1 Friday, 2 February 2024 2 (10.00 am) 3 MR BEER: Good morning, sir, can you see and hear us? 4 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, I can, thank you very much. 5 Further evidence read into the record by MR BEER 6 MR BEER: Thank you, sir. 7 Before we proceed to hear submissions from Core 8 Participants, I would like, if I may, please, to address 9 you in relation to the status of written statements that 10 have been obtained for the purposes of Phase 4 of the 11 Inquiry, from individuals who have not appeared before 12 you to give oral evidence. 13 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes. 14 MR BEER: To ensure that the Inquiry has obtained as full 15 a picture of Phase 4 issues as possible, Rule 9 requests 16 were sent to a wide pool of individuals, a wider pool 17 than those who have ultimately been called to give oral 18 evidence before you. This was the case for each 19 category of Phase 4 witness we've heard from, namely 20 Post Office Policy and Practice witnesses, Criminal 21 Prosecution Case Study witnesses and Civil Recovery Case 22 Study witnesses. 23 Where the Inquiry has decided that it's not 24 necessary to hear oral evidence from individuals who 25 have provided written statements, their statements will 1 1 be admitted into evidence and treated as having been 2 read into the record and the witness statements will 3 shortly be disclosed on the Inquiry's website. 4 I should say that the fact that the statements are 5 to be read into the record does not mean that the 6 accounts given within them is agreed by each of the Core 7 Participants. It's necessarily untested evidence. 8 Could we have on the screen, please, INQ00002020. 9 This is a PowerPoint presentation with a series of 10 slides which the Inquiry Team has prepared listing the 11 written statements that are to be read into the record 12 set out by category of witness. Can we go to slide 2, 13 please. 14 On this slide, we have a list of witness statements 15 relating to "Post Office Policy and Practice". You can 16 see the names of each of the witnesses there and the 17 unique reference numbers of their witness statements. 18 As I've said, they will be uploaded to the Inquiry's 19 website. 20 The individuals listed here were all sent Rule 9 21 requests based on the description of their roles held at 22 the Post Office at the relevant time. They've not been 23 called to give oral evidence because there were other 24 witnesses who were better placed to speak to the given 25 areas of policy and practice. 2 1 Can we go to slide 3, please. The witnesses listed 2 on this page were each sent Rule 9 requests because they 3 were Auditors involved in one or more of the criminal 4 investigation and prosecution case studies that you 5 selected for Phase 4. Their written evidence is 6 informative as to the practices of Auditors, insofar as 7 it's relevant to Phase 4 issues, but their oral evidence 8 would not have added materially to the evidential 9 picture. 10 Can we go to the next slide, please. 11 The witnesses listed here held other roles in 12 relation to Phase 4 criminal investigation and 13 prosecution case studies, namely financial investigation 14 and Contracts Adviser roles. Again, it was considered 15 that these witnesses attending to give evidence would 16 not add materially to the evidential picture. 17 Slide 5, please. 18 All of these witnesses have provided witness 19 statements relating to the Cleveleys Post Office civil 20 recovery case study. The first listed witness is Julie 21 Kay, previously Wolstenholme, the subpostmistress at the 22 branch. The second individual only had fleeting 23 involvement in the case and was unable to take your 24 enquiries further in his statement. The third 25 individual provided a corporate disclosure statement on 3 1 behalf of Royal Mail in relation to the disclosure of 2 documents relevant to the Cleveleys case. 3 Slide 6, please. 4 The individuals listed here provided witness 5 statements in relation to their knowledge of relevant 6 events at the Marine Drive Post Office, a further civil 7 recovery case study: a lawyer from Bond Pearce, two 8 temporary subpostmasters, a member of staff at the 9 branch and an employee of Fujitsu. 10 Can we go to the last slide, please, slide 7. 11 Finally, sir, there are some written statements 12 relating to Phase 2 and 3 of the Inquiry which have been 13 received by the Inquiry since I addressed you at the end 14 of Phase 3 in relation to written records to be read 15 into the record, in the same way as I'm reading them in 16 now. 17 Thank you, that PowerPoint presentation can come 18 down. 19 Those are the statements the Inquiry Team wish to be 20 read into the record at this stage. I should pause to 21 say that the Inquiry has received a significant volume 22 of disclosure in the course of Phase 4 and the Phase 4 23 hearings and it expects to receive more disclosure that 24 is relevant or may be relevant to Phase 4 in the near 25 future. We will keep, of course, those documents under 4 1 review and will disclose them to Core Participants as 2 soon as reasonably practicable after their receipt. 3 I should say, as we've said before, the Inquiry Team 4 will not seek to hesitate to re-call any witnesses, 5 where it considers it's necessary to do so, to put 6 questions to them on new documents that have come to 7 light. The appropriate time to do that will be 8 determined in due course but will likely be during the 9 Phase 5 and 6 hearings, should that be necessary. 10 That's all I wish to say at the moment, sir, in 11 terms of reading documents into the record and we move 12 now to the closing submissions from the Core 13 Participants in an order which you have directed, 14 starting, I think, with Mr Moloney. 15 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, Mr Beer. 16 Before Mr Moloney addresses me, can I reiterate that 17 those who have been following the Inquiry will realise 18 that not all witness statements result in witnesses 19 giving live oral evidence. Inevitably, there is 20 an exercise of judgement as to who should be called to 21 give oral evidence and I am completely satisfied that 22 very careful consideration has been given as to which 23 witnesses should be called and which witnesses should 24 simply stand as witnesses with their witness statement 25 read into the record. 5 1 So I am ready for Mr Moloney now. 2 MR BEER: Thank you sir. 3 Closing statement by MR MOLONEY 4 MR MOLONEY: Thank you, sir. 5 We represent 76 former postmasters, all of whom were 6 prosecuted and convicted and all of whom have since had 7 their convictions quashed but only after having their 8 lives destroyed by the scandal at the heart of this 9 Inquiry. Those former postmasters include Jo Hamilton, 10 Noel Thomas, Michael and Susan Rudkin, whose stories, 11 together with many others featured in the ITV drama, 12 Mr Bates vs The Post Office, which has inspired the 13 powerful groundswell of public and political interest in 14 this scandal. 15 That drama sees Jo Hamilton surrounded by paperwork, 16 distraught and seeking assistance from the helpline. 17 She didn't know what was going on nor what to do. The 18 help offered was no help at all, doubling a discrepancy 19 before her eyes. Those scenes, which have had such 20 impact, were real life for Jo, as detailed in her first 21 witness statement to this Inquiry back in 2021. 22 Our clients' stories repeatedly echo that awful fear 23 and the impossible questioning of themselves and 24 Horizon. Time and again, they asked for help. For 25 many, because none came, the time came when they stopped 6 1 asking for help. Time and again, faced with 2 investigation and the threat of prosecution, they told 3 the Post Office that there were unexplained 4 discrepancies, unexplained problems with the system, 5 that they did not take any money and that they were not 6 dishonest. Time and again, they were prosecuted and 7 convicted. Time and again, their lives were ruined. 8 It's only as a result of the dedication of many 9 hundreds of brave men and women postmasters and their 10 supporters working together that some justice has 11 finally been found in the greatest miscarriage of 12 justice in the modern UK legal history. 13 Now people are listening. Our clients are now 14 finally being heard. They are not guilty and they 15 always were not guilty. This phase has been critically 16 important at getting at the real truth for them about 17 what they went through. 18 As our client, Tim Brentnall, told the Inquiry as 19 long ago as 1 March 2022 in Phase 1: 20 "Horizon merely provided the data that showed 21 a shortfall but it was people who chose to believe that 22 data over myself or hundreds of other subpostmasters. 23 It wasn't Horizon that prosecuted us. It was the Post 24 Office. It wasn't Horizon that encouraged us to pay 25 back money under threat of theft charges. That was 7 1 people at the Post Office." 2 In this phase, the Inquiry has begun, as 3 Mr Brentnall urged, to consider responsibility for the 4 investigation and prosecution of postmasters. The 5 evidence of the postmasters heard in Phase 1 is now 6 confirmed by hours and hours of witness evidence and 7 tens of thousands of pages of evidence which illustrate 8 the corporate and individual failures which came to see 9 so many people of previous good character criminalised, 10 the evidences of individual actions, which were, in some 11 cases, at best, shameful. At worst, those actions now, 12 as perhaps just a starting point, lay some witnesses 13 open to rigorous criminal investigation. 14 We represent 16 of the 22 case study Core 15 Participants in England and Wales and Mr Alan McLaughlin 16 in Northern Ireland. For them, this phase has been both 17 challenging and informative. We obviously don't propose 18 to go through much of the evidence that's been heard, 19 such has been the scale of this phase, there just isn't 20 time. But, instead, in our address today, we focus on 21 three primary submissions based on the evidence heard in 22 Phase 4. 23 First, the approach of Post Office, supported by 24 Fujitsu to investigation and recovery of losses, as well 25 as prosecution of alleged offences, was deeply and 8 1 fundamentally flawed. 2 Second, the management and oversight of 3 investigations and prosecutions by the Post Office, as 4 supported by Fujitsu, was wilfully blind to, or 5 disregarding of, the proper lawful administration of 6 justice. 7 Thirdly and finally, an overarching focus on the 8 commercial interests of both the Post Office and 9 Fujitsu, including in protecting the brand reputation of 10 both companies, contributed significantly and 11 detrimentally to the prosecution of individuals in the 12 face of faults in Horizon, of which the Post Office were 13 or ought to have been aware. 14 We now develop each of those in turn, sir. First, 15 the approach of the Post Office supported by Fujitsu to 16 investigation and recovery of losses, as well as 17 prosecution of alleged offences, was deeply and 18 fundamentally flawed. This is by far the longest 19 section of our submissions; the other submissions are 20 much shorter. 21 Until this scandal is uncovered, the Post Office 22 remain proud of its centuries old heritage in law 23 enforcement. A History of Royal Mail Investigations, 24 Prosecutions and Security was produced in 2010 and the 25 reference is LCAS0000124. 9 1 We can now see that that pride was severely 2 misplaced long before 2010. It's said that it's only 3 when the tide goes out that you can see who has been 4 swimming without a costume and, now that the tide has 5 gone out on Post Office and they've been forced to open 6 up their books, we've been able to see just how wrong 7 things were in Post Office law enforcement, that there 8 was nothing to be proud of once Horizon came to blight 9 the lives of a great many people. 10 But before setting out just how the Post Office, 11 supported by Fujitsu, failed in its duties as 12 a prosecutor, it's important to briefly look back to the 13 evidence which emerged in Phases 2 and 3 of this 14 Inquiry, in order to identify a number of factors which 15 are critical to informing the analysis of where Post 16 Office went wrong and why in investigation and 17 prosecution, factors that created the conditions in 18 which this miscarriage of justice occurred. 19 These factors contain, first, bugs, errors and 20 defects from the outset and the institutional amnesia 21 around them, the inadequacy of audit data and audits and 22 the policies develop around investigation and 23 prosecution. The existence of bugs, errors and defects 24 in Horizon, impacting on the integrity of accounts, and 25 thus the integrity of investigations and prosecutions by 10 1 the Post Office, of necessity, were known or ought to 2 have been known to both the Post Office and to Fujitsu 3 throughout the life of both Legacy Horizon and Horizon 4 online but they were ignored in apparent acts of 5 institutional amnesia. 6 We include the following very few examples which 7 evidence that proposition. First, on behalf of Fujitsu, 8 Paul Patterson accepted on 19 January, at page 16 of the 9 transcript: 10 "All the bugs and errors had been known at one level 11 or not for many, many years. Right from the very start 12 of deployment of this system, there were bugs, errors 13 and defects which were well known to all parties, 14 actually." 15 It was his evidence that the vast majority of bugs, 16 errors and defects was shared contemporaneously with the 17 Post Office. He accepted that this information ought to 18 have been included in evidence provided by Fujitsu in 19 support of Post Office litigation. 20 Everything that was known about the troubled birth 21 of Horizon, the Acceptance Incidents and including, of 22 course, the third supplementary agreement, would warrant 23 real care in investigating any challenge to the 24 integrity of Horizon. Indeed, that process fixes senior 25 management in both organisations with the knowledge of 11 1 problems in Horizon and fallibility as concerns the 2 integrity of accounts which would affect prosecutions 3 from the start, yet there is no evidence of any such 4 caution in the approach of either Post Office or 5 Fujitsu. 6 On the contrary, as highlighted in our opening for 7 this Inquiry and in our closing submissions for Phase 2, 8 the priorities for both businesses appear to have moved 9 swiftly in 1999/2000 from concern over integrity to the 10 further commercial exploitation of Horizon. 11 Further, when, in 2001, the audit data loss 12 occurred, it ought to have been clear that the audit 13 trail was in secure. In 2003, Post Office was put on 14 notice of admissions in evidence relied upon in evidence 15 as a result of operator error and, again, in January 16 2009, when Post Office was belatedly notified that bugs, 17 errors and defects had impacted the critical audit trail 18 for Horizon, this ought to have been an even greater 19 reason for caution on the parts of Post Office. 20 Yet, in summer 2010, facing further revelations of 21 bugs connected to duplicates in audit data, which 22 impacted upon or potentially impacted upon evidence 23 provided to the court, the Post Office was again willing 24 to rely on Fujitsu assurances without independent 25 testing. 12 1 Mr Patterson accepted that the information disclosed 2 to relevant subpostmasters about the 2010 bug was not 3 the "whole truth about audit data problems", yet 4 business as usual was resumed. Prosecutions continued 5 undeterred. 6 Indeed, this work ran in parallel with public 7 relations efforts by the Post Office in response to 8 growing concerns for injustice expressed in 2009 9 reporting from Computer Weekly, the BBC and The Grocer. 10 By February 2010, the Post Office had adopted a stock 11 line that the system was robust in response to such 12 reporting. 13 This was seen in an email from Hayley Fowell to 14 David X Smith, Michele Graves -- who managed executive 15 correspondence -- and others on 2 February 2010. It's 16 POL00002268 and it's at page 2, when she says: 17 "I am providing our stock line which states the 18 system is robust." 19 It will be for the Inquiry to address precisely who 20 knew what and when at what level, and whether and to 21 what extent Fujitsu held information back about the 22 precise extent and nature of bugs, errors and defects to 23 serve its own business interests. 24 We note, for example, the initial approach taken to 25 the summer 2010 audit data, the duplicate transactions 13 1 bug. That initial approach appeared first to consider 2 the impact of acceptance of Horizon Online. It was said 3 in FUJ00097046, "Please do not make any communication on 4 this with Post Office for the moment". When information 5 was provided to the Post Office, the Inquiry may 6 consider whether it was delayed, underplayed or 7 misrepresented on more than one occasion. 8 Secondly, Post Office and Fujitsu both knew from the 9 outset that the data held in the audit trail, and not 10 only that held on the counter or provided as part of 11 a standard ARQ request, would be crucial to any 12 investigation based on the integrity of accounting data. 13 But that was not acted on and prosecutions continued 14 without ensuring that the right data was accessible by 15 Investigators. 16 The 2002 Network Banking Prosecution Support Policy, 17 which Ms Patrick asked Mr Ward about yesterday afternoon 18 and its later 2007 iteration, makes clear that the data 19 held by Fujitsu, as part of the audit trail and for the 20 purposes of prosecution support, goes well beyond that 21 covered in an ARQ statement. 