when 14 I had elements of formal training, with a view 15 that, rather than just simply piecemeal hand 16 this investigation product over to POID, that we 17 would start to support as second officers. 18 I never fully understood the politics behind 19 that. I suspect that's some way above my pay 20 grade but you're right: there was certainly 21 a time when we were being encouraged to sit 22 closer with POID and that would involve 23 performing second officer type activity for 24 interviews under caution. 25 Q. You say at paragraph 11 of your statement that 7 1 this was the start of your formal training. Can 2 you recall even roughly what year this would 3 have been? 4 A. I think we'd be coming towards the mid-1990s, 5 I would have thought for that, potentially 6 coming into the late 1990s, that would seem to 7 ring a bell with me. 8 Q. Is it right that this training was 9 classroom-based training delivered by Royal Mail 10 Group? 11 A. It was indeed. I do recall that, yes. 12 Q. You say at paragraph 11 of your statement that 13 you had access to other materials; is that 14 right? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. You also say at paragraph 11 that you were very 17 heavily mentored by an experienced and far more 18 senior Investigation Manager in this role? 19 A. Absolutely, yes. 20 Q. You then became an Assistant Investigator in the 21 newly formed Regional Security Department; is 22 that right? 23 A. Correct. 24 Q. Again, roughly speaking, how many years after 25 taking on the second officer role did you become 8 1 an Assistant Investigator? 2 A. It would have been a matter of years. It 3 certainly wasn't a short few months; it would 4 have been a matter of years. 5 Q. At this stage, you underwent further training; 6 is that right? 7 A. Absolutely. 8 Q. You say that included classroom training as well 9 as electronic and paper handouts; is that right? 10 A. From memory, yes. 11 Q. You also have a recollection of meeting members 12 of the Criminal Law Team in your training; is 13 that right? 14 A. Yes, in Croydon, Impact House, as they were 15 based at the time, yes. 16 Q. You say at paragraph 21.2 of your statement that 17 you recall training sessions from both in and 18 out of house lawyers as well as training staff 19 from the Post Office Investigation Department; 20 is that right? 21 A. Yes, it is. 22 Q. Can you recall roughly how long you were 23 an Assistant Investigator before you became 24 a substantive lead Investigator? 25 A. It would have been two, three years, something 9 1 like that. 2 Q. You deal with becoming a lead Investigator at 3 paragraph 16 of your statement. Could we have 4 that on screen, please, it is page 6 of 5 WITN08170100. You say here: 6 "Again, I would need reference to Post 7 Office HR details, but I then became 8 a substantive lead investigator. This move was 9 supported by additional training and my lead 10 work (first officer interviews, file preparation 11 and so on) was highly supervised to the extent 12 that even grammatical errors within reports 13 would be returned for correction -- that was the 14 standard of supervision. Even after this 15 promotion to lead investigator I remained in 16 supervision for many, many months and certainly 17 longer than for any professional role I have 18 held subsequently. I don't think this was any 19 reflection on my ability to progress at pace, it 20 was just the way it was. There was 21 a recognition that the role was unique and 22 required a high level of interpersonal skill and 23 confidence to deploy effectively." 24 You deal further with this role at 25 paragraph 21(iii) your statement. Could we turn 10 1 to that, please, it's page 9, and scrolling 2 down, please, to (iii), you say: 3 "The investigator role was regionally based. 4 My training detailed above was supplemented by 5 significant levels of supervision and general 6 oversight. In this role I was performing the 7 role of lead investigator and discharging 8 activity from interviews under caution through 9 to case paper and committal preparation. To the 10 best of my knowledge all my tenure in this 11 capacity was pre-Horizon." 12 Is it right, then, that you stopped 13 conducting investigations yourself before the 14 introduction of the Horizon system in the year 15 2000? 16 A. Yes, it is. I certainly recall that to the 17 extent, if I may add, that I think I was 18 deployed doing other activity when formal 19 Horizon training was being undertaken and I had 20 to have, effectively, a supplementary oversight 21 course to that. 22 Q. From the position of being a Regional Lead 23 Investigator, is it right that you then became 24 an Investigation Team leader, also regionally? 25 A. I do wonder if that wasn't superseded by another 11 1 role, albeit there was a period obviously when 2 I became an Investigation Team leader. 3 Q. Can you recall what that other role might have 4 been in the interim? 5 A. I know that there was a role where I was 6 seconded, I think it was for around about 7 12 months, on the creation of Post Office 8 Limited. So that was project management work, 9 working from London. As I say, I don't know if 10 that came before or after -- I apologise, 11 I don't know if that came before or after the 12 team leader role. Certainly, yes, became 13 a substantive Investigation Team Leader. 14 Q. You deal with the team leader role and the 15 national roles you held at paragraph 21(iv) of 16 your statement. Scrolling down a little, 17 please, you say: 18 "I don't recall me holding National 19 Investigator role (I thought this was a title 20 afforded to a former line manager Mr Tony 21 Utting). There was a period when I was 22 responsible for leading a small team of 23 Investigators, again a regional role. This role 24 was leading on complex investigations and 25 supporting a team to ensure effective casework 12 1 delivery. Again, this was mainly pre-Horizon 2 and was interspaced with a period supporting 3 Tony Utting as National Investigation Manager 4 for Post Office Limited; I also supported 5 Mr Utting at this time with the draft of policy 6 documents and also was seconded for a 12-month 7 period as a project head to the creation of Post 8 Office Limited from Post Office Counters." 9 A. Correct. 10 Q. In terms of the role you held supporting Tony 11 Utting with the draft of policy documents, there 12 is a document which has been provided to you 13 relatively recently which may assist with dating 14 this role. Could we have that on screen, 15 please. The reference is POL00166569. This 16 document is undated but it appears to set out 17 the roles and responsibilities of a role you 18 held at one point, that of Internal Crime Policy 19 and Standards Manager. Do you recognise this 20 document now? 21 A. I do, yes. 22 Q. Did you hold this role, Internal Crime Policy 23 and Standards Manager? 24 A. I did. I wonder how much of the substantive 25 role actually undertook those deliverables but 13 1 I certainly held a role with that title, yes. 2 Q. Looking, please, to the last section towards the 3 bottom of the page, "Role of Assurance", to the 4 last bullet point, this is: 5 "To provide assurance to the National 6 Internal Crime Manager in own areas of 7 accountability." 8 Is this the role you were referring to in 9 your statement when you say you supported Tony 10 Utting as a National Investigation Manager? 11 A. It is, I've clearly used the wrong title. 12 Apologies, yes. 13 Q. So do you think it is this role that involved 14 you supporting Mr Utting with the draft of 15 policy documents? 16 A. As required, yes. 17 Q. At the top of this document, please, the "Scope 18 of Area" is set out. The first thing listed is 19 "MI access/flows/adequacy". Can you help with 20 what "MI" is an acronym for? 21 A. Management information. 22 Q. Then the second bullet point there, "Legal 23 Services (Criminal Law) conduit" and "Internal 24 crime risks and issues". Under the "Role of 25 User for Own Operations Teams", that first 14 1 heading, there's this: 2 "Ensure that MI flows and sources are 3 identified that facilitate the identification 4 and prosecution of internal crime." 5 Second bullet point: 6 "Establish the adequacy of MI flows in the 7 support of the above." 8 Thirdly: 9 "Ensure that MI access is identified to 10 enable data retrieval in line with demands 11 above." 12 Pausing there, can you help with what data 13 was to be retrieved? 14 A. I -- sorry, I -- simply, reading that, I don't 15 recall that. I think that's an element of the 16 role that was clearly there within the design of 17 the role that just didn't come through to 18 fruition. I don't recall at that stage having 19 a substantive role where I'd be the conduit for 20 MI access at all. Sorry. 21 Q. The next bullet point says this: 22 "Through Legal Services (Criminal Law Team) 23 establish the legal status of the Branch Trading 24 Statement." 25 Is this a reference to the introduction of 15 1 branch trading? 2 A. I'm assuming it is but, again, I have no 3 recollection that I deployed any element of 4 that. 5 Q. So this would have been after the introduction 6 of Horizon -- 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. -- trying to date this document. 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. The Inquiry understands branch trading to have 11 been introduced in around 2005. Does that fit 12 with your recollection of things? 13 A. I'd have to go with that, I thought this would 14 be slightly earlier but, if that's the case, 15 that's the case. 16 Q. It appears that one of your responsibilities was 17 to establish the legal status of the branch 18 trading statement. Can you recall why there was 19 a need to establish the legal status of the 20 branch trading statement? 21 A. And, again, that is an element of the role that 22 I do not think came through to fruition. I do 23 not recall a piece of work -- in fact, I don't 24 know why that would even sit with that type of 25 policy and standards role. 16 1 Q. Were you given any kind of briefing for this 2 role? 3 A. Well, of course there would have been a job 4 description. There would have been a remit to 5 that role. But, after the passage of so much 6 time, I can't say with conviction the precise 7 elements of the role and its deliverables. 8 Q. In the context of branch trading statements, 9 were events at Marine Drive Post Office, 10 relating to a subpostmaster called Lee 11 Castleton, raised with you by anyone, either in 12 a briefing when you took up the role or at any 13 point before or after you took up this role? 14 A. From memory, no. 15 Q. To the extent that you can recall, was the focus 16 on the branch trading statement as a result of 17 a desire to ensure that the branch trading 18 statement had the status of an unimpeachable 19 record of the cash and stock which an Auditor 20 should find when they audited a branch? 21 A. I don't recall it ever being outlined to me in 22 that context unfortunately, no. 23 Q. Can you recall what the Criminal Law Team's role 24 was in relation to establishing the legal status 25 of the branch trading statement? 17 1 A. No, I can't. 2 Q. Looking at the next bullet point please: 3 "Through Legal Services (Criminal Law Team) 4 research alternative criminal charges to 5 accompany change in status of Cash Account to 6 Trading Statement." 7 Why was there a need to research alternative 8 criminal charges to accompany the change in 9 status of cash account to trading statement? 10 A. I've absolutely no clue. I've not a clue. 11 Again, I wouldn't know why that would sit with 12 a policy standards role, it seems completely 13 outside of that. You know, that should sit 14 firmly with the Criminal Law Team. 15 Q. Can you recall there being any discussion of 16 alternative criminal charges? 17 A. No, I can't. 18 Q. The next bullet point says this: 19 "Comment on trading and communication needs 20 to operational investigators and other 21 identified stakeholders." 22 Was this referring to training and 23 communication required because of the 24 introduction of branch trading, or more 25 generally? 18 1 A. More generally, from recollection. 2 Q. Did you provide any comment on what the training 3 and communication needs for operational 4 investigators were -- 5 A. I would assume that I did during that period, 6 yes. 7 Q. The last bullet point here: 8 "Identify and comment on internal crime risk 9 issues within scope." 10 Can you recall if there were any new crime 11 risk issues which you identified on taking up 12 this role? 13 A. The only thing that springs to mind is if this 14 was towards the cessation of the benefit book as 15 a method of payment which, from memory, would 16 have been around about 2005, then there would 17 have been quite a significant tranche of work to 18 risk assure the withdrawal of that Post Office 19 product. 20 Q. Going to the next section, please, the "Role of 21 Planning". It says here you were to: 22 "Feed into the Planning Team information on: 23 "issues 24 "risks 25 "concerns 19 1 "training & comms requirements (for 2 operational investigators & other 3 stakeholders)." 4 Then the last section deals with assurance. 5 We've touched on that last bullet point already. 6 Could we have paragraph 33 of Mr Pardoe's 7 statement on screen, please. It is page 15 of 8 WITN08170100. You say at paragraph 33: 9 "Very early in my Security career I worked 10 with Tony Utting as National Investigation 11 Manager. I held for a very brief period 12 a policy and standards role. I do not recognise 13 any of my work from this period in the supplied 14 documents. This would certainly have been 15 a pre-Horizon role. Any of my work from that 16 time I suspect would predate materials available 17 to be given to the Inquiry." 18 Having seen the roles and responsibilities 19 document since making your statement, I think 20 you now accept that the policy and standards 21 role was, in fact, a role you held after the 22 rollout of the Horizon system? 23 A. Absolutely, yes. 24 Q. Although you could not recognise any of your 25 policy drafting work in the documents supplied 20 1 to you by the Inquiry, can you recall what type 2 of policy documents you worked on? 3 A. I think, logically, there'd have been documents 4 around case file construction, documents of that 5 nature. I can't be more specific, 6 unfortunately. 7 Q. Accepting that it is difficult to recall exact 8 dates now, can you recall whether you took up 9 the role of Senior Security Manager before or 10 after you held the policy and standards role? 11 A. I think that would have been a more senior role, 12 so logically that would have been after the 13 policy and standards role. 14 Q. So assuming that you held the policy and 15 standards role at the point when branch trading 16 was introduced in around 2005, would that mean 17 you took up the role of Senior Security 18 Manager -- 19 A. It would. 20 Q. -- after that? 21 A. It would. 22 Q. You address at paragraph 22 of your statement 23 the varied positions you held when you were 24 a Senior Security Manager, which included 25 Commercial Security Manager and Fraud Strand or 21 1 Security Operations Manager, the title, it 2 seems, varying depending on the terminology used 3 to describe this strand of the Security Team; is 4 that right? 5 A. Correct. 6 Q. Is it right that it was in this role as a Senior 7 Security Manager leading the Fraud or Security 8 Operations strand of the Security Team, that you 9 made decisions on prosecutions as the nominated 10 representative? 11 A. I believe so, yes. 12 Q. A position that we've also heard referred to as 13 the designated prosecuting authority? 14 A. Correct. 15 Q. You say that your training continued when you 16 held these roles, and you qualified as 17 a Proceeds of Crime Act Senior Appropriate 18 Officer; is that right? 19 A. It is. 20 Q. At paragraph 20 of your statement, you suggest 21 that Iain Murphy was the Fraud Strand leader for 22 a period throughout 2010 and you think he was 23 your successor; is that right? 24 A. I do and, from recollection, this is where the 25 waters become muddied, so there would have been 22 1 Iain Murphy. I then think that the role handed 2 over to, potentially, Andy Haywood and then 3 onwards from that, it's certainly about '10, 4 '11, going into '12, where I probably lack some 5 clarity around succession. 6 Q. Is it right, therefore, that you think you moved 7 to the crime, intelligence and administrative 8 function titled Grapevine in 2010? 9 A. I think it may have been later than that. If 10 I may, the piece that throws me is that there is 11 clearly, within the papers, a prosecution 12 decision made by myself, there is then 13 a prosecution report addressed to Iain Murphy 14 but then the decision precedes Iain Murphy, so 15 I'm confused there about the exact time that 16 Iain would have been in post and why it appears 17 I've ebbed and flowed out of that post. 18 Q. If we can have paragraph 20 on screen, please, 19 it's page 8. Scrolling down a bit, please, 20 about halfway down this paragraph. You refer to 21 Mr Murphy here and you say, in relation to the 22 Senior Security Manager in leading the Fraud 23 Strand, you think Mr Murphy held the position 24 throughout 2010. So what do you think you were 25 doing in 2010? 23 1 A. That's the bit I'm really struggling to 2 recollect. 3 Q. You say in this paragraph that you think you 4 returned to Security Operations for a period in 5 2011; is that right? 6 A. Correct. 7 Q. But you say you had certainly taken up the 8 substantive Grapevine Senior Security Manager 9 role by 2012? 10 A. Correct. 11 Q. We'll come on to the detail of that role in due 12 course. Finally, for around nine months before 13 you left the Post Office in late 2014, you say 14 you were removed from your role, and you deal 15 with this at paragraph 22(v) of your statement. 16 It's page 12, please. 17 You say: 18 "Around 9 months or so before I left in late 19 2014, I was effectively being removed from my 20 role and asked to design a structure that would 21 again support a reduction in headcount as well 22 as accommodate my departure. I wasn't exactly 23 placed on gardening leave, but my operational 24 career with Post Office was at an end and I was 25 more or less omitted from all other activity." 24 1 Restructuring and repeated reductions in 2 headcount feature in a number of places in your 3 statement. Could we go back, please, to page 6 4 of the statement, to paragraph 17. Here you say 5 this: 6 "There followed a further series of team 7 restructures, building moves and boundary moves. 8 The function throughout the years if not decades 9 always struck me as an easy target to drive 10 headcount reduction. Indeed, later in my career 11 I was performing the role of consultation 12 manager for a long serving colleague who had 13 been subject to redundancy. I was to follow 14 a party line around change being a business 15 necessity ... when the colleague abruptly 16 stopped me and proceeded to produce a piece of 17 paper and recount the 14 restructures they had 18 been personally impacted by since joining the 19 Post Office -- the majority in the Security 20 field. That was the regularity of structure 21 change." 22 You address this theme further at 23 paragraph 30 of your statement. Could we go to 24 that, please. It's page 14. You say here: 25 "Function changes could be significant. 25 1 I seem to recall organisational charts with 80 2 or so colleagues, quickly depleted over the 3 years. There were several significant changes 4 that led to sizeable redundancies, strand 5 renaming and functional job titles changing." 6 Do you think that the depletion of numbers 7 within the Security team had a detrimental 8 impact on the adequacy and sufficiency of 9 investigations. 10 A. Without a shadow of a doubt. 11 Q. One example you give in your statement of 12 resourcing changes impacting upon the scope of 13 investigation work is at paragraph 43. Could we 14 have that on screen, please. It's page 18. You 15 say: 16 "There was also a period when resources 17 would have been applied to suspected thefts from 18 SPMR assistants. By this I mean cash thefts and 19 not simply fraud against customers and/or 20 clients. This ceased when I was new in role and 21 ended with the transition of Districts to 22 Regions that I mention earlier in the statement. 23 On an aside, I do think that was a retrograde 24 step as it left SPMRs isolated and with the 25 unenviable task of attempting to engender police 26 1 support to counter and evidence suspected 2 employee theft." 3 This retrograde step had a direct impact on 4 subpostmasters who experienced an apparent loss 5 in branch and suspected their staff of theft, 6 didn't it? 7 A. Absolutely. 8 Q. Was it a step taken to save money? 9 A. Yes, it was. 10 Q. To your knowledge, where there was a shortfall 11 in a subpostmaster's branch and the evidence 12 pointed to theft on the part of a member of 13 a subpostmaster's staff, was it the Post 14 Office's approach to seek to recover the 15 shortfall under the subpostmaster's contract? 16 A. On every occasion. 