



Debt & Losses Reduction

FSC Process Flows



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1 Teams

1.1 Personal Banking, Cash & Bureau

Background- Personal Banking

Receive and log bank enquiries on dynamics to resolve customer enquiries regarding cash and cheque deposits. Depending on the result, Transaction corrections are occasionally issued to either debit the office or credit the bank (via settlement email) or vice versa.

Link

Card transactions processed in branch may result in a miskey. The Branch report the loss to NBSC who send an enquiry form to the Team to process an enquiry. If the miskey fits into the criteria for investigation, the bank is notified and we wait for a response. If the bank are successful in retrieving the money, they notify the Team who then inform Cashiers the money is expected and issue a TC to branch when confirmation comes though.

If the Bank is unsuccessful in retrieving the funds, the Branch stand the loss.

Santander

Card transactions processed in branch may result in a miskey. The Branch report the loss to NBSC who send an enquiry form to the Team to process an enquiry. If the miskey fits into the criteria for investigation, the bank is notified and we wait for a response. If the bank are successful in retrieving the money, they notify the Team who then complete the transaction on settlements and issue a TC to Branch.

If the Bank is unsuccessful in retrieving the funds, the Branch stand the loss.

Cash and Bureau


Work on GL open items, investigating the reason for an open item remaining in the GL.

Cash in Pouches and Cash in Transit, also Bureau in pouches and Bureau in Transit – Working with the Cash Centre to issue TC's on their behalf for missing pouches, rejected pouches and pouches which are stuck following failure of the scanning card.

Glossary of Control Owners

Job Title	Control Owner
FSC Team Leader	Sarah Parkes

TC - PERSONAL BANKING



Activity - Personal Banking

Chronological steps in the process:

1. Incoming General inquiry – fax / e-mail (*Personal Banking Admin*)
2. *Ensure all emails are processed in Dynamics on a daily basis. If enquiry originates from a Partner Bank, create a case in dynamics.*
3. SLA turnaround time is 12 days excluding weekends and bank holidays (*Personal Banking Admin*)
4. *2.5x Personal Banking Admin Team who process enquiries working oldest to newest.*
5. Identify nature of query (*Personal Banking Admin*)
6. Confirm transaction in CREDENCE system (today optional but make mandatory) (*Personal Banking Admin*)
7. Identify “session number” (Transaction number) in CREDENCE (*Personal Banking Admin*)
8. Send correct information to the bank to complete underpayment or permission for overpayment. If required issue TC to Branch
9. Fill in Personal Banking Settlement Breakdown sheet (UP or OP) (*Personal Banking Admin*)
10. Send (e-mail) “Settlement team for processing in POLSAP (*Personal Banking Admin*)
11. If a TC is required (very few) POSTMASTER checks HORIZON for new TC (*Branch*)
12. POSTMASTER accepts or rejects TC (*Branch*). *Appeal process is in place.*
13. POSTMASTER sign off end of month Trading statement (Roll over) (*Branch*)
14. POSTMASTER roll over in HORIZON (system prevents roll over if any pending TC's) (*Branch*)
15. End

Please note that IPSL is now Parseq, having moved in September 2018. Cheque deposit enquiries, they forgot to put In a process so we have an Interim process where we send BCV request to the Project (Simon Woods) and he sends onto Barclays to process, there is no SLA for them to come back to us.

Control(s): TC15.01

Risk: Personal banking queries are not investigated in a timely manner, resulting in SLA being missed (12 days - excluding weekends and bank holidays)

Control objective: To ensure timely monitoring and investigation of open items

Frequency: Daily

Control owner: FSC Team Leader (Sarah Parkes)

Control description: A "New Bank enquiry" spreadsheet is maintained on SharePoint with the status of all open queries. A daily review is performed to identify aged items on the list and these are flagged for further investigation as a priority, ensuring the 12 day (excluding weekends and bank holidays) SLA deadline is met in all cases.

Control(s): TC15.02

Risk: Customer fraudulently queries a banking transaction resulting in incorrect transaction correction

Control objective: To ensure open enquiries are investigated prior to transaction correction being processed

Frequency: Daily

Control owner: FSC Operations Manager (Sarah Parkes)

Control description: On a daily basis the personal banking team allocate queries amongst team and run a credence report for all new open enquiries, in order to confirm transaction occurred. The results of investigation are recorded in "New Bank enquiry" spreadsheet to evidence review process.



Control(s): C4.9.a.2 & C4.9.a.3

Risk: Balance sheet accounts are not reviewed resulting in error and misstatement or fraud

Control objective: To ensure that all BS accounts are reconciled and analysed and have evidence of balance justification

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Operations Manager(s)

Control description: "All BS accounts within FSC area are reconciled at month end by the relevant Admin team members. Any open items are explained / annotated by the Admin team member and the reconciliation is sent to respective FSC Team Managers for review and approval. The FSC Team Manager(s) follows up any unreconciled/unexplained items with the respective Admin team member and once satisfied the reconciliation is approved (sign and dated as evidence) and forwarded to the FSC Operations Manager for final review and approval. The FSC Operations Manager reviews and queries where applicable with the FSC Team Manager(s) and sends/signs as evidence of final approval. The reconciliation(s) with approvals and any supporting documentation is dated, stored/printed and filed on Sharepoint."



Control(s): C4.9.a.5 & C4.9.a.6

Risk: Build-up of aged balances - unapproved aged balances of affected account resulting in loss of reputation to PostOffice.

Control objective: To ensure close monitoring of aged balances and prevent where possible any aged build-up of accounts affected.

Frequency: Weekly


Control owner: FSC Operations Manager(s)

Control description: "On a weekly basis the FSC Operations Manager performs an ageing analysis of all open items matching account per product area. The main objective is to prevent wherever possible any open item(s) falling into an aged (>3 months) category.

The respective Team Managers explains the analysis for their product area at the weekly Team Operational meeting. Open items are prioritised by highest value, date and/or other steer from Management.

Agreed actions are followed up with respective FSC Team Managers.

1.1.1.1 Online Banking – LINK



Chronological steps in the process:

1. Debit Card holder does either a cash deposit / (cheque deposit is dealt with Cheque team) or cash withdrawal in a branch, *(Branch)*
2. Branch (attempts) to enter transaction into HORIZON (either cash route or Cheque), *(Branch)*
3. Branch prints authorization receipts from HORIZON and gives this to the customer, *(Branch)*
4. Branch log mistake/transaction with NBSC (Network Business Support Centre), *(NBSC)*
5. NBSC (help line for Postmaster - part of POL) send to e-mail box "Linkenquiries" **GRO** (restricted access) a "Mis-key" form detailing the nature of the error, *(NBSC)*
6. Check and verifies information on Mis-key form in TESQA system (shows all transactions made by card in a Branch), *(Personal Banking Team)*
7. Determine error and amend the mis-key form where applicable, *(Personal Banking Team)*
8. Log case in "Link Mis-key yyyy" spreadsheet (SharePoint and restricted to team access), this log contains all enquires coming from various sources, *(Personal Banking Team)*
9. E-mail mis-key form from "Linkenquiries" **GRO** box to Bank (whichever was involved in the transaction) advising as per electronic copy of mis-key form (stored in restricted SharePoint) (no confirmation is received back from Bank source), *(Personal Banking Team)*
10. Receive advise from POL Treasury that they have received amount with reference number, *(Personal Banking Team)*
11. Check reference number and identify Open Case, *(Personal Banking Team)*
12. Issue TC in POLSAP – gives TC reference number – Vendor account, *(Personal Banking Team)*
13. Update "Link Mis-key yyyy" spreadsheet with TC reference number and date, *(Personal Banking Team)*
14. Branch accepts TC in HORIZON, *(Branch)*
15. Transaction error clears in POLSAP
16. End

Control(s): TC13.01

Risk: Miskey's in relation to branch withdrawal or deposit are not investigated in a timely manner

Control objective: Monitor errors and ensure timely review

Frequency: As required

Control owner: FSC Team Manager (Sarah Parkes)

Control description: A "Link Mis-key yyyy" spreadsheet is maintained on SharePoint with the status of all open queries. This is updated as open items are worked on. A weekly review is performed to identify aged items on the list that require expediting / follow up.

Control(s): TC13.02

Risk: Miskey's in relation to branch withdrawal or deposit are not agreed with third party prior to correction, resulting in subsequent variances

Control objective: To ensure transaction corrections are confirmed with third party prior to processing

Frequency: As required

Control owner: FSC Team Manager (Sarah Parkes)

Control description: When a miskey resolution is concluded, a Miskey Form (MF) is sent to the relevant bank for them to investigate and resolve. Prior to issuing a TC, fund receipts from relevant bank are compared to MF details (stored in SharePoint file). SharePoint file is updated to record the tie through.



Control(s): C4.9.a.2 & C4.9.a.3

Risk: Balance sheet accounts are not reviewed resulting in error and misstatement or fraud

Control objective: To ensure that all BS accounts are reconciled and analysed and have evidence of balance justification

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Operations Manager(s)

Control description: "All BS accounts within FSC area are reconciled at month end by the relevant Admin team members. Any open items are explained / annotated by the Admin team member and the reconciliation is sent to respective FSC Team Managers for review and approval. The FSC Team Manager(s) follows up any unreconciled/unexplained items with the respective Admin team member and once satisfied the reconciliation is approved (sign and dated as evidence) and forwarded to the FSC Operations Manager for final review and approval. The FSC Operations Manager reviews and queries where applicable with the FSC Team Manager(s) and sends/signs as evidence of final approval. The reconciliation(s) with approvals and any supporting documentation is dated, stored/printed and filed on SharePoint."



Control(s): C4.9.a.5 & C4.9.a.6

Risk: Build-up of aged balances - unapproved aged balances of affected account resulting in loss of reputation to Post Office.

Control objective: To ensure close monitoring of aged balances and prevent where possible any aged build-up of accounts affected.

Frequency: Weekly

Control owner: FSC Operations Manager(s)


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The respective Team Managers explains the analysis for their product area at the weekly Team Operational meeting. Open items are prioritised by highest value, date and/or other steer from Management.


Agreed actions are followed up with respective FSC Team Managers.

The FSC Operations Manager signs and dates the analysis and minutes from meeting with any other supporting documentation and retain as evidence."


Link Enquiry Process – Branch Enquiry Customer Unaware



Link Enquiry Process – POCA Enquiry




Link Enquiry Process – FI Originated



(This may have been updated but unable to obtain or find out if a newer copy exists via Greg Lewis)

1.1.2 Personal Banking Santander- Branch Query




Activity - Santander Online Banking – part1**Chronological steps in the process:****Part 1 covers an error done in Branch and where Branch contacts Network Support centre regarding own mistake (mis key):**

1. A Santander Customer does either a cash deposit or cash withdrawal in a PostOffice branch (*Customer*)
2. Branch enters transaction into HORIZON (*Branch*)
3. Branch issues receipts (generated via HORIZON) (*Branch*)
4. Mistake made in Branch? (*Branch*)
5. Branch log mistake/transaction with NBSC (Network Business Support Centre) (*Branch*)
6. NBSC send to “network Banking mail” (restricted access) box a “Mis-key” form detailing the nature of the error (*NBSC*)
7. Check and verifies information on Mis-key form in TESQA system (shows all transactions made by card in a Branch), (*Agent Accounting & Santander banking*)
8. Determine error and amend the mis-key form where applicable and add the PAN (cust. long card number – only visible in TESQA system) + the action required by Santander, (*Agent Accounting & Santander banking*)
9. Log case in “Santander NWB enquiries” spreadsheet (SharePoint and restricted to team access), (*Agent Accounting & Santander banking*)
10. E-mail mis-key form from “network Banking mail” box to Santander advising as per electronic copy of mis-key form (stored in restricted SharePoint), (*Agent Accounting & Santander banking*)
11. Receive Confirmation e-mail from Santander of adjusted mis-keys, (*Agent Accounting & Santander banking*)
12. Retrieve the hard copies of mis-key for cases being adjusted as per Santander e-mail, and verify the action required on the hardcopy with the adjustment advise as per Santander e-mail, (*Agent Accounting & Santander banking*)
13. Adjust the “Santander NWB enquiries” log with the adjustment amount and settlement date (always today + 1 business day), (*Agent Accounting & Santander banking*)
14. Bring hardcopies of mis-key forms for cases above to the Settlement team, (*Agent Accounting & Santander banking*)
15. Settlement team adjust the Santander settlement and e-mail Santander with overall Settlement +/- any adjustments as per above and CC in Shaun., (*Settlement team*)
16. Checks that e-mail from Settlement team to Santander includes all transaction as per requested (“Santander NWB enquiries” log vs. Settlement teams spreadsheet “Network Banking Adjustment Schedule”, (*Agent Accounting & Santander banking*)
17. Check POLSAP if discrepancy has been declared (Branch should declare discrepancy), (*Agent Accounting & Santander banking*)
18. If discrepancy has been declared and shows in POLSAP then issue a TC, (*Agent Accounting & Santander banking*)
19. If POLSAP does not show that the discrepancy has been declared contact the Branch and advise that a discrepancy declaration must be made before a TC can be issued., (*Agent Accounting & Santander banking*)
20. End



1.1.3

Personal Banking Santander- Santander Query



Santander mickeys (Shaun Wood) is now within Sarah Parkes team merged with Link duty.

Activity - Santander Online Banking – part 2

Chronological steps in the process:

Part 2 covers where a Santander customer contact and raise a query with Santander Bank:

1. Customer raise a query with Santander (*Customer*)
2. Log query and e-mail case to “network Banking e-mail” (*Santander*)
3. Retrieve query, save to SharePoint and verify transaction is in TESQA, (*Agent Accounting & Santander banking*)
4. Verify transaction in CREDENCE and identify the Stock Unit (COUNTER) the transaction was performed from, (*Agent Accounting & Santander banking*)
5. Verify transaction in POLSAP to identify where a discrepancy has been declared, (*Agent Accounting & Santander banking*)
6. Verify transaction in HORICE to identify “cash declarations” made in branch for +/- dates near the transaction date as per enquiry form/ CREDENCE, (*Agent Accounting & Santander banking*), access to HORICE is limited to Gill Hoyland)
7. Call the Branch and explain case, (*Agent Accounting & Santander banking*)
8. Branch investigates case and verifies, a) surplus, b)shortage, c) Branch balanced, (*Branch*)
9. Feedback to Agent Accounting & Santander banking a, b or c as per above, (*Branch*)
10. Validate information from Branch in HORICE, (*Agent Accounting & Santander banking*)
11. Log case in “Santander NWB enquiries” spreadsheet (SharePoint and restricted to team access), (*Agent Accounting & Santander banking*)
12. Update hardcopy (as per 3) of case for Settlement use and electronic copy of case for Santander use, (*Agent Accounting & Santander banking*)
13. e-mail case to Santander – (electronic copy), (*Agent Accounting & Santander banking*)
14. e-mail action taken to “network Banking e-mail” with case reference (*Santander*)
15. Retrieve hardcopy of case and Update “Santander NWB enquiries” with Amount and Settlement date (next WD), (*Agent Accounting & Santander banking*)
16. Send hardcopies to Settlement team, (*Agent Accounting & Santander banking*)
17. Settlement team CC in *Agent Accounting & Santander banking* in e-mail settlement to Santander, (Settlement team)
18. Issue TC (via file automatic Transaction Corrections), (*Agent Accounting & Santander banking*)
19. Branch accept TC, (*Branch*)
20. End.

1.1.4 Personal Banking Manual

Risk & Control Santander Online Banking part 1 & 2

Control(s): C4.9.a.7

Risk: SLA's are not met resulting in penalty and/or incurred loss to POL and/or reputational damage

Control objective: To ensure that all SLA's between POL and third party are met.

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: Dawn Phillips

Control description: To ensure timely responses to Santander, all queries are logged in spreadsheet log "Santander NWB enquiries" with date of received and responded to Santander and stored on SharePoint with restricted access. Queries from Santander Bank to POL are subject to a SLA of 10 Business day's turnaround time for responses to Santander. To prevent any queries from Santander falling outside the SLA timeframe, the Team Leader Agent Accounting & Santander banking monitors and where applicable takes action on a weekly basis to ensure POL meets the SLA and/or explains any missed SLAs. On a monthly basis the Team Leader Agent Accounting & Santander banking signs, dates and uploads the log into TrAction.

Control(s): TC18.01

Risk: Errors for EBUF's are not agreed with third party prior to settlement, resulting in subsequent issues transaction correction, resulting in subsequent variances

Control objective: Agree correction with third party

Frequency: Weekly

Control owner: FSC Operations Manager (Jackie Whitham)

Control description: On a weekly basis a "RIZ 1" report is run, and compared to the Riz 3 report from Santander, received 10 days after the event. Variances are pulled together on a "Provcash" report and emailed to Santander on Monday. On Wednesday Santander email a response to FSC to confirm the balance to be settled. On Thursday the balance is settled with Santander in line with the Provcash confirmation.

