

Witness Statement

(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss 5A(3)(a)
and 5B, MC Rules 1981, r 70)

Penny,

I've added in thoughts / comments as revisions in this colour.

Gareth

Brian

You asked for my comments on this witness statement – here they are. Anything highlighted means:-

I have read this, but I have no firsthand or background knowledge
I have made some comment in the text

Also, OBSC is now dead and network banking has taken its place. I believe that any witness statement relating to data since network banking started to replace OBSC (date unknown) should have a narrative explaining that process. Any statement relating to data after OBSC ceased (I believe end May 05) should not contain OBSC statements.

Network Banking was introduced on 1st April 2003. From that point onward, DWP went through an exercise of moving Benefits Claimants to receiving money directly into a Bank Account. Post Office then supported Cash Withdrawal from certain Bank Accounts (through Network Banking). This process took about 2 years and eventually the OBSC application stopped being used operationally in May / June 2005 and the desktop buttons that allowed staff access to it were removed. The underlying databases are being removed in January 2006.

Statement of	Penelope Anne Thomas	
Age if under 18	Over 18	(If over 18 insert 'over 18')
This statement (consisting of pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe true.		
Dated the	day of	20
Signature		
A		
I have been employed by Fujitsu Services, Post Office Account, formally ICL Pathway Ltd., since 20 January 2004 as an Information Technology (IT) Security Analyst responsible for audit		

Signature

Signature witnessed by

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Continuation of statement of Penelope Anne Thomas

data extractions and IT Security. I have working knowledge of the computer system known as Horizon, which is a computerised accounting system used by Post Office Ltd. I am authorised by Fujitsu Services to undertake extractions of audit data held on the Horizon system and to obtain information regarding system transaction information processed on the Horizon system.

B

Horizon's documented processes relate to each Post Office outlet. They state that at each Post Office, there are counter positions which each have a computer terminal, a visual display unit and a keyboard and printer. This individual system records all transactions input by the counter clerk working at that counter position. Each clerk logs on to the system by using their own unique password. The transactions performed by each clerk, and the associated cash and stock level information are recorded by the computer system in a stock unit. Once logged on, any transactions performed by the clerk must be recorded and entered on the computer and are accounted for within the user's allocated stock unit.

C

The Horizon system provides a number of daily and weekly records of all transactions input into it. It enables Post Office users to obtain computer summaries for individual clients of Post Office Limited e.g. National Savings Bank, Girobank, Driving Vehicle Licence Agency and the Department of Working Pensions (DWP). The Horizon system also enables the clerk to produce a periodic balance of cash and stock on hand combined with the other transactions performed in that accounting period. (Balancing is now done monthly rather than weekly as a result of changes introduced by Impact for S80. The change over varied from branch to branch but was between September and November 2005.)

D

Where local reports are required these are accessed from an icon on the desktop menu. The user is presented with a parameter driven menu, which enables the report to be customised to requirements. The report is then populated from transaction data that is held in the local database and is printed out on the tally roll printer. The system also allows for information to be transferred to the main accounting department at Chesterfield in order for the office accounts to be balanced. – I have never seen a report generated by Horizon nor the method for obtaining one Also, some reports (particularly Office reports) are produced on a single back

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office printer rather than on the tally roll printer.

E

The Post Office counter processing functions are provided through a series of counter applications: the Order Book Control Service (OBCS) that ascertains the validity of DWP order books before payment is made; the Electronic Point of Sale Service (EPOSS) that enables Postmasters to conduct general retail trade at the counter and sell products on behalf of their clients; the Automated Payments Service (APS) provides support for utility companies and others who provide incremental in-payment mechanisms based on the use of cards and other tokens and the Logistics Feeder Service (LFS) which supports the management of cash and stock movements to and from the outlet, principally to minimise cash held overnight in outlets. The counter desktop service and the office platform service on which it runs provides various common functions for transaction recording and settlement as well as user access control and session management. – I have seen a Horizon terminal in a test environment at Bracknell but I have never seen these applications on the system. These applications do not actually appear as separate applications. In some cases the distinction is very artificial as a result of the wording of the original contract between ICL and POCL. OBCS has now been removed, however we now have some new applications which you may need to be aware of:

- Network Banking
- Settlement to Debit / Credit cards
- Bureau de Change

As before these applications are fully integrated into the Horizon counter and are not really visible as separate applications to the user.