17 Q. Before the resourcing change you address at 18 paragraph 43, would the Post Office have 19 prosecuted the staff member and sought to 20 recover the money from them directly through the 21 criminal courts? 22 A. From memory, yes. So the logical steps that 23 would be taken would be an out-of-hours onsite 24 meeting with the subpostmaster, a review of the 25 trading accounts, at which that stage would be 27 1 paper based, daily and weekly trading accounts 2 and then, logically, there would ordinarily 3 be -- a covert camera would be installed at 4 branch. 5 When we referred to the stage when I was the 6 liaison officer, that would be another element 7 of my role. I would view the ensuing video 8 product, as and when theft was identified -- and 9 I must add, in the majority of cases, theft was 10 identified -- and that product would be passed 11 into the Post Office Investigation Department 12 for their direct investigation. 13 Q. Was a material factor in the resourcing change 14 a view within the Post Office that it was easier 15 to recovery money from a subpostmaster under 16 their contract than to go after the thief 17 directly? 18 A. I think element, yes, but I think the primary 19 driver, which has already been touched on, is 20 that that is undoubtedly a resource-hungry 21 approach and a decision was taken some way above 22 my pay grade that that was no longer a suitable 23 application of investigation resource. 24 Q. Were you or your colleagues ever consulted about 25 business restructures or reductions in 28 1 headcount? 2 A. So if I can just break that down. In terms of 3 consultation, we would be very much handed the 4 fait accompli. So I tended to take a lead on 5 the majority of the restructures once I reached 6 a suitable grade. You would be told that there 7 would be a number of hours and an associated 8 financial cost that had to be lost from the 9 function, and I would go away and work with 10 other strand leads and with the Head of Security 11 about repopulating a function that would achieve 12 those cost reduction demands. 13 Q. Did you ever raise concerns about the impact of 14 restructuring or headcount reductions with your 15 seniors? 16 A. Absolutely. 17 Q. Can you elaborate on that? 18 A. There was a step taken on every occasion that it 19 was better to put your hand up and volunteer to 20 lose resource, rather than wait for the business 21 to come after you and demand that that resource 22 be left -- be reduced. So we would always be on 23 the front foot of almost offering up resource. 24 And, to my mind, there was no correlation 25 between the resource we were offering up and the 29 1 demands on the function in terms of the numbers 2 of cases that were being raised and the demands 3 on individual Investigators. And I think both 4 myself and other senior security personnel had 5 some real concerns about the functions that were 6 being lost and the increased demands that were 7 being placed on Investigators, particularly as 8 a result. 9 Obviously, there were other functions of the 10 Security family that were being impacted but 11 certainly on the operational Investigators. 12 Because it just -- it followed no logic, you 13 know. This was not a function that was 14 experienced in less caseload. There were some 15 significant changes going on for subpostmasters 16 during this time. UK Plc were changing in the 17 way that they were customers of the Post Office, 18 so that gone were the days when customers would 19 queue up every quarter to pay a phone bill or 20 a gas bill, or queue up every six months to pay 21 a car tax. 22 The result of that is that, in my opinion 23 and fact, is that subpostmasters' salaries were 24 reducing year on year. That increased the 25 financial demand. Logically, that could 30 1 increase the demand on an investigation function 2 because of wrongdoing. So there's a complete 3 anathema there that that then would then lead to 4 a function that's reducing in size because 5 obviously activity would have to cease. 6 Q. What was the response of those you raised 7 concerns with? 8 A. We marched on regardless and we lost the heads 9 accordingly. 10 Q. I'm sorry, can you say that last bit again? 11 A. We marched on regardless and we lost the heads 12 accordingly. 13 Q. What was it that led to you being removed from 14 your role nine months before your departure? 15 A. I said removal: so this is not a physical 16 removal. This was just -- you just sense and 17 you know that you are being omitted from future 18 plans, from future strategic development. So 19 I'd still be within the workplace but it's just 20 a sense, isn't it? You just know that, I guess, 21 you know, my light was about to extinguish and 22 that I was -- by that stage I'd had a leaving 23 date from the business and that I knew that 24 I would be leaving that business imminently. 25 Q. Did you get any impression of why it was that 31 1 this plan for you had been formed? 2 A. I think it was common practice, to be honest. 3 I'd seen it before with other peers, that once, 4 if you want, they were out of favour, that there 5 would be almost a discarding of them, they were 6 no longer seen to be useful and that it was just 7 a matter of time until they exited the business 8 and the function just continued. 9 Q. Do you know why you were out of favour? 10 A. I think we use an expression, don't we, about 11 falling out of love. I was incredibly proud of 12 my Post Office career. I was proud of the 13 things that I'd achieved, the way that I'd 14 developed personally and professionally. 15 I became tired with the prevailing culture. 16 I became more conscious of the impact that the 17 culture was having on both my peers' direct 18 reports and direct reports to direct reports. 19 I became more sensitive as an individual, in 20 that the decisions that we were quite coldly 21 making were having significant personal impacts 22 on individuals, and I think it's probably fair 23 to say that it's a culture I wanted to step away 24 from. 25 With hindsight -- and hindsight's always 32 1 20:20 -- it's probably a decision that I should 2 have taken some years previously. 3 Q. You also say at paragraph 20 of your statement 4 that you have an issue with several prosecution 5 decision-making activities and subsequent 6 inputs, which you address later in your 7 statement. We'll come on to those parts of your 8 statement in more detail in due course but, 9 broadly speaking, do these relate, in the main, 10 to the messaging of the Post Office around the 11 reliability of the Horizon system? 12 A. No. 13 Q. No. What do the concerns or did the concerns 14 with the prosecution decision-making activities 15 and subsequent inputs relate to? 16 A. I think it's a -- sorry, if there's any 17 confusion. I think it refers to the continuity 18 of my involvement once the decision had been 19 made. 20 Q. Can you explain that a little more? 21 A. Absolutely. So, yes, I could have been in that 22 post. Again, we come to that 2010/11 when 23 a decision has been made. Again, without 24 a definitive suite of organisational charts, 25 I don't know when I would have left that role. 33 1 So a decision could be made, there then could, 2 say, be a request for further evidence or there 3 could be a twist and turn in that 4 decision-making process. I may not have been in 5 post then to actually see that through to 6 fruition. 7 Q. You refer at paragraph 19 of your statement to 8 having worked with some individuals at the Post 9 Office who were highly capable and committed to 10 doing their role to the best of their ability, 11 and others who were less so and would be managed 12 accordingly. Can you recall any examples of an 13 individual being less capable and committed to 14 their role? 15 If I can ask you to pause there. 16 (Pause for fire alarm) 17 Our apologies for that interruption. 18 My question before the alarm was: can you 19 recall any examples of an individual being less 20 capable and committed to their role, with the 21 effect that they were managed? 22 A. Absolutely, yes. 23 Q. Would you share those with us or an example with 24 us? 25 A. Absolutely. So we used to use an expression, 34 1 which I guess is somewhat distasteful, but 2 we'd -- irrespective of the support that we'd 3 give an individual. So this was all -- if you'd 4 look at the Investigator, this was always a role 5 that it was accepted there would be 6 a significant lead-in time to perform 7 competently. But there would be an expression 8 that would be used if an individual was "tackle 9 shy", and what that would translate to is that 10 an individual could not quite get over that 11 hurdle of making introductions to a suspect, 12 sitting them down, performing a competent 13 interview, if that whole part of the process 14 just filled them with so much turmoil because of 15 what they were facing, that they just couldn't 16 perform the role effectively. 17 I know of at least two, if not three 18 individuals, who, probably even after the 19 probationary period, we had to draw a line in 20 the sand, almost, with one of them, for their 21 own benefit, to say "This clearly is not 22 working, you're full -- you know, the anxiety 23 that you're exhibiting, you know, even with the 24 thought of sitting somebody down and 25 interviewing them is so much so that, you know, 35 1 the view is taken that the role is not going to 2 be for you". And that happen on at least two 3 occasions, if not three. 4 Q. Could we have on screen, please, paragraph 13 of 5 Mr Pardoe's statement, this page 4. So this is 6 going back to the period in time in relation to 7 your training that you received when you were 8 an Assistant Investigator, so the bottom of 9 paragraph 12 before there, and at paragraph 13 10 you say this about your training: 11 "This period saw me receive significantly 12 more training both formally and informally. 13 It's difficult to recall the timeline, but at 14 various stages in an operational role I received 15 classroom investigative training, internally and 16 externally delivered courses around search 17 awareness (using Metropolitan Police 18 facilities), interviewing course with Lancashire 19 Constabulary, PACE training, RIPA awareness and 20 CPIA awareness. Elements such as PACE, RIPA, 21 HRA and CPIA were supplemented with various 22 materials that were intended for retention. 23 PACE and CPIA Codes of Practice would have been 24 available within every interview kit. I still 25 recall having the codes in my investigation kit. 36 1 In my Post Office career, I also studied and 2 passed my Proceeds of Crime Act Senior 3 Appropriate Officer. This was a pass fail 4 one-week course delivered by the National Police 5 Improvement Agency." 6 The training you describe here, with the 7 exception of your POCA training, was this all 8 training you received as an Investigator 9 pre-Horizon? 10 A. From memory, yes, and, logically, it would have 11 been. 12 Q. So at the time you were an Investigator, you 13 recall there being copies of the PACE and CPIA 14 Codes of Practice available in an interview kit; 15 is that right? 16 A. So CPIA, you need to refresh my memory, is that 17 '97, is it? 18 Q. '96. 19 A. '96, then, yes, there would have been. 20 Q. What was an interview kit? 21 A. So an interview kit would be a ring binder, 22 similar to the one I've got in front of me, you 23 would have witness statements in there, you'd 24 have bank authority disclosures blanks in there. 25 You'd have the introduction to tape recorded 37 1 interviews. Logically, you'd have the most 2 up-to-date copy of PACE, you'd have the CPIA 3 Codes of Practice. You may carry with you the 4 Police Almanac, as well, in there. So there'd 5 be a variety of blank templates that could be 6 useful for any particular investigation activity 7 along with the Codes of Practice and Police 8 Almanac. 9 Q. How was this kit used? Where did you take it? 10 A. Everywhere with you. So if you were going out 11 doing an operational investigation that could 12 have resulted in an interview under caution, we 13 would use a two-tape Neal tape recorder and, as 14 well as the tape recorder with you, you would 15 carry -- I think the vernacular was the "tackle 16 kit", you would carry this kit with you. So, 17 traditionally, it would have been kept in the 18 boot of Investigators' cars, ready to be used on 19 various operational activities. 20 Q. When you were a Senior Security Manager, were 21 Investigators still provided with copies of the 22 PACE and CPIA Codes of Practice and an interview 23 kit? 24 A. Absolutely. So if there'd been any change to 25 that, that would have been given to existing 38 1 Investigators and then new hires to the function 2 traditionally would have been given that through 3 their formal training. 4 Q. You refer at paragraph 35 of your statement to 5 a suite of policies and procedural standards, 6 listing the legislation and codes you refer to 7 at paragraph 13 here. Where was this suite of 8 policies and procedural standards held and how 9 would Investigators access this material, so 10 both when you were an Investigator and later, 11 when you were a Senior Security Manager? 12 A. I think, from memory, it was electronic. 13 Q. Was there an electronic repository for training 14 materials which Investigators could access in 15 the same way as that suite of policy documents 16 could be? 17 A. I seem to recall that there was. 18 Q. You don't mention the Attorney General's 19 Guidelines on disclosure at paragraph 13 of your 20 statement, which may be explained because you're 21 referring there to training pre-Horizon, so 22 pre-2000, but when you were in the roles you 23 held after you stopped conducting investigations 24 yourself, were you aware of the Attorney 25 General's Guidelines on Disclosure? 39 1 A. I was aware of them, yes, but I'm struggling to 2 recall what format they would have been 3 available to the Investigators. 4 Q. Do you think they were available to 5 Investigators or not? 6 A. I couldn't answer that with absolute accuracy, 7 unfortunately. 8 Q. Both when you were an Investigator and when you 9 were a Senior Security Manager, was there any 10 method for updating Investigators about changes 11 in the law or applicable codes or guidance? 12 A. Yes, there was. So at earlier stages when we 13 were still part of the Group, I seem to recall 14 that would have been a group function, and then 15 at later stages, I seem to recall that would 16 have come through the Criminal Law Team. 17 Q. You deal in a little more detail with the 18 training you had in interviews and search at 19 paragraph 62 of your statement, and you make 20 clear there that the courses you attended 21 personally and reference in your statement may 22 well have subsequently been made obsolete or 23 replaced by other training interventions. 24 In particular, your training on 25 investigative interviewing was done under 40 1 Lancashire Constabulary and your search course 2 was led by the group trainers at the Met Police 3 training college, using their search houses; is 4 that right? 5 A. It is right, yes. 6 Q. Do you know whether that external provided 7 training continued after the year 2000, so when 8 you were in other roles? 9 A. I'm fairly sure that the relationship with Lancs 10 Constab didn't continue. That was particularly 11 looking at a piece model for investigative 12 interviews. I'm fairly sure that didn't 13 continue. The search awareness piece using Met 14 Police facilities, I'm not sure about that one. 15 I think there may have been -- it was a key area 16 for Investigators. I think there may have been 17 a replacement to that one. I'm unsure whether 18 that continued to use Met facilities. 19 Q. You undertook some further academic learning 20 yourself, didn't you, culminating in the 21 completion of an MSc in security and risk 22 management? 23 A. That's correct. 24 Q. Is it right that that was completed with the 25 submission in September 2000 of an academic 41 1 study on the reasons why subpostmasters 2 committed offences, including theft? 3 A. Correct. 4 Q. Was the study based on your experiences as 5 an Investigator with the Post Office? 6 A. So it was partially that, and it was also 7 through legitimised access to historic 8 investigation reports and précis of interviews. 9 Q. What were the key themes covered in your study? 10 A. So the study looked at verbalisation and 11 rationalisation, and it proposed that there were 12 three main types of offenders that the Post 13 Office were dealing with during that period. 14 Would you like me to go through those, or? 15 Q. If you'd like to, yes. 16 A. Absolutely. So number 1, I think I detailed 17 within the dissertation, were highly 18 acquisitive, so these would include 19 subpostmasters who had direct links with 20 organised crime groups, or were being influenced 21 by organised crime groups. I go into some 22 details around that. 23 I particularly recall dealing with 24 a subpostmaster who had stolen money to buy 25 a Ferrari. I dealt with a subpostmaster who had 42 1 stolen money to travel the world watching 2 Formula One. Subpostmaster who had stolen 3 money, travelled Europe with a Michelin Guide to 4 Fine Dining. So they were, at the top tranche 5 highly, highly, acquisitive. 6 I dealt with a sub office assistant who was 7 on the equivalent of minimum wage who was 8 renting a Georgian manor house with a swimming 9 pool. I still remember that with some clarity. 10 I remember disclosing that pre-interview with 11 his legal representative and his legal rep 12 actually put his head in the hands because 13 I disclosed the estate agent's details to where 14 his client was renting. So that's very much at 15 the top tier. 16 The second category I've already touched on 17 these, and these were absolute victims of us, as 18 customers of the Post Office changing. My 19 father was a subpostmaster, it's within the 20 statement, he'd been a subpostmaster since the 21 1950s. I remember talking to my father before 22 he passed -- and that would have been in the 23 2000s -- and he would tell me that in the 1960s, 24 '70s, '80s, he enjoyed financial pay parity at 25 a level that his professional acquaintances, 43 1 doctors, dentists, lawyers, were also enjoying. 2 That level of remuneration was completely 3 changing. Postmasters were paid a form of 4 commission, the more transactions that were 5 conducted, the higher their salary would be and, 6 year on year, salaries were dropping. 7 So that second tranche of individuals that 8 I was actually talking about during the 9 dissertation were purely forced into 10 an offending cycle because they were seeing the 11 Post Office salary reduce year on year. 12 And the Post Office, not too subtly, went 13 away from saying to potential subpostmasters 14 "Become a postmaster and have a fantastic 15 standard of living, based solely on Post Office 16 salary". They shifted towards saying, rather, 17 "Become a postmaster because it's a fantastic 18 opportunity to drive additional footfall into 19 what should be your buoyant retail business". 20 They are two completely different propositions. 21 And around about this period leading up to 22 the dissertation, we were dealing with a number 23 of subpostmasters -- I go on in my statement to 24 say that we were dealing with repeat 25 subpostmasters, at the same site on some 44 1 occasions, who were just simply victims of 2 a dwindling Post Office remuneration without the 3 benefit of a buoyant retail side to prop up the 4 viability of that business. 5 So that was very much the second tranche. 6 At that time, there had been a number of 7 rudimentary audit models that were being 8 deployed, really basic models that had something 9 I like a return rate of around about 70, 10 80 per cent. I was running one myself in North 11 West/North Wales. 12 So there was no machine learning or AI in 13 these models, these were simple models, saying 14 to an Area Manager "Report back if you go into 15 a sub post office and the retail side is 16 depleted of stock", "Report if you're going into 17 a CTN" -- confection, tobacco, newsagents -- 18 "with a sub post office and there's no daily 19 newspapers", because the newspaper suppliers put 20 you on stop very quickly if you fail to pay your 21 newspaper bills. And the return rate on that 22 was absolutely staggering, that was 23 an incredibly busy time for the Post Office. 24 That was tranche number 2. 25 Tranche number 3 would be individuals who 45 1 you would interview under caution, who would 2 admit readily their involvement in falsification 3 of, at the time, paper-based accounts but would 4 deny wholeheartedly being responsible for the 5 thefts. And I always found those the most 6 difficult out of the three to deal with. I had 7 very little sympathy or empathy with that top 8 tier. If you're stealing money to buy a Ferrari 9 or a Porsche, you deserve everything that's 10 coming your way. I had sympathy with the second 11 tranche, who were victims of a change in UK Plc 12 and changing model of remuneration. 