Control(s): TC18.02

Risk: Miskey transaction corrections in relation to Santander branch withdrawal or deposit by customers are not agreed with third party prior to issuing transaction correction, resulting in subsequent variances

Control objective: To ensure transaction corrections are confirmed with third party prior to processing

Frequency: As required

Control owner: FSC Operations Manager (Dawn Phillips)

Control description: Agreement with third party: When a miskey resolution is concluded, a "Miskey Form" is sent to Santander for them to review. An email confirmation of the required adjustment is sent by Santander to Agent Accounting and Santander Banking Team prior to the case being fully resolved and processed.

Control(s): TC18.03

Risk: Incomplete or inaccurate transaction corrections are processed in relation to Santander branch withdrawal or deposit by customers, resulting in subsequent variances

Control objective: To ensure transaction corrections are confirmed with third party prior to processing and corrections are reviewed internally

Frequency: As required

Control owner: FSC Operations Manager (Dawn Phillips)

Control description: Review of corrections: When settlement confirmation for a miskey error is received from Santander, the Settlement Team (ST) email a "Network banking adjustments schedule" to Santander and copy in the Agent accounting and Santander banking team (AASBT), listing all corrections to be made for the day. The AASBT compare the schedule to the "Santander NWB Queries" log in order to verify completeness and accuracy of all corrections required. Evidence of review retained.



Control(s): C4.9.a.2 & C4.9.a.3

1.2 Cash & Bureau

Background

Cash rems from branch (POLSAP G/L acc. 553002 Cash in transit-notes and coin collect from branches)

Cash Control team

Purpose of process: (please fill in a paragraph)


The overall purpose is to send physical cash from Branch to central Postoffice as a Branch should only have a certain amount of cash in the Branch.


POLSAP GL accounts:

- 551100 – Cash held at branch
- 551200 – Cash (GBP) in pouches at branch
- 553002 – Cash (GBP) in transit from branch
- 553102 – Bureau (All) in transit from branch
- 552117 – Bureau (EUR) in pouches at branch
- 552118 – Bureau (USD) in pouches at branch
- 552119 – Bureau (Other) in pouches at branch
- 531222 – Shortages in Bureau (All) received at cash centre
- 539103 – Surplus in Bureau (All) received at cash centre
- 551000 – Cash held at cash centre
- 553001 – Cash (GBP) in transit from cash centre (CC) to branch
- 553101 - Bureau (All) in transit from cash centre (CC) to branch
- 539106/539202/539210/629507/629506/629510/629504/629503 – specific variance accounts when cash counted

Glossary of Control Owners

Job Title	Control Owner
FSC Team Leader	Gillian Hoyland & Sarah Parkes
Cash Centre Manager	Bryan Flynn





Chronological steps in the process (Branch to CC):

1. Branch performs 3 step process to move cash from till to Pouch:
 - a) bundles up cash in POUCHES for shipment to Post Office cash centre (*Branch*)
 - b) scan the pouch barcode in Horizon, recording the cash on Horizon as "Cash in Pouch", sub level "Packed" (551100 to 551200)
 - c) Horizon produces 2 receipts, 1 for the pouch and 1 for the branch
2. Move pouch from "Packed" to "InSack" on Horizon (*Branch*)
3. Branch prints collection receipt, shows all pouches marked as "InSack" on Horizon.
4. CVIT scan ACC card on Horizon (or enter code), authorising collection. Triggers all "InSack" cash to move from 551200 to 553002. (*Courier CVIT*)
5. Branch place pouch in iBox (£26k max per time), viewed by CVIT.
6. CVIT sign the collection receipt next to the pouch.
7. CVIT take the cash to the van, scan the pouch on transtrack and deposit in the security box.
8. Section 5, 6 and 7 repeated for each pouch.
9. Pouch deposited at cash centre and scanned into POLSAP as receipted.
10. Processing in Cash Centre – (via surveillance cameras) – match up in POLSAP by POUCH number (POLSAP will reflect the 40 trans. Coming from Horizon and Cash centre match this per assignment with a 50 entry in POLSAP) (*Cash Processing Centre*)
11. To investigate what is outstanding run report GL Open Item Ageing Report (no variant) (classified as aged if > 3 months old, however the report shows all periods. (*Cash Control Team*)
12. Select from Ageing report own item as per Branch Code and run report GL Acc Line Item Display (*Cash Control Team*)
13. Run report in POLSAP GL Acc Line Item Display with variant. (Cash Control team)
14. Investigate and error resolution : (*Cash Control Team*)
 - a. Resolution can be resolved within Cash Control Team
 - b. Resolution needs a Transaction Correction to the Branch (TC issued from Cash Control Team)
15. Where applicable TC is issued in POLSAP (*Cash Control Team*)
16. Branch picks up the TC in Horizon and Accepts or Rejects (*Branch*)
17. Branch accepts in HORIZON and this triggers the 50 transaction in POLSAP (*Branch*)

19. Next day the error transaction will disappear from GL Open Item Ageing Report (*System*)
20. If rejected error resolution and where applicable escalation etc. resulting in acceptance. (*Cash Control Team*)
21. On a monthly basis (usually at month end) perform a probity (balance sheet showing all outstanding for the period) and reconciliation (breakdown, account specification with explanations) and this is being sent to Line Manager Dawn Wall who checks, keeps and files. (*Cash Control Team Lead*)

Chronological steps in the process (CC to Branch):

- 1) Cash Centre bag cash into Pouch
- 2) Pouch scanned when collected by CVIT
- 3) Cash delivered to branch and ACC card scanned at branch (triggering cash transfer)
- 4) Cash counted into till by Postmaster
- 5) Variance arises when value entered into Horizon by Postmaster (differs to Pouch value)
- 6) Auto TC issued to correct variances
- 7) Ageing review performed at month end and balances aged 3+ months investigated.

Risk & Control BUREAU & CASH REMS FROM BRANCH

Control(s): CC15.1

Risk: Classification of cash balances between cash centre and network is incorrect

Control objective: Identify cash lost or delayed in transit

Frequency: Daily

Control owner: Cash Centre Manager (Bryan Flynn)

Control description: On a daily basis a review is performed to identify pouches from cash centre to branch, and vice versa, which have been in transit for one week or more. All pouches identified are investigated to identify why the cash has not been rem'd in or out appropriately. Mitigating circumstances are documented where necessary, with follow up occurring for all other instances.

Control(s): CC15.2

Risk: Cash variances between branch and cash centre are incorrectly written off, resulting in fraudulent activity not being identified

Control objective: Ensure write-offs are fully investigated prior to processing

Frequency: As required

Control owner: Cash Centre Manager (Bryan Flynn)

Control description: Branches are advised of all discrepancies as they arise and have a week to dispute these. If the branch choose to dispute, and on investigation the cash centre is deemed liable, the balance will be written off subject to relevant authorisation within cash centre.

Control(s): CC15.3

Risk: Cash variances between branch and cash centre are incorrectly written off, resulting in fraudulent activity not being identified

Control objective: Ensure write-offs are fully investigated prior to processing

Frequency: Weekly

Control owner: Cash Centre Manager (Bryan Flynn)

Control description: On a weekly basis, a transaction report is run identifying all cash centre write offs. A write off form is produced for each cash centre based on the downloads. The write off form is reviewed to check for reasonableness of postings with follow up occurring for any unusual activity. The write off forms are subsequently forwarded to cash centre managers for approval (evidenced via signoff).

Control(s): CC15.4

Risk: Classification of cash balances between cash centre and network is incorrect

Control objective: Identify mismatch between cash recorded per branch and physical cash receipts at Cash Centre

Frequency: Annual

Control owner: Cash Centre Manager (Bryan Flynn)

Control description: Automatic - POLSAP performs an automatic reconciliation of the cash balance entered into Horizon by branch ("40 entry") to the cash counted and entered into POLSAP ("50 entry") by "Cash Processing Centre". The resulting variance is posted to GL 551000.

Control(s): TC04.04

Risk: Classification of cash balances between cash centre and network is incorrect

Control objective: Identify mismatch between cash recorded per branch and physical cash receipts at Cash Centre


Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Operations Manager (Sarah Parkes)


Control description: At Month end the Cash Control Team perform a review of cash sat in pouch at branch and compare to last cash collection date, thus identifying cash incorrectly held in pouch at month end. Items followed up accordingly.


1.2.1 Bulkcash ●


BULK CASH/COIN PROCESS



Royal Mail Special Delivery Missing Items







1.4 Camelot, Debits Cards & ATM Team ●

1.4.1 Camelot Auto TC Process Prize Payments ●

Glossary of Control Owners	
Job Title	Control Owner
FSC Team Leader	Andrea Green

Background


Camelot Auto TCs shows what has been paid out in prizes and the reconciliation between Camelot system and HORIZON – POLSAP. Daily open item reports are generated and from a comparison of Camelot & SAP system data and TC's are issued to rectify any open items.

Lottery tickets - 3 accounts: Cash prizes (manual), Online sales (automated) (Lottery), Scratch card activation (automated)

Branch divided into groups A B C D (each group represents roughly 4000 branches)

POLSAP GL accounts:

- 627012 – (CAMELOT Prizes) (Manual into HORIZON)



Chronological steps in the process:

1. Camelot sends report SRC (contains volumes of sales, prizes etc.) to PostOffice, ATOS (CAMELOT)
2. PostOffice uploads report SRC into CREDENCE (after validation checks over data)
3. CREDENCE interface to POLSAP (CREDENCE)
4. POLSAP interface HORIZON (POLSAP)
5. One G/L account 627012 – contains prizes (POLSAP)
6. Choose group of Branches (A, B, C, D) where each group represents roughly 4000 branches (Lottery team)
7. Each morning retrieve the CAMELOT file and rename to : CAMdd.mm.yy in POLSAP (Lottery team)
8. Weekly rename the CAMdd.mm.yy files for TC issue – rename to TE OPEN (the TE OPEN contains the total of all errors across all groups (A B C D) (Lottery team)
9. Run POLSAP G/L Acc Line Item with variant "SALES PRIZE", (Lottery team)
10. Download report to Excel – report shows FAD code for Branch and total amount of errors associated with the Branch, (Lottery team)
11. For each group (ABCD) rename the TE OPEN to "6yyyy/mm/dd/P X (P=period) (X=group) (POLSAP) , this splits the TE OPEN file as per step 8 into individual errors per group (A B C D), (Lottery team)
12. For each group (ABCD) rename the HORIZON file in POLSAP to "6yyyy/mm/dd/P X (P=period) (X=group) this splits the HORIZON file into individual errors per group (A B C D), (Lottery team)
 - a. Query: how do you identify the total TE open into groups? Answer: It's via Branch lookup, where each Branch is identified as group A B C or D.
 - b. Query: How do you identify the HORIZON file to be renamed? Answer: search in POLSAP for file "TE OPEN" and a date range of Month month.
 - c. Query: Does POLSAP do any automatic matching within the file as it now has identical file names originating from 2 sources (HORIZON and POLSAP)
Answer: No matching, however POLSAP now gives the total open per Branch, etc. Credits from CAMELOT postings and Debits from HORIZON.
13. Anything less than 1 GBP (Deb/cr.) no TC is issued. Items < £1 written off (form created and retained) (Lottery team).
14. Select from spreadsheet amounts over GBP 300, (Lottery team). These are checked individually before auto TC is run.
15. Type in FAD code into POLSAP G/L acc display to bring up the total error, (Lottery team)
16. Identify error (open item) in Trading period
17. Fill in template for TCs (spreadsheet "Group x period yyyy" (stored on Sharepoint)
18. TCs are issued monthly per Branch (per Group), working on a group per week so each group is covered during the month.
19. POLSAP screen "automatic TC correction" – meaning POLSAP uploads from TC template and posts automatically all TC's that has been filled.
20. Run first in Test run
21. When test run is successful – run in normal mode
22. TCs issued in POLSAP
23. Transaction posts in "Lottery Stock Unit", GL acc 629310 (Outstanding Transaction Corrections) Debit in Stock Unit OoH (Out of Hours) money in to Stock Unit, Credit paying money back to Branch (no physical transfer of money is happening between POL and Branch)

1.4.2 Camelot - Others Process Flow ●

Glossary of Control Owners	
Job Title	Control Owner
FSC Team Leader	Andrea Green

Background


Main purpose of this process is to monitor the below G/L accounts and keep Open items to a minimum. Any Open item > 90 days is considered aged. In POLSAP the matching is compared between the uploaded CAMELOT file and CREDENCE (via Interface to POLSAP) and data source coming from HORIZON

POLSAP GL accounts:

- 627016 - CAMELOT Online Sales Matching (Pinged into HORIZON automatically)
- 627011 - CAMELOT Scratch card activation acc (Pinged into HORIZON automatically)
- 627012 - CAMELOT Prizes (Manual into HORIZON)
- 622045/622046 - CAMELOT Barclay Cheques prizes (manual into HORIZON), max £500 in Cash and rest in Barclay cheque

Accounts that contain pinged data should match unless there has been a failure to deliver TAs (Transaction Acknowledgements) to branch.

TAs may then be recreated by POL IT suppliers or branches can be TCd in order to provide data entry.



Activity - CAMELOT (Other)

Chronological steps in the process:

1. Customer buys/checks winning ticket lottery via "Lottery terminal" (*Branch*)
2. Transaction is recorded on Lottery terminal as a sale in CAMELOT
3. Lottery terminal "PINGS" automatically to HORIZON G/L 1 & 2, whereas 3 & 4 is entered manually)
4. Upload daily file from CAMELOT to CREDENCE (*ACCENTURE*)
5. Interface to POLSAP with daily total, (*POLSAP*)
6. Check open items G/L Acc. Line Item display in acc. 627016, 627011, 627012 (*Camelot team*)
7. Investigate open items (aged > 90 days) (POLSAP compare CAMELOT data vs. HORIZON), (*Camelot team*)
8. Issue resolution – either raise a TC or correct without TC
9. The data requires to be resolved, this could be;
 - A TP6 to Former Agents Debt
 - A Camelot query to investigate.
 - No customer line item due to HR process
 - Manually clearing POLSAP postings that don't net to zero due to some late postings.

1.4.3 Camelot Dynamics Process – General Branch Enquiries via Call Centre ●

Glossary of Control Owners	
Job Title	Control Owner
FSC Team Leader	Andrea Green

Background

Main purpose of this ad hoc process is to ensure that the POLSAP Camelot GL accounts contain correct accounting entries and branch queries are correctly resolved.


On occasion there may be contact between the FSC Lottery Team and Barclays the Camelot Prize Cheque issuing bank, adjustments may be made in APOP to cancel cheques should such a requirement arise. i.e. an office has printed two cheques but failed to spoil one so a live cheque, although secure in branch, is in existence.

Activity - CAMELOT (Dynamics Queries)

Chronological steps in the process:

1. Enquires received via MS Dynamics these could relate to a number of issues but mainly.
2. Queries regarding TAs (Transaction Acknowledgements) i.e. the branch does not agree with the value
3. Queries relating to Prize payments specifically cheques
4. POLSAP, Credence and for cheques APOP is investigated in order to form a conclusion and evidence may be created.
5. Contact is made with the branch to discuss conclusions formed to avoid posting hard copies.
6. Hard copy evidence is only sent if specifically asked for.
7. Once a satisfactory conclusion is reached remedial action is taken, this could be;
8. Issue resolution – either raise a TC or correct without TC
9. The data requires to be resolved, this could be;
 - A TP6 to Former Agents Debt
 - A Camelot query to investigate.
 - No customer line item due to HR process
 - Manually clearing POLSAP postings that don't net to zero due to some late postings.

Camelot – using Dynamics




1.4.4 Debit Cards High Level Process Flow ●

Glossary of Control Owners	
Job Title	Control Owner
FSC Team Leader	Andrea Green

Background

Reconcile debit card accounts for all products/services either in a Branch or Online web services (e.g. top up a Drop & Go card). Majority of TCs are issued to refund money directly to Customers card (that was used for payment). Requests for refunds would normally come via MS Dynamics e-mail from NBSC.

