1 Tuesday, 30 January 2024 2 (10.00 am) 3 MS MILLAR: Good morning, sir, can you see and hear us? 4 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, I can, thank you very much. 5 MS MILLAR: May we please call Mr Thorpe. 6 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes. 7 FREDERICK LESLIE THORPE (affirmed) 8 Questioned by MS MILLAR 9 MS MILLAR: Could you please confirm your full name 10 Mr Thorpe? 11 A. Frederick Leslie Thorpe. 12 Q. Thank you very much for coming to the Inquiry to give 13 evidence and for the provision of your witness 14 statement. You should have that witness statement in 15 front of you. It's dated 22 December 2023. 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. If you turn to the last page of that, which is page 14, 18 is that your signature? 19 A. It is, yes. 20 Q. I understand that you have a couple of corrections you'd 21 like to make before we proceed? 22 A. Yes, the first correction is that when I made the 23 statement I hadn't had sight -- or I wrote in it that 24 I hadn't had sight of Mrs McKelvey's taped transcript. 25 I've since had sight of that, so if that could be 1 1 altered. 2 And the other amendments were that I wrote in it 3 after the interview with Mr McLaughlin and Mrs McKelvey, 4 I hadn't -- had no further involvement in the 5 prosecution case of either party. But, in fact, it 6 brought to my attention, that because I made a witness 7 statement I had in fact had some involvement, so those 8 are just the two amendments I feel I should make. 9 Q. For us for the purpose of the transcript, in relation to 10 the interview tapes of Mrs McKelvey -- that should be 11 paragraph 39 of your witness statement at page 13 -- you 12 say that "I have now seen case papers relating to this 13 case but not the interview taped transcripts"; so that's 14 a correction in relation to that, that you have seen 15 those transcripts? 16 A. So, in fact, if you just delete the "but not the" -- 17 "but not the" and put in there "and" -- "I've seen the 18 case papers relating to this case and the interview 19 taped transcripts", that would satisfy that one. 20 Q. Then, just in relation to both case studies, that you 21 did provide a witness statement in both cases but those 22 were limited to describing the fact of both the audit 23 and the interview; is that correct? 24 A. Yes, yes. 25 Q. Thank you. So having made those corrections, are the 2 1 contents of that witness statement true to the best of 2 your knowledge and belief? 3 A. They are, yes. 4 Q. For the purposes of the transcript the URN is 5 WITN10410100. As you know, my name is Megan Millar and 6 I will be asking you questions on behalf of the Inquiry. 7 I think you'd agree that you've had a long and varied 8 career working for the Post Office? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. For the purposes of your evidence today, I'll just be 11 focusing on the conduct of investigations and 12 particularly in Northern Ireland. 13 A. Okay. Yeah. 14 Q. So could we start, please, with the roles you held while 15 working for the Post Office. Is it correct that your 16 career with the Post Office spanned from 1976 to January 17 2003? 18 A. It does, yes, albeit the very first part I wasn't 19 a direct employee of the Post Office; I was 20 a subpostmaster so I was agent of the Post Office but 21 was working for the Post Office at that time, yeah. 22 Q. Thank you. So, when you started working as 23 a subpostmaster, that was in 1976; is that correct? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. You then held a number of roles in Post Office branches 3 1 until 1987 when you became an Audit Manager? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. You were promoted to District Audit Manager in 1990 4 before you became a Security and Investigation Manager 5 in 1993; is that right? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. In that role, were you based in Leeds? 8 A. Sorry? 9 Q. Were you based in Leeds when you became a Security and 10 Investigation Manager? 11 A. Well, I became a Security and Investigation Manager 12 following a business reorganisation. The area I was 13 working in, the district of Newcastle, was merged with 14 Leeds and my job as an Audit Manager disappeared but 15 I went with my Finance Manager into Security 16 Investigation. Initially, I was doing the physical 17 security, procedural security and the design of security 18 equipment for sub post offices, before I was moved on to 19 the investigation side. 20 Q. So then in 1996, is it right that you were asked if 21 you'd be interested in becoming an Investigation 22 Manager? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. So, just in terms of the titles of those roles, up to 25 that point you'd been a Security and Investigation 4 1 Manager, how did this role then, the new one in 1996, 2 differ from that? 3 A. It differed in so much as the -- as I say, the first 4 part of the job was security, physical security, 5 procedural security, and then the second part was purely 6 looking at the investigative side of crime or potential 7 crime against the Post Office. 8 Q. You then explain in your statement at paragraph 10 that 9 when this vacancy arose, so the Investigation Manager 10 vacancy, there was no one who was suitably qualified to 11 fill that vacancy as almost all of the Investigators had 12 been part of the Post Office Investigation Department, 13 which, at that point, had been disbanded; is that 14 correct? 15 A. What had happened, when it was disbanded, the respective 16 Investigators had been moved into Royal Mail or Post 17 Office Counters. Not everybody seemed to be happy with 18 their allotted business and one of the Investigators put 19 into Post Office Counters in Leeds didn't like the 20 job -- well, he liked the job but he transferred to 21 Royal Mail at the first opportunity and there were no 22 other suitably qualified ex-POID officers available, and 23 I was asked would I like to do the job, subject to 24 an assessment to see whether I was at the right 25 capabilities. 5 1 Q. So it wasn't, then, that the ex-POID officers were 2 unsuitable, in so much as they were unqualified to fill 3 the new vacancy, but they'd already been allocated to 4 different roles; is that right? 5 A. I think it was because they'd been allocated different 6 roles in a different business, rather than the lack of 7 qualifications. 8 Q. How was your suitability for that role assessed? 9 A. Well, I had to come to London for an interview with the 10 ex-Head of Post Office Investigations and, also, there 11 was a psychiatrist available who did a psychiatric 12 evaluation. Following the interview, then my boss in 13 Leeds was told they felt I was suitable, subject to 14 being able to arrange some training. There wasn't 15 a formal training course available at that time -- 16 Q. Can I just stop you there, just to go back to the 17 evaluation. What did you understand the purpose of the 18 psychiatric evaluation to be? 19 A. To be quite honest, I wasn't quite sure whether it 20 was -- I don't know to decide whether I was too gung-ho 21 to go charging into investigating people or -- I wasn't 22 sure. It was just something that was thrown in when 23 I was interviewed for the job. So ... 24 Q. Did you understand that to be common practice? Did 25 other Investigators undergo psychiatric evaluation? 6 1 A. Well, I don't know anything about the recruitment 2 process for the POID officers, as they were then. So 3 I'm not sure whether that was part of their initiation 4 or sort of initial interview. I'm not sure. 5 Q. Were you told what the results of that psychiatric 6 evaluation was? 7 A. Well, I assume I was okay because I got the job but 8 I didn't get a formal feedback for it, no. 9 Q. So is it right then you believe you were the first 10 person to be recruited since the Post Office 11 Investigation Department was disbanded as 12 an Investigator. 13 A. I believe at that time I was but that's my belief. 14 I may be wrong because, obviously, the Post Office is 15 spread all throughout the UK but I believe I was the 16 first one to go through it. 17 Q. So in 1996, what geographical areas were you responsible 18 for? 19 A. 1996, it was -- well, I was based on Leeds but my area 20 was the Northeast from the -- Hull up to the Scottish 21 Borders, bordering by the Pennines, so the very North 22 East section of England. 23 Q. Then is it right that, following the retirement of two 24 officers in Scotland and Northern Ireland in 2000, you 25 also became responsible for those regions? 7 1 A. Well, my boss at that time said, "You're the nearest, 2 would you like to do the job?" and they -- yeah, well, 3 that was basically it. And I said okay, so I shadowed 4 the outgoing POID officer in Scotland and -- 5 Q. Do you remember who that was? 6 A. It was a man called Peter Webb. He'd formerly been 7 a Senior Manager within POID. 8 Q. Did you also mentor someone, the person who had been 9 responsible for Northern Ireland? 10 A. I don't know, I never met them. I don't know who they 11 were. 12 Q. Do you know why those individuals weren't replaced, so 13 why another person wasn't sent to Scotland and another 14 person wasn't sent to Northern Ireland, rather than you 15 being asked to take over those roles? 16 A. Well, I was doing the investigation role in the North 17 East of England, I don't know what efforts were made to 18 find somebody else to do that area, I don't know. 19 Geographically, I was the nearest person to take it 20 over. 21 Q. So is it right, then, from 2000 until your retirement in 22 2003, that you managed a team of four Investigators who 23 were based in Newcastle, Glasgow, Perth and Belfast? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. Were you still based in the North East of England 8 1 throughout that time? 2 A. Well, I didn't actually have an office as such. So 3 I just used to divide my time between Newcastle and 4 Glasgow, spending more time probably in Glasgow than 5 I did in Newcastle. 6 Q. Were you ever based in Belfast throughout that time? 7 A. No, no. I -- well, traditionally, going back, POID did. 8 There was only ever one officer in Belfast and so what 9 would happen -- the Investigator was Suzanne Winter and 10 I would fly over, probably once a month, more often if 11 there was a need for it, which sometimes there was, 12 but -- so Glasgow was a good base for me. 13 Q. So, as you've said, the manager in Belfast was Suzanne 14 Winter, who the Inquiry heard from last Friday; that's 15 right? 16 A. Yes, yes, I believe so. 17 Q. Then the manager based in Perth was Raymond Grant, who 18 the Inquiry also heard from last week? Was it Raymond 19 Grant who you managed? 20 A. Raymond Grant was the officer in Perth, yes. 21 Q. So was part of your role supervising the day-to-day 22 conduct of investigations in Northern Ireland? 23 A. Well, Suzanne would do that. Basically, we were a small 24 team and, although I had the title Team Leader, there 25 was enough work to keep everybody active, including 9 1 myself. So rather than being sort of sitting at a desk 2 managing, I was sort of active as well. So all 3 activities in Northern Ireland were conducted by Suzanne 4 Winter; in Scotland, it depended. There wasn't 5 a geographical split, so Shirley Stockdale or Raymond 6 Grant would pick up the work, wherever it was within 7 Scotland and, in the North East of England, the officer 8 there, I would support him if necessary or, if I was 9 unavailable, then somebody from the Northeast team, 10 based in Leeds, would go and support him. 11 Q. So did you have any supervisory function in Northern 12 Ireland with Ms Winter's investigations? 13 A. Well, I was her supervisor, as such, so any work that 14 she undertook, we would discuss as a team, rather than 15 leaving her out there on a limb, yeah. 16 Q. Before 2000, when you took responsibility for Northern 17 Ireland, did you have any experience of conducting 18 investigations there yourself? 19 A. Not in Northern Ireland or Scotland, no. 20 Q. When you took in the role did you appreciate the 21 differences in how the legal systems and processes 22 worked in Northern Ireland and Scotland? 23 A. Not until I moved there, no. I did speak to Post Office 24 Legal Services for advice but the advice was they don't 25 know -- well, they weren't fully up to speed on Irish 10 1 and Scottish law to be able to advise. So it became 2 quite a steep learning curve for Suzanne and myself to 3 learn how to process cases to the prosecution, partly 4 because, previously, we'd been able to deal directly 5 with the DPP, Director of Public Prosecutions -- 6 Q. So we'll come on to that but just back to your point 7 about whenever you first took on the role, you didn't 8 really have experience in Northern Ireland -- 9 A. No. 10 Q. -- and you sought advice from Post Office Legal 11 Services? 12 A. Yeah. 13 Q. Do you remember who that was in Post Office Legal 14 Services? 15 A. Well, I had a lot of dealings with Rob Wilson but 16 I can't say for certain that it was Rob Wilson who 17 actually said, "We can't help". 18 Q. Okay. 19 A. But I sort of remember him from my days in England. 20 Q. So moving, then, to the training that you received, 21 first when you became an Investigator and then 22 throughout your time in the role, in your statement at 23 paragraph 11 you explain that when you first became 24 an Investigator in 1993, there was no formal training 25 available, and you touched on that earlier. 11 1 A. Yeah. 2 Q. Is it right, then, that your initial training was 3 provided by the Security and Investigation Service in 4 Croydon? 5 A. It was, yes. The training team in Croydon, yes. 6 Q. Was that team an external team or an internal team? 7 A. No, it was an internal team. 8 Q. To the best of your recollection, who provided that 9 training? Was it Investigators or lawyers or a mixture? 