

To: Jenkins Gareth G[REDACTED] GRO Memberby Bill[REDACTED] GRO
Cc: Davidson James[REDACTED] GRO
From: Newsome Pete[O=EXCHANGE/OU=ADMINGROUP1/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=BLAGG-NEWSOMEPE]
Sent: Tue 6/4/2013 10:21:08 AM (UTC)
Subject: FW: Urgent & In Confidence: Bracknell Enquiry Clarity From Second Sight
[SR005 V2.doc](#)

Gareth/Bill


From the discussion yesterday there are 2 things that come to mind:

- This may have been in the test system only as it was in the basement – Can we show there was no access to a live system
- Is the premise in the ops manual correct and could the person in the basement be able to make the change
- Would this person be PO or Fujitsu?

Any other questions we need to answer.

Pete

Pete Newsome
Business Change Manager
Post Office Account, Fujitsu UK&I
Tel: [REDACTED] GRO
E-Mail: [REDACTED] GRO
Web: <http://uk.fujitsu.com>

 Please consider the environment - do you really need to print this email?

From: [REDACTED] GRO [REDACTED] GRO
Sent: 04 June 2013 11:11
To: Newsome Pete
Subject: FW: Urgent & In Confidence: Bracknell Enquiry Clarity From Second Sight
Importance: High
Sensitivity: Confidential

Pete Newsome
Business Change Manager
Fujitsu
Liaising with Post Office Ltd
Mob: [REDACTED] GRO
Email: [REDACTED] GRO [REDACTED] GRO

From: Steve Allchorn
Sent: 04 June 2013 10:26
To: Pete Newsome; gareth.jenkins@fujitsu.com [REDACTED] GRO
Cc: Simon Baker; Lesley J Sewell
Subject: Urgent & In Confidence: Bracknell Enquiry Clarity From Second Sight

Pete/Gareth

I have now received a response from Ian Henderson (Second Sight) clarifying the specific line of enquiry in their current investigations into the POL Bracknell site.

Ian's specific questions are listed in his email below. They primarily concentrate on Horizon system data access capabilities and controls rather than procedures. To provide greater context, also attached is the spot review that outlines the specific allegation.

As a matter of urgency, could you provide a response to each of Ian's points and feed these back to me asap. I suggest your responses are clear paragraphed statements rather than a provision of further information via attachments etc.


I will then collate and formally feedback to Ian.


Please also note the potential that a further line of questions may be created from Second Sight's ongoing review of the information they have recently received.

Thanks as always for your co-operation.


Steve Allchorn | IT & Change Lead CPMO Manager


 2nd Flr, Central Wing, 148 Old Street, LONDON, EC1V 9HQ

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From: Ian Henderson

Sent: 03 June 2013 17:36

To: Steve Allchorn

Cc: Simon Baker; 'Ron Warmington'

Subject: RE: Follow up from call

Sensitivity: Confidential

Steve

I'm sorry for the delay in replying. There's a lot going on at the moment....

I attach a copy of Spot Review 5 which describes the allegations that have been made.

The emails that have been forwarded to you appear to describe matters that may be relevant to the allegation. Please note that we are primarily interested in finding out the following:

1. What capabilities did the POL Bracknell team have? (As far as TC or Rem Out type transactions or Journal adjustments are concerned)
2. What were the PHYSICAL or LOGICAL controls over their use of the systems available to them?
3. What audit trail is available to show the extent that they posted TC or Rem Out type transactions, or Journal adjustments?
4. Can we rely on the COMPLETENESS of the audit trail? i.e. does it record all transactions or just transactions meeting certain criteria? Is it protected from user manipulation?
5. What USER ID was used if TC type transactions or journal adjustments were posted?
6. Could the POL Bracknell team log on with either super user or SMPR credentials?
7. How would TC, Rem Out or Journal Adjustment type transactions executed by the POL Bracknell team be seen by SMPR of Branches affected by those actions?

There are probably other questions / issues that will arise after you have had a preliminary look at this.

Please note that we're not really interested in what the procedures manual says about any of this. We need to look at whether it would be possible for a rogue employee to do what is alleged and what log files would be generated to record that activity. Please note that I have now been provided with a second batch of employee email and I may find other emails that are potentially relevant to this matter.

Thank you for your help with this

With best wishes

Ian R Henderson CCE CISA FCA
Advanced Forensics - London, UK

Forensic computing expert witness and electronic disclosure specialist

UK Mobile: [GRO]

Email: [GRO] [GRO]

Website: <http://advancedforensics.com>

LinkedIn: [GRO]

Twitter: [GRO]

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From: Steve Allchorn [GRO]

Sent: 30 May 2013 12:43

To: Ian Henderson [GRO]

Subject: FW: Follow up from call

Sensitivity: Confidential

Hi Ian

I've been forwarded the email stream below however having not been party to prior conversations or spoken to Susan as she is formally off-work I just need to understand the context of the enquiry as the email pdf's attached are a collection of individual instances rather than a clear line.

My perception of what I think you need is;


- 1) A clear documentation/articulation of the end-to-end Transaction Corrections process, how it is applied and the sign-off authorities that are in place (e.g. subpostmaster acceptance etc.).
- 2) An understanding of how the attached email instances relate to that process and authorities.


Let me know if I'm on the right lines or not.

Thanks

Steve Allchorn | IT & Change Lead CPMO Manager

 2nd Flr, Central Wing, 148 Old Street, LONDON, EC1V 9HQ

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From: Susan Crichton
Sent: 28 May 2013 15:00
To: Steve Allchorn
Cc: Alwen Lyons
Subject: FW: Follow up from call
Sensitivity: Confidential

Steve – copy of some of the emails as extracted by Ian Henderson, please can you forward to FJ as appropriate.

Susan

From: Ian Henderson [GRO]
Sent: 28 May 2013 09:35
To: Susan Crichton; Alwen Lyons
Cc: rwarming@ [GRO]
Subject: RE: Follow up from call
Sensitivity: Confidential

Susan

I attach 11 emails from our preliminary review of the Bracknell data. Please note that I only received the second batch of Bracknell data on Friday and it will take 3 or 4 days to process.

With best wishes

Ian R Henderson CCE CISA FCA
Advanced Forensics - London, UK

Forensic computing expert witness and electronic disclosure specialist

UK Mobile: [GRO]

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Website: <http://advancedforensics.com>

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From: Susan Crichton [GRO]
Sent: 24 May 2013 17:54
To: [GRO] [GRO] Alwen Lyons
Cc: [GRO] [GRO]
Subject: Re: Follow up from call

Sensitivity: Confidential

Ian - thanks could you also send the details of the relevant emails to help us move forward this work next week.

Thanks

Susan

From: Ian Henderson [GRO]
Sent: Friday, May 24, 2013 09:35 AM
To: Alwen Lyons; Susan Crichton
Cc: 'Ron Warmington' [GRO]
Subject: Follow up from call

As requested, please find attached the letter from JA to JFSA received by us on 19 April

I also attach the Rudkin Spot Review sent to POL on 10 May

With best wishes

Ian R Henderson CCE CISA FCA
Advanced Forensics - London, UK

Forensic computing expert witness and electronic disclosure specialist

UK Mobile: [GRO]

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