GL Acc. – Bureau (555079), Retail (555078), Online Drop & Go (555083), Paystation (555080), Self Service Kiosk (555095), AMEX Bureau (555085), AMEX Retail (555084)



Activity – Debit Cards

Chronological steps in the process:

Debit Card Team

1. Customer uses a debit/credit card in a Branch to pay for a service/product (*Customer*)
2. Branch enters transaction into HORIZON (*Branch*)
3. HORIZON interface to CREDENCE & POLSAP (*HORIZON*)
4. Global Pay process card payments and send file through FUJITSU/ACCENTURE, (*Global Pay*)
5. Daily uploads file into POLSAP (*FUJITSU/ACCENTURE*)
6. Weekly Sweep file for all GL accounts in POLSAP that match (*FUJITSU/ACCENTURE*)
7. Run GL Acc LI Display for GL acc, and investigate Open item (majority of POLSAP can be resolved without TC) (*Debit Card Team*)
8. Requests for refunds – receive e-mail request for refund from NBSC (Call Centre - Helpline etc.) (*NBSC*) **SEE DYNAMICS PROCESS 1.3.5**
9. Determine product and how the Branch has accounted for the transaction (e.g. reversal, cancellation, duplicates etc. etc.) (*Debit Card Team*)
10. Based on type of error (as in 8 above) determine whether or not to issue a TC (*Debit Card Team*)
11. No TC Issued – resolution within FSC (*Debit Card Team*)
12. Issue TC in POLSAP – screen “Enter Outgoing Invoices” and fill in Branch, customer, date etc. (*Debit Card Team*)
13. POLSAP interface to HORIZON – Branch has pending TC – Accepts TC, (*POLSAP*)
14. Same day as Issuing TC – request Global Pay (fill in spreadsheet “Refund Request Form” in order to refund the card (that was used for the transaction) (*Debit Card Team*)
15. Encrypt spreadsheet and e.mail to Global Pay. (*Debit Card Team*)
16. Global Pay reviews request form and query (e.mail) if required, otherwise action the refund (*Global Pay*)
17. Global Pay payment file is reflected (interface into POLSAP) (*POLSAP*)
18. Branch accepts the TC in HORIZON and via Interface to POLSAP (*Branch*)

Debit card refunds enquiries are received from (see below) via MS Dynamics there is no other difference in the way and enquiry is handled.

GL Account files are received as follows.


Branch txn = occurs day 1

Horizon txn received day 2 in POLSAP

Global Pay txn file received in POLSAP day 3

REFUND BACK ONTO DEBIT CARDS IMMEDIATELY WOULD BE THE BEST IMPROVEMENT, ALSO NOT REVERSING REFUNDING BILL PAYMENTS TXNS AT ALL WOULD ELIMINATE MANY FRONT END BRANCH ISSUES.

1.4.5 Debit Cards - Dynamics Process



Control(s): TC07.01

Risk: Debit card transactions are incorrectly recorded and not identified as erroneous, resulting in incorrect financial reporting

Control objective: To ensure debit card transactions are matched to third party reporting

Frequency: Daily

Control owner: FSC Operations Manager (Andrea Green)

Control description: POLSAP performs an automatic reconciliation of the debit card transactions per Horizon (branch and online) to the transactions recorded by Global Pay. This occurs daily following upload of Global Pay file onto POLSAP by Fujitsu / Accenture. The resulting variance is posted to relevant GL accounts dependent on transaction type:

- 555079 – Bureau
- 555078 – Retail
- 555083 - Online drop & Go
- 555080 – Paystation
- 555095 - Self Service Kiosk
- 555085 - AMEX Bureau
- 555084 - AMEX Retail

Control(s): TC07.02

Risk: Debit card transactions are incorrectly recorded and not identified as erroneous, resulting in incorrect financial reporting

Control objective: To ensure erroneous debit card transactions are identified and investigated

Frequency: Daily

Control owner: FSC Operations Manager (Andrea Green)

Control description: On a daily basis the Debit Card Team run a GL account query for all debit card GL's, highlighting open items. Open items are investigated and processed via TC or internal correction. Aged open items are included on the month end probity.

Control(s): TC07.03

Risk: Debit card transaction corrections are not agreed with third party, resulting in subsequent variances

Control objective: To ensure transaction corrections are confirmed with third party prior to processing

Frequency: As needed

Control owner: FSC Operations Manager (Andrea Green)

Control description: Where a transaction correction is required a "Refund request form" is sent to Global Pay confirming the proposed action. "No response" from Global Pay is taken as agreement to the correction. If Global Pay query the correction then they will contact the Debit Card Team via encrypted email and the correction will be revisited.



Control(s): C4.9.a.2 & C4.9.a.3

Risk: Balance sheet accounts are not reviewed resulting in error and misstatement or fraud

Control objective: To ensure that all BS accounts are reconciled and analysed and have evidence of balance justification

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Operations Manager(s)

1.4.6 ATM High Level Process Flow ●

Glossary of Control Owners	
Job Title	Control Owner
FSC Team Leader	Andrea Green

Background


Process covers discrepancies between Branch and Client banks as per above. Normally approx. 10 weeks behind. High value TC's must be issued within 90 days, as CREDENCE only keeps the breakdown for 90 days.

ATM

- Bank of Ireland (daily)
- YourCash (daily)
- Note Machine (weekly)
- TRMB (settlement do upload)

POLSAP GL accounts:

- 627046 – Bank of Ireland (BOI) ATM transaction account, recording all cash dispensed from ATM's
- 627047 – Variances arising between BOI and horizon, generated from 627046 and BOI report
- 627050 – Variances arising between Hanco and horizon for ATM transactions
- 627060 / 627061 / 627043 – Variances arising between Notemachine and horizon for ATM transactions




Activity ATM

Chronological steps in the process:

1. Bank of Ireland e-mails ATM team all transactions dispensed from ATM machine belonging to Bank of Ireland (this is ATM machines physically located inside the Branch) (the report covers from 16:30 to 16:30 following day) (reports shows total dispense per ATM machine identified via Merchant ID)
2. Upload report into POLSAP (ATM team)
3. Branch runs ATM report (16:30) and manually keys into HORIZON the 16:30 figure from the ATM report
4. Check G/L account 627047 "Post Office ATM matching", should ideally balance to zero each day
5. Investigate any open items (in POLSAP transactions with RED.
6. Run CREDENCE report in order to get the breakdown of HORIZON entries.
7. Issue TC (<=GBP 10,000 - >10,000 fill in high value forms and signed by LM (up to 250,00) >250,000 senior LM)
8. If TC > 1,000 send enquiry form to Branch explaining the Branch error and turnaround time for Branch to correct in HORIZON is 10 WD
9. If Branch corrects in HORIZON this will then clear in POLSAP
10. If Branch do not correct in HORIZON an issue a TC
11. If by any chance both POL and BRANCH corrects, then POL will issue a compensating TC the following day
12. Evidence of HORIZON entries are download to excel and save on desk top
13. At month end do the reconciliation and probity (justifying the balance) Reconciliation of 627047 and 627046 (Settlement matching account) and save on Sharepoint and team lead reviews and signs and send to 2nd senior manager for their review.

1.4.7 ATM Branch Enquiry Form Process Flow ●



Control(s): TC01.01

Risk: Erroneous ATM transactions resulting in incorrect cash balances

Control objective: Identify and investigate potentially incorrect ATM transactions

Frequency: Daily

Control owner: FSC Team Leader (Andrea Green)

Control description: On a daily basis the Bank of Ireland ATM transaction report will be uploaded into POLSAP by the ATM team. POLSAP can then automatically compare the Horizon transactions with the daily uploads. On a daily basis the ATM team run a POLSAP report to identify all potential mismatches - GL code 627047 - and investigate and follow up accordingly

Control(s): TC01.02

Risk: Erroneous ATM transactions resulting in incorrect cash balances

Control objective: Identify and investigate potentially incorrect ATM transactions

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Team Leader (Andrea Green)

Control description: On a daily basis the Hanco/Notemachine ATM transaction report will be uploaded into POLSAP by the ATM team. POLSAP can then automatically compare the Horizon transactions with the daily uploads. On a monthly basis the ATM team run a POLSAP report to identify all potential mismatches - GL codes:
- Hanco – 627050
- Notemachine - 627060



Control(s): C4.9.a.2 & C4.9.a.3

Risk: Balance sheet accounts are not reviewed resulting in error and misstatement or fraud

Control objective: To ensure that all BS accounts are reconciled and analysed and have evidence of balance justification

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Operations Manager(s)

Control description: "All BS accounts within FSC area are reconciled at month end by the relevant Admin team members. Any open items are explained / annotated by the Admin team member and the reconciliation is sent to respective FSC Team Managers for review and approval. The FSC Team Manager(s) follows up any unreconciled/unexplained items with the respective Admin team member and once satisfied the reconciliation is approved (sign and dated as evidence) and forwarded to the FSC Operations Manager for final review and approval. The FSC Operations Manager reviews and queries where applicable with the FSC Team Manager(s) and sends/signs as evidence of final approval. The reconciliation(s) with approvals and any supporting documentation is dated, stored/printed and filed on Sharepoint."



Control(s): C4.9.a.5 & C4.9.a.6

Risk: Build-up of aged balances - unapproved aged balances of affected account resulting in loss of reputation to PostOffice.

Control objective: To ensure close monitoring of aged balances and prevent where possible any aged build-up of accounts affected.

Frequency: Weekly

Control owner: FSC Operations Manager(s)

Control description: "On a weekly basis the FSC Operations Manager performs an ageing analysis of all open items matching account per product area. The main objective is to prevent wherever possible any open item(s) falling into an aged (>3 months) category.

The respective Team Managers explains the analysis for their product area at the weekly Team Operational meeting. Open items are prioritised by highest value, date

1.4.8 ATM Retracts High Level Process Flow ●

Glossary of Control Owners	
Job Title	Control Owner
FSC Team Leader	Andrea Green

Background


ATM (PostOffice + Bank of Ireland machines) retracts the cash that is being dispensed by customer back into the machines. This is due to “time out”, if the physical cash is not taken within 59 seconds the ATM retracts the money and put in a “retract” tray within the machine. Customer account has been debited.

If there are communication failures on the machine, it can also happen that cash is never dispensed, however the customer account has been debited. A surplus can also consist of a combination of retracts and communication failures etc.

Bank of Ireland normally refunds customer within 3-5 WD.

POLSAP GL accounts:

- 626206 – Aged surplus balances (> 3 months old) reported by branch but refund not received by BOI
- 627077 – Surplus balances (< 3 months) reported by branch but refund not received by BOI



Activity - ATM Retracts**Chronological steps in the process:**

1. Customer requests cash, however machine retracts the money (if cash is not taken within 59 seconds) / or money never comes out of the machine at all due to e.g. "communication error", machine jammed etc. etc. *(Customer)*
2. Raise enquiry with own bank or Branch *(Customer)*
3. Bank of Ireland automatically get alerted of re-tracts (via Link) *(Bank of Ireland)*
4. PostMaster should notice same day a £ surplus in their re-tract box and declare in HORIZON *(Branch)*
5. PostMaster does weekly balance and any re-tract should show as a surplus, *(Branch)*
6. Scan the "weekly balance" in HORIZON through APADC, *(Branch) This goes to BOI*
7. Log into CREDENCE and run report "weekly balance sheet" and download to excel, *(Camelot, Debit Card & ATM Team)*
8. Filter on "surplus" and verify in POLSAP if the Branch has declared the surplus, *(Camelot, Debit Card & ATM Team)*
9. *If "surplus" declared = End (POLSAP will balance)*
10. If not declared – issue TC, *(Camelot, Debit Card & ATM Team)*
11. Gather all TC's in auto TC spreadsheet and weekly upload to POLSAP (normally on Fridays), *(Camelot, Debit Card & ATM Team)*
12. Branch accepts the TC in HORIZON, (acceptance of the TC replaces the "declare") *(Branch)*
13. Weekly e.mail "refund file" to Camelot, Debit Card & ATM Team (sent to individuals in the team and not a team box), *(Bank of Ireland)*
14. Upload Bank of Ireland "refund file" directly in POLSAP, *(Camelot, Debit Card & ATM Team)*
15. Run report "POL FS Automatic matching" in POLSAP for applicable period, *(Camelot, Debit Card & ATM Team)*
16. Check any remaining open items G/L acc. display 627077 and investigate, *(Camelot, Debit Card & ATM Team)*
17. Issue a TC as a resolution and where necessarily utilise Acc. 626206 "creditor holding acc." in order to balance, *(Camelot, Debit Card & ATM Team)*
18. Probity and account reconciliation monthly, *(Camelot, Debit Card & ATM Team)*

Risk & Control ATM Retracts

Control(s): TC02.01

Risk: Cash surpluses arise from erroneous ATM transactions and are not investigated

Control objective: Identify potentially incorrect ATM transactions arising from ATM retracts

Frequency: Weekly

Control owner: FSC Team Leader (Andrea Green)

Control description: On a weekly basis a refund file is received from BOI and uploaded to POLSAP by the ATM team. POLSAP automatically matches surpluses declared by branch within Horizon against the refund file data. A report "POL FS Automatic Matching" is run weekly by the ATM team and all open variances are identified and investigated.

Control(s): TC02.02

Risk: Cash surpluses arise from erroneous ATM transactions and are not identified

Control objective: Identify potentially incorrect ATM transactions arising from ATM retracts

Frequency: Weekly

Control owner: FSC Team Leader (Andrea Green)

Control description: On a weekly basis the ATM team run a "Weekly balance sheet" report from Credence and filter by "Surplus" to identify ATM retracts for the week. Surpluses are compared to those declared in POLSAP by the branch and where the Branch has not declared a surplus the balance is placed into the "auto TC" spreadsheet and transaction correction is issued.

Control(s): TC02.03

Risk: Cash surpluses arise from erroneous ATM transactions and are not investigated

Control objective: Identify, monitor and investigate aged open items in relation to ATM retracts

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Team Leader (Andrea Green)

Control description: Each month end, a transaction report is run for GL 627077 and all aged items (those not resolved in month or where TC not issued) are manually transferred to GL 626206 to allow further monitoring.



Control(s): C4.9.a.2 & C4.9.a.3

Risk: Balance sheet accounts are not reviewed resulting in error and misstatement or fraud

Control objective: To ensure that all BS accounts are reconciled and analysed and have evidence of balance justification

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Operations Manager(s)

Control description: "All BS accounts within FSC area are reconciled at month end by the relevant Admin team members. Any open items are explained / annotated by the Admin team member and the reconciliation is sent to respective FSC Team Managers for review and approval. The FSC Team Manager(s) follows up any unreconciled/unexplained items with the respective Admin team member and once satisfied the reconciliation is approved (sign and dated as evidence) and forwarded to the FSC Operations Manager for final review and approval. The FSC Operations Manager reviews and queries where applicable with the FSC Team Manager(s) and sends/signs as evidence of final approval. The reconciliation(s) with approvals and any supporting documentation is dated, stored/printed and filed on Sharepoint."



Control(s): C4.9.a.5 & C4.9.a.6

Risk: Build-up of aged balances - unapproved aged balances of affected account resulting in loss of reputation to PostOffice.

1.4.9 First Rate Travel Money Card (TMC)

Glossary of Control Owners	
Job Title	Control Owner
FSC Team Leader	Andrea Green


Background

Travel money card is a card where you can load money on the card and use e.g. abroad. (Multi-currency card, e.g. can put multiple currencies on it). There are no day to day involvement from the team, only via queries from First Rate, Branch etc.

Settlement team would have an open item in case the team forgets to issue a TC or settle with First Rate.

POLSAP GL accounts:

- 627024 – travellers cheque matching account
- 555083 – currency sales made in branches



Activity - First Rate

Chronological steps in the process:

1. Customer buys Travel Money Card from branch
2. Branch input into Horizon..... (Branch)
3. Upload file to CREDENCE (Accenture)
4. Receive enquiry from First rate/Branch etc. (via AP enquiry inbox) (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
5. Log query into "Enquiries spreadsheet", (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
6. Move Query from AP enquiry inbox to Travel Money Card folder, (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
7. Investigate and establish nature of error, check in CREDENCE, (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
8. Confirm proposed action with First rate/Branch (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
9. Determine if TC is required (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
10. Where no TC is required – transaction seems OK and advise First rate/Branch (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
11. If TC needed complete Settlement Sheet to inform Settlement Team to debit/credit First Rate accordingly and await signed sheet to be returned (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
12. Update "Enquiries spreadsheet", (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
13. Issue TC in POLSAP (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
14. Update "Enquiries spreadsheet", (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
15. Branch accept TC, (Branch)
16. End

Risk & Control First Rate Travel Money Card

Control(s): TC10.01

Risk: First Rate travel money card transaction corrections are not agreed with third party, resulting in subsequent variances

Control objective: To ensure transaction corrections are confirmed with third party prior to processing

Frequency: As required

Control owner: FSC Team Leader (Andrea Green)

Control description: When a resolution is concluded, an email is sent to First Rate or Branch to confirm the proposed action. "No response" is taken as agreement to the correction. If First Rate query the correction then they will contact the automated payments enquiry Team via encrypted email and the correction will be revisited. Final email confirmation is sent once query resolved.

