1 Tuesday, 5 December 2023 2 (11.00 am) 3 MR BEER: Good morning, sir, can you see and hear 4 us? 5 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, I can, thank you. 6 MR BEER: Thank you very much. Sir, as everyone 7 knows, we're sitting today between 11.00 am and 8 2.30 pm, and certainly no later than 2.30 pm. 9 If it suits you, sir, I would propose that we 10 take half an hour's break between 12.30 and 1.00 11 so that the evidence sessions are split into 2 12 one and a half hour slots. 13 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: That's fine by me, and I take it 14 that's okay with the transcriber? 15 MR BEER: We'll see how we go, if it becomes 16 a problem, then I'm sure she will let us know. 17 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes. Fine. 18 MR BEER: Sir, can I call David Posnett, please. 19 DAVID POSNETT (sworn) 20 Questioned by MR BEER 21 MR BEER: Good morning, Mr Posnett. My name is 22 Jason Beer and I ask questions on behalf of the 23 Inquiry. Can you please tell us your full name, 24 please. 25 A. David Posnett. 1 1 Q. Thank you. Thank you very much for coming to 2 give evidence to the Inquiry today and for the 3 provision of a detailed witness statement to 4 assist us in our investigation. 5 Can we start by looking at that document, 6 please. I think you've got it in front of you 7 at tab A1. It should be dated 4 October 2023 8 and, excluding the exhibits index, it's 44 pages 9 in length. 10 A. Yes, that's correct. 11 Q. Is that your signature on page 44? 12 A. It is, yes. 13 Q. Are the contents of that witness statement true 14 to the best of your knowledge and belief? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. Thank you. Now, a copy of that is going to be 17 uploaded to the Inquiry's website. I'm not 18 going to ask you questions about every part of 19 it, just selected elements of it. You're here 20 today to assist us with the issues arising in 21 Phase 4 of the Inquiry, which is the 22 investigation and prosecution of subpostmasters 23 for criminal offences. 24 Can I start, please, with your career. 25 I think you worked for the Post Office for 2 1 31 years; is that right? 2 A. That is right, yes. 3 Q. I think you started in '87; is that right? 4 A. It was 1986. 5 Q. '86, that's right, and finished in 2017? 6 A. That's correct, yes. 7 Q. So '86 to 2017, 31 years? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. You started life in the Post Office as a counter 10 clerk; is that right? 11 A. That's right, yeah. 12 Q. I think that job lasted for eight years until 13 about '95, is that right: 9 years until '95? 14 A. About that. It's about that, yes. 15 Q. Then in 1995 you started a new role as 16 an Auditor; is that right? 17 A. That's correct. 18 Q. Whereabouts were you based as an Auditor? 19 A. I was based in Guildford. 20 Q. Did you have any professional or other 21 qualifications to be an Auditor? 22 A. No. 23 Q. I think you stayed in that role for four years 24 or so until 1999, when you took up a job as 25 a joint business testing analyst; is that right? 3 1 A. Yeah, I think it was the back end of 1999, yes. 2 Q. We're going to come back to that in a moment 3 because the work that you did there may be of 4 relevance to the Inquiry. 5 That lasted until 2000; is that right? 6 A. It lasted until the end of December 2000, yes. 7 It was a few months, yeah. 8 Q. So a year or so? 9 A. No, it was during 1999, about midway or a bit 10 further, and I finished that role at the end of 11 December '99. 12 Q. Oh, it was just in 1999, was it? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. Right, okay. So about six months, then? 15 A. May have been less than that but, roughly, it 16 was a few months. 17 Q. In your statement you say in 2000 you started 18 work as an Investigation Manager based in 19 Twickenham; is that right? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. As an Investigation Manager, were you managing 22 investigations or managing people? 23 A. Investigations. 24 Q. Okay. Did you manage any people? 25 A. No. 4 1 Q. Okay. You moved, I think, from Twickenham to 2 Woking and in 2004 you were promoted to 3 an Investigation Team Manager; is that right? 4 A. That's correct. 5 Q. Did that mean that you then started managing 6 people as well as investigations? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. How many people were in the team that you 9 managed? 10 A. It fluctuated but roughly between four up to 11 eight people. 12 Q. Did they all work in Woking too? 13 A. No, they didn't. They were dispersed 14 geographically. 15 Q. Did they home work or did they have an office 16 they could come into? 17 A. Back then we had offices. 18 Q. Right. How did you monitor or supervise these 19 four to eight people? 20 A. Did regular one-to-ones, I usually went to their 21 office to conduct a one-to-one -- might have 22 been every month or six weeks, or so -- and team 23 meetings, we'd sort of have at my office. So 24 I'd generally go to them but -- the 25 one-to-ones -- for team meetings, they'd come 5 1 back to my office. 2 Q. How frequently were the team meetings where 3 everyone in the team came in? 4 A. Ooh, probably every month or two. 5 Q. Were they scheduled, "We're having a team 6 meeting every month or two", or were they only 7 when the occasion arose? 8 A. They were scheduled. We'd have a meeting, 9 I think, and at that meeting we'd pencil in the 10 date for the next meeting. 11 Q. Was there sort of a standing agenda for those? 12 A. Some bits were standing agenda, like any new 13 Post Office related products or transactions, 14 et cetera, and also I used to print off 15 everybody's current cases, and they could select 16 a case or two if it was unusual and talk about 17 it, and it was also used for, if somebody had 18 an investigation and needed someone to help them 19 on the day of when the operation concluded. You 20 know, because we're all in the same room, we 21 could sort those sort of things out. 22 Q. When an Investigation Manager submitted a file 23 for a decision on prosecution, did that have to 24 come through you before it got to Legal Services 25 or to somebody else? 6 1 A. I think it went direct to the Casework Team and 2 then up to the Criminal Law Team. 3 Q. So it didn't have to come through you? 4 A. I don't think it came through me but they would 5 email me, for example, their reports, maybe. 6 Q. Okay. So you would see something about the 7 cases that were going off to the Criminal Law 8 Team -- 9 A. Yes -- 10 Q. -- investigated by members of your team? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Would you conduct reviews of their files, the 13 Investigation Managers? 14 A. I didn't conduct reviews but I did read, 15 obviously, some of the reports. 16 Q. What would cause you to read the reports? 17 A. Because I'm their manager, just to make sure 18 there wasn't any horrendous errors or anything 19 wrong. 20 Q. So you'd have a good idea of the things that 21 your team were investigating, the nature of the 22 investigations that they were carrying out, and 23 the conclusions that they reached in their 24 investigation reports? 25 A. Yes. 7 1 Q. To whom did you report in this period? I'm 2 talking about 2004 onwards when you were the 3 Investigation Team Manager? 4 A. When I was the Investigation Team Manager 5 I reported initially to Manish Patel, who was 6 the Senior Investigation Manager, and then 7 I think after him it was Trevor Lockey. I think 8 there were -- and then perhaps Dave Pardoe, 9 after that. 10 Q. Was there any one Senior Investigation Manager? 11 A. I believe so, yes. 12 Q. I think you stayed in that role until 2007; is 13 that right? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. In that year, 2007, and then 2008, you worked as 16 a Casework Manager based in Croydon; is that 17 right? 18 A. It was, yes, for a number of months between '07 19 and '08, yes. 20 Q. What was the function of the Casework Team in 21 Croydon? 22 A. The function of the Casework Team was -- it was 23 sort of split into two. On one side was 24 banking, the Post Office Card Account. So there 25 was an assistant manager and some admin staff 8 1 who primarily dealt with DPA requests from law 2 enforcement in relation to the -- 3 Q. Data Protection Act requests? 4 A. Yes. Then the other side was another assistant 5 manager and admin staff, who dealt with 6 investigations. So, as I mentioned earlier, the 7 case file would come into the Casework Team, 8 they'd complete a spreadsheet with, I don't 9 know, date of interview, or date of summons, or 10 anything relating to the case, and then they 11 would send that up to the Criminal Law Team. 12 Q. So what did they add, the Casework Team, what 13 was their purpose, their function, if you like? 14 The bit that -- not the banking side, the 15 investigation side. 16 A. Well, the investigation side, with the 17 spreadsheet that we used, which was -- I can 18 remember was horrendous, it was the movement of 19 the case throughout its life-cycle and to ensure 20 that it's dispatched to the relevant people and 21 emails sent to relevant stakeholders. And so it 22 was -- it was like the central admin for a case. 23 Q. Was it only an administrative function or did it 24 perform any tasks of substance in relation to 25 the investigation? 9 1 A. In relation to the investigation, possibly 2 obtaining the audit requests from Fujitsu. 3 Q. Anything else, other than that? We're going to 4 come back to that because I think you'll realise 5 that's quite a big topic for the Inquiry. So 6 that function sat within the Casework Team in 7 Croydon, obtaining audit data from Fujitsu? 8 A. Yeah. 9 Q. Anything else? 10 A. I can't think of, at the moment, anything else. 11 Q. How many people worked within the Casework Team 12 on the investigation side of the house? 13 A. There was two or three. 14 Q. They were managed by one assistant manager; is 15 that right? 16 A. That would include the -- 17 Q. That would include the assistant manager? 18 A. Yeah. 19 Q. Did you sit underneath the assistant manager? 20 A. I sat above the assistant manager. 21 Q. Above, okay, and your title then was? 22 A. Casework Manager. 23 Q. Casework Manager, okay. At that time to whom 24 did you report? 25 A. I think it was Dave Pardoe, at that stage. 10 1 Q. Was he based in the Croydon office? 2 A. He wasn't, no. He was up in St Helens, I think 3 he lived. 4 Q. Did you have meetings with him, regular contact 5 with him or, because of the geographical 6 separation, not? 7 A. I had contact with him. I don't recall it being 8 regular. 9 Q. Then, I think, later in 2008, you became a Fraud 10 Risk Manager; is that right? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. So that moved you out entirely of the Casework 13 Team in Croydon; is that right? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. That lasted until 2010? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. What did that job entail: Fraud Risk Manager? 18 A. It was primarily running fraud risk programmes, 19 for example the fraud risk programme on Crown 20 Office cash losses, scratchcards, Overnight Cash 21 Holdings, Post Office Card Account, rejected 22 postage labels. So I'd say 90-odd per cent of 23 it was these particular products or transactions 24 and we'd draft up a programme to address risks 25 and weaknesses in those areas. 11 1 Q. By "programme", do you mean a computer program 2 or a schedule of work? 3 A. A schedule of work. It was the Crime Risk Team 4 that was based within the Security Admin Team 5 who identified these as more high-risk areas. 6 Q. Then I think in 2010 you became an Accredited 7 Financial Investigator; is that right? 8 A. Yes, it took a while to get the accreditation 9 but, yes. 10 Q. You stayed in that job until 2014; is that 11 right? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. I think your accreditation was given by the 14 NPIA, the National Police Improvement Agency; is 15 that right? 16 A. That's right, yes. 17 Q. What was your role as an Accredited Financial 18 Investigator? 19 A. My role was basically to recover losses on 20 behalf of the business. 21 Q. So this is, essentially, proceeds of crime work; 22 is that right? 23 A. Yes, yes. 24 Q. Was that all post-conviction work? 25 A. Confiscation was post-conviction. 12 1 Pre-conviction would be things like restraint 2 orders and production orders. 3 Q. Whereabouts were you based when you were 4 an Accredited Financial Investigator? 5 A. That would have been in, I think, Old Street in 6 London. 7 Q. Then in 2014 and until 2015, you worked as 8 a Security and Investigation Team Leader; is 9 that right? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. You retained your title as an Accredited 12 Financial Investigator; is that right? 13 A. That's right. 14 Q. Did you do any financial investigation work? 15 A. Yes, but it sloped off during that period. 16 I mean, to be honest, I did many of the roles 17 I'd previously done in that last year. 18 Q. As a Security and Investigation Team leader, 19 what was your function? 20 A. Again, it was, as I described in 2004, manage 21 a team of people but it also had a security 22 element at that stage. So the team would deal 23 with burglaries, robberies, cash centres, 24 security visits, et cetera. 25 Q. Then, finally, I think in 2015 until 2017, you 13 1 were a Branch Standards Manager? 2 A. Branch Standards Field Manager, yes. 3 Q. What did a Branch Standards Field Manager do? 4 A. The main thrust of that role was to check that 5 subpostmasters or staff were having the correct 6 conversations with customers in relation to 7 items they were posting over the counter. One 8 of the focuses was whether items were prohibited 9 or restricted and to make sure that they were 10 asking the right questions. 11 Q. Was there any investigation function within that 12 role? 13 A. No. 14 Q. Can we go back, then, having looked briefly at 15 each stage of your career in the Post Office, to 16 the time that you were involved in 1999, and 17 I think your statement says into 2000, as 18 a Joint Business Testing Analyst for Horizon. 19 Can you help us just again -- I think I missed 20 it earlier -- how long you worked for as a joint 21 business testing analyst for Horizon? 22 A. If it was mid-1999, I definitely finished on -- 23 at the end of December that year. So I would 24 say six months, maybe a month or two more or 25 less. 14 1 Q. Tell us what a Joint Business Testing Analyst in 2 relation to Horizon did? 3 A. Yeah. So I was based within ICL Pathway, as it 4 was known then. 5 Q. So you mean physically based? 6 A. Yes, the Head Office is in Feltham, and they had 7 quiet a large room called -- I think it was 8 called the Rig and, within that room, were lots 9 of computer terminals that reflected the names 10 of post offices. And they chose football teams 11 so you'd have Liverpool Post Office, which might 12 be a single terminal; you could have Chelsea 13 post office, which might have three terminals, 14 a bigger, busy office that would represent. 15 Q. A slightly better post office, presumably? 16 A. Potentially. And my role, and a colleague who 17 joined at the same time as me, we would 18 basically get scripts and we would literally 19 have to follow these scripts, so it would say go 20 to Liverpool Post Office, log on, sell a first 21 class stamp, take cash for it, and literally 22 just follow a basic script like that. 23 Q. So a rig was, it was a dummy system; is that 24 right? 25 A. Yes, yeah. 15 1 Q. Was it self-contained, a closed system, or did 2 it connect with the outside world? 3 A. I don't think it connected with the outside 4 world. That's basically what we did, follow 5 these scripts and, when we'd finished, we'd hand 6 the script over to -- I think it was the back 7 office team. So I don't know whether the system 8 communicated with them but that's what we did. 9 It was just literally following these scripts. 