22 It makes clear that the work to be done by Fujitsu 23 was to go beyond production of the material in an ARQ 24 statement and a simple statement of fact. It refers to 25 events data, which the Inquiry has covered with Gerald 14 1 Barnes and Mr Simpkins and with Mrs Chambers at some 2 length. Yet this appears to have had little or no 3 impact on the training offered to Investigators, 4 Auditors or the Casework Management Team for Post 5 Office. 6 Evidence was consistent that no training was 7 provided on what sat in the audit trail or its purpose. 8 Indeed, a standard ARQ would never be enough to 9 understand or interrogate the integrity of Horizon data 10 and that was expressly accepted by Paul Patterson on 11 19 January at page 57 of the transcript. That was known 12 or ought to have been known to both Fujitsu and Post 13 Office by 2002. As just said, the 2002 prosecution 14 support policy demonstrated that to be the case. 15 Mr Patterson confirmed that the data held by Fujitsu 16 would include event logs but that the routine checking 17 of event logs by the Litigation Support Unit did not 18 begin until after 2008, and that's page 55 of the 19 transcript. 20 So Fujitsu would have been aware that the Post 21 Office was litigating on the basis of incomplete 22 information from pretty much the start of the process 23 and, in any event, from 2007, when Mrs Chambers said 24 expressly in her Afterthoughts document she sent to 25 management that Tivoli events were not being disclosed, 15 1 and that's FUJ00152299. She wrote: 2 "This suggested that the disclosure of the message 3 store itself was an afterthought, though it is 4 fundamental to the system." 5 And: 6 "Surely the full message store has to be disclosed 7 in all cases", and yet that was not acted on. 8 Critically and in any event, it's admitted that the 9 audit trail held by Fujitsu lacked the integrity 10 required by the contractual arrangements agreed with the 11 Post Office. That's at page 39 of the transcript of 12 Mr Patterson's evidence. 13 So the data that was available and used for 14 prosecutions was never really adequate nor sufficient. 15 Moreover, the Post Office, NBSC, and Fujitsu's HSH and 16 higher levels of support appeared to operate on 17 an unjustifiable default presumption that, without 18 further evidence, the cause of any discrepancy would be 19 user error. 20 This created an implicit bias against the effective 21 investigation of system problems and substantially 22 disadvantaged postmasters. 23 Having heard evidence in Phase 4, the Inquiry may 24 reach the conclusion that this default presumption found 25 its way through to the attitude of Investigators in 16 1 interview, something which we consider shortly. 2 Importantly, in that context of a default 3 presumption that the user was to blame, any Post Office 4 audit that did happen was a simple stock check against 5 the figures produced by Horizon. Auditors were there 6 not to help an SPM in trouble, a subpostmaster in 7 trouble, they were there to do a stock check. 8 Auditors held no particular IT skills nor were they 9 professionally qualified auditors or accountants. 10 Mr Ferlinc confirmed that on the 4 July. 11 The identification of any apparent shortfall 12 resulted in near automatic consequences for 13 a postmaster: suspension, a contractual inquiry and 14 a possible criminal investigation followed. 15 As Helen Rose confirmed, it was only in the case of 16 a discrepancy due to a known error that a postmaster 17 would be authorised to place the sum in a suspense 18 account. In all other circumstances it appears that 19 a formal disciplinary and/or criminal investigation 20 would follow. Auditors could print reports from the 21 counter for use in any later investigation but they had 22 no access to the underlying Fujitsu audit trail. 23 To confound that obvious problem, any system audit 24 data was considered a matter for others to investigate 25 at a later stage, only after the instigation of 17 1 an investigation by management or the Security Team. 2 Moving on from audit, another factor which created 3 the conditions for this miscarriage of justice was that 4 the Horizon contract and policy requirements agreed by 5 the Post Office and Fujitsu treated the prosecutorial 6 function of the Post Office as an afterthought. 7 Policies and practices across both companies for the 8 role which they each were to play in the criminalisation 9 of hundreds of men and women of previously good 10 character were neglected, ill conceived or disrespectful 11 of the law. 12 There was evidence of cutting and pasting, including 13 possibly from pre-Horizon material, without thought 14 being given to any known bugs, errors and defects. 15 Prosecution support had to begin work under 16 a without-prejudice agreement, pending further 17 negotiation. The first written prosecution support 18 policy appears only in November 2002. 19 We do not dwell on the appalling racist language in 20 the now notorious Identification Codes document. This 21 was most recently circulated in 2013 when many agreed it 22 would have been read. There was no evidence of any 23 challenge to its substance at any point in its use by 24 Post Office. 25 Last but not least, among the conditions which 18 1 create the conditions for this miscarriage of justice is 2 that contractual arrangements and policies were 3 consistently read, rightly or wrongly, to promote the 4 business interests of Post Office and/or Fujitsu and to 5 the detriment of postmasters. 6 Echoing arguments before Mr Justice Fraser, the 7 Inquiry heard evidence on corporate misreading of the 8 contractual obligations owed by postmasters for losses, 9 equating them to strict liability for anything that and 10 everything that went wrong. Witnesses repeatedly 11 adopted the essential position that postmasters were 12 "responsible for all losses", and seemingly required to 13 make good any discrepancy, whether attributable to 14 negligence, error, or fraud. 15 This dangerous misreading of the legal terms on 16 which the Post Office Network operated, alongside the 17 default perception amongst Post Office staff that any 18 discrepancy was a user problem, as we've already 19 referred to, sir, perhaps reinforced the erroneous 20 impression that any flaw in the system must be human. 21 The Post Office, without foundation, routinely 22 reversed the burden of proof in requiring postmasters to 23 disprove their responsibility for discrepancies. As 24 Mr Ferlinc said on 4 July: 25 "So the auditor must find the discrepancy if there 19 1 was one and then there could be number of reasons why 2 there was a discrepancy. The subpostmaster would be 3 expected to make good, unless they could identify the 4 reason why." 5 The onus in this policy was upon subpostmasters to 6 prove something that they could not prove or probably 7 could not prove, it was conceded. 8 Witnesses repeatedly accepted that proof of a fault 9 in Horizon would be an unfair and even impossible task 10 to set for postmasters with limited access to the data 11 behind the counter held by Post Office and Fujitsu. 12 This approach was inconsistent with any ordinary 13 contractual construction and an obscene reversal of the 14 presumption of innocence. 15 Then, looking at Post Office policies on 16 investigation and prosecution, they repeatedly stressed 17 the significance of the interests of the business and 18 the recovery of losses, to which we return later. 19 Just one example, which was from the Security 20 Operations Team's Compliance Guide to the Preparation 21 and Layout of Investigation Red Label Case Files, 22 POL00038452, and page 13 of that document. It read: 23 "Significant failures that may affect the successful 24 likelihood of any criminal action and/or cause 25 significant damage to the business must be confined 20 1 solely to the confidential offender report. Care must 2 be exercised when including failures within the 3 disciplinary reports as obviously this is disclosed to 4 the suspect and may have ramifications on both the 5 criminal elements of the Inquiry as well as being 6 potentially damaging to the reputation or security of 7 the business." 8 Some witnesses appeared to accept that this was 9 antithetical to the disclosure duties in prosecution. 10 A document ought to be disclosed precisely because it is 11 considered to impact upon either the prosecution or 12 defence case. 13 Another example is found in the Memorandum of 14 Understanding on Joint Investigation reached between the 15 Royal Mail Group and Post Office post-separation, and 16 this was agreed in January 2012. At paragraph 2.4 of 17 POL00105098, it reads under "Prosecution Decision", 2.4: 18 "Cases leading to an interview under caution will 19 ordinarily be reported to the Criminal Law Team acting 20 on behalf of the organisation which has suffered the 21 loss and against which the offences have been committed, 22 for advice on the sufficiency of evidence and the usual 23 public and business interest considerations. There may 24 be exceptions to this where the lead business is the 25 more appropriate choice and this will normally be at the 21 1 discretion of the appropriate Legal Team and the Royal 2 Mail Head of Investigations and Post Office Limited 3 Senior Security Manager Security Operations." 4 The issue of business interest in prosecution 5 decision making was addressed squarely by Duncan 6 Atkinson king's Counsel in his evidence. He said, 7 perhaps with a degree of understatement: 8 "There was also, in the material I saw, references 9 to a series of factors that it was considered were 10 relevant to a prosecution, which included the best 11 interests of the business and the integrity of the mail, 12 as opposed to the much more nuanced and detailed set of 13 criteria that would or should be applied to 14 a prosecution decision by reference, for example, to the 15 Code." 16 That was on 5 October 2003 at page 56. 17 The Inquiry may consider whether this focus on 18 business interests reflected or fostered a culture which 19 degraded the administration of justice, objectified and 20 diminished the subject of the investigation and 21 encouraged instead a focus, first, on the bottom line. 22 We return to this in our third and final main 23 submission. 24 Any proposition that problematic policies were 25 ironed out in training or practice notes and judged in 22 1 the light of the evidence on the case studies identified 2 by the Inquiry is simply unsustainable. At each stage, 3 there were clear flaws which, whether by design or 4 practice, substantially disadvantaged the postmaster. 5 The Inquiry also has the evidence of Mr Atkinson 6 that, in policy and in practice, the Post Office skipped 7 over core steps and ignored legal obligations 8 fundamental to the duties of a responsible prosecutor. 9 We do not revisit his detailed conclusions but 10 highlight particular faults in investigation and 11 prosecution on which the Inquiry may wish to draw and we 12 hope these may, in fact, echo the conclusions of 13 Mr Atkinson and the experience of many subpostmasters in 14 evidence. 15 Just going to those faults now, with investigations 16 and the Investigators. 17 Subpostmasters told Post Office Investigators, 18 Security Managers, that there were unexplained 19 discrepancies or they blamed the system outright. The 20 Post Office did not listen or refused to hear. We make 21 a number of points about their approach. 22 The Inquiry might conclude that Post Office 23 Investigators, Security Managers, were underqualified, 24 ill trained and undersupervised. The Inquiry heard of 25 the short weeks of training completed in-house, followed 23 1 by mentoring in-house, which it might conclude 2 perpetuated a particular brand of Post Office practice. 3 Interviews with suspects, which were fundamental to 4 the Post Office prosecutorial approach, were handled 5 unprofessionally, both in their conduct and their 6 presentation, for the purposes of prosecutorial decision 7 making and for trial. 8 Following the theme of the default position in the 9 contract that the postmaster was responsible for all 10 losses, there was an apparent default assumption of 11 fault and dishonesty in the face of any Horizon 12 discrepancy. 13 The Inquiry saw it in the interviews of David 14 Blakey, inexplicably asked about whether he had been in 15 an adulterous relationship and faced with the suggestion 16 that his ill wife would be investigated; and 17 Alison Hall, whose position that Horizon was not 18 100 per cent was not reflected in her suspect offender 19 report, to name just two examples; and even saw the 20 Investigators asking Lynette Hutchings why it was that 21 she did not have a solicitor based locally to her but, 22 instead, had retained the services of Issy Hogg, who had 23 represented Jo Hamilton, Seema Misra and others. 24 Time and again, postmasters were aggressively 25 accused of lying, simply because they could not explain 24 1 where the money had gone. The interviewer would 2 typically ask "Where has the money gone?" The 3 postmaster would reply, "I don't know", to which the 4 interviewer would respond, "You're lying". 5 Investigators faced with challenges to Horizon 6 repeatedly failed to explore reasonable lines of inquiry 7 and the failure to explore reasonable lines of inquiry 8 went beyond challenges to Horizon data. 9 Investigators were not trained in the operation of 10 Horizon nor in the role of the audit trail. They were 11 not technically qualified. When Horizon issues were 12 explored, the Post Office was completely reliant on 13 Fujitsu for the answer. Fujitsu was relied on to 14 explain away any questions; it marked its own homework. 15 The handling of expert evidence by Post Office 16 Investigators, supported by Fujitsu, was fundamentally 17 and irretrievably flawed, and inconsistent with the 18 requirements of fairness and proper criminal procedure: 19 no expert declaration, for example. Moreover, there's 20 no question that the Security Team were aware of 21 repeated challenges to Horizon integrity. Any 22 suggestion that cases were never discussed or that the 23 team was unaware of the challenges in the press ought to 24 be treated with contempt, we say. There will be no need 25 to remind the Inquiry that we had the truly 25 1 extraordinary evidence of Mr Ward yesterday as to his 2 involvement in the proposed expert evidence of Gareth 3 Jenkins in the case of Noel Thomas. 4 Investigators' handling of ordinary witness evidence 5 was often fundamentally and irretrievably flawed as well 6 and inconsistent with the requirements of fairness and 7 proper criminal procedure. We have in mind, for 8 example, that Stephen Bradshaw allowed Cartwright King 9 to write and serve his statements for him, even though 10 he did not agree with the contents. The Inquiry will 11 remember the evidence of Cath Oglesby, who appeared 12 almost astonished that anybody would even think that she 13 would have been responsible for what was in her own 14 signed statement. 15 Investigators' handling of disclosure, including 16 requests from the defence, was also irretrievably flawed 17 and inconsistent with the requirements of fairness, 18 justice and proper criminal procedure. Investigators 19 actively helped shape the prosecution approach to 20 particular cases in order to protect the interests of 21 the business to the detriment of the defendant. 22 The Inquiry heard numerous examples of Investigators 23 attending conferences with counsel and involved in 24 discussions on plea, including at the door of the court. 25 Stephen Bradshaw's self-appraisal in respect of 26 1 Jacqueline McDonald's prosecution was a case in point. 2 In what he said was flamboyant language, he claimed to 3 have persuaded counsel for the Post Office to have 4 insisted on a trial of theft allegations, rather than be 5 content with Mrs McDonald's pleas to false accounting, 6 and he did so in order to counter the postmasters' 7 campaign. 8 If her pleas to false accounting had been accepted, 9 even though she was guilty of nothing, she might have 10 avoided prison. As it was, a 47-year-old mother of two, 11 of previous good character, she was sent into custody 12 away from her children and family and had to endure all 13 the indignities, which we won't elaborate upon here, 14 that go with being confined to a closed prison. 15 Mr Bradshaw had no reason to be proud of himself. 16 Financial investigation and the recovery of losses 17 also played a significant, if not guiding role in the 18 conduct of criminal investigations and subsequent 19 prosecutions. 20 Yesterday, Mr Ward was taken to POL00121975, the 21 post-pub email, which speaks to the priority with which 22 Investigators were treating recovery. In the same 23 thread, he talks up the benefits of POCA over 24 a post-conviction compensation order because 25 compensation orders have no teeth. Ged Harbinson, 27 1 another Financial Investigator, asked by Juliet 2 McFarlane for a view on a possible plea for Jo Hamilton 3 said: 4 "I'm never confident with false accounting charges 5 in relation to recovery under POCA 2002 and the theft 6 charge makes life so much easier." 7 I will return to this later. 8 Finally, the Post Office Security Team and 9 individual Investigators operated free from professional 10 obligation and regulatory oversight. There was and is 11 no Independent Office for Police Complaints for the Post 12 Office police, the Investigators. These policemen were 13 accountable only to the company to which they were so 14 loyal. 15 There were thus numerous highly significant problems 16 in the process of investigation and the actions of 17 Investigators, which this Inquiry has heard evidence of, 18 and we are only able to briefly touch upon them today. 19 But there were similar problems with prosecution and 20 prosecutors, and we turn to those now, sir, as the final 21 part of this aspect of our first submission. 