Control(s): TC10.02

Risk: Travellers cheque encashment balances are not recoverable from third party

Control objective: Agree encashment with third party

Frequency: Weekly

Control owner: FSC Team Leader (Andrea Green)

Control description: On a weekly basis a file containing all traveller's cheque encashment balances where support has been received by First Rate (FR) is obtained from FR and uploaded into POLSAP. Automatic matching is performed between the uploaded report and horizon transactions from branch.

Control(s): TC10.03

Risk: Travellers cheque encashment balances are not recoverable from third party

Control objective: Identify and investigate open items

Frequency: Weekly

Control owner: FSC Team Leader (Andrea Green)

Control description: On a weekly basis the FSC run a GL report (627024) to identify all unmatched cheque encashment balances. Balances identified are followed up with the relevant branches and TC's issued where errors identified.

Control(s): TC10.04

Risk: Travellers cheque encashment balances are not recoverable from third party

Control objective: Identify items for write-off

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Team Leader (Andrea Green)

Control description: In the last week of each period an ageing review is performed on GL 627024 to identify all unmatched items in excess of 2 months aged. Where a TC has not been issued for these, the balance is written off to the profit and loss.



Control(s): C4.9.a.11-16 (same control, however assigned to 6 different Team Managers)

Risk: Workload and peaks are not monitored resulting in build up of back log.

Control objective: To ensure there are frequent monitoring of the teams workload and any necessarily actions are taken pro-actively.

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Team Manager(s)

Control description: "The FSC Team Manager monitors on a weekly basis their teams workload and escalates areas of concern with their reporting line.


1.4.10

Travellers Cheques Process Flows




1.4.10.1 TRV Upload Process

Travellers Cheques – Upload Process




Travellers Cheques – GL Clearing



Travellers Cheques – Error resolution

Text fields that are not blank have previously been worked and annotated.



1.5 Cheques & Moneygram Team


Glossary of Control Owners	
Job Title	Control Owner
FSC Team Leader	Tracy Mather


Background

This is a debt recovery process as once a cheque has been received unpaid POL have the debt that they need to recover either by unpaying a customer's bill or requesting a debit to the customer savings/current account.

G/L accounts:

- 533306 PABA Unpaid Cheques Control
- 533301 Unpaid Cheques Branch non-conformance (TC)
- 533309 BOI Unpaid Cheques
- 533304 Royal Mail Business Redirection Unpaid Cheques
- 539594 Giro Schemes Unpaid Cheques (daily balance to zero)
- 554078 Unpaid cheques Bank account
- 533315 POL ISA Unpaid cheques
- 250701 Misc. losses returned cheques (internal POL acc)





Activity - Unpaid Cheques**Chronological steps in the process:**

Unpaid Cheques Priority (e-mail Early Warning by noon same day, no TC issued in Early Warning process). The purpose of Early Warning process is a Pre-warning of bounced cheques and customer account has to be blocked as soon as possible in order no funds can be redrawn from cust. savings acc. etc..

1. Scan all cheques received into BANK TECH system (*iPSL*)
2. Post Office processing Centre (*iPSL*) sends fax to *Cheque/MoneyGram team* regarding returned cheques (*iPSL*)
3. Receive fax from *iPSL* by 11:00 or call *iPSL* by 12:00 to chase up (*Cheque/MoneyGram team*)
4. Retrieve the cheque (as per fax) from BANK TECH system – by SORT CODE, ACC and Value, (*Cheque/MoneyGram team*)
5. Retrieve from CREDENCE – FAD code (Office code) and date, (*Cheque/MoneyGram team*)
6. Investigate and determine if product relates to Savings and current, (yes) update “Early Warning spreadsheets” , SLA 3pm same day, (if No, process ends) (*Cheque/MoneyGram team*)
7. e-mail Bank of Ireland the “Early Warning spreadsheets” , (*Cheque/MoneyGram team*)
8. Account blocked – (*Bank of Ireland*)

Unpaid Cheques normal (by noon next WD) (these are the same cheques as in Early warning Spreadsheet). The purpose of this process is to advise clients (e.g. BG, BT etc. etc.) of bounced cheques so they can correct customer account from PAID to UNPAID. The process is that when a customer pays a bill in a Post Office branch with a cheque, the Post Office stamps the bill as PAID and credit the client (BG, BT etc.) account. The consequence is that it is the Post Office who is bearing the payment until the cheque clears.

1. Bundle up bounced cheques and produce list “returned Cheques Batch Order Report” , (*iPSL*)
2. Send via Courier bounced cheques & list to (*Cheque/MoneyGram team*), (*iPSL*)
3. Chase up *iPSL* if not received by 4:45 (*Cheque/MoneyGram team*)
4. Receive physical cheques & “returned Cheques Batch Order Report” and date stamp with today’s date (*Cheque/MoneyGram team*)
5. Verify the number and amount of cheques received and reconcile to *iPSL* list “returned Cheques Batch Order Report” , (*Cheque/MoneyGram team*)
6. Investigate each cheque in CREDENCE to establish Client (recipient) , (*Cheque/MoneyGram team*)
7. Update UNPAID daily spreadsheet, sheet for unique client (e.g. BT, BG etc.), (*Cheque/MoneyGram team*)
8. Reconcile UNPAID total for the day with number 5 (cheques and total value) (NB: a cheque can be split), (*Cheque/MoneyGram team*)
9. Photocopy all cheques and file together with clients “summary form” , (*Cheque/MoneyGram team*)
10. POLSAP entries: GL posting to individual vendors D, GL Control account Cr., D total of all individual Vendor GL accounts and Cr GL Bank acc., (*Cheque/MoneyGram team*)
11. Leave physical paperwork for the day in Settlement team In Tray. Who in turn will adjust the settlement to the client with the POLSAP G/L posting, (*Cheque/MoneyGram team*)
12. Transaction corrections: If there are any cheque in the pouch received where the client cannot be identified (as per step 5 above) then a TC is issued to the branch. It is then for the branch to accept the TC in HORIZON and do further investigation as to what client was the payment meant for. (*Cheque/MoneyGram team*)

Risk & Control Unpaid Cheques

Control(s): TC23.01

Risk: Bounced cheques are not followed up timely, resulting in debt being incurred by the Post Office

Control objective: Reconcile bounced cheques report to physical cheques, to ensure completeness of items for investigation

Frequency: Daily

Control owner: FSC Team Leader (Tracy Mather)

Control description: On a daily basis the Cheque and MoneyGram team gather all bounced cheques couriered from IPSL the previous day, date stamp these and perform a reconciliation of cheques physically received to the IPSL listing per "returned cheques batch order report". These are followed up same day, with either TC issuance or paperwork being passed to Settlement team to update client.



Control(s): C4.9.a.2 & C4.9.a.3

Risk: Balance sheet accounts are not reviewed resulting in error and misstatement or fraud

Control objective: To ensure that all BS accounts are reconciled and analysed and have evidence of balance justification

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Operations Manager(s)

Control description: "All BS accounts within FSC area are reconciled at month end by the relevant Admin team members. Any open items are explained / annotated by the Admin team member and the reconciliation is sent to respective FSC Team Managers for review and approval. The FSC Team Manager(s) follows up any unreconciled/unexplained items with the respective Admin team member and once satisfied the reconciliation is approved (sign and dated as evidence) and forwarded to the FSC Operations Manager for final review and approval. The FSC Operations Manager reviews and queries where applicable with the FSC Team Manager(s) and sends/signs as evidence of final approval. The reconciliation(s) with approvals and any supporting documentation is dated, stored/printed and filed on SharePoint."



Control(s): C4.9.a.5 & C4.9.a.6

Risk: Build-up of aged balances - unapproved aged balances of affected account resulting in loss of reputation to Post Office.

Control objective: To ensure close monitoring of aged balances and prevent where possible any aged build-up of accounts affected.

Frequency: Weekly

Control owner: FSC Operations Manager(s)

Control description: "On a weekly basis the FSC Operations Manager performs an ageing analysis of all open items matching account per product area. The main objective is to prevent wherever possible any open item(s) falling into an aged (>3 months) category.

The respective Team Managers explains the analysis for their product area at the weekly Team Operational meeting. Open items are prioritised by highest value, date and/or other steer from Management.

Agreed actions are followed up with respective FSC Team Managers.

The FSC Operations Manager signs and dates the analysis and minutes from meeting with any other supporting documentation and retain as evidence."



Control(s): C4.9.a.11-16 (same control, however assigned to 6 different Team Managers)

Risk: Workload and peaks are not monitored resulting in build-up of back log.

Control objective: To ensure there are frequent monitoring of the teams workload and any necessarily actions are taken pro-actively.

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Team Manager(s)

Control description: "The FSC Team Manager monitors on a weekly basis their team's workload and escalates areas of concern with their reporting line.

Issues affecting the team's ability to process workloads are flagged by the FSC Team Manager and discussed in the weekly FSC Team Leader meeting.

On a monthly basis the FSC Team Manager signs, dates and retains the "weekly Stats" as evidence."


1.5.1

●
Bulk Cheques

Bulk Cheques – High Level Process




The open item identified is the Horizon rem out compared to the cheques processed by IPSL (currently).
The investigation is made using Credence, BankTec




Bulk Cheques: AP Adjustments

Bulk Cheques: AP Adjustments





Bulk Cheques



Bulk Cheques: IPSL (Barclays) Processing Errors

Error at processing centre (Barclays).






1.5.2

Missing Cheques


Missing Cheques: Cases

Missing Cheques Cases



Missing Cheques: Cheque to IPSL (Barclays)

Missing Cheques to IPSL (Barclays)




Upon receiving cheque, IPSL make posting into Bulk Cheques.
When credits are posted Missing Cheques duty will move from 553040 and credit 533281 and manually clear down as it is not open item managed back onto the missing cheques log change from awaiting credit to closed and update reason for closure and then file in FSC steel cabinets until destruction date is met

Missing Cheques: Period End Write Offs

Missing Cheques Period End Write Offs



These are period end write offs for DVLA only. Write offs for other products occur as soon as we realise a case can't progress further





1.5.3


Unpaid Cheques

Unpaid Cheques: Balancing Cheques

Unpaid Cheques – Balancing Cheques




PO Savings, BT, Credit card, ISA, PO telecoms, PO current account (Ad-hoc, only if they haven't been notified the day before. clients need it to be sent before 12:00 EON, N-power, SSE, PO invoicing, Client settlement, DVLA (2 adhoc- capita and Westminster as and when we get cheques) clients have the file sent to them after 12:00.



Unpaid Cheques: Cheques lost in clearing


Unpaid Cheques – Lost in Clearing



Unpaid Cheques: Early warning fax.

Unpaid Cheques: Early warning fax


* After 11:30am



Unpaid Cheques: Settlements

Unpaid Cheques: Settlements

*Completed after 11:30. GL is cleared daily



1.5.4

Moneygram High Level Process

Glossary of Control Owners	
Job Title	Control Owner
FSC Team Leader	Tracy Mather

Background

Investigates differences between MoneyGram system and Horizon system

MoneyGram transactions in PLSAP are identified with doc type KC whereas Horizon transactions in PLSAP are identified with doc type RV. The team also receives a breakdown of Horizon and MoneyGram files and these are downloaded to Excel and saved in SharePoint. Majority of all TCs issued for MoneyGram are related to SEND transactions. MoneyGram send the file via e-mail to our Settlement team who then upload it into PLSAP

PLSAP GL accounts:

- 627030 – Unmatched MoneyGram transfers (send)
- 627031 – Unmatched MoneyGram transfers (receive)

Activity - MoneyGram

Chronological steps in the process:

1. Customer require a cash sum to be sent (normally abroad)
 2. Customer fills in form, name, address, etc.
 3. Postmaster takes the money from customer and enter into HORIZON
 4. A transaction reference receipt is generated from Horizon and this reference number is the customers proof of purchase
 5. Post Office must be sure that no transaction reference is given to the customer if customer has not paid the money (because the transaction can be "live" in the MoneyGram system.
 6. Customer send the reference to end receiver
 7. End receiver goes to either a post office or MoneyGram agent with ID and transaction reference number and funds are paid out.
 8. In POLSAP doc type = KC is MoneyGram and RV comes from Horizon
-
1. Receive MoneyGram file daily and upload into POLSAP (*Settlement team*)
 2. Log into POLSAP G/L account 627030 (Send) transaction and G/L 627031 (Receive) transaction. (*Cheque and MoneyGram team*)
 3. POLSAP screen shows wherever there is a discrepancy between MoneyGram and Horizon
 4. Download into excel HORIZON file and save in SharePoint, (*Cheque and MoneyGram team*)
 5. Download into excel MoneyGram file and save in SharePoint, (*Cheque and MoneyGram team*)
 6. TC for SEND – a TC is issued to correct Branch account in POLSAP by either placing liability or receivable back to Branch. E.g. A Transaction has been reversed in HORIZON but not cancelled in MoneyGram (Branch needs to retrieve money back from MoneyGram or take the hit), or a transaction has been cancelled in MoneyGram and not reversed in Horizon, TC is issued to replace the missing reversal., (*Cheque and MoneyGram team*)
 7. Issue TC to Branch, (*Cheque and MoneyGram team*)
 8. Accept TC (*Branch*)

Risk & Control MoneyGram

Control(s): TC12.01

Risk: Variances arise in MoneyGram transactions that are not investigated, resulting in aged open items

Control objective: To identify potentially incorrect MoneyGram transactions and highlight for investigation

Frequency: Annual

Control owner: FSC Team Leader (Tracy Mather)

Control description: On a daily basis a transaction report is received from MoneyGram which is uploaded to POLSAP. POLSAP automatically matches send and receive transactions declared by branch within Horizon against the MoneyGram report. A list of remaining open items is generated and recorded within GL codes:

- 627030 – Send
- 627031 – Receive

Control(s): TC12.02

Risk: Variances arise in MoneyGram transactions that are not investigated, resulting in aged open items

Control objective: Identify and investigate open MoneyGram items

Frequency: Daily

Control owner: FSC Team Leader (Tracy Mather)

Control description: On a weekly basis the FSC run a GL report on 627030 and 627031 to identify all unmatched MoneyGram transactions. Balances identified are followed up with the relevant branches / MoneyGram and TC's issued where errors identified.



Control(s): C4.9.a.2 & C4.9.a.3

Risk: Balance sheet accounts are not reviewed resulting in error and misstatement or fraud

Control objective: To ensure that all BS accounts are reconciled and analysed and have evidence of balance justification

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Operations Manager(s)

Control description: "All BS accounts within FSC area are reconciled at month end by the relevant Admin team members. Any open items are explained / annotated by the Admin team member and the reconciliation is sent to respective FSC Team Managers for review and approval. The FSC Team Manager(s) follows up any unreconciled/unexplained items with the respective Admin team member and once satisfied the reconciliation is approved (sign and dated as evidence) and forwarded to the FSC Operations Manager for final review and approval. The FSC Operations Manager reviews and queries where applicable with the FSC Team Manager(s) and sends/signs as evidence of final approval. The reconciliation(s) with approvals and any supporting documentation is dated, stored/printed and filed on SharePoint."



Control(s): C4.9.a.5 & C4.9.a.6

Risk: Build-up of aged balances - unapproved aged balances of affected account resulting in loss of reputation to Post Office.

Control objective: To ensure close monitoring of aged balances and prevent where possible any aged build-up of accounts affected.

Frequency: Weekly

Control owner: FSC Operations Manager(s)

Control description: "On a weekly basis the FSC Operations Manager performs an ageing analysis of all open items matching account per product area. The main objective is to prevent wherever possible any open item(s) falling into an aged (>3 months) category.

The respective Team Managers explains the analysis for their product area at the weekly Team Operational meeting. Open items are prioritised by highest value, date and/or other steer from Management.


Agreed actions are followed up with respective FSC Team Managers.



1.5.5

Moneygram Open Items – Send or Receive

Moneygram (MGM)



1.6

AP Clients Enquiries

Background

Customer pays a bar coded bill or swipe card to pay a utility bill, council, tax, rent etc. Responding to queries being raised etc.


A dedicated team member updates the “Enquiries spreadsheet”, the log has macros for SLA and turnaround times.