F

Information from counter transactions is written into a local database and then replicated automatically to databases on all other counters within a Post Office outlet. The information is then forwarded over ISDN (or other communication service) to databases on a set of central Correspondence Servers at the Fujitsu Services data centres. This is undertaken by a messaging transport system within the Transaction Management Service (TMS). Various systems then transfer information to Central Servers that control the flow of information to various support services. Details of outlet transactions are normally sent at least daily via the

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Continuation of statement of Penelope Anne Thomas

system. Details are then forwarded daily via a file transfer service to the Post Office accounting department at Chesterfield and also, where appropriate, to other Post Office Clients. – I could not describe TMS or explain how it works

G

An audit of all information handled by the TMS is taken daily by copying all new messages to archive media. This creates a record of all original outlet transaction details including its origin - outlet and counter, when it happened, who caused it to happen and the outcome. The TMS journal is maintained at each of the Fujitsu Services Data Centre sites and is created by securely replicating all transaction records that occurred in every Outlet. They therefore provide the ability to compare the audit track record of the same transaction recorded in two places to verify that systems were operating correctly. All exceptions are investigated and reconciled. Records of all transactions are written to audit archive media. I'm not aware of the two audit tracks being compared. However I agree that there are two independent audit tracks that ought to be equivalent!

(HA)

The system clock incorporated into the desktop application on the counter visual display units is configured to indicate local time. This has been the situation at (INSERT PO) (FAD) since (INSERT INSTALLATION DATE) when the Horizon system was introduced at that particular Post Office. May also be worth adding, that any variation in the clock time is compared with that at the data centre and should it differ by more than 60 seconds, the clock will be corrected. The clocks at the data Centre are kept in synchronisation with the radio controlled clocks at Rugby (I'm not sure about the gory details of this.)

j

The Order Book Control System (OBCS) software, linked to the Horizon system was developed in conjunction with the DWP. OBCS provides details of DWP order books on the national stop payment list, and, enables data regarding the movement of order books, and, encashments to be captured on their behalf. Each Horizon terminal at a Post Office counter has access to the national stop list through OBCS, when a barcoded DWP order book is scanned at the Post

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Office counter, or the order book details are manually keyed into Horizon at the Post Office counter. Each night, the national stop payment list is updated from information supplied electronically from the DWP computer centre. National stop payment list data is held centrally within the Horizon system, and is available to all Post Offices. However, certain information from the national stop payment list is also downloaded to individual Post Offices for faster access; this download process is called polling. The polling of individual Post Offices also involves receiving details of order book movements and encashments at Post Offices, centrally within Horizon, for onward transmission to the DWP. – I have never seen this – but presumably most of this is no longer valid All this was correct, but as you say we removed the buttons that invoked this functionality on counters in May / June 2005 and DWP then stopped sending updates to the stop list (and we stopped sending them transactions!)

K

I have access to reports that monitor faults, polling failures, equipment failures and calls for advice and guidance logged by the Horizon System Helpdesk. During the ??? to ??? , there were ?? calls from **name & fad code** to the Helpdesk. **None of these calls relate to faults which would have had an effect on the integrity of the information held on the system.** – I am not an engineer and I have no guidelines to support this statement.

L

When information relating to individual transactions is requested, the data is extracted from the audit archive media via the Audit Workstations (AW's). Information is presented in exactly the same way as the data held in the archive although it can be filtered depending upon the type of information requested. **The integrity of audit data is guaranteed at all times from its origination, storage and retrieval to subsequent despatch to the requester. Controls have been established that provide assurances to Post Office Internal Audit (POIA) that this integrity is maintained.** – What are these controls? I don't know the details. Alan Holmes would have been the person to describe these. Perhaps Simon Fawkes can also describe this.

During audit data extractions the following controls apply : I can't really comment on any of this.