10 A. It -- well, several of them I know were ex-POID 11 officers, who'd changed to a training role but whether 12 everybody was, I'm not sure. 13 Q. How long did that initial course last? 14 A. Well, it wasn't like a formal course of sort of three 15 weeks or four weeks, it was a case of I would go down to 16 Croydon and this week we would do interview techniques, 17 investigation techniques, or whatever, and then another 18 week I'd go down and it may just be going round courts 19 to see how a court system operated, and things like 20 that. So it was very much made up on the -- as it went 21 along, it was made up until, eventually, they felt I had 22 sufficient knowledge. And then I went back to Leeds 23 with a POID officer, who was then going to be my shadow, 24 and mentor for any work that I did. 25 Q. At the end of the course, was there any assessment see 12 1 whether you had reached the sufficient knowledge to 2 proceed with -- 3 A. There was no formal assessment as such, no. 4 Q. Who was the ex-POID officer, then, that mentored you 5 when you went back up to Leeds? 6 A. I can't remember. It was a lady but I can't remember 7 her name. She was based in Croydon. She travelled up 8 from Croydon to Leeds on a weekly basis to mentor me, 9 but I can't -- no, I can't remember her name, sorry, it 10 was 20 odd -- 25 years ago. 11 Q. So your initial training pre-dated the Criminal 12 Procedure and Investigations Act, which came into force 13 in 1996. Do you remember receiving any specific 14 training on disclosure after that legislation came into 15 force? 16 A. No, I don't, no. 17 Q. Do you remember at any point receiving training on 18 disclosure? 19 A. We had -- after my training was complete, we had regular 20 Security Investigation Team meetings, where most points 21 of law and changes to the law were discussed but, no, 22 they were held probably every -- probably every couple 23 of months but I can't be -- you know, be specific as to 24 how often about that. 25 Q. Who would have communicated the changes in the law to 13 1 you in those team meetings? 2 A. Yes, yes. 3 Q. Who would that have been, sorry? 4 A. Sorry. Sorry? 5 Q. Who would the person have been in those team meetings 6 who would have explained to you, as an Investigator, 7 "This piece of law has now changed"? 8 A. Um, most of the training was headed by people from 9 Security Investigations in Croydon, and Phil Gerrish was 10 often active in that -- in the role of leading the 11 meetings. 12 Q. You then also explain in your statement that team 13 members would also attend periodic training, arranged by 14 the Central Security and Investigation Team; is that 15 right? 16 A. That's right, yes. 17 Q. Did you attend that training or was it members of your 18 team? 19 A. No, usually -- usually the whole team would attend. 20 Q. Who delivered that training? 21 A. Again, it would probably be somebody from the National 22 Security or an Investigation Team -- one of the 23 trainers. They had a -- as far as I understand, they 24 had a group of trainers who would come out and give 25 that -- or it may just be Phil Gerrish or one of the 14 1 managers responsible for the particular topic we were 2 talking about. 3 Q. In relation to that periodic training, in your statement 4 you say that the topics covered included audit and it 5 says "investigator" but I think that should probably be 6 "investigation", so audit and investigation, with 7 Horizon afterwards in brackets you've put? 8 A. Well, that was -- I think it was just a one-day 9 familiarisation session, where they said, "This is 10 Horizon, this is what it can do. These are the reports 11 you can get from it", but that was it. There was no 12 real hands on working on it, which, in hindsight, was 13 probably a failing but that's all it was, is a one-day, 14 this is what's coming in to replace the old pen and 15 paper system. 16 Q. Do you remember when that was, was that around the time 17 of the rollout of Horizon? 18 A. It must have been around about the time of the rollout, 19 so I'd say what, about 1998/1999 but I can't be sure of 20 the date. 21 Q. Can you remember who, in particular, led that one-day 22 session? 23 A. No, I can't think who delivered that session, no. 24 Q. During that one-day session, did you receive training on 25 how to analyse the data from the Horizon system? 15 1 A. I don't think the session lasted that long. It was more 2 a case of, "This is the kit they're going to be using in 3 the post offices, you can get your information of it or 4 it can go back to Horizon and ask for information", but 5 it was very, very basic, as best that I remember. 6 Q. Did any of your training or the periodic training 7 covering the conduct of investigations or prosecutions 8 in Northern Ireland? 9 A. It didn't, no. Because, as I say, the two experts were 10 Suzanne Winter and myself. We didn't know a great deal 11 at that time. 12 Q. Is it right, then, that you mentored Ms Winter whenever 13 she started conducting investigations in Northern 14 Ireland? 15 A. Well, we worked together -- I think the first 16 investigation we did I led the actual investigation. We 17 submitted the -- we were told that we couldn't submit 18 the papers directly to the DPP, as we were now a limited 19 company, and we had no more clout than Marks & Spencer 20 or one of the big chains. 21 So we had to go through the PSNI, and the first case 22 that I remember doing, we submitted the papers to the 23 police in Londonderry, and we got a response back 24 "That's rubbish, there's nothing I can do with those", 25 and that was it. So we had to sort of rethink what the 16 1 problem was because the detective sergeant who'd 2 reviewed the cases didn't seem interested in meeting up 3 with us, so we made arrangements to speak to the police 4 in Belfast, to try and work out a system whereby we 5 could report -- as the first line of reporting was going 6 to be the police, how we would report to the police. 7 Q. Just before we get into a bit more detail on that 8 process that you developed, so you explain at 9 paragraph 23 of your statement that investigations 10 followed the roles set out in the P&CE Order Northern 11 Ireland 1989, is that the Police and Criminal Evidence 12 Order? 13 A. Yes, Police and Criminal Evidence Order, yes, of 14 Northern Ireland, yes. 15 Q. So does it follow from your earlier answers that you 16 didn't remember any specific internal policies or 17 guidance for Northern Ireland? 18 A. Not that I can remember, no. 19 Q. So there was nothing for you to access in terms of 20 guidance, it was for you and Ms Winter to decide how to 21 conduct the investigation? 22 A. Unfortunately it was because, by the time we were 23 getting to the point of submitting cases, Mr Webb, who'd 24 been the Senior Investigator in Scotland and Northern 25 Ireland, had left the business and there was really 17 1 nobody to actually talk with within the Post Office. 2 We'd spoken to Legal Services, they said that they 3 couldn't offer us any specific advice and so we 4 contacted the police. 5 I say "we" -- initially, I was involved and then 6 Suzanne Winter took it on and she, in fact, developed 7 a process for submitting files to the police service, so 8 that they could be assessed and considered for action, 9 or non-action. 10 Q. So the catalyst for that was really, whenever you and 11 Suzanne Winter submitted your first case, the feedback 12 from the PSNI was "The quality of that's not good 13 enough", and you then went away to develop a process 14 that you could put in place? 15 A. Well, the process -- because, ultimately, the files that 16 we were producing were very similar to the files we 17 produced in that first instance. As I say, the police 18 sergeant who reviewed the case wasn't willing to meet us 19 and critique and say "Well, you know, that was rubbish 20 because". So we took it on ourselves to speak to the 21 police service, see what they suggested, where we had 22 failed and how we could improve, and how they wanted 23 everything reporting to them. 24 Q. So do you remember who, from the police side, assisted 25 you in developing that process? 18 1 A. I can't. Suzanne Winter would have been the one 2 because, as I say, initially I was involved; then, 3 because of my location in Glasgow, it was easier for 4 Suzanne to liaise with the police on a day-to-day or 5 month-to-month basis. 6 Q. Do you remember when it was, roughly, in terms of the 7 year, that that process then was developed? 8 A. I think it must have been probably around about 2000. 9 It was fairly early on in the -- in my involvement in 10 Northern Ireland. 11 Q. So the Inquiry hasn't been able to find a written 12 process dated from around that time specific to Northern 13 Ireland. Do you remember if that process was committed 14 to writing by Ms Winter? 15 A. I can't remember whether it was or not. 16 Q. Can you describe briefly what the process that you 17 developed or Ms Winter led in developing involved? 18 A. Well, pretty much the same as we had been doing in 19 England; it was preparing a prosecution file which 20 included the sort of offender report, the tape 21 transcriptions, list of evidence, list of the unused 22 material and a disclosure listing, as well. So ... 23 Q. So just want to take one step become, back to the audit 24 process before going into the investigation process in 25 a little bit more detail. Could we please have page 6 19 1 of Mr Thorpe's witness statement on screen, it's 2 WITN10410100. 3 Page 6, please, and down to paragraph 19. So you 4 explain at paragraph 19 that: 5 "Where the pattern of irregularities suggested 6 deliberate action rather than error, then the District 7 Audit Manager would be contacted and a special audit of 8 the accounts of the post office under suspicion 9 requested." 10 So is this a description of what would happen before 11 a special audit? 12 A. Well, it depends. One of the most common problems -- 13 well, problems we had was with pension allowances, and 14 what would happen is that they, the Paid Order Unit, 15 Lisahally, up in Londonderry, would take an office, 16 check all the pension allowances, if they found any 17 discrepancies, they would report that back to us after 18 a period of time. We would then intercept the pouches 19 from the office locally, have them checked locally and 20 a schedule would be produced from the results of the 21 checks. 22 When it was decided that the evidence was such that 23 it was probably deliberate action, rather than error, 24 then we would ask for a special order to be committed, 25 and then we would attend the office on the day of the 20 1 audit. 2 Q. Who then decided that the evidence was such that it 3 suggested that there was deliberate action, as opposed 4 to error? 5 A. Well, ultimately, it would have been myself. 6 Q. So in what circumstances would you consider that the 7 evidence would suggest that there was deliberate action, 8 rather than just error on the part of a subpostmaster or 9 subpostmistress? 10 A. Well, with the regularity of the pension overclaims -- 11 We're going back sort of almost pre-Horizon, when people 12 still had paid pension books and you had to tear a foil 13 out, the subpostmaster retained the foil and paid the 14 person the appropriate amount. And these pension 15 allowance foils were accumulated in the office, adlisted 16 and a figure put into the cash account. Now, if they 17 were -- once they started being checked, if they were 18 regularly missing, then you would check the office 19 account and, if there wasn't the corresponding surplus, 20 the question is why. 21 And sometimes there were large amounts and sometimes 22 only small amounts which were possibly a keying error 23 and, once we'd established that, we would then call 24 an audit. 25 If, after doing the checks, there wasn't a pattern 21 1 developing, then we would perhaps pass it back to the 2 Retail Network Manager as a training issue or just to 3 speak to the subpostmaster and say ... 4 Q. So a few line down then on paragraph 19, you explain 5 that: 6 "On initial entry [at the office] the Investigation 7 Manager would introduce themselves and explain why the 8 audit had been arranged." 9 Did you or Ms Winter attend a special audit as 10 a matter of course? 11 A. Yes, special audits we would, yes. 12 Q. You also explain that: 13 "The Investigator would explain that following the 14 audit the subpostmaster or staff from a directly managed 15 branch office would be invited to attend a formal due 16 under caution." 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. Were they invited to that interview before the audit had 19 actually taken place? 20 A. Yes, we would have done. The reason being that we had 21 a potential problem, which the schedule demonstrated, 22 and so we would need to speak to the subpostmaster in 23 the first instance because we didn't how they ran their 24 office. Did they run it hands on? Did they run it from 25 a distance? You know, were staff involved? So we 22 1 weren't -- at that level we weren't sure who would be 2 involved. 3 So we would speak to the subpostmaster in the first 4 instance; we would explain that we would be conducting 5 the interview under caution; we would further explain 6 the legal rights and that, if they wanted to make 7 arrangements to have a solicitor present, or make 8 arrangements to have -- to interview in the solicitor's 9 office or whatever, they could do that once the audit 10 was completed; and we would also mention the friend 11 option and say "If you want to invite" -- often it was 12 a union representative from branch office staff or 13 Federation of SubPostmasters for the subpostmasters, but 14 we were fairly lenient on who we allowed as a friend 15 just in the -- just so as not to overwhelm the person 16 being interviewed. 17 Q. Was it ever the case, though, that a special audit 18 revealed that there was actually no problem with the 19 branch and that the accounts had been balanced? 20 A. It could do. I can't think of a particular instance 21 where it did but it could do, in which case we'd say, 22 "Okay, there's no problem here, just a careless 23 subpostmaster", and then we'd speak to the Retail 24 Network Manager and arrange to have error notices issued 25 to collect the monies due or repay the monies due from 23 1 the overstating of the pension allowances that we'd 2 found. 3 Q. In those situations then a formal interview under 4 caution wouldn't be necessary; is that right? 5 A. We'd probably would still do that, maybe seem a bit 6 heavy-handed but, as I say, until we spoke to the 7 subpostmaster, we didn't know exactly how the office was 8 managed and how many staff they had, was it a one-man 9 band, as I say, or whether he managed the office from 10 afar or what. 11 Q. Does it follow from that that, before a special audit 12 had taken place, it that already been decided that 13 a criminal investigation of some description would 14 follow the audit? 