POLSAP GL accounts:

- 627211 – payments from customers to be passed on to bank to pay vendors
- 620119 – Holding account for AP miss-keys noted, prior to issuing TC

Glossary of Control Owners

Job Title	Control Owner
FSC Team Leader	Tracy Middleton



Activity - Automated Payments

Chronological steps in the process:

1. Receive enquiry from NBSC/Customer care/Client(s) (AP9 form) (via AP enquiry mailbox) (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
2. Log query into "Enquiries spreadsheet", (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
3. Move Query from AP enquiry inbox to relevant subfolder, (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
4. Investigate and establish nature of error, check in CREDENCE/BANK TECH, (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
5. Where required request further information/documentation from Client, (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
6. Update any AP9 form and return to client and fill in form "POL/CLIENT incident report" (Overpayment / Underpayment) (all form have incident number), system generated incident number and add own initial and (A=TC, E=Internal adjustment,) (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
7. Update log "Enquiries spreadsheet" with Status (1=Require pre-approval from "re-sellers", 2=Sent to Settlement, 3=Completed (form received back from Settlement and TC issued where required)
8. Print 3 hardcopies, keep 1 and file, 2 copies to settlement team in-tray, (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
9. Receive 1 signed and dated copy back from Settlement team (they have actioned what was on the form), (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
10. File signed copy from Settlement team in team folder, (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
11. Determine next step: a)No action and file, b>Action with TC
12. Where applicable issue TC in POLSAP with ref number=Incident number
13. Branch accept TC
14. End

Risk & Control Automated Payments

Control(s): TC03.02

Risk: Transaction correction is incorrectly issued

Control objective: Ensure TC is issued in line with automated payment query resolution

Frequency: As needed

Control owner: FSC Team Leader (Tracy Middleton)

Control description: Once a resolution is determined, the "Automated payments enquiry team" (APET) print 3 copies of the "POL client incident report" (PCIR). One copy of the PCIR is retained and two copies are passed to the "Settlement team" (ST). The ST review, sign and date the PCIR as evidence of approval. One copy of the PCIR is retained by the ST and the final copy is passed to the APET who compare this to the original document and use the approved figures for issuing the TC (incident number is used as TC reference - allows tracking).



Control(s): C4.9.a.11-16 (same control, however assigned to 6 different Team Managers)

Risk: Workload and peaks are not monitored resulting in build up of back log.

Control objective: To ensure there are frequent monitoring of the teams workload and any necessary actions are taken pro-actively.

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Team Manager(s)

Control description: "The FSC Team Manager monitors on a weekly basis their teams workload and escalates areas of concern with their reporting line. Issues affecting the team's ability to process workloads are flagged by the FSC Team Manager and discussed in the weekly FSC Team Leader meeting. On a monthly basis the FSC Team Manager signs, dates and retains the "weekly Stats" as evidence."



Control(s): C4.9.a.17

Risk: Control accounts are not monitored on a regular basis resulting in unjustified and unexplained aged balances.


Control objective: Control accounts are monitored on a regular basis and action taken to clear any aged items without unnecessarily delay.

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Team Manager

Control description: "The FSC Team Manager monitors on a monthly basis all outstanding TC's over 5 weeks on control account 'A/C 629310 Outstanding Transaction Correction Cash'. All issued TC's related to "Cash" are also posted on Control account 'A/C 629310 ' to enable overall monitoring, and an e.mail reminder is automatically sent each month to TC issuer for all open TC's > 5 weeks. The TC issuer annotates for own area of responsibility an explanation/action against each open TC. The information from each TC issuer with open TCs are collated, monitored and followed up with TC issuer via control 'A/C 629310'. Once satisfied that all open TCs have a justification with action - the FSC Team Manager signs, dates and files the open item report on control 'A/C 629310' as evidence of review."

Passport Enquiries process



1.6.3

Paystation

Background

Payment terminal used for payments of certain bills, top up of Mobile phones and Energy top up etc.


POLSAP GL accounts:

- 627236 – Paystation ping transactions
- 629122 – Paystation holding account

Glossary of Control Owners

Job Title	Control Owner
FSC Team Leader	Tracy Middleton

Below relates to an NBSC call raised by branch for missing TAs



Activity - PayStation

Chronological steps in the process:

1. Receive enquiry from Branch/NBSC/Customer care, **IMR form these will all land in Dynamics**
2. Log query into |Dynamics and create the case
3. Review query
 - a. Query related to **IMR** – receive IMR form from Ingenico
 - b. Review IMR form and Issue TC (where applicable)
 - c. Update Dynamics and check that TC is accepted on G/L acc. 627236
 - d. Once TC is accepted move TC from G/L 627236 to Creditor Holding acc 629122
 - e. Update Dynamics and end.
4. Investigate and establish nature of error, check in CREDENCE/BANK TECH, (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
5. Fill in form "POL/CLIENT incident report" (Overpayment / Underpayment) (all form have incident number), system generated incident number and add own initial and (A=TC, E=Internal adjustment,) (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
6. Update Dynamics with activities
7. Print 3 hardcopies, keep 1 and file, 2 copies to settlement team intray, (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
8. Receive 1 signed and dated copy back from Settlement team (they have actioned what was on the form), (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
9. File signed copy from Settlement team in team folder, (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
10. Determine next step: a)No action and file, b)Action with TC
11. Where applicable issue TC in POLSAP with ref number=Incident number
12. Branch accept TC
13. End

Risk & Control PayStation

Control(s): TC14.01

Risk: Paystation variances become aged and are not investigated and resolved

Control objective: To ensure aged balances are reviewed and cleared down periodically

Frequency: Annual

Control owner: FSC Team Leader (Tracy Middleton)

Control description: An annual ageing review is performed on Paystation variances (GL 629122) arising on non-pollled terminals with write off being performed for all balances aged in excess of 3 years.

Control(s): TC14.02

Risk: Queries in relation to Paystation are not investigated in a timely manner, resulting in incorrect aged balances and loss of goodwill

Control objective: Monitor and investigate open items

Frequency: Weekly

Control owner: FSC Team Leader (Tracy Middleton)

Control description: When a query is received in relation to Paystation, the enquiry is entered into the workflow system. An actionable date is placed on the system and this is updated each time the query is worked on. A weekly review is performed on the "workflow" system to ensure all actionable dates are reasonable and that items are being processed in line with the system schedule - amendments are made to dates and workflow where required.

Control(s): TC14.03

Risk: Paystation variances become aged and are not investigated and resolved

Control objective: Monitor and investigate open items

Frequency: Weekly

Control owner: FSC Team Leader (Tracy Middleton)

Control description: On a weekly basis the Automated Payments Enquiry team review GL 627236 and transfer all accepted transaction corrections into 629122 to allow monitoring and aging review. Where transaction correction is not accepted this is followed up as per the workflow system timings.



Control(s): C4.9.a.2 & C4.9.a.3

Risk: Balance sheet accounts are not reviewed resulting in error and misstatement or fraud

Control objective: To ensure that all BS accounts are reconciled and analysed and have evidence of balance justification

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Operations Manager(s)

Control description: "All BS accounts within FSC area are reconciled at month end by the relevant Admin team members. Any open items are explained / annotated by the Admin team member and the reconciliation is sent to respective FSC Team Managers for review and approval. The FSC Team Manager(s) follows up any unreconciled/unexplained items with the respective Admin team member and once satisfied the reconciliation is approved (sign and dated as evidence) and forwarded to the FSC Operations Manager for final review and approval. The FSC Operations Manager reviews and queries where applicable with the FSC Team Manager(s) and sends/signs as evidence of final approval. The reconciliation(s) with approvals and any supporting documentation is dated, stored/printed and filed on SharePoint."



Control(s): C4.9.a.5 & C4.9.a.6

Risk: Build-up of aged balances - unapproved aged balances of affected account resulting in loss of reputation to Post Office.

Control objective: To ensure close monitoring of aged balances and prevent where possible any aged build-up of accounts affected.

Frequency: Weekly

Control owner: FSC Operations Manager(s)

Control description: "On a weekly basis the FSC Operations Manager performs an ageing analysis of all open items matching account per product area. The main objective is to prevent wherever possible any open item(s) falling into an aged (>3 months) category."



1.6.4

Pre Order Foreign Currencies

Background

This process is for pre-order of foreign currency.

Customer can either:


PRE ORDER - Order direct from Branch

CLICK AND COLLECT - Order direct Online with First rate and pick up in Branch, or order direct via phone to First rate and pick up in Branch.

POLSAP GL accounts:

- 629310 – Outstanding Transaction Corrections (The whole Branch Corrections team uses this account)

Settlement team would have an open item in case the team forgets to issue a TC.



Activity – Pre-Order

Chronological steps in the process:

1. Query raised due to currency error.
2. Automated Payments Team logs query into MS Dynamics.
3. Automated Payments Team investigate error; is this a Branch or First Rate pre order.
4. If First Rate contact First Rate and advise of Query – await response.
5. If a Branch pre order investigate APOP.
6. Gather supporting documentation.
7. Contact First Rate or Branch and discuss proposed actions, issue evidence.
8. If no TC is required confirm with Branch or First Rate everything is okay and update Dynamics, close case.
9. If TC is required issues TC.
10. Branch accepts TC.
11. Advise Settlement Team to Debit or Credit First Rate, based upon TC type issued.
12. File and Close case on Dynamics.



Control(s): C4.9.a.11-16 (same control, however assigned to 6 different Team Managers)

Risk: Workload and peaks are not monitored resulting in build-up of back log.

Control objective: To ensure there are frequent monitoring of the teams workload and any necessarily actions are taken pro-actively.

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Team Manager(s)

Control description: "The FSC Team Manager monitors on a weekly basis their team's workload and escalates areas of concern with their reporting line. Issues affecting the team's ability to process workloads are flagged by the FSC Team Manager and discussed in the weekly FSC Team Leader meeting. On a monthly basis the FSC Team Manager signs, dates and retains the "weekly Stats" as evidence."



Control(s): C4.9.a.17

Risk: Control accounts are not monitored on a regular basis resulting in unjustified and unexplained aged balances.

Control objective: Control accounts are monitored on a regular basis and action taken to clear any aged items without unnecessarily delay.

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Team Manager


Control description: "The FSC Team Manager monitors on a monthly basis all outstanding TC's over 5 weeks on control account 'A/C 629310 Outstanding Transaction Correction Cash'. All issued TC's related to "Cash" are also posted on Control account 'A/C 629310 ' to enable overall monitoring, and an e-mail reminder is automatically sent each month to TC issuer for all open TC's > 5 weeks. The TC issuer annotates for own area of responsibility an explanation/action against each open TC. The information from each TC issuer with open TCs are collated, monitored and followed up with TC issuer via control 'A/C 629310'. Once satisfied that all open TCs have a justification with action - the FSC Team Manager signs, dates and files the open item report on control 'A/C 629310' as evidence of review."

1.6.5

Pre-Order

Relates to case logging/creation/update in Dynamics


This describes the process for how the AP team handle pre-order enquiries from First Rate Exchange Services, and Premasters.



1.6.6

Online Order


Relates to case logging/creation/update in Dynamics



1.6.7

Click and Collect

Relates to case logging/creation/update in Dynamics





1.6.8

TMC & Currency

Background


Travel money card is a card where you can load money on the card and use e.g. abroad. (Multi-currency card, e.g. can put multiple currencies on it). There are no day to day involvement from the team, only via queries from First Rate, Branch etc.

Settlement team would have an open item in case the team forgets to issue a TC or settle with First Rate.

POLSAP GL accounts:

- 627024 – travellers cheque matching account Travellers' Cheques
- 555083 – currency sales made in branches TMC

Glossary of Control Owners	
Job Title	Control Owner
FSC Team Leader	Tracy Middleton TMC
FSC Team Leader	Andrea Green Travellers' Cheques



Activity - First Rate

Chronological steps in the process:

1. Customer buys Travel Money Card from branch
2. Branch input into Horizon..... (Branch)
3. Upload file to CREDENCE (Accenture)
4. Receive enquiry from First rate/Branch etc. (via AP enquiry inbox) (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
5. Log query into "Enquiries spreadsheet", (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
6. Move Query from AP enquiry inbox to Travel Money Card folder, (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
7. Investigate and establish nature of error, check in CREDENCE, (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
8. Confirm proposed action with First rate/Branch (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
9. Determine if TC is required (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
10. Where no TC is required – transaction seems OK and advise Frist rate/Branch (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
11. If TC needed complete Settlement Sheet to inform Settlement Team to debit/credit First Rate accordingly and await signed sheet to be returned (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
12. Update "Enquiries spreadsheet" , (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
13. Issue TC in POLSAP (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
14. Update "Enquiries spreadsheet" , (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
15. Branch accept TC, (Branch)
16. End

Control(s): TC10.01

Risk: First Rate travel money card transaction corrections are not agreed with third party, resulting in subsequent variances

Control objective: To ensure transaction corrections are confirmed with third party prior to processing

Frequency: As required

Control owner: FSC Team Leader (Tracy Middleton)

Control description: When a resolution is concluded, an email is sent to First Rate or Branch to confirm the proposed action. "No response" is taken as agreement to the correction. If First Rate query the correction then they will contact the automated payments enquiry Team via encrypted email and the correction will be revisited. Final email confirmation is sent once query resolved.

Control(s): TC10.02

Risk: Travellers cheque encashment balances are not recoverable from third party

Control objective: Agree encashment with third party

Frequency: Weekly

Control owner: FSC Team Leader (Andrea Green)

Control description: On a weekly basis a file containing all traveller's cheque encashment balances where support has been received by First Rate (FR) is obtained from FR and uploaded into POLSAP. Automatic matching is performed between the uploaded report and horizon transactions from branch.

Control(s): TC10.03

Risk: Travellers cheque encashment balances are not recoverable from third party

Control objective: Identify and investigate open items

Frequency: Weekly

Control owner: FSC Team Leader (Andrea Green)

Control description: On a weekly basis the FSC run a GL report (627024) to identify all unmatched cheque encashment balances. Balances identified are followed up with the relevant branches and TC's issued where errors identified.

Control(s): TC10.04

Risk: Travellers cheque encashment balances are not recoverable from third party

Control objective: Identify items for write-off

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Team Leader (Andrea Green)

Control description: In the last week of each period an ageing review is performed on GL 627024 to identify all unmatched items in excess of 2 months aged. Where a TC has not been issued for these, the balance is written off to the profit and loss.



Control(s): C4.9.a.11-16 (same control, however assigned to 6 different Team Managers)

Risk: Workload and peaks are not monitored resulting in build up of back log.


Control objective: To ensure there are frequent monitoring of the teams workload and any necessary actions are taken pro-actively.

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Team Manager(s)

Control description: "The FSC Team Manager monitors on a weekly basis their teams workload and escalates areas of concern with their reporting line.

This relates to case updating on Dynamics





1.6.9


Government Services

Background

License applications for e.g. UK Border Agency, SIA Security Industry Authority & Driving Licences.

Glossary of Control Owners

Job Title	Control Owner
FSC Team Leader	Tracy Middleton



Activity - Government Services

Chronological steps in the process:

1. Receive enquiry from Client (e.g. SIA, DVLA, Branch etc.) (via Dynamics) (*Automated Payments Enquiry Team*)
2. Log query into Dynamics (*Automated Payments Enquiry Team*)
3. Investigate and establish nature of error, check in CREDENCE for (SIA, UK border Agency, DVLA renewals), (For Passport enquiries check database SQL) (*Automated Payments Enquiry Team*)
4. Confirm proposed action with Client, for SIA/DVLA only (If query is from Branch fill in Incident report), (*Automated Payments Enquiry Team*)
5. Fill in form -where applicable for Client- the "POL/CLIENT incident report" (Overpayment / Underpayment) (all forms have incident number), system generated incident number and add own initial and (A=TC, E=Internal adjustment,) (*Automated Payments Enquiry Team*)
6. Update Dynamics and add activities (*Automated Payments Enquiry Team*)
7. Print 3 hardcopies, keep 1 and file, 2 copies to settlement team Inray, (*Automated Payments Enquiry Team*)
8. Receive 1 signed and dated copy back from Settlement team (they have actioned what was on the form), (*Automated Payments Enquiry Team*)
9. File signed copy from Settlement team in team folder, (*Automated Payments Enquiry Team*)
10. Determine next step: a) No action and file (Code=E), b) Action with TC (code=A), (*Automated Payments Enquiry Team*)
11. Where applicable issue TC in POLSAP with ref number=Incident number, (*Automated Payments Enquiry Team*)
12. Branch accept TC, (*Branch*)
13. End

Risk & Control - Government Services



Control(s): C4.9.a.11-16 (same control, however assigned to 6 different Team Managers)

Risk: Workload and peaks are not monitored resulting in build up of back log.

Control objective: To ensure there are frequent monitoring of the teams workload and any necessarily actions are taken pro-actively.

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Team Manager(s)

Control description: "The FSC Team Manager monitors on a weekly basis their teams workload and escalates areas of concern with their reporting line. Issues affecting the team's ability to process workloads are flagged by the FSC Team Manager and discussed in the weekly FSC Team Leader meeting. On a monthly basis the FSC Team Manager signs, dates and retains the "weekly Stats" as evidence."



Control(s): C4.9.a.17

Risk: Control accounts are not monitored on a regular basis resulting in unjustified and unexplained aged balances.

Control objective: Control accounts are monitored on a regular basis and action taken to clear any aged items without unnecessarily delay.