13 But that third bit was incredibly difficult 14 to deal with because it felt like, if I was to 15 believe the account, and on many occasions I did 16 believe the account, it became evident that, as 17 you were dealing with that individual, you'd go 18 through the mechanics of the tape recorded 19 interview and our average interview duration 20 would be around about 45 minutes, and they 21 tended, as ironic as it sounds to be quite 22 cordial and, if you were sat down after that 23 interview, and you'd have refreshments whatever, 24 you'd outline the next steps around suspension, 25 transfer of office, you would slowly start to 46 1 see dawn on that individual that their downfall 2 was wholly attributed to either theft by family 3 member, theft by assistant, and you'd left that 4 family at the end of the day in complete and 5 utter turmoil. 6 And out of everything I dealt with within my 7 Post Office career, that's the one thing that 8 changed me as an individual, and probably not 9 for the better, because I'd walk away from 10 a situation and you'd just say "How can anybody 11 willingly, knowingly, place an individual in 12 this type of insidious position?" And 13 I remember we dealt with -- it was quite ironic, 14 we dealt with a whole series of cases where it 15 was the younger son, youngest, and he would just 16 absolutely, for want of a better word, pillage 17 the Post Office; the older son would want to 18 take all the blame for whatever reason; and it 19 would -- there were just -- it was such 20 a difficult series of investigations to deal 21 with. 22 I say, I think, in the statement from 23 memory -- I can't locate a copy of the 24 dissertation, unfortunately -- but that was 25 certainly a significant element of the three 47 1 tranches. 2 I then break it down -- just to come to 3 an end -- I break it down to a difference 4 between male and female offending as well, at 5 the time. We found very little females who were 6 in that top tranche, where the thefts were 7 purely just for greed. We found more in 8 categories 2 and 3, and that's a brief summary 9 of the dissertation. 10 Q. The title of your study was "There must be some 11 mistake". Is it fair to say that your study was 12 proceeding on the premise that there was no 13 mistake? 14 A. Absolutely. Absolutely, yes. I think it was 15 more -- well, it was actually -- somebody 16 actually said that to me, so when we sat down 17 and they were logically asking about next steps, 18 and you would go through, quite legitimately -- 19 there'd be nothing outside of PACE, outside of 20 a captured recorded interview, you'd go through 21 the logical next steps. So "The logic is you'll 22 be suspended from duty, you'll be asked to offer 23 your premises to an interim subpostmaster, the 24 arrangements between you and them as regards 25 rent is a private matter between you and them", 48 1 so on and so on, and an individual actually said 2 to me, "There's just got to be some mistake". 3 Q. You say in your statement at paragraph 22(iii) 4 that training continued when you were a Senior 5 Security Manager. What training did you receive 6 when you were a Senior Security Manager in 7 addition to the POCA training? 8 A. Can I see that paragraph for context, please? 9 Q. Yes. It is page 11 of the document on screen -- 10 A. Thank you. 11 Q. -- and subparagraph (iii). 12 A. Thank you. I've got that one, thank you. So, 13 save for the POCA Senior Appropriate Officer, 14 I think there was some additional training on 15 evidence in court. I think I probably just 16 tagged along to that one because I had team 17 leaders who were attending and a number of 18 Investigators. 19 It's fair to say that there would have been 20 less formal operational training at that time 21 because, at that time, I'd moved away from 22 day-to-day operational investigation activity. 23 Q. At paragraph 63 of your statement, you say that 24 all Investigators would have received 25 instruction in the use of Horizon. Did you 49 1 receive instruction or training in the use of 2 Horizon? 3 A. I did indeed, and I think I've referred to 4 earlier, I know, for whatever reason, I absented 5 the formal training session, but I seem to 6 recall, on a one-to-one basis, we had a number 7 of counter training schools across the UK. I'm 8 not sure whether I didn't actually go to Chester 9 to actually have some one-to-one training just 10 to gain a brief overview. 11 We'd also at that time as well -- yes, we 12 would, so during the various bouts of CWU 13 industrial action, as Senior Managers we would 14 be expected to work at Crown branch offices. So 15 I'd have undertaken Horizon activities then, 16 firsthand dealing with customers. 17 Q. You also say at paragraph 63 that you would have 18 envisaged case file construction training for 19 Investigators, including obtaining evidence from 20 third parties, but you say you don't recall any 21 specific reference to Horizon data. Just to be 22 clear, are you talking about your recollection 23 of the training you received or the training 24 that was provided to Investigators operating 25 under your lead? 50 1 A. Again, could I see that part of the statement? 2 Q. Yes, it's page 25. 3 A. Yeah, so that would have been Investigators 4 within the function. That would not have been 5 applicable to myself. 6 Q. Did you ever provide any training to 7 Investigators? 8 A. Me personally? 9 Q. Yes. 10 A. Not from recollection, no. 11 Q. Did you attend the trained provided to 12 Investigators? 13 A. Again, from recollection, yes, I think at that 14 time Post Office had a bespoke training facility 15 just outside Rugby. I certainly seem to recall 16 going there. It may not have been for the full 17 duration but, certainly, those training courses 18 which were residential in nature, members of the 19 senior security group would drop into that 20 training at various times within that training 21 week. 22 Q. Scrolling down a little, please, to 23 paragraph 64. You say here that: 24 "Formal training would have been 25 supplemented with significant levels of 51 1 supervision in terms of operational activity and 2 case paper construction and submission. This 3 was a role that traditionally had a longer lead 4 in time given the uniqueness of activity 5 undertaken." 6 We've looked at an earlier paragraph of your 7 statement where you stress that you had a high 8 level of supervision when you started 9 investigatory roles. Was that the case for 10 Investigators operating under your lead 11 throughout the time you were in Security 12 Operations? 13 A. I think probably a lot of my experiences were by 14 virtue of the person who was being mentored at 15 the time. I can't imagine many of the new 16 Investigators would see a written report 17 underlined in red and thrown across the room to 18 them. I think it was probably just by virtue of 19 different era, a different type of personality 20 that I was being mentored with at the time, who 21 certainly wouldn't hold back from niceties of 22 giving you a constructive sandwich, in terms of 23 feedback. The casework literally would be 24 physically thrown back at you and you were told 25 to sort out if there were grammatical issues 52 1 within the paperwork, or anything of a similar 2 ilk. 3 But I nevertheless -- remove the differences 4 in decades to one side, I would expect that new 5 incumbents would have had a decent level of 6 supervision. It was always recognised, if you 7 weren't coming into the function from 8 an investigative or policing background, this 9 was not a function that you were expected to be 10 up on your feet in a short few months. It was 11 a completely unique role and there was some 12 cognisance and allowance given for that fact. 13 MS PRICE: Sir, I've finished one topic and I wonder 14 whether that might be a convenient moment for 15 the morning break, just a short 15-minute break, 16 if we may, please. 17 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, sure. 18 MS PRICE: I don't know what your watch says, sir, 19 the clock here is a little fast on counsel's 20 table. 21 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Well, it's actually 10.26 22 according to me, so 10.40? 23 MS PRICE: Yes, sir, thank you. 24 (10.27 am) 25 (A short break) 53 1 (10.41 am) 2 MS PRICE: Hello, sir. Can you see and hear us? 3 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, thank you, yes. 4 MS PRICE: Mr Pardoe, in terms of policy, when you 5 first started as an Investigator, were you given 6 a copy of any documents setting out the Post 7 Office Prosecution Policy? 8 A. I suspect I must have been. I don't have that 9 detail of recollection but, logically, I must 10 have been given that policy. If I may, I think 11 that was a group policy at the time. So yes, 12 I would have been given that policy. 13 Q. Did anyone cover what the prosecution policy was 14 in your initial training or set out a rationale 15 for it? 16 A. Again, initial training, I don't recall, 17 unfortunately, that level of detail. I'd be 18 surprised if it wasn't touched upon but I don't 19 recall the specifics, sorry. 20 Q. Later, when you were a Senior Security Manager, 21 do you recall any discussion of the prosecution 22 policy and the rationale for it or were you 23 given any briefing about that? 24 A. I think, by that stage, I'd have been in the 25 function for some time. It would have just been 54 1 something instinctively that you were aware of, 2 if a case had been produced where there was that 3 prima facie evidence of wrongdoing, then it 4 would go up to Criminal Law Team for the advice 5 as regards the prospect of realistic prospect of 6 conviction, in terms of prosecution. 7 Q. Were you aware of any discussions within the 8 Security Team in the context of action against 9 Post Office employees or agents about the 10 deterrent effect of prosecution? 11 A. Absolutely, yes. 12 Q. What was the substance of those discussions? 13 A. So there was a period in the function where the 14 function started to rely quite heavily on 15 academic underpinnings. If you look at the 16 conditions that exist to entailing what's 17 referred to as a motivated offender, one of 18 those things that needs to be in presence is 19 the -- what's called the absence of a capable 20 guardian, and that can be a physical individual, 21 an entity that stops you from doing something. 22 Likewise, it was recognised that a policy 23 that was unwavering in its approach towards 24 prosecution could act as that capable guardian 25 but then, hopefully, would influence correctly 55 1 those individuals who may be tempted to commit 2 wrongdoing against the business. And I think 3 it's probably fair to say that that was being 4 recognised, during that time, as being something 5 that was important to set the scene, set the 6 standard and, as I say, act, as that 7 policy-driven capable guardian. 8 Q. To what extent was this a relevant factor for 9 those making decisions, including you, on 10 whether or not to prosecute? 11 A. I don't know if that actual element would be 12 a relevant factor and I know I cover it in the 13 statement. From my perspective, offering that 14 sign-off towards prosecution, wrongly or 15 rightly, I suspect for me -- and I suspect other 16 signatories in the period as well -- was almost 17 a fait accompli, dependent on what the Criminal 18 Law Team were actually advising. 19 I never felt in a position, certainly not 20 professionally, to go into absolute battle with 21 Criminal Law Team around a decision that they'd 22 made in terms of prosecution. 23 Q. At any point that you had involvement in Post 24 Office investigations and prosecutions, did you 25 understand that the Post Office was unusual, in 56 1 that it was the alleged victim of the crimes 2 which it investigated, it investigated such 3 suspected crimes itself and it decided whether 4 to prosecute such suspected crimes itself? 5 A. Absolutely, and I think, if I recall, that was 6 covered at various iterations of formal training 7 that would have been given to Investigators. 8 Q. So it was victim, investigator and prosecutor? 9 A. Correct. 10 Q. At the time, were you conscious of the risks 11 that may arise on account of the Post Office 12 being simultaneously victim, investigator and 13 prosecutor? 14 A. With honesty, not at the time, but obviously 15 I am now. 16 Q. When you look at it now, do you see the risk 17 that might attach in particular to the Post 18 Office's disclosure obligations as a prosecutor 19 or its use of expert evidence? 20 A. Absolutely. 21 Q. Were these risks ever discussed within the 22 Security Team, as far as you're aware? 23 A. Never. 24 Q. Were they acknowledged in any Post Office or 25 Royal Mail policy that you have seen? 57 1 A. Not to my knowledge, no. 2 Q. Were any particular steps taken, to your 3 knowledge, in recognition of these risks by way 4 of training for Investigators, first of all? 5 A. In terms of -- sorry, can you just expand on 6 that, please? 7 Q. Were any steps taken, to your knowledge, in 8 recognition of these risks in training for 9 Investigators? 10 A. Not to my knowledge, no, other than obviously 11 going through the mechanics of case preparation. 12 Q. Were any particular steps taken in your training 13 in relation to being a prosecution decision 14 maker? 15 A. So I recall being given guidance during a period 16 when I was acting for one of the security leads, 17 so I wouldn't have been promoted substantively 18 to the level of signing those off. I remember 19 acting for a period and I also remember 20 discussions around responsibilities with one or 21 other of the principal lawyers within the 22 Criminal Law Team at the time. 23 But, certainly, there was no -- nothing 24 I could point to that said this was a formal 25 training brief or formal aide memoire about how 58 1 you actually deal with that type of case. No, 2 there was nothing. 3 Q. Did you consider, at the time you worked within 4 the Security Team, the extent to which 5 prosecutions served the Post Office's broader 6 commercial interests, such as the reduction of 7 debt and the increase of income? 8 A. Not so much that, no. But, certainly, to go 9 back to the earlier point, that whole concept of 10 capable guardian, ie something that exists that 11 hopefully drives individuals to keep, as we saw 12 at the time, onto the straight and narrow, I saw 13 that as being more paramount than a focus on 14 actually balancing recovery versus loss in that 15 commercial way. 16 Q. The Inquiry has heard evidence that in late 2005 17 you put Paul Whitaker and Mick Matthews forward 18 for a new role for the Security Team, that of 19 Financial Investigator; is that right? 20 A. Paul Whitaker? 21 Q. Paul Whitaker and Mick Matthews. It was 22 Mr Whitaker's evidence that you had put him and 23 Mr Matthews forward for a new role in the 24 Security Team, the Financial Investigator role, 25 in around late 2005? 59 1 A. I don't actually recall that; I mean, obviously 2 I know the individuals. I don't recall 3 Mr Whitaker being put forward for that role. 4 Thought at the time there would have been Ged 5 Harbinson -- 6 Q. Apologies, this is entirely my fault: Ged 7 Harbinson? 8 A. Yeah, absolutely, yeah. Mr Harbinson, yes, 9 definitely. 10 Q. Mr Harbinson provided evidence that this new 11 role was campaigned for by you; is that right? 12 A. No, I wouldn't -- there's absolutely no way in 13 my wildest dreams I'd have had that amount of 14 influence within the business to actually design 15 and to populate a role like that. Absolutely 16 not, no. There would have been -- I thought 17 those functions existed within Group. 18 There would have been perhaps a role that 19 I had in the design of a Post Office structure 20 that had to map over those roles from Group to 21 a self-sufficiency within Post Office Limited, 22 if that makes sense, but I didn't see any of the 23 Exec boarding or the type of levers you'd need 24 to exact to populate those roles and commission 25 or canvass for those roles to exist within the 60 1 Post Office, certainly not. 2 Q. Do you recall the introduction of that new role 3 of financial investigation? 4 A. I do. 5 Q. Was the intention to recoup losses through the 6 Proceeds of Crime Act? 7 A. It was. 8 Q. So before you took up the role of taking 9 prosecution decisions, the business desire to 10 recover losses was something you were aware of 11 and involved, as a Senior Appropriate Officer; 12 is that right? 13 A. It was. 14 Q. Does it remain your position that commercial 15 considerations were not something you were 16 conscious of when taking prosecution decisions? 17 A. I never saw those as being paramount. 18 Q. Do you see here a potential for a conflict of 19 interest arising? 20 A. Yes, most definitely. 21 Q. While we are on the topic of financial 22 investigation and recovery, you say in your 23 statement at paragraph 27 -- if we can have that 24 on screen, please, that's page 13, about halfway 25 down -- that John Scott, Head of Security, had 61 1 overarching responsibility for the strategy 2 around recovery and you say here you recall 3 conversations with him around calculations 4 concerning recoverable amounts in defendants' 5 benefit. 6 You recall a specific challenge raised by 7 the National Federation of SubPostmasters around 8 the calculation of the recoverable amount in 9 a particular case. Can you help with what it 10 was that was being challenged? 11 A. I seem to recall that the calculation that was 12 being applied had resulted in confiscation of 13 an amount some way in excess of the Post Office 14 loss. 15 Q. You refer at paragraph 34 of your statement to 16 three Royal Mail Group policies which would have 17 come across your desk, as you put it, and, 18 whilst you do not specifically recall them, you 19 say would have been applicable to your team. 20 One of these is the December 2007 Royal Mail 21 Group Limited Criminal Investigation and 22 Prosecution Policy. 23 Could we have that on screen, please. The 24 reference is POL00030578. This is, as you have 25 noted in your statement, a Royal Mail Group 62 1 policy. The "Purpose" is set out at the top, it 2 describes the: 3 "... Royal Mail Group Limited response to 4 crime and suspected crime against the 5 organisation." 6 If we can look, please, at point 4 on page 4 7 of this document, under "Deployment", it says: 8 "This Policy is published on the Royal Mail 9 intranet site as policy number S2." 10 When you worked within the Security Team, 11 did you have access to the Royal Mail intranet 12 site? 13 A. I don't recall that, sorry. 14 Q. You don't recall whether you did or you don't 15 recall having access? 16 A. I don't recall whether I had access to the Royal 17 Mail intranet site. 18 Q. You say you don't specifically recall this 19 document. Do you think you read it at the time 20 that it applied to the work of your team? 21 A. I would have been surprised if I hadn't. 22 Q. Taking some of the principles set out in this 23 policy and starting with paragraph 3.1.4, that's 24 back a page, please -- and again, and again -- 25 under "Conduct of Investigations": 63 1 "The conduct, course and progress of 2 an investigation will be a matter for the 3 investigators as long as it is within the law, 4 rules and priorities of the business. 5 Investigators will ultimately report to the 6 Director of Security with regard to the conduct 7 of criminal investigations." 8 So this document here was not purporting to 9 give any guidance to Investigators about how 10 they should conduct an investigation, was it? 11 A. Correct. 12 Q. Some legislation is identified within this 13 policy, so, for example, under 3.2.2, please, on 14 page 2, you can see there: 15 "Evidence will be gathered and retained in 16 accordance with the Criminal Procedure and 17 Investigations Act 1996 Codes of Practice." 18 Under 3.2.8 on "Casework" -- this is page 3, 19 and under "Casework": 20 "Investigations leading to potential 21 prosecution will be reported in accordance with 22 the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 23 1996 [and the] Code of Practice." 24 There's no explanation in this document, is 25 there, about the requirements that are set down 64 1 by the Act and the Code, is there? 2 A. Absolutely none whatsoever. 3 Q. There is some suggestion the detail might be 4 contained elsewhere, going back to the section 5 on deployment, that's page 4, section 4. It 6 says: 7 "Investigation Procedures and Standards 8 relating to this policy are included in the 9 induction and ongoing training courses and 10 material provided to investigators. Any changes 11 to the procedures and standards are notified to 12 investigators via investigation circulars and 13 communications." 14 There is also a specific section applicable 15 to the Post Office, paragraph 3.2.12, just above 16 section 4, which applies to "Post Office Limited 17 Investigation": 18 "While adhering to legislative and group 19 policy requirements, the POL Investigation Team 20 have additional and, in some cases, alternative 21 Procedures and Standards, and supporting 22 documentation with which Post Office Limited 23 colleagues will comply. Post Office Limited 24 Investigation Team will maintain a separate 25 casework procedure and database." 