15 A. Yes, we would speak with the Retail Network Manager, 16 explain what evidence we had, and we would then report 17 back to the Retail Network Manager following the audit, 18 and it could be to say "Look, it's not the 19 subpostmaster, there's no evidence to show that he's 20 involved in this in any way", in which case the Retail 21 Network Manager would take -- there's no action to take 22 other than arrange for the error notices to be raised or 23 it could point to the member of staff, in which case, 24 you know, they would need to be interviewed as well. 25 Q. So that deals, then, with special audits. Could you 24 1 just explain briefly what the difference between 2 a special audit and a scheduled audit is? 3 A. Well, a special audit, the -- would be arranged for 4 a Thursday morning. Each branch had to prepare a weekly 5 account -- it did then, I think it's changed since -- 6 but they had to prepare a weekly account on a Wednesday, 7 so going in on a Thursday, you should be faced with 8 a signed cash account representing all the cash and 9 stock which should be in the office at that time and 10 there should be no further business transacted between 11 that being prepared and the audit taking place. 12 So it was a checking exercise, there was no sort of 13 room for error, that should be what's there, if it isn't 14 there, why not? 15 And a standard audit was -- would be when the 16 Auditors went in, any day of the week, and completed 17 an audit of the office on that day. 18 Q. There was no particular reason for that audit, in terms 19 of an error hadn't been flagged necessarily, in terms of 20 the scheduled audit? 21 A. A specialist audit wouldn't be called unless there was 22 grounds for an investigation, no. We would do that to 23 try and establish the facts of what was happening. 24 Q. A scheduled audit was just done at certain periods in 25 time, just to check in on a branch? 25 1 A. Well, the District Audit Manager would draw up an audit 2 programme and Auditors would go out so every office was 3 audited over a period. So the Auditors would just go 4 out and do an audit on any day of the week, really. 5 Q. So if we could go over the page, then, to paragraph 20 6 of your witness statement, please. Can you explain that 7 there: 8 "Where accounting discrepancies were identified 9 during a scheduled audit, the first point of contact by 10 the Auditors would usually be the respective Retail 11 Network Manager." 12 When you say "usually" there, would there be 13 exceptions to that? 14 A. Sorry, I missed the last part of that. 15 Q. So you say that the first point of contact would usually 16 be the Retail Manager? 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. Were there exceptions when it wasn't the Retail Manager? 19 A. No, no. The Retail Network Managers were responsible 20 for their outlets. So, if the audit found 21 a discrepancy, they would speak to the Retail Network 22 Manager who had the option just dealing with it himself, 23 recovering the monies, whether it was operational errors 24 or whatever. If the Retail Network Manager felt there 25 was more to it, then he would speak to ourselves and we 26 1 would then assess the facts and then invite the 2 subpostmaster again. It was the first point of contact, 3 because they were the ones who ran the operation. 4 Q. So your Investigation Team wouldn't be present at 5 a scheduled audit; is that right? 6 A. At a scheduled audit no, no. 7 Q. So is it the decision of the Retail Network Manager 8 alone to decide whether to involve your team? 9 A. Basically, yes, yeah. 10 Q. But if they decided to deal with it as a disciplinary 11 matter, you wouldn't become involved or know about it 12 necessarily at all? 13 A. There would be no need to involve ourselves, no. 14 Q. That statement can come down, please. Thanks. 15 Was that the case throughout the time you were 16 involved in conducting criminal investigations, that the 17 Retail Network Manager would make the decision as to 18 whether an investigation was necessary? 19 A. Well, they had that right, because the outlet was 20 managed by the Retail Line and, obviously, if they made 21 a decision which was wrong, then they would be held to 22 account. So it was, you know, up to them to decide on 23 the facts what they -- how they wanted to treat the 24 matter. 25 Q. When you say they would be held to account if they made 27 1 the wrong decision, who would they be held to account 2 by? 3 A. Well, each district had a Head of Retail Network, and 4 all these Retail Network Managers reported to the Head 5 of Retail Network, but obviously their actions had to be 6 explained to the Head, if they were wrong. 7 Q. Did you have a view at the time on whether it was 8 appropriate for the Retail Network Managers to decide if 9 a criminal investigation was appropriate? 10 A. Not really. They managed the outlets so, if they 11 decided they would deal with it, that was fine. I had 12 no strong feelings that we should always be involved as 13 Investigators. 14 Q. Then, focusing on what happened following an audit in 15 Northern Ireland, it's correct, then, that once your 16 team became involved, the case would be allocated to 17 Ms Winter; is that correct? 18 A. Yes, yes. 19 Q. You explain in your statement that, as you were a small 20 team, you've already said, you were actively involved in 21 interviews; is that correct? 22 A. That's right, yes. 23 Q. Sometimes you were the Lead Investigator and sometimes 24 you were Second Officer? 25 A. Yes. 28 1 Q. You go on to explain that the circumstances in location 2 of the case would dictate your role. Can you just 3 explain what you mean by that? 4 A. Well, sometimes it would be workload. If the 5 Investigator for the area, say Ms Winter in Northern 6 Ireland, had a couple of active cases she was working 7 on, then I would take the lead and then I could do the 8 necessary write-ups and preparation of prosecution 9 files, if necessary, to relieve the work load from her. 10 Q. So in Northern Ireland you were both Lead Investigator 11 and Second Officer on different cases; is that right? 12 A. Yes, yeah, could do either role, yeah. 13 Q. In your statement, you describe Ms Winter as a "highly 14 trained and experienced Investigator". 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. What was your understanding of her training and 17 experience? 18 A. To be quite honest, I don't think I ever went into what 19 her training had been. My observations were just 20 working with her, seeing the quality of her work and 21 I had every confidence that what she was doing was good 22 so I was quite happy with that. But what training she'd 23 received, I may have known but I obviously can't 24 remember. 25 Q. So going back to the interview process, then, is it 29 1 correct that, up until 2001, interviews in Northern 2 Ireland were recorded in writing by your team? 3 A. Notes of interview, that's right, yes. 4 Q. Then it was only after 2001 that they were recorded on 5 tape? 6 A. Sometimes, and I can't remember where I saw the 7 authority to do that, but, yes, we were allowed to do 8 that. 9 Q. You estimate that you personally conducted in excess of 10 100 interviews. 11 A. Well, I was trying to work it out and I think probably 12 around about the 100 mark, including all my interviews 13 in England, Scotland and Northern Ireland, yeah. 14 Q. Following the interview, then, would it be the case that 15 the Investigation Manager would conduct further 16 enquiries to follow up on the account given interview? 17 A. Well, yes, it's possible. As I said, our first point of 18 contact would be the subpostmaster. Now, whatever came 19 from that could lead out to further investigations, yes. 20 Q. Were you involved in liaising with Ms Winter in respect 21 of what further enquiries were necessary in a particular 22 case? 23 A. Sorry, could you repeat that? 24 Q. No problem. Were you involved in liaising with 25 Ms Winter in respect of what further enquiries might be 30 1 necessary in a particular case? 2 A. Yes, we would discuss cases on a regular basis. 3 Q. You explain in your statement that the Investigation 4 Manager would liaise with other departments where 5 necessary to request further information? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. You explain that the most common departments were the 8 Post Office Audit Department -- 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. -- the Department for Work and Pensions -- 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. -- and National Savings in Girobank; is that correct? 13 A. That's correct, yes. 14 Q. You also explain, at the time of your involvement, it 15 was not common practice to contact Horizon? 16 A. No, my involvement, Horizon was in its infancy. We were 17 still operating the paper-based system, Horizon, and 18 even a different system in the branch post offices, and 19 we'd never been given any direct contact with Horizon 20 and -- 21 Q. When you say, "Horizon", do you mean Fujitsu? 22 A. Sorry, Fujitsu, yeah. 23 Q. Would you have been aware of how you could have 24 contacted Fujitsu if you'd wanted to. 25 A. I don't think I was aware at that time. If we needed 31 1 to, we'd have had to probably go through National 2 Security. 3 Q. Were you aware of the availability of the different 4 types of data from Fujitsu, such as ARQ data? 5 A. I think at that time we would be more reliant on audit 6 because they had the hands-on experience of dealing with 7 Horizon and we'd say, you know, we're looking at pension 8 allowances, can you run off some reports and get them to 9 run off the reports, which we could then use and check 10 any evidence or information that we had. 11 Ultimately, the investigators did develop a skill of 12 interrogating the system and getting reports from 13 Fujitsu but, in the early days, it was still in its 14 infancy and it was a little bit vague as to what we 15 could get and when we could get it. 16 Q. So at some point, did you then start to request reports 17 from Fujitsu, which was data from the system? 18 A. Personally, I've never requested any. I never requested 19 anything from Fujitsu and, up until my leaving, I don't 20 believe anybody on the team, whether Scotland or 21 Northern Ireland, would have requested information. 22 Q. Could we please have Mr Thorpe's witness statement back 23 on screen at page 7. While we're waiting for that to 24 come up, was it your role, then, to review the file and 25 then decide whether a case should be submitted for 32 1 prosecution advice? 2 A. Yes. Yes. 3 Q. About halfway through this paragraph, paragraph 20, you 4 explain that, that as Team Leader you would decide: 5 "... whether to submit the case for prosecution 6 advice ..." 7 Then you've written: 8 "... [comma], England [comma], Post Office Legal 9 Services if prosecution was advised I would discuss it 10 with my line manager." 11 Do you mean there that, before you submitted a case 12 for prosecution advice, you would discuss it with your 13 line manager in England? 14 A. Usually, yes. Yes. 15 Q. Then you go on to say: 16 "In Scotland and Northern Ireland cases were 17 referred to the Procurator Fiscal who would decide on 18 what action to take without further consultation with 19 the Post Office Limited managers." 20 Should you also have included "Procurator Fiscal or 21 the DPP in Northern Ireland"? 22 A. Yes, sorry, I missed that, yes. 23 Q. That's fine. 24 A. Yes. My line manager appreciated that we, unlike in 25 England, where the Legal Services team would suggest 33 1 charges, if necessary, in Scotland and Northern Ireland, 2 we had no control over what the prosecution advice would 3 be, whether it was to reject the case, whether it was to 4 prosecute. And so it was agreed that we would just -- 5 once the case was completed, we would discuss it with 6 the line manager and then he would sort of give the nod, 7 okay, push it through to the appropriate authorities to 8 see what their view is on the case. 9 Q. So is it the case that when you're reviewing the file 10 before you've submitted it, in England you did speak to 11 your line manager, but in Northern Ireland and Scotland 12 you didn't? 13 A. Well, we would, in so much as given the bare bones of 14 the case, what the issue was, what we'd found out as 15 part of the investigation, and then we could submit it 16 through to the Procurator Fiscal or the PSNI. In 17 England we would do the same, the same discussion, but 18 then send it down to Post Office Legal Services and, 19 once it came back with a decision, we would then discuss 20 that with the line manager before applying for summonses 21 and the like to progress the case further, if that was 22 the issue. 23 Q. So is it -- so it's correct, is it, that in Northern 24 Ireland and Scotland the file didn't go off to Legal 25 Services? 34 1 A. No, it didn't go to Legal Services, No. 2 Q. Did you understand what the reason for that was? Was it 3 just because Post Office had no decision making power in 4 relation to whether to prosecute? 5 A. Well, I think it was historical. When I took over, that 6 was the process. It went straight to the deciding 7 authority and our Legal Services were not involved and, 8 whenever we spoke for advice, they always said, "Well, 9 we're not really 100 per cent sure on Scottish and Irish 10 law to give advice on that", so they were missed out of 11 the chain of events. 12 Q. So that statement can come down. Thank you very much. 13 So, in respect of the Northern Irish cases, you were 14 responsible for reviewing them to decide whether they 15 should be submitted to PSNI. 16 A. Yes, yes. 17 Q. That would involve cases where you'd been the Second 18 Officer or the Lead Investigator? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. So, in effect, you would be reviewing cases you'd 21 already worked on? 22 A. It's possible, yes. Yes. 23 Q. And at that point, when you were considering whether to 24 submit a case, what test did you apply before you 25 submitted it, or what factors did you consider? 35 1 A. Well, obviously, the evidence, the evidential trail, any 2 admissions or denials made by the people who'd been 3 interviewed, the completeness of the case, so just 4 an overall sort of picture: is this a viable case to 5 submit? 6 Q. At that point, did you ever decide that the case 7 shouldn't be submitted for prosecution advice? 