10 Q. Were you aware, in this time, as a testing 11 analyst, of significant problems arising with 12 the development and testing of the Horizon 13 system? 14 A. I can recall two things: number 1, the system 15 was meant to have the Benefits Payments System 16 attached to it, so to pay out pensions, and that 17 was pulled, I think, during the time I was 18 there, which was quite significant. I don't 19 know the reasons why but the Government said 20 we're not going to be going down that road. 21 And the other noises, for want of a better 22 word, I can remember, were people said that 23 Horizon was chosen -- sorry, Fujitsu or ICL 24 Pathway were chosen because it was the cheapest 25 option. So I don't know which other companies 16 1 tendered for the system, but Fujitsu or 2 ICL Pathway were chosen. 3 Q. What about problems at an operational level with 4 the system? Were you aware of, in this testing 5 phase, issues and problems with the operation of 6 Horizon? 7 A. I was aware of issues whilst testing, because 8 that's what you do in the testing environment. 9 Q. That was the purpose of it? 10 A. Yes. But, for example, you know, if the script 11 said "Issue a motor vehicle licence" -- and this 12 is just an example, not an actual example -- but 13 you'd go to the screen and the motor vehicle 14 licence wouldn't be there. So you'd have to 15 annotate the script to say, "Can't perform this 16 transaction because the icon is not there", and 17 that would go to the back office team and 18 I think they'd look at it and then rectify that 19 issue. 20 The only problem I do remember was I think 21 there was a Northern Ireland icon and -- 22 Q. A Northern Ireland icon? 23 A. Yes. It was a picture of somebody with a green 24 sweater and it was raised that perhaps this 25 green sweater should be made purple because of 17 1 political situation. 2 Q. Were you aware of what happened when a problem 3 arose in testing? You wanted to issue a DVLA 4 licence and the script told you to, and it -- 5 the system couldn't, and you put -- you handed 6 in that script marked up in the way you've said 7 saying, "Can't do that function". Were you 8 aware of the next steps or were you a sort of 9 a smallish cog in a larger set of machinery? 10 A. I was a smallish cog. That would be relayed 11 back to the back office team and then, after 12 that, I don't know. We would then get another 13 script to work on. 14 Q. So you wouldn't see what the solution was to 15 that problem or, indeed, whether there was 16 a solution to it? 17 A. I wouldn't see it and, to be honest, I wouldn't 18 understand anyway, even if I did see it. 19 Q. Why wouldn't you understand if you did see it? 20 A. Because that would be far too technical for me. 21 Q. I think it's right that you didn't have any 22 qualifications or experience in computing? 23 A. No. 24 Q. Is that -- 25 A. That's right, yeah. 18 1 Q. Were you aware at this time of something called 2 AIs or Acceptance Incidents? 3 A. Not that I recall, no. 4 Q. Do you remember any of these testing issues 5 affecting settling accounts or balancing? 6 A. No. 7 Q. Is that "It's 23 years ago now and, therefore, 8 I can't remember one way or another what each of 9 the issues were" or "I don't think any of them 10 involved balancing issues"? 11 A. Again, I can't remember, specifically, 23 years 12 ago but there may have been -- I mean, when 13 I mentioned the scripts that we used, if it 14 ended up with a cash account, for example, and 15 before that, there were problems in finding 16 icons and things, we may not have finished the 17 script because we couldn't end up doing the cash 18 account that would come out the way it should 19 have done. But I can't remember. 20 Q. Can we just look at one example of maybe one of 21 the things you were doing when you were a Joint 22 Business Testing Analyst, by looking at 23 FUJ00021692. Can you see this is a document 24 called a PinICL; can you see that? 25 A. I can, yes. 19 1 Q. Do you remember PinICLs? 2 A. I can -- the word "PinICL" rings a bell but 3 I can't remember it. 4 Q. You can't remember what their function was or 5 who issued them or -- 6 A. No. 7 Q. -- what their purpose was? 8 A. No. 9 Q. We can see that this one was opened on the 10 2 June 1998 and the summary of it, to the left, 11 is EPOSS, do you remember what EPOSS was? 12 A. Is that Electronic Point of Sale. 13 Q. Yes, and that was a problem. It says the 14 transaction logs were not working with EPOSS? 15 A. Yeah. 16 Q. I take it you don't remember that as a problem? 17 A. I don't remember that as a problem and that was 18 before I had that role anyway. 19 Q. That's what I wanted to ask you about, if I may. 20 If we turn to page 5, please. Look at the 21 bottom half of the page, thank you. Can you 22 see, I think it's five lines in now, it says: 23 "The 'BA/POCL Reports and Receipts' document 24 reflects the system. It does not specify the 25 requirement for transaction logs. The 20 1 requirement is to offer the same functionality 2 as the existing system. Two joint testers 3 (Chris Phillips and Dave Posnett) are currently 4 checking the transaction log functionality on 5 Horizon (a) against the documented functionality 6 of the existing system (b) for usability (which 7 is what this PinICL was originally raised for)." 8 So a number of questions arising from that. 9 Firstly, this PinICL was raised in June 1998 -- 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. -- and this entry is in September 1998, and it 12 refers to you, along with Chris Phillips, as 13 a joint tester? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Do you think you were, in fact, doing the joint 16 testing or had the role as a joint tester 17 earlier than you thought? 18 A. If those dates are correct, then, yes. But I'm 19 sure it was 1999. But Chris Phillips was the 20 other guy who joined the same time as myself. 21 I thought it was a few months in '99 because 22 I can remember the Millennium Bug that everyone 23 thought all the computers in the world were 24 going to stop, so I didn't think it was 1998. 25 I may be wrong. 21 1 Q. If this is accurate, and we've got no reason to 2 think that the dates on here are wrong, it looks 3 like in the autumn of '98 you were performing 4 the role of a joint tester? 5 A. Yeah. 6 Q. It refers to you checking the transaction log 7 functionality on Horizon. That sounds something 8 slightly different to running a script, seeing 9 whether a test rig could perform a function like 10 issue a DVLA licence; would you agree? 11 A. That element does sound different, yes. 12 Q. What you understand it is saying here or it is 13 recording you as doing: checking a transaction 14 log functionality? 15 A. It says that, yes. 16 Q. Yes, but what do you understand it to be 17 referring to? 18 A. That we were trying to obtain transaction logs 19 from the system within the rig. 20 Q. What do you understand transaction logs to be? 21 A. A record of all the transactions entered on the 22 terminal over a given time frame. 23 Q. Yes, thank you. That can come down, please. 24 How collaborative was the joint testing 25 team, ie how much exchange of information was 22 1 there between you about the issues or problems 2 with the system? 3 A. My recollection was, as I've outlined, we 4 followed the scripts and those scripts, whether 5 they'd worked out correctly or not, were passed 6 to the back office team for review and to 7 rectify anything, if anything needed rectifying. 8 Q. When you left this role, what was your view as 9 to the reliability and integrity of the data 10 that Horizon produced? 11 A. I don't recall having any concerns because, 12 although it was a new role for me, my 13 understanding was that the testing environment 14 was to test, test, test, identify issues and 15 then people with more technical knowledge would 16 rectify them. So I don't think I gave it any 17 I serious thought. I thought that was par for 18 the course for that particular role. 19 Q. What was the chat, the conversation, the feeling 20 amongst those with whom you were working, as to 21 the adequacy or otherwise of the Horizon system? 22 Was it seen as problematic or difficult? Were 23 people saying, "Look, there are lots of problems 24 with this, we've got a rollout coming around the 25 corner, a deadline to meet"? 23 1 A. Yeah. I don't recall any conversations but I do 2 recall that the rig was down quite often. So, 3 for example, we'd have a script and we'd have to 4 go and do some work, but the technicians were 5 working on the rig. So, to be honest, there 6 were hours where we had to just get on with 7 other things whilst waiting to go in. So there 8 were problems but I wouldn't know what those 9 problems were because we were just told when we 10 could go in and start following the script 11 again. 12 Q. So what was your overall impression of Horizon 13 when you walked away from this job? 14 A. It was a new computer system for all post 15 offices. We'd mentioned EPOSS there. I think 16 it was also partly based on ECCO, which Crown 17 Offices had. 18 Q. Had been using for a while? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. Was there anything in particular about EPOSS 21 that had raised concerns about the operation and 22 functionality of the EPOS System? 23 A. Not that I can recall, no. 24 Q. Were you involved in any way in the training of 25 subpostmasters in the rollout of Horizon? 24 1 A. No. 2 Q. Did you have any function concerning the rollout 3 of Horizon? 4 A. No. When I finished that job, at the end of 5 2000, after Christmas, I then became 6 an Investigation Manager, or temporarily became 7 an Investigation Manager, until there was 8 interviews for the post on a permanent basis. 9 Q. Again, when you left, would you say that your 10 experience was that testing had revealed some 11 problems, no problems or significant problems 12 with the operation of Horizon? 13 A. I would personally say some to significant, 14 because I don't know what the norm would be, in 15 terms of errors on a computer system during 16 a testing phase. 17 Q. Can you remember delays to the programme of 18 rollout due to technical problems with Horizon? 19 A. No. All I can recall is I think it was meant to 20 be rolled out in 2000 and it was rolled out in 21 2000. If there were a month or three delays, 22 because I wasn't in that role then, I don't 23 know. 24 Q. Can we just look at something that you said 25 about this period of time years later, in 2015, 25 1 by looking at two documents alongside each 2 other, if we may. Firstly, POL00063370 and, 3 secondly, POL00118547. Thank you. 4 We can see that this is, on the left-hand 5 side, a Post Office Limited submission to 6 a BIS -- Business Innovation and Skills -- 7 committee inquiry into the Post Office Mediation 8 Scheme, which was conducting an investigation in 9 2015. That's the document on the left-hand 10 side. 11 A. Yeah. 12 Q. On the right-hand side, we can see an email from 13 you to Helen Dickinson and Rob King, saying: 14 "I've trawled through this and made some 15 comments (yellow and blue highlights). Not 16 many, though as a lot of it is technical or not 17 within my knowledge to comment further. Witness 18 statement associated to reflect Horizon 19 training." 20 You say: 21 "As an aside (and my personal view) I really 22 do think there are cases where Horizon is 23 clearly irrelevant. The subpostmaster admits 24 theft, says what he did with the money, 25 et cetera. No grounds to even cite Horizon. 26 1 George Thompson mentioned the Rudkin case at the 2 Select Committee hearing. There are others and 3 I think (without mentioning names, details, etc) 4 we could be more on the front foot if these were 5 flagged to MPs, Second Sight, etc." 6 So Parliament is conducting an inquiry, 7 an investigation, the Post Office has given some 8 evidence already through Mr Thompson, and this 9 is, on the left-hand side, a submission to that 10 Parliamentary committee, and you've marked up 11 this draft submission. 12 Can we just look at page 5, please, on the 13 left-hand document, and have a look at training 14 at 2.1. Thank you. 15 The Post Office was proposing to tell the 16 Committee that it heard evidence on the training 17 available to subpostmasters at the time of 18 Horizon's introduction: 19 "This evidence focused on the back of 20 training materials provided to subpostmasters at 21 the relevant time", et cetera. 22 Then next paragraph: 23 "As presented to the Committee, one might be 24 left with the impression that the training and 25 support ended there. On the contrary, on the 27 1 introduction of Horizon, two different training 2 courses were then provided by ICL Pathway. The 3 first was for subpostmasters and the second was 4 for staff. This training was delivered prior to 5 the branch migrating to Horizon. All 6 subpostmasters left the course with a Horizon 7 User Guide and they were all also subsequently 8 provided with Quick Reference Guides." 9 Then I think the part that you added, this 10 would have been marked blue or yellow in the 11 original, was: 12 "It was also a pass/fail course (so if they 13 weren't up to scratch they weren't allowed to 14 work with Horizon, it wasn't a case of 'going 15 through the motions' -- see associated witness 16 statement which may provide more ammunition)." 17 Now, this you were writing in 2015, yes? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. Yes? We've seen the email -- 20 A. The email, yes. 21 Q. -- enclosing this document with these mark-ups 22 on it, yes? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. What direct experience had you got of the 25 provision of training to subpostmasters? 28 1 A. Sorry, could you repeat that? 2 Q. Yes. What direct experience had you got of the 3 provision of training to subpostmasters at the 4 rollout stage? 5 A. None. 6 Q. But you're here providing "ammunition", it says, 7 or you say, to those that are compiling this 8 submission to Parliament. If you had no direct 9 experience of the provision of training to 10 subpostmasters, why were you providing the 11 ammunition? 12 A. Firstly, I don't remember or recall that 13 document. Secondly, I think, when we were 14 investigating cases, one of the things we got on 15 occasions were the training records and it would 16 have been from those we were informed that it 17 was a pass/fail course. So that's probably 18 where I took that from. 19 Q. So this addition that you're suggesting to the 20 submission to Parliament comes from your 21 knowledge, not from the period that I was 22 talking about as a tester in rollout, but later, 23 when you were an Investigator; is that right? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. To what extent did you look into the adequacy of 29 1 training as an Investigator? 2 A. I think it was -- if we obtained the part the -- 3 well, it would have to be a pass, otherwise it 4 wouldn't have been working in the Post Office 5 and, again, I can't remember, I don't know 6 whether it was simply a pass or whether there 7 was some text "Competent with this", "Okay with 8 that", or "Issues with this", et cetera. So it 9 gave picture of a subpostmaster or a clerk as to 10 how well they were coping with the system during 11 training. 12 Q. Did you investigate the quality of training? 13 A. No. 14 Q. Did you ever hear subpostmasters say that the 15 training that they received on Horizon was not 16 adequate or satisfactory? 17 A. I have heard that, whether it was my cases or -- 18 I can't recollect specific examples but that 19 does ring a bell and, if I am honest, when 20 I trained can be a counter clerk, I think it was 21 something like two or three weeks in a classroom 22 and then two or three weeks with somebody sat 23 behind me watching everything I did, whereas 24 this is obviously a couple of days' or one day's 25 training. 30 1 Q. That wasn't the message that you were seeking to 2 convey here, though? 3 A. No, the message -- 4 Q. You were providing ammo to beef up the Post 5 Office's case to Parliament? 