22 Subpostmasters defended their innocence, denied 23 dishonesty and produced defence statements and 24 disclosure requests which put unexplained discrepancies 25 front and centre as issues in the case. They produced 28 1 independent expert reports. 2 Alan McLaughlin did all of that in the clearest ways 3 possible but still the Post Office did not hear or 4 refuse to hear. 5 So far as the difficulties, the problems, the clear 6 faults in prosecutions and prosecutors, we include the 7 following for the reference of the Inquiry. First, the 8 Inquiry might conclude that some members of the Legal 9 Team at Post Office were underqualified, undertrained 10 and ill supervised. Jarnail Singh ascended to Head of 11 Criminal Law, seemingly because he was the only one 12 left, whilst simultaneously practising in a completely 13 different area of law in his spare time. 14 Prosecutors, including internal and external lawyers 15 acting for Post Office said they were given limited or 16 no training on the audit trail operated by Fujitsu on 17 behalf of the Post Office. 18 The internal and external lawyers, acting as 19 prosecutors at times, appeared to put the interests of 20 the business before their professional obligations and 21 failed to take obvious steps to meet the requirements of 22 fairness, justice and proper criminal procedure. 23 There was evidence that they failed to conduct 24 adequate scrutiny and supervision of investigations, 25 including their failure to identify reasonable lines of 29 1 inquiry and their mismanagement of disclosure. 2 They also failed in their instruction of expert 3 evidence and served and relied upon expert evidence 4 which was obviously not compliant with the standards 5 required in both civil and criminal litigation. 6 These were trained lawyers. 7 See, for example the evidence yesterday on the 8 changes made Mr Jenkins' statement in Noel Thomas' case 9 and the failings apparent in the evidence of Jarnail 10 Singh and Warwick Tatford. They failed in respect of 11 disclosure duties, including in the handling of 12 third-party disclosure from Fujitsu and in the direct 13 response to defence requests and, importantly, they have 14 failed to exercise the independence expected of a legal 15 professional in the exercise of the discharge of their 16 duties to the court. 17 For example, in January 2010 Mr Singh called 18 disclosure requests by Mrs Misra's Legal Team 19 "unreasonably and unnecessarily raised", and sought 20 counsel's advice thinking, "This may have a wider 21 implication for the business". 22 Mr Singh wrote or dictated the well-known 23 "bandwagon" email, which we won't repeat here, sir -- 24 but is at POL00093686 and at page 5 -- but was 25 essentially concluded with: 30 1 "It is to be hoped that the case will set a marker 2 to dissuade other from jumping on the Horizon bashing 3 bandwagon." 4 Decisions on charging were unsupported by evidence 5 and appeared to have departed from the guidance of the 6 Court of Appeal in Eden and the Inquiry is now well 7 familiar in the review of Graham Brander in his suspect 8 offender report prepared for Jo Hamilton, saying that: 9 "Having analysed the Horizon printouts and 10 accounting documentation, I was unable to find any 11 evidence of theft or that the cash figures had been 12 deliberately inflated." 13 Decisions on plea were inappropriately circumscribed 14 by conditions related to the defence of Horizon and the 15 recovery of funds. The acceptance of pleas, as you well 16 know, sir, was sometimes conditional on an agreement not 17 to criticise Horizon -- for example, the cases of 18 Allison Henderson and Alison Hall -- and Mrs Hamilton 19 was required to pay the illusory debt she owed before 20 sentence or she would have been proceeded against on the 21 theft allegation. 22 These were all actions, whether in the civil or 23 criminal teams, under the supervision of General 24 Counsel, we understand a board level appointment 25 reporting to the Company Secretary. Many questions 31 1 arise in relation to the advice being provided to the 2 Post Office by its Legal Team, which we anticipate will 3 be explored in Phases 5 and 6, touched on in this phase. 4 We anticipate that the Inquiry will continue to 5 consider the legal strategy in response to the first 6 civil claims pursued in 2011, including in the guidance 7 offered as to document destruction and the operation of 8 privilege, which was heard in this phase in the evidence 9 of John Breeden and others. 10 We note the evidence of Mr Scott and Mr Singh on the 11 shredding advice and the involvement of Ms Crichton in 12 the aftermath of the Simon Clarke Advices. 13 We note the circumstances in which Ms Crichton 14 departed from the Post Office remain as yet unclear and 15 we anticipate she'll be called in Phase 5 and so reserve 16 comment on these matters until then. 17 Having dealt with the Post Office roles in the 18 investigations and prosecutions, we ought to briefly 19 touch on the role of Fujitsu in supporting Post Office. 20 Mr Patterson accepted that information about bugs, 21 errors and defects ought to have been included in 22 Fujitsu evidence and expressed surprise that it was not. 23 He noted the editing of statements. He called this 24 state of affairs "shameful" and indeed it was. These 25 omissions and edits were part of a process that led to 32 1 wrecked lives. 2 Our observations on Fujitsu are necessarily 3 provisional, pending the evidence of Mr Jenkins and the 4 anticipated further evidence of Mr Dunks, but we 5 suggest, firstly, that Fujitsu benefited from 6 contractual terms which impacted upon the cost of audit 7 data obtained by the Post Office in litigation support. 8 They made Post Office pay to prove the integrity of 9 their own system. 10 The Inquiry has heard much evidence on the caps on 11 standard ARQ requests. Enhanced data was chargeable 12 outside the ordinary ARQ allocation. Expert evidence 13 was chargeable. These were costs which were not 14 incurred lightly by the Post Office and which were 15 apparently resented by some. On 19 March 2012, John 16 Scott asked, "Why should we pay for Fujitsu to defend 17 their own IT system?" 18 The answer is found, perhaps in the contemporary 19 documents disclosed because it appears the Post Office 20 agreed it would do so in the November 2002 Network 21 Banking Prosecution Support Policy canvassed with 22 Mr Ward yesterday. 23 Fujitsu provided provide any or adequate training to 24 any of the team involved in prosecution support as to 25 the role which they were playing, including on the 33 1 provision of expert evidence in civil and criminal 2 cases. Mrs Chambers and other witnesses spoke 3 powerfully about the impact of giving evidence. The 4 Inquiry has heard Fujitsu were aware or ought to have 5 been aware of reluctance by members of their Litigation 6 Support Unit to provide the evidence they were routinely 7 being asked to sign off, such as Rajbinder Sangha, Donna 8 Munro and Peter Sewell. 9 The inadequate steps taken by Legal Team for the 10 Post Office in respect of witness statements and the 11 instruction of expert evidence was addressed at length 12 in evidence, but the same allegation of inaction could 13 also be levelled at Fujitsu. 14 Diane Matthews provided a wholly inappropriate 15 assurance to Mr Jenkins that giving evidence would be 16 just like it was on TV. 17 A template or boilerplate statement agreed by 18 Fujitsu and Post Office provided assurances which were 19 inconsistent with practices at Fujitsu. Those related 20 to statements on matters designed directly to provide 21 assurances on the integrity of Horizon data. It missed 22 points and was misleading, said Mr Patterson for 23 Fujitsu, on 19 January at page 59. 24 Fujitsu must have or should have known, at the time 25 that these statements were made, that they were 34 1 inadequate representations of the state of its corporate 2 knowledge. 3 Consecutive members of the Prosecution Support Unit 4 appeared to have signed statements of truth concerning 5 evidence which was outwith their knowledge, which was 6 partial and misleading and which neglected to address 7 the bugs, errors and defects known to Fujitsu. 8 Where amendments were made, the Inquiry might 9 consider where it was that witnesses conceded to such 10 an amendment. The Inquiry heard numerous examples of 11 statements given, and we don't address each of them or 12 any of them in detail. 13 As a consequence, members of the Prosecution Support 14 Unit may have tendered statements to court and appeared 15 at trial on evidence which was outwith their knowledge 16 and which was partial and misleading and/or which was 17 incomplete. As mentioned earlier, feedback from Anne 18 Chambers on the need for change in the approach taken by 19 Post Office and Fujitsu to litigation support was 20 seemingly shelved by management. 21 It appears that the Legal Team and corporate legal 22 counsel for Fujitsu were or ought to have been aware of 23 the significance of the role of the Prosecution Support 24 Unit on ARQ data integrity problems, for example 25 an email notifying periodic of a possible integrity 35 1 problem in an ARQ, on the preparation of statements for 2 court, and the proposed amendment of template statements 3 prepared by the Post Office. They were involved in 4 questions of integrity arising in the development of 5 Horizon Online, where the Post Office sought an express 6 undertaking to support Post Office in litigation to 7 prove the integrity of Horizon, which was raised with 8 Mr D'Alvarez in Phase 3. 9 So problems occurred, sir, of a really serious 10 nature in investigations and prosecutions by Post Office 11 and the support of Fujitsu. 12 Our second main submission -- and, as I said 13 earlier, this and our final submission are much 14 shorter -- is that the management and oversight of 15 investigations and prosecutions by the Post Office, as 16 supported by Fujitsu, was wilfully blind to, or 17 disregarding of, the proper lawful administration of 18 justice. 19 The challenges to the integrity of Horizon bought by 20 subpostmasters were brought to the attention of 21 management in the Post Office in individual 22 prosecutions, in civil claims and, eventually, in the 23 press. Still the Post Office did not hear those 24 warnings, and/or refused to hear them. We advance eight 25 propositions about Phase 4 evidence on the involvement 36 1 of management in investigation and prosecution. 2 First, as the evidence of Mandy Talbot confirms, the 3 existence of challenges to the integrity of Horizon were 4 dawn to the attention of management, including Rod Ismay 5 and David X Smith at the Post Office, as early as 2005, 6 and there is POL00107426, the briefing on Castleton and 7 other cases on 23 November 2005 to confirm that. 8 Second, at the very time that Noel Thomas was being 9 investigated, suggestions made by Mandy Talbot in 2005, 10 in the course of the Castleton case included a clear 11 recommendation of the involvement of independent 12 expertise beyond Fujitsu and a more consistent joined-up 13 approach by the Post Office. Her recommendations appear 14 to have been discussed and then largely stalled. 15 Third, proposals for an independent external review 16 in March 2010 were shut down following contact between 17 several Senior Managers, including the Head of Criminal 18 Law, the Head of Security and the head of Product and 19 Branch Accounting. 20 Fourth, the reason for this shutdown was plainly 21 directly linked to duties of disclosure which would 22 arise and the impact on challenges to Horizon. 23 Fifth, the subsequent Ismay report was 24 a whitewash -- and there's no other term for it -- 25 reflecting the stock line that Horizon was robust, 37 1 agreed before February 2010, for which now no one in 2 Post Office Management appears willing to own 3 responsibility. 4 Sixth, despite repeated recommendations for 5 a coordinated approach to Horizon challenges, it appears 6 there was no substantial effort to collate a record of 7 challenges until 2012, when Helen Rose was said to have 8 prepared a spreadsheet of approximately 20 cases, after 9 she produced a short report. Regrettably, this report 10 of 30 August 2012 painted an incomplete and misleading 11 picture. 12 Seventh, this critical information relating to 13 internal concerns around Horizon, which had gone on for 14 so long, was not disclosed to defendants in criminal 15 prosecutions, including where there were specific 16 requests for disclosure of other challenges by 17 defendants raising questions of Horizon integrity. 18 Eighth, steps taken in Post Office Management after 19 2005 served to substantially delay the process of 20 independent scrutiny, which began only with Second Sight 21 and continues to this day with this Inquiry. 22 There are substantial questions to be asked over the 23 role of management in both the Post Office and Fujitsu 24 in shaping this scandal. Phases 3 and 4 together make 25 clear that senior management were involved in decision 38 1 making designed to protect Horizon, to deflect 2 challenges to Horizon and to manage publicity around 3 Horizon. 4 These included members of more senior management 5 with reporting lines into the board or roles in 6 reporting to board level, for example: Rod Ismay, 7 through the Risk and Compliance Committee; John Scott; 8 and Susan Crichton. Mr Ward was yesterday shown 9 a document suggesting that access to ARQ data and 10 contract caps were discussed at Executive Committee 11 level in 2003, and that was POL00114566 at 37. 12 The role and responsibility of General Counsel, both 13 at Fujitsu and the Post Office, remains to be fully 14 explored but it's anticipated that the Inquiry will 15 return to these themes further in Phases 5 and 6. 16 Our third and final submission is that there was 17 an overarching focus on the commercial interests of both 18 the Post Office and Fujitsu, including in protecting the 19 brand reputation of both companies, which contributed 20 significantly and detrimentally to the fair prosecution 21 of individuals in the face of faults in Horizon, of 22 which the Post Office were or ought to have been aware. 23 The evidence in this phase has been informative as 24 to why these failings might have been able to continue 25 for so long. These are matters which the Inquiry will 39 1 continue to consider in Phases 5 and 6 and we will 2 return to the significance of any learning for the 3 Inquiry's recommendations at the close of the Inquiry, 4 but we have three main points to consider under this 5 submission, at this stage. 6 First, culture and attitude. 7 Emails and correspondence unearthed by this Inquiry 8 provide illustrative flashes of an arrogantly dismissive 9 attitude adopted both by the Post Office and by Fujitsu 10 staff, when it came to Horizon challenges. 11 The Inquiry may conclude that where professional 12 curiosity perhaps ought to have sparked enquiry, instead 13 assumptions were made based upon a prevailing 14 institutional attitude, which started with postmasters 15 wrongly deemed responsible for all loss and ended with 16 the assumption that all postmasters were crooks, in 17 absence of evidence to the contrary. 18 This was not just a coalface problem, which could be 19 explained away as workplace banter, never intended to 20 see the light of day. It was a thoroughly defensive 21 attitude, designed to protect the interests of the 22 business and which impacted decision making. 23 In POL00169170 on 22 October 2010, Rod Ismay 24 forwarded on the Jarnail Singh bandwagon email to others 25 in very senior board level positions at the Post Office, 40 1 including Dave Smith, Susan Crichton, who was General 2 Counsel, Mike Young and others. He said: 3 "Dave and the Executive Team have been aware of the 4 significance of these challenges and have been 5 supportive of the excellent work going on in so many 6 teams to justify the confidence that we have in Horizon 7 and in our supportive processes." 8 That much demonstrates how widespread this attitude 9 was and how high up it went. Far from reprimanding 10 Mr Singh for his emotive, gloating response to the 11 conviction of a postmaster, the Executive Team were 12 associated with the thanks offered by management to him 13 for his efforts. This was, of course, over a year since 14 the Computer Weekly article in 2009, at least six months 15 since Post Office rolled out its stock line that Horizon 16 was robust, and very shortly after Mr Ismay had 17 completed his Horizon Integrity Report in August 2010. 18 Over at Fujitsu, years earlier, for Jan Holmes, 19 Jason Coyne, the independent expert instructed in the 20 Cleveleys case, was dismissed as a "git". Peter Sewell 21 later, of course, called Mr Castleton "a nasty chap". 22 Asked about his role in the 2007 bug reported to Post 23 Office in 2009, he said, "We all protect our own 24 companies", and that's at INQ00001116 at pages 111-112. 25 The Inquiry might ask what, if anything, was ever 41 1 done by Post Office and/or Fujitsu senior management and 2 board to dispel or to discourage this kind of "us and 3 them", blinkered, "win at all costs" culture. Was it 4 rather, at the very least, tacitly encouraged? 5 Secondly, recoveries, performance and reward. 6 In Phases 3 and 4, the Inquiry heard evidence of the 7 keen focus placed on recovery of perceived losses, both 8 in policy and in practice to the Post Office business. 9 This is consistent with the entire Security team being, 10 for several years, where documents were available, 11 subject to performance targets requiring first 40 per 12 cent recovery to losses, with a later increase in the 13 target to 65 per cent. 14 Whilst some witnesses denied this figure was 15 connected to any performance-related bonus, others 16 accepted that performance was marked against targets, 17 and performance informed both team and individual 18 bonuses. Recovery was one aspect of that performance. 