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Team Manager

Control description: "The FSC Team Manager monitors on a monthly basis all outstanding TC's over 5 weeks on control account 'A/C 629310 Outstanding Transaction Correction Cash'. All issued TC's related to "Cash" are also posted on Control account 'A/C 629310 ' to enable overall monitoring, and an e.mail reminder is automatically sent each month to TC issuer for all open TC's > 5 weeks. The TC issuer annotates for own area of responsibility an explanation/action against each open TC. The information from each TC issuer with open TCs are collated, monitored and followed up with TC issuer via control 'A/C 629310'. Once satisfied that all open TCs have a justification with action - the FSC Team Manager signs, dates and files the open item report on control 'A/C 629310' as evidence of review."



1.6.10


DVLA

Background

Vehicle tax payments to DVLA.

Glossary of Control Owners

Job Title	Control Owner
FSC Team Leader	Tracy Middleton



Activity - DVLA

Chronological steps in the process:

1. Receive enquiry from NBSC/Customer care/client (AP9 form) (DVLA) (via AP enquiry inbox) (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
2. Log query into "Enquiries spreadsheet", (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
3. Move Query from AP enquiry inbox to relevant subfolder, (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
4. Investigate and establish nature of error, check in CREDENCE/BANK TECH, (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
5. Where required request further information/documentation from Client, (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
6. Update any AP9 form and return to client and fill in form "POL/CLIENT incident report" (Overpayment / Underpayment) (all form have incident number), system generated incident number and add own initial and (A=TC, E=Internal adjustment,) (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
7. Update log "Enquiries spreadsheet" with Status (1=Require pre-approval from "re-sellers", 2=Sent to Settlement, 3=Completed (form received back from Settlement and TC issued where required)
8. E.mail "POL/CLIENT incident report" to Settlement team and DVLA and print 1 hardcopy for own filing, (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
9. Receive 1 signed and dated hard copy back from Settlement team (they have actioned what was on the form), (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
10. File signed hard copy from Settlement team in team folder, (Automated Payments Enquiry Team)
11. Determine next step: a)No action and file, b>Action with TC
12. Where applicable issue TC in POLSAP with ref number=Incident number
13. Branch accept TC
14. End



Control(s): C4.9.a.11-16 (same control, however assigned to 6 different Team Managers)

Risk: Workload and peaks are not monitored resulting in build-up of back log.

Control objective: To ensure there are frequent monitoring of the teams workload and any necessarily actions are taken pro-actively.

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Team Manager(s)

Control description: "The FSC Team Manager monitors on a weekly basis their team's workload and escalates areas of concern with their reporting line.

Issues affecting the team's ability to process workloads are flagged by the FSC Team Manager and discussed in the weekly FSC Team Leader meeting.

On a monthly basis the FSC Team Manager signs, dates and retains the "weekly Stats" as evidence."



Control(s): C4.9.a.17

Risk: Control accounts are not monitored on a regular basis resulting in unjustified and unexplained aged balances.

Control objective: Control accounts are monitored on a regular basis and action taken to clear any aged items without unnecessarily delay.

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Team Manager

Control description: "The FSC Team Manager monitors on a monthly basis all outstanding TC's over 5 weeks on control account 'A/C 629310 Outstanding Transaction Correction Cash'. All issued TC's related to "Cash" are also posted on Control account 'A/C 629310 ' to enable overall monitoring, and an e-mail reminder is automatically sent each month to TC issuer for all open TC's > 5 weeks. The TC issuer annotates for own area of responsibility an explanation/action against each open TC. The information from each TC issuer with open TCs are collated, monitored and followed up with TC issuer via control 'A/C 629310'.

Once satisfied that all open TCs have a justification with action - the FSC Team Manager signs, dates and files the open item report on control 'A/C 629310' as evidence of review."

1.7

Stock & Mails




Glossary of Control Owners	
Job Title	Control Owner
FSC Team Leader	Tracy Middleton


Background

Monitoring of Royal Mail stock products, (Stamps) and adjustments.

REMIT IN is a means of accounting for received stock (stamps) and has no cash effect on the Branch, whereas a Stock adjustment has a Cash effect. When a branch receives stock it should always be REMIT IN. The ownership of stamps sits with Royal Mail and the Branch gets a commission for each stamp sold.

Wrongful stock adjustments could potentially lead to misstatement of sales data from Royal Mail.





Activity - Stock non Rem**Chronological steps in the process:**

1. Scheduled delivery / Request for extra (additional to already scheduled) Stamps to NBSC Helpline *(Branch)*
2. Swindon courier (CVIT) a Pouch and despatch to Branch *(Swindon)*
3. Check content and REMIT IN (manually) into HORIZON *(Branch)*
4. Selling of stamps enter into HORIZON *(Branch)*
5. End of Month (Balancing period) take physical stock count *(Branch)*
6. Print off balance in HORIZON and compare to physical stock *(Branch)*
7. If any difference – do a sale or a sale reversal *(Branch)*
8. Run daily report in CREDENCE and download to excel to check for Branch Stock adjustments (report shows all stock adjustments made by all Branches) *(Mails and Stock team)*
9. Save daily report in SharePoint “Stock Adjustments dd.mm.yy”, *(Mails and Stock team)*
10. Filter on highest positive value/volume (Positive means increase in stock, negative means decrease in stock), *(Mails and Stock team)*
11. Run non sales report in CREDENCE to identify the Stock products (within Stamps), *(Mails and Stock team)*
12. Log into GALAXY and verify what has been physically despatched from Swindon, *(Mails and Stock team)*
13. Compare non sales report in CREDENCE to despatched stock from GALAXY, *(Mails and Stock team)*
14. If not REMIT in, advise branch to REMIT IN and advise to do a Negative Stock adjustment (in order to balance the REMIT IN), *(Mails and Stock team)*
15. Update daily report in SharePoint “Stock Adjustments dd.mm.yy” with stock product, volume, value, contact person in Branch and advice given. *(Mails and Stock team)*
16. REMIT IN and Adjust the Stock in HORIZON, *(Branch)*
17. Re-run following day the Non Sales report in CREDENCE to verify that Branch has REMIT In and adjusted Stock. *(Mails and Stock team)*

TCs are AD HOC and involves receiving requests for TC from Branch, Audit, NBSC. G/L account 539106 “REM shortages Suspense” and G/L 629452 “REM Surplus Suspense” – these accounts are monitored for aged balances by the Cash Team.

Transaction Corrections:

1. Receive request for a TC, via e-mail, calls, NBSC spreadsheet (Branch, Audit team, NBSC), *(Mails and Stock team)*
2. Log request/query in hardcopy sheet with supporting documentation, (log from NBSC is electronic) *(Mails and Stock team)*
3. Investigate and establish the nature of error, *(Mails and Stock team)*
4. If error relates to “Open Postage” – Branch do a negative/positive Stock adjustment in HORIZON *(Branch)*
5. The value of Stock Adjustment is posted in HORIZON against a suspense in HORIZON *(Branch)*
6. Interface to POLSAP (suspense account)
7. Issue TC to offset POLSAP Suspense (Open Postage), *(Mails and Stock team)*
8. If error does not relate to “Open Postage”, do a Volume TC, *(Mails and Stock team)*
9. Branch accepts TC

1.7.1 Stock & Mails

Risk & Control **Stock non Rem**

Control(s): TC19.01**Risk:** Royal mail stock sales are incorrectly recognised, resulting in incorrect commission for sales**Control objective:** To ensure accuracy of royal mail stock sales**Frequency:** Daily**Control owner:** FSC Team Manager (Tracy Middleton)**Control description:** On a daily basis the mails and stock team run a "non sales transaction report" in Credence. The report is compared to stock shipments from Swindon to branch, per Galaxy system. Where stock deliveries have been booked at branch via a stock adjustment instead of "remit in", the branch is contacted to correct the transaction. All adjustments and associated advice is recorded on SharePoint spreadsheet "Stock Adjustments dd.mm.yy".**Control(s):** TC19.02**Risk:** Royal mail stock sales are incorrectly recognised, resulting in incorrect commission for sales**Control objective:** To ensure accuracy of royal mail stock sales**Frequency:** Daily**Control owner:** FSC Team Manager (Tracy Middleton)**Control description:** On a daily basis the mails and stock team run a "non sales transaction report" in Credence. The report is compared to the previous days SharePoint spreadsheet "Stock Adjustments dd.mm.yy" to identify any corrections recommended the previous working day that have not been processed by branch. The mails and stock team contact the relevant branch to follow up on issues accordingly.**Control(s):** C4.9.a.2 & C4.9.a.3**Risk:** Balance sheet accounts are not reviewed resulting in error and misstatement or fraud**Control objective:** To ensure that all BS accounts are reconciled and analysed and have evidence of balance justification**Frequency:** Monthly**Control owner:** FSC Operations Manager(s)**Control description:** "All BS accounts within FSC area are reconciled at month end by the relevant Admin team members. Any open items are explained / annotated by the Admin team member and the reconciliation is sent to respective FSC Team Managers for review and approval. The FSC Team Manager(s) follows up any unreconciled/unexplained items with the respective Admin team member and once satisfied the reconciliation is approved (sign and dated as evidence) and forwarded to the FSC Operations Manager for final review and approval. The FSC Operations Manager reviews and queries where applicable with the FSC Team Manager(s) and sends/signs as evidence of final approval. The reconciliation(s) with approvals and any supporting documentation is dated, stored/printed and filed on Sharepoint."**Control(s):** C4.9.a.5 & C4.9.a.6**Risk:** Build-up of aged balances - unapproved aged balances of affected account resulting in loss of reputation to PostOffice.**Control objective:** To ensure close monitoring of aged balances and prevent where possible any aged build-up of accounts affected.**Frequency:** Weekly**Control owner:** FSC Operations Manager(s)**Control description:** "On a weekly basis the FSC Operations Manager performs an ageing analysis of all open items matching account per product area. The main objective is to prevent wherever possible any open item(s) falling into an aged (>3 months) category.


The respective Team Managers explain the analysis for their product area at the weekly Team Operational meeting. Open items are prioritised by highest value, date and/or other steer from Management.

Agreed actions are followed up with respective FSC Team Managers.

The FSC Operations Manager signs and dates the analysis and minutes from meeting with any other supporting documentation and retain as evidence."

1.7.2

●
Obsolete Stock



1.8 Postal Orders, Drop & Go


Glossary of Control Owners	
Job Title	Control Owner
FSC Team Leader	Carol King


Background

Drop and Go is a service where one apply for a D&G card (up to GBP 750) to be used for postage. This service is specially geared towards e.g. eBay sellers etc. who have frequent parcels to ship. They don't need waiting in a queue and can drop off parcels quickly.

POLSAP GL accounts:

- 555095 – self-service post and go machines
- 555083 – online top up





Activity - Drop & Go

Chronological steps in the process:

(Cheque and MoneyGram team)

Part of APOP (Automated Payments Out Payment) team

Drop and Go is a service where one apply for a D&G card (up to GBP 750) to be used for postage. This service is specially geared towards e.g. e.bay sellers etc. who have frequent parcels to ship. They don't need waiting in a queue and can drop off parcels quickly.

CREDENCE shows all transactions that has happened in HORIZON

1. Customer applies/sets up an account with CDP (Accenture supported system) (where transactions are recorded and balances held) *(Customer)*
2. The branch scans the parcel labels and enters into HORIZON (postage paid) *(Branch)*
3. Branch process the postage payment part via the D&G card which debits the card balance *(Branch)*
4. Accenture sends daily "daily pending Closure Report" sitting on QUATRIX system *(Accenture)*
5. D&G team logs on to QUATRIX system and download daily reports to excel *(Drop & Go team)*
6. Unblock all cards on report in CDP system (D&G team) *(Drop & Go team)*
7. Check the transaction in CREDENCE using a) Office code, b) date, to identify the amount of the error *(Drop & Go team)*
8. Enter into CDP system and double check that the payment has not gone out *(Drop & Go team)*
9. Issue a credit TC (in POLSAP) to the Branch and debits the customer drop and go card *(Drop & Go team)*
10. The branch will see the TC in HORIZON next day and need to accept in order to clear transaction. *(Branch)*

Each day all items are resolved.

Risk & Control Drop & Go

Control(s): TC08.01

Risk: Customer's post and go account is not unblocked in a timely manner, resulting in reputational damage

Control objective: Identify and investigate unrecorded transactions

Frequency: Daily

Control owner: Drop and Go Team

Control description: On a daily basis the Drop and Go team download a "Daily Pending Closure" report from Quatrix. All related cards are unblocked on CDP and transaction records are compared to Credence. Variances are investigated and followed up.



Control(s): C4.9.a.2 & C4.9.a.3

Risk: Balance sheet accounts are not reviewed resulting in error and misstatement or fraud

Control objective: To ensure that all BS accounts are reconciled and analysed and have evidence of balance justification

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Operations Manager(s)

Control description: "All BS accounts within FSC area are reconciled at month end by the relevant Admin team members. Any open items are explained / annotated by the Admin team member and the reconciliation is sent to respective FSC Team Managers for review and approval. The FSC Team Manager(s) follows up any unreconciled/unexplained items with the respective Admin team member and once satisfied the reconciliation is approved (sign and dated as evidence) and forwarded to the FSC Operations Manager for final review and approval. The FSC Operations Manager reviews and queries where applicable with the FSC Team Manager(s) and sends/signs as evidence of final approval. The reconciliation(s) with approvals and any supporting documentation is dated, stored/printed and filed on SharePoint."



Control(s): C4.9.a.5 & C4.9.a.6

Risk: Build-up of aged balances - unapproved aged balances of affected account resulting in loss of reputation to Post Office.

Control objective: To ensure close monitoring of aged balances and prevent where possible any aged build-up of accounts affected.

Frequency: Weekly

Control owner: FSC Operations Manager(s)

Control description: "On a weekly basis the FSC Operations Manager performs an ageing analysis of all open items matching account per product area. The main objective is to prevent wherever possible any open item(s) falling into an aged (>3 months) category.

The respective Team Managers explain the analysis for their product area at the weekly Team Operational meeting. Open items are prioritised by highest value, date and/or other steer from Management.

Agreed actions are followed up with respective FSC Team Managers.

The FSC Operations Manager signs and dates the analysis and minutes from meeting with any other supporting documentation and retain as evidence."



Control(s): C4.9.a.11-16 (same control, however assigned to 6 different Team Managers)

Risk: Workload and peaks are not monitored resulting in build-up of back log.

Control objective: To ensure there are frequent monitoring of the teams workload and any necessary actions are taken pro-actively.

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Team Manager(s)


Control description: "The FSC Team Manager monitors on a weekly basis their team's workload and escalates areas of concern with their reporting line.

Issues affecting the team's ability to process workloads are flagged by the FSC Team Manager and discussed in the weekly FSC Team Leader meeting.

On a monthly basis the FSC Team Manager signs, dates and retains the "weekly Stats" as evidence."


1.8.1 Drop & Go daily process

Drop & Go daily process



1.8.2 Drop & Go Enquiry Process

Drop & Go Enquiry Process – High Level



Glossary of Control Owners	
Job Title	Control Owner
FSC Team Leader	Carol King

Background

Majority of this process is regarding sending postal orders for people without bank account.


Code 5 and 22 (coded as Ns) will trigger a TC

Max Postal Orders a person can buy is GBP 250

NB: Postal Order process will change - no longer dealing with IPSL.

POLSAP GL accounts:

- 622014 – BA Postal Orders
- 554546 – Barclays PO Differences



Activity - Postal order

Chronological steps in the process:

Team: APOP database – Postal Order team

1. Customer buys Postal Order from Branch (*Customer*)
2. Branch scans barcode on a blank Postal Order who automatically gets into HORIZON, (*Branch*)
3. Branch enters into HORIZON name and amount, (*Branch*)
4. Branch issue receipt and postal order to customer, (*Branch*)
5. Log into APOP system and Uploads daily exception report , (*Postal Order team*)
6. Reformat report and check and code each transaction (coding as per predefined list of actions) which via lookup/macro determines a Y=return to bank (TC not issued) (goes to IPSL who does the clearing with Barclays) who or a N=Dealt with within postal order team. (*Postal order team*)
7. Filter on report for anything to go back to IPSL (Ys) and send to IPSL by 10AM same day, (*Postal order team*)
8. IPSL sends back to Postal Order team the same file with further explanations, (*IPSL*)
9. Postal Order team advise IPSL either “PAY / NO PAY” and sends to IPSL by 2PM same day, (*Postal order team*)
10. IPSL amend the file and sends final file back to Postal Order team with final decision (NO PAY goes back to Post Office bank account (IPSL refund the money via Barclays), PAY goes to end Customer, CASE RAISED and IPSL investigates further. (*IPSL*)
11. IPSL also sends copy of NO PAY report to Postal Order team, (*IPSL*)
12. Investigate “Bank File Analysis dd.mm.yyyy” (normally next WD), and check on all N’s and look for code 5’s and 22’s who will trigger a TC, (*Postal order team*)
13. For code 5 investigates if transaction exist in CREDENCE? If yes (Spoil or Branch sale) then no further action required, if Not on CREDENCE issue a TC Invoice POLSAP “Enter Outgoing Invoices”. (*Postal order team*)
14. For code 22 are cases where the branch has given the postal order back to customer by mistake. Validate on the bank file (Exception report) that the money has been cashed twice. Raise a TC (invoice) to the branch to gain back the money.
15. Branch accepts TC in HORIZON, (*Branch*)
16. Period End reconciliation between POSTAL Orders and BANK, (*Postal order team*)

Control(s): TC16.01

Risk: A pay / no-pay decision regarding postal order is not issued to the bank on time, resulting in a financial penalty from the bank

Control objective: To ensure timely monitoring and investigation of open items

Frequency: Daily

Control owner: FSC Operations Manager (Carol King)

Control description: On a daily basis the Postal Order team run a "Daily exception report" from APOP, highlighting all Postal Order exceptions. These are categorised and resolved internally or passed to the IPSL team by 10am each day. IPSL items are returned to the Postal Order Team by 2pm same day to be resolved.