6 A. Yeah, I don't remember this at all. What I was 7 doing -- I think that's factual. It was also 8 a pass or fail course, et cetera. 9 Q. But what it doesn't do is provide that more 10 nuanced position that you've just expressed, 11 namely "Look, when I was a counter clerk, 12 I spent two or three weeks being trained, and 13 that was reduced to a couple of days, and then 14 I think a day, and then even less"? 15 A. Yeah. Having said that, these people may 16 already have been subpostmasters and clerks, so 17 they would know how to work in a post office. 18 I think it was purely the Horizon training, not 19 the Full Monty of counter clerk work. 20 Q. By this time, 2015, I realise we're jumping 21 right ahead at the moment, were you asked to 22 positive views only when making comments on this 23 document that was to be submitted to Parliament? 24 A. I don't recall because I don't recall the 25 document. 31 1 Q. Would you naturally provide ammunition for the 2 Post Office's case when making comments? 3 A. I don't think so, no. 4 Q. You would express any negative views of Horizon, 5 the training of subpostmasters, the operation of 6 the system, the quality of investigations and 7 the like too, would you? 8 A. I'd like to have thought so, yes. 9 Q. Would Post Office Management, if we just go back 10 to the email -- Helen Dickinson, you'll see that 11 she was the Security Operation Team Leader 12 North, yes; do you remember her? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. Would Post Office Management be receptive to bad 15 news stories about Horizon in an exercise like 16 this? 17 A. At the time -- I think my view at the time was, 18 if it was good news, it was good news; if it was 19 bad news, it was bad news. Again, I don't 20 recall it, but I'd like to think that I would 21 have told the truth, you know, whichever side 22 that fell on. 23 Q. You wouldn't have felt any inhibition in 2015 of 24 giving additions to this document that were 25 negative or uncomplimentary about Horizon? 32 1 A. I wouldn't have an issue with that, although at 2 the time the -- or the messages were that there 3 is nothing wrong with the system. So whether 4 that's reflected my mindset, but, you know, I'd 5 like to think, if I saw something that wasn't 6 right, I would say it. 7 Q. Okay. Well, we'll be coming back to this later. 8 That can come down, both those documents can 9 come down. Thank you. 10 You have told us already that you worked as 11 an Investigation Manager between 2000 and 2004. 12 Can we look, please, at POL00106867, please. 13 Can we start with page 9, please. This is part 14 of a long email chain, years later in 2010, and 15 can you see that you're copied in on this email 16 from Sue Lowther to a group of people. 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. Can you remember who Sue Lowther was? 19 A. I think she was the Head of Information 20 Security. 21 Q. That's completely accurate, it fits with her 22 signature block. If we just read the start of 23 this chain, insofar as you were included within 24 it. 25 "As was discussed on the conference call and 33 1 taking into account Rob's comments, to confirm 2 that what we are looking at is a 'general' due 3 diligence exercise on the integrity of Horizon, 4 to confirm our belief in the robustness of the 5 system and thus rebut any challenges." 6 Do you remember this, early 2010? 7 A. I don't remember it, but this is an example, as 8 I said, of the messages that there's nothing 9 wrong with Horizon, and that's not having a go 10 at Sue. I think she was in the same position as 11 quite a few of us. 12 Q. Looking at the email there, do you think that 13 you were part of that conference call? 14 A. Probably. I can't remember it. 15 Q. In any event, Ms Lowther continues: 16 "The Information Security Team have looked 17 at the information that has been forwarded to 18 them, re the above and it seems that the issues 19 raised are mainly around procedural items and 20 about 'Accounting' reconciliation. 21 "To enable us to examine the integrity of 22 Horizon from an Information Security perspective 23 we need input from a number of areas. 24 "1. A description of the accounting process 25 from the business perspective, including the 34 1 interfaces between Horizon and POLFS and the 2 process by which 'error notices' are generated. 3 "2. The identity of all the offices making 4 allegations, together with a list of loss 5 declarations from those offices. 6 "3. A report from Service Delivery of all 7 the problems they have received through the Live 8 Service Desk." 9 Then there is some attribution of actions, 10 and then at the end: 11 "Once we have that information, I can then 12 put together a plan of how we will examine the 13 system 'integrity' of Horizon and the resource 14 required to complete it." 15 Do you remember this proposal to undertake 16 a due diligence exercise on the integrity of 17 Horizon, the purpose of which was to confirm 18 an existing belief in the robustness of the 19 system? 20 A. I don't recall it, no. 21 Q. If we go forwards, please, to page 7, and scroll 22 down, please. Just scroll down a little 23 further, please. Mr Wilson, a lawyer -- do you 24 remember him, Rob Wilson -- 25 A. I do, yes. 35 1 Q. -- says: 2 "I note that you wish to examine the 3 integrity of Horizon from an information 4 security perspective." 5 Then just on to page 9: 6 "What does this mean?" 7 Yes? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. Then back to page 7, please. Middle of the 10 page. Ms Lowther: 11 "Essentially it means we would wish to 12 examine the Security controls that we have 13 specified for Horizon and those systems with 14 which it interfaces are indeed in place and 15 working correctly." 16 Then top of the page, please. Mr Wilson 17 says: 18 "We have additional difficulties in relation 19 to challenges to Horizon. Today I have been 20 made aware of a prosecution being conducted by 21 the CPS where Horizon is being challenged. The 22 case may have been already identified by you. 23 The difficulty, however, will be our lack of 24 control over any case that is not being 25 prosecuted by my team." 36 1 Just stopping there, before we get to the 2 questions that arise at the end of this chain, 3 in what circumstances were cases prosecuted by 4 the CPS? 5 A. I think they were few and far between but it may 6 be, for example, a subpostmaster, a member of 7 staff was dealing from him and, if they went 8 directly to the police, they may investigate it 9 and they may wish to have the transaction event 10 logs or some other Fujitsu documents to examine. 11 Q. The view that Mr Wilson expresses here, was that 12 one that was circulating within the 13 investigation community, namely that, when the 14 CPS are the prosecutors and the police the 15 investigators, there is a lack of control by the 16 Post Office over what happens within the case? 17 A. I don't recall it being a -- I mean, I don't 18 recall this anyway but I don't recall it being 19 communicated to others. 20 Q. Can you recall it being a problem or being seen 21 as a problem that -- 22 A. I don't recall it but I can understand what he's 23 saying that, yes, if it's not being dealt with 24 by his team, it's obviously not as good as if it 25 were being dealt with by their team. 37 1 Q. I think that's a matter of debate but here he's 2 talking about control over a case. What would 3 you understand the reference to "control" to be, 4 in the context of a debate over a challenge to 5 Horizon? 6 A. My view on this is that the Legal Services or 7 Criminal Law Team by and large would have 8 oversight over all cases. So, I mean, they 9 could see patterns or problems, et cetera. If 10 it was being -- a case that was being dealt with 11 by the police or another law enforcement agency, 12 they wouldn't have sight of the potential 13 problems or issues. 14 Q. That's one aspect of control, namely sight, 15 potentially. But wouldn't you understand 16 control also to mean control over what is 17 disclosed and what is not disclosed? 18 A. I don't read it like that. The difficulty, 19 however, will be our lack of control, if the 20 control is about disclosure, then I would 21 imagine it's up to the police or other law 22 enforcement agency, who is investigating the 23 case, to deal with the disclosure. 24 However, having said that, yes, I accept 25 that, if the police were unaware of potential 38 1 problems or issues with Horizon, then they 2 wouldn't know to pursue that and disclose 3 anything. If that makes sense. 4 Q. Isn't what Mr Wilson saying to you and the 5 others here, that, "Look, we're planning to 6 potentially investigate Horizon integrity. We 7 might have to disclose that to the police and 8 the CPS in independently investigated and 9 prosecuted cases, we will lose control over that 10 information"? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. "Whereas, if it stays within the post office 13 Investigation Team, we retain control over that 14 information"? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. Can we go, please, to page 1. I should have 17 said at the bottom of the page, please. 18 You say, in relation to this chain: 19 "Can we please ensure that Rob Wilson ... is 20 kept apprised of the situation ..." 21 If we just read on to page 3. 22 "... and included in any further 23 meetings/updates on this subject. Our 24 prosecution cases have faced an increase in 25 challenges as well as our civil cases, so the 39 1 activities outlined below and indeed going 2 forward, are applicable to both legal teams." 3 So you wanted Mr Wilson cited on this idea 4 of a review, a due diligence exercise on 5 Horizon? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. Can we see what he replied to you, please. 8 Page 1, he says: 9 "If it is thought there is a difficulty with 10 Horizon then clearly the action set out in your 11 memo is not only needed but imperative. The 12 consequence however will be that to commence or 13 continue to proceed with any criminal 14 proceedings will be inappropriate. My 15 understanding is that the integrity of Horizon 16 data is sound and it is as a result of this that 17 persistent challenges that have been made in 18 court have always failed. These challenges are 19 not new and have been with us since the 20 inception of Horizon as it has always been the 21 only way that defendants are left to challenge 22 our evidence when they have stolen money or 23 where they need to show that our figures are not 24 correct." 25 By 2010, March 2010, does what Mr Wilson 40 1 says in that paragraph reflect the view that you 2 would have held? 3 A. So he says it's imperative that he's kept 4 informed. I agree, and that's why I asked 5 everyone to make sure that he's kept in the loop 6 because I noted he wasn't copied in on some of 7 the preceding emails. 8 Q. Well, let's take it in stages after, then. The 9 third line, he says his understanding is that 10 the integrity of Horizon data is sound. 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Did that represent your view by 2010? 13 A. Yes, so it's another example, as I mentioned 14 earlier, about messaging -- we had Sue Lowther 15 saying that the system is fine, here's Rob 16 Wilson saying his understanding is it's fine, 17 and the message from the top was similar. So 18 ... 19 Q. Who consisted of the top? 20 A. Well, I've heard things and seen things that 21 about this Inquiry that allegedly people much 22 higher up the chain knew things or were told 23 there are problems or there might be problems. 24 I don't know the ins and outs or who those 25 individuals are. I can't remember any 41 1 particular messages coming down but what I can 2 recall is that there was certainly no messages 3 coming up saying, "Stop investigating" or "Stop 4 prosecuting". 5 Q. So just breaking down what you said there, you 6 can't recall any messages coming from the top of 7 the organisation at Executive Team level or 8 similar, that filtered their way down to you 9 that there was nothing wrong with Horizon? 10 A. I can't recall specific messages, no, but that 11 was my understanding and, likewise, we've got 12 Rob Wilson here, his understanding is that it's 13 fine; sue Lowther, her understanding was that 14 it's fine. So, at my level and their level 15 higher up, I think the impression was that we've 16 been told that the system is fine or it's 17 working all the time correctly. 18 Q. Moving on: 19 "It is as a result of this that persistent 20 challenges that have been made in court have 21 always failed." 22 Would that have been your understanding by 23 2010? 24 A. Yes, insofar as I don't recall any challenges 25 being successful. So, if that was the case, 42 1 let's say there's been three, six, 12 or 20 2 challenges, and they've been unsuccessful, 3 I think that would have, rightly or wrongly, 4 cemented my view that the system was okay. 5 Q. Would it be your understanding that, in all of 6 those cases where the challenges had failed, 7 full disclosure had been given of any system 8 problems with Horizon, ie so that there was 9 a fair hearing that had resulted in a dismissal 10 to the challenge to Horizon? 11 A. My view back then or now? 12 Q. Back then? 13 A. Back then, I would have thought everything was 14 done as it should have been. 15 Q. Had you heard of a case concerning the Cleveleys 16 sub post office involving Mrs Wolstenholme? 17 A. I've heard the name Cleveleys but I don't think 18 anything about it. 19 Q. Would you have known about it by then, by 2010, 20 or is it something you've heard in the Inquiry? 21 A. I don't know where I've heard of it but I've 22 heard of the post office. 23 Q. Had you heard about subpostmasters being 24 acquitted when they had raised a challenge to 25 Horizon? 43 1 A. Not that I recall, but maybe in -- well, no, 2 I don't recall. 3 Q. Your view, come 2010, would have been that the 4 persistent challenges had always failed? 5 A. Yes, I can't remember any challenges that were 6 successful. There may have been some but 7 I can't remember. 8 Q. Mr Wilson says: 9 "These challenges are not new and have been 10 with us since the inception of Horizon." 11 Were you aware that the Post Office had 12 received complaints concerning the integrity of 13 Horizon data and challenges to Horizon data 14 since the system's very inception. 15 A. No. I don't recall that and, as we've 16 discussed, I was an Investigation Manager from 17 2000 to 2004. So I would only have had my 18 cases, whereas the Legal Services team would 19 have had oversight of all the cases across the 20 country coming into them. So they may have been 21 aware that there were issues at the beginning 22 but I don't recall that. 23 Q. During your tenure as the Investigation Manager, 24 which included part of the national rollout 25 period, what was the message coming down from 44 1 above as to Horizon integrity? 2 A. Back then I don't recall any mention of Horizon 3 integrity. I think it was more in later years 4 that it was mentioned. 5 Q. Were you, as an Investigation Manager, given 6 training in relation to the way that Horizon 7 operated and was relevant to your job as 8 an Investigator? 9 A. I would say yes but I can't remember any 10 training that was given. 11 Q. I'm talking about bespoke training in relation 12 to Horizon as an Investigator? 13 A. Again, I would say yes but I can't remember the 14 training. 15 Q. How did Investigation Managers understand the 16 data, the varieties of data, that were available 17 for them from Horizon? 18 A. I don't know how they were made aware. All 19 I can remember is transaction and event logs, 20 and how to get them off the system. 21 Q. Were there written instructions issued to 22 Investigators saying, "A key source of our 23 evidence after, say, 2000, is going to be the 24 Horizon system. It's new, we haven't got any 25 policy or procedure that relates to getting 45 1 evidence from this thing. This is a menu of the 2 data that's available. This is what it shows, 3 or this is what it might show, such data. It 4 might help you to prove A or disprove B. These 5 are the people that you can get it from"? 