19 The Inquiry may consider that the enthusiasm with 20 which individual Investigators self-assessed their 21 over-target recoveries speaks for itself. 22 Look at the evidence of Steve Bradshaw and Robert 23 Daily, for example, if required to see where that 24 evidence was. His target was a measure of the 25 importance with which these recoveries were treated by 42 1 the business, despite growing attention on the repeated 2 challenge to the integrity of Horizon following reports 3 in the press and in the broadcast media in 2009. 4 Third and finally under this, protecting the brand. 5 Post Office policy and the actions of individuals 6 were openly driven by an interest in protecting the 7 reputation of the business and in protecting the brand. 8 There was evidence too of similar action by Fujitsu 9 employees. 10 At its nadir of this public relations driven 11 approach to justice, the Inquiry has uncovered the 12 company line written by the Communications Team, 13 distributed by Jarnail Singh, to be adopted by "agents 14 and counsel", in response to any defence based on 15 Horizon integrity and which was adopted wholesale in 16 witness statements for court. 17 The duty to investigate, to truly ask whether there 18 were any problems in the integrity of Horizon accounts, 19 was to be deflected by a generic statement first 20 appearing as the stock line that Horizon was robust, 21 then again in 2012 as Our Story, on Second Sight to be 22 released to legal agents and counsel, and the final 23 agreed draft being prepared by the Head of Public 24 Relations and Media in an exchange copied to the Company 25 Secretary and General Counsel. 43 1 The Inquiry heard, of course, about the PR input on 2 Our Story prepared on appointment of Second Sight, which 3 again said Horizon was robust and it was distributed to 4 agents and counsel and made its way into witness 5 evidence for court through the evidence of the witness 6 statement of Stephen Bradshaw. 7 For centuries, the Post Office was a cornerstone of 8 public service in this country. It's been said many 9 times but it really was one of the United Kingdom's most 10 trusted institutions, integrated close to the heart of 11 every community, in our cities, our towns and our 12 villages. It was trusted with our mail, trusted with 13 our savings, our pensions and, for many, our 14 livelihoods. But those images are now long gone. 15 The future of both Post Office and Fujitsu was 16 intrinsically linked to the success of Horizon; horizon 17 simply could not and would not be allowed to fail. We 18 saw that in Phase 2 and we see it in Phase 4. 19 Postmasters were easy targets to point to, to persecute, 20 to prosecute, and to pursue for apparent losses and, by 21 contrast, Horizon could not and would not fail. 22 This false narrative hid, for too many years, 23 a disastrous reality that allowed the Post Office to 24 prosecute a large number of its own people and to 25 bankrupt many more, and to pursue hundreds of thousands 44 1 of pounds in false recoveries in reliance on false data. 2 Yet, the false narrative, in some places, continues to 3 run. In their evidence to this Inquiry, some Post 4 Office witnesses have continued to assert their enduring 5 belief that postmasters are guilty, second-guessing the 6 Court of Appeal -- for example, Andrew Wise and Gary 7 Thomas -- and to question if Horizon lacked integrity -- 8 Susan Harding. 9 "Where had the money gone?" asked postmasters, with 10 ever-increasing desperation. This was an obvious 11 question that it appears the Post Office could not or 12 would not ask, let alone answer. 13 In none of the detailed case studies explored by the 14 Inquiry was there any concrete evidence of serious 15 investigative effort on the part of the Post Office to 16 prove a loss beyond Horizon. There was no money found 17 secreted away in postmasters' bank accounts or in 18 stuffed mattresses, yet the Post Office and Fujitsu did 19 not and/or would not hear any suggestion that Horizon 20 was at fault. 21 The Inquiry has heard that the volume and value of 22 these recoveries were closely monitored by the Post 23 Office each year. Where did that money go? Did it 24 simply appear on the Post Office's bottom line? So the 25 Inquiry must consider whether staff, executives and 45 1 senior managers at the Post Office and Fujitsu were 2 motivated by commercial interest to the detriment of 3 justice. 4 The Inquiry must consider whether those responsible 5 for this scandal, in the Post Office, at Fujitsu, and in 6 Government, did not, could not or would not hear any 7 warning that Horizon lacked integrity because their ears 8 were stuffed with cash. 9 Were they too busy thinking about wealth in purely 10 monetary terms that they ignored or disregard the wealth 11 of community? Those communities, such as South 12 Warnborough, where Jo Hamilton had her Post Office, 13 Gaerwen, where Noel Thomas had his, Dukinfield, where 14 Della Robinson had her Post Office, those communities 15 relied on the Post Office. Jo Hamilton kept the pension 16 cards and PIN numbers of the elderly residents in 17 a drawer at her branch so that she could look after 18 them. All of that was something you couldn't put 19 a price on but which was incredibly valuable. Post 20 Office didn't and/or wouldn't see the wealth in that. 21 They ignored or disregard the wealth of reputation. 22 They not only trashed the reputations of postmasters 23 whom they dragged through the courts and imprisoned and 24 bankrupted, by doing so, through this massive 25 miscarriage of justice, they trashed the reputation of 46 1 the Post Office as well: something you couldn't put 2 a price on but which was incredibly valuable. They saw 3 wealth as just monetary wealth and, as the old phrase 4 goes, they knew the price of everything and the value of 5 nothing. 6 It can take centuries to build something valuable, 7 it only takes a relatively short time to seriously 8 undermine it. 9 So to move to our conclusions, we are, sir, as ever, 10 grateful for the opportunity to make these submissions 11 today on behalf of each of the subpostmasters we 12 represent while many of their stories have become part 13 of the national narrative, many of them and their 14 families remain intensely private people, irreparably 15 damaged by their experiences at the hands of the Post 16 Office. For a great many postmasters, it has taken 17 a lot for them to be able to watch these proceedings and 18 to see themselves in the spotlight. 19 The loss and the stigma that postmasters have lived 20 with for decades does not disappear easily. They remain 21 grateful for the work of the Inquiry so far, not only in 22 further unearthing the dirty, difficult truth behind 23 this scandal, but in pressing the Post Office and 24 Government on their commitment to provide prompt, full 25 and fair compensation, to try to ensure that offers that 47 1 are made to them are not, in the very recent words of 2 Alan Bates, "derisory, offensive and after all this 3 time, yes, cruel". 4 This phase highlights that the individual decision 5 makers who failed in their responsibilities as 6 prosecutors must be under a different but similarly 7 bright spotlight, as must the shared failures of 8 governance which lie behind this scandal. Anything less 9 would neglect to ensure that lessons are learned for the 10 future about the dangers which lie in the confluence of 11 commercial interest, individual ambition and criminal 12 injustice. 13 The cost of this scandal includes what may be 14 irreparable damage to the Post Office in our community 15 consciousness. The next stages of this Inquiry will 16 focus further on the shared financial responsibility for 17 redress, owed not only by Post Office and the public 18 purse, but by Fujitsu. Those we represent do not wish 19 to see any constructive steps to compensate all 20 postmasters await any such attribution of responsible as 21 may follow the evidence in this Inquiry. 22 Tragically, postmasters continued to die before any 23 offer of full, fine and proper compensation. Others 24 continue to grapple with delays in administration which 25 is continuing their trauma and delaying yet further 48 1 their capacity to move on and enjoy the rest of their 2 lives. 3 Fujitsu accepts a moral responsibility to share the 4 load but it is vague about precisely what this means, 5 and we suggest that as it goes forward, the Inquiry 6 might consider the extent of any agreement reached 7 between Government, Post Office, and Fujitsu, as to any 8 legal course of action arising, their timing and whether 9 any such arrangements may have informed the approach to 10 the GLO and any strategic steps since, including 11 decisions on compensation. 12 While Fujitsu has voluntarily committed, with 13 seeming fanfare, to refrain from bids for public work 14 while the Inquiry continues, the Inquiry may wish to 15 examine the increasing commercial value and the 16 corresponding cost to the public purse of the 17 relationship between Fujitsu and Government over the 18 life of Horizon. There are lessons to be learned in the 19 relationship between Government and Fujitsu developed on 20 the back of Horizon. This may not only help explain why 21 Horizon was defended for so long but may inform the 22 Inquiry's recommendations for the future conduct of 23 public private contracting. 24 Moreover, those we represent expect to see criminal 25 prosecution pursued where the evidence warrants it. We 49 1 welcome the decision of the chair to provide careful, 2 appropriate warnings against self-incrimination to 3 a number of witnesses. 4 The Phase 4 transcripts provide evidence which, at 5 the very least, justifies rigorous investigation of 6 possible offending in a number of cases. We note that 7 The Metropolitan Police Service is a Core Participant 8 and we understand they are monitoring these proceedings. 9 The integrity of any possible prosecution ought to be 10 closely guarded. It would be a devastating result for 11 those we represent and for the public interest should 12 any person liable to investigation, prosecution and 13 conviction escape or unnecessarily delay trial for 14 procedural reasons, no matter how spurious. 15 The evidence in Phase 4 provides a flavour of what 16 is to come in Phases 5 and 6. We ask that it includes, 17 firstly, why, if not for profit and commercial interest, 18 did the Post Office continue to turn a blind eye and 19 a deaf ear to the growing evidence of Horizon's flaws? 20 Just how was it allowed to do so in the face of the 21 involvement of Parliament and of independent reviews 22 conducted by Second Sight, Deloittes and individual 23 legal experts? 24 Why did Fujitsu continue, as it appears they did, to 25 support the stock line that Horizon was robust? What 50 1 role was played by Government, including the Government 2 representation on the Post Office Board? 3 Additionally, the treatment of Second Sight will be 4 a significant issue for Phase 5. There is now concrete 5 evidence that Post Office Management rejected any 6 question of closer scrutiny and independent 7 interrogation of Horizon as early as 2005. Each ignored 8 opportunity to interrogate Horizon represents years lost 9 to many of our clients. For others, an opportunity 10 missed could have prevented their loss and their pain 11 entirely. Justice delayed in this case truly was 12 justice denied. 13 Just as no rational person could believe that 14 Government and Parliament were in the dark about the 15 Post Office scandal before the airing of Mr Bates by 16 ITV, the board and the Post Office were not and cannot 17 have been uninformed of concerns about the flaws in 18 Horizon and the shortcomings of their own prosecutorial 19 conduct until the conclusion of the GLO. 20 Exploring and determining the extent of 21 responsibility for the continued seemingly determined 22 failure to acknowledge the devastating flaws both in 23 Horizon and in the Post Office's approach to prosecution 24 is critical for this Inquiry, central to our clients' 25 true understanding of what happened to them and 51 1 essential before lessons can truly be learned for the 2 future. 3 As ever, sir, we and those we represent will do all 4 we can to assist the Inquiry in finding out those 5 things. 6 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Mr Moloney, thank you very much for your 7 submissions. Those of you who follow the Inquiry will 8 know that occasionally I congratulate Mr Moloney for the 9 accuracy of his predictions as to the length of his 10 submissions. On this occasion, he was within two or 11 three minutes of his prediction and that is a mark of 12 excellent advocacy, if I may say so. 13 We will take a break for 15 minutes and then I will 14 hear from Mr Stein, I take it. 15 Yes, so 11.30. 16 MR BEER: Yes, thank you very much, sir. 17 (11.15 am) 18 (A short break) 19 (11.30 am) 20 MR BEER: Sir, I think it's Mr Stein next. 21 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes. Has there been a problem with me 22 being on screen there, Mr Beer? 23 MR BEER: No, not that I'm aware of. 24 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: All right. Thank you. 25 Closing statement by MR STEIN 52 1 MR STEIN: Sir, Phase 4 has pulled back the curtain on the 2 decades of the Great Post Office Cook-Up and Cover-Up. 3 That has been made up of these four key ingredients: 4 The disdain and dislike of subpostmasters by the Post 5 Office and their employees because, and I quote from 6 a Post Office Investigator, they are "all crooks"; 7 secondly, an appalling lack of professionalism of 8 lawyers combined with bullying Investigators; thirdly, 9 a refusal to investigate the Horizon system because of 10 what that would reveal; and lastly and finally, 11 fourthly, the Post Office cult -- the almighty Post 12 Office must be protected at all costs. 13 Sir, what an awful cocktail, a Molotov cocktail, 14 that they consistently over these decades threw at 15 subpostmasters, their families, their managers and their 16 staff, in doing so risking mental physical and economic 17 health. 18 Sir, we suggest that the least we can expect of 19 a publicly and taxpayer-funded organisations is that 20 they will do right when no one is watching, not do what 21 is unconscionable because they think nobody will find 22 out. 23 Let me deal with the consistency of attitude towards 24 subpostmasters. Phase 4 started in Phase 3. You will 25 recall the statement -- and, sir, we will provide a copy 53 1 next week of my speaking notes, which will contain all 2 references and, otherwise, I won't therefore refer in 3 this speech to references today. 4 Sir, you will recall the statement of Susan Harding 5 the designer of the IMPACT Programme in 2003 to 2006. 6 The programme that largely removed the suspense account, 7 meaning that, to balance, subpostmasters had to pay up 8 and not dispute a shortfall. 9 At paragraph 31, page 7 of her statement, it says 10 this: 11 "It was agreed during the design of IMPACT that the 12 suspense account would be removed as, historically, it 13 was used by subpostmasters to hide discrepancies in 14 their accounts rather than resolve them." 15 In the questions asked of Ms Harding by Mr Beer 16 King's Counsel on 22 February 2003, Ms Harding confirmed 17 that she worked on the principle that, prior to Horizon, 18 subpostmasters did have losses and hid those losses. We 19 have seen through the evidence in Phase 4 that this has 20 been the mindset that informed the actions taken by the 21 Post Office against subpostmasters since the 22 introduction of Horizon, essentially a mindset that was 23 echoed through to Mr Thomas' slanderous email to 24 Mr Graham Ward, who gave evidence yesterday, in 2015. 25 No investigation of the Horizon system could be 54 1 allowed. Mr Pardoe said in his evidence to the Inquiry 2 on 29 November last year: 3 "There was a persistent sentiment that the system 4 was fit for purpose. I was never in a meeting when it 5 was discussed with me, the concept of putting the brakes 6 on prosecution activity. It's clear that there was 7 a fear that to do that would immediately cast doubt on 8 prosecutions that had been completed, that had gone 9 before." 10 Mr Wilson, the Head of Criminal Law at the Post 11 Office, sent an email on 3 March 2010, in which he told 12 his colleagues: 13 "An investigation will be disclosable as undermining 14 evidence on the defence in the cases proceeding through 15 the criminal courts." 16 Going on to say: 17 "The potential impact, however, is much wider for 18 POL, in that every office in the country will be seen to 19 be operating a compromised system with untold damage to 20 the business. To continue prosecuting alleged 21 offenders, knowing that there is an ongoing 22 investigation to determine the veracity of Horizon, 23 could also be detrimental to the reputation of my team." 24 Anne Chambers told the Inquiry in her Phase 4 25 evidence on 27 September 2023 that the Post Office's 55 1 priority in 2007, she was referring to, was not to 2 assist subpostmasters. She said it was fairly clear 3 that the Post Office were keen on defending the 4 integrity of their system rather than trying to get of 5 the bottom of issues, whether system problems or 6 business problems, affecting individual branches. 7 Ms Chambers said that she'd expressed these views in 8 a disregarded Afterthoughts document which she produced 9 following Mr Castleton's case. 10 We mustn't forget the 2010 Receipts/Payments 11 Mismatch Bug Meeting Notes document that we've looked at 12 many times, the document described as dynamite by Debbie 13 Stapel, which shows Post Office and Fujitsu joining 14 forces to concoct unacceptable and disingenuous 15 solutions in relation to one of the many bugs that 16 plagued the system, leaving you, sir, to ask the 17 question of witnesses: which one of those solutions were 18 ever used? 19 Mr Ismay, Post Office's head of Product and Branch 20 Accounting, set out his views in his whitewash report on 21 2 August 2010, where he repeats, in essence, Mr Wilson's 22 concern: adverse publicity and reputation and nothing 23 about "Do the right thing". 