8 A. It's possible. There are times when cases have been 9 investigated, and -- excuse me, I've got a dry throat. 10 Q. No problem. 11 A. There's been a case where cases have been investigated 12 and the outcome hasn't been sufficiently serious to 13 warrant a prosecution, and that's when it would have 14 been passed back to the Retail Line for him to make 15 a decision as to how to handle it, whether it be 16 discipline or just issue the error notices, recover the 17 money and just business as usual. 18 Q. Do you remember doing that in some of the cases you 19 reviewed, so you decided "No, actually, we're not going 20 to submit this, we're going to hand it back to the 21 retail" -- 22 A. Yes, that has happened, yes. 23 Q. So you've explained before, but just to make it clear, 24 that when you initially became involved in 25 investigations in Northern Ireland, files could be 36 1 submitted directly from your team to the Director of 2 Public Prosecutions; is that correct? 3 A. That was my understanding but -- 4 Q. Then following a change in 2001, cases had to be 5 submitted to the Police Service of Northern Ireland? 6 A. That's right because, as the Post Office, we were sort 7 of a corporate body, which had the authority to go 8 straight to the DPP. Once we became Post Office 9 Limited, we then became a limited company, albeit solely 10 owned by the Government. But the status changed, so we 11 then had to go the roundabout route, through the police, 12 through the PPS and then the DPP, yes. 13 Q. So what would that file, initially submitted to the 14 PSNI, contain? 15 A. That would contain everything. 16 Q. That would contain everything that your team had? 17 A. Everything we had, yes. It would be a complete file: 18 the offender report, the taped transcripts, the 19 disclosure material, witness statements; everything 20 would be there for them to make a judgment on the merits 21 of the case. 22 Q. So you also explain that PSNI would assess the evidence 23 and consider whether the case had merit, that's how 24 you've described it; is that correct? 25 A. Yes. 37 1 Q. What was your understanding of the test being applied by 2 the PSNI to decide whether a case had merit? 3 A. Well, whether they felt there was dishonest involved in 4 the case. Often they would liaise with Suzanne Winter 5 because the cases were slightly unusual, in the fact 6 that they involved Post Office accounting procedures. 7 So sometimes they needed a bit of clarity, 8 clarification, guiding them through how the process 9 worked and showing them what evidence there was to show 10 why we believed that an offence had taken place. 11 Q. Once a case had been submitted to the PSNI, who did you 12 understand was in charge of the investigation at that 13 point? 14 A. Then PSNI would be involved -- they would be in charge 15 of the case. They'd had all the evidence they had the 16 prosecution or the -- sorry, the file of evidence, and 17 it would be then, they'd then take it through their 18 system to whatever level they required to decide, yeah, 19 we can prosecute this case or sent it back, it has no 20 merit. 21 Q. So it was a PSNI investigation with the assistance of 22 Ms Winter from Post Office? 23 A. Basically yes, yeah. 24 Q. So in your statement and in your evidence, you've 25 referred to the prosecution file then being submitted by 38 1 the PSNI to the Public Prosecution Service, which also 2 referred to as the PPS. 3 A. Yes, yes. 4 Q. It's the Inquiry's understanding that, from 2000 to 5 2003, the majority of cases in Northern Ireland would 6 have been prosecuted still by the DPP, with the PPS only 7 having been established in 2005. Does that accord with 8 your understanding, that it would have been the DPP, the 9 file -- 10 A. That sounds like error on my behalf. So -- 11 Q. So should we understand the references in your statement 12 to PPS to be to the DPP? 13 A. I think that could have been -- that's -- yeah, 14 I understand that, but that was after my time with the 15 Post Office, so yeah, that's an error on my behalf. 16 Yeah. 17 Q. So is it the case, then, that, even after it had been 18 submitted by the PSNI to the DPP, that Ms Winter would 19 still be involved in assisting? 20 A. Yes, she, to my understanding, was involved throughout 21 the process, to provide and assist, provide additional 22 information to the DPP or PSNI to progress the case, 23 yeah. 24 Q. Were you also involved in helping to progress the case? 25 A. Not directly. I would be if -- Ms Winter and I would 39 1 discuss the case and see what was required, what she'd 2 been asked to produce, could she produce it, and she 3 would normally progress the case through without my 4 involvement -- without my direct involvement. 5 Q. Do you remember the PSNI or the DPP ever requesting that 6 further reasonable lines of inquiry were pursued by the 7 Post Office? 8 A. I can't remember such a case, no. 9 Q. Once the case then been submitted to the DPP, whose 10 decision was it whether to prosecute a case in Northern 11 Ireland? 12 A. If the DPP said there were grounds for prosecution, the 13 business would accept it, you know, I would say, "Well, 14 okay, go ahead with it". I would discuss it with my 15 line manager and explain what was happening, and that 16 would usually go forward. The problem is the length of 17 time it took. In England, it was fairly quick process 18 because we had direct access to the legal advice; in 19 Northern Ireland it took a while. 20 Q. So did you have any input into the decision whether the 21 DPP was going to prosecute a case or not? 22 A. No. No, I didn't. 23 Q. What would happen if the DPP decided not to prosecute 24 the case? 25 A. Then we would recover the case and discuss that with my 40 1 boss, and with the Retail Line Manager because, 2 ultimately, it would be his responsibility to decide 3 what he wanted to happen with the case, whether he still 4 wanted to deal with it as a discipline matter or whether 5 he just wanted to say we'll recover the monies and 6 reinstate the subpostmaster, or whatever. 7 Q. Who did you then report to at the time from 2000 to 8 2003? 9 A. Well, my initial boss was a Duncan McFadyen, who wasn't 10 an Investigator or had no investigation background and, 11 if I was stuck with a problem with an investigation 12 I would go to National Security Investigations for 13 advice from them. 14 Q. So he was your line manager but had no experience of 15 investigations; is that correct? 16 A. That's right, yeah. 17 Q. What was his title, his job title? 18 A. I've been racking my brains for weeks on that and 19 I can't remember. 20 Q. Don't worry. 21 A. But he was in charge of the physical security side and 22 the investigation side, and his area covered North West 23 England, Scotland, Northern Ireland and a little bit 24 North East England but he had no investigative 25 background in the job. 41 1 Q. So I just want to go back to summarise the people that 2 were involved at the various stages because it'll be 3 useful whenever we come to look at the case studies. So 4 in respect of cases in Northern Ireland after 2001, if 5 there was a shortfall discovered following a special 6 audit, the case would have gone to Ms Winter in the 7 first instance? 8 A. Yeah. 9 Q. Then you would have decided whether to submit the case 10 to the PSNI? 11 A. You said a special audit? 12 Q. Yes. 13 A. A special audit would be something we'd arranged. If it 14 was a cash shortage then scheduled audit, then that 15 possibly would have been reported to Ms Winter; is that 16 what -- or I misunderstood what you were asking, sorry. 17 Q. So following a special audit, the case would have sat 18 with Ms Winter -- 19 A. Yeah. 20 Q. -- and then you would have submitted it to the PSNI? 21 A. Following our investigations -- 22 Q. Yes. 23 A. -- and any follow-up investigations, yes, we would have 24 done, yes. 25 Q. PSNI would have reviewed the case and then would have 42 1 submitted it on to the DPP if they considered it had 2 merits? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. The DPP would review the case and then would decide to 5 prosecute if appropriate; is that right? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. So then, in contrast with the scheduled audit, at the 8 very start, you would have also had the Retail Network 9 Manager, who would have decided whether there was going 10 to be a criminal investigation at the start; is that 11 right? 12 A. They had that option, I was going to say authority, but 13 it's probably more of an option, to decide whether or 14 not -- it would depend on the history of the office, you 15 know. Offices were audited not overly frequently but 16 frequently, and if the previous audit report and the 17 current audit report showed there is an issue in the 18 office, the Retail Line may decide it's a disciplinary 19 issue, a training issue, we will deal with it and 20 recover the monies ourselves. 21 Q. So do you agree, then, that the case potentially passed 22 through quite a few hands before the decision to 23 prosecute was made in Northern Irish cases? 24 A. Not every case. Some cases, where we did the special 25 audits -- again, I keep going back to pension allowance 43 1 fraud but that was because it was probably the most 2 common one that we dealt with. It would be discussed 3 with the Retail Line before we went in for a special 4 audit, and then they would be told of the outcome and, 5 based on the outcome, they could say "Well, it was a sub 6 office assistant rather than a subpostmaster, it's 7 business as usual but the subpostmaster is ultimately 8 responsible for the shortfall". 9 Q. At the time, what was your view of how effective the 10 investigation process in Northern Ireland was? 11 A. As effective as anywhere else. 12 Q. So you considered -- 13 A. Just -- 14 Q. Sorry. 15 A. As effective as in England or Scotland, except the 16 timescale was a bit of an issue but, other than that, 17 I think it was just as effective as anywhere else. 18 Q. So, in your experience, how long would it take from the 19 interview to the decision to prosecute being made by the 20 DPP in Northern Ireland, just as an estimate? 21 A. Well, we're looking at probably four years, three/four 22 years. 23 Q. How did that compare with prosecutions in England or 24 Wales? 25 A. Well, England and Wales, it was a case of we would do 44 1 the investigation, submit the file to the Legal 2 Services, they would come back and say, "Yes, a case to 3 answer, these are the specimen charges". Then we'd have 4 an officer available to go to a local Magistrates Court, 5 swear out the summonses, and then we would serve the 6 summonses. So it was a fairly compact process. 7 Q. How long would you estimate that would take in England 8 or Wales? 9 A. Well, it would probably be done within five or six 10 weeks, in some cases. Other cases, it may drag out 11 a bit longer but it was a fairly compact, self-contained 12 system. 13 MS MILLAR: Sir, that would be an appropriate moment in my 14 questions for a break, if that's a convenient moment for 15 you. 16 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, certainly. So 15 minutes from now 17 takes us to where? 18 MS MILLAR: Just after 11.20. 19 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Fine. Well, let's give ourselves 20 an extra minute or two and say 11.25, all right. 21 MS MILLAR: Thank you very much, sir. 22 (11.06 am) 23 (A short break) 24 (11.25 am) 25 MS MILLAR: Good morning, sir, can you see and hear us? 45 1 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, I can. 2 MS MILLAR: Thank you. 3 Mr Thorpe, before I move on, then, to discuss the 4 two case studies -- the case of Alan McLaughlin and the 5 case of Maureen McKelvey -- I want to just ask you some 6 questions about your knowledge or involvement with the 7 Horizon system. 8 So in your statement you say: 9 "In the limited time that I was involved with 10 Horizon I had no knowledge of any problems with the 11 accuracy of the Horizon system." 12 Does that remain your position? 13 A. Yes, it hasn't changed. As I say, I left the Post 14 Office beginning of 2003 and, in that period, between 15 its rollout, it was still a very limited number of 16 offices had Horizon, and I wasn't aware and nobody said, 17 "We have a potential problem with the system". 18 Q. Could we please have the document reference 19 WITN05970134, on screen, please. 20 We can see that this document has, as its title, 21 "Review of Horizon Cash Account System -- Stage 2", and 22 just in the box below the introduction, it says: 23 "... the original TOR [which the Inquiry understands 24 is Terms of Reference] had as its objective 'to confirm 25 that the end-to-end reconciliation and accounting 46 1 processes are free from system inaccuracies or 2 discrepancies'." 3 We can see that the first paragraph above that box, 4 the Terms of Reference were agreed with the Horizon 5 Programme Director on 15 July 1999. Did you recognise 6 this document from before you were provided it by the 7 Inquiry? 8 A. No, I can't remember seeing it at all. 9 Q. The Inquiry understands this document to have been 10 written by Jeremy Folkes; do you remember him? 11 A. Jeremy? 12 Q. Folkes: F-O-L-K-E-S. 13 A. No, I don't recognise the name. 14 Q. If we just go down the name a little bit, under 15 "Management Summary", it says, "POSIS [Post Office 16 Security and Investigation Service] Investigations at 17 Outlets". We can see it says: 18 "We were extremely concerned to be informed during 19 the review that POSIS currently do not have access to 20 archived data from the system. Data on the system is 21 compressed and archived after 35 days. It was 22 originally intended that access would be gained via the 23 Fraud Risk Management Server, which formed parts of the 24 Benefits Payment System and has now been withdrawn. 25 This means the business could be in a position where it 47 1 is unable to investigate potential frauds or prosecute 2 cases due to the unavailability of critical data." 3 Then just going on to the second line, the end of 4 the second line, in the paragraph below: 5 "Les Thorpe, Investigation Manager in the North East 6 Region ..." 