6 A. I do recall something like that. But, again, 7 I can't remember it, but it was very more 8 simplified. It was how to obtain a transaction 9 log, do A, B, C; how to obtain an event log, do 10 X, Y, Z, and so on. I think it was a one sheet 11 of paper. 12 Q. Was that a within-your-team document or was it 13 something that applicable country-wide? 14 A. I can't remember and I don't know whether it was 15 drafted by someone in our team or one of the 16 Crime Risk Team, or even borrowed from the Audit 17 Team, I don't know. 18 Q. When you were acting as an Investigation 19 Manager, what determined whether you would 20 investigate or not? What were the relevant 21 considerations? 22 A. For an investigation? 23 Q. Yes. 24 A. Well, as an Investigation Manager, it would be 25 whether my Investigation Team Manager had 46 1 allocated a case to me. 2 Q. You tell us in your witness statement -- there's 3 no need to turn it up, it's paragraph 43 -- in 4 relation to deciding whether and in what 5 circumstances to investigate: 6 "... the decision was informed by a number 7 of factors, including the shortfall and the 8 current resource and workloads within the 9 teams." 10 Is that correct? 11 A. Yeah. 12 Q. So, leaving aside for the moment, the amount of 13 the alleged shortfall and focusing on the 14 current workloads within the team, do you mean 15 by that that the workload of the Criminal 16 Investigation and Debt Recovery Teams played 17 a part in deciding whether an alleged shortfall 18 would be pursued as a crime or as a debt? 19 A. The Investigation Team, yes, we had nothing to 20 do with the Debt Recovery Team. If I could just 21 give you an example. Over the -- I think when 22 I started there was about 60 Investigators and 23 something like nine or ten teams and, over the 24 years, that went down to two or three teams and 25 about 20 Investigators. 47 1 So, as the staff reduced, the workload 2 didn't reduce as much, probably like most 3 businesses, and there came a time where, you 4 know, Investigators were swamped with work. 5 So -- 6 Q. Did that affect the quality of the investigation 7 that they were able to carry out? 8 A. It would have done if they'd retained that work. 9 But I do remember we had to be quite hard and 10 say "Right well, we're not investigating this, 11 that or the other". 12 Q. What was the "this, that or the other" that you 13 wouldn't investigate? 14 A. Lower value audit shortages, pension allowance 15 overclaims that were of a certain amount. 16 Q. On alleged shortfalls, what, if any, was the 17 limit or the floor beneath which you wouldn't go 18 in an investigation? 19 A. I can't remember a particular figure. But I do 20 remember -- I think I put it in my statement -- 21 about triggers and timescales. 22 Q. I'm sorry? 23 A. Triggers and timescales. 24 Q. Yes. Can you now remember what the triggers 25 were? 48 1 A. I can't remember now no but they fluctuated and, 2 even when we were agreed on a trigger, if some 3 has gone long-term sick and someone has left, 4 then, again, that still wouldn't be set in stone 5 as for us to investigate. 6 Q. Notwithstanding the use of these triggers, did 7 it nonetheless remain the case that teams had 8 an overstretched capacity to investigate? 9 A. At times, yes. When I mentioned we had about 10 90/60 Investigators back then, I think, probably 11 like other law enforcement agencies, we would 12 investigate anything and everything that came 13 our way. As time went on, staff became less, so 14 you had to prioritise more what you actually 15 investigated. 16 Q. Was there any drop in the extent and quality of 17 the investigations that were conducted? 18 A. Not that I recall. 19 Q. So quality has always remained the same? 20 A. I believe so. 21 Q. It's right, isn't it, that you were set 22 objectives to recover a certain amount, 23 a certain percentage of fraud activity, weren't 24 you? 25 A. Yes. 49 1 Q. Can we look, please, at POL00126734. These are 2 your objectives, your personal objectives, for 3 the year April 2012 to March 2013. Was this 4 a feature of all of your time as an Investigator 5 and at this time in Fraud Recovery? 6 A. So every year we had objectives. I'm not sure 7 when I was an Investigator we had a target for 8 recoveries. 9 Q. At this time that we're looking, April 2012, 10 March 2013, you're an Accredited Financial 11 Investigator? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. Are you saying that you don't remember targets 14 for recovery in the earlier period that I was 15 looking at, 2000 to 2004, when you were 16 an Investigation Managers? 17 A. That's correct. I think the recovery was 18 important, but I don't remember it being 19 an actual objective like it is here in later 20 years. 21 Q. If we just scroll down and look at box 3, 22 please. Under the heading "Fraud activity 23 return on investment", and "Fraud activity 24 return on investment", "investment" means 25 investment in you, does it -- 50 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. -- ie the Post Office saying, "We're employing 3 you to investigate, as a Financial Investigator, 4 losses and seek to recover them"? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. "We are making an investment. We want to see 7 what the return is on our investment in 8 employing you"? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. Is that what that heading means? 11 A. I think so. 12 Q. I think it says that: 13 "Evidence activity that produces recovery 14 rates on inquiries closed of 65% or more 15 (subject to quarterly review)." 16 Can you tell us what that figure means, 65 17 per cent or more, ie 65 per cent or more of 18 what? 19 A. Right so 65 per cent or more on closed cases. 20 Q. But of what? 21 A. Well, if there's been ten cases in the year and 22 all of them were £10,000 losses, the total is 23 £100,000 of loss, so the recovery target would 24 be 65,000. 25 Q. Okay, so it means that you have got to produce 51 1 evidence that shows that, of the total amount of 2 shortfalls for that year, ie the alleged 3 losses -- 4 A. Yeah. 5 Q. -- you have recovered 65 per cent of those? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. It doesn't mean in 65 per cent of cases and it 8 doesn't mean 65 per cent of cases there must be 9 some recovery; it's by reference to the total 10 figure? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Can we see similarly for the next year 13 POL00126836. These are your objectives for 14 April 2013 to March 2014, "Fraud activity return 15 on investment": 16 "Evidence activity that produces recovery 17 rates on closed enquiries of 65% or more." 18 So the same? 19 A. Yeah. 20 Q. Do you know why one of your performance 21 objectives was the recovery of such a number of 22 the alleged shortfalls? 23 A. The particular number, I don't know why it's 24 65 per cent, but I can understand, if you're 25 an Accredited Financial Investigator, your job 52 1 is to get money back for the business. 2 Q. Was that a consistent theme throughout your time 3 as an Investigator and then as an AFI? 4 A. As an AFI, yes. As an Investigator, I can't 5 remember but, you know, there was a recovery 6 element to the role. 7 Q. Can we look, please, at POL00126944. 8 Just pause there a moment. It looks like we 9 may have lost the connection with the Chairman. 10 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Sorry, I was muted. 11 I was saying that there was a very small 12 period of time, no more than seconds, where 13 I think I lost connection but I've been 14 following all that's happened without a problem. 15 MR BEER: Okay, sir, we can't see you at the moment, 16 for some reason, which it's slightly 17 discombobulating to hear a voice without 18 a picture, because we don't know whether you're 19 here or not. 20 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Well, I can assure when that I am 21 here but, obviously, it's necessary that I can 22 be seen. 23 MR BEER: Yes, you can now, sir. 24 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Fine. 25 MR BEER: You're back in the room. 53 1 Can we look, please, at this document which 2 looks like the outcome of a performance review 3 against the objectives that we've just looked 4 at. It's for the period April to October 2013; 5 can you see that? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. If we just scroll down on the one we're looking 8 at, the ROI, return on investment, it says: 9 "72% recovery rate against closed cases 10 across the team." 11 So you exceeded the 65 per cent target and 12 then you set out the things that you did in 13 order to do that, essentially, yes? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Did these recovery targets, getting in money, 16 impinge on the way that you and your team went 17 about its work in relation to subpostmasters? 18 A. Not that I remember, no. 19 Q. "We've got to get the money in, there's an 20 objective"? 21 A. Well, we've got to get the money in is the 22 objective but, if there is no money -- 23 I wouldn't say it's the luck of the draw but in 24 some cases there isn't any money, in some cases 25 there is. 54 1 Q. What were the consequences for you in missing 2 targets? 3 A. The potential consequences were -- I don't want 4 to go into too much detail but, on our PDRs you 5 got a score of 5, which was excellent; 4 was 6 very good; 3 was good; 2 was improvements 7 required; and 1 was poor. So, if you didn't hit 8 the targets, it might have gone from good to 9 improvement required. 10 So it affected your PDR score, which in turn 11 would affect your bonus that you got as well. 12 Q. I was about to ask: was the achievement of the 13 target in getting money in from subpostmasters 14 linked to remuneration? The answer is yes. 15 A. It was linked to remuneration for me and others. 16 But, as I say, let's say that was 50 per cent, 17 I could demonstrate well, you know, you couldn't 18 get money in these cases because there weren't 19 any, so I would have argued the toss if I hadn't 20 hit the required target. 21 Q. Were all Financial Investigators on a bonus 22 scheme in the link to the recovery of money from 23 subpostmasters? 24 A. Yes, and everyone within the Security Team was 25 on a bonus, depending on their own objectives. 55 1 Q. What were the other bonus metrics for other 2 members of the Security Team? 3 A. I don't know. I mean, a Crime Risk Analyst, 4 their day job is more analytics and -- 5 Q. What about a straight Investigator? 6 A. The Investigator, as I say, I can't recall. 7 When I was an investigator, there was a specific 8 target and I can't -- I mean, I can't remember 9 what, if any, target they had in later years. 10 Q. Here you are telling a manager, presumably, in 11 this sentence, the second sentence: 12 "I have continued to secure impressive 13 recoveries." 14 Something in order to justify your bonus? 15 A. Indeed. 16 Q. At this time, and we're here late 2013, had you 17 any knowledge at all of any Horizon integrity 18 issues? 19 A. Not specifically, just -- well, if I could call 20 it noise. 21 Q. So "noise", in my mind, means something that's 22 going on in the background that's a bit annoying 23 and something you'd rather not pay attention to; 24 is that how you're referring to noise? 25 A. No. 56 1 Q. What do you mean by Horizon integrity issues 2 were just noise? 3 A. What I mean is -- I mean, I can't be specific in 4 terms of which years but there would be some 5 noise, ie people citing Horizon. As the years 6 went on, there may have been more offices or 7 people citing Horizon. It's a bit of like 8 a snowball effect, it sort of gathers momentum, 9 as the years go on. 10 Q. Is that how you viewed it, that it was just 11 momentum gathering -- 12 A. Um -- 13 Q. -- rather than potentially the true picture 14 emerging, having been either not investigated or 15 suppressed for a period of time? 16 A. Yeah, again, I'll be honest, I viewed it as, as 17 you've outlined at the time. 18 Q. So it's something that was just gathering 19 momentum because it was being mentioned in the 20 press -- 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. -- and amongst the subpostmaster community? 23 A. Yes, and myself and, as we've mentioned, Rob 24 Wilson, Sue Lowther and others, didn't know or 25 believe there was a problem, or issue -- 57 1 Q. No, more than that. They're saying that there 2 isn't. 3 A. Yes, indeed. 4 Q. Did you ever know what their view was based on? 5 A. No. But I presume it's the same as mine: that 6 the business were constantly saying "There's 7 nothing wrong with it, there's nothing wrong 8 with it", which I always found a bit strange 9 myself. 10 Q. Why did you find it strange? 11 A. Because my view is that every computer system 12 has problems or glitches. So I think it was too 13 strong to say "There is nothing wrong with it 14 and it's working at all times". I mean, I'm 15 sure we've all been in a supermarket, half price 16 item, you get to the till and it comes up as 17 full price. I'm sure we've all been on our PCs 18 and some message comes up saying "You can't 19 access this, you haven't got the rights", yet 20 I've not even wanted to access it. On a grander 21 scale, you've got air traffic control across the 22 world. 23 So every computer system, in my view, does 24 have issues with it. So, I think, perhaps I was 25 sort of quite strong there but that doesn't mean 58 1 that I thought there was anything systemically 2 wrong with Horizon and that seems to have been 3 backed up by witness statements obtained by 4 Fujitsu. 5 Q. Presumably linking bonuses to the amount of 6 money that you recovered from subpostmasters was 7 intended to affect your behaviour? 8 A. Yes, but when you say that, it affected my 9 behaviour, insofar as I would do what I could 10 within the realms of the Proceeds of Crime Act. 11 Q. How did it affect your behaviour, knowing that 12 you were on a bonus if you got more money in? 13 A. Well, even putting that aside, that was my job 14 to get money back. And I utilised primarily 15 confiscation orders, which was within the realms 16 of the Proceeds of Crime Act and only following 17 a conviction. So I utilised the powers in the 18 appropriate way. 19 Q. That can come down. Thank you. 20 In your witness statement -- no need to turn 21 it up, it's paragraphs 19 and 20 -- you refer to 22 your role in relation to case strategies. 23 A. Right. 24 Q. In paragraph 25, you refer to involvement in the 25 development or management of policies. Who was 59 1 responsible for criminal litigation strategy at 2 the Post Office? 3 A. I think it was the Head of Security and the 4 Senior Security Manager within that strand. 5 Q. Did you ever see criminal litigation strategy 6 described? 7 A. I may have seen a policy, like a prosecution 8 policy, if that was the same thing. I can 9 remember it but I don't know the details of it. 10 Q. Can you, in general terms, describe what the 11 Post Office criminal litigation strategy was, 12 say, between 2000 and 2004? 13 A. No. 14 Q. What about at a later stage when you were 15 an AFI? 16 A. I don't recall. 17 Q. How would you describe it now, looking back at 18 it? 19 A. One element or one focus is to recover monies 20 owed. 21 Q. Was that the principal purpose of the criminal 22 litigation strategy? 23 A. I'm not sure it was the principal reason. 24 Again, my recollection was that there was 25 a policy to prosecute, if it was in the public 60 1 interest and, you know, whatever rules or 2 guidance that needed to be followed by primarily 3 the Criminal Law Team. The recoveries were 4 a significant part of that. 5 Q. Some organisations have or describe themselves 6 as having a robust Criminal Investigation and 7 Prosecution Policy. Some would say that they 8 have a weak or a tolerant criminal investigation 9 policy or strategy. Some might impose 10 thresholds for investigation and prosecution 11 that are exceedingly high, meaning that not much 12 gets investigated or prosecuted. 