1. Extractions can only be made through the AWs, which exist at Fujitsu Services, Forest

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- Road, Feltham, Middlesex, Fujitsu Services, Lovelace Lane, Bracknell, Berkshire and the two Fujitsu Services Data Centres. These are all subject to rigorous physical security controls appropriate to that location. Specifically, the Feltham and Bracknell AWs – where most extractions take place – are located in a secure room subject to proximity pass access within a secured Fujitsu Services site. – who has access to the AWs at the datacentres? Who checks whether they have been used? Also, I assume the FEL01 room will soon close!
2. Logical access to the AW and its functionality is managed in accordance with the Fujitsu Services, Post Office Account Security Policy and the principles of ISO 17799. This includes dedicated Logins, password control and the use of Microsoft Windows NT security features.
 3. All extraction's are logged on the AW and supported by documented Audit Record Queries (ARQ's), authorised by nominated persons within Post Office Ltd. This log can be scrutinised on the AW.
 4. Extractions are only made by authorised individuals.
 5. Upon receipt of an ARQ from Post Office Ltd they are interpreted by CS Security. The details are checked and the printed request filed.
 6. The required files are identified and marked using the dedicated audit tools.
 7. Checksum seals are calculated for audit data files when they are written to audit archive media and re-calculated when the files are retrieved.
 8. To assure the integrity of the audit data while on the audit archive media the checksum seal for the file is re-calculated by the Audit Track Sealer and compared to the original value calculated when the file was originally written to the audit archive media. The result is maintained in a Check Seal Table. – I'm told that checksum seals are an algorithm but I have no idea how they work
 9. The specific ARQ details are used to obtain the specific data.
 10. The files are copied to the AW where they are checked and converted into the file type

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required by Post Office Ltd.

11. The requested information is copied onto removal CD media, sealed to prevent modification and virus checked using the latest software. It is then despatched to the Post Office Ltd Casework Manager using Royal Mail Special Delivery. This ensures that a receipt is provided to Fujitsu Services confirming delivery.

M

ARQs 111-120/0506 were received on 18 May 2005 and asked for information in connection with the Post Office at Rose Hill (FAD 173137). I produce a copy of ARQs 111-120/0506 as Exhibit PT/01. On various dates and at various times between 18 May 2005 and 24 May 2005 I undertook extractions of data held on the Horizon system in accordance with the requirements of ARQs 111-120/0506 and followed the procedure outlined above. I produce the resultant CD as Exhibit PT/02.

N

The report is formatted with the following headings:

- ID – relates to counter position
- User – Person Logged on to System
- SU – Stock Unit
- Date – Date of transaction
- Time – Time of transaction
- SessionId – A unique string relating to current customer session
- TxnId – A unique string relating to current transaction
- Mode – e.g. SC which translates to Serve Customer
- ProductNo – Product Item Sold
- Qty – Quantity of items sold
- SaleValue – Value of items sold
- Entry method - Method of data capture for OBCS Transactions (0 = barcode, 1 = manually keyed, 2 = magnetic card, 3 = smartcard, 4 = smart key)
- State – Method of manual keyed Entry Method (4 = encash, 5 = non-barcode)
- IOP - Order Book Number

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Continuation of statement of Penelope Anne Thomas

Result – Order Book Transaction Result (1 = OK, 2 = impound, 3 = unreadable, 4 = invalid)
Foreign Indicator – Indicates whether OBCS payment was made at a local or foreign outlet (0- Local, 1- Foreign). The foreign indicator defaults to a '0' for all manually entered transactions.

The Event report is formatted with the following headings:

Groupid – FAD code
ID – relates to counter position
Date – Date of transaction
Time – Time of transaction
User – Person Logged on to System
SU – Stock Unit
EPOSSTransaction.T – Event Description
EPOSSTransaction.Ti – Event Result

P

The CD (Exhibit PT/??) was sent to the Post Office Investigation section by Special Delivery on DATE 2005.

Q

There is no reason to believe that the information in this statement is inaccurate because of the improper use of the computer. To the best of my knowledge and belief at all material times the computer was operating properly, or if not, any respect in which it was not operating properly, or was out of operation was not such as to effect the information held on it. I hold a responsible position in relation to the working of the computer – I do not hold a responsible position in the working of the Horizon system. I hold a responsible position in relation to the AW

Any records to which I refer in my statement form part of the records relating to the business of Fujitsu Services. These were compiled during the ordinary course of business from information supplied by persons who have or may reasonably be supposed to have personal knowledge of the matter dealt with in the information supplied, but are unlikely to have any recollection of the information or cannot be traced. As part of my duties, I have access to these records.

Signature

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Signature

CS011A

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