24 He concluded that there should be no independent 25 review of Horizon because this could lead to 56 1 a perception that the Post Office cast doubts on its own 2 system. 3 In his evidence earlier in 2023, Mr Ismay stated 4 that, although his name was on the report, he hardly 5 accepted that these were his own words, stating: 6 "That narrative would have come from speaking to 7 somebody in the Criminal Law Team. I imagine it 8 probably came from a conversation with Mr Rob Wilson." 9 Mr Beer asked Mr Wilson about these matters in 10 October '23. Mr Beer's first question in relation to 11 this: 12 "Was it your view that the Post Office should just 13 grit its teeth and get on with prosecuting people?" 14 Mr Wilson: 15 "I think so, yes." 16 When Mr Pardoe was asked by ourselves on 17 29 November, at page 150 of the transcript, whether the 18 persistent sentiment that the system was fit for purpose 19 came from his boss, John Scott, he agreed that this was 20 the case: 21 "The one I remember probably with greater clarity is 22 the Paula Vennells communications", he said. 23 "I'm sure that that preceded known media interest 24 that was imminently about to go public." 25 Essentially saying, "Look folks, this is likely to 57 1 be out within the public domain and the approach we are 2 taking is this, this, this and this", to paraphrase. 3 Mr Jacobs took the point one further when he asked 4 this: 5 "So the whole organisation was told there's going to 6 be something in the media about Horizon and it is to be 7 disregarded because everything is robust?" 8 Mr Pardoe replied. 9 "I certainly recall reading a written rebuttal and 10 position that the business were adopting, yes." 11 For further insights into the Horizon cover-up we 12 should look at what was said in Mr Coyne's evidence in 13 July '23. Mr Coyne was a jointly instructed expert in 14 the Cleveleys case, so he is POL's expert. He advised 15 that the whole estate was suffering from problems. 16 Mr Moloney has dealt with this already in his 17 submissions today, recalling that Mr Coyne was called 18 a "git" for his troubles. 19 The Inquiry will also recall the letter in February 20 2004 which adds to this, in which Mr Keith Baines of the 21 Post Office wrote to Colin Lenton-Smith at Fujitsu and 22 said: 23 "As I'm sure you will understand, the Post Office is 24 concern by these findings, not only in relation to this 25 particular case but also because of any precedent that 58 1 this may set." 2 Going on to say: 3 "And that may be used by Post Office's agents to 4 support claims that the Horizon system is causing errors 5 in their branch accounts." 6 So the Post Office knew that the Horizon system was 7 defective but still sought to bring prosecutions of 8 subpostmasters, bring civil actions against postmasters 9 and refuse to investigate these issues because the 10 subpostmasters might catch on to the truth. 11 In Phase 4 we have seen a parade of liars, bullies, 12 amnesiacs and arrogant individuals give evidence before 13 you. This has been a mixed experience or many of our 14 clients. 15 Shazia Saddiq has said: 16 "I came to the inquiry to see my tormentor but he 17 wouldn't look me in the eye." 18 Indeed, in a lot of cases, our clients have been 19 appalled to see the extent to which Post Office staff 20 members treated subpostmasters as subhumans. They 21 hounded and harassed and, in some cases, drove decent 22 and honest men and women to their graves. 23 It has been noteworthy, we say, that for every 24 witness who has been brazen about their behaviour, there 25 have been others who have chosen to plead amnesia. We 59 1 have witnessed, sir, a chorus of cowards who deny any 2 memory of involvement in this scandal. 3 Two stark examples of such amnesia are provided by 4 the evidence of Suzanne Winter and Lisa Allen 5 respectively. They claim to be unable to recall trials 6 in 2004 and 2007 which they attended and gave evidence, 7 notably those trials were where subpostmistresses were 8 found not guilty. 9 We have also heard from witnesses that have sought 10 to tell the Inquiry that the message from above was that 11 any complaints from subpostmasters about the Horizon 12 system was to be denied and that the system was robust: 13 a dishonest message, sir, that shows that honour has 14 been lost in the post at the Post Office. 15 We know, of course, that the Inquiry cannot make any 16 findings as to civil or criminal liability but our 17 clients take some small comfort in the fact that The 18 Metropolitan Police and Solicitors Regulation Authority 19 have followed the hearings closely. 20 The Post Office did not do all of this alone. 21 Fujitsu were complicit from the outset. Mr Patterson 22 told us on 19 January that Fujitsu knew about the bugs, 23 errors and defects for many years and right from the 24 very start of the deployment of the system. 25 Ms Munro acknowledged Fujitsu's complicity when 60 1 answering questions from ourselves on 18 January this 2 year. She was asked whether she thought postmasters and 3 mistresses were being prosecuted in circumstances where 4 the Post Office, with Fujitsu's assistance, was 5 misrepresenting the robustness and integrity of the 6 Horizon system. Her answer was: 7 "Based on what I've seen and read today, I would say 8 yes." 9 Now, I turn to the question of remote access. In 10 doing so, I'm going to ask for the one document I'm 11 going to ask to go on to the screen to go on to the 12 screen, and that is FUJ00002023. Can we go, please, to 13 page 13 of 18, using the internal pagination at the 14 bottom and highlight, please, the paragraph at the top, 15 which is 2.7.1.5. Thank you. 16 Sir, in dealing, briefly, with the evidence that 17 relates to remote access, it is helpful to remind 18 ourselves of what was said in relation to the Horizon 19 system about third line and fourth line, the support 20 service. This document is dated, as we can see, 21 31 August 2006 and it sets out that: 22 "The Application Support Service (Fourth Line) and 23 Third Line Support Service work closely together in the 24 identification and resolution of Software Incidents 25 requiring bug fixes." 61 1 That's what they did. 2 Let's add to that remote access. 3 In Phase 4, the Inquiry heard the evidence of Anne 4 Chambers in September, who accepted that there were 5 occasions where the Fujitsu team would use a branch user 6 ID when inserting transactions. In those circumstances, 7 the insertion would not be detectable. Of course, 8 Mr Roll told the Inquiry in March 2023 that the amount 9 of access to terminals that Fujitsu had was pretty 10 shocking. Furthermore, Mr Simpkins, a Fujitsu Team 11 Leader, confirmed in his evidence on 17 January that 12 there was unrestricted access to the live system and 13 that access seems to have been unaudited. 14 It is more than clear that, if Fujitsu and the Post 15 Office had come clear about the bugs, the purposes of 16 the helplines, the interactions, the fact that the teams 17 at 3 and 4 of the service line were fixing bugs in 18 combination with remote access -- if that had been 19 revealed in relation to any matters taken against 20 subpostmasters and mistresses in either civil or 21 criminal actions, any judge, having that brought to 22 their attention, would have required further and deeper 23 information. 24 This scandal could have been avoided if either the 25 Post Office or Fujitsu had done the right thing. 62 1 Fujitsu, we say, chose to hide behind its contract, 2 actively supporting its contractual partner and 3 financial benefactor and getting a few more years of 4 public contracts adding to its £1 billion global empire. 5 The document can come down from the screen with my 6 thanks. 7 Let me turn to my clients' views. Scott Darlington 8 has summed up the experience of subpostmasters who have 9 followed Phase 4 perfectly. He said in an interview 10 that he gave to the BBC on 18 January: 11 "Once they knew that things were going wrong and the 12 system wasn't right, POL doubled down in their behaviour 13 against postmasters with Fujitsu acting in conjunction 14 with them. You know it wasn't you, you know it wasn't 15 your fault and when things start to come out in the 16 Inquiry, and we've realised that they did know, Post 17 Office's doubling down is like kick in the teeth and 18 they've done it time and time again." 19 Clients' views in relation to some of the evidence 20 that has been given. 21 Sarah Osolinski, who was a subpostmaster at Gaer 22 Park Post Office in Newport says: 23 "Gary Thomas is not a victim. He is a bully who 24 thoroughly enjoyed his role in bringing us down." 25 Of john Scott: 63 1 "Don't write anything down and shred documents? How 2 dare they? This was people's lives they were messing 3 with. How could they?" 4 Sally Stringer, a subpostmistress at Beckford Stores 5 and Post Office in Beckford in Gloucestershire, her 6 comments echoed by every single one of our 157 clients 7 was this: 8 "To say I'm incandescent with anger about corporate 9 amnesia is an understatement." 10 Terence Seeney said this: 11 "They were all underqualified bully boys. It's 12 surprising what people will do for money: sign false 13 statements, threaten people and ruin their lives and 14 that of their families, only promoted because they did 15 as they were instructed." 16 Let's put those comments into perspective. I'm 17 going to refer to some particularly bad witnesses, for 18 special mention, a rogues' gallery. 19 Gary Thomas, an Investigator who told our client, 20 Tracey Merritt, that she was the only one who had 21 complained about the system and, of course, his 22 notorious email to Graham Ward, his old Gunners Matt, 23 describing all subpostmasters and mistresses as 24 "thieving" and "crooks". 25 Mr Singh, who gave evidence on 30 November, referred 64 1 to his email, already mentioned by Mr Moloney, a second 2 email he drafted in December 2013, carried the same 3 theme. This was some months after Mr Clarke had written 4 his advices, the lawyer at Cartwright King, and advising 5 then Post Office in writing that prosecutions that POL 6 had conducted had been obtained with misleading expert 7 evidence. Mr Singh wrote this: 8 "Any case begun now will attract some type of 9 Horizon issue because this is the passing bandwagon 10 people are jumping on. When we have a few more wins 11 under our belt the Horizon challenges will melt away 12 like midnight snow." 13 John Scott. 14 John Scott, as you will recall, sir, was the Head of 15 Security at the Post Office. He gave evidence on 16 11 October and what he said in his internal 17 communications was consideration of the Post Office 18 staff looking at Horizon integrity issues to shred 19 documents. 20 I pause there for one moment. In this matter, the 21 interface between subpostmasters, mistresses and their 22 staff and the Horizon system was largely conducted 23 through the helplines, of which there were two: the 24 Fujitsu helpline and the Post Office helpline. We have 25 sought to obtain disclosure of scripts now for the many 65 1 years that we have been engaged on this particular 2 matter, the scripts of what was said at that interface, 3 otherwise known as "knowledge articles". That seems to 4 be the internal description of scripts. 5 Have those scripts gone into Mr Scott's corporate 6 shredder? Where are they? Maybe with Mr Jackson at the 7 helm of the latest set of Post Office lawyers, maybe 8 those scripts, knowledge articles, can be found. 9 But what was Mr Scott about? He didn't want notes 10 of minutes of meetings that discussed Horizon and we 11 suggest that, throughout this module, it has become 12 clear that the Security Department at the Post Office 13 worked as the Post Office's own Stasi, dedicated 14 reputational protection of the Post Office at all and 15 any cost. 16 Mandy Talbot. 17 She gave evidence on 28 September. She is a former 18 Post Office Legal Case Manager who was responsible for 19 civil actions but who deliberately inserted herself in 20 the wider dealings with Horizon cases, the Post Office's 21 very own "evil robot". She was aware that 22 subpostmasters were making allegations since 2001 but 23 chose to disregard Mr Coyne's expert evidence to the 24 effect that the system was not robust. 25 Stephen Bradshaw. 66 1 Mr Bradshaw is a current Post Office Investigator at 2 POL. His behaviour towards subpostmasters and 3 mistresses was bullying, we say, and oppressive. Shazia 4 Saddiq was called a "bitch" by Mr Bradshaw on the phone. 5 He made Ms Rita Threlfall, who has mobility issues, use 6 a small parcel lift. He expressed no regret or remorse 7 for his behaviour in his evidence before the Inquiry 8 when he gave evidence on 11 January. Our clients would 9 like to know what action is being taken by the Post 10 Office in relation to Mr Bradshaw. 11 Mr Dilley, Stephen Dilley. 12 He was the Post Office's solicitor in the Castleton 13 case. He gave evidence on 21 September '23. He 14 accepted that the Post Office's priority in the 15 Castleton case was to send a message that Post Office 16 was willing to defend the Fujitsu Horizon system. 17 Then, of course, there's Mr Daily, who was the Post 18 Office Investigator who advised that Mr Holmes should be 19 prosecuted, conducting a very intrusive search of the 20 Holmes family home, looking for evidence of a Horizon 21 generated loss which the Post Office could never prove. 22 Mr Daily gave evidence on 23 January and confirmed 23 in response to questions from you, sir, that the 24 investigations that the Post Office conducted were very 25 extensive but revealed nothing. Yet this did not prompt 67 1 him to follow the line of inquiry raised by Mr Holmes, 2 in other words that the Horizon system had been the 3 cause of the alleged shortfalls. 4 The case studies. We acknowledge that it has not 5 been easy for our clients, whose lives were directly 6 affected by the Phase 4 witnesses, to have to relive 7 what were highly traumatic experiences. 8 By way of example, Suzanne Palmer, who is here with 9 us today in this room, has described that the experience 10 of facing the witnesses who dealt with her was quite 11 traumatic. She says that part of her felt like she was 12 back in a dock with a policeman standing behind her. 13 Two of the case studies concerned acquittals. Our 14 acquitted clients are Maureen McKelvey and Suzanne 15 Palmer. It is notable that in both of these cases the 16 investigations were inadequate and the juries at trial 17 roundly rejected the Post Office's position as to the 18 robustness of the Horizon system. 19 Mrs McKelvey was the subpostmistress at Clanabogan, 20 a post office in Omagh, Northern Ireland. She was 21 prosecuted by the Post Office for theft and acquitted on 22 all counts by a jury in 2004. She raised Horizon issues 23 at her interviews with Ms Winter and Mr Thorpe in 2002 24 but those matters did not find their way into the 25 Investigator's report, which was submitted to the Police 68 1 Service in Northern Ireland. 2 Furthermore, the investigation report, written by 3 Ms Winter, failed to inform the police service that one 4 of the alleged acts of theft was a balance that had been 5 carried out by Mrs McKelvey's Area Manager in her 6 absence. Mrs McKelvey recalls that the trial judge was 7 scathing towards the Post Office after the jury returned 8 their acquittal and she recalls that the trial judge 9 told the Post Office that the prosecution had been 10 a sham. 11 Sir, notwithstanding her acquittal and vindication, 12 Mrs McKelvey became bankrupt as a result of what the 13 Post Office did. She remains struggling to access 14 compensation due to that very bankruptcy. Even though 15 our client was acquitted so long ago, she continues to 16 suffer today. 17 Suzanne Palmer was a subpostmistress at The Grange 18 Post Office in Rayleigh in Essex, acquitted of all 19 counts of false accounting. In her interview she gave 20 a detailed account of the technical problems she was 21 experiencing with the Horizon system. However, these 22 matters were not considered as relevant to the 23 investigation that the Post Office conducted. Yet those 24 points, raised by Mrs Palmer, were not lost on the jury. 25 In her trial in 2007, the jury asked a highly 69 1 pertinent question: 2 "What was Mrs Palmer supposed to do if she didn't 3 agree with the Horizon generated figures?" 4 The Post Office Legal team were unable to answer 5 that question. Mrs Palmer was acquitted approximately 6 half an hour after the jury retired. 7 Mr Atkinson King's Counsel has addressed 8 Mrs Palmer's case at paragraphs 220 to 237 of volume 2 9 of his report. He confirmed a number of important lines 10 of inquiry, which had a particular tendency to exonerate 11 rather than implicate Ms Palmer, were not pursued. None 12 of these errors were identified by the reviewing lawyer, 13 Mr Singh, who in fact advised that no further evidence 14 was required. Mr Atkinson additionally advised that 15 there was no review of the evidence when the decision to 16 charge by Mr Singh was taken, neither was there any 17 reference to the public interest test. Questions also 18 arose, as Mr Atkinson examined, as to whether the 19 disclosure process was adequately conducted. 20 Notwithstanding her acquittal and exoneration by the 21 jury, Mrs Palmer's life was still ruined by the Post 22 Office. She too remains bankrupt to this day. 23 There was a lack of review, as the Inquiry is aware, 24 after the acquittals. When Rob Wilson, Head of Criminal 25 Law Team at the Post Office, gave evidence in this phase 70 1 on 12 December '23, he told the Inquiry that there would 2 usually be a review undertaken by the Post Office when 3 an acquittal was reported in a case that it had 4 prosecuted. 