13 Where, in the spectrum, did the Post Office 14 sit, say, in 2000 to 2004, when you were 15 an Investigation Manager? 16 A. I don't know because I can't compare to those. 17 All I can say is recoveries were important and 18 they grew more important as time went on. 19 Q. Was it explained to you why recovery of money 20 was important, seen as important? 21 A. The only thing I can recall was that different 22 parts of the Post Office generated profits for 23 the business, whereas security investigations 24 were more of a cost. So in order to redress 25 that balance in some way, that's why recoveries 61 1 became more of a focus. 2 Q. So the recovery of debt, as you call it, from 3 subpostmasters was seen as a way of contributing 4 to the Post Office's bottom line? 5 A. Yes. 6 MR BEER: Thank you. 7 Sir, it's 12.30. I wonder whether that 8 would be an appropriate moment to break just for 9 half an hour until 1.00. 10 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, certainly. 11 MR BEER: Thank you very much, sir. 12 (12.30 pm) 13 (A short break) 14 (1.00 pm) 15 MR BEER: Good afternoon, sir, can you see and hear 16 us. 17 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, thank you. 18 MR BEER: Thank you. 19 Good afternoon, Mr Posnett, can we turn to 20 the issue of casework management and, in 21 particular, the extent to which Post Office 22 policies regulated the revelation of material 23 that showed a procedural weakness in Post Office 24 systems. Can we start by looking at 25 POL00104777. If we look at the foot of the 62 1 page, please, to get a date, October 2002. So 2 this is whilst you would have been 3 an Investigation Manager; do you see that? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. If we go to the top of the document, please. 6 It's a Casework Management policy for England 7 and Wales, part of "Investigation Policy": 8 "The aim of [the]; policy is to ensure 9 adequate controls are in place to maintain 10 standards throughout investigation processes." 11 Can we turn to page 2, please. Look at the 12 last bullet point that we can see currently, the 13 one beginning "The issue". Thank you. The 14 policy says: 15 "The issue of dealing with information 16 concerning procedural failures is a difficult 17 one. Some major procedural weaknesses, if they 18 became public knowledge, may have an adverse 19 affect on our business. They may assist others 20 to commit offences against our business, 21 undermine a prosecution case, bring our business 22 into disrepute or harm relations with major 23 customers. Unless the offender states that he 24 is aware that accounting weaknesses exist and 25 that he took advantage of them, it is important 63 1 not to volunteer that option to the offender 2 during interview. The usual duties of 3 disclosure under the Criminal Procedure and 4 Investigations Act 1996 still apply." 5 Is the approach that is set out there one 6 that you used when you were an Investigator? 7 A. I believe so, yes. 8 Q. You'll see it refers to "major procedural 9 weaknesses, may ... undermine a prosecution 10 case", if they became public knowledge -- 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. -- and that unless the offender states they're 13 aware and took advantage of them, don't 14 volunteer them in interview. Is that the 15 approach that you took? 16 A. I don't recall that's the approach I took but, 17 if this was the policy at the time I was 18 an Investigator, I would have thought, by and 19 large, I would have adhered to that policy. 20 Q. Do you know why it was the Post Office's policy 21 not to reveal major procedural weaknesses to 22 people accused of crime? 23 A. Because, if word got out, others could commit 24 the same crime with those weaknesses still in 25 place. 64 1 Q. What about if the weaknesses were not about 2 security or locks and barriers and screens and 3 cash in transit and safes, and things like that, 4 physical security issues, what about if they 5 were weaknesses in the accounting integrity of 6 the Horizon system? 7 A. I can recall that, on the discipline reports, 8 I would sometimes note weaknesses. In terms of 9 the Horizon accounting, I don't recall any of my 10 cases having that. 11 Q. So that issue didn't arise for you because you 12 believe there were no weaknesses in Horizon? 13 A. That's what I believe but I don't recollect any 14 of my cases where Horizon was cited anyway. 15 Q. Can we look, please, to the distinction between 16 the discipline report and the offender report, 17 by looking at a different policy, POL00118101. 18 You'll see this a guidance document or a guide 19 to the preparation of Red Label Case Files. Can 20 you just help us with what's a Red Label Case 21 was? 22 A. If a case was going to go up for legal advice, 23 there was a Red Label we used to put on the case 24 file that said, "Urgent today, must be 25 prioritised during the course of transit". 65 1 Q. So it was a signal that it was going for legal 2 advice? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. Thank you. Can we took, please, at page 10, 5 please, at the foot of the page. Can you see 6 paragraph 2.15, "Details of failures in security 7 supervision, procedures and product integrity": 8 "This must be a comprehensive list of all 9 failures in security, supervision, procedures 10 and product integrity [and] it must be 11 highlighted in bold in the report. Where the 12 investigator concludes that there are no 13 failures a statement to this effect should be 14 made and highlighted in bold." 15 Then over the page: 16 "Significant failures that may affect the 17 successful likelihood of any criminal action 18 and/or cause significant damage to the business 19 must be confined, solely, to the confidential 20 offender report. Care must be exercised when 21 including failures within the Discipline Report 22 as obviously this is disclosed to the suspect 23 offender and may have ramifications on both the 24 criminal elements of the enquiry, as well as 25 being potentially damaging to the reputation or 66 1 security of the business. If you are in any 2 doubt as to the appropriateness of inclusion or 3 exclusion you must discuss with your team 4 leader." 5 Do you understand the distinction that's 6 being drawn there between a discipline report 7 and the offender report? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. Do you understand that any failures that might 10 affect the likelihood of successful criminal 11 proceedings were not to be included in the 12 report disclosed to the offender? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. Why was that? 15 A. I don't know but with -- this particular 16 document doesn't relate to when I was 17 an Investigation Manager. I think the previous 18 document you showed, POL00104777, was applicable 19 during the time frame that I was an Investigator 20 and, on that policy, I believe it says something 21 like weaknesses to be put on the report that 22 goes to Legal Services. 23 Q. That's the same as this: include weaknesses in 24 the confidential report -- 25 A. Yes. 67 1 Q. -- that goes to Legal Services; don't include 2 them in the one that goes to the suspect? 3 A. Yes, but on the one that would be more 4 applicable to me when I was an Investigator, I'm 5 sure it says in there somewhere the failings, it 6 would be up to Legal Services to decide whether 7 that should be disclosed. 8 Q. So do you know why, if a list or a narrative 9 description of failures that might affect the 10 successful likelihood of criminal action against 11 a suspect, were not to be disclosed to them in 12 a report which they would receive? 13 A. No, other than, as we've mentioned, if it's 14 a weakness in Post Office procedures or policies 15 and word got out, it could mean other people 16 could commit the same act. That's what 17 I understood that to be. I didn't understand it 18 to be "We need to keep this quiet because" -- 19 you know, in terms of disclosure. 20 Q. Who was responsible for deciding what should be 21 disclosed and what should not be disclosed in 22 criminal proceedings? 23 A. Again, when I was an Investigation Manager, 24 there was a Royal Mail Group Policy and 25 Standards Team and all these things came out 68 1 from them. As the years went by, Post Office 2 became more independent and we had our own 3 people drafting policies or reissuing policies. 4 Q. Who, when you were an Investigation Manager 5 between 2000 and 2004, in an investigation, was 6 responsible for deciding what fell to be 7 disclosed to a defendant? 8 A. The Criminal Law Team. 9 Q. Did the Investigator have any role? 10 A. Yes, the Investigator would record all the 11 information on the relevant schedules, unused 12 material. Then it went to the Criminal Law Team 13 and it was up to them to say yea or nay, or this 14 should be on that form rather than that form. 15 So, ultimately, they were responsible for 16 disclosing to the defence that the Investigator 17 recorded all the items that they had. 18 Q. So it was a joint venture in which the 19 Investigator was responsible for gathering the 20 material together and scheduling it? 21 A. Yes. The Investigator had to do their part and 22 then, ultimately, it was the Criminal Law Team 23 who decided what was -- 24 Q. Who decided on which schedule a document should 25 appear or whether it should not appear on 69 1 a schedule at all, and were responsible for 2 giving physical disclosure of that to the 3 defence; is that right? 4 A. Pretty much, yeah. I mean, for example, I can 5 remember one criticism I received. I can't 6 remember the name of the lawyer but they -- 7 I remember them phoning me up, because I used to 8 include post notes and bits of paper and all 9 sorts on my unused material, and they said to me 10 "Dave, it's only relevant material you need to 11 disclose", and my view was "Well, who is to 12 determine what's relevant and what's not?" 13 So if the only criticism for me was to 14 disclose too much, then I was happy to take that 15 criticism. But that's what I mean about I would 16 submit the forms and then Criminal Law Team 17 would decide what gets disclosed. 18 Q. Getting back to the report issue, do you 19 understand why it was that significant failures 20 that might cause damage to the business should 21 not be included in a report that was disclosed 22 to the offender? 23 A. No, other than what I've said. 24 Q. Can we move on to POL00031005. This is 25 a Conduct of Criminal Investigations Policy and 70 1 we can see that it came into force in August 2 2013. Was there a policy like this beforehand, 3 that you're aware of? Maybe you want to just 4 flip through some of the pages to see what it 5 looks like, its topics. If we scroll to -- 6 that's it, the table of contents. 7 A. I think there possibly was but I don't recall. 8 Q. Okay. Can we look, please, at page 16, right at 9 the bottom, please, paragraph 5.11.6. This is 10 dealing with interviews. The policy tells 11 Investigators: 12 "Should the recent Second Sight review be 13 brought up by a suspect or his representative 14 during a PACE interview the Security Manager 15 should state: 'I will listen to any personal 16 concerns or issues that you may have had with 17 the Horizon system during the course of this 18 interview'." 19 Was that a policy that you're aware was 20 followed, that a pre-prepared script, in 21 accordance with that sentence there, was read 22 out to suspects? 23 A. I wouldn't be aware as to whether that occurred 24 in every case of relevance. What date was this 25 document? 71 1 Q. August 2013. 2 A. Right. So I think this may have been on the 3 advice of Cartwright King, perhaps. 4 Q. You picked up the role of an Investigation Team 5 Leader in 2014 and in 2015, where I think this 6 policy will still have been extant, and, 7 plainly, the Second Sight review was something 8 that suspects may raise. Would you agree? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. Was voluntary disclosure given to a suspect of 11 the Second Sight Report? 12 A. I don't know. 13 Q. Was there any sense in which the Post Office 14 were seeking to shut down a suspect in interview 15 by reading a pre-prepared line like this back to 16 a suspect who raised the Second Sight Report? 17 A. I don't know but, on reading that again, I don't 18 think so because, if a suspect raises Second 19 Sight, this is saying that I will listen to any 20 personal concerns or issues that you may have 21 had. It doesn't sound to me like it's shutting 22 it down. 23 Q. Okay, thank you. Can I move to the extent to 24 which you understood the Horizon system could be 25 afflicted by system integrity issues. You tell 72 1 us in your witness statement that, when you were 2 the Casework Manager at Croydon -- so I think 3 we're talking between 2008 and 2010; is that 4 right? 5 A. I thought Casework Manager was 2007 and 2008 6 but, yeah. 7 Q. So I think 2004 to 2007, Investigation Team 8 Manager; 2008 to 2010, Fraud Risk Manager, quite 9 right. 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. In what job was one of your responsibilities -- 12 I'll ask it the other way round -- the obtaining 13 of ARQ data? 14 A. So that was -- Post Office Investigators would 15 email in to the Casework Team a request for 16 primarily transaction and event logs. Myself or 17 one of the team would complete an ARQ form and 18 send that to Fujitsu. 19 Q. So this is when you were working as a Casework 20 Manager at Croydon -- 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. -- you had that responsibility for a couple of 23 years? 24 A. My recollection -- and bear in mind I seem to 25 have got the date wrong on my testing analyst 73 1 thing -- I thought I was a Casework Manager 2 between '07 and '08, a number of months, so I'd 3 say it was a few months between '07 and '08. 4 Q. So you held a responsibility for a period of 5 time as a Casework Manager for obtaining ARQ 6 data from Fujitsu? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. What training did you have to assist you to 9 understand the nature of ARQ data before you 10 took up that role? 11 A. I don't recall any training in respect of that. 12 Q. Did you have any training about the nature and 13 extent of the data held by Fujitsu, which could 14 potentially assist the Post Office in its 15 investigations and prosecutions, before you took 16 up the role? 17 A. I don't recall. 18 Q. When you carried out this work as the person 19 responsible for obtaining the ARQ data from 20 Fujitsu, did you understand the difference 21 between what might be called standard ARQ data 22 and enhanced ARQ data, the latter of which 23 included data that could show where an action in 24 the system had been generated by the system, 25 rather than being generated at the counter? 74 1 A. Not that I recall, no. 2 Q. So you didn't know there was a difference 3 between two species of ARQ data? 4 A. I don't think so, I don't recall. What I do 5 recall is whatever the Investigator wanted via 6 the email they sent was what I would put in the 7 ARQ request. 8 Q. Did you get a handover from the person who was 9 doing the job before you? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Did they explain to you that, "Look, there are 12 different levels of ARQ data available"? 13 A. Not that I recall. 14 Q. You were the main point of contact between the 15 two organisations, is this right, in relation to 16 obtaining ARQ data? 17 A. Anyone in the Casework Team could act in getting 18 the data but I was the liaison point liaison in 19 terms of the relationship between Post Office 20 and Fujitsu. 21 Q. So you knew how the system worked for getting 22 data from Fujitsu? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. You knew the forms that needed to be filled in, 25 in order to get that data from Fujitsu? 