7 Do you understand that to be a reference to you? 8 A. Yes, yes. 9 Q. "... advised us that Pathway had estimated the cost to 10 reintroduce the Fraud Risk Management Server to be in 11 the region of £180,000 with an additional fee of £1,500 12 per man day for performing extraction. These concerns 13 were highlighted after a possible fraud at Grange Park 14 SPSO, which is involved in the Horizon Live Trial." 15 Can you remember this advice that you've given or 16 being involved in this review? 17 A. I can't remember this document at all and I agree that's 18 my name, and "Investigative Manager North East Region", 19 so I'm assuming it must have been 1999/1998, somewhere 20 in those -- that period when it was written, but I just 21 can't remember it at all or what enquiries I made to 22 find out the cost of reintroducing the server or what 23 fees would be involved thereafter. I can't remember. 24 Q. Do you remember having any involvement during the time 25 of the live trial in feeding in to the audit trail or 48 1 anything to do with investigations? 2 A. I honestly can't. I saw this document in the bundle 3 that I was sent and it gave me a shock when I saw my 4 name but I can't remember anything about it at all or 5 any involvement with Horizon -- the Horizon live trial. 6 Q. If we could just go down, then, to the bottom of page 3 7 of that document, it's under the heading "Transaction 8 Processing". It says under that title: 9 "During the course of the review we were made aware 10 of concerns that Transaction Processing had regarding 11 the level of errors generated by Horizon outlets and the 12 impact on operations with the rollout further outlets. 13 This is because the level of Class and Pivot errors are 14 well above the expected levels of 195 and 110 per week 15 respectively." 16 Did you have any awareness of these errors? 17 A. None whatsoever, no. 18 Q. Then finally, if we just look at page 5, the 19 "Conclusion" of that document, we see it says: 20 "There is a need to ensure that the problems 21 relating to the audit trail or S&IE investigations 22 demonstrating that the system meets the requirements of 23 the Police and Criminal Evidence Act have been impact 24 assessed as incidents and are considered by the 25 Acceptance and Release Authorisation Boards if not 49 1 satisfactorily resolved. In addition, it will be 2 necessary to consider whether the current level of cash 3 account errors will affect the accuracy of settlement 4 with clients, when considering the rate at which the 5 system should rollout." 6 From your earlier answers, do we take it that you 7 had no involvement in the conclusion to that report? 8 A. None whatsoever, and the names that are mentioned, none 9 of the names ring a bell either. 10 Q. Would you agree that the conclusion appears to draw 11 a link between cash account errors and the accuracy of 12 the audit trail which was used in investigations? 13 A. It would appear from that that there was significant 14 problems, yes. 15 Q. Would you have expected that to have been communicated 16 to you? 17 A. I would have thought so, yes, yes. 18 Q. So you don't remember any follow-up work after this 19 period, in relation to those errors or concerns that 20 were raised? 21 A. None whatsoever, or any discussions regarding the 22 suitability of the system as to the Police and Criminal 23 Evidence Act, or anything like that, I really can't 24 remember anything at all. 25 Q. Thank you, that document can come down. 50 1 I'd like to turn then, please, to your involvement 2 in the investigation of Alan McLaughlin and, to help 3 with your memory of the case, Alan McLaughlin was the 4 postmaster at Brookfield Post Office in Tennent Street 5 in Belfast, and he was prosecuted for 15 offences of 6 false accounting, which were said to have occurred 7 between 13 December 2000 and 26 July. 8 After initially contesting the charges, he pleaded 9 guilty on 16 February 2005. He received a fine and was 10 or interested to pay compensation and, following his 11 conviction, he lost his business and was made bankrupt, 12 and his convictions were quashed by the Court of Appeal 13 in Northern Ireland in 2022. 14 Is it correct, then, that you were the Second 15 Officer in Mr McLaughlin's case? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. So I'd like to start, then, with the special audit which 18 was arranged at Mr McLaughlin's branch. You attended 19 that audit on 26 July 2001 with Ms Winter; is that 20 correct? 21 A. I did, yes. 22 Q. You explain in your statement that the audit and 23 subsequent interview had been arranged following 24 irregularities having been identified in respect of 25 pension allowance claims at the branch? 51 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. Did you have any involvement in looking at those issues 3 before you attended the audit? 4 A. Yes, Suzanne Winter and myself, we'd been through all 5 the case papers, we'd looked -- she had collated all the 6 information which she'd received regarding pension 7 allowance overclaims and we discussed the matter, 8 a schedule was prepared and we decided there was 9 sufficient evidence to go and talk to the subpostmaster. 10 As I'd previously said, the subpostmaster was our first 11 and primary source of contact. 12 Q. So during the special audit, what was your role? 13 A. Nothing. Nothing at all. The special audit -- as 14 previously mentioned, Mr McLaughlin was told special 15 audit had been recalled because of irregularities in the 16 cash account and we were required to speak to him after 17 the audit was complete and he was asked to watch the 18 audit take place, mentioned he would have the right of 19 legal representation and/or a friend, and he chose to 20 have his mother present as friend, which although 21 strictly wasn't part of it but, in the interests of 22 fairness, we said that was not a problem with the 23 interview, and then the audit progressed. 24 Q. During the audit, did you conduct any searches of 25 Mr McLaughlin's branch? 52 1 A. No, no. 2 Q. Could we please have AMCL0000032 on screen, please, at 3 page 177. This is an excerpt from Mr McLaughlin's 4 interview, which we'll come back to in more detail in 5 a minute, but it's right, isn't it, that you were one of 6 the interviewing officers along with Ms Winter? 7 A. Yes, yeah. 8 Q. If we look about halfway down the page, page 177, so we 9 see the initials "FT", do we take it that that's you 10 speaking? 11 A. (No audible answer) 12 Q. Then you say: 13 "Now we also recovered from the dustbin this morning 14 the -- to try to assist the auditors -- there's actually 15 a listing that somebody had prepared. I'm now showing 16 you a listing which has been stuck together with 17 Sellotape because it had been destroyed." 18 So did you carry out searches of the branch at any 19 point? 20 A. I suppose that constitutes a search. We didn't actually 21 go through drawers and cupboards, and the like, but 22 obviously we'd noticed something in the dustbin which 23 was recovered, rather than sort of searching the 24 property, as such, yeah. 25 Q. To your recollection, was that bin inside the branch or 53 1 was it outside the branch? 2 A. That -- I can't remember but I'm assuming it would have 3 been under the counter in the branch, in the secure area 4 of the Post Office. 5 Q. So it's your evidence, is it, that you didn't actually 6 formally search the branch but you did search the bin 7 inside the branch? 8 A. Well, we didn't formally search the premises but we -- 9 but I suppose from that, it would appear we searched the 10 dustbins. I can't remember actually doing it. In fact, 11 when I think about it, I think it actually wasn't myself 12 or Ms Winter who found it, I believe it was one of the 13 Auditors who actually found it. I can't remember which 14 one. I think they mention in their statement that they 15 actually found that in the bin and brought it to our 16 attention. 17 Q. So what you said in that little excerpt of the 18 interview, you said, "we also recovered from the dustbin 19 this morning the -- to try to assist the Auditors". So 20 you agree that it sounds like it wasn't one of the 21 auditors; it was either you or Ms Winter who recovered 22 that? 23 A. Well, perhaps we did recover it. I honestly can't 24 remember, you know, it was sort of 23 years ago. You 25 know, it's difficult. 54 1 Q. So that can come down for a moment. We'll go back to 2 it, thank you very much. 3 So is it correct, then, that the interview was 4 conducted later the same day as the special audit? 5 A. It was conducted the same day, yes, at Mr McLaughlin's 6 premises. 7 Q. In your statement, you say that, having read the tape 8 transcripts of the interview, Mr McLaughlin briefly 9 mentioned Horizon but did not suggest or have concerns 10 about the reliability of the Horizon system, which could 11 have contributed to the accounting irregularities 12 identified; does that remain your understanding of the 13 interview? 14 A. Yes, he did mention Horizon and he said initially he'd 15 had a few problems with it but then, when we started 16 talking to him regarding the pension allowance 17 overclaims, he didn't actually say "Oh, it's Horizon's 18 problem". He didn't say that. 19 Q. So if we could go back then to that interview transcript 20 it's AMCL0000032, starting at page 94 of the document. 21 So we can see that, as you've said, Ms Winter and you 22 were the interviewing officers and Mr McLaughlin was 23 interviewed and his mother, Margaret McLaughlin, was 24 present? 25 A. Yes. 55 1 Q. I'd like to take you then to page 152 of the transcript. 2 About a third of the way down that page, we see your 3 initials again, and you say: 4 "Your balancing is quite exceptionally good." 5 Do you see that -- 6 A. Yeah. 7 Q. -- just highlighted there? You then go on to say: 8 "Ian [which I think must be Alan] must be all credit 9 to you to the systems in the way you operating but when 10 I look through them going back to the beginning of the, 11 of the financial year ..." 12 You go on to say: 13 "... there's ups and downs because there's nothing, 14 I don't usually want to go above £50." 15 Then, towards the bottom of that page, you say: 16 "But things that have been declared and you know 17 ..." 18 Then if we look over to the top of the next page you 19 say: 20 "... £13 surplus, £9 surplus, £25 short." 21 You then go on to say: 22 "It's exceptionally good except ... 23 "... this." 24 So were you then looking through Mr McLaughlin's 25 accounts at this point and commenting that, in general, 56 1 they were of good quality, except for this issue with 2 the pension and allowance claims; is that your reading 3 of that transcript? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. Do you agree with that, yes? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. Going then, please, to page 154. At this stage of the 8 interview Ms Winter was putting to Mr McLaughlin 9 apparent discrepancies relating to pension payments 10 shown by two documents, and that was the computer adlist 11 and the weekly summary sheet, which I think you've 12 referred to earlier in your evidence? 13 A. Yes, yes. 14 Q. About a third of the way down, we can see you're 15 referring to the summary and also the actual adlists. 16 Is your understanding that those are two automated 17 documents produced by the Horizon system, the adlist and 18 the weekly summary? 19 A. The adlisting can be produced by the Horizon system, 20 yes, the idea being that, as you transact a document, it 21 goes into the memory of the system and then, at the end 22 of the week, it produced a -- or you can produce 23 a snapshot at any time and print off the list of 24 vouchers that should be contained within the bundle, 25 yes, yeah. 57 1 Q. Is the same of the weekly summary, that's a document 2 produced by the computer system? 3 A. And -- so, yes, so what would happen is the -- if the 4 pension allowance had been run off on a daily basis, 5 which it would have been on a busy office, then they 6 would be collated so, at the end of the week, just 7 a gross figure would be showing in the cash account for 8 pension allowances paid, yes. 9 Q. At the bottom, then, of page 154, please. We see 10 Ms Winter says: 11 "And what made it interesting was that you always 12 seem to be balancing." 13 Then Mr McLaughlin further down says: 14 "Yeah, it would start, we got dreadful problems 15 starting [because] of the problems with the Capture 16 system and the change over to Horizon, things were very 17 see-saw, very up and down you know." 18 He then at the bottom of the page says: 19 "It wasn't stable at all ..." 20 So do you understand that to be him raising issues 21 with the Horizon system when his branch first moved 22 over? 23 A. Well, yeah, the Capture was the earlier system and it 24 transferred to Horizon but that was one of the few 25 limited mentions that he had of the Horizon system. 58 1 Q. If we go over to the top of the next page, then, you 2 then ask: 3 "When did you go onto Horizon?" 4 He says: 5 "In September of '99 and it wasn't stable, the 6 balance were not stable at all." 7 In your statement, you've described that you think 8 Mr McLaughlin was one of the first branches to move 9 under Horizon; is that correct? 10 A. Sorry? 11 Q. In your statement you said that you thought 12 Mr McLaughlin was one of the first branches to move -- 13 A. Yes, it was rolled -- I believe it was rolled out 14 sometime in July 1999, so Mr McLaughlin would have been 15 one of the first offices, yeah. 16 Q. Then just a little bit further down, you say: 17 "But that's 2 years ago." 18 Then you say: 19 "Yeah, well, you could control by now not then." 20 So was what you were saying there that that seemed 21 to be a problem two years ago but didn't explain the 22 problem now; was that your view? 23 A. Yes, yeah. 24 Q. So going on, then, to page 166. If we see beside the 25 tape counter time 29.18, Ms Winter says: 59 1 "It should, it doesn't explain how for last night 2 for instance there's 3 amounts were then put through the 3 system." 4 Mr McLaughlin says: 5 "Again it's person time tying to get the balance on, 6 trying to get it you know done by a certain time in 7 a way. [Because] when I was first here you know and 8 they were all over the place, we were 8 o'clock, 9 9 o'clock at night, yeah." 10 So do you agree that at that point he's talking 11 about having further problems getting his balancing 12 correct? 13 A. Well, it would appear so but whether that was the result 14 of the Horizon system or Mr McLaughlin's operating 15 system, I don't know. But, yes, it would appear that it 16 was the system or some problems. 