5 No review was conducted by the Post Office when 6 Mrs McKelvey was acquitted in 2004 and when Suzanne 7 Palmer was acquitted in 2007. We have seen that the 8 Post Office was more than happy to crow about 9 Mrs Misra's conviction in 2010, as evidenced by 10 Mr Jarnail Singh's emails. But had it reviewed 11 Mrs McKelvey and Mrs Palmer's acquittals, three and six 12 years earlier, then maybe -- maybe -- the truth would 13 have come out within the organisation. 14 It was striking that when Mr Daily gave evidence on 15 23 January in relation to the prosecution of Peter 16 Holmes in 2010, he said he was unaware of any other case 17 where a subpostmaster has alleged that Horizon was 18 responsible for shortfalls. 19 Ms Price, Counsel to the Inquiry, specifically asked 20 Mr Daily whether he'd been made aware of Suzanne 21 Palmer's acquittal and he denied any knowledge of the 22 matter. 23 We suggest that the evidence shows a deliberate 24 corporate decision to not review acquittals -- 25 acquittals such as those of Maureen McKelvey and Suzanne 71 1 Palmer -- for the simple reason that POL never wanted 2 the truth to get out. 3 I turn to now of the matter that related to Joan 4 Bailey. Joan Bailey was the assistant to her husband, 5 who was the subpostmaster for Howey in Wales. She 6 received a caution after a shortfall was identified at 7 an audit in January 2011. Mrs Bailey was particularly 8 unfortunate because her case was handled under the 9 Bradshaw-Singh axis. Her case is covered in 10 Mr Atkinson's second report, paragraphs 444 to 458, 11 saying there that Mrs Bailey and her solicitor raised 12 the Horizon system at interview but Stephen Bradshaw, 13 the Post Office Investigator, said: 14 "Well, I can assure you that whatever glitches if 15 there are any at the beginning with Horizon Next 16 Generation has been solved. Right." 17 Mr Bradshaw submitted an investigation report to 18 Mr Singh but there was no proposal in that report that 19 any enquiry should be made into the operation of the 20 Horizon system at that branch. 21 Mr Singh reviewed the case and followed 22 Mr Bradshaw's suggestion that there should be a caution, 23 but dependent on there being an undertaking from 24 a solicitor that the Post Office would recoup the 25 identified loss from a sale of Mrs Bailey's home. 72 1 The evidence in her case shows that there was no 2 consideration of any of the issues with the Horizon 3 system that Mrs Bailey had identified. Mr Atkinson 4 correctly notes that this is pertinent because it would 5 have been appropriate to consider whether there was 6 sufficient evidence to prove the offence and whether it 7 was in the public interest even to caution Mrs Bailey, 8 as opposed to taking no criminal action against her at 9 all. 10 The decision to issue a caution without any 11 investigation into the accuracy of Horizon data upon 12 which reliance was placed, the lack of any financial 13 inquiry and the obvious financial motivation behind the 14 giving of a caution are all strong indicators that there 15 was a miscarriage of justice in Mrs Bailey's case. 16 However, unlike those who are convicted at the hands 17 of the Post Office, cautions cannot be overturned. 18 A caution may be challenged, by way of judicial review, 19 and therefore will be subject, because of JR time 20 limits, to the timeliness of a challenge. There are 21 procedures in Magistrates Courts to review the 22 administration of cautions, however these procedures are 23 unlikely to assist the victims of the Post Office, such 24 as Joan Bailey and Susan Hazzleton, many years after the 25 event. 73 1 Mrs Bailey's caution, in fact, conflicted, we say, 2 with the Post Office's own policies because the flawed 3 investigation did not establish evidence of guilt 4 sufficient to give a realistic prospect of conviction. 5 We say that the administration of a caution to 6 Mrs Bailey was every bit as much of an abuse of process 7 as a conviction would have been. 8 In the absence of any obvious remedy, we invite the 9 Chair, you, sir, to make a robust finding in the final 10 Inquiry report that, if you were called upon to decide 11 this issue in a court, that the administration of 12 cautions to Mrs Bailey and others were an abuse of 13 process. This may enable, insomuch as it is possible, 14 for our clients' names to be cleared in at least 15 a public manner. 16 Move on to Mr Holmes. 17 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: I'm not trying to be difficult, Mr Stein, 18 but can I actually do that? 19 MR STEIN: Well, sir, yes, you can only make the comment. 20 You cannot make a determination. We ask that the 21 comment is -- 22 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: I can stretch my powers in the Terms of 23 Reference to or beyond breaking point, yes? 24 MR STEIN: We ask you so to do, yes. 25 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: All right. 74 1 MR STEIN: Mr Holmes. Peter Holmes is a classic case of 2 a subpostmaster or assistant raising the issue of 3 Horizon from the very outset but Post Office 4 Investigators failing to follow up on a basic line of 5 inquiry. Mr Holmes was an assistant, actually the 6 de facto subpostmaster at Jesmond Post Office branch, 7 and pleaded guilty to four counts of false accounting in 8 December 2009. 9 Tragically, Peter, a former policeman of four years 10 and a man of impeccable character, died in the years 11 before the Court of Appeal finally cleared his name. 12 His prosecution was always an affront of justice, as the 13 Court of Appeal rightly found. Peter has been more than 14 ably represented by his widow, Marion. It must be 15 a great source of shame to the Post Office that its 16 employee, Mr Daily, was unable to provide any apology 17 for the part that he played in Peter's conviction and 18 the loss of his reputation. 19 It really beggars belief that Mr Daily didn't 20 consider having conducted an investigation into 21 Mr Holmes and, having uncovered absolutely nothing, 22 whether Mr Holmes was right when he blamed the "bloody 23 awful" Horizon system. 24 You will remember, sir, the long silence that 25 followed when you put this very point to Mr Daily on 75 1 23 January. 2 Mr Atkinson dealt with Mr Holmes' case at 3 paragraph 309 to 335 of his report. He noted that there 4 was no evidence of any Horizon checks, which is 5 consistent with the material that was in the evidence 6 schedules in the criminal proceedings and also with the 7 evidence that is before this Inquiry. 8 Mr Daily's protestations that such checks would have 9 been conducted are without any credibility. Once again, 10 the decision to charge was made without reference to any 11 public interest and did not set out how dishonesty was 12 said to be established. Mr Daily was a singularly 13 unimpressive witness. 14 What would Mr Holmes think himself? Peter would 15 have been horrified at the absence of proper lines of 16 inquiry, as an ex-police officer. He would have been 17 devastated to learn about the complete failure to pursue 18 lines of inquiry that pointed to the innocence of the 19 person under investigation. 20 Let me turn to the use of the subpostmaster 21 contract. It is important to remember that Phase 4, and 22 this Inquiry, is not solely concerned with prosecutions. 23 Hundreds, if not thousands, of subpostmasters were 24 hounded under the Post Office tyranny into paying 25 alleged shortfalls which had been generated by the 76 1 Horizon system. The Post Office seems to have believed 2 that its contract with subpostmasters entitled it to 3 embezzle without proper investigation or even actual 4 losses. Have we got to the bottom of where the 5 subpostmasters' money went when they paid for 6 shortfalls, as a result of the Horizon bugs, errors and 7 defects in the system? Was it put into a separate and 8 accountable account or simply stuffed back into the 9 business? 10 John Breeden summarised the position from the 11 contractual side in his evidence on 17 October '23. He 12 accepted that the Post Office's protection of the brand 13 image may have come at the expense of doing the right 14 thing by subpostmasters. He described the Post Office's 15 overwhelming desire was to protect the brand at all cost 16 and that was part of the DNA of the business and, going 17 on to say, that was dictated from the top, 18 ie management. 19 The cultural sickness at the Post Office was 20 embedded, we suggest, in its policies. Mr Lusher, 21 another former Contracts Advisor, gave evidence on 22 18 October to the effect that Post Office policy 23 regarding losses wrongly assumed that all losses were 24 the responsibility of the subpostmaster. 25 Subpostmasters were attacked from all sides. They 77 1 were ruined by the contracts, which were incorrectly 2 interpreted by the Post Office and which many 3 subpostmasters never actually saw. They were unable to 4 properly investigate the cause of the discrepancies or 5 losses, due to their limited access to back office and 6 accounting data within Horizon. It was, of course, 7 always impossible for a subpostmaster to produce 8 evidence that Horizon was the cause of an alleged loss 9 and many Post Office Investigators appeared to think the 10 subpostmasters were required to do just that. 11 We ask you to make the following findings in 12 relation to this phase of the Inquiry: 13 Investigators systematically failed to pursue 14 important lines of inquiry that appointed away from the 15 guilt of subpostmasters. This was particularly apparent 16 in cases where postmasters had experienced problems with 17 the computer system or had raised those problems in 18 interview or through legal representatives. 19 Secondly, there were failures of prosecutorial 20 supervision as to the identification and pursuit of 21 reasonable lines of inquiry. 22 Thirdly, there were failures to refer to the public 23 interest in decisions to prosecute. 24 Fourth, in a substantial majority of cases, the 25 shortfall concerned was Horizon generated and Post 78 1 Office could not prove any loss. 2 Fifth, there were systematic failings in the 3 disclosure process at all levels. 4 Sixth, Post Office frequently imposed a requirement 5 that pleas were accepted conditional upon an undertaking 6 that no criticism would be made of the Horizon system. 7 Seventh, that the entire process was procedurally 8 unfair. Where a company or organisation is the alleged 9 victim, investigator and prosecutor, there will always 10 be a tendency for a lack of balance and objectivity. 11 Post Office had skin in the game in every case and there 12 were no effective independent checks in place. 13 Eighth, the Post Office was driven by improper 14 considerations. They wanted results in criminal 15 prosecution and civil actions to bolster the failing 16 Horizon system and to deter subpostmasters. They crowed 17 when they won cases but failed to review cases where 18 a defendant had been acquitted. 19 Finally, we ask you to look at all these matters 20 altogether. We ask that you make what 10 years ago have 21 been an astonishing and incredible finding, that these 22 findings add up to a system that was biased against 23 subpostmasters, a system that failed to investigate, 24 a system that avoided self-analysis, a system which 25 sought above all else to protect the holy Post Office 79 1 and regarded subpostmasters as, at best, an expendable 2 cash resource. 3 What does all this mean? It remains the case that 4 perhaps 80 per cent of the wrongfully convicted of the 5 Post Office's victims have not come forward and there 6 will be hundreds more of subpostmasters, mistresses, 7 managers and staff, whose lives have been blighted by 8 the threats of criminal actions, civil actions and 9 employment issues whose cases remain untouched. 10 This scandal cannot be over until every Post Office 11 victim is identified, every Post Office victim 12 vindicated and every Post Office victim fully and 13 properly compensated. 14 As to compensation, it needs to be paid and paid 15 now. To those of you who are watching and who are 16 thinking of coming forward, we urge you to do so. Seek 17 assistance with overturning your conviction, unpicking 18 your bankruptcy or IVA and access the compensation to 19 which you are entitled. We suggest that you have 20 nothing to fear any more from the Post Office. They 21 have been discredited, they have been beaten, and they 22 cannot hurt you any more. 23 Two weeks ago, we asked of Mr Patterson, the UK and 24 European Director of Fujitsu, whether Fujitsu will 25 commit to compensation of subpostmasters and he agreed 80 1 that the establishment of a fund to support 2 subpostmasters and their families in future education 3 and entrepreneurial endeavours would be a good idea. 4 We asked that question openly, on record, under the 5 public gaze, as our clients have learnt that no one in 6 this sorry saga can be trusted, so we must get 7 commitments on the record. 8 Now, given that Fujitsu, it appears, has only just 9 woken up to its own responsibility to subpostmasters, 10 the working out of the details of such a scheme will 11 take time, but we ask Fujitsu to turn this good idea 12 into a good reality. We need to acknowledge the 13 importance of the Inquiry, and our independent press 14 and, indeed, the general public in continuing to hold 15 the Post Office, Fujitsu and the Government to account. 16 Marion Holmes told me last week that, unless this 17 tragedy is kept in the public eye, it would die again, 18 as it appeared to have done before her husband's 19 conviction was overturned. 20 Lastly, sir, our brave and remarkable clients would 21 wish to thank you, sir, and the excellent Inquiry Team 22 for their invaluable work in this Inquiry. Phase 5 will 23 draw back the corporate veil yet further and reveal 24 greater details of the scandal and the extent of the 25 cover-up. 81 1 Sir, as ever, we look forward to assisting the 2 Inquiry in that phase. 3 Sir, I don't know whether I achieved the accolade of 4 excellence regarding timing but those are our 5 submissions. 6 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Well, in terms of your prediction of 7 length, certainly, Mr Stein: a model, if I may say so. 8 Thank you very much for your submissions. 9 MR STEIN: Sir. 10 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: So next is Ms Watt, I gather, Mr Beer? 11 MR BEER: Yes, that's right, sir. 12 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Can I ask her whether she would like to 13 go now or whether she would like a few minutes' break? 14 MS WATT: Sir, I'm in your hands, if it suits you to have 15 a few minutes -- 16 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: I'm sorry, you're going to have to repeat 17 that. I didn't catch it. 18 MS WATT: Can you hear me now? 19 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Only just. 20 MS WATT: How about that? Oh, I think that's me now. 21 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, definitely now. 22 MS WATT: Thank you. I'm in your hands, sir, whichever 23 would suit. It may be a few minutes would suit but I am 24 happy to go. 25 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Well, fine. All I'd say is that, given 82 1 the exemplary way in which advocates are keeping to time 2 limits, we've got about three-quarters of an hour left 3 in total, so I'm very happy to have a few minutes' break 4 and then we will complete the next two submissions. 5 MS WATT: Thank you, sir. 6 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: So we will start again at 12.30. Fine. 7 (12.23 am) 8 (A short break) 9 (12.30 pm) 10 Closing statement by MS WATT 11 MS WATT: Good afternoon, sir. 12 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Good afternoon. 13 MS WATT: Thank you, sir. 14 The National Federation of SubPostmasters is 15 grateful for the Inquiry's permission to make oral 16 closing submissions on the evidence heard in Phase 4. 17 The NFSP of today once again takes this opportunity 18 to confirm to this most important of public inquiries 19 that it is committed to assisting the Inquiry in any way 20 it can. It has watched carefully the Phase 4 throughout 21 and submitted questions for witnesses for Counsel to the 22 Inquiry throughout. 23 It wants the Inquiry to shine a light where there 24 have been lies, deception and potential criminality and, 25 of course, that is a reference to the actions of the 83 1 Post Office and Fujitsu and not the hundreds of 2 subpostmasters, assistants, Crown Office employees who 3 the Post Office so wrongly, and knowingly wrongly, 4 pursued through the courts with such great vigour. 5 It is no exaggeration to say that the evidence 6 throughout Phase 4, taken either individually or 7 collectively, has been nothing short of extraordinary, 8 but not in a good way: extraordinary in its often 9 deliberate obfuscation. I use that word advisedly: the 10 action of making something obscure, unclear or 11 unintelligible, and several, indeed many, candidates 12 dates for that immediately confirm to mind. 13 Obfuscation, in that never have so many failed to 14 remember so much about what was their daily job, or even 15 their previous jobs, or about their employer, or even 16 who was in their team, or even what their team was 17 called, or who led it, or, crucially, who told them 18 there was nothing wrong with Horizon, or anything at all 19 about those whose lives they had ruined. 