75 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. Was the Post Office ever reluctant to request 3 ARQ data from Fujitsu because it would incur 4 cost? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. Did you ever feel that commercial considerations 7 overshadowed the desire to investigate 8 shortfalls thoroughly and consistently? 9 A. I don't recall making that link. 10 Q. Was there a difference, from case to case, as to 11 the extent of the ARQ data obtained? 12 A. The extent, as in what -- 13 Q. The time period covered. 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Was that sometimes based on cost? 16 A. I would say yes. 17 Q. We're going to get into the detail on this in 18 a minute but can you give us your overall 19 impression of how significant an issue this was? 20 A. From recollection, I don't think it was 21 a significant issue; I think there were a couple 22 of occasions where the volume of information 23 being requested seemed excessive. So, if the 24 quota or, you know, the volume of requests per 25 month was eaten into to an extent, it could have 76 1 affected Investigators' requests, so that was 2 a sort of juggling act. 3 Q. Was some data not sought because of cost? 4 A. In part, I would say, yes. 5 Q. Can we just turn to -- a bit before we get into 6 the detail of ARQ data -- a view expressed on 7 Post Office's duties to verify through evidence 8 the existence of a shortfall. Can we look at 9 POL00140164. This is an exchange of emails 10 concerned the Glenmoriston branch from November 11 2014 and, if we can go to page 3, please -- and 12 scroll down, please, and keep scrolling. 13 It's an email exchange between you and 14 Angela van den Bogerd and I needn't, I think, 15 introduce the context for it but she says: 16 "Dave, 17 "Thanks for letting me have sight of this. 18 I'd be interested to see the response we have 19 sent to the letter as we need to ensure we are 20 replying in a reasonable yet robust way." 21 Then this: 22 "The verification of stock and cash should 23 be evidence enough that there is a shortfall and 24 if we have evidence of falsification of accounts 25 this will add further weight. We should be 77 1 drawing our legal colleagues also [I think it 2 should be 'drawing on our legal colleagues 3 also'] as it is not for [the Post Office 4 Limited] to demonstrate where the shortfalls 5 have occurred just that they have." 6 So this is a discussion about what evidence 7 is needed to prove a shortfall. Can you see 8 that Ms van den Bogerd says: 9 "The verification of stock and cash should 10 be evidence enough that there is a shortfall 11 ..." 12 Was that a commonly held view? 13 A. I don't recall. 14 Q. Is it a view that you would subscribe to, as 15 an Investigator? 16 A. As an Investigator: 17 "The verification of stock and cash should 18 be evidence enough that there is a shortfall 19 ..." 20 Q. Essentially she's saying, if, at audit, 21 a shortfall is shown between what the system 22 says should be there in terms of stock and cash 23 and what is there in stock and cash, that's as 24 far as the Post Office needs to go? 25 A. Yes, that would have been evidence of 78 1 a shortfall. 2 Q. Would it be sufficient evidence of a shortfall 3 in the context of criminal proceedings? 4 A. I don't know. There would be other parts or 5 information relating to the case but then, 6 ultimately, it's a decision for people higher 7 up. 8 Q. I don't think you're answering my question at 9 the moment. Would it be your view that, in 10 order to prove a loss in a shortfall case 11 against a subpostmaster, it's sufficient just to 12 show at audit there was a difference between 13 what the system showed ought to be there in 14 terms of cash and stock and what was there in 15 cash and stock? 16 A. I think when I was an Investigator, that was 17 pretty much it. 18 Q. Would that apply to the period of 2000 to 2004 19 and when you came back to investigations later 20 in your career? 21 A. I didn't come back to being an Investigator. 22 I don't think that changed. If a cash amount 23 has been declared, which is different to the 24 system, that was a big part. But it's possible 25 that an error notice could come back to explain 79 1 the loss. 2 Q. This is saying how far the Post Office needs to 3 go or doesn't need to going proving its case: 4 "All we need to show is the difference", as I've 5 said, "between what the system shows and what's 6 there on the ground, as displayed at audit"; was 7 that a view, essentially, that was held 8 commonly? 9 A. I would think so but I can't recall. 10 Q. Was it a view that you held: "I can prove 11 a case, I can put a case before the criminal 12 court, fit for the criminal courts to consider, 13 of a subpostmaster stealing money if there's 14 a difference between what the system says should 15 be in his cash and stock and what's in his cash 16 and stock"? 17 A. When I was an Investigation Manager, yes, but 18 there would be other things, as well, to 19 consider. 20 Q. Were the other things, as well, to consider 21 necessary things to consider? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. What were the other things that were necessary 24 to prove a case? 25 A. The points to prove on a particular offence. 80 1 Q. What would be the points to prove on a theft 2 case? 3 A. A theft case would have been the dishonest 4 appropriation of property belonging to another 5 with the intention to permanently deprive. 6 Q. So that's the definition of theft? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. How would that be translated into 9 a subpostmaster shortfall case? What evidence 10 would you need in order to prove those, 11 depending how you cut them, four or five 12 elements to of the offence of theft? 13 A. His responses or answers to relevant questions 14 put to him or her during interview. 15 Q. Ie it would be necessary to have an admission 16 from him? 17 A. It would be necessary to tick off those points 18 to prove, yes. 19 Q. I don't understand what you mean, I'm afraid, 20 Mr Posnett. This email tends to suggest that 21 "We think we can get a case home to port by 22 showing a shortfall at audit". 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. I'm asking: is that your view? 25 A. I think that would have been my view at the time 81 1 I was an Investigator -- 2 Q. The other stuff is just trimmings; is that 3 right? 4 A. Well, I would say they were important but -- not 5 just trimmings, but, yes, I think when I was 6 an Investigation Manager, if the cash and stock 7 physically there was different to what had been 8 declared, that would have gone a long way to -- 9 Q. Proving a case of theft? 10 A. Yes, but that wouldn't be us; that would be up 11 to the people above. And, also, it's if the 12 Auditors had contacted various people to get the 13 Investigation Team involved. So it's not just 14 there's a shortage, we're there, it has to go 15 through certain channels. 16 Q. That's the people who need to look at it and 17 investigate it from a matter of process? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. I'm asking, from an evidential point of view, 20 and I think we've reached the position that you 21 say that it was your view when you were 22 an Investigator that shortfall at audit was 23 a sufficient basis to make an allegation of 24 crime and the crime being of theft? 25 A. Yes. 82 1 Q. Would you subscribe to the other parts of Ms van 2 den Bogerd's email, that, if there is any 3 evidence of falsification of accounts, that's 4 just additional weight, that's just what I've 5 called trimmings? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. That's something nice to have but not necessary 8 to have? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. Would you subscribe to the other part of her 11 email at the end there: it's not necessary for 12 the Post Office to demonstrate where the 13 shortfalls have occurred -- ie to prove on which 14 day, through which transaction or by which means 15 the shortfalls have occurred -- just that there 16 is a shortfall? 17 A. I would disagree with that now. 18 Q. Why would you disagree with that now? 19 A. Because of what we know now. 20 Q. You wouldn't have disagreed with at the time, 21 I take it? 22 A. I don't know. 23 Q. So we, Post Office, don't have to show, by 24 reference to records, that the subpostmaster 25 took the money out of the account by overstating 83 1 the amount of stamps sold or undervaluing the 2 amount of cash received? 3 A. Yeah. 4 Q. All we have to do is show that, at cashing up, 5 at the audit, at the stocktake, there's 6 a difference between what Horizon shows should 7 be held and what is, in fact, held? 8 A. Yeah, I would say that's wrong. 9 Q. You would say that's wrong now. 10 A. Well, it was wrong at the time as well. 11 Q. Why was it wrong at the time? 12 A. Because it says it's not for POL to demonstrate 13 where the shortfalls have occurred, just that 14 they have. 15 Q. Just that they have. 16 A. So there could be a genuine error that could be 17 explained by an error notice that comes back. 18 Yeah. 19 Q. So how was it to be investigated how the 20 shortfalls have occurred? If it was wrong at 21 the time, what Ms van den Bogerd wrote, and 22 presumably wrong in 2000 and 2004 too, how did 23 the Post Office go about demonstrating where the 24 shortfall occurred? 25 A. Via interview. 84 1 Q. That's asking the subpostmaster? 2 A. Yeah. 3 Q. What about by reference to any other evidential 4 source? 5 A. Like Horizon? 6 Q. Yes. Was that done? 7 A. I don't recall it being done in my cases but 8 I am aware that Investigators did obtain 9 transaction event logs. 10 Q. Is that where the suspect raised an issue as to 11 Horizon integrity? 12 A. I believe so. 13 Q. Was that seen as the touch point for whether 14 Horizon needed to be investigated or 15 interrogated or not, depending on whether the 16 suspect raised an issue of Horizon integrity? 17 A. I think transaction event logs were obtained by 18 Investigators (1) to counter what may be claimed 19 by a subpostmaster or counter clerk or (2) to 20 back up the Investigator's view as to what's 21 happened. 22 Q. Do you remember that the standard request for 23 ARQ data included, amongst the additional 24 requirements that could be made, could be 25 ticked, "confirmation that there are no reported 85 1 system matter of law functions during the date 2 range period"? 3 A. I don't recall that. 4 Q. Can we look, please, at POL00051793. This is 5 an ARQ request in Seema Misra's case, completed 6 by you. Can you see that? 7 A. I can, yes. 8 Q. It's dated 9 June 2009 and is this in fairly 9 standard format? 10 A. I don't recall but yes. 11 Q. You can see that it asks the question whether 12 a witness statement is required, yes or no. 13 What would determine whether a witness statement 14 was required? 15 A. If the Investigator has asked. 16 Q. Yes, that's a bit circular. But why would 17 an Investigator ask for a witness statement and 18 why might an Investigator not ask for a witness 19 statement when asking for ARQ data? 20 A. I don't know. I mean, at this stage, if they're 21 requesting data during an investigation, they 22 wouldn't know at that stage whether a witness 23 statement would be required, so I don't know -- 24 Q. Why might it be required in some cases and not 25 in others? 86 1 A. It may be required if a person was going to 2 plead not guilty or to cover off any challenges 3 that a person may make. 4 Q. Does the opposite of that apply, that it wasn't 5 required if it was thought the person was going 6 to plead guilty? 7 A. I don't recall but, yes, it could. 8 Q. Why might that be? Why might a witness 9 statement not be required if it was believed 10 that the person might plead guilty? 11 A. Well, I think if someone is going to plead 12 guilty, then it would be a bit of a waste of 13 time doing a witness statement because it won't 14 be required. 15 Q. What about giving them all of the evidence so 16 they can judge whether to plead guilty or not? 17 A. It would be relevant in that situation. 18 Q. In any event, the form continues "Standard 19 Format Requirements". Can you help us as to 20 what that meant? Were they pre-printed, those 21 standard format requirements? 22 A. I don't recall but I would say yes. 23 Q. It asks for: 24 "A report of all transactions and events 25 (including inactivity logout, log on/log off 87 1 information) for the office including 2 remittances received, transfers between stock 3 units and error notices. Information to be 4 provided in Excel 97 format with each category 5 in a separate column." 6 Then "Column headers as follows", then 7 scroll down, please. 8 Then "Additional Requirements", and you 9 would mark this up "Yes" or "No"? 10 A. I would say yes. 11 Q. Yes, ie you would mark it up "Yes" or "No"? 12 A. I think so, yes. 13 Q. What would determine what information you asked 14 for or didn't ask for? 15 A. What the Investigation Manager is requesting on 16 the email. 17 Q. So there wasn't a form for the Investigator to 18 fill in like this, was there? 19 A. I don't believe so, no -- 20 Q. How -- sorry, I interrupted you. 21 A. I don't think so because Fujitsu would only deal 22 with the Casework Team. They shouldn't really 23 have dealt directly with the Investigator. 24 Q. So how would you decide what information to seek 25 and not to seek? 88 1 A. Purely based on what the Investigator is 2 requesting. 3 Q. In the second box down here, the words: 4 "Please could you obtain a standard 5 statement from Fujitsu that confirms the Horizon 6 system for the above [Post Office] was 7 functioning properly between 30 June 2005 [and] 8 14 January 2008. The statement should state 9 that they have reviewed and summarised all call 10 logs during this period; however, these do not 11 need to be produced." 12 Just breaking that down, why was it 13 necessary to obtain a statement that said the 14 Horizon system was functioning properly? 15 A. I don't know. 16 Q. To what extent were the call logs seen as 17 a measure of whether Horizon was functioning 18 properly at a branch? 19 A. I suppose the call logs may identify if 20 a subpostmaster or clerk believed that the 21 system wasn't functioning properly. 22 Q. Did you understand whether any additional work 23 was carried out by Fujitsu in the provision of 24 a witness statement, which addressed anything 25 other than the call logs? 89 1 A. Not that I recall. 2 Q. So you understood that the Fujitsu statement was 3 based on and only based on an analysis of the 4 call logs? 5 A. Well, I don't know what they -- I mean, the bit 6 here that the -- if the system was functioning 7 properly, I don't know, only Fujitsu can answer 8 that, but I don't think you should just look at 9 the call logs to determine whether the system 10 was working correctly. 11 Q. Why should you not just look at the call logs to 12 determine whether the system was working 13 properly? 14 A. Because the call logs can't definitively tell 15 you whether the system was working correctly. 16 Q. But, as a matter of fact, you don't know whether 17 they looked beyond the call logs in the 18 provision of this standard statement that says 19 that it was functioning properly? 20 A. Correct. I mean, I assume that they did look at 21 the system because that was the key part of 22 their witness statements, to confirm or not, 23 although confirm mainly, that the system was 24 working correctly. 25 Q. The request says that the call logs do not need 90 1 to be produced. Why did the call logs not need 2 to be produced? 3 A. I'm assuming that this is what the Investigator 4 has requested. 5 Q. Well, I think we may see that this is a standard 6 form of request that's marked "Yes" or "No", and 7 that the date range is altered depending on 8 a range of factors? 