Control(s): TC16.02

Risk: Branch errors in relation to postal orders are not identified and followed up, resulting in losses not being passed to the branch

Control objective: To ensure timely monitoring and investigation of open items

Frequency: Daily

Control owner: FSC Operations Manager (Carol King)

Control description: On a daily basis the Postal Order team review the "Bank file analysis dd.mm.yyyy" file to identify erroneous branch transactions which require TC's (Code 5 and 22). These are investigated and followed up same day.



Control(s): C4.9.a.2 & C4.9.a.3

Risk: Balance sheet accounts are not reviewed resulting in error and misstatement or fraud

Control objective: To ensure that all BS accounts are reconciled and analysed and have evidence of balance justification

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Operations Manager(s)

Control description: "All BS accounts within FSC area are reconciled at month end by the relevant Admin team members. Any open items are explained / annotated by the Admin team member and the reconciliation is sent to respective FSC Team Managers for review and approval. The FSC Team Manager(s) follows up any unreconciled/unexplained items with the respective Admin team member and once satisfied the reconciliation is approved (sign and dated as evidence) and forwarded to the FSC Operations Manager for final review and approval. The FSC Operations Manager reviews and queries where applicable with the FSC Team Manager(s) and sends/signs as evidence of final approval. The reconciliation(s) with approvals and any supporting documentation is dated, stored/printed and filed on SharePoint."



Control(s): C4.9.a.5 & C4.9.a.6

Risk: Build-up of aged balances - unapproved aged balances of affected account resulting in loss of reputation to PostOffice.

Control objective: To ensure close monitoring of aged balances and prevent where possible any aged build-up of accounts affected.

Frequency: Weekly

Control owner: FSC Operations Manager(s)

Control description: "On a weekly basis the FSC Operations Manager performs an ageing analysis of all open items matching account per product area. The main objective is to prevent wherever possible any open item(s) falling into an aged (>3 months) category.

The respective Team Managers explain the analysis for their product area at the weekly Team Operational meeting. Open items are prioritised by highest value, date and/or other steer from Management.

Agreed actions are followed up with respective FSC Team Managers.


The FSC Operations Manager signs and dates the analysis and minutes from meeting with any other supporting documentation and retain as evidence."





Control(s): C4.9.a.11-16 (same control, however assigned to 6 different Team Managers)

1.8.4 Post Orders AP Reversals

Postal Orders AP Reversals




1.8.5 Postal Orders Daily Barclays File




1.8.6 Postal Orders Email Enquiries

Postal Orders Email Enquiries




1.8.7 Postal Orders Letters Enquiries



1.8.8 Postal Orders '122' Errors

Postal Orders '122' Errors 



1.9 Agents Debt

Glossary of Control Owners	
Job Title	Control Owner
FSC Team Leader Agents Accounting Team	Dawn Phillips
FSC Team Leader Former Agents Accounting Team	Dawn Wall

Background

The majority of this process relates to the collection of debt relating to current or former subpostmasters.

- Debt can be the result of a misbalance between methods of payment (cash, cheque, payment card) in the branch when compared to transactional data entered into Horizon.
- Invoiced debt is also included, for example if a branch has been invoiced for costs relating to an alarm system.
- Alternatively debt could be due to a difference in the value of stock declared in Horizon when compared to the stock held in branch

SAP accounts:

- Debt is held on the relevant customer account for a postmaster or former postmaster.

The purpose of the Agents Account Team (AAT)

- To action debt belonging to current agents from the initial identification through to collection of balance. Agent debt builds up during a month and the monitoring begins the following month. The process from initial monitoring through to collection should take a maximum of 35 days in the case of full settlement, but can extend for a significantly longer period where a payment plan is put in place.

The purpose of the Former Agents Accounting Team (FAAT)

- To action debt owed by former agents from the initial identification through to collection of balance. The process can be lengthy (potentially years) and therefore monitoring of the ongoing cases and maintaining robust documentation is key to success in the process.

Activity – Current Agents Debt**Chronological steps in the process:**

1. Agent incurs debt (deficit in branch, central invoices or choose to settle credits centrally) and choose to settle at the end of the day, in horizon, via either:
 - a) make good cash / cheque (required for all debt < £150 – horizon driven option)
 - b) settle centrally
2. If debt isn't settled, recorded in 539590.
3. Balances swept from 539590 into 539591 on a monthly basis (part of branch close down process)
4. Balances selected as "settle centrally" in horizon are swept into customer account codes in CFS (13000 codes)
5. POLSAP account 539591 is mirrored in CFS within the customer account codes (13000 codes)
6. First Monday of the month, Agent Accounting Team (AAT) run "Dunning Run 1" report from CFS for A branches.
7. Identify "former agents" and flag to the Former Agent Accounting Team (FAAT).
8. Identify branches with debt < £2. Complete a "write off" form, process write off and retain documentation.
9. Identify multiple partner branches. Send monthly statement to the partners requesting payment.
10. Identify other current agents (new multiple partner branches, singletons, operator self-funded). Send "Dunning Letter 1" requesting settlement of debt within 7 days.
11. Second Tuesday of the month, ADT run "Dunning Run 2" report from CFS for A branches.
12. Identify other current agents. Send "Dunning Letter 2" requesting settlement of debt within 7 days.
13. Third Wednesday of the month, ADT run "Worklist" report from CFS for A branches.
14. AAT team call the SPMR (number of attempted calls dependent on size of debt) to request payment.
15. Debt not settled, AAT assess the debt against SPMR monthly remuneration and calculate time period to repay using 25% of monthly remuneration as a basis.
16. Case passed to contract advisor if agent currently on or has had a payment plan in the last 12 months (manual check) or has directly refused to settle the debt.
17. Obtain approval for payment plan based on the payment plan approval matrix.
18. Contact SPMR to advise of payment plan put in place – mail merge letter sent.
19. Spreadsheet completed by AAT and sent to HR to setup payment / payment plan.

Control(s): AD1a

Risk: Agent debt is not monitored resulting in irrecoverable balances and potentially fraudulent transactions not being investigated.

Control objective: To ensure agent debt is monitored on a regular basis.

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC team leader (Dawn Phillips)

Control description: All branches are subject to monthly review of agent debt by the FSC. On a monthly basis the Agent Accounting Team (AAT) run a “Dunning” report from CFS to identify agent debt balances. All balances > £2 are followed up with the agent through issuance of a “dunning letter”. This process is repeated after 7 days for 2 consecutive weeks, following which the debt collection process is started for outstanding balances i.e. payment plan or deduction from agent remuneration. Copies of dunning letters and dunning report analysis are retained.

Control(s): AD1b

Risk: Agent debt is not monitored resulting in irrecoverable balances and potentially fraudulent transactions not being investigated.

Control objective: To ensure agent debt is monitored on a regular basis.

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC team leader (Dawn Phillips)

Control description: On a monthly basis a “customer line report” is run by the Agent Accounting Team (AAT). The report is reviewed for agent debt balances > 35 days for which a “dunning” letter has not been issued and therefore the debt recovery process started. All instances are appropriately investigated and followed up by the AAT with documentation of investigation retained.

Control(s): AD1c

Risk: Agent debt becomes irrecoverable and potentially fraudulent transactions are not investigated.

Control objective: To ensure agent debt payment plans are appropriately reviewed and authorised

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC team leader (Dawn Phillips)

Control description: Prior to an agent debt payment plan being implemented the Agent Accounting Team (AAT) obtain signed approval in line with the payment plan approval matrix: - Payment plan < 12 months = AAT administrator - Payment plan > 12 months and < 24 months = Dawn Phillips - Payment plan > 24 months = Alison Bolsover - Payment plan > 36 months = Contract Advisor

Where a payment plan already exists for the agent, or a payment plan has been in place within the previous 12 months for the agent, additional approval is required from the Contract Advisor, in order to mitigate the potential fraud risk. Evidence of approval is retained.

Control(s): AD1d

Risk: Agent debt becomes irrecoverable and potentially fraudulent transactions are not investigated.

Control objective: To ensure agent debt is monitored on a regular basis.

Frequency: Weekly

Control owner: FSC team leader (Dawn Phillips)

Control description: A CFS “customer account” report is run on a weekly basis by the Agent Accounting Team (AAT). Comparison is made between the level of agent debt per this report and the monthly agent remuneration (as provided by HR). Items which breach either of the following are flagged to the Legal Team for further investigation and fraud analysis: - agent isn’t on a payment plan and the agent debt will take > 12 months to pay based on repayments of maximum 25% of remuneration - current payment plan exceeds 25% of monthly remuneration

Control(s): C4.9.a.2 & C4.9.a.3

Risk: Balance sheet accounts are not reviewed resulting in error and misstatement or fraud

Control objective: To ensure that all BS accounts are reconciled and analysed and have evidence of balance justification

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Operations Manager(s)

Activity – Former Agents Debt

Chronological steps in the process:

1. Masterdata updated to change the agent “type” on the system from current agent (AGUN) to former agent (FSPM).
2. Every Friday the Former Agent Accounting Team (FAAT) run a “customer account” report from CFS, compare this to the manual spreadsheet maintained in SharePoint and identify all FSPM’s.
3. Identify agents that have become former within the week (compared against prior week’s spreadsheet):
 - a) Where debt < £50, complete a write off form and complete write off in CFS. Case closed.
 - b) Other balances, setup a hardcopy case file for FSPM, setup a case within the CFS worklist for FSPM (flagging the resubmission date required) and send letter to FSPM requesting payment (within 21 days).
4. Identify former agents who have exceeded payment terms (flags on CFS worklist) (step 3b):
 - a) Where debt < £300, complete a write off form and complete write off in CFS. Case closed.
 - b) Debt > £300, flag to legal team (LT) who issue an LBA and then decide whether to progress the debt recovery:
 - i) No – advise FAAT who complete a write off form and complete write off in CFS. Case closed.
 - ii) Yes – LBA letter issued by LT to FSPM. FAAT update resubmission date in CFS.
5. Identify former agents who have been sent LBA’s previously (step 4aii)
 - a) Identify if branch was trading as a limited company:
 - i) No and debt < £5k – LT to take case to small claims court.
 - ii) No and debt > £5k – LT to start legal proceedings.
 - iii) Yes – send letter to guarantors requesting payment.
 - iv) Yes and no response from guarantors – SCLT to take case to small claims court (< £5k) or start legal proceedings (>£5k)
 - b) LT advise FAAT of status. CFS updated to reflect workflow.

Control(s): AD2a

Risk: Former agent debt is not monitored resulting in irrecoverable balances.

Control objective: To ensure former agent debt is monitored on a regular basis.

Frequency: Weekly

Control owner: FSC team leader (Dawn Wall)

Control description: On a weekly basis the Former Agent Accounting Team (FAAT) run a worklist report from CFS to identify all debt associated with former agents. This is compared to the maintained "mastersheet" (control AD2b) and the case followed up appropriately.

Control(s): AD2b

Risk: Former agent debt is not monitored resulting in irrecoverable balances.

Control objective: To ensure former agent debt is monitored on a regular basis.

Frequency: As required

Control owner: FSC team leader (Dawn Wall)

Control description: A spreadsheet ("Mastersheet ddmmy") is maintained within SharePoint which includes status details for all open cases in relation to former agent debt. The spreadsheet is updated at each point that the case is worked on by the Former Agent Accounting Team (FAAT) and is used to monitor workload. Workflow is driven by the worklist maintained with CFS which is updated in line with the SharePoint document. User access restrictions are in place on the SharePoint spreadsheet.

Control(s): AD2c

Risk: Former agent debt is not monitored resulting in irrecoverable balances.

Control objective: To ensure former agent debt is monitored on a regular basis.

Frequency: As required

Control owner: FSC team leader (Dawn Wall)


Control description: A hardcopy case file is maintained for all former agent debt balances. This forms the basis of any legal proceedings that may be required. The file is updated at each point that the case is worked on by the Agent Debt Team and is retained until the point of final settlement by the former agent.

1.9.3 Disputed Balance

Glossary of Control Owners	
Job Title	Control Owner
AAT Team leader	Dawn Phillips
FAAT Team leader	Dawn Wall

Background

At any point in the agent debt process (6.1 and 6.2 above) the agent (or former agent) can dispute the debt balance. The process can result in no changes to the case, such as when there is no evidence to the agent's claims / queries, or it may result in a transaction correction and subsequent change in the balance requested from the agent. There is no specific timeframe for completion, with cases taking as long as required to resolve. Debt collection is halted whilst disputes are being investigated



Activity: Disputed balance

Chronological steps in the process:

1. Agent/Former Agent contacts AAT/FAAT with a query over the debt balance – sent via letter with supporting information.
2. AAT/FAAT request support from the SPMR (if not provided with initial query).
3. AAT/FAAT place the debt collection process on hold.
4. Agent doesn't provide support – "hold" removed and case continues
5. Agent provides support – AAT/FAAT investigate claim
6. AAT/FAAT agree with claim – process TC, continue with case if balance remains or end case if no balance remaining.
7. Contact SPMR to advise of the findings.
8. SPMR wishes to escalate the query.
9. Team leader reviews the case to assess if further amendments needed.
10. AAT/FAAT agree with claim – process TC, continue with case if balance remains or end case if no balance remaining.

Risk & Control: Disputed balance

Control(s): AD3a

Risk: Agent debt balance is incorrect and not investigated.

Control objective: To ensure agent enquiries are reviewed and approved.

Frequency: As needed

Control owner: FSC Operations Manager (Dawn Phillips / Dawn Wall)

Control description: Where an agent / former agent wishes to dispute a debt balance the query is investigated. Where the query is escalated by the agent, the case is formally reviewed and approved by the agent debt team leader. Documentation is retained to support the review process (documentation mirrors the form of communication by branch, therefore phone calls are not recorded).

Control(s): C4.9.a.2 & C4.9.a.3

Risk: Balance sheet accounts are not reviewed resulting in error and misstatement or fraud

Control objective: To ensure that all BS accounts are reconciled and analysed and have evidence of balance justification

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Operations Manager(s)

Control description: "All BS accounts within FSC area are reconciled at month end by the relevant Admin team members. Any open items are explained / annotated by the Admin team member and the reconciliation is sent to respective FSC Team Managers for review and approval. The FSC Team Manager(s) follows up any unreconciled/unexplained items with the respective Admin team member and once satisfied the reconciliation is approved (sign and dated as evidence) and forwarded to the FSC Operations Manager for final review and approval. The FSC Operations Manager reviews and queries where applicable with the FSC Team Manager(s) and sends/signs as evidence of final approval. The reconciliation(s) with approvals and any supporting documentation is dated, stored/printed and filed on SharePoint."

Control(s): C4.9.a.11-16 (same control, however assigned to 6 different Team Managers)

Risk: Workload and peaks are not monitored resulting in build-up of back log.

Control objective: To ensure there are frequent monitoring of the teams workload and any necessarily actions are taken proactively.

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC team leader(s)

Control description: "The FSC Team Manager monitors on a weekly basis their team's workload and escalates areas of concern with their reporting line. Issues affecting the team's ability to process workloads are flagged by the FSC Team Manager and discussed in the weekly FSC Team Leader meeting. On a monthly basis the FSC Team Manager signs, dates and retains the "weekly Stats" as evidence."

1.9.4 Agent Surplus

Glossary of Control Owners	
Job Title	Control Owner
AAT Team leader	Dawn Phillips
FAAT Team leader	Dawn Wall


Background

Agent accounts can be in a deficit position (agent debt) or a surplus position. A surplus is where the branch have excess funds and assuming no subsequent transaction correction is received or a deficit is offset by surplus then the funds should become the property of the SPMR. The SPMR may choose to accept these funds or decline them, with the latter resulting in a creditor on POL BS.