17 Q. Do you agree that one possible explanation for the 18 problems could have been the system? 19 A. One possible explanation could be the Horizon, yeah. 20 Q. Then at page 169, please. So this second comment from 21 you on that page is: 22 "Right okay. So you've had some big shortages. You 23 become ..." 24 Mr McLaughlin, three lines down agrees with you and 25 he says: 60 1 "Big, big shortages yep." 2 You go on to say: 3 "And for that reason with a little bit of 4 manipulation here to (inaudible) the surpluses to make 5 good the shortages." 6 So was your view at that point that the only 7 explanation for the shortages was that Mr McLaughlin had 8 been manipulating the figures? 9 A. Well, what Mr McLaughlin was doing wouldn't have created 10 shortages; it would have created surpluses. So what he 11 seems to be saying here is that he was having some 12 shortage with the Horizon system, and -- well, that's 13 one explanation, the Horizon system -- and he was taking 14 it upon himself correct those shortages by manipulating 15 the pension allowance payments that the office was 16 making. 17 On this, he does say he was having shortages but, at 18 one point during the interview, he also said he had 19 a member of staff who was dishonest and she was 20 dismissed. Shortly after, his balancing did improve, so 21 that was another explanation, not always the Horizon 22 system. 23 Q. He then goes on to say, at the bottom of that page 24 there, on the screen: 25 "You think oh fine, that's balancing and all the 61 1 rest of it, but stores up, a bit stupid really it stores 2 up problems and you know it's not accurate accounting." 3 Do you agree that there he is suggesting that it's 4 the system that isn't accurately accounting, rather than 5 him? 6 A. I took that to be that his accounting wasn't accurate, 7 because of what he was doing, manipulating the 8 cash-on-hand figures and overstating the pension 9 allowances that had been paid, not necessarily 10 attributable to the Horizon system. 11 Q. Would you agree that it's not necessarily clear, though, 12 on that account there, that he's talking about his own 13 accurate accounting, it could be that he's talking about 14 the computer system? 15 A. Okay, it's not 100 per cent clear but, as I say, that 16 would have been my understanding at the time. 17 Q. If we could go on, then, to page 181, please. We see 18 a question from you which is: 19 "Which was the figure we just carried in your cash 20 account. So why did you adjust it by £660? 21 "Answer: Obviously to make the cash account show 22 a reasonable balance. If that was the amount over that 23 must have been the adjustment." 24 So, at that stage, Mr McLaughlin accepts adjusting 25 the figures but that's to make the accounts balance; is 62 1 that your understanding? 2 A. That's what he suggested that he was doing. He was 3 making the accounts balance so they looked acceptable, 4 and that was one occasion where he'd made the -- 5 adjusted it by £660, yeah. 6 Q. Then going to page 196, please. So the second line of 7 that page, we see that the allegation of false 8 accounting is put to Mr McLaughlin: 9 "So that is a false account which is for you to 10 submit this to the Post Office? 11 "Answer: Hmm. 12 "Question: Is actually a criminal offence. And ... 13 "Answer: ... sorry. 14 "Question: No, no, it's an, an, this pattern as 15 you'd said has been going on regularly since perhaps 16 January-February of the current year when ... 17 "Answer: Yeah. In ... when I found out that, you 18 know, what er procedure (inaudible) what the postmasters 19 were actually doing wasn't, because obviously we've had 20 (sighs) wildly variation erm cash accounts for a period 21 but whenever I found out that what they would do would 22 be, they would take the money, hold it, put it in, or 23 keep it aside as according to what indication they were 24 getting of where their cash account was going. I mean 25 that is what in my unclear way erm it's always been well 63 1 this is the practice that everyone's doing so it must be 2 what you do to establish a continuum of (inaudible) 3 acceptable accounts." 4 So, in summary, do you understand that what 5 Mr McLaughlin was saying was that there are other people 6 with variations in their account and this was how he 7 understood other people were trying to accurately 8 balance their accounts? 9 A. That's what he's saying. Whether it's based on fact or 10 wishful thinking, I don't know. 11 Q. Was that something that, taking it at face value, you 12 would have wanted to look at further, if, in fact, other 13 people were having the same problems as him? 14 A. Well, there were no specific allegations there, just 15 other subpostmasters. It could have been 16 a subpostmaster in Northern Ireland or nationally, or 17 whatever. At one point, Mr McLaughlin employed on 18 a part-time basis the former subpostmaster. So whether 19 they had been talking and the other subpostmaster, from 20 his experience, was saying "Everybody's doing it, get 21 over it", I don't know where that came from. But 22 certainly, from our experience, you know, it's not 23 a wild -- not a widely operated system of fiddling the 24 cash account to make it look good. 25 Q. Do you mean: in your experience, that isn't what other 64 1 subpostmasters and mistresses were doing? 2 A. It's possible. It's difficult to generalise but, 3 ultimately, if a subpostmaster doing that, the 4 likelihood is they're going to be caught out when the 5 office is audited. If they're doing what Mr McLaughlin 6 was doing, by inflating the value of paid pension 7 allowances, then, I think subpostmasters realised that 8 the sheer volume of pension allowance vouchers collated 9 or collected any week there was no way anybody could, 10 actually, or any organisation could physically count 11 every one. So I think there was a belief that it's 12 a bit -- you know, if you try it on like that, then you 13 may get away with it, you may not. 14 Q. So my question wasn't so much were other people also 15 inflating the figures but whether you were concerned 16 that other people seemed to be saying they were having 17 wild variations in their accounts. Would that have been 18 something that would concern you as an Investigator? 19 A. That would concern me. What is the problem is that, if 20 they were doing the same as Mr McLaughlin, they were 21 disguising the fact, so nobody would actually know, 22 unless they said to the Retail Network Manager "I'm 23 having problems", that there was a problem in the 24 office. By falsifying the cash on hand or inflating the 25 paid pension allowances to make an acceptable balance, 65 1 it's not showing a true account but it's also not 2 highlighting the problem there is an issue in the 3 office, with the balancing or with the Horizon system. 4 Q. Would you agree that as an Investigator, you would have 5 had the obligation to look to see whether there are 6 actually problems with the balancing and the figures in 7 the branch? 8 A. Well, as I say, we did actually look at the cash 9 accounts for the office but, because they were being 10 manipulated, it was difficult to actually identify 11 when -- or when the errors occurred or what the value of 12 the errors were because of what Mr McLaughlin was doing. 13 Q. Okay. Thank you. If we can move, then, on to page 202, 14 and the second line down, Ms Winter says: 15 "And you were aware that this was a criminal offence 16 because it was falsifying accounts? 17 "Answer: I wasn't that -- I never thought about it 18 or erm put it in those terms at all. No I wasn't -- as 19 aware of that, I weren't as aware of that ... 20 "Question: You were aware that it was wrong to do 21 that? 22 "Answer: I was aware that erm what I thought was if 23 not unaccepted but a common practice to keep reasonable 24 accounts ... 25 "Question: So you were aware that you were 66 1 falsifying your accounts? 2 "Answer: Not -- I wouldn't have set out to do that 3 in that form, or, with that intention or plan, but ... 4 as it were that by allowing this kind of pattern to go 5 on the, the, the final accounting probably would not be 6 completely accurate." 7 Do you accept that Mr McLaughlin is denying 8 criminality? He's saying that it wasn't the case that 9 at the start he was intending to inflate his figures, he 10 was doing it to balance his accounts? 11 A. Yeah, I accept, on the points to prove for this, he's 12 not accepting dishonesty. But what he was doing was 13 still wrong and so, obviously, others had to decide 14 whether there was a criminal intent in what he was 15 doing. 16 Q. In terms of points to prove, did you ever consider or 17 give any thought to whether there was an actual loss at 18 this branch? 19 A. There was an actual loss which was shown in the -- well, 20 there was a loss, because of the value of the pension 21 allowances overclaimed, which was round about £10,000, 22 I believe, without checking the schedules. So there was 23 a loss to the Post Office in that respect. 24 Q. Was there evidence of that loss on the weekly summary in 25 the adlists that we talked about? 67 1 A. It was a combination of all of the adlists which had 2 been submitting, which had been checked either by 3 Lisahally or by Ms Winter, after the Lisahally had 4 reported a number of discrepancies in the office. 5 Q. I think you accepted earlier that those two documents, 6 the adlist and the weekly summary, were documents 7 produced by the Horizon system? 8 A. Yes, yes, yes. They were, yeah. 9 Q. So did you ever give any thought to the fact that there 10 could be errors in the system that were generating 11 a loss, which wasn't actually there? 12 A. Well, they weren't generating losses, they were 13 generating discrepancies. 14 Q. Or a discrepancy, I beg your pardon. 15 A. So I know the Horizon system -- sorry, going onwards -- 16 has shown that a lot of offices were finding lots of 17 losses but what Mr McLaughlin was doing, or what was 18 coming through on the Horizon printouts from his office, 19 was -- would have generated a surplus, not a shortage. 20 Q. So, in any event, it was a discrepancy in his accounts? 21 A. It would be a discrepancy but in his favour. 22 Q. But did you ever consider that that was caused by 23 an error in the system, rather than Mr McLaughlin? 24 A. Well, no, because we were dealing with physical 25 documents. This was going back in the day. Now, it's 68 1 all electronic but, back in the day, when you tore 2 a foil out of a pension book, kept that in your office 3 as your record and paid your client however much was 4 due. So there should be a voucher in each adlist to 5 support the figure in the adlist. If there was 6 a voucher missing, then where was it, basically? And if 7 it was happening once or twice, there may be an error. 8 Q. But the adlist itself was a computer generated document? 9 A. The adlist would be computer generated but controlled by 10 the operator. 11 Q. Okay. So is it still the case, then, that you think 12 that potential errors with the system were only 13 mentioned briefly by Mr McLaughlin or do you accept that 14 he did, on numerous occasions, report potential 15 problems? 16 A. He mentions them in passing. He doesn't mention -- the 17 difficulty, is, substantiating what he's saying by 18 comparing it with the respective cash accounts because 19 these was manipulating the figures in the cash account. 20 If he'd been showing true accounts, then it would have 21 given more scope for an investigation to be carried out, 22 but because he was changing the figures, it was more 23 difficult to actually go back and find out what he'd 24 been -- what the real state of the account was. 25 Q. But do you agree that it still was your role, as the 69 1 Investigator with Ms Winter, to get to the bottom of 2 that, as best you could? 3 A. We got to the bottom of it as best we could, I think, 4 under the circumstances and, plus, Mr McLaughlin's 5 admission that he manipulated the cash account, the cash 6 on hand, and he also adjusted the pension allowances to 7 make the account look good. 8 Q. So moving on, then, after the interview you explain in 9 your statement that it would have been normal procedure 10 for you to liaise with Ms Winter regarding the 11 preparation of the case, but do you have any 12 recollection of actually doing that in Mr McLaughlin's 13 case? 14 A. I would have spoken to Ms Winter regarding that, 15 obviously given her a statement because I was involved 16 in the interview but, what direct involvement I had 17 after the interview, I wouldn't like to say. Maybe it 18 was quite limited because the length of it took for the 19 case to be presented to the PSNI and for them to process 20 it, most of the work would have fallen on Ms Winter's 21 shoulders. 22 Q. Just to be clear, when you say you wouldn't like to say 23 what your involvement was, is that because you don't 24 have a specific recollection of it? 25 A. I don't have a recollection of exactly what my 70 1 involvement was, other than the interview. 2 Q. Can you remember requesting that Ms Winter pursue any 3 lines of inquiry following the interview? 4 A. No, I don't think I did. No, I'm sure I didn't. 5 Q. So you've mentioned that the PSNI hadn't progressed this 6 case prior to your leaving the Post Office in January 7 2003. Do we take it from that that, at some point prior 8 to that, you must have submitted the case to the PSNI? 9 A. I can't remember when the case was submitted to the 10 PSNI. It would be fairly timely, I would suggest, but 11 I can't say that it was, you know, the end of 2001, the 12 beginning of 2002; I can't remember. 13 Q. Can you remember what stage the case was left, whenever 14 you left the Post Office, in January 2003? 15 A. I can't -- I can't be certain. I would suggest it would 16 be well progressed, if not ready for submission to the 17 PSNI, but I can't be certain. 18 Q. Moving on, then, please from that to your involvement in 19 the case of Maureen McKelvey. Again, to -- 20 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Before you do that, sorry -- before you 21 do that, let me just get Mr Thorpe's view about the 22 likelihood of where the case was when he left. 23 This interview under caution was July 2001 and you 24 left in early 2003. I mean, from your -- even if you 25 can't remember this specific case, from your dealings 71 1 with cases in Northern Ireland, would you think it 2 likely that you hadn't submitted the case to the PSNI 3 over a period of 18 months? 