20 Apparently, it's just one big collective memory 21 failure: "I don't remember, I can't recall", from one 22 witness after another. Their evidence could be 23 described as a collective "See no evil, hear no evil, 24 speak no evil". Unfortunately, the fourth element of 25 that ancient saying was simply not present anywhere in 84 1 the Post Office: do no evil. 2 Alongside that, ran the refrain "It wasn't me" or 3 "It wasn't my job" or "It was someone else's job but 4 I can't remember who". 5 The colloquial version of the Scots criminal law 6 defence of incrimination sums it up perfectly: It wisnae 7 me, a big boy done it and ran away. 8 Extraordinary in that some -- and some might say 9 a lot -- of what was heard simply defied belief: witness 10 statements as evidence for court proceedings being 11 signed as truthful by witnesses who didn't even write 12 those statements; so-called experts being instructed, 13 without having the requisite expertise or, even if they 14 did, without being given all the relevant information; 15 witnesses who today think that those they investigated 16 and whose convictions were quashed in the criminal 17 appeal courts are actually still guilty. 18 So it was, on the basis of the way these people did 19 their jobs, whether it was on the computer side of 20 things, technical support, software, legal, auditing, 21 investigating and prosecuting, that hundreds were 22 wrongly convicted and had their lives ruined. 23 Over and above those convictions, there are all of 24 those, including the convicted, who paid money to the 25 Post Office for the alleged shortfalls. Again, pursued 85 1 with a level of vigour that is almost indescribable. 2 Where is that money? It must amount to tens of 3 thousands, if not millions of pounds, apparently all in 4 the pocket of the Post Office. Was it funding their 5 bonus or just going into the bottom line of profits? 6 As a result of the way in which many of these 7 witnesses gave their evidence and disclosure failures 8 throughout, it is submitted there must be a concern as 9 to how it is that the Inquiry and you, sir, can get to 10 the bottom of all of this. However, the NFSP has faith 11 in the clear, dogged and forensic way in which the 12 Inquiry is working and is determined to assist it 13 wherever it can. 14 While the NFSP was among those lied to on 15 an industrial scale by the Post Office about Horizon for 16 many years, the NFSP of today knows that its commitment 17 to engagement in the forthcoming Phase 5 will shine 18 a light of all of those involved in the response to the 19 scandal as it emerged. It stands ready to acknowledge 20 and accept where the organisation of yesterday failed. 21 It welcomes the opportunity to deal with that alongside 22 those of others involved, including the courts, unions 23 and representative bodies and other organisational 24 bodies. 25 The NFSP of today is committed to working with 86 1 others and campaigning on the speeding up of the 2 quashing of criminal convictions, compensation, the 3 Horizon Shortfall Scheme, while also trying to ensure 4 that Post Office branches up and down the land are 5 supported by the public and not boycotted due to the 6 damage that has been done to the words "Post Office" as 7 a result of this scandal. 8 Whatever some have said about the past, the one 9 thing the NFSP of today can say loud and clear is that 10 it is prepared, wherever and whenever necessary, to 11 publicly criticise the Post Office and it does so here 12 today, loud and clear. 13 In terms of disclosure, it's submitted that Phase 4 14 has highlighted, and indeed the Inquiry has been plagued 15 by, the Post Office's disclosure failures. There's the 16 original failure to fully and properly comply with their 17 disclosure obligations under earlier Rule 9 requests, 18 and the ongoing failure, for whatever reasons, to 19 provide documents which are relevant not only to 20 forthcoming phases but which may have been relevant to 21 this and previous phases. 22 It appears from the Phase 4 evidence that there is 23 a culture within the Post Office and those who work with 24 them that understanding and ensuring that proper 25 disclosure has occurred is always someone else's 87 1 responsibility, and then to blame others when it has not 2 occurred. 3 Investigators, including the Head of Security, blame 4 the Criminal Law Team, despite usually being Disclosure 5 Officers themselves, see, for instance, the evidence of 6 Stephen Bradshaw, on 11 January and also Tony Marsh on 7 5 July. The Post Office Criminal Law Team allegedly 8 relied upon the Investigators, their reports and their 9 disclosure schedule, despite having their own duties in 10 relation to disclosure, see, for instance, the evidence 11 of Rob Wilson on the 12 October. 12 The external Legal Team blamed the Post Office's 13 instructions regarding this, see the evidence of Andrew 14 Bolc on 15 December, and expected to be told if there 15 was a problem. 16 All of this, despite the duty to ensure that all 17 disclosable documents were made available to the court, 18 and, as a result of the failures by the Post Office 19 either to obtain all of the relevant and necessary 20 documents, which would, for instance, show transactions 21 or to fully disclose what was known about Horizon, or 22 both of those things, postmasters and others accused of 23 theft, embezzlement, false accounting and other crimes 24 and those representing them didn't stand a chance of 25 proving their innocence. 88 1 The NFSP believes the evidence shows that the Post 2 Office and those instructed by them to pursue action 3 against Horizon users failed to provide full disclosure 4 to those subject to investigations and court actions. 5 They've failed to provide full disclosure to those they 6 investigated, especially if they were not represented, 7 see the evidence of Tony Marsh on 5 July and more 8 recently Robert Daily on 23 January. 9 The NFSP considers that this evidence shows the Post 10 Office has a past and ongoing issue with disclosure. In 11 respect of how they investigated and prosecuted 12 subpostmasters and others, there was the failure to 13 routinely recover ARQ data due to the annual limit 14 imposed contractually, beyond which the Post Office 15 would have to have made payment to Fujitsu, see, for 16 instance, the evidence of Natasha Bernard on 17 10 November, Debbie Stapel on 14 November, Tony Utting 18 on 17 November and Mike Wilcox on 7 December, and that 19 was despite the knowledge that this vitally important 20 data, if disclosed, would allow a cross-check with the 21 transactions the postmaster said had taken place. 22 The NFSP submits that it is frankly unacceptable 23 that the Post Office's failures in disclosure have 24 significantly and repeatedly delayed the hearing of key 25 witnesses, such as Gareth Jenkins, and have allowed 89 1 others witnesses to claim that policies and procedures 2 were in place that were not available to the Inquiry for 3 us to see. 4 Given that this Inquiry, with its statutory powers, 5 threat of sanctions and public scrutiny, has struggled 6 to get the Post Office to comply with disclosure 7 obligations, the NFSP is concerned that, once this 8 Inquiry has concluded, the Post Office will continue to 9 fail to provide proper disclosure to those undergoing 10 investigations or in other proceedings. 11 The NFSP is therefore concerned that this cultural 12 attitude within the Post Office will prevail and will 13 continue to adversely affect NFSP members, other 14 postmasters, Crown Office employees, managers and 15 assistants in the future and, without the ongoing 16 scrutiny of a public Inquiry, there will be no person or 17 organisation with enough power or resources to hold the 18 Post Office to account on a daily and ongoing basis. 19 This is the experience of the NFSP today in its 20 dealings with the Post Office, and it notes the Inquiry 21 may address this in Phase 7 when considering 22 recommendations about the future of the Post Office. 23 Looking at what we describe as incompetence, 24 entrenchment, investigations and prosecutions, it is the 25 submission of the NFSP that the level of decades of 90 1 significant and continuing failures could only occur in 2 an environment where there is widespread incompetence, 3 potentially deliberately bought about by having the 4 wrong people in the wrong jobs, as was seen in much of 5 the evidence here. 6 Entrenchment, and possibly the Inquiry may find, 7 even dishonesty, although the obfuscation referred to 8 earlier is ensuring that, wherever dishonesty occurred, 9 it will be difficult to bring it to light. 10 In relation to entrenchment, the NFSP considers the 11 evidence shows there seems to have been a failure by all 12 of those, externally as well as internally, involved in 13 investigations and prosecutions against Horizon, to 14 consider the immense power that the Post Office held as 15 victim, judge, jury and, effectively, executioner. 16 The Post Office were the ones who gained when 17 Horizon users were ordered to pay back the so-called 18 shortfalls, which were not in fact owed. They were the 19 ones who conducted audits and investigations and they 20 were the ones who prosecuted individuals or made the 21 referral and provided the material to those that did. 22 Instead of always having in mind that this power came 23 with responsibility, it is submitted that the evidence 24 in this phase shows that the Post Office seems to have 25 focused on ensuring the power -- I'm sorry, sir, I just 91 1 lost my place there -- the power they had was retained 2 and unchallengeable, through making examples of those 3 who challenged Horizon to deter others from making 4 allegations. 5 See, for example, the now infamous and often 6 mentioned here Horizon bashing email from Jarnail Singh 7 to Mandy Talbot and others regarding Seema Misra's case 8 on 21 October 2010, that's POL00093686 at page 5; the 9 email from Stephen Dilley to Mandy Talbot, regarding Lee 10 Castleton, dated 5 May 2009, that's POL00070237; the 11 email from Jarnail Singh to David Oliver re current 12 prosecution, POL00141653 at page 2; the Helen Rose 13 report, dated 30 August 2012, that's FUJ00156648 at 14 page 5; and the email from Mandy Talbot to Marie Cockett 15 and others "Re Castleton, Marine Drive", dated 16 9 November 2006, POL00113909 at page 5. 17 Also suppressing knowledge of issues within Horizon, 18 including disclosure failures, for example the Helen 19 Rose report on Lepton SPSO; putting the onus on those 20 accused of having shortfalls to identify errors and then 21 removing their ability to substantiate or investigate 22 their concerns by limiting the data available to them or 23 locking them out of their branch; and circumventing 24 obligations and duties that would expose knowledge of 25 bugs, errors and defects. 92 1 The NFSP has found it extraordinary that, amongst 2 the people involved in action against Horizon users, 3 there seem to be a refusal to consider the Horizon 4 users' point of view or evidence pointing away from 5 culpability. This is demonstrated through suspicion 6 without proof, see the evidence of Elaine Cottam on 7 7 November, at pages 36 to 37 of the transcript, the 8 fact that postmasters were suspended immediately upon 9 audit, even if they had been asking for help and had 10 requested the audit, and the refusal to disclose 11 relevant material to the defence as discussed 12 previously. 13 In addition, it is concerning that Andrew Bolc 14 dismissed the obtaining of ARQ data and asking Gareth 15 Jenkins to discount a possible explanation for losses, 16 rather than seeking to pursue a reasonable line of 17 inquiry and investigating a potential explanation, see 18 the email from Andrew Bolc to Gareth Jenkins "Re Sefton 19 and Nield", dated 3 December 2012 at page 2, that's 20 POL00089394. 21 The NFSP has found it shocking to learn that 22 Investigators received a bonus for individual 23 performance and their performance objectives included 24 a target for recovery of funds, which the NFSP considers 25 must have been from the postmasters and others who were 93 1 being investigated for alleged Horizon shortfalls. 2 Investigators were tasked with looking into all of 3 the evidence supporting and against the existence of the 4 shortfall, and the reason for that shortfall, and 5 providing the information uncovered in their 6 investigations to those pursuing actions against Horizon 7 users. Yet they had a vested interest in concluding 8 that the shortfall existed and in concluding that the 9 shortfall was the Horizon user's fault, and therefore 10 recoverable. 11 It is, therefore, perhaps not entirely surprising 12 that Investigators, such as Mr Daily, for instance, 13 decided only to request ARQ data where he thought it 14 would support the prosecution case. 15 The NFSP submits that the evidence in Phase 4 shows 16 the words "investigations", "audits" and "prosecutions" 17 are misnomers. All of these, properly done, should be 18 aimed the finding the truth and recovering all available 19 evidence. Here, the evidence that supported the Post 20 Office's ability to prosecute and recover funds came 21 from Horizon and, effectively, barriers were in place 22 which prevented the recovery of evidence that could 23 support those whose balances were showing shortfalls or 24 who were accused of wrongdoing. 25 It is submitted that the evidence has shown 94 1 an assumption of criminality or guilt pervaded 2 investigated each process. The NFSP believes the 3 evidence shows that the culture of the Post Office's 4 Auditors, Investigators and Prosecutors, of assuming 5 Horizon guilt, was so entrenched, so pervasive, that 6 some of those involved in prosecutions which have 7 subsequently been overturned believe the Horizon users 8 were still guilty today. That was the evidence of 9 Raymond Grant on 25 January. 10 It's submitted that the entrenchment of individuals 11 involved in actions against Horizon users and a refusal 12 to consider the other side is also demonstrated in the 13 language they used, for example: Jarnail Singh's email, 14 "We were able to destroy the criminal standard of 15 proof", interview transcripts with assertions made to 16 the postmaster "You're lying to us again and again and 17 you have told me a pack of lies". 18 There was also the shocking statement that 19 "Postmasters were getting support for the contention 20 that Horizon is the cause of all evil and that they were 21 the perfect postmasters", which came from Mandy Talbot 22 in an email to Michele Graves "re Eleanor Dixon" dated 23 6 January 2010, that's POL00053778 at page 5. The NFSP 24 believes this is also demonstrated through the language 25 used within files and policies that assume guilt or are 95 1 otherwise detrimental, such as policies having a section 2 on prosecuting criminals, the compiling of offender 3 reports and, of course, the despicable racist 4 identification codes document. 5 Although such language was often dismissed by those 6 responsible for it as "clumsy", the purported position 7 that this did not reflect the mindset of the 8 organisation or those using the language must, in the 9 NFSP's you, be disingenuous at the least. Indeed, it is 10 noted that the language about Horizon bashing was not 11 uncommon at every level. 12 The NFSP believes that the consistent use of 13 language assuming guilt and dismissing the Horizon 14 user's concerns reflects an institutional mindset that 15 is detrimental to Horizon users. 16 It is submitted that there seems to be a pattern of 17 the Post Office valuing business considerations and the 18 ability to recover funds, whether or not actually owed 19 to them, over the truth, their duties to the court and 20 to justice. 21 The NFSP was concerned to hear that business 22 considerations played a role in the decision whether or 23 not to prosecute an individual and that their external 24 solicitors do not remember challenging this when it was 25 identified. 96 1 The NFSP has been shocked by the displays of 2 incompetence by some of those giving evidence to the 3 Inquiry. In particular, the evidence of Elaine Cottam 4 and Jarnail Singh call into question the Post Office's 5 and their lawyers' understanding of basic concepts, such 6 as how to answer questions in a witness statement and 7 whether information that is not written down is 8 disclosable. 9 The NFSP was also appalled to hear the evidence of 10 Helen Rose regarding her audit report and witness 11 statements concerning Lee Castleton. It is unacceptable 12 that Ms Rose told the court, on the basis of a blank 13 template, that a number of failures applied in this 14 matter, such as the safe being left open, when this was 15 not the case. It is unacceptable that she went on to 16 try and undermine Mr Castleton's character by telling 17 the court he smelt of alcohol when this was not recorded 18 within the contemporaneous documentation and was not 19 true. It is also unacceptable that, when asked by the 20 Inquiry why she included these within her witness 21 statement to the court, she just said she couldn't 22 remember why. 23 The NFSP submits that this demonstrates 24 a fundamental disregard for ensuring that she was 25 fulfilling her duty to the court and begs the question 97 1 whether there was anything that those involved in 2 actions against Horizon users weren't willing to do in 3 order to make an example of those challenging Horizon 4 and ensure that prosecutions and the recovery of funds 5 could continue. 6 It seemed that Ms Rose was unapologetic for her 7 significant part in a case which had life altering 8 consequences. 9 This also appeared to be the case for Mr Singh, who, 10 despite being advised that Gareth Jenkins' role as 11 an expert witness had been discredited and that there 12 were instances where the Post Office had breached their 13 disclosure obligations, provided a quotation to the Post 14 Office's Public Affairs Manager, that it is submitted he 15 knew must be untrue, to allow the Post Office to defend 16 Horizon to the public. 