65 1 Do you recall there being a separate 2 casework procedure and database? 3 A. Not specifically, no. 4 Q. Do you recall there being a database? 5 A. No. 6 Q. In relation to the prosecution policy, page 2 7 again, please, at 3.1.6, the heading is 8 "Prosecuting Criminals": 9 "This policy supports the Code of Business 10 Standards in normally prosecuting those who 11 commit theft or fraud and where appropriate 12 offences under the Postal Services Act 2000 13 Sections 83 and 84." 14 Stopping there, the heading here, and what 15 follows, rather assumes that it has already been 16 established that the person suspected of 17 committing a crime is guilty of it, doesn't it? 18 A. It does. 19 Q. They are a criminal, those that commit theft or 20 fraud? 21 A. It's clumsy. It does. 22 Q. Was this the way that those being prosecuted by 23 the Post Office were spoken about by those 24 within the Security Team? 25 A. On occasion, yes. 66 1 Q. Do you think, looking back, that this might have 2 reflected a mindset that, if there was, on the 3 face of things, a loss, a subpostmaster or 4 employee was guilty of theft, fraud or false 5 accounting? 6 A. I think there was an element of groupthink in 7 that, yes, I do. 8 Q. Moving then to paragraph 3.2.9 on page 3, 9 "Prosecution": 10 "Suspect offenders will be prosecuted where 11 there is sufficient evidence and it is in the 12 public interest in accordance with the Code for 13 Crown Prosecutors. Decisions to prosecute in 14 non-Crown Prosecution Service cases will be 15 taken by nominated representatives in the 16 business with consideration to the advice 17 provided by the Royal Mail Group Criminal Law 18 Team." 19 In relation to responsibility for deciding 20 whether to prosecute an individual or not, we 21 can see the position, as set out here, is that 22 the decision would be taken by the nominated 23 representatives in the business, consideration 24 to the advice from the Criminal Law Team. This 25 is in 2007. 67 1 As far as you can recall, does the position 2 set out here in the policy accurately reflect 3 who was, in fact, making decisions on 4 prosecutions in 2007? 5 A. In terms of nominated representatives, yes, it 6 would have done. 7 Q. This document is the first prosecution policy 8 document the Inquiry has seen which sets out 9 with any specificity who will take the 10 prosecution decision. Could we have on screen, 11 please, paragraph 55 of Mr Pardoe's statement. 12 That is page 22 of WITN08170100. 13 Under the heading here "Decisions about 14 prosecution and criminal enforcement 15 proceedings", you say this at 55: 16 "There was a period when I dealt with 17 prosecution decisions, both as a conduit between 18 the Post Office Investigation Department and 19 line managers making the decision and then as 20 a period myself as the nominated representative. 21 I'm unsure why the switch was made between line 22 manager and Security as a nominated 23 representative, but it occurred." 24 When you refer to line managers taking 25 prosecution decisions, who were you referring 68 1 to? 2 A. So there would have been a time, and it would 3 really be going back to the earliest days of my 4 career within the Security function, where at 5 a local district level, line managers within the 6 district would make a recommendation on the back 7 of an investigation conducted by the Post Office 8 Investigation Department and an advice offered 9 by the Criminal Law Team about whether 10 prosecution would be signed off. It was dealt 11 with on such a local level. I certainly 12 remember that. 13 That was outside of the security line. That 14 was dealt with dependent on seniority, maybe not 15 line manager. It may be more accurate with 16 hindsight to read line manager's line manager 17 but I certainly recall, in my earliest days, 18 decisions being made by an out of the Security 19 function line manager. 20 Q. Can you recall when the switch was made? 21 A. So we moved from districts, we moved to regions. 22 I suspect that, even then, a regional 23 representative was signing off the prosecution 24 element. So we'd probably be coming into the 25 start of the 2000, probably maybe even coming 69 1 into the date of that policy document. 2 Q. Do you recall the reason for the change? 3 A. I was never apprised as to the reason, no. 4 Never. 5 Q. At paragraph 57, going over the page, please, 6 you deal here with a document which the Inquiry 7 understands to date to around 2012. Unless you 8 wish to go to it, we needn't have that up on 9 screen but the document reference for the 10 transcript is POL00104929. 11 This document suggests that it was the Head 12 of Security who would make the prosecution 13 decision. Is it right that you don't recall 14 this being the case while you were in a Security 15 Operations role? 16 A. Correct and, indeed, from the evidence that I've 17 seen through the Inquiry, that was not the case. 18 It was -- I think I say there, it was at the 19 latter end of my career. 20 Q. As to the process you would follow when you were 21 in the prosecution decision-making role, you 22 deal with this in general terms at paragraph 56, 23 going back a page, please. 24 You say this: 25 "A decision to prosecute would only ever be 70 1 made in the face of supporting advice from the 2 Criminal Law Team. CLT would have seen all the 3 facts appertaining to the case, including audit 4 reports, Investigator report, supporting 5 evidence and interview précis. My expectation 6 was that the CLT, as an integral part of Post 7 Office Security, would have made all the due 8 considerations in line with Code for Crown 9 Prosecutors and applied each necessary test in 10 reaching their decision. I took a stance that 11 the decision will have been checked by CLT for 12 fairness and objectivity. I saw my role to 13 confirm their decision and place the case into 14 prosecution status via the Investigation Team 15 leader." 16 Moving over the page, please, to 17 paragraph 59. You say: 18 "In terms of test around the correctness of 19 prosecution and charging decisions, then 20 I firmly expected this to have been considered 21 at the CLT stage. If they had felt that public 22 interest factors tended against prosecution then 23 my expectation was that this would have been 24 clearly stated. I am genuinely not attempting 25 to be evasive but I fail to see what additional 71 1 input I was providing around correctness when 2 a principal or senior lawyer had carefully made 3 the charging decision." 4 Then at 60: 5 "The question around charges was solely 6 within CLT; whilst towards the ending of my 7 tenure I'm aware that investigators would 8 recommend charges when submitting papers into 9 the CLT, the ultimate recommendations sat with 10 CLT. Again, in terms of prosecution decision 11 then my expectation was that all elements had 12 been considered by CLT in reaching a decision." 13 Do you recall ever declining to provide your 14 authority when the Criminal Law Team's advice 15 was that the prosecution test was met? 16 A. Not by authority, although I do reference in the 17 statement I recall with some clarity when a case 18 came into the district, early days of my career, 19 with a prosecution consensus from the Criminal 20 Law Team, and that was returned as being not 21 agreed with, yes. 22 Q. What was the reason for not agreeing? 23 A. Ironically, it was a case I had some detailed 24 knowledge of. I know that I'd supported POID in 25 the case. It was an individual who took over 72 1 the running of a post office in, I guess, one of 2 the less salubrious areas of the northwest of 3 England. For whatever reason, the local 4 community had taken almost an immediate dislike 5 to him. 6 He'd been subject to quite serious physical 7 assault on a number of occasions when going 8 about his day-to-day life in the community. His 9 backyard to the Post Office had actually, 10 effectively, been booby trapped, in so much, as 11 if he'd have opened the rear gate into his 12 backyard, two large concrete blocks would have 13 dropped onto whoever opened the gate. That was 14 spotted, fortunately, by his partner as she was 15 taking a child of probably no more than one or 16 two years of age in a pram out into the 17 backyard. You could only imagine if that hadn't 18 been spotted what the ramifications could have 19 been. 20 It's fair to say that individual probably 21 lost their head, which is understandable. They 22 moved their infant child and wife away from the 23 premises, incurred additional rental demands on 24 their income as a result of that, went into 25 complete state of disarray, and I apprised 73 1 the -- it was, at the time, the Head of Services 2 for the district of the facts to that, even to 3 they'd been detailed comprehensively within the 4 Post Office Investigation Department report and, 5 between us, it was decided that it served no 6 useful interest to place that subpostmaster into 7 prosecution for the false accounts that had been 8 completed to cover the fact that monies had been 9 stolen to support his wife and child as they 10 lived away from the premises. 11 Q. Would you have seen the advice of the Criminal 12 Law Team where the advice was that the 13 prosecution test was not met? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Was there ever a case where you pushed back 16 against the advice that the test for prosecution 17 was not met? 18 A. I don't recall when not met no. I think it's 19 probably fair to say that the vast majority of 20 cases that went forward, where there was felt to 21 be a prima facie case to answer, probably came 22 back with a prosecution decision from the 23 Criminal Law Team. 24 Q. Looking back now, do you think you were 25 conscious -- truly, actively conscious -- that, 74 1 as a prosecution decision maker, you had 2 a different and distinct role to that of the 3 Investigators in your strand of the Security 4 Team? 5 A. Yes, I was conscious of that. I would still -- 6 I have no truck with taking responsibility for 7 decisions that I was making during that period. 8 I still thought that I was, in effect, rubber 9 stamping and placing back into an operational 10 casework environment a decision that had been 11 made by a highly qualified, on occasion, 12 principal lawyer within the Criminal Law Team 13 and, sat here now, that may sound a weak 14 approach but I think, if you compare and 15 contrast five/six years of legal training, plus 16 principal law status within the Group and then 17 Post Office Criminal Law Team, and you compare 18 that to my own experience, I think it's probably 19 understandable why I'd take that viewpoint. 20 Q. Looking back now, do you think it was 21 appropriate for a non-legally-qualified Post 22 Office employee to be the sign-off for 23 a decision as significant to the lives of 24 individuals, and to the business, as 25 a prosecution? 75 1 A. So if I just -- almost replaying that through my 2 mind. So a Criminal Law Team lawyer would make 3 the overview in the first instance. Should that 4 then have sat with somebody else who was 5 suitably legally qualified to effectively rubber 6 stamp that decision? I think probably the 7 element that's missing, with respect, there is 8 that element of true independence. I couldn't 9 sit here and argue or debate that I was 10 an independent oversight in that whole process; 11 of course I wasn't. I was heavily employed -- 12 heavily invested in the function. 13 So I think what was missing there, again, 14 with respect, would be an element of true 15 independence to that process. 16 Q. How did you satisfy yourself that there was 17 a genuine loss to the business in cases where 18 you were being asked to approve the prosecution, 19 or did that not enter your mind as something 20 that was a question for you? 21 A. So the case papers would obviously come across 22 my desk at some stage. I think there was 23 a period when casework may have been performed 24 electronically but, nevertheless, I would see 25 the Investigator's report, and that would be 76 1 a structured report, and part of the demands of 2 that report is that it would outline the most 3 current loss, known loss to the business. 4 I'd read through that report. So I'd be 5 fully aware that we were stating there was 6 a loss to the business at that stage, and that's 7 even before it found its way to the Criminal Law 8 Team. So when the advice came back from the 9 Criminal Law Team with whatever charges were 10 felt to be appropriate, I'd have been aware that 11 certainly the Post Office was stating that there 12 was a particular loss attached to that case. 13 Q. Did you ever give consideration to whether 14 a shortfall might have been caused by a user 15 error stemming from inadequate training on the 16 Horizon system? 17 A. No, and I think what there was, there was almost 18 a mentality, not just from myself but probably 19 from an Investigator perspective as well, that 20 the admission to false accounting, that was 21 almost stated and that's what should have been 22 reported. So I think there was probably less 23 focus given to the root cause than there was to 24 actually submitting a set of case papers that 25 outlined the fact that there was that admission 77 1 to false accounting, and the standard way would 2 be you'd detail the date when the first account 3 was prepared falsely, one in the middle, and 4 then the last account was prepared falsely. 5 So I think that was probably something that 6 was occurring at the time, yes. 7 Q. So were you simply taking it as a given that 8 there was a loss? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. You say at paragraph 40 of your statement that 11 you recall there being a template around the 12 construction of case files to standardise 13 casework; is that right? 14 A. Correct, yes. 15 Q. You then deal at paragraph 67 to 76 with 16 a number of casework compliance documents. One 17 document which the Inquiry sent you for the 18 purposes of preparing your statement was 19 a document entitled "Casework Management", and 20 there are two versions of that: one dated March 21 2001 dated October 2002. Is it right that you 22 do not specifically recall receiving either 23 version of this document before they were 24 provided to you by the Inquiry? 25 A. Yes, but again, logic would dictate that they -- 78 1 at some stage, I'd have been aware of those. 2 Q. This document in both versions sets out the need 3 for two separate reports: one the conduct 4 report, to go to the discipline manager, and 5 another the legal report, to go to the Criminal 6 Law Team. Sensitive information should only be 7 included in the legal report, not the conduct 8 report, and there are also paragraphs dealing 9 with both operational and procedural failures 10 identified during an investigation. Is that 11 a fair summary of the nature of the document? 12 A. Absolutely, yes. 13 Q. If we could have paragraph 68, please, on 14 screen, this is page 26. You've addressed your 15 understanding of the document at some length in 16 this paragraph. Without going through line by 17 line and taking it fairly shortly, is it right 18 that you never read this document as being 19 applicable to bugs, errors or defects in the 20 Horizon system? 21 A. Absolutely. 22 Q. You provide an example of what the instructions 23 contained within the document might apply to. 24 In short, is it an example of weakness in 25 a product which, if known about by unscrupulous 79 1 people, might be exploited to commit fraud? 2 A. Correct. 3 Q. You say at paragraph 71 of your statement -- and 4 that's page 27 over the page -- that it was also 5 your understanding that: 6 "... every single document and Investigator 7 comment on organisational weaknesses should have 8 been subject to review by the [Criminal Law 9 Team] and the disclosure test applied 10 accordingly." 11 You say that you recall the Criminal Law 12 Team specifically advising you that this would 13 be the case; is that right? 14 A. It is. 15 Q. Who was it who advised you of this? Can you 16 recall? 17 A. Yeah, Rob Wilson. 18 Q. The Inquiry has provided you with a number of 19 emails from 2011 and 2012, from David Posnett, 20 relating to casework compliance. Is it right 21 that you recall something of the introduction of 22 compliance checks in 2011? 23 A. It is. I recall the concept yes, I do. 24 Q. Can we have the first of the emails from David 25 Posnett on screen, please. This is document 80 1 reference POL00118096. Looking, please, at the 2 email starting about halfway down the page from 3 David Posnett to a number of Security Team 4 recipients, including you, it's dated 23 May 5 2011, and the subject is "Casework Compliance". 6 The email reads as follows: 7 "All 8 "Most of you are aware that case files 9 submitting for legal advice will become subject 10 to compliance checks. This process is due to 11 commence in June and is designed to raise 12 standards of files submitted (including their 13 contents -- reports, taped summaries, appendix 14 enclosures, recoveries, stakeholders, etc) and 15 ensure there is a consistent approach across the 16 team. It is also probably an opportune time 17 given that we have recently recruited new people 18 to the team. 19 "I've associated relevant documents that 20 feed into the compliance process. Please 21 familiarise yourself with these documents." 22 A number of compliance documents were 23 attached to Mr Posnett's email in a zip file. 24 Presumably, given the instruction in 25 Mr Posnett's email to "familiarise yourself with 81 1 the documents attached", would you have read 2 them all when you received this email? 3 A. I think it would probably be fair to say, at 4 best, they would have been scan read. 5 I wouldn't have expected them to go into them in 6 the same level of detail and I recognise 7 obviously all the names there in the "to" box. 8 I wouldn't expect to go into the same level of 9 detail as, say, an existing team leader but, 10 yes, I'd have given it the due attention of 11 opening those and just scanning them. 12 Q. One of the documents which Mr Posnett asked 13 recipients of his email to familiarise 14 themselves with was the Identification Codes 15 document, and this is a document which you 16 comment on at paragraph 75 of your statement. 17 The Inquiry is familiar with this document 18 and I do not intend to display it on screen. 19 But do you know the document I'm referring to? 20 A. It's absolutely abhorrent. I do indeed, yes. 21 Q. Does it remain your position that you do not 22 recall reviewing the document at the time? 23 A. I think it remains my position. Had I been 24 consciously aware of that document at the time, 25 I'd have vehemently challenged that document. 82 1 It's completely unacceptable. 2 Q. You say at paragraph 76 of your statement -- and 3 could we have that on screen, please, that is 4 page 29 of Mr Pardoe's statement -- you say 5 here: 6 "We did instruct Investigators to record 7 identification codes. My recollection was that 8 these were required to complete any submission 9 into Police to have details of subsequent 10 convictions ended onto the PNC. These were 11 referred to as NIB type details. I certainly 12 don't recall the horrendous language on the form 13 or the obsolete country names." 14 Do you recall there being a specific form 15 used by the Post Office as a non-police agency 16 to notify the police of criminal proceedings? 17 A. I think I probably recall a number of variations 18 of that form. I would have referred -- I think 19 "NIB type details" would have been appertaining 20 to when I was an Operational Investigator. 21 I think that they changed then to NPA details. 22 Q. Could we have on screen please document 23 reference POL00118374. This is a blank copy of 24 the form NPA01; do you recognise that now? 25 A. I do indeed. 83 1 Q. We can see the agency name, Post Office Limited, 2 at the top left. Then there are boxes for 3 various identifying details of the person being 4 charged or summonsed. The prosecuting agents 5 are identified about halfway down the page as 6 the Post Office Legal Services Criminal Law 7 Team. 8 Then over the page, please. There are 9 a number of options there for ethnic appearance 10 and there are seven boxes for those options. 11 Is this the form that you understood 12 investigators to use to notify the police of 13 proceedings? 14 A. At that time, yes. It certainly -- from memory, 15 it would have been different in the form I would 16 have been completing as an Operational 17 Investigator but, certainly at the time that 18 I was in the strand, that's the form I recognise 19 Investigators would complete. 20 Q. Was this the form on which they would identify 21 the identification code which applied in any 22 given case for the police? 23 A. I'm failing to see the actual field where that's 24 actually inserted. 25 Q. Well, the ethnic appearance boxes, there are 84 1 seven options there: "White European"; "Dark 2 European"; "Afro-Caribbean"; "Asian", 3 "Oriental"; "Arab"; and "Unknown"? 4 A. Correct. 