4 A. I feel certain, sir, that the case would have been 5 submitted to the PSNI before I left but, as I say, 6 I can't actually categorically say, yes, it was within 7 six months or within six weeks. I can't remember. 8 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Well, in relation to English cases, you 9 said that it was quite common for them to be processed 10 quickly. My impression from what you've been saying 11 earlier was that you -- from your perspective, namely 12 the Post Office, you would reasonably quickly decide 13 whether or not to present a case to the PSNI, and the 14 delays occurred thereafter. Now, you seem to be 15 suggesting that it could have taken many months for the 16 Post Office to decide whether or not to present a case 17 to the PSNI. I would just like to get a flavour of all 18 of this, if I could. 19 A. No, I believe, sir, that the delays were once the case 20 was submitted to the PSNI, rather than within the Post 21 Office. Once the case was completed -- the interview 22 was completed, witness statements, all evidence 23 gathered, the case would then have been presented to the 24 PSNI for them to progress it. So, as I say, I can't but 25 a timescale on it, but it would be reasonably quickly. 72 1 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: All right. Thank you. 2 Yes, sorry, Ms Millar. 3 MS MILLAR: Thank you very much, sir. 4 Moving on, then, please, to your involvement in the 5 case of Maureen McKelvey. So Mrs McKelvey cell was the 6 subpostmistress at Clanabogan Post Office in Omagh and 7 she was prosecuted for the theft of £4,623.48, which was 8 alleged to have occurred between -- 9 I beg your pardon, she was prosecuted for the theft 10 of in the region of £4,600 and she was tried and found 11 not guilty on 16 September 2004 but, nonetheless, she 12 lost her business and was made bankrupt. 13 Is it correct that, similarly to the case of 14 Mr McLaughlin, you were the Second Officer in this case 15 and Ms Winter was the Lead Investigator again? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. Also, similarly to Mr McLaughlin's case, a special audit 18 had been arranged following a number of irregularities 19 in the pension and allowance claims? 20 A. Exactly, yes. 21 Q. Again, you attended the audits on 4 April 2002 with 22 Ms Winter and members of the Audit Team. 23 A. (No audible answer) 24 Q. Later that day, is it right that you and Ms Winter 25 interviewed Ms McKelvey? 73 1 A. We did in the presence of her solicitor, yes. 2 Q. Could we have the interview transcript on screen, 3 please. It's PNI00000001_062, and it's page 50 of that 4 document. 5 Thank you. So we can see the date of the interview, 6 you're present with Ms Winter and Mrs McKelvey, and then 7 Stephen Atherton was her solicitor; is that correct? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. Going then to page 54 of that document, please. If we 10 look, then, to Ms Winter's question which is: 11 "How do you go about preparing everything for your 12 cash account? 13 "Answer: On the Wednesday? 14 "Question: Yes." 15 Mrs McKelvey then gives an account, I'm not going to 16 read all of it but, starting at the end of line 5, she 17 says: 18 "You try to audit and do everything, you know put 19 everything out to go through it at different stages on 20 the computer and bring it all to a balance now it 21 doesn't always balance first time as we all know ... but 22 some weeks if I'm out, the next week it usually balances 23 itself out, you know, it's neither big amounts here or 24 there. I know it will balance itself out and I'm happy 25 enough with that [because] I'm the one who's doing it 74 1 and I know if it's a mistake made, I know I have made it 2 and just a simple mistake and it will all sort itself 3 out the following week but that's the way I do to the 4 best of my ability and I don't do anything wrong as far 5 as I can see." 6 Do you agree when that Mrs McKelvey was explaining 7 that she had trouble balancing her accounts but, in her 8 experience, it usually worked itself out? 9 A. Yes, yeah. I think what she's also referring to is that 10 the fact that she's running, because it's a rural 11 office, she's bending the rules a little bit and 12 allowing people to come in at all times, and she has 13 this Camphill Community which she runs a post office 14 account for outside of the Post Office. And I think 15 what she's saying is there that she can have errors 16 occurring with the Camphill Community office and with 17 people coming in at odd times of the day but it's likely 18 that, if she'd made a mistake this week, it could 19 correct itself next week when she brings everything to 20 account that she's transacted late on the Wednesday, 21 yeah. 22 Q. Going, please, then, to page 76 of this document. If we 23 go -- sorry, thank you very much. 24 So if we just look towards the bottom of the screen, 25 Ms Winter says: 75 1 "Just before the completion of the interview I just 2 want to confirm a conversation that I had with 3 Mrs McKelvey this morning where Mrs McKelvey you 4 produced a bundle of 12 paid pension and allowance foils 5 with an adlist paperclipped around them and the date on 6 the adlist was 4 May 2001 timed at 17.52 and it was cash 7 account period 07 and you stated to me that you'd found 8 the bundle of fills last week in an envelope under the 9 counter in the post office, is that correct?" 10 "Answer: Yes." 11 Then, if we could go to just about two-thirds of the 12 way down the page, at the bottom of the screen we see 13 you say: 14 "We can have with us (paper rustling) the foils to 15 be checked to date. Would you like to examine those 16 foils again, that's with the tape recorder off whilst 17 you do that, if you would like to examine them in any 18 way. 19 "Answer: No." 20 Going down the page then, please, you say: 21 "To see if there's anything on there that you can 22 suggest there has been a problem. 23 "Answer: Are these foils wrong you're saying, these 24 ones from ..." 25 Ms Winter says: 76 1 "from this schedule." 2 "Answer: No, that's okay, no they're okay." 3 Just skipping to the bottom line she says: 4 "If it's there, it's there like, I can't, you're 5 saying it's on paper, that's it." 6 So do you understand that Mrs McKelvey is accepting 7 that she wouldn't find fault with the hard copy 8 documents, in terms of the foils themselves? 9 A. Sorry, I'm not quite sure what you're asking. 10 Q. So you have presented the foils to her and you've asked 11 her "Do you want to check these to see if you can find 12 a problem with them?" and she seems to be saying, "No, 13 those are all fine, the foils themselves are fine, I'm 14 not going to find any issue with them". Would you agree 15 with that? 16 A. Yes, yeah -- that she doesn't feel there's anything 17 wrong with the foils on that particular bundle, yeah. 18 Q. Ms Winter at the bottom of that page then asks: 19 "Have you anything else you'd like to say 20 Mrs McKelvey before we conclude the interview?" 21 If we look over the page, Mrs McKelvey says: 22 "Yes I do believe I did everything to the best of my 23 ability, I've been doing it for 11 years and I done it 24 right, if there's been an error on the computer?? I've 25 just done that, I didn't mean to do it, that's all I can 77 1 say." 2 Do you agree then that she raised that there might 3 be an error with the computer at that point? 4 A. Well, it's sort of speculative, isn't it, if there's 5 been an error on the computer? I know earlier in the 6 interview she did say that she liked the new computer 7 system and she felt proud of herself in the way she was 8 coping with it. 9 Q. But, at this point, you say it was speculative but she 10 did raise it in her answer to Ms Winter at that point, 11 as a potential issue? 12 A. Well, she's suggesting there could have been error on 13 the computer but only a suggestion, really. 14 Q. We can see then, the next questions from yourself and 15 Ms Winter, that there were no follow-up questions in 16 relation to there being a potential error on the 17 computer. Is there a reason why neither of you probed 18 that suggestion that there was an error on the computer? 19 A. Sorry, I'm not sure what we're looking at. 20 Q. So we're just looking at Mrs McKelvey had made the 21 suggestion that, if there had been an error on the 22 computer, she says with a question mark after it; would 23 that have been something you would have thought 24 "I should ask further to understand what she means by 25 that?" or do you think you -- 78 1 A. Perhaps, yes, it should have been explored slightly 2 further on that particular instance, yeah. 3 Q. This interview was taking place less than a year after 4 you interviewed Mr McLaughlin. Did you appreciate that 5 there were any similarities between those two cases, 6 Mr McLaughlin and Mrs McKelvey's case? 7 A. Not really. Pension allowance manipulation was quite 8 a common inquiry that we had to deal with and the 9 surpluses generated could have been to do with 10 satisfying losses on the Horizon system but often 11 subpostmasters would use the means of financing their 12 private business and this sort of thing. I'm not 13 suggesting that in either case that was the issue here. 14 But there was no real suggestion that Horizon was in any 15 way at fault in this because, again, if Horizon was 16 generating these errors then it would have been 17 surpluses in the account, rather than shortages in the 18 account. 19 Q. Do you accept, though, that, even if it was a surplus, 20 that would have still been an error? 21 A. Oh, yeah -- 22 Q. It wouldn't have reflected a true account? 23 A. -- it still would have been an error -- 24 Q. So there could have been a system problem? 25 A. (The witness nodded) 79 1 Q. In both of these cases, both postmaster and 2 subpostmistress had described problems balancing, in 3 both cases in relation to pensions and allowances, and 4 also mentioned the possibility of there being computer 5 errors; did you draw any link between the two cases at 6 the time? 7 A. At the time, no, no. 8 Q. You told us that Mr McLaughlin's case hadn't been 9 progressed by the time you left the Post Office so, at 10 the time of Mrs McKelvey's interview, the investigation 11 into Mr McLaughlin's case would have still been ongoing? 12 A. Yes, yes. 13 Q. Similarly to Mr McLaughlin's case, did you liaise with 14 Ms Winter about this case following the interview? 15 A. Liaise with Ms Winter regarding the? 16 Q. The investigation in Mrs McKelvey's case? 17 A. I would have liaised with her, yes, but we did feel, in 18 Mrs McKelvey's case, that there was possible confusion 19 because of the way she was manipulating -- not 20 manipulating -- the way she was operating the Downhill 21 Community (sic) because there was large sums of money 22 involved in that, because you're paying pension 23 allowance out and things like that. That was a possible 24 source of the -- to generate losses but then it didn't 25 account for the fact that there was systematic pension 80 1 allowances being claimed systematically, which hadn't 2 been paid -- which had been shown as being paid but 3 hadn't been -- no documents were there to support the 4 payment. 5 Q. So is it the case, then, that you considered that part 6 of it might have been down to Mrs McKelvey's error, 7 innocent error, but then it left things unexplained that 8 you considered were -- merited a criminal prosecution? 9 A. In hindsight, it possibly is, as we talked about earlier 10 on, a borderline case where the subpostmaster could be 11 referred back to the Retail Network Manager for them to 12 say "We think it's an error, therefore we're going to 13 deal with it on a disciplinary matter -- disciplinary 14 form". However, the strength of the evidence shown on 15 the schedules which Ms Winter prepared showed that this 16 was happening week after week, after week, after week, 17 which suggests that it wasn't error; it was more 18 a deliberate action, and we never got to the bottom of 19 why it was occurring. 20 Q. So, firstly, do you accept that she could, if 21 uncorrected, just have been making the same error, again 22 and again, not realising that she was making an error? 23 A. She could have been. But the amounts varied week on 24 week and, if it was the same error, as I say, that 25 should be shown in the cash account as surpluses, which 81 1 wasn't the case. 2 Q. Did you request that any reasonable lines of inquiry 3 were pursued by Ms Winter? 4 A. We didn't follow anything further than the evidence we 5 already had. 6 Q. Because you said that you didn't get to the -- you felt 7 like you didn't get to the bottom of it? 8 A. As to what was causing the overclaims, if it was 9 error -- and it didn't appear to be error, it appeared 10 to be more direct action, rather than error, and from 11 what we had and the evidence we had, it didn't warrant 12 further inquiry. 13 Q. So is it right that this case was still in progress when 14 you left the Post Office? 15 A. Yes, yes. 16 Q. Do you remember what stage this case was at whenever you 17 left the Post Office in 2003? 18 A. Well, again, I would imagine it was already complete and 19 ready for submission, if not already being submitted to 20 the PSNI, but I can't remember at what stage it was when 21 I left. 22 Q. When you retired in 2003, who was it that became 23 responsible for managing investigations in Northern 24 Ireland? 25 A. It was a gentleman called Dave Pardoe, he took over from 82 1 me. 2 Q. Was there any kind of handover process between the two 3 of you, where you explained "These are my cases, here's 4 the case Mr McLaughlin and Mrs McKelvey"? 5 A. Well, at the time of the handover, I had no active 6 cases, so I spoke to Mr Pardoe and, obviously, 7 introduced the team and explained how we worked. So it 8 wasn't an in-depth handover because each of the 9 Investigators would be able to sort of talk him through 10 what they did, how they did it, what the reporting 11 procedure was, and the like, because Mr Pardoe had come 12 from England where, obviously, the reporting system was 13 different. 