POLSAP GL codes:

- 539590 – weekly build-up of agent debt, swept into 529591 weekly.
- 539591 – built up agent debt

626210 – surplus balances not reimbursed to SPMR



Activity: Agent surplus

Chronological steps in the process:

1. Horizon records surplus within 539590. SPMR choose to settle at the end of the day, in horizon, via either:
 - a) take the surplus cash from system and retain it – end of process
 - b) settle centrally
2. Balances swept from 539590 into 539591 on a monthly basis (part of branch close down process)
3. Balances selected as “settle centrally” in horizon are swept into customer account codes in CFS (13000)
4. POLSAP account 539591 is mirrored in CFS within customer accounts
5. Once a month AAT run a “customer account” report in CFS and identify accounts in surplus:
 - a) Surplus < £150, refunded to SPMR by AAT.
 - b) Surplus > £150 an < £500, balance is held on the account for 6 months prior to refund by AAT (on the basis that a TC / other correction will filter through to resolve the surplus in this period).
 - c) Surplus > £500 and < £1000, balance retained for 12 months before refund issued.
 - d) Surplus > £1000, balance retained for 12 months then SPMR contacted to ask if they want refund. If they don't, balance transferred to 626210 and held for 5 years prior to release.

Risk & Control: Agent surplus

Control(s): AD4a

Risk: Agent surplus refunded prematurely resulting in agent debt

Control objective: To ensure surplus' refunded after appropriate time period

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Team Leader (Dawn Phillips)

Control description: Once a month the Agent Accounting Team (AAT) review the agent debt balances for "surplus" balances. Where identified, age and value are used to identify the action to perform:

- Surplus < £150, refunded to agent by ATT.
- Surplus > £150 and < £500, balance held for 6 months then refunded to agent by AAT.
- Surplus > £500 and < £1000, balance retained for 12 months then refunded to agent by AAT.
- Surplus > £1000, balance retained for 12 months then agent contacted regarding refund. For refunds not accepted by agent the balance should be transferred to GL 626210 for monitoring.

Control(s): AD4b

Risk: Agent surplus retained / released over incorrect term

Control objective: To ensure branch surpluses are separately identifiable and held for a reasonable period of time to allow customers to query

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Team Leader (Dawn Phillips)

Control description: When a branch surplus becomes aged in excess of 12 months, branches are contacted to ask if they would like a refund. Where a refund is declined by branch, the surplus should be transferred to GL 626210 where it is to be retained for 5 years prior to release to PL.

Control(s): AD4c

Risk: Agent surplus retained / released over incorrect term

Control objective: To ensure branch surpluses are separately identifiable and held for a reasonable period of time to allow customers to query

Frequency: Quarterly

Control owner: FSC Team Leader (Dawn Phillips)

Control description: Quarterly review performed on GL 626210 to identify agent debt surplus balances in excess of 6 years (since surplus occurred). Quarterly release of balance is processed.

1.9.5 Loan to POL


Glossary of Control Owners	
Job Title	Control Owner
AAT Team leader	Dawn Phillips

Background

When a branch runs short on cash the SPMR can choose to top up the cash supplies from their own funds. They record this within the loan account which allows the FSC to monitor the loan balances.

POLSAP GL codes:

- 621020 – Loans to POL



Activity: Loan to POL

Chronological steps in the process:

1. SPMR identifies shortfall in branch cash.
2. SPMR loans cash to the branch and records this within GL 621020 (Dr Cash, Cr Loan to POL).
3. Cash remittance received from cash centre
4. SPMR takes funds from cash remittance and records within GL 621020 (Cr Cash, Dr Loan to POL).
5. Monthly basis, AAT run a report of GL 62102 to identify net debit balance.
6. Where account has been in net debit position more than once in 12 months – contact Legal team to investigate potential fraud.
7. Other instances > 1 month old - contact SPMR to discuss balance and request account settled up.

Risk & Control: Agent surplus

Control(s): AD5a

Risk: Fraudulent borrowing by postmaster

Control objective: To monitor loan account balances and identify potentially fraudulent actions

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Team Leader (Dawn Phillips)

Control description: On a monthly basis a GL transaction list (GL 621020) is downloaded and reviewed. Where branches do not have a nil postmaster loan balance, investigation occurs. A debit balance would indicate the postmaster is borrowing POL funds, in which case follow up occurs and is documented. Where the postmaster is noted as being on the list more than once in 12 months it is flagged to the fraud team for review. Where the balance is a net credit balance this indicates the post master hasn't taken back their loan balance from the latest cash remittance from cash centre. Where the balance is more than 1 month aged this is investigated. Documentation of the review and appropriate commentary is retained.

1.10 Burglaries


Glossary of Control Owners	
Job Title	Control Owner
FSC Team Leader	Andrea Green

Background

Burglary in branch results in transaction corrections between initial posting account and subsequent holding and monitoring account.

POLSAP GL accounts:

- 539107 – Burglary suspense
- 539108 – Burglary pending



Activity - Burglary

Chronological steps in the process:

1. Burglary identified in branch (Branch).
2. Value less than £1000 – post directly into GL 539107 (Branch).
3. Value greater than £1000 – branch closes and they notify FSC.
4. FSC inform Internal audit who perform an branch audit.
5. Form P3263 completed – documenting findings
6. Daily basis, Debit card and lottery team run a GL report to identify balances.
7. Items > £1000 agreed to P3263 form, or left in GL until form received.
8. TC issued to move balance to 539108, pending identification of culpability, balance then released to P&L as required.

Risk & Control: Burglary

Control(s): TC20.01

Risk: Transaction corrections in relation to branch burglary are processed before audit is performed

Control objective: To ensure internal audit review occurs prior to processing burglary transactions

Frequency: As required

Control owner: FSC Team Leader (Andrea Green)

Control description: Where a burglary occurs in branch, balances in excess of £1000 are posted into the burglary suspense account (539107). Prior to processing a transaction correction for these a completed P3263 form must be received from internal audit, following their investigation. The value per suspense account is agreed to the P3262 form prior to the balance being corrected.



Control(s): C4.9.a.2 & C4.9.a.3

Risk: Balance sheet accounts are not reviewed resulting in error and misstatement or fraud

Control objective: To ensure that all BS accounts are reconciled and analysed and have evidence of balance justification

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Operations Manager(s)

Control description: "All BS accounts within FSC area are reconciled at month end by the relevant Admin team members. Any open items are explained / annotated by the Admin team member and the reconciliation is sent to respective FSC Team Managers for review and approval. The FSC Team Manager(s) follows up any unreconciled/unexplained items with the respective Admin team member and once satisfied the reconciliation is approved (sign and dated as evidence) and forwarded to the FSC Operations Manager for final review and approval. The FSC Operations Manager reviews and queries where applicable with the FSC Team Manager(s) and sends/signs as evidence of final approval. The reconciliation(s) with approvals and any supporting documentation is dated, stored/printed and filed on SharePoint."



Control(s): C4.9.a.5 & C4.9.a.6

Risk: Build-up of aged balances - unapproved aged balances of affected account resulting in loss of reputation to Post Office.

Control objective: To ensure close monitoring of aged balances and prevent where possible any aged build-up of accounts affected.

Frequency: Weekly

Control owner: FSC Operations Manager(s)

Control description: "On a weekly basis the FSC Operations Manager performs an ageing analysis of all open items matching account per product area. The main objective is to prevent wherever possible any open item(s) falling into an aged (>3 months) category.

The respective Team Managers explain the analysis for their product area at the weekly Team Operational meeting. Open items are prioritised by highest value, date and/or other steer from Management.

Agreed actions are followed up with respective FSC Team Managers.

The FSC Operations Manager signs and dates the analysis and minutes from meeting with any other supporting documentation and retain as evidence."



Control(s): C4.9.a.11-16 (same control, however assigned to 6 different Team Managers)

Risk: Workload and peaks are not monitored resulting in build-up of back log.

Control objective: To ensure there are frequent monitoring of the teams workload and any necessary actions are taken pro-actively.

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Team Manager(s)

Control description: "The FSC Team Manager monitors on a weekly basis their team's workload and escalates areas of concern with their reporting line. Issues affecting the team's ability to process workloads are flagged by the FSC Team Manager and discussed in the weekly FSC Team Leader meeting.

On a monthly basis the FSC Team Manager signs, dates and retains the "weekly Stats" as evidence."

1.11 Suspense


Glossary of Control Owners	
Job Title	Control Owner
FSC Team Leader	Sarah Parkes
FSC Ops Manager	Gillian Hoyland

Background

Cash shortages/surplus related to Cash Rems from Branch. This process relates to cash rem from Branch, whenever the cash centre counts up either a surplus or a shortage of cash send by pouches from Branch.

POLSAP GL accounts:

- 539106 – Shortage suspense
- 539104 – Surplus – surpluses from Cash Centre (input by Cash Centre)
- 629452 – Surplus suspense
- 531220 – Shortages from Cash Centre (input by Cash Centre)



Activity - Suspense

Chronological steps in the process:

9. Cash Centre receives cash pouches and counts (Cash Centre)
10. Where discrepancies (shortage/Surplus), post to respective suspense account (Cash Centre)
11. Download to excel templates transactions from POLSAP G/L account surplus / shortages (Cash Control Team)
12. Prepare excel template for TC upload to POLSAP, (Cash Control Team)
13. Log into POLSAP – “automatic TC”, find correct file and do a test run, (Cash Control Team)
14. Review test run and where applicable correct test run, re-run test run, (Cash Control Team)
15. Once test run is successful – run TC’s in final mode, (Cash Control Team)
16. Annotate in POLSAP the G/L acc. with “TC issued, dd.mm.yy and counterparty suspense acc.), (Cash Control Team)
17. Branch accepts in Horizon, (Branch)
18. Message re TC to Branch, redeem transaction Correction? (Branch)
19. Follow up on issued TCs – await until next period (one month), any open items? (Cash Control Team)
20. Ensure no open items falls into aged (3 Months), (Cash Control Team)
21. Issue new TC to offset un-actioned (from Branch) original TC, (Cash Control Team)
22. Rec & probity

Control(s): TC21.01

Risk: Cash shortages / surpluses between branch and cash centre are not identified or investigated

Control objective: To ensure timely monitoring and investigation of open items

Frequency: Daily

Control owner: FSC Team Leader (Sarah Parkes)

Control description: On a daily basis the Cash Control Team receive a report on surpluses and shortages between cash centre and branch and upload into POLSAP. An "automated TC" template is completed the following day and uploaded into POLSAP in order to issue correcting TC's for the variances identified.

Control(s): TC21.02

Risk: Cash shortages / surpluses between branch and cash centre are not identified or investigated

Control objective: To ensure timely monitoring and investigation of open items

Frequency: Weekly

Control owner: FSC Team Leader (Sarah Parkes)

Control description: On a weekly basis the Cash Control Team run an ageing report on all bureau suspense accounts. All items aged > 1 month are investigated and followed up via issuance of revised TC or further investigation of the balance where required.



Control(s): C4.9.a.2 & C4.9.a.3

Risk: Balance sheet accounts are not reviewed resulting in error and misstatement or fraud

Control objective: To ensure that all BS accounts are reconciled and analysed and have evidence of balance justification

Frequency: Monthly

Control owner: FSC Operations Manager(s)

Control description: "All BS accounts within FSC area are reconciled at month end by the relevant Admin team members. Any open items are explained / annotated by the Admin team member and the reconciliation is sent to respective FSC Team Managers for review and approval. The FSC Team Manager(s) follows up any unreconciled/unexplained items with the respective Admin team member and once satisfied the reconciliation is approved (sign and dated as evidence) and forwarded to the FSC Operations Manager for final review and approval. The FSC Operations Manager reviews and queries where applicable with the FSC Team Manager(s) and sends/signs as evidence of final approval. The reconciliation(s) with approvals and any supporting documentation is dated, stored/printed and filed on SharePoint."



Control(s): C4.9.a.5 & C4.9.a.6

Risk: Build-up of aged balances - unapproved aged balances of affected account resulting in loss of reputation to Post Office.

Control objective: To ensure close monitoring of aged balances and prevent where possible any aged build-up of accounts affected.

Frequency: Weekly

Control owner: FSC Operations Manager(s)

Control description: "On a weekly basis the FSC Operations Manager performs an ageing analysis of all open items matching account per product area. The main objective is to prevent wherever possible any open item(s) falling into an aged (>3 months) category.

The respective Team Managers explains the analysis for their product area at the weekly Team Operational meeting. Open items are prioritised by highest value, date and/or other steer from Management.

Agreed actions are followed up with respective FSC Team Managers.

The FSC Operations Manager signs and dates the analysis and minutes from meeting with any other supporting documentation and retain as evidence."



Control(s): C4.9.a.11-16 (same control, however assigned to 6 different Team Managers)

1.12 Emergency Suspense


Glossary of Control Owners	
Job Title	Control Owner
FSC Team Leader	Andrea Green
FSC Team Leader	Paul Smith

Background

This account is used at month end for branch's to be able to roll forward their accounts when an error is identified by branch but is unknown as to why e.g. losses in shortages. Emergency suspense account requires authorisation prior to posting by branch, however this is not system driven and therefore postings can be made by any branch at any time.

G/L accounts:

- 620221 – Emergency suspense



Chronological steps in the process:

9. Error identified by branch prior to month end.
10. Contact NBSC and request use of the emergency suspense.
11. NBSC provide authorisation to branch evidenced via reference number, and advise on posting to be made.
12. Branch make the posting in Horizon, using the reference number per NBSC as transaction reference.
13. TC processed at a later date and feeds through to this GL, removing the item.

Risk & Control Emergency suspense

Control(s): TC22.01

Risk: Suspense accounts are used inappropriately, resulting in branch errors being incorrectly processed and not investigated

Control objective: Review usage of emergency suspense account

Frequency: Weekly

Control owner: FSC team leader (Andrea Green)

Control description: On a weekly basis transactions which have occurred in GL 620221 are compared to the NBSC "emergency suspense call log" in order to identify unauthorised usage of the emergency suspense accounts. Where unauthorised usage is noted this is followed up with the branch and reversal made.

Control(s): TC22.02

Risk: Suspense accounts are used inappropriately, resulting in branch errors being incorrectly processed and not investigated

Control objective: Review usage of emergency suspense account


Frequency: Weekly

Control owner: FSC team leader (Andrea Green)


Control description: On a weekly basis an ageing review is performed on GL 620221, with all items in excess of 6 weeks aged being followed up for further investigation. All items within this emergency suspense account should have a transaction correction issued within 2 weeks, or be transferred to the appropriate GL for follow up.

Remittance Surplus Suspense


Rule – PMRs use rem suspense surplus regularly for rem surplus in cash bureau and stock




POLSAP Clear GL account process – Task 4



Remittance Shortage Suspense




POLSAP Clear GL account process – Task 2




Remittance Surplus Suspense


Rule – PMRs use rem
suspense surplus regularly
for rem surplus in cash
bureau and stock




POLSAP Clear GL account
process – Task 4




REMS GENERAL



POLSAP Clear GL account process – Task 2



Find negative values process - Task 3



1.13 Appendices

Background

Appendix 1: Issuing of TCs – e2e daily process

Appendix 2: TC - Month End Procedures


Appendix 3: Issuing TC: I) Enter Outgoing Invoices, II) Auto upload

Appendix 4: Ageing of TC's


Appendix 5: Aged Debt Disputes

Glossary of Control Owners	
Job Title	Control Owner
Senior Debt Recovery Manager	Alison Bolsover
Senior Settlement Manager	Kay Wilson


1.13.1 Appendix 1 - Issuing of TCs – e2e daily process – Process Flow



1.13.2 Appendix 2 - TC - Month End Procedures – Process Flow




1.13.3 Appendix 3 - Issuing TC: I) Enter Outgoing Invoices, II) Auto upload- Process Flow



1.13.4 Appendix 4 - Ageing of TC's

Risk & Control	Ageing of TC's
	<p>Control(s): TC24.01</p> <p>Risk: Transaction corrections are issued and not accepted, resulting in aged unresolved variances</p> <p>Control objective: Identify aged transaction corrections and resolve</p> <p>Frequency: Monthly</p> <p>Control owner: FSC Team Leader (Dawn Phillips)</p> <p>Control description: Identify aged balances: On a monthly basis, GL 531210 is reviewed to identify transaction correction balances aged > 2 months that have not been accepted in branch. Follow up occurs through either TC reversal or follow up with branch.</p>



1.13.5 Appendix 5 – POLSAP to CFS Account Mapping Table

This attachment contains the mappings of POLSAP accounts and the new GL account codes used within CFS.



POLSAP to CFS
account codes.xlsx