9 A. Yeah, I -- I mean, this part and the top part of 10 the form, I mean, there's no way on earth I can 11 imagine I've completed all these questions, so 12 I think you're right, although I can't recall, 13 that there's text already in these boxes and 14 they may need to be tweaked to reflect 15 a particular office or a particular time frame. 16 Q. Why did you understand that it wasn't necessary 17 for Fujitsu to produce to Post Office, the 18 prosecutor, the call logs? 19 A. I don't know. 20 Q. They might contain weekly or monthly or 21 sometimes, as we've seen, even daily complaints 22 by a subpostmaster? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. Aren't they relevant information? 25 A. Yes, I guess so. 91 1 Q. So I just ask again: do you know why the Post 2 Office was asking or saying that they needn't be 3 produced? 4 A. I don't know why. 5 Q. Can we look, please, at FUJ00155830. You can 6 see that the form appears to have changed 7 a little bit in terms of the way it's printed 8 but it contains the same sort of information? 9 A. Yeah. 10 Q. If we can just scroll down, please, and again. 11 Yes, you can see that this is a form, version 4, 12 dated November 2007, right at the foot of the 13 page? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. If we scroll back up, please. The year is not 16 completed. You see that it was completed by you 17 on 2 July? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. This is for the Cowleymoor branch with some date 20 ranges between July '05 and January '06. You'll 21 see the standard format hasn't changed; can you 22 see that? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. Then if we scroll down, you'll see that the 25 previous standard wording has been removed and 92 1 it seems to have been replaced by analysis of 2 Horizon Helpdesk call logs. Can you see that in 3 the second box down? 4 A. I can, yes. 5 Q. Do you know why that was? 6 A. I don't know why it's changed. I don't recall 7 the form actually changing either, but yes. 8 Q. Who was responsible for the design of these 9 forms, ie the information that Post Office, as 10 a prosecutor, was seeking from Fujitsu, as 11 a third party provider of material? 12 A. I assume that the Casework Team back in 2000, or 13 even before that, drafted these forms and 14 policies ready for when Horizon came in. 15 Q. You would agree that the standard wording on the 16 ARQ form that we saw before this one supports 17 an understanding that any large computer system 18 could suffer system malfunctions and, therefore, 19 checks needed to be made to exclude at least 20 those that had been reported? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. Here, the position is changed. It's just asked 23 for an analysis of the call logs. Again, do you 24 know why that change was made -- 25 A. I don't know. 93 1 Q. -- rather than asking for a positive statement, 2 confirmation that there are no reported system 3 malfunctions -- 4 A. I don't -- 5 Q. -- that Horizon was working properly to 6 an analysis of the call logs? 7 A. I don't know the reason why it's changed. 8 Q. In any event, you didn't ask for that in this 9 case; you've marked it up as "No"? 10 A. Correct. 11 Q. Why wouldn't you want to know in a particular 12 case whether a subpostmaster had made calls to 13 the Horizon Helpdesk about Horizon? 14 A. Again, it's what the Investigator is requesting. 15 Q. Why might an Investigator not want to know that 16 his suspect or her suspect has made calls to the 17 Horizon Helpdesk? 18 A. I don't know. 19 Q. What did you understand the purpose of all of 20 this was, seeking this data, as the person 21 responsible for seeking it? 22 A. So the purpose was for the Investigation Manager 23 to advance the investigation. That's what this 24 was designed for in the beginning. 25 Q. But can you maybe look at it a bit deeper than 94 1 that? What was the purpose of seeking this data 2 from Fujitsu? 3 A. To back up what was happening in branch, to 4 assist the case. 5 Q. Again, did you have any deeper understanding 6 than that or were you just sort of filling out 7 forms? 8 A. Well, at this stage, filling out forms. We were 9 just the interface between the Investigator and 10 Fujitsu. So the email came in, we'd complete 11 this form or the other version and off it goes 12 to Fujitsu. 13 I mean, if I go back to when I was an 14 Investigation Manager, the only time I can 15 recall obtaining logs was to demonstrate that 16 certain transactions had gone through the system 17 when they shouldn't have, things like that. 18 I don't actually remember any audit shortages 19 where I would have obtained logs. 20 Q. If we go back to POL00051793 and look at that 21 box a bit further down, please: 22 "Please could you obtain a standard 23 statement which confirms the Horizon system for 24 the above post office was functioning properly." 25 Can you see that? 95 1 A. I can, yes. 2 Q. Did you not think that in each and every case it 3 was a necessary element of a prosecution to 4 prove that? 5 A. Back then, no. 6 Q. Why not? 7 A. Because if Horizon hadn't been mentioned, or 8 there were no concerns by other either party 9 about Horizon, it, in my mind, I think, would 10 have been superfluous to the nitty-gritty of the 11 case. 12 Q. So you didn't consider it a necessary element of 13 the investigation, everything else being equal, 14 to prove that the system that produced the data 15 that you relied on was functioning properly? 16 A. That was the assumption, in much the same way 17 that, prior to Horizon, you had ECCO in Crown 18 Offices, Capture or Jackson I think, in sub post 19 office but I don't think we got any, as a matter 20 of course relevant logs from those systems. 21 Q. Was there any policy or guidance on this? 22 You're a criminal investigator, you're seeking 23 to prove a loss by computer-produced evidence. 24 You either do or don't need to produce some 25 evidence of system reliability and the reason 96 1 that you do need to produce evidence of system 2 reliability is as follows, and the reason you 3 don't need to prove system reliability is as 4 follows. 5 A. I don't recall a policy outlining that. 6 Q. Again, we can see, although the forms are 7 differently worded, in one case some such data 8 was to be sought and in another it was not. 9 A. Yeah. 10 Q. What accounted for the difference of approach? 11 Why might it be needed in some cases and not 12 others? 13 A. I mean, it partly depends on the case. I notice 14 one of the things there is barcode and car 15 licence details. So primarily that would be 16 nothing required but, if the case did relate 17 to -- 18 Q. I'm thinking more about the system integrity 19 box. 20 A. Oh, system integrity. I don't know, it's 21 whatever the Investigator indicated. 22 Q. Yes, that can come down. Thank you. 23 In paragraph 58 of your statement you say 24 that the Post Office was required to pay Fujitsu 25 for ARQ data over a certain amount of annual 97 1 requests. 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. I think you say that the figure was around 720 4 requests in 2006? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. Can we look, please, at FUJ00002033. Can we 7 look at page 16, please. 8 I've done that far too quickly. I should 9 show you the front page first. 10 This is a Fujitsu document dated 28 August 11 2006, headed "Security Management Service: 12 Service Description". Can we just please look 13 at page 16. If we scroll down, please, to 2.4, 14 it says this table, Table 2, defines the limits 15 on new and old data requests. 16 If we look at the box on the far right, the 17 limit per year shall be the first of the 18 following to be reached, 720 ARQs, yes -- 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. -- or 15,000 query days. Do you know what the 21 query days related to, do you remember? There 22 is, in fact, a definition in here but do you 23 remember? 24 A. I don't remember. 25 Q. Can we look, please, at FUJ00080107, and if we 98 1 just scroll down, please, for the date, 2008, 2 bottom right, December 2008. Scroll up to the 3 top, please. Same title "Security Management 4 Service: Service Description", and go to 5 page 17, please. 6 Similarly, in the box on the right-hand 7 side, 720 ARQs or 15,000 query days. 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. What happened when that limit was reached? 10 A. I think, if that limit was reached, we would 11 then have to have paid extra. So we paid for 12 these services as part of the contract. If we 13 went over those, I think we got charged extra. 14 Q. What was the amount that you were charged? Can 15 you remember? 16 A. I can't remember. 17 Q. Was it seen as a sum of a level that it acted as 18 a disincentive to seek ARQ data beyond the 19 limits? 20 A. I don't remember but, yes, possibly. 21 Q. We've heard evidence in the Inquiry, it was on 22 19 October this year, from Alison Bolsover who 23 was a Debt Recovery Manager; do you remember 24 her? 25 A. I do, yes. 99 1 Q. She said that it would have been worthwhile for 2 the Post Office to obtain ARQ data before 3 commencing action against subpostmasters, 4 ie before suspension or termination, and 5 certainly before the initiation of any criminal 6 proceedings but that the quotes that were being 7 given by Fujitsu for doing that were 8 astronomical. Do you remember that? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. Was cost essentially the reason that this data 11 was not sought as a matter of course, before 12 suspension and termination? 13 A. Cost was one of the factors. 14 Q. What were the others factors? 15 A. The other factors were whether we reached the 16 limit of requests, which would adversely impact 17 on investigations. So, for example, in previous 18 years, I think it was something like 350 a year 19 or 30-something requests a month, and I can 20 remember Investigators sending in requests and 21 say it was, I don't know, 20 October, we'd 22 already reached the maximum, so we used to ask 23 the Investigator "Can you wait ten days and 24 submit it on 1 November?" That way we could not 25 exceed our monthly requests. That was 100 1 alleviated more when it increased to 720 but, 2 yes, the costs were a part of that as well. 3 Q. At the time, did it feel like cost for the 4 provision of ARQ data was a significant issue 5 for the Post Office? 6 A. I would say yes, on the basis that costs and 7 money spent throughout the Post Office was not 8 frowned upon but they want to, you know, keep 9 a tight rein on every penny spent. 10 Q. The judge that heard the Group Litigation in 11 2019 found that audit data should have been 12 sought in every case where a subpostmaster was 13 possibly going to be suspended or have their 14 contract terminated, that the Post Office acted 15 unreasonably in failing to seek such data before 16 those events occurred, and that the commercial 17 arrangements between the Post Office and Fujitsu 18 did not justify the failure to seek the audit 19 data, which was the best evidence of what had 20 occurred and whether any bugs, errors or defects 21 were operative. 22 Was that something that you were aware of, 23 obviously not the judge's view, but the essence 24 of what he was to find when you were carrying 25 out this work? 101 1 A. No. 2 Q. Putting it another way, was there an awareness 3 by you and within your team that postmasters 4 were being suspended and their contracts 5 terminated without the full suite of data being 6 obtained first and that that was potentially 7 unfair? 8 A. I wasn't aware of that because I don't know what 9 Investigators would have requested Horizon data 10 and when. I believe it wasn't every single 11 case, so what you've said makes sense. 12 Q. You must have been aware of what Horizon data 13 Investigators sought and didn't seek because you 14 were the gateway through which it had to pass? 15 A. The Casework Team were but we never sort of said 16 "Right, there's been 100 cases this year or 17 we've had 100 ARQ requests, so that marries up", 18 you know. We didn't reconcile cases against 19 data requests like that. 20 Q. Was there a view ever expressed within your team 21 or a view that you heard that the Post Office 22 regarded Fujitsu as an organisation which saw 23 the Post Office as a cash cow? 24 A. I don't recall that but, personally, I thought 25 Fujitsu were doing quite well out of the 102 1 relationship. 2 Q. Specifically in relation to ARQ data? 3 A. Partly in relation to ARQ data. I mean, 4 I always found it a bit strange that we -- if it 5 came to the crunch, we had to pay a lot of money 6 for, in effect, our own data. But that's 7 contracts for you. But, also, I seem to 8 remember I think Fujitsu -- I might be wrong -- 9 got a penny for every transaction across the 10 Post Office Network, which is worth a lot of 11 money. 12 Q. Can we turn, please, to FUJ00152212. You can 13 see that this is a document, if we scroll to the 14 foot, please, dated 2009. If we go to the top, 15 please, "Management of the Litigation Support 16 Service". Were you aware of something within 17 Fujitsu called the Litigation Support Service? 18 A. No, I didn't -- I didn't view it as a group of 19 people, but just as the -- what they would 20 provide us from a litigation perspective. 21 Q. If you had to name people that provided 22 litigation support to the Post Office within 23 Fujitsu, who would you have named? 24 A. Penny Thomas, Peter Sewell, Gareth Jenkins and 25 Andy Dunks. 103 1 Q. Anyone else? 2 A. Not that I can recall, no. 3 Q. Can we go to paragraph 7.1, please, in this 4 document -- I'm sorry, my note omits the page 5 number -- under the heading "Additional 6 Litigation Support", Fujitsu's policy states: 7 "Where additional information to that 8 described in the standard litigation support 9 service is requested, RMGA shall view each 10 request on a case-by-case basis, and in 11 accordance with the Change Control Procedure." 12 Were you aware that, other than the standard 13 provision of ARQ data -- which we can see was 14 regulated by those two documents that we just 15 looked at, the 720 or 15,000 query days -- there 16 were litigation support services outside of 17 that. 18 A. I don't recall. Yeah, I don't recall. 19 Q. This document says that Fujitsu were going to 20 view each request on a case-by-case basis. 21 Would you understand that to refer to the 22 provision by Fujitsu of witness statements and 23 the attendance of witnesses at court? 24 A. Yes, on reading that. 25 Q. It refers to the Change Control Procedure. Do 104 1 you know what a Change Control Procedure is or 2 the Change Control Procedure was? 3 A. No. 4 Q. You didn't know about a formalised mechanism by 5 which a document was drawn up that contained 6 a specification for the service required, 7 provided limitations on the service to be 8 provided and gave a cost or cost assumptions for 9 the provision of the service, so it seemed like 10 an amendment to the contract, essentially, for 11 a bespoke activity? 12 A. I don't remember that but ... 13 Q. Did you ever receive any of those, or ask to 14 comment on any of those, a change control 15 notice? 16 A. I don't recall. I mean, I notice at the top of 17 this document Jane Owen from Security is 18 mentioned. 19 Q. Yes. 20 A. I'm not in there. The previous one you showed, 21 I think, Sue Lowther was the Post Office person, 22 and the one before that was dated August 2006 23 which was before I was -- 24 Q. You were doing something else then? 25 A. Yes. So I may have seen these documents or 105 1 equivalents but I don't recall them. 2 Q. I'm thinking more about the outcome of them, 3 namely if something outside the standard was 4 required, certainly Fujitsu thought that 5 a rather specialised or rarefied change control 6 notice procedure needed to be undertaken? 7 A. I don't recall. 8 Q. We haven't seen any evidence of that. What 9 we've seen is some emails being exchanged 10 between people asking for things. 11 A. Yeah. 12 Q. Can we look at paragraph 7.2, "Expert Witness 13 Evidence", Fujitsu's policy says: 14 "Expert, in-depth analysis detailed 'expert' 15 witness statements (as opposed to witness 16 statements of fact) are rarely required. 