14 Q. So when you say, though, that you retired and you had no 15 live cases, Mr McLaughlin and Mrs McKelvey's cases were 16 still live at the point where you left? 17 A. Sorry, yes, yeah, I -- yeah, it's the same mistake 18 I made in my witness statement, yeah. I was active, 19 insomuch as I had made a witness statement in both the 20 McKelvey and the McLaughlin cases but, unless I was 21 called, I wouldn't have had any more input into the case 22 than that. 23 Q. In terms of them handing over to Mr Pardoe, do you 24 remember talking him through either case and saying, 25 "This needs to be done, this is where we are with it"? 83 1 A. I can't remember doing that, no. 2 Q. So lastly, then, with the benefit of hindsight, do you 3 have any reflections in respect of the way in which 4 criminal investigations were conducted specifically in 5 Northern Ireland? 6 A. I don't think so. I think the cases were investigated 7 to the best of our ability and to the best of our 8 knowledge regarding the Horizon system at that time. 9 Things have progressed since then, so, obviously, as 10 things have progressed, things will have changed in the 11 way investigations were carried out but, on these 12 particular investigations, it was early days within the 13 rollout of Horizon, we were operating three systems, 14 there was Horizon, the pen and paper system and the 15 branch offices had a different system again. So it was 16 learning as we went along, in that respect. But 17 I believe we did what was necessary and the outcomes 18 were what we would have expected, really. 19 MS MILLAR: Thank you very much for your assistance, 20 Mr Thorpe. I don't have any further questions for you. 21 Sir, do you have any questions before I check 22 whether there are any from Core Participants? 23 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: No, thank you, no. 24 MS MILLAR: Mr Jacobs, thank you, sir. 25 Questioned by MR JACOBS 84 1 MR JACOBS: Thank you, Mr Thorpe. I act for Mrs McKelvey. 2 I have a few questions for you. 3 You were taken by Ms Millar to Mrs McKelvey's 4 interview, in which she said, to the best of her 5 ability, she'd been doing her job for 11 years and there 6 may have been an error on the computer, and you 7 acknowledged that should have been explored further; is 8 that right? 9 A. Sorry, um -- 10 Q. In your evidence just now, you acknowledged that 11 Mrs McKelvey's raising the computer system matter at 12 interview should have been explored further? 13 A. She only mentioned it very briefly. Earlier on she said 14 how satisfied she was with the system and how she felt 15 she was coping with operating the system. I think she 16 said, "at my age", which is I disregarded saying but 17 I don't think there's much more we could have done to 18 interrogate the system. 19 Q. I'm just referring you to the answer you gave at 12.15 20 today, you said that you now think this should have been 21 explored further. 22 A. Had we had the means to do that, yes, yes. 23 Q. You left in January 2003; is that right? 24 A. That's right, yes. 25 Q. Your name was on the investigation report? 85 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. Did you see that report? 3 A. I think I did but I can't remember it. It's not in the 4 bundle and I can't remember -- 5 Q. Right, perhaps we can have that on screen, then. It is 6 POL00000001_082 [Inquiry note: please note the correct 7 URN is PNI00000001_082]. Ms Winter was taken to this on 8 Friday. I don't know if you followed that hearing. So 9 if we go to page 4 of the pdf, please, and scrolling 10 down to the bottom, please, of that page, I think we can 11 see there you're named as Les Thorpe -- 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. -- and you're the Investigation Team Leader -- 14 A. Yeah. 15 Q. -- and the report is submitted in December 2002, so 16 that's a month before you left; is that right? 17 A. Yes, yes. 18 Q. So now, if we can go to page 7 of the pdf. If we scroll 19 down, please, to the last line there. So what we can 20 see here is: 21 "McKelvey could or would not offer a reason for the 22 discrepancies and stated she had done everything to the 23 best of her ability." 24 Do you accept that, in your investigation report 25 with Ms Winter, you didn't raise the fact with PSNI that 86 1 Mrs McKelvey said she'd had problems balancing and she'd 2 raised the possibility of computer errors? 3 A. I feel sure that would have been discussed between 4 Suzanne Winter and the PSNI. I certainly wasn't privy 5 to any discussions regarding that. Perhaps, in 6 hindsight, it was an issue which could have been raised 7 and could have been recorded in writing but I think it 8 was a minor issue regarding what had actually gone on in 9 the office. 10 Q. Well, isn't this something that should have gone into 11 the investigation report to assist PSNI to decide what 12 to do with the case? 13 A. Yes, I accept the point, yeah. 14 Q. You also said at 10.50 this morning in your evidence 15 that you never requested evidence from Fujitsu and you 16 don't believe anybody in the Scottish team or the 17 Northern Ireland team requested information, certainly 18 while you were there; is that right? 19 A. From Fujitsu? 20 Q. Mm. 21 A. Yeah, no, we never did. 22 Q. If a subpostmaster or subpostmistress had raised 23 an issue with the computer system, why didn't you think 24 it was appropriate to investigate that with Fujitsu, 25 given that you had a duty to undertake reasonable lines 87 1 of inquiry? 2 A. Well, in the two cases we've looked at, we were dealing 3 with physical documents, not computer generated 4 information, as is the case now, where everything is on 5 the computer. Then we were dealing with physical 6 documents which were missing. It didn't seem to be 7 an issue with the computer system because, if it was 8 an issue with the computer system, that would have been 9 reflected in the balance recorded by the office on 10 a weekly basis, and that wasn't the case in either 11 McKelvey or McLaughlin cases. 12 Q. If we could move on, then, going to the next page of the 13 investigation report. What is said on the last page, if 14 you could scroll down, please, the third paragraph from 15 the bottom there: 16 "The discrepancies summarised on the pension 17 schedule indicate it is due to deliberate action and not 18 error and McKelvey is the only person with the 19 appropriate access and opportunity." 20 Now, do you remember that an issue came up in the 21 interview for week 32, which was in October 2001, the 22 work had been done with a red pen in a different way to 23 how Mrs McKelvey would normally have done it? 24 A. Mrs McKelvey did say during the interview she was the 25 soul operator in the post office, with the exception 88 1 that when her daughter came back from university, 2 I believe the daughter would occasionally help in the 3 post office. But I can't remember the particular -- 4 Q. Maybe we could then just very quickly go to that 5 interview transcript. If we could go to PNI0000000_062 6 [Inquiry note: please note the correct URN is 7 PNI00000001_062], and it's at page 86 of 304 in the 8 pdfs. 9 So if we could get up to 12.46, please. If we could 10 scroll down. I think it's two pages on from there, 197, 11 if that helps. So we've got Ms Winter saying: 12 "... I'm showing you copies of updated pension 13 schedule dated 21 May ... for Clanabogan ..." 14 She goes on to say: 15 "My interest why anybody had covered for you, if we 16 just go to the final page of the summary, it's just 17 summarising the discrepancies that I discovered when 18 checking the weeks right through from week 26 to week 53 19 and what I had said on week 32 just halfway down the 20 page, I've indicated it was prepared differently to 21 other weeks compared to the way, week 32 was week ending 22 31 October 2001 ..." 23 Mrs McKelvey says: 24 "I wouldn't have been on leave I don't think." 25 She's not sure and Ms Winter says: 89 1 "It just seems strange." 2 Mrs McKelvey says: 3 "Prepared differently from other weeks, red tick on 4 list." 5 There's a conversation about whether it was 6 Hallowe'en, at the bottom there and, if we scroll over 7 two pages down, at 17.17, and we can see she says: 8 "Would that have been the week we had the errors 9 that I got Garry out?" 10 Then she says: 11 "Yeah there was a week, I remember I said £500 was 12 it short or over?" 13 "Question: That particular week, week 32, your 14 office was showing £101 of a loss in your cash account. 15 "Answer: That seems like Garry or someone has 16 checked all the bundles or something. There was a week 17 that, so hard to remember ..." 18 So what we have here is we have a suggestion that 19 one of the transactions that was later said to have 20 amounted to an act of theft could have been undertaken 21 by Garry Groogan, who was the Area Manager; do you 22 recall that? 23 A. Well, reading that, obviously Mrs McKelvey had had 24 a problem balancing and she had contacted the Retail 25 Network Manager for advice and assistance. He had come 90 1 to the office and he had gone through everything for 2 that week's cash account, hence the red ticks. Quite 3 what he found, I think it was £101 surplus -- shortage 4 in the account. 5 Q. Did you consider that you should have contacted 6 Mr Groogan to say, "In week 32, did you do the balance 7 at a time when Mrs McKelvey wasn't present at the 8 branch?" 9 A. I don't think that's said. He'd actually prepared the 10 balance or hadn't she -- hadn't Mrs McKelvey had 11 a problem with the balance and contacted the Retail 12 Network Manager for assistance, to try and find the 13 source of the loss? But we would have spoken with 14 Mr Groogan. 15 Q. There's no evidence that Mr Groogan was ever contacted 16 and asked, "Were you present without the subpostmistress 17 in week 32 and did you undertake this balance?" There's 18 no evidence of that at all. 19 A. Okay, well, I feel certain -- I can't remember doing it, 20 personally, but I feel certain that a conversation would 21 have taken place with Mr Groogan, whether it was 22 evidenced in writing -- as you're saying, it isn't. So 23 I can't be sure what they said -- exactly went on. 24 Q. Do you accept that this is a point that potentially 25 points away from the guilt of Mrs McKelvey and should 91 1 have been investigated? 2 A. I wouldn't like to accept that it points away from 3 Mrs McKelvey. It just shows that she was asking for 4 additional help or she wanted somebody else to prepare 5 a balance, which was £101 short, either Mrs McKelvey 6 prepared that balance or would the pension allowances 7 had been manipulated to cover that £101? 8 Q. You're aware that Mrs McKelvey was acquitted by a jury 9 after you left, of course? 10 A. She was. Yes, I saw it was a majority verdict, yes. 11 Q. This is a point that should have been raised in the 12 investigation report, isn't it, this point about 13 Mr Groogan -- 14 A. Okay, I accept that it's another factor which should 15 have been recorded but, at the time, it probably didn't 16 seem overly relevant. That's all I can assume. 17 Q. Isn't that really something for PSNI to decide, not for 18 you? 19 A. Yes, it would have been, yeah. 20 MR JACOBS: I haven't got any further questions. Thank you. 21 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Any other questions? 22 MS MILLAR: Thank you, sir. There's no further questions in 23 the room. 24 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: All right. 25 MS MILLAR: Oh no, sorry, I beg your pardon. Ms Page. 92 1 MS PAGE: Very sorry, very quickly. 2 Questioned by MS PAGE 3 MS PAGE: Mr Thorpe, it's about the document you were shown 4 which you hadn't seen at the time and you've only seen 5 much more recently, which names you. 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. Just to remind you, after going through the figures that 8 you had apparently found out about what it was going to 9 cost to reinstall the Fraud Management system, it says 10 this: 11 "These concerns were highlighted after a possible 12 fraud at Grange Park SPSO." 13 Can you remember what happened at Grange Park? 14 A. I have no recollection at all of that document or 15 anything that's within it. The actual name of Grange 16 Park doesn't ring a bell. With a lot of sub post 17 offices, you'll go "Oh, yeah, that's Leeds" or "That's 18 Glasgow", or whatever. That doesn't ring a bell at all 19 and I can't remember at all being involved in any 20 research into finding out the cost of getting 21 information from computer systems. 22 Q. No, all right. So no recollection of Grange Park. No 23 recollection of these concerns at all. But you accept, 24 didn't you, that these were serious concerns? 25 A. The way it's been worded there, yes, obviously there 93 1 were concerns at that time. 2 Q. Can you help us with who would have been responsible for 3 trying to get to the bottom of these concerns and what 4 needed to happen as a result? 5 A. Well, I didn't recognise any of the names on the report, 6 so I can only imagine it would have been controlled by 7 the Security Investigation Team nationally, rather than 8 just localised, possibly picking on local outlets to 9 sort of create case studies. 10 Q. So is that Tony Marsh, at this time? 11 A. At that time, it wouldn't have been. I would think it 12 possibly would have been Phil Gerrish. Tony Marsh, 13 I think, took over after Phil Gerrish but, over time, 14 I can't remember exactly when people were moved in and 15 out of post. 16 MS PAGE: All right. Thank you very much, those are my only 17 questions. 18 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Thank you. 19 MS MILLAR: Thank you, sir. 20 Apologies, that was my oversight. Those are all the 21 questions in the room. 22 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Well, thank you, Mr Thorpe, for coming to 23 give evidence to the Inquiry and making a statement in 24 advance. I'm grateful to you. 25 So that concludes today's business, does it, 94 1 Ms Millar? 2 MS MILLAR: It does, sir, and we're back again tomorrow for 3 the evidence of Kevin Shiels at 10.00. 4 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: All right, so we'll adjourn until then. 5 Thank you. 6 MS MILLAR: Thank you. 7 (12.42 pm) 8 (The hearing adjourned until 10.00 am the following day) 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 95 I N D E X FREDERICK LESLIE THORPE (affirmed) ............1 Questioned by MS MILLAR .......................1 Questioned by MR JACOBS ......................84 Questioned by MS PAGE ........................92 96