5 Q. Do they accord with the options, as you 6 understood them, for submission to the police, 7 or not? 8 A. Correct. They do. 9 Q. So is it right then that no reference to the 10 Identification Codes document circulated by 11 Mr Posnett in 2011 was necessary to provide 12 identity code information to the police? 13 A. Absolutely correct, yes. 14 Q. Turning back, then, to Mr Posnett's zip file of 15 compliance documents. Could we have document 16 reference POL00118101. This is one of the 17 attachments, this is the "Guide to the 18 Preparation and Layout of Red Label Case Files, 19 Offender reports & Discipline reports". I think 20 you had the opportunity of reading this for the 21 purposes of preparing your statement? 22 A. I did. 23 Q. Starting on page 4 of that document, please, we 24 see a preamble for the policy template of 25 an offender report, scrolling down a little, 85 1 please. Going over to the top of the next page 2 please, at the top right we see "Identification 3 Code: (Numbers 1 to 7 only)", and the 4 Identification Codes document which Mr Posnett 5 had circulated had seven options, didn't it, in 6 terms of identification codes? 7 A. It did. 8 Q. So Investigators were being instructed to enter 9 an identification code limited to options 1 to 10 7? 11 A. Correct. 12 Q. They were being provided with the Identification 13 Codes document sent in the same compliance zip 14 file, which you describe as utterly abhorrent? 15 A. Correct. 16 Q. Was there any other way for Investigators 17 receiving Mr Posnett's suite of compliance 18 documents to interpret the instruction, other 19 than "Use this Identification Codes document to 20 complete the identification codes space on the 21 offender report"? 22 A. I think the only exception to that would be the 23 more long-serving Investigators who may hold 24 an alternative version of the identity codes 25 document, without reference to such offensive 86 1 terms. 2 Q. Given that it was not necessary to use this 3 document, the Identification Codes document 4 circulated by Mr Posnett for police notification 5 purposes, because the options were there on the 6 face of the form, can you help us with why it 7 was being used to populate the offender report? 8 A. Absolutely no idea, sorry. No. 9 Q. Turning, please, to the involvement of Post 10 Office Investigators following the 11 identification of an apparent shortfall at 12 audit. In relation to cases where an apparent 13 shortfall was discovered at audit, you recall 14 there being a triggers and timescale document 15 that covered the monetary loss value at which 16 Investigators would get involved; is that right? 17 A. It is. 18 Q. Is it right that you recall, at least at some 19 stage, a £1,000 loss being the minimum level or 20 the involvement of investigators? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. Do you recall what the rationale was for there 23 being a minimum level of apparent loss for the 24 commencement of a criminal investigation? 25 A. Sheer volume of work. 87 1 Q. What were the other triggers for a criminal 2 investigation in addition to the level of 3 an apparent shortfall? 4 A. I think it would have been a victim impact. So 5 I would expect that an investigation would have 6 been triggered if, say, the alleged fraud was 7 directly impacting a customer of Post Office. 8 I can't really think of any others outside of 9 that. 10 Q. You say at paragraph 6 of your statement that: 11 "In the face of reductions in investigator 12 numbers, lower level cases would not have been 13 progressed." 14 We've heard evidence from Tony Utting that 15 there came a time when restructuring of the 16 Security Team and a reduction in headcount led 17 to a rising of the triggers for a criminal 18 investigation; do you recall that? 19 A. I don't recall the explicit instruction but 20 I wouldn't challenge that. I certainly, as 21 an Operational Investigator, dealt with lines of 22 operational investigation that simply would not 23 have been taken on, for want of a better 24 expression, after, say, 2000/2005. 25 Q. Where the level of an apparent shortfall 88 1 identified on audit wasn't sufficient to trigger 2 a criminal investigation, what steps were taken 3 by the Post Office in relation to the apparent 4 shortfall? 5 A. So my understanding and expectation is that 6 would have been dealt with by the local line 7 management in various monikers, whether that's 8 the area sales manager or early support manager. 9 I think that title changed over the years, 10 although the functionality remained broadly 11 similar. It would have been dealt with at 12 a local level but still with a focus on 13 repayment back to the business. 14 Q. So were attempts made to recover the apparent 15 shortfall under a subpostmaster's contract? 16 A. The contract, that clause in the contract, "The 17 subpostmaster is responsible for all losses no 18 matter how they occur", would have been pursued 19 relentlessly. 20 Q. Absent the criminal investigation machinery, did 21 the Post Office consider itself under any 22 obligation to get to the bottom of the cause of 23 an apparent shortfall or was it sufficient for 24 debt recovery purposes that there was one? 25 A. In terms of a case that the investigation 89 1 function was taking forward or where it sat 2 with -- 3 Q. Where it wasn't being taken forward. 4 A. Where it wasn't being taken forward. I think 5 that would probably depend on the tenacity of 6 the Area Manager. I don't think that there was 7 any formal policy document or expectation that 8 that would be the case. 9 Q. You refer at paragraph 49 of your statement to 10 the steps which were taken once a reportable 11 audit discrepancy had been identified. By 12 reportable audit discrepancy, do you mean one 13 which triggered the involvement of 14 Investigators? 15 A. I do. 16 Q. Who decided whether an audit discrepancy was 17 reportable? 18 A. So I think if it was in excess of the prevailing 19 triggers document at that time, then the 20 mechanics would be that the audit function would 21 report that into an investigation contact point. 22 Q. You discuss the purpose of an Investigator 23 attending a branch at paragraph 45 of your 24 statement and you say it was to secure and 25 examine evidence and take an account from the 90 1 person responsible. 2 You then set out at paragraphs 49 to 54 some 3 more detail in terms of the process, which you 4 say Investigators would follow following 5 identification of a shortfall at audit. 6 Were you ever an Investigator in a case 7 where a reportable discrepancy was discovered on 8 audit of a branch after the introduction of the 9 Horizon system? 10 A. As an Operational Investigator? 11 Q. Yes. 12 A. No, never. 13 Q. Is the detail at paragraphs 49 to 54 based on 14 your practice when you were an Investigator? 15 A. Broadly, yes. I think probably the only add-ons 16 for that would be source documentation 17 post-Horizon that the Investigator would obtain 18 from the Auditor at branch. But the mechanics 19 of, you know, the use of a pocket book, the 20 mechanics of invite to tape recorded interview 21 with all that entailed under PACE, would be the 22 same, yes. 23 Q. When you were leading the Fraud Strand and 24 Security Operations function, what documents 25 would you have expected Investigators operating 91 1 under your leadership to secure when they 2 attended a branch in an apparent shortfall case? 3 A. The relevant documentation that would evidence 4 the shortfall at branch obtained from the 5 auditor to enable production at the first 6 account type of interview under caution. 7 Q. Are you referring there to the Horizon reports 8 which could be printed from the counter in the 9 branch? 10 A. Yes, plus any supplementary evidence that the 11 Auditor had brought to the branch, because 12 a risk audit may have been triggered by other 13 elements such as a reluctance to return, 14 ostensibly, excess cash held by the branch. So, 15 obviously, if those type of details were held by 16 the Auditor, my expectation is that they would 17 have been taken into the interview as well and 18 an account asked for that form of scenario. 19 Q. You say at paragraph 45 of your statement that 20 an Investigator would have engaged with the 21 Retail Line in terms of the future of the 22 office, immediately post-audit. Would the views 23 of a Retail Line Manager ever had had any 24 bearing on whether a criminal investigation was 25 commenced in the first place? 92 1 A. No, never. 2 Q. In terms of investigatory steps taken after 3 interview of a suspect, where the only evidence 4 of a loss was the Horizon record available in 5 branch, or later on Credence, when compared with 6 the Auditor's findings, what further enquiries 7 would you have expected an Investigator to make 8 as part of their investigation before sending 9 their report to casework? 10 A. And, again, I think that would have been based 11 on the account that had been given at the 12 interview under caution. If there'd been quite 13 a full and frank account, it's fair to say there 14 would be less back research to support the 15 submission to the Criminal Law Team. If the 16 account had been vague, particularly in terms of 17 when shortfall existed and first commenced, and 18 so on and so on, I'd have expected them to be 19 more tenacious in obtaining ARQ logs and the 20 like. 21 Q. When you were an Investigator in an apparent 22 shortfall case, did you understand it to be any 23 part of your role to make enquiries into the 24 liability of the core evidence which was being 25 relied upon to prove the loss to the business? 93 1 A. When I was an Investigator? 2 Q. When you were an Investigator? 3 A. So when I was an Investigator, I'd have been 4 faced with a number of scenarios. Number 1 5 would have been the production of daily and 6 weekly handwritten ledgers, which were the daily 7 and weekly books. The other scenario is that, 8 at that stage, there was the advent of those 9 books being transcribed electronically, so there 10 were a number of IT systems that did the job of 11 those two handwritten ledgers. I was aware 12 that I was to examine those ledgers, and confirm 13 the veracity of the audit findings, yes. 14 Q. When you led the Fraud Strand or the Security 15 Operations function, did you expect your 16 Investigators to make enquiries as to the 17 reliability of the core evidence which was being 18 relied upon to prove loss to the business in 19 an apparent shortfall case? 20 A. In terms of reliability, then I -- my belief is 21 that the Investigator would have accepted the 22 audit findings. 23 Q. When you were an Investigator in an apparent 24 shortfall case, where the suspicion was that 25 someone had stolen money, would you investigate 94 1 where the money had gone, try and follow the 2 money, so to speak, by making financial 3 enquiries relating to the suspect? 4 A. On occasion, yes. 5 Q. When you led the Fraud Strand or Security 6 Operations function, did you expect your 7 Investigators to make financial enquiries to try 8 to establish where the money that gone? 9 A. If they felt that appropriate, yes. 10 Q. Was there a checklist of steps to take or any 11 other guidance to ensure all relevant 12 information was identified, collected and sent 13 to the Criminal Law Team in proceedings brought 14 by the Post Office against subpostmasters and 15 relevant staff? 16 A. I seem to recall there was something that the 17 investigator would be able to rely on, certainly 18 in that case file construction, and the contents 19 of the various appendices within that case file 20 construction. 21 Q. When did you first become aware of a case where 22 a Post Office employee, a subpostmaster, or 23 a member of a subpostmaster's staff, attributed 24 an apparent shortfall to problems with the 25 Horizon system? 95 1 A. I think it would have been the early part of the 2 2000s. I can't give any greater clarity than 3 that, unfortunately. 4 Q. You address your understanding of the purpose of 5 and process for acquiring ARQ data starting at 6 paragraph 77 of your statement. Could we have 7 that on screen, please. It is page 29 of 8 Mr Pardoe's statement. You say at 77: 9 "I personally was not an operational 10 Investigator from the inception of Horizon. 11 I don't recall supporting or certainly leading 12 a Horizon type investigation. I did obviously 13 lead the Fraud Strand and Security Operations 14 function during the pertinent periods, so will 15 respond with that in mind." 16 You go on at paragraph 78 to say this: 17 "I appreciate that this is a view that will 18 have been expressed previously but, throughout 19 my tenure, the opinion firmly expressed at every 20 turn, internally, was that Horizon was fit for 21 purpose. I recall with an element of clarity 22 updates from John Scott assuring the Security 23 function that the system was reliable, and we 24 were to continue with BAU activity. 25 I appreciate that there became a more measured 96 1 approach towards the end of my tenure, but 2 I certainly don't recall being involved in those 3 conversations. I also seem to recall 4 an internal Paula Vennells communication in 5 response to the increasing noise around Horizon; 6 obviously I can't recall word for word, but the 7 thrust was that Post Office were defending the 8 system and refuted the claims. My point is that 9 with honesty the use of tools such as Credence 10 data and ARQ logs were to my mind used as much 11 to evidence guilt than innocence and 12 particularly utilised when false accounting was 13 admitted but not theft. My understanding is the 14 Investigator would analyse logs to attempt to 15 evidence theft and wrongdoing particularly in 16 terms of cash balance declarations and 17 redeclarations; I'm not even sure how the log 18 would denote a bug, error or defect. It's 19 certainly not an area we had any training in, 20 ie to spot a bug, error or defect these are the 21 data patterns you should search for." 22 You then say: 23 "The language at POL00055590 in terms of 24 Horizon bashing expressed by a senior lawyer was 25 not uncommon." 97 1 Pausing there, could we have the document 2 referred to here on screen, please. The 3 reference is POL00055590. This is an email from 4 Jarnail Singh to a number of individuals on the 5 21 October 2010, following the conclusion of the 6 Seema Misra trial. You are not, in fact, by the 7 looks of things, on the email circulation list 8 here. The email reads as follows: 9 "Dear All, 10 "After a lengthy trial at Guildford Crown 11 Court the above named was found Guilty of theft. 12 This case turned from a relatively 13 straightforward general deficiency case to 14 an unprecedented attack on the Horizon system. 15 We were beset with unparallel degree of 16 disclosure requests by the defence. Through 17 hard work of everyone, counsel Warwick Tatford, 18 Investigation Officer Jon Longman and through 19 the considerable expertise of Gareth Jenkins of 20 Fujitsu we were able to destroy to the criminal 21 standard of proof (beyond all reasonable doubt) 22 every single suggestion made by the Defence. 23 "It is to be hoped the case will set 24 a marker to dissuade other defendants from 25 jumping on the Horizon bashing bandwagon." 98 1 Is it the language used in the last line of 2 this email that you say in your statement was 3 not uncommon? 4 A. Absolutely. 5 Q. Not uncommon for this particular lawyer or not 6 uncommon in general? 7 A. I believe that was a theme. 8 Q. At what level within the business was this 9 language being used? 10 A. That type of sentiment, at every level. 11 Q. Could we have page 30 of Mr Pardoe's statement 12 up on screen, please. Paragraph 79 of your 13 statement reads as follows: 14 "My understanding is that Fujitsu was 15 contracted to provide Audit Record Query data, 16 on demand, using an agreed secure process. 17 I seem to recall that the data provided a full 18 log at keystroke levels for the period specified 19 by the Investigator and providing transactional 20 and branch reporting detail. I'm aware that 21 this data could be used to identify singleton 22 transactions (like the use of a certain credit 23 card) or a full and complete series of 24 transactions using a date range specified by the 25 requester." 99 1 Going then, please, to paragraph 91 of the 2 statement, this is page 33, here you say this: 3 "In line with my response at 78, my belief 4 is that there was a cynicism in terms of the 5 steps that were taken to support any assertion 6 that Horizon was the root cause of 7 discrepancies. Horizon data from my perspective 8 was primarily a tool to either evidence how 9 false accounting took place or to support 10 a charge of theft and particularly when theft 11 was denied at interview. I'm struggling to 12 understand how the ARQs would identify a bug, 13 error or defect and particularly if their 14 presence was subtle and sat beneath obvious 15 keystroke data." 16 At 92: 17 "I'm not aware of circumstances where an ARQ 18 was provided to an SPMR, save for prosecution 19 cases when I would have expected the data to be 20 disclosed." 21 Should the Chair understand from the 22 paragraphs of your statement that we've just 23 looked at that ARQ data was primarily obtained 24 in order to support a prosecution once the 25 decision had been made to prosecute? 100 1 A. I think there may have been a variety of 2 approaches to that. 3 Q. So the purpose of obtaining ARQ data was not, at 4 least in your mind, for an Investigator to test 5 the reliability of the core evidence being 6 relied upon to prove an offence? 7 A. That's correct. 8 Q. Or to pursue a line of inquiry which might lead 9 away from the guilt of a suspect? 10 A. That's correct. 11 Q. Do you recall ARQ data ever being obtained 12 before a decision had been made to prosecute? 13 You just referred to a variety of approaches? 14 A. I think, on occasion, it would be, yes. 15 Q. You recall there being limits in respect of ARQ 16 requests and you address that at paragraph 80 of 17 your statement. Could we have that on screen, 18 please, it's page 30. You say here that 19 a document has refreshed your memory and you can 20 recall that: 21 "... as a function we were capped, within 22 contract, at 720 requests [per annum]." 23 Was that per annum, "PA"? 24 A. It is, yes. 25 Q. "I seem to recall that this changed during 101 1 mediation, but I wasn't involved in discussions 2 around this and am not aware what the uplift 3 was. I seem to recall that additional requests 4 were around £500. I don't specifically remember 5 being involved in uplift conversations that 6 authorised these; it certainly wasn't a budget 7 that I held, and I presume that John Scott would 8 have addressed this with the wider business." 9 Then at paragraph 81: 10 "I don't recall specifically any specific 11 changes between Legacy Horizon and Horizon 12 Online I do not recall Investigator noise that 13 this was proving to be problematic." 14 By "Investigator noise", do you mean you 15 were not aware of Investigators complaining 16 about the limits on ARQ requests? 17 A. I think an element of that and also any 18 difficulties in investigation, because the 19 business had changed from Legacy Horizon with 20 local storage and transmission to rather towards 21 Horizon Online. I don't recall any noise for 22 either of those instances. 23 Q. Do you recognise, however, that the existence of 24 limits was likely to impact upon the number of 25 cases in which ARQ requests were made? 102 1 A. I do indeed, and I think, probably earlier to 2 this, there was a greater demand on the limits 3 because the demise of the benefit book as 4 a method of payment, a decision was made by the, 5 at the time, DWP to cease reconciliation of 6 subpostmaster submissions, and so the business 7 took a risk-based view that they would sit that 8 reconciliation within house, so that in itself, 9 because of the findings of the reconciliation 10 function, if I recall, also led to a greater 11 demand on ARQ requests. 12 MS PRICE: Sir, I have reached the end of one topic 13 and the next topic is a little larger. Would 14 now be a convenient time to that have an early 15 lunch? 16 Sir, I think you're on mute. 17 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: How are we doing, generally, in 18 terms of closing at 2.00 because that is, I'm 19 afraid, an unmovable cut-off point. 20 MS PRICE: Sir, we're making good progress. If we 21 take 30 minutes for lunch, we should be fine to 22 finish at 2.00, including, I hope, Core 23 Participant questions. 24 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Well, it will have to include 25 them, so to speak. So between you and them, 103 1 you'll have to arrange the rest of the programme 2 to permit that to happen, if I can put that in 3 that way, all right? 4 MS PRICE: Yes, sir, understood. 5 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Fine. Okay. So what do we make 6 the time now? 11.54, I make the time. So 7 12.25? 