17 "However, in the event of such a request, 18 RMGA will endeavour to provide 'expert' 19 witnesses who are able to give more detailed and 20 specific evidence to support Post Office's 21 litigation activity. This 'expert' activity 22 shall be provided on a case-by-case basis and 23 shall be dealt with in accordance with the 24 Change Control Procedure. 25 "Again, RMGA shall use reasonable endeavours 106 1 to meet dates notified by Post Office limited 2 for the production of this material and 3 support." 4 First off, I think you can see that this 5 policy draws an explicit distinction or 6 difference between the provision of evidence of 7 fact and expert evidence. 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. Was that a distinction with which you were 10 familiar at the relevant time? 11 A. Not that I recall, no. 12 Q. Were you aware that Fujitsu drew a distinction 13 between the provision of evidence of fact and 14 expert evidence? 15 A. Not that I recall, no. 16 Q. Were you aware that -- I think I know the 17 answer -- that Fujitsu said that this 18 specialised change control procedure needed to 19 be brought into effect if expert evidence was 20 required? 21 A. I don't remember that. 22 Q. Was that distinction between expert evidence and 23 evidence of fact ever something that you saw in 24 practice in administering these ARQ requests or 25 other litigation support requests? 107 1 A. Not that I recall. If a statement was required, 2 Fujitsu would provide that statement. I didn't 3 see any distinction between what's written down 4 here. 5 Q. So when we saw that ARQ request you filled out 6 earlier, the Misra one, asking for a witness 7 statement which said that the system was working 8 properly at all material times -- I'm 9 summarising -- would you have seen that as 10 a witness statement of fact or expert evidence, 11 or an expert witness statement? 12 A. Hopefully both. 13 Q. Why both? 14 A. Because we would want the statement to say it 15 was working correctly, if it was working 16 correctly, and whoever provided the statement 17 would be the expert providing that view. 18 Q. Did you expect any such statement from Fujitsu 19 to contain an analysis to support a suggestion 20 that Horizon was functioning correctly or with 21 integrity? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. Did you expect any such statement to explain 24 what enquiries had been undertaken in order to 25 be able to make a statement that Horizon was 108 1 functioning correctly or with integrity? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. What analysis would you expect, as 4 an Investigator, to have been undertaken, if 5 any, in response to a request for a statement 6 which said that Horizon was functioning 7 correctly or with integrity? 8 A. If that was in the statement of the person from 9 Fujitsu, I would expect them to explain, not 10 that I would understand it, what they've 11 actually done to verify that the system is 12 working correctly. 13 Q. Putting it another way, was the request for ARQ 14 data seen by you and your colleagues to be 15 a request for Fujitsu to perform, essentially, 16 an administrative task, ie harvesting data from 17 the system and providing it to you, or was it 18 also a request for their qualitative analysis of 19 what that data showed? 20 A. I would say both, given their knowledge and 21 experience. Yeah, both. 22 Q. At the time that you were either 23 an Investigation Manager or you were working in 24 the Casework Team, or when you were working as 25 an Accredited Financial Investigator, so in any 109 1 of those roles, did you have the technical skill 2 and knowledge to be able to subject audit data, 3 ARQ data, to detailed technical analysis? 4 A. No. 5 Q. Did any Investigator have such expertise? 6 A. Some were more IT literate or au fait with 7 technical things than others. 8 Q. That's a slightly different issue. Did any of 9 them have sufficient skills or training to be 10 able to analyse the raw ARQ data? 11 A. I don't know. I don't think so. I mean, 12 I don't think we relied on colleagues for that 13 purpose. 14 Q. Were you aware of any colleagues doing that 15 function themselves, ie getting the data and 16 trying to read it, trying to analyse it, and 17 themselves come to a view as to what it showed? 18 A. I think the only person I can recollect who 19 would get involved to that depth would probably 20 be the Crime Risk Analyst, which was Helen Rose, 21 at the time. 22 Q. What time was that? 23 A. That would have been well between 2008 and 2010, 24 and probably earlier. 25 Q. Did she, in fact, carry out analysis of raw ARQ 110 1 data? 2 A. I don't know if it was raw ARQ data but I've 3 obviously seen a document where she's looked at 4 something and come up with the report or a view. 5 Q. Had you, as an Investigator, been trained to 6 analyse ARQ data? 7 A. No. 8 Q. Had you and your colleagues received any 9 training to spot any errors, bugs or defects 10 disclosed in ARQ data? 11 A. Errors, bugs or defects, no. I can't answer for 12 them but I don't think so. 13 Q. Would you have been able to identify within the 14 ARQ data whether sufficient information had been 15 provided to you, ie the dataset that you 16 received, to be able to judge whether or not 17 a transaction had been completed by the clerk or 18 an SPM, a subpostmaster, as opposed to being 19 a system-generated transaction? 20 A. In the cases I can recall that I dealt with 21 myself, I had received adequate information from 22 the transaction logs I'd requested. 23 Q. What does that mean? 24 A. Well, if I can give you an example of a case. 25 A subpostmaster has got stolen pension books and 111 1 he cashes five of them. Well, I used to get 2 transaction logs and all five would have been 3 cashed within the space of a minute, whereas 4 ordinarily, if they were genuine, you would have 5 customers queueing up and being paid out, and 6 you would see the time of the encashments might 7 be 7.00 in the morning, which was two hours 8 before the Post Office even opened. 9 So that's the extent to which I would get 10 transaction and event logs, to prove that stolen 11 foils had been cashed before the office is even 12 open. 13 Q. I think in one of your earlier answers you said 14 that you didn't know or understand the 15 distinction between what I've called standard 16 ARQ data and enhanced ARQ data. 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. The latter of which had the facility to show 19 that a transaction had been system generated 20 rather than SPM generated? 21 A. I wouldn't know. 22 Q. So I think it followed that you didn't have the 23 facility to be able to look at the ARQ data you 24 received and say "Ah, that's type A, not type B 25 data"? 112 1 A. Correct. I'd see the data, I wouldn't know 2 which of those streams it came from. 3 Q. Can I turn to address an issue concerning 4 problems identified with ARQ data between 2007 5 and 2009, which led to the proposal to make 6 changes to the standard, as it was called, 7 statement. You deal with this in paragraph 69 8 to 73 of your witness statement. 9 That document can come down from the screen. 10 So we're dealing here with a problem that 11 has been spotted by Fujitsu with the ARQ data 12 that's being produced and what was done about 13 it, okay? 14 A. Yeah. 15 Q. Can we start, please, with FUJ00155399. Can we 16 scroll down to Wendy Warham's email, so this is 17 7 January 2009 -- you're not on copy at this 18 time -- directly to Sue Lowther and David X 19 Gray, subject "Security Incident": 20 "Sue, I have left you a voicemail as I need 21 to update you on a recent issue that has 22 occurred and been resolved but does have some 23 short-term impacts. In summary the issue as 24 follows: 25 "In December 2007 ..." 113 1 Just note the time there, December 2007 -- 2 A. Yeah. 3 Q. -- and this email is being sent in January 2009: 4 "In December 2007, an occurrence was 5 reported in one office where a stock unit 6 rollover coincided with the end of day process 7 running. This led to a previously unseen 8 database lock where an administrative balancing 9 transaction failed to be written to the local 10 message store database. This generated 11 a generic and non-specific software error which 12 went unnoticed in the monitoring of events. 13 A financial imbalance was evident and was 14 subject to investigation by Fujitsu Service 15 Support Centre and Post Office Limited. The 16 financial imbalance has been resolved. 17 "A software [condition] was applied across 18 the estate in early November 2008 to ensure that 19 any such event generated would be monitored. 20 Testing of that correction has established that 21 the unmonitored error does not occur elsewhere 22 in the system. 23 "Impact 24 "We need to work with the Post Office 25 Limited to recheck the ARQs and reconfirm the 114 1 data integrity during the period of May 2007 to 2 November 2008 -- Penny will do this. 3 "We need to discuss how we disclose the 4 issue on the witness statements and we have some 5 words which may be appropriate -- both need to 6 discuss and agree the words. 7 "Identify which witness statement we have 8 supplied and are still awaiting court to confirm 9 whether or not the data provided was May '07 to 10 November '08 to (a) ensure events have been 11 checked and (b) to recall and replace witness 12 statements -- Post Office and Penny. 13 "Further action 14 "Automate the message store alerts on the 15 system so that no manual intervention is 16 required ... 17 "Education to ensure that this type of 18 incident is raised as a Major Incident in the 19 security stack so we can communicate and manage 20 this in accordance with incident timescales. 21 "Apologies that this has not been 22 communicated earlier but the review to security 23 incidents should improve this issue." 24 So, if we just scroll back up, please, this 25 is talking about an historic problem with 115 1 Horizon -- 2 A. Yeah. 3 Q. -- that may have had an impact from May 2007 4 onwards -- 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. -- which was discovered in 2007, December 2007, 7 yes? An occurrence was reported -- 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. -- in respect of which a change was made in 10 2008, yes? But witness statements had been 11 prepared for the purposes of criminal 12 investigations and criminal proceedings which 13 did not disclose this database lock, which 14 affected balancing. 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. Correct? Is that a fair summary of this? 17 A. I think so. 18 Q. This was quite a serious issue, wasn't it? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. Can we turn, please, to FUJ00155400. Can we 21 turn to page 3, please. If we just scroll, 22 thank you, it's your email of 7 January to Rob 23 Wilson; can you see that? 24 A. I can, yes. 25 Q. It's in relation to that same security incident, 116 1 and you say: 2 "Rob, 3 "In relation to the standard witness 4 statement Fujitsu provide: 5 "1) The following addition has been 6 inserted (see bullet point 11 on page 5). This 7 addition seems okay (it's just another check 8 that Fujitsu conduct -- to ensure the 'security 9 incident' doesn't occur again)." 10 The addition is: 11 "Windows Events generated by the counters 12 within the branch/time frame in question are 13 checked to ensure the counters were functioning 14 correctly." 15 Then 2: 16 "The following additional paragraphs have 17 been inserted, (page 7)." 18 If we just read that, the insertion: 19 "In December 2007, an occurrence was 20 reported in one office where a stock unit 21 rollover coincided with the end of day", 22 et cetera, et cetera. 23 You'll see that's drawn from the earlier 24 email we looked at; can you see that? 25 A. Yes. 117 1 Q. So that was proposed to be inserted in the 2 standard Fujitsu witness statement, ie revealing 3 to people that there was a system fault which 4 affected balancing transactions and which had 5 not been spotted at the time. You say: 6 "I personally do not see the need for these. 7 If there are no problems identified with the 8 data relating to the case in question. Why 9 inform anyone about a problem we have had within 10 the network but possibly at one branch, if it 11 bears no relation or relevance." 12 Why did you form that view? 13 A. Because at the time, if it didn't impact on post 14 offices once Fujitsu had done their 15 investigations, what was the point of putting it 16 into a witness statement? 17 Q. Do you not agree that the exchange that we'd 18 looked at alerted you to the fact that there 19 could be bugs in the Horizon system, which 20 impacted on financial integrity, including the 21 integrity of audit data and they weren't picked 22 up by the system? 23 A. Again, I can't put myself back there but I've 24 mentioned previously that all computer systems 25 have issues. I thought -- I presume at the time 118 1 I thought this was a localised issue that had 2 been flagged up, so I looked at the details, as 3 far as I could understand them, and my view is 4 communicated to Rob Wilson, the Head of Criminal 5 Law. 6 Q. But surely, Mr Posnett, you realise that this 7 wasn't concerning because it affected or 8 potentially affected a small number of branches; 9 the concern was it was an unseen that meant that 10 part of a balancing transaction had not been 11 recorded in the local message store and 12 Fujitsu's systems had not picked it up? 13 A. I can only repeat what I've just said. 14 Q. Do you agree, on reflection, that that's 15 a serious issue, that not only there's 16 a problem, all computer systems have problems, 17 but the Fujitsu systems to identify it at the 18 time did not identify it at the time? 19 A. In hindsight, given what we know now, I would 20 change that paragraph. 21 Q. But even without what we know now, reflecting on 22 it, is it not a considerable concern that what's 23 described as a "previously unseen" database lock 24 had operated without the safety nets identifying 25 it? 119 1 A. I can any say that what I've written there 2 represented my personal view at the time, and 3 that's what I communicated to Rob Wilson, for 4 his stance on it. 5 Q. Putting it another way, it revealed that there 6 could be unseen bugs in Horizon? 7 A. Yes, but I didn't look at that -- I saw that as 8 one localised problem. 9 Q. But why? 10 A. Well, perhaps, at the time, that's the only 11 particular problem that's been referred to me. 12 I didn't look at that and think, "Oh, there's 13 bugs all over the place". 14 Q. I'm not suggesting that it meant there are bugs 15 all over the place. What it meant was that 16 Horizon was a system that could have bugs that 17 affected financial integrity and balancing and 18 the system did not reveal itself to have them. 19 A. I understand that but, again, I can't put myself 20 back there, but to me it reads as though it was 21 a one-off issue that had been flagged up to me, 22 and I've given my view and Rob Wilson has given 23 his view. 24 MR BEER: Thank you. 25 We'll end it there, sir. I think we'll have 120 1 to pick that up tomorrow. 2 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: All right. So we begin again at 3 10.00 tomorrow. I'm sorry that your evidence 4 has been truncated in this way, Mr Posnett, but, 5 I'm sorry, it's unavoidable this afternoon. 6 I don't suppose you'll want to, but if you 7 do want to talk about your evidence this 8 evening, resist the temptation. All right? 9 A. Yes, sir. 10 MR BEER: Thank you very much, sir. 10.00 tomorrow. 11 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes. 12 (2.28 pm) 13 (The hearing adjourned until 10.00 am 14 the following day) 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 121 I N D E X DAVID POSNETT (sworn) .........................1 Questioned by MR BEER .........................1 122