8 MS PRICE: Yes, please, sir. 9 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Fine. 10 (11.54 am) 11 (A short break) 12 (12.26 pm) 13 MS PRICE: Hello, sir, can you see and hear us. 14 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, thank you. 15 MS PRICE: Mr Pardoe, do you recall the first 16 iteration of Horizon being rolled out to 17 branches? 18 A. Broadly, yes. 19 Q. At the time, did you have any awareness of there 20 being bugs, errors or defects or Acceptance 21 Incidents during the rollout? 22 A. I did not, no. 23 Q. Did you become aware of such issues occurring 24 during that rollout at any point later in your 25 career? 104 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. Can you remember when? 3 A. Unfortunately, not, no. 4 Q. There is a sentence which you use in a number of 5 places in your statement about your awareness of 6 bugs, errors or defects in the Horizon system. 7 Could we have on screen, please, 8 paragraph 111 of Mr Pardoe's statement, it's 9 page 37. This is the first time that you use 10 the sentence and you do so in the context of 11 commenting on the Josephine Hamilton case? 12 A. Could it be enlarged please? 13 Q. Yes, of course. 14 A. Thank you. 15 Q. Is that large enough or shall we zoom in? 16 A. No, that's fine, thank you. 17 Q. So in the context of Josephine Hamilton's case 18 you say this: 19 "Clearly the prosecution was wholly wrong as 20 was the continual Post Office refutes that the 21 system was not at fault. Had I been aware that 22 there was knowledge of bugs, errors and defects, 23 that could ultimately and significantly affect 24 the cash values required to perform 25 an acceptable balance and I was expected to 105 1 remain mute around these and continue any form 2 of role within the Security function, then 3 I would have considered my position untenable." 4 There are a number of parts to that 5 sentence. First, what do you mean by "bugs, 6 errors and defects that could ultimately and 7 significantly affect the cash values required to 8 perform an acceptable balance"? 9 A. So I think there I refer to the concept of 10 systematic week in, week out, week in, week out, 11 bugs, errors or defects impacting the same 12 branch with the result that every single week, 13 losses were being generated by that branch, 14 either because the bug, error or defect was 15 artificially reducing the payments line or 16 artificially increasing the receipts line, and 17 then I go on to say I'd have considered the 18 position -- my position to be untenable if I was 19 expected to say, "Look, Mr Pardoe, David, we've 20 discovered this, but let's just keep it quiet. 21 We know it's going on, let's just keep quiet 22 about it". 23 Q. Just focusing first on what you were aware of, 24 were you aware of bugs, errors or defects which 25 could cause discrepancies in accounts? 106 1 A. I think that there was an awareness that this 2 was increasingly being cited, but I was still 3 relying on the refutes that were being given 4 back to me from the business. 5 Q. Could we have on screen, please, document 6 reference POL00104593. This is an email chain 7 with recipients from Post Office Legal Services 8 on both the civil and criminal sides, and 9 a number of people from the Security Team. The 10 legal contingent included Mandy Talbot and Rob 11 Wilson. The Security Team contingent included 12 David Posnett, Tony Utting and yourself. The 13 top email here is dated 30 September 2004, and 14 is from Mandy Talbot. 15 You are, as you can see, on the copy list. 16 Her email addresses a number of points arising 17 from the proposed changes to Post Office 18 accounting practices and, in particular, the 19 proposed introduction of the branch trading 20 statement. So we can see the subject "Trading 21 statement". 22 Is it likely that you were included on the 23 copy list because of the policy and standards 24 role that you held reporting to Tony Utting? 25 A. Potentially, that would be the case, yes. 107 1 Q. Looking, please, to the seventh paragraph in 2 this email, scrolling down a bit, please. It 3 starts "If POL is going to". It says: 4 "If POL is going to rely on data produced by 5 the Horizon system in court, then it will need 6 to put in place a standardised witness statement 7 signed by a party who can confirm that the 8 system was working accurately during particular 9 periods of time and that the information 10 supplied by the same is reliable. Post Office 11 Limited and Horizon will have to identify named 12 individuals who are prepared to undertake this 13 task, and if necessary who are prepared to 14 attend court." 15 Do you recall this suggestion from Mandy 16 Talbot? 17 A. Not specifically from that document, 18 unfortunately, no. 19 Q. Do you remember it at all, whether in this 20 document or elsewhere, the suggestion that, if 21 POL were going to rely on data produced by the 22 system, then someone would have to produce 23 a statement that the system was working 24 accurately and the information supplied was 25 reliable? 108 1 A. I recall that theme, yes, but, as I say, 2 unfortunately not from this specific document. 3 Q. Did you understand, either from what Mandy 4 Talbot was saying here or from anything said by 5 others, that there may be occasions on which the 6 Horizon system was not working accurately and 7 the information supplied was not reliable? 8 A. I don't interpret that, no. 9 Q. Could we have on screen, please, document 10 reference POL00172808. This is an email from 11 Mark Dinsdale, dated 12 March 2010, attaching 12 something called a "Security -- 4 Weekly 13 Report". You are one of a long list of 14 recipients. What role did Mark Dinsdale hold at 15 this time? 16 A. I can only be triggered by the salutation that 17 he was the Security Programme Manager. 18 Q. What was the "Security -- 4 Weekly Report" and 19 who did go to? 20 A. I think it was a stakeholder-focused report 21 around key activities performed by the Security 22 Team for that period. 23 Q. Could we have on screen, please, the report 24 itself, which is document reference POL00172809. 25 The date of the report is the same as the email, 109 1 12 March 2010. Going, please, to page 3 of this 2 report, there is a heading here "Security 3 programmes for products" and, under this, the 4 fifth bullet point, please, refers to Horizon 5 Online. It says this: 6 "Due to live service issues, the decision 7 has been made not to migrate any further 8 branches until these issues are fully 9 understood, necessary actions agreed and success 10 criteria met. In effect, the Pilot 11 'stabilisation' period has been brought forward 12 in order to assure the quality before 13 proceeding. This will allow Fujitsu some time 14 to resolve issues, including a higher than 15 expected number of screen freezes and resultant 16 recovery transactions." 17 Did that cause you any concern at all when 18 you read it? 19 A. Not that I can recollect, no. 20 Q. What did you understand at the time, if you can 21 recall, by the reference to screen freezes and 22 resultant recovery transactions? 23 A. I don't recall, sorry. 24 Q. Did you understand from this or from any other 25 discussions that there were technical problems 110 1 with the rollout of Horizon Online? 2 A. I suspect I would have done, yes. 3 Q. Could we have on screen, please, document 4 reference POL00165450. This is an email dated 5 4 June 2014, and if we scroll down a bit, 6 please, we can see that there is a title 7 "Update, Service/Systems Down or Offline", and 8 there is an incident title there. Just 9 scrolling back up, please, there's a long list 10 of recipients again, including you. 11 Was this is an email sent to the Grapevine 12 function, given the date it is being sent? 13 A. It seems to have been sent to a number of the 14 security function and to other key stakeholders 15 in the business, as well, from what I can read 16 through. 17 Q. This is one of a number of documents which 18 appear in this format. Is this a standard 19 format email which was sent when there was 20 a service or systems problem? 21 A. I don't recall that specifically. 22 Q. Scrolling down, please, the "Incident title" 23 here reads as follows: 24 "Issues with transfer acknowledgement in the 25 National Lottery system -- this is causing 111 1 duplicate tickets." 2 The "Current business impact" says this: 3 "All Camelot branches will not be able to 4 balance as they have duped transactions." 5 Under "Case summary", scrolling down, 6 please, we have this, update 3 June: 7 "CGI", do you know who CGI were? 8 A. I don't, sorry, No. 9 Q. "CGI are process of raising FIX86 to negate the 10 duplicate Camelot data within Credence. This 11 should corrected once the overnight batch jobs 12 have processed." 13 Update earlier that day below: 14 "POL are currently looking at providing 15 branches with Transaction corrections. 16 "We are in the process of raising FIX86 to 17 negate the duplicate Camelot data within 18 Credence." 19 On its face, this seems to be reporting 20 a systems issue, meaning that Camelot branches 21 would not be able to balance; is that your 22 understanding of it? 23 A. It does, yes. 24 Q. Do you recall receiving this email or any like 25 it now? 112 1 A. Not at all, no. 2 Q. Since you are on the copy list for this, do you 3 think there was anything about this that might 4 have concerned you on reading it at the time? 5 A. With hindsight, yes, but I don't recall that 6 feeling at the time, no. 7 Q. Could we have on screen, please, document 8 reference POL00165493. This is an email dated 9 10 July 2014, and scrolling down, please, the 10 title, the subject, is "Service/Systems 11 Performance Degraded -- Reference Data Integrity 12 Not proven error in Horizon". Again, it is sent 13 to a long list of recipients including you. So 14 scrolling up, please. 15 Does that appear to you to be the same 16 varied make-up of stakeholders within the 17 business? 18 A. It does. 19 Q. Under "Incident Summary" it says this: 20 "Incident title: Reference Data Integrity 21 Not proven error in Horizon." 22 Next to "Current business impact", this 23 under "Incident summary": 24 "Fujitsu have confirmed that currently 658 25 [Post Office] branches are affected. This 113 1 number is currently increasing." 2 Next to the "Case summary" here, we see 3 an update, it probably makes more sense to start 4 at the bottom: 5 "INITIAL 10 July 2014 7.42 6 "Fujitsu have been engaged to investigate." 7 "Next Update to be at 10.00. 8 "Fujitsu have logged the incident with BT. 9 "Fujitsu believe this to be a BT WAN Failure 10 and are currently trying to correlate 11 information in relation to the PO branch 12 locations to identify the geographical nature of 13 the incident." 14 Then above, update at 8.47: 15 "ATOS Incident Management have agreed to 16 raise this incident to a P1." 17 Again, can you recall receiving this email 18 now? 19 A. Not at all, no. 20 Q. What do you understand the problem to be in this 21 instance? 22 A. Even reading it now, live, I'm absolutely -- I'm 23 not sure what to make of that. 24 Q. Do you have any idea why the author of this 25 alert chose to use the words "Not proven error 114 1 in Horizon"? 2 A. Not at all. 3 Q. Could we have on screen, please, POL00165581. 4 This is a case closure report, dated 9 October 5 2014, from Robert Daily. It is sent to Denise 6 Reid, Brian Trotter and John Breeden, copied to 7 you, among others. Can you help with why you 8 were being copied into this case closure report, 9 given what you have told us about your role by 10 this point in 2014? 11 A. I suspect that could be custom and practice. 12 I looked through that, I can see the majority, 13 if not all, of the senior lead team for Security 14 being copied into that, the names I recognise 15 there, Rob King, Sally Smith, John Bigley. 16 I assume it's just an email cascade. 17 Q. We can see that this case relates to a case set 18 up on 3 December 2012, relating to a branch 19 named Gorbals. The "Enquiry Type" is "Cash 20 Loss". The "Primary Stakeholder" is Denise 21 Reid, the "Identified 'Criminal Loss'", 22 scrolling down a bit, please, is £34,179.54. 23 Scrolling down, please, to "Final Outcome", 24 and that's in highlight there at the top of that 25 page: 115 1 "PF has decided not to proceed." 2 Can you help with "PF"? What does that 3 stand for. 4 A. Procurator Fiscal, I suspect. 5 Q. Then under "Procedural and organisational 6 failings", we see "Yes", is recorded. Under 7 this, a date given is on which procedural and 8 organisational failings are said to have been 9 discussed with the primary stakeholder, on 10 29 January 2013. 11 Then under "Any other comments", a little 12 further down, please, it says: 13 "Angus Crawford PF has cited issues with 14 Horizon for not proceeding with case." 15 Do you recall receiving this case closure 16 report? 17 A. I don't, no. I don't recall that. 18 Q. It appears from it that a case was being dropped 19 because of issues with Horizon; is that right? 20 A. Absolutely. 21 Q. Can you help with what those issues were at all? 22 A. Not at all, no. 23 Q. The form of words you use in your statement, 24 that you were unaware of bugs, errors and 25 defects that could ultimately and significantly 116 1 affect the cash values required to perform 2 an acceptable balance, does this reflect that 3 you were aware of bugs, errors and defects which 4 might affect a branch's ability to balance, but 5 you assumed that, where such problems arose, 6 they were either fixed or did not create 7 balancing issues which were significant? 8 A. I think, yes, they were fixed or did not create 9 those systematic balance variances. 10 Q. When do you think you first became aware that 11 systems problems could arise which could cause 12 balancing problems for banks? 13 A. Again, I wouldn't be able to state that with any 14 great certainty, unfortunately. 15 Q. Was it before you started making prosecution 16 decisions? 17 A. No. 18 Q. Was it before you ceased in that role? 19 A. I don't recall that. 20 Q. Having the awareness that you did, when 21 subpostmasters being criminally investigated and 22 prosecuted attributed apparent shortfalls to the 23 Horizon system, why did you dismiss these claims 24 out of hand? 25 A. I think that was following on from the repeated 117 1 business assertions that Horizon was fit, 2 robust. 3 Q. The Inquiry has heard evidence that Fujitsu were 4 able to access the systems in a branch remotely, 5 and alter the data. Were you aware of that? 6 A. No. 7 Q. Had you been aware, would this have concerned 8 you? 9 A. I'd have expected that the sufficient safeguards 10 would have been in place to maintain the probity 11 of the system. I wouldn't have felt technically 12 competent to be able to challenge that, per se. 13 Q. The Inquiry has also heard evidence that there 14 were occasions on which the Post Office did not 15 tell Horizon users, who had been identified as 16 affected by a bug, error or defect, that they 17 had been so affected. Were you aware of this? 18 A. Not at all, no. No. 19 Q. Had you been aware, would this have concerned 20 you? 21 A. Absolutely. 22 Q. As far as you are aware, did the Post Office 23 ever consider that there might be discrepancies 24 which had been caused by an issue with the 25 system, of which the user was unaware, and the 118 1 relevance this might have had to 2 an investigation or prosecution? 3 A. No. 4 Q. It's right, isn't it, that, at the point of 5 advising on whether the prosecution test was 6 met, the Criminal Law Team would have been 7 reliant on Investigators to provide them with 8 all relevant material in the case? 9 A. It was, yes, yes. 10 Q. They would be reliant on your Investigators 11 pursuing all reasonable lines of inquiry? 12 A. Correct. 13 Q. The same is true at the point of disclosure, 14 should a prosecution be brought, isn't it, 15 because, if reasonable lines of inquiry are not 16 pursued, then there is a risk relevant material 17 will not have been obtained? 18 A. It is. 19 Q. When you were an Investigator, were you 20 conscious that there was an obligation on you to 21 pursue lines of inquiry which pointed away from, 22 as well as towards, the guilt of the suspect? 23 A. Correct, yes. 24 Q. When you led the Fraud Strand or Security 25 Operations function, were you satisfied that 119 1 your Investigators understood their obligation 2 to pursue lines of inquiry which pointed away 3 from, as well as towards, the guilt of the 4 suspect? 5 A. I was at the time. 6 Q. How did you satisfy yourself that that was the 7 case? 8 A. I think there was a blanket belief that some of 9 the explanations being given, as astounding as 10 it sounds, were not relevant to the case. 11 Q. When you were an Investigator, were you aware 12 that there was a duty on you as an Investigator 13 to obtain and consider third-party material 14 from, for example, financial institutions and 15 Fujitsu, in appropriate cases? 16 A. As an Investigator, not from Fujitsu. That 17 would not have been applicable. But certainly 18 we'd seek with authority information from 19 financial institutions. 20 Q. So you're saying Investigators would not have 21 sought material from Fujitsu? 22 A. Apologies, I thought you said when I was 23 an Investigator. 24 Q. Ah, when you were an Investigator, I see. When 25 you led the Fraud Strand and Security Operations 120 1 function, were you satisfied that your 2 Investigators understood there was a duty to 3 obtain and consider third-party material, in 4 an appropriate case? 5 A. At the time, yes. 6 Q. How did you satisfy yourself that that was the 7 case, that your Investigators understood that 8 obligation relating to third-party disclosure or 9 material? 10 A. Again, I'd have expected that to have been 11 covered through formal training. I'd have 12 expected that to have been reiterated by team 13 leaders and I would have expected that to be 14 directed, as well, by the Criminal Law Team, if 15 they could see there was a particular absence or 16 omission within a set of case papers. 17 Q. In terms of disclosure, it's right, isn't it, 18 that the Investigator in the case was normally 19 also the Disclosure Officer? 20 A. Almost without exception, yes. 21 Q. Do you recall the three Rs which apply to 22 disclosure: retain, record, reveal? 23 A. I do. 24 Q. What were the provides within the Post Office to 25 ensure that these fundamental disclosure 121 1 principles -- retain, record, reveal -- were 2 applied to information held by the Post Office? 3 A. I think across the piste, with hindsight, that 4 was seen as an administrative case preparation 5 function, as opposed to forming a pivotal 6 component of the criminal investigation. 7 Q. What processes existed within the Post Office 8 Security Team to ensure that there was collation 9 of information held by the Post Office, going to 10 the operation of Horizon? 11 A. Again, I think that would come back to the fact 12 that the relevance of the information was simply 13 just not considered. 14 Q. What processes existed within the Post Office 15 Security Team to ensure that there was proper 16 recording of information held by the Post Office 17 going to the operation of Horizon? 18 A. Can you just repeat the question, please? 19 Q. What processes existed within the Post Office 20 Security Team to ensure that there was proper 21 recording -- as opposed to collation of 22 information, recording of information held by 23 the Post Office, going to the operation of 24 Horizon? 25 A. I'm not aware of that, sorry. 122 1 Q. Does it follow that you can't help with whether 2 there are any processes in the Post Office 3 Security Team to ensure that there was proper 4 recording of information going to the operation 5 of Horizon which had been raised in prior 6 prosecutions? 7 A. I can't, yes, that's correct. 8 Q. Which part of the Post Office was the repository 9 for information or evidence about bugs, errors 10 and defects in Horizon? 11 A. It would have sat with one of the IT functions. 12 I can't be more specific than that 13 unfortunately. There would have been functions 14 that would have phased into Fujitsu. I can't be 15 more specific. 16 Q. Were Investigators informed or kept updated 17 about significant changes to Horizon or about 18 any problems, bugs, errors or defects, that the 19 Post Office was aware of? 20 A. I suspect from documentation that's been 21 produced as part of the Inquiry that that was 22 not always the case. 23 Q. Was there, as far as you were aware, any formal 24 coherent approach across prosecutions as to what 25 the investigative approach should be when 123 1 a subpostmaster sought to rely on Horizon as 2 explaining losses which formed the basis of 3 a prosecution? 4 A. No, there wasn't. 5 Q. Turning, please, to the witness evidence which 6 was provided by Fujitsu in support of 7 prosecutions brought by the Post Office, in 8 terms of the people who you recall from Fujitsu, 9 who provided prosecution support, is it right 10 that you recall Penny Thomas being involved in 11 ARQ requests -- 12 A. I do. 13 Q. -- and these requests being provided by the 14 return of password-protected CD-ROMs? 15 A. I do. 16 Q. Could we have paragraph 84 of Mr Pardoe's 17 statement on screen, please. That's page 31. 18 Towards the bottom of the page, at 84, you say: 19 "In terms of additional prosecution support 20 then I obviously recall that Fujitsu would 21 provide expert witness testimony presented by 22 Gareth Jenkins. I'm unsure what the contractual 23 basis for this was." 24 Your recollection of the involvement of 25 Penny Thomas and Gareth Jenkins, does that come 124 1 from your time as a Senior Security Manager, 2 heading up the Fraud or Security Operations 3 strand, or does that come from your time when 4 you headed up the Grapevine function? 5 A. I think Penny Thomas resonates more from heading 6 up the Grapevine function. I think that Gareth 7 Jenkins will resonate from both Grapevine 8 function and from the Fraud Strand function, as 9 well. 10 Q. When you were in Security Operations and making 11 decisions on prosecutions, did you understand 12 that the prosecution had specific 13 responsibilities when they instructed an expert 14 to ensure that the expert was properly 15 instructed to provide an opinion or questions on 16 issues between the parties? 17 A. Not specifically, and I would have relied 18 heavily on the Criminal Law Team to ensure that 19 those duties were fulfilled. 20 Q. The same question in relation to whether you 21 were aware that such instructions should be 22 confirmed by anyway of a written document? 23 A. I'm not aware of that. 24 Q. And that the expert understood what the expert's 25 duties to the court entailed? 125 1 A. I would make an assumption that that was the 2 case. 3 Q. Did you know that the instruction of an expert 4 gave rise to distinct disclosure obligations on 5 the part of the prosecution, including that the 6 prosecutor was required to bring to the 7 attention of the defence and to the court any 8 material which the prosecutor was aware of being 9 reasonably capable of undermining the expert's 10 opinion? 11 A. I was not advised of that, no. 12 Q. Were you aware that there was a particular duty 13 to retain communications between the police and 14 experts, such as forensic scientists, reports of 15 work carried out by experts and schedules of 16 scientific material prepared by the expert for 17 the Investigator for the purposes of criminal 18 proceedings? 19 A. Appertaining to that particular case or to 20 a theme of cases, sorry? 21 Q. So in the context of the provision of expert 22 evidence, specifically by Fujitsu, were you 23 aware that there was a duty on prosecutors, 24 a disclosure duty, to retain communications 25 between the Investigator and the expert? 126 1 A. Yes. I would have been. 2 Q. Were you aware that there was a duty to record 3 the existence of such communications on 4 a disclosure schedule? 5 A. Yes, I would have been. 6 Q. You address your role in relation to Grapevine 7 at paragraph 82 of your statement. Could we 8 have that on screen, please. It's page 31. 9 Here, you say this: 10 "There was a period towards the end of my 11 career when I managed the crime intelligence 12 function under the heading Grapevine. This 13 function acted as the conduit between the 14 Operational Investigators and Fujitsu in terms 15 of ARQ requests. This was a stringent process 16 and covered by a policy that unfortunately 17 hasn't been presented to me within supplied 18 documents. I didn't act as the gatekeeper to 19 requests. I do recall that Dave Posnett would 20 get involved in out of course requests in terms 21 of size." 22 Turning, please, to paragraph 99 over the 23 page -- apologies, it's not over the page. 24 Page 34, please. At 99, you say: 25 "Other than acting in a role that had team 127 1 members who acted as the conduit between Post 2 Office Investigators and Fujitsu then I can't 3 recall any regular contact with them. Contact 4 historically was via the Information Security 5 Team." 6 Can you recall the Casework Management Team 7 having a role as being the point of contact 8 between Investigators and Fujitsu. 9 A. Yes, they would be. 10 Q. Was that casework management function something 11 that came to be part of the Grapevine function? 12 A. There was a period when that was the case, yes. 13 Q. You say you cannot recall regular contact with 14 Fujitsu but your team had a role in liaising 15 with Fujitsu over the production of witness 16 evidence. Did you know when you headed up the 17 Grapevine function that there was certain things 18 which were necessary inclusions in an expert 19 report, for example, a statement setting out the 20 substance of all instructions received -- 21 A. I did not. No. 22 Q. -- the materials provided and considered and the 23 documents, statements, information or 24 assumptions, which are material to the opinions 25 expressed -- 128 1 A. I did not. 2 Q. A statement to the effect that the expert has 3 complied with his or her duty to the court to 4 provide independent assistance, by way of 5 objective, unbiased opinion, in relation to 6 matters within their expertise -- 7 A. No. 8 Q. And an acknowledgement that the expert will 9 inform all parties and, where appropriate, the 10 court in the event that his or her opinion 11 changes on any material issues? 12 A. Again, no. 13 Q. It is your evidence that you did not know the 14 contractual basis for Mr Jenkins' involvement in 15 cases and you had no regular contact with 16 Fujitsu. Does it follow that, although you were 17 aware that Mr Jenkins would provide expert 18 witness testimony, you had no involvement in the 19 instruction of Mr Jenkins in any case? 20 A. Absolutely. I had no involvement in his 21 instruction whatsoever. 22 Q. Did you yourself check whether Mr Jenkins had 23 been properly instructed, according to the 24 principles relating to expert witnesses that 25 we've just been through? 129 1 A. No, I'd have made that assumption that that 2 check had been conducted end to end by members 3 of the Criminal Law Team. 4 Q. Is the same true in respect of whether you 5 yourself checked whether Mr Jenkins understood 6 the expert duties as were required? 7 A. Correct. The same would be true. 8 Q. And, again, in relation to whether Mr Jenkins' 9 witness statements had the necessary in 10 conclusions for expert evidence? 11 A. And again, the same would be true. 12 Q. Turning, please, to some of the specific case 13 studies with which you had involvement, is it 14 right that, in relation to all of the Inquiry 15 criminal prosecution case studies you comment on 16 in your statement, that is the cases of 17 Josephine Hamilton, Susan Rudkin, Julian Wilson, 18 Peter Holmes, Seema Misra, Alison Hall, Lynette 19 Hutchings, Grant Allen, Khayyam Ishaq, Angela 20 Sefton and Anne Neild, you now consider that the 21 prosecution was wholly wrong, as was the 22 continual Post Office position that the system 23 was not at fault? 24 A. I would have more confidence in making that 25 assertion if I'd have been approached prior to 130 1 this with examples of the bugs, errors and 2 defects that had actually applied to those cases 3 that you've just recounted to me. In the 4 absence of those, then yes, I must make the 5 assertion that those prosecutions were wholly 6 wrong. 7 Q. Well, the question is based on a summary of the 8 same paragraph that you've included and that 9 wording -- 10 A. It is. 11 Q. -- in relation to each and every one of those 12 case studies. 13 A. It is. 14 Q. Does that remain your position, that you 15 consider that the prosecution was wholly wrong? 16 A. The prosecution was wholly wrong. If I may just 17 go on, there should have been more care and 18 attention in supporting the impacted 19 subpostmasters to uncover the root cause. 20 Q. I do not propose to take you through the papers 21 relating to all of these cases but, in relation 22 to some cases, you appear to have had greater 23 involvement in the progression of the case. In 24 particular, I'd like to deal, please, with the 25 case of Josephine Hamilton. You note in your 131 1 statement that this is a case where the 2 prosecution was authorised by Tony Utting, who 3 is listed on the suspect offender report as the 4 Designated Prosecution Authority. 5 So this wasn't a case which you authorised 6 prosecution in but you did become involved, you 7 say in your statement, at a later stage, 8 specifically when consideration was being given 9 to whether pleas to false accounting charges 10 should be accepted; is that right? 11 A. That's right. 12 Q. This is a case where the charges brought were of 13 both theft and false accounting. It is a case 14 in relation to which you say you were aware of 15 the allegations being made by Mrs Hamilton 16 around Horizon IT issues; is that right? 17 A. It is. 18 Q. You say in your statement that you would have 19 read the suspect offender report produced by 20 Graham Brander in this case. Would this have 21 been when you became involved in consideration 22 of plea or before that? 23 A. I think the former, in consideration of plea. 24 Q. You've had a chance to reread Mr Brander's 25 report for the purposes of preparing your 132 1 statement for the Inquiry; is that right? 2 A. It is. 3 Q. Could we have the report on screen, please. It 4 is POL00047955. We see here, as you note, Tony 5 Utting is listed as the Designated Prosecution 6 Authority. Going to page 5 of this document, 7 please, scrolling down, please, we see here the 8 author is the Investigator in the case, Graham 9 Brander, and the report is dated 17 May 2006. 10 Just pausing there, did Graham Brander 11 report to you? 12 A. He would have been, from memory, a direct report 13 to direct report. So he would have reported via 14 a team leader into myself. 15 Q. Going, please, to page 3 of this document, at 16 the top, Mr Brander says this: 17 "Having analysed the Horizon printouts and 18 accounting documentation I was unable to find 19 any evidence of theft or that the cash figures 20 had been deliberately inflated." 21 This was a case in which the prosecution was 22 for theft as well as false accounting. Did it 23 concern you, when you read this report, that 24 a prosecution for theft had been brought by the 25 Post Office in a case where the Investigator in 133 1 the case was unable to find any evidence of 2 theft? 3 A. From memory, that was -- I don't think this case 4 is isolated in that approach. I think that 5 there was quite a common practice by the 6 Criminal Law Team. 7 Q. What was that practice? 8 A. That there would be a charge of theft and then 9 also charges of false accounting. 10 Q. Could we have on screen, please, document 11 reference POL00049083. Starting, please, with 12 the email about halfway down this page. This is 13 an email from Jennifer Andrews from the Criminal 14 Law Team to the SD Prosecution Office, dated 15 9 October 2007. Can you help with what the SD 16 Prosecution Office's role was? 17 A. No, I can't, no. No. Sorry, I'm not familiar 18 with that term. 19 Q. This email is copied to Graham Brander, Colin 20 Price and Juliet McFarlane. As we can see from 21 the subject of the email, it relates to the case 22 against Josephine Hamilton. Ms Andrews is 23 forwarding an email from counsel for the Post 24 Office in the case, Richard Jory. So scrolling 25 down, please, to the next page. We see there 134 1 Richard Jory. It his email reads as follows: 2 "Juliet/Jenee 3 "Counsel defending has offered pleas to 4 false accounting in this matter (I presume 5 counts 2-9 inclusive) and asked me to take 6 instructions as to whether this might be 7 an appropriate offer. My view is that there is 8 evidence she has taken the money and that there 9 is sufficient evidence to support theft, but 10 Royal Mail may be content with guilty pleas to 11 dishonesty matters if she undertook to repay the 12 amount of the shortage at audit, ie £36,444.89. 13 It might be worth speaking to the officers, 14 Graham Brander and Colin Price, to canvass their 15 views." 16 Scrolling up, please, to the top of the 17 page, the first page, we see an email from 18 Graham Brander to Jennifer Andrews and Juliet 19 McFarlane, dated 10 October 2007. This email is 20 copied to you, among others. Mr Brander says 21 this in his email: 22 "Jenee/Juliet 23 "I agree with counsel. In my opinion, the 24 evidence clearly shows theft (charge 1), 25 however, if the defence are offering up guilty 135 1 pleas to all false Accounting charges (2-15 on 2 my copy of the indictment), then I would suggest 3 we accept this on the understanding that 4 Mrs Hamilton agrees to repay the full amount ... 5 "Any decision in respect of whether we 6 accept this would need to be made by Dave 7 Pardoe." 8 Should we take it from this that, at least 9 in this case, the decision on acceptance of 10 a plea needed to come from you? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Was that always the case, that the Senior 13 Security Manager needed to agree any plea 14 agreement? 15 A. No, absolutely not. Many of these decisions 16 would have been made quite dynamically on the 17 day, so they would have been made in court on 18 the day without any reference to myself and 19 rather with reference to the Criminal Law Team. 20 Q. Could we have on screen, please, document 21 reference POL00049154. This is a memo dated 22 15 November 2007 from Juliet McFarlane. If we 23 scroll down, please, at the bottom there, to the 24 Investigation Team. Going back up, please, 25 copied to Graham Brander, Ged Harbinson and you, 136 1 it reads as follows: 2 "I refer to previous correspondence 3 regarding this matter. 4 "As you know there has been some discussion 5 as to whether or not pleas to false accounting 6 would be acceptable. I note this would be 7 agreeable, providing that Mrs Hamilton were to 8 repay the full amount. 9 "On counsel's request, this matter has been 10 listed for mention on 19 November 2007. The 11 purpose of this is to see whether or not the 12 trial can be vacated. It is possible that 13 Mrs Hamilton may wish to enter pleas to false 14 accounting. I understand however that she is 15 not yet in a position to repay and has not given 16 a date as to when this can be done. 17 "One option would be for the theft count to 18 be left on file pending payment by the date of 19 trial or some later date." 20 Ms McFarlane is essentially saying that 21 pleas to false accounting would be agreeable, 22 conditional upon Mrs Hamilton repaying the full 23 amount of the apparent shortfall, isn't she? 24 A. Absolutely. 25 Q. This is in circumstances where, regardless of 137 1 the assessment of counsel and the Investigator 2 in the case at this point, originally in the 3 investigator report the Investigator had found 4 no evidence of theft or even the cash figures 5 being deliberately inflated. 6 A. Correct. 7 Q. You say in your statement at paragraph 108 that 8 you link the ultimate agreement to drop the 9 theft charge to the lack of theft evidence. Is 10 that a fair summary of your paragraph 108? 11 A. Absolutely, yes. 12 Q. We can see that Ged Harbinson's view was being 13 sought -- if we scroll down a little, please -- 14 on the prospects of recovery by a confiscation 15 order should pleas be entered on the false 16 accounting. Is it fair to say that the 17 prospects of recovery of the money was a key 18 consideration for the Post Office when 19 considering what plea might be agreeable? 20 A. It would have been one consideration. 21 I wouldn't describe it as key but, certainly, it 22 would have been one consideration. I do recall 23 it would have been more problematic to secure 24 confiscation based on the false accounting 25 piece, than on a conviction for a straight theft 138 1 charge, yes. 2 Q. At the time, did you think it was appropriate to 3 make acceptance of pleas to false accounting 4 dependent on Mrs Hamilton repaying the full 5 amount of the apparent shortfall? 6 A. I didn't, no, because that had been almost 7 custom and practice from myself being quite 8 a junior investigator all the way through my 9 tenure with the Post Office, that had been 10 an adopted practice. This by no means struck me 11 as being a one-off case. 12 Q. So, in answer to that, you think at the time you 13 thought that it was appropriate? 14 A. I didn't think any different. It's something 15 that I'd -- my professional career within the 16 security function had grown up with. 17 Q. You're aware now, aren't you, that the way this 18 was dealt with, making repayment a condition of 19 dropping the theft charge, was criticised by the 20 Court of Appeal when it overturned 21 Mrs Hamilton's conviction. They said that it 22 placed undue pressure on Mrs Hamilton. You're 23 aware of that now, aren't you? 24 A. Indeed, yes. 25 Q. There is a memo from Juliet McFarlane also -- 139 1 well, dated 19 November 2007, which you were 2 copied into. Can we have that on screen, 3 please. The reference is POL00044388. We can 4 see that the memo goes to the Investigation 5 Team, copied specifically to Graham Brander, Ged 6 Harbinson and you. It reads as follows: 7 "The Defendant appeared before the court 8 today. The prosecution was represented by 9 Mr Richard Jory of 9-12 Bell Yard, London ... 10 and the Defendant was represented by Anita 11 Saran. 12 "The Defendant pleaded guilty to the false 13 accounting counts 2-15 on the indictment. The 14 case has been adjourned ... for pre-sentence 15 reports. 16 "The Defendant has been informed that full 17 payment must be made prior to that date. The 18 theft count has remained on file on the 19 understanding that it should be proceeded with 20 if the money is not repaid. 21 "It is believed that the Defendant has 22 monies which will be available at the end of the 23 year. If the Defendant does not repay then 24 consideration will need to be given to the 25 practicalities of proceeding with the charge of 140 1 theft or whether confiscation proceedings should 2 pursue. 3 "I not that the compensation outstanding is 4 [and there's the figure]. 5 "I note that the figure canvassed [the 6 higher sum] is a sum which includes interest, 7 the greatest sum will no doubt be pursued should 8 confiscation proceedings be brought." 9 Then this, at the penultimate paragraph: 10 "It has been made clear to the Defence that 11 there must be some recognition that the 12 Defendant had the money short of theft and that 13 a plea on the basis that the loss was due to the 14 computer not working properly will not be 15 accepted." 16 You were aware that Mrs Hamilton had raised 17 allegations that the Horizon system was not 18 working properly and this memo is making clear 19 the Post Office position, that a plea on the 20 basis the loss was due to the computer not 21 working properly would not be accepted. We've 22 seen reference in the email of 10 October from 23 Mr Brander to the decision on plea ultimately 24 being a matter for you. Was this a stipulation 25 which came from you or not? 141 1 A. Absolutely not. 2 Q. Was it a stipulation with which you agreed? 3 A. I'm not sure I thought that at the time, whether 4 he agreed or disagreed with it. It was 5 a stipulation. I'm fairly sure it wasn't in 6 isolation just towards this case. I think it 7 was part of the whole Horizon defence piece that 8 was being practised across the Post Office at 9 the time. 10 Q. Was this is an example of a Post Office line to 11 take, that the computer not working properly was 12 not to be entertained as a defence to a criminal 13 allegation? 14 A. I think that's fair to say, yes. 15 Q. You say in your statement at paragraph 138 that 16 you can say that dropping the theft charge in 17 relation to acceptance of falsification of 18 accounts was certainly not unheard of. Is that 19 the same point that you've already made that 20 this is -- 21 A. It is indeed, yes. 22 Q. -- part and parcel of a wider picture? 23 A. It is indeed, and it certainly wasn't a recent 24 thing, you know. As I said, even from being 25 a junior investigator, it would be custom and 142 1 practice. 2 Q. Was this practice to bring charges for theft, as 3 well as false accounting, intended to put 4 pressure on a defendant to plead guilty to 5 a lesser plea -- to a lesser charge, forgive me? 6 A. I can only make that assumption that that's the 7 case, yes. 8 Q. The concluding paragraphs in your statement are 9 set out at 180 to 181. Could we have that on 10 screen, please. This is page 54 of the 11 statement. You say at paragraph 180: 12 "The more I see and hear from the Inquiry, 13 then the further I despair. It strikes me that 14 no one, at a suitable level of seniority, had 15 the conviction and gumption to say enough is 16 enough and to drive a timely, truly independent 17 review whilst ceasing all prosecution activity 18 and having the courage to be prepared to support 19 the application and lessons of a truly 20 independent Horizon review to both historic 21 prosecutions and non-prosecuted repayment of 22 accounting shortfalls. As someone that held 23 several investigatory roles in the Post Office, 24 I feel utterly deceived." 25 You go on to say: 143 1 "With hindsight there should have been 2 a team of skilled analysts working on behalf of 3 branch errors, conducting full error analysis 4 using complete and unabridged Fujitsu data 5 including all reversals. This level of 6 transparency would have supported SPMRs to come 7 forward at low level loss stage rather than 8 being pushed into systematic false accounting 9 series." 10 You have made fairly plain your position in 11 relation to the Post Office stance relating to 12 the Horizon system. Looking back, do you think 13 that you bore any responsibility for the 14 perpetuation of the Post Office stance in 15 relation to Horizon? 16 A. I was part of that groupthink and it would be 17 remiss of me to sit here today and say that 18 I didn't. 19 Q. Looking back, do you think you bore any 20 responsibility for what happened to the 21 individuals who were affected? 22 A. I think, in the absence of a more complete 23 ability to conduct investigations into those 24 conditions, then yes. 25 MS PRICE: Sir, those are all the questions that 144 1 I have for Mr Pardoe. There are some questions 2 from Core Participants. 3 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: All right. Who is going first? 4 MS PRICE: Mr Jacobs, sir. 5 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes. 6 Questioned by MR JACOBS 7 MR JACOBS: Thank you, Mr Pardoe. 8 I don't know if you can hear me, I don't 9 have the microphone switched on. 10 A. I can. 11 Q. You can. Good. 12 I'm going to be asking you about Peter 13 Holmes and Marion Holmes, his widow, sits next 14 to me today. You deal with the prosecution of 15 Peter Holmes at paragraphs 130 to 134 of your 16 statement. In Mr Holmes's case, the Court of 17 Appeal found that his prosecution had been 18 an abuse of process, there was no evidence to 19 corroborate the Horizon evidence, there was no 20 investigation into the integrity of the Horizon 21 figures and there was no proof of any actual 22 loss to the Post Office. Were you aware of that 23 or are you now aware of that? 24 A. I'm now aware of that but I'm only aware through 25 my involvement today in the Inquiry. 145 1 Q. Yes. You say at paragraph 131 of your evidence 2 that you were the nominated representative in 3 the case. 4 A. For prosecution purposes, yes. 5 Q. Yes. Is that the same as the Designated 6 Prosecution Authority because I think that's how 7 your name appears on some of the documents? 8 A. It is, it is. 9 Q. Just for completeness, you say at paragraph 56 10 of your evidence that the job of the Designated 11 Prosecution Authority or nominated 12 representative was to confirm the CLT decision, 13 check the decision for fairness and objectivity 14 and place the case into prosecution status; is 15 that right? 16 A. Correct. 17 Q. So you're effectively authorising a decision 18 that's already been made? 19 A. Correct. 20 Q. Would you describe it as a rubber stamping 21 exercise in any way? 22 A. I think I've already referred to it in that 23 manner. 24 Q. Okay, thank you. 25 A. The position I adopted -- apologies, for talking 146 1 over you -- is that I would have not felt 2 professionally equipped to counter a decision 3 that's been made by a senior or principal lawyer 4 in the matter. 5 Q. Well, that's helpful. Thank you. 6 A. Thank you. 7 Q. At paragraph 132 of your statement, in relation 8 to Mr Holmes' case, you say: 9 "I can see that Horizon difficulties have 10 been cited. Again, these assertions would have 11 been transacted with the fact that a steady 12 stream of denials were being issued by Post 13 Office." 14 So your position is that it was the Post 15 Office's repeated assertions, as you've said, 16 that was factoring into these prosecution 17 decisions; is that right? 18 A. Absolutely. 19 Q. You make a statement at paragraph 134 in 20 relation to Mr Holmes' case, which is similar to 21 the statement in fact -- it's worded the same -- 22 A. It is. 23 Q. -- as what you say in relation to others. You 24 say the prosecution was wholly wrong, which of 25 course the Court of Appeal have found, and you 147 1 say, "Had I been aware that there was knowledge 2 of bugs, errors and defects", and you go on to 3 say, "that could ultimately affect significantly 4 cash values, require to perform an acceptable 5 balance", and you were expected to remain mute 6 around these, and continue in your Security 7 function, you would have considered your 8 position untenable. 9 Now, the Inquiry has heard evidence that 10 there was knowledge of bugs, errors and defects 11 within Post Office and Fujitsu, certainly at the 12 time of Mr Holmes' prosecution. Is that 13 something that you're aware of, isn't it? 14 A. I'm not aware of it at that time. 15 Q. Right. No, at the time you weren't aware of it 16 but have you become aware of that now through 17 following the Inquiry? 18 A. Sorry, absolutely. 19 Q. We understand, then, that your evidence is that 20 information of the knowledge of bugs, errors and 21 defects that Post Office had was withheld from 22 you; is that right? 23 A. I can only assume that, yes. 24 Q. Then it must follow from that, that had this 25 information -- and Mr Holmes had repeatedly, in 148 1 his interview, blamed and criticised the Horizon 2 system -- had this information not been withheld 3 from you, it must follow that you would not have 4 authorised Mr Holmes' prosecution? 5 A. Correct. 6 Q. Well, thank you for that. 7 If I could then ask you to turn to 8 paragraph 78 of your witness statement. Now, 9 that's page 29 of 62, and the reference is 10 WITN08170100. You should have that on the 11 screen in a minute, unless I've given the wrong 12 number of course. Here it is, 78. So if we 13 could perhaps scroll down and you say here: 14 "I recall with an element of clarity updates 15 from John Scott assuring the Security function 16 that the system was reliable, and we were [able 17 to] continue with BAU activity." 18 I assume that's "business as usual"? 19 A. It is. 20 Q. So in relation to the clarity of your 21 recollection, what can you tell us the Inquiry 22 about the detail of these updates, their dates, 23 their frequency? 24 A. I couldn't go into that level of granularity, 25 apologies. 149 1 Q. But when you say "with clarity", are you able to 2 say the wording, what was being said, how often? 3 Who it was addressed to? 4 A. I'm unfortunately not, no. 5 Q. Okay. 6 A. There was a persistent sentiment that the system 7 was fit for purpose. I was never in a meeting 8 when it was discussed with me the concept of 9 putting the brakes on prosecution activity. 10 It's clear that there was a fear that, to do 11 that, would immediately cast doubt on 12 prosecutions that had been completed that had 13 gone before. I was never privy to that type of 14 conversation, no. 15 Q. But I think we can see from your statement that 16 this was coming from John Scott? 17 A. It's coming from John Scott. The one I remember 18 probably with greater clarity is the Paula 19 Vennells communication. 20 Q. I was going to ask you about that, yes, if you 21 can carry on. 22 A. I'm sure that that preceded known media interest 23 that was imminently about to go public, and I'm 24 sure that there was some form of written 25 communication to say, you know, "Look, folks, 150 1 this is likely to be out within the public 2 domain and the approach we're taking is this, 3 this, this and this", to paraphrase. 4 Q. Would that have been before the Computer Weekly 5 article in 2009, perhaps? 6 A. It could have been around about the same time. 7 Q. But it was a clear communication, and who was it 8 addressed to, or -- 9 A. I think it went to everybody. It wasn't 10 Security family specific. I'm sure it went to 11 everybody. 12 Q. So the whole organisation was told "There's 13 going to be something in the media about Horizon 14 and it is to be disregarded because everything 15 is robust and" -- 16 A. I certainly recall a -- reading a written 17 rebuttal and position that the business were 18 adopting, yes. 19 Q. You said in your evidence at around about 11.45 20 this morning, when you were taken to Mr Jarnail 21 Singh's email after the Seema Misra trial, you 22 said that Horizon bashing sentiment was being 23 used at every level. How frequently were you 24 hearing this and what sort of people and what 25 sort of roles were responsible? 151 1 A. I just recollect it being a consistent 2 organisational theme, that there was nothing 3 wrong with Horizon; it was simply a hook that 4 individuals were attaching themselves to, to try 5 to explain unexplained losses that were being 6 incurred at branch. It was almost the modern 7 theme, rather than place blame on employees. It 8 was, you know, almost more palatable just to 9 place blame on the Horizon system. It was just 10 a whole sentiment at the time. 11 Q. Does this arise from what the Chief Executive 12 Officer had been saying and what John Scott had 13 said? 14 A. It was all -- everything that was building up to 15 form of sentiment, yes. 16 Q. Right. Now you were taken a moment ago by 17 Ms Price to what you say at the end of your 18 statement at paragraphs 180 and 181. What you 19 end with in paragraph 180, is you say: 20 "As someone that held several investigatory 21 roles in the Post Office, I feel utterly 22 deceived." 23 Now, as the person who authorised Mr Holmes' 24 prosecution, do you have anything to say to 25 Mrs Holmes and to other subpostmasters about 152 1 that deception? 2 A. Absolutely. I was omitted from -- I believe, 3 from key information that would have helped me 4 to direct investigation resource and support 5 individuals. 6 Q. Do you have anything you wish to say to 7 Mrs Holmes herself? 8 A. I wonder if any words I could express would help 9 to resolve what happened. I really do, 10 genuinely do. 11 As I said, you know, I go back to my time at 12 district days when we were supported and 13 encouraged to support on a one-to-one basis 14 subpostmasters, and the business, fast forwards 15 10, 20 years, rather than improve that level of 16 support, it appears to have just stepped 17 backwards from it. 18 MR JACOBS: Thank you. I haven't any further 19 questions. 20 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much. 21 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Anyone else? 22 MR HENRY: Thank you, sir, Mr Henry, please. 23 Questioned by MR HENRY 24 MR HENRY: Mr Pardoe, I represent number of 25 subpostmasters whose lives were destroyed by the 153 1 Horizon IT scandal. You would agree, as 2 a general principle, that you cannot put a price 3 on justice -- 4 A. I would. 5 Q. -- and that, in the discharge of the Post 6 Office's duty as a private prosecutor, money 7 ought to have been no object in ensuring that it 8 fulfilled and complied with its obligations? 9 A. I would. 10 Q. So you were aware -- maybe not the Section of 11 the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act -- 12 but you were aware that material which might 13 reasonably be considered capable of undermining 14 the case for the prosecution against an accused 15 or of assisting the case for the accused, ought 16 to be disclosed? 17 A. I think there was a view being taken around the 18 relevance of that and that it simply -- as 19 astounding as it sounds to sit here today, that 20 it simply was not relevant. 21 Q. Well, that is a decision which is either so 22 irrational or it is taken in bad faith. Is 23 there anything you'd like to say about that? 24 A. I think the issue of disclosure, there was 25 a focus on that on the administrative discharge, 154 1 as opposed to it being a fundamental part of 2 a proper and correct investigation. 3 Q. So in other words lip-service, administrative 4 tick box, saying one thing but meaning or doing 5 another, as opposed to a profound adherence to 6 the principle of disclosure? 7 A. From all levels, yes. 8 Q. Right. Were you aware that, in conducting 9 an investigation, an Investigator should pursue 10 all reasonable lines of inquiry, whether they 11 pointed towards or away from a suspect? 12 A. Of course, yes. 13 Q. You were. So you agree with me that it ought 14 not to be about money; it ought to be this is 15 a very important obligation which rests on our 16 shoulders and we should discharge it to the best 17 of our ability, whatever the cost? You agree 18 with that in principle? 19 A. I do. 20 Q. And that matters that pointed away from the 21 suspect ought to have a high value, so far as 22 the investigation is concerned? 23 A. Where considered relevant, I do, yes. 24 Q. Now, I want to ask you, please -- we're just 25 going to concentrate on one document and it's 155 1 POL00064033. It's a Financial Investigation 2 Policy log, compiled by a man called Mick 3 Matthews, whom I think you recall. 4 A. I do. 5 Q. You do. Well, I wonder if that could be put up 6 on screen so that you can see it. If we just go 7 through it briefly, this is what Mr Matthews 8 says. He has: 9 "... commenced an investigation into 10 Ms Janet Louise Skinner, ex-subpostmaster of 11 North Bransholme Post Office. She is under 12 investigation for the suspected theft of [nearly 13 £60,000] whilst she was employed as 14 a subpostmaster. This investigation is for the 15 purpose of identifying money laundering offences 16 and confiscation. The investigation will be 17 proportionate, have a legal framework, 18 accountable and necessary." 19 Then it says: 20 "It will follow of the legal requirements of 21 the Proceeds of Crime Act, the Police and 22 Criminal Evidence Act, Criminal Procedure and 23 Investigations Act and Regulation of 24 Investigatory Powers Act. It will also be 25 European Convention on Human Rights compliant", 156 1 et cetera, et cetera. 2 What I want to put to you, sir, is that the 3 prosecution is not what it says or the Post 4 Office is not what it says, but what it does. 5 It's got to be judged on its actions; do you 6 agree with that? 7 A. I do. 8 Q. You do. On 7 December 2006, Diane Matthews, who 9 recently gave evidence, reported that Wendy 10 Lyell, the replacement subpostmaster at North 11 Bransholme, had been suspended on suspicion of 12 theft and that Diane Matthews was to establish 13 the details. So it followed that Ms Skinner was 14 accused of the suspected theft of nearly 15 £60,000 pounds and, at the time, she was in 16 negotiations to settle this by way of a plea to 17 false accounting. You may not have been aware 18 of that. 19 A. No. 20 Q. But let me just briefly ask you to consider 21 this: Ms Skinner had been ringing up the 22 Helpdesk time and time again, complaining about 23 the system, and then, lo and behold, her 24 replacement is then, a few weeks after that, 25 suspended on suspicion of theft. Those two 157 1 facts were capable, were they not, of suggesting 2 that the system was at fault, not the 3 individual; do you agree? 4 A. I don't understand the full context of the case, 5 but that's a potential, yes. 6 Q. That's a potential. Now, that was as long ago 7 as December '06. On 22 May, Mr Matthews spoke 8 to a person called Juliet, as it occurred to him 9 that the defence would say that Ms Skinner has 10 not benefited from crime, as it was a member of 11 staff. 12 Sorry, could you scroll down, I do 13 apologise. 14 I'm scrolling my screen, but unfortunately 15 yours is not. 16 What I want to go to is that on 22 May 2007, 17 and this is page 2 of 3, Mr Matthews says: 18 "It occurred to me that I had not made any 19 enquiries about Wendy ..." 20 He describes her there as "Liddell"; in fact 21 it's Lyell. 22 "I looked through the event log and read the 23 entry date, 7 December. I had overlooked, 24 pursuing the matter. Decided to find out what 25 the current position was. 158 1 "Received an email from Dave Pardoe my new 2 Line Manager to the effect that no further 3 resources were to be expended on the case in 4 respect of Wendy Lyell." 5 Do you recall contacting Mr Matthews and 6 telling him not to pursue his enquiries into 7 Wendy Lyell. 8 A. Absolutely not. 9 Q. 27 August: 10 "It occurred to me that in the interests of 11 justice we could be rightly criticised for not 12 carrying out a comprehensive investigation into 13 Wendy Lyell. I spoke with and asked him [that's 14 you, Mr Pardoe] to reconsider allocating 15 resources in order for the matter to be further 16 investigated." 17 You are reported to have said, Mr Pardoe, 18 that: 19 "... if we are criticised, so be it, no 20 further investigation resource was going to be 21 allocated." 22 Do you recall saying that to Mr Matthews? 23 A. I don't recall that position and it wouldn't be 24 something that I'd adopt within my leadership 25 style. 159 1 Q. It's not a question of costs, as you rightly 2 said at the outset, because costs shouldn't have 3 anything to do with the discharge of justice. 4 Were you aware, Mr Pardoe, of the problems with 5 the system and that this might reveal, with 6 stark clarity, the problems in the system? 7 A. Not at all. 8 Q. Further, 27 August: 9 "Following the conversation it occurred to 10 me that the defence in the interests of justice 11 may well be entitled to a comprehensive 12 investigation and it is my view that one should 13 be carried out. Spoke with Dave again and he 14 said he did not agree and he was maintaining his 15 position." 16 Mr Pardoe, do you recall that conversation? 17 A. Absolutely not. 18 Q. It's been put there fairly and squarely in this 19 report by Mr Matthews. How would this report be 20 circulated, sir? It's obviously got a purpose, 21 hasn't it? 22 A. Well, it's a log of Proceeds of Crime type 23 activity, of POCA activity. 24 Q. Right: 25 "Following the conversation it occurred to 160 1 me that the defence in the interests of justice 2 may well be entitled to a comprehensive 3 investigation ..." 4 He was spelling this out to you, wasn't he? 5 A. Until it was presented to me as part of the 6 Inquiry bundles, I had no knowledge of this 7 document. 8 Q. It is not a question of you having knowledge of 9 this document. I am now asking you to recall, 10 on your oath or affirmation, what was said on 11 27 August 2007 when Mr Matthews was saying that, 12 in the interests of justice, the defence may 13 well be entitled to a comprehensive 14 investigation and that one should be carried 15 out. Are you saying you do not recall that? 16 A. From 16 years ago, absolutely. 17 Q. Do you think this is a demonstration of the 18 groupthink of the siege mentality in action, the 19 very thing -- 20 A. Sorry. I apologise. I would need to understand 21 the context of that. I really would. 22 Q. You would. You would agree? 23 A. No, I said I'd need to understand the full 24 context. I do not recognise -- we all have 25 a certain leadership style. I do not recognise 161 1 my leadership style within that. I do not see 2 what I would have to gain from reducing activity 3 in that area by one of my, at the time, 4 Financial Investigators. I don't understand the 5 context of that whatsoever. 6 For me, it seems such a cursory thing that 7 I would just authorise further investigations as 8 required. There was nothing to be gained by me 9 in saying that, you know, under no circumstances 10 should resource be applied to that. There would 11 simply be nothing to be gained. 12 Q. Well, isn't this actually a way for you to 13 acknowledge what you have, by implication, 14 accused others of, which is the groupthink, 15 which is "We have to protect" -- this is the 16 theme, "we have to protect Horizon at all 17 costs"? 18 A. Not at all. 19 Q. Because there it is. It's simple, unambiguous 20 language. It occurs to Mr Matthews that, in the 21 interests of justice, the defence may well be 22 entitled to a comprehensive investigation and 23 that one should be carried out. You contradict 24 him, state you do not agree, and maintain your 25 position that you are not going to fund that 162 1 inquiry? 2 A. Allegedly contradict him. 3 Q. Nothing is served by repetition but I'm, for the 4 last time, just now, asking you, knowing the 5 solemnity of this moment and knowing what 6 happened to the people I represent, is there 7 anything you would like to say arising from what 8 you have read and what I have put to you in this 9 document? 10 A. I do not recall the document whatsoever. 11 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Is that it, Mr Henry? 12 MR HENRY: That is it. Thank you. 13 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Any other questions from anyone? 14 MS PRICE: No, sir. I think those are all the 15 questions from Core Participants. 16 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Thank you. 17 Then thank you, Mr Pardoe, for 18 a comprehensive witness statement and answering 19 a good many questions today. I'm sorry if it 20 was inconvenient for you to start at 9.00. That 21 was because I have to go somewhere shortly. 22 Those who were listening to your evidence 23 with a personal interest in it, I hope they 24 found it informative. 25 So thank you all, everyone, and we will 163 1 begin again at 10.00 tomorrow morning. 2 MS PRICE: Yes, sir. Thank you. 3 (1.50 pm) 4 (The hearing adjourned until 10.00 am 5 the following day) 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 164 I N D E X DAVID JOHN PARDOE (affirmed) ..................1 Questioned by MS PRICE ........................1 Questioned by MR JACOBS .....................145 Questioned by MR HENRY ......................153 165