17 He seemed equally unapologetic for his part in his 18 role as Head of Criminal Law, or whatever the title may 19 have been: Mr Singh seemed not to be able to remember. 20 Instead, he compared himself as aggrieved, in the same 21 way as victims of Horizon were, because he was in 22 a position to do something and he didn't. His evidence 23 and that of Elaine Cottam was shocking in its 24 incoherence and, whether deliberate or not, adds to the 25 obfuscation created by so much of the witness evidence. 98 1 Touching on legal obligations, another key concern 2 for the NFSP that has emerged from Phase 4 is that those 3 involved in progressing investigations, prosecutions and 4 other processes within and on behalf of the Post Office 5 appear to have gone beyond failing to comply with their 6 legal obligations by omission. 7 The NFSP submits that one example of this was 8 an apparent attempt to minimise or destroy written 9 information about issues with Horizon. This seemed to 10 have been based on an idea that, if information was not 11 written down, it did not have to be disclosed. 12 The NFSP is appalled to hear that not only were 13 those who were dealing with taking action against 14 Horizon users told to reduce electronic correspondence 15 regarding Horizon issues, for instance the evidence of 16 the witness John Scott, and not to take minutes in 17 relevant meetings, but that people were also told that 18 typed minutes should be scrapped and that it was implied 19 that minutes should be shredded. 20 The NFSP considers that the Post Office must explain 21 to the Inquiry and the victims of Horizon why they did 22 not change practices in the light of the advice provided 23 by Simon Clarke on 2 August 2013, see advice on 24 disclosure and the duty to record and retain material by 25 Simon Clarke, dated 2 August 2013, that's POL00006799. 99 1 It's also submitted that the apparent attempt to 2 avoid disclosure of weaknesses in cases against Horizon 3 can be seen in the difference between an offender report 4 and a discipline report. For instance, significant 5 failures in accurate, supervision, procedures and 6 product integrity had to be kept in the offender report, 7 which was then kept confidential as it was considered to 8 be subject to legal privilege. 9 However, those failures were explicitly not 10 contained within the discipline report, which was 11 disclosed to the person being investigated and, 12 therefore, could have an impact on the ability to 13 prosecute and the reputation or security of the Post 14 Office. 15 The NFSP was shocked to hear the evidence of Elaine 16 Cottam and Stephen Bradshaw that witness statements 17 signed by them and submitted as evidence in court 18 proceedings were, in fact, drafted by others and were 19 not their words. 20 Finally, in relation to legal duties, the NFSP was 21 shocked to hear that there was quite a common practice 22 by the Criminal Law Team that there would be a charge of 23 theft and then also charges of false accounting, even 24 when the Post Office's own Investigators concluded that 25 there was no evidence of theft in relation to 100 1 a shortfall. There was evidence from David Pardoe on 2 that, Diane Matthews and others. 3 It is the NFSP's understanding that a prosecutor 4 cannot and should not raise a charge where there is not 5 sufficient evidence to support that charge. It is 6 submitted that there is evidence before the Inquiry 7 which appears to show that the threat of a conviction of 8 theft was used as a threat to encourage those subject to 9 prosecutions to make a guilty plea to the alternative 10 charge of false accounting. 11 In relation to criminal proceedings in Scotland, the 12 NFSP notes that, while it was for the Procurator Fiscal 13 to take the decision on criminal proceedings, they were 14 wholly reliant on the Post Office as a reporter and 15 a Specialist Reporting Agency to provide all relevant 16 evidence and to follow the guidance and training given 17 to them by the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal 18 Service. 19 The continuation of legal proceedings despite known 20 issues. 21 Therefore, it seems clear to the NFSP, on the 22 evidence heard, that the attitude of the Post Office and 23 those instructed by them in relation to action against 24 Horizon users appears to have been to continue with 25 legal proceedings despite known issues with Horizon. 101 1 The NFSP submits that it is clear through the Helen Rose 2 report, the associated correspondence with this and 3 Simon Clarke's related advice, that the Post Office were 4 aware that there were concerns that the data relied upon 5 in prosecutions would not be giving a true picture, and 6 it appears from the evidence that the Post Office were 7 aware Gareth Jenkins knew of Horizon issues at the time. 8 It seems to the NFSP that, at least partially as 9 a result of the likely impact of an investigation on the 10 ability of the Post Office to prosecute postmasters and 11 others, the proposed independent review by an external 12 organisation, such as Ernst & Young, did not occur. 13 Instead, the Rod Ismay report, a supposedly independent 14 report but which ended up looking only at evidence 15 supporting the robustness of Horizon, was commissioned, 16 see the evidence of Rod Ismay on 11 May. 17 On the basis of this, Mr Wilson's position that the 18 Post Office should "grit its teeth and get on with it 19 shows" that the Post Office prioritised the ability to 20 be able to prosecute above investigating known concerns. 21 In addition, the NFSP submits that it was 22 unacceptable that those within the Post Office, who by 23 then knew of Horizon integrity issues, did not have 24 discussions about pausing prosecutions due to the fear 25 this would immediately cast doubt on prosecutions that 102 1 had been completed before, see the evidence of David 2 Pardoe on 29 November. 3 It seems perverse to the NFSP that a prosecutor 4 would not investigate the robustness of evidence it 5 relied upon when it was aware of issues, simply in order 6 to keep prosecuting and to ensure that previous possibly 7 erroneous prosecutions were not reviewed or called into 8 question. 9 In closing, sir, the NFSP believes that, as a result 10 of the action and failures of the Post Office in 11 effectively creating the Horizon scandal, the Post 12 Office have tarnished this once most trusted of brands. 13 The NFSP is therefore concerned about the impact of this 14 on its members and other postmasters who have invested 15 in this Network and also the relationship it must have 16 with the Post Office to protect their members' 17 investment. 18 The NFSP considers the evidence so far demonstrates 19 a pervading culture of cover-up, incompetence, knowingly 20 doing wrong in relation to prosecutions and 21 an entrenchment of placing corporate considerations 22 above legal obligations and human decency. 23 The NFSP is concerned about how postmasters, their 24 assistants and staff, Crown Office employees and their 25 respective representative bodies are meant to have trust 103 1 in their ongoing relationship with a huge and powerful 2 organisation which has not, so far, on the evidence 3 demonstrated the fundamental cultural and moral change 4 which is necessary as a result of the miscarriages of 5 justice. 6 In that regard, the NFSP looks forward to the 7 Inquiry's recommendations for the future in Phase 7. 8 I believe that concludes my submissions, just within 9 30 minutes, sir. 10 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Well, you too are to be warmly 11 congratulated on the quality of your submissions and 12 your predictive powers. 13 So that leaves Mr Munro. 14 MR MUNRO: Thank you, sir. I wonder if I can be heard, sir? 15 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: It's not very loud at the moment it needs 16 to be amplified. 17 MR MUNRO: Thank you, sir. 18 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: There we go. 19 Closing statement by MR MUNRO 20 MR MUNRO: Thank you. 21 Sir, thus far, there have only been a handful of 22 successful appeals against Horizon convictions in 23 Scotland. Our client, Susan Sinclair, was the first to 24 see her conviction overturned. Following a POL 25 investigation and report, Ms Sinclair was prosecuted by 104 1 the Scottish Public Prosecutor, COPFS, on a charge of 2 common law embezzlement in 2003. She was found guilty 3 after trial in 2004. It appears, on the evidence that 4 this Inquiry has heard, that COPFS only became 5 institutionally aware of material concerns about the 6 reliability of Horizon evidence in 2013 but it took 7 a far-reaching investigation by the Scottish Criminal 8 Cases Review Commission, the SCCRC, before Ms Sinclair's 9 case was referred to the High Court of Justiciary in 10 November 2002. Her appeal was finally allowed on 11 29 September last year. 12 Ms Sinclair sought and was granted Core Participant 13 status on 17 November 2023, long after this Inquiry and, 14 indeed, this phase began. 15 In light of that, those who have spoken powerfully 16 before me are in a far better position to make 17 submissions on the totality of the Phase 4 evidence, 18 insofar as it concerns audits and investigations, 19 preparation of cases for prosecution, failures in 20 disclosure on the part of POL. Likewise, I recognise 21 that this Inquiry has heard of the harrowing experiences 22 of countless SPMs, whose lives were ruined by false 23 accusations and the events which followed. 24 I do not seek to add anything to what others have 25 already forcefully said. My focus, in the brief time 105 1 I have available, sir, will be instead on matters 2 specific to Ms Sinclair's experience and to those of 3 Scottish subpostmasters in general, and I propose to 4 address four questions: 5 Firstly, did the involvement of COPFS, the 6 independent public prosecutor, afford greater protection 7 to those facing allegations and, if not, why not? 8 Secondly, did POL understand its duties as 9 a Specialist Reporting Agency; did it discharge them, 10 particularly in relation to revelation? 11 Thirdly, did COPFS comply with its duty of 12 continuing disclosure? 13 Fourthly, to what extent did the corroboration 14 requirement, that we have in Scottish Criminal Law, act 15 as a safeguard against wrongful conviction? 16 So if I may turn to the first to the first of those 17 questions: did the involvement of COPFS afford greater 18 protection to those facing allegations? 19 As the Inquiry will be aware, in Scotland 20 prosecutions are generally the responsibility of the 21 Crown, COPFS. Private prosecutions are vanishingly 22 uncommon. POL has never had any power to prosecute in 23 the Scottish courts, and it is instead a Specialist 24 Reporting Agency, taking on a role broadly analogous to 25 that of the police. 106 1 Did, then, the involvement of the Public Prosecutor 2 make any practical difference? I respectfully suggest 3 that, on the face of it, the answer to that question is 4 no. The failure of POL to reveal issues with Horizon 5 meant, at least until 2013, that cases were prosecuted 6 on the same evidential understanding as elsewhere. 7 COPFS relied on investigation reports in making 8 prosecutorial decisions. We heard that from the 9 evidence of David Teale, INQ00001120 at page 7. 10 There has been no indication, as I understand it, on 11 the evidence that was led before the Inquiry, of POL 12 being actively interrogated it by COPFS on the basis for 13 prosecutions or being directed to provide further 14 evidence. 15 Now, one may have hoped that the involvement of 16 a single independent prosecutor would have highlighted 17 similar concerns across multiple cases but it would 18 appear that cases were, in fact, dealt with in local 19 offices without any real understanding of similar cases 20 existing elsewhere, again, David Teale, same reference, 21 at page 8. 22 Had all such cases been dealt with by a single team, 23 had there been some recognition of parallels between 24 individual cases, then it may have been that issues 25 could have been highlighted at an earlier stage but that 107 1 did not happen. 2 The second question I posed: did POL understand its 3 duties as a Specialist Reporting Agency and did it 4 discharge them? 5 COPFS publishes on its website a list of Specialist 6 Reporting Agencies. There are well over 100, including 7 bodies such as HMRC, local authorities, health boards 8 and other public bodies. POL appears to be the only one 9 which is a commercial enterprise. It's also unusual in 10 that it had a financial interest in the cases it 11 reported, and I invite the Inquiry to consider the 12 appropriateness of that when reaching conclusions about 13 the conduct of POL generally. 14 COPFS has produced various documents relating to the 15 standards expected from Specialist Reporting Agencies. 16 The evidence before the Inquiry has not yet established 17 the extent to which those standards were understood by 18 POL, far less applied. 19 It's worth noting, though, the position regarding 20 obligations of revelation and disclosure in Scottish 21 criminal law. Prior to the commencement of the Criminal 22 Justice and Licensing Scotland Act 2010, disclosure in 23 criminal proceedings was governed by the common law. 24 The legislation that now applies in Sections 117 and 25 119, referring to summary and solemn cases respectively, 108 1 now provides that, as soon as practicable, after first 2 appearance in court, the investigating agency, in this 3 case POL, must provide the prosecutor with details of 4 all the information that may be relevant to the case for 5 or against the accused that the agency is aware of, that 6 was obtained, whether by the agency or otherwise, in the 7 course of investigating the matter. 8 That duty of revelation plainly encompasses 9 information which would be relevant to an assessment of 10 the reliability of a computer system such as Horizon. 11 Yet it is plain that no such information was provided to 12 COPFS, certainly not at the outset. The first 13 indications of concern came, it would appear, in 2013. 14 At that time, POL instructed external solicitors in 15 Scotland for the first time and sought to research COPFS 16 about ongoing cases. It was only in October 2015 that 17 POL finally intimated to COPFS that Horizon prosecutions 18 were no longer considered to be sustainable. 19 I refer to the statement of Kenneth Donnelly, the 20 Deputy Crown Agent, a very senior position in Crown 21 Office, which is WITN10510100 at paragraphs 43 to 53. 22 I then ask: did COPFS comply with its duty of 23 continuing disclosure? 24 Now, plainly, COPFS could not disclose to the 25 defence information that it was unaware of. POL's 109 1 revelation of the Horizon problems came 10 years too 2 late, so far as Ms Sinclair's prosecution was concerned. 3 But COPFS's duty did not end at the point of conviction. 4 Section 137 of the 2010 Act provides that: 5 "Where the prosecutor becomes aware of relevant 6 information after conviction, that information must be 7 disclosed to the convicted person as soon as 8 practicable." 9 This duty was acknowledged by Mr Donnelly at 10 paragraphs 7 to 12 of this witness statement, and by 11 David Teale in his oral evidence, that's INQ00001120 at 12 page 6, but wasn't further addressed. 13 COPFS appears to accept that it knew of concerns 14 about the reliability of Horizon in 2013, yet no attempt 15 appears to have been made to consider the implications 16 for convicted persons, such as Mrs Sinclair, and the 17 Crown's duties under Section 137. In his evidence, 18 David Teale said that he was not asked to report back on 19 any live cases to the Crown's Head Office. That's at 20 page 10 of the same reference given. 21 As it was, it took a further ten years from that 22 point of 2013, and the involvement and the sterling work 23 of the SCCRC before any Scottish convictions were 24 finally overturned. 25 The final question I would invite the Inquiry to 110 1 consider is: to what extent did the corroboration 2 requirement act as a safeguard against wrongful 3 conviction? 4 In the Scottish system, nobody can be convicted of 5 a crime based on a single source of evidence alone. 6 Where there is a strong primary source of evidence, 7 however, all that is required is something that provides 8 an independent check, evidence that is at least capable 9 of supporting that primary source. 10 Corroboration is often presented as a significant 11 safeguard for accused people and yet here it appeared 12 that the assumption that evidence from a computer system 13 was inherently reliable meant that very little was then 14 thought to be required to corroborate it and, in 15 particular, to corroborate the fact that a crime had 16 been committed, that money had disappeared. 17 In the case of William Quarm, which the Inquiry 18 considered, corroboration apparently came from 19 admissions that he made when confronted by 20 Investigators, David Teale's evidence, INQ00001120 at 21 page 16. 22 In the case of my client, Ms Sinclair, the court 23 relied on, essentially, her unwillingness to accept that 24 any money had gone missing, her failure to make a report 25 to the authorities, and so forth, and we see that from 111 1 the report from the trial judge, which is at 2 COPF0000052, page 12. 3 It would appear that the existence of what might be 4 termed "technical corroboration" was seen as being good 5 enough in the face of this inherent acceptance of the 6 reliability of a computer system and that, as a result, 7 there was no need for COPFS to look any further. 8 So in conclusion, these are my submission matters 9 which are critical for those affected in Scotland, but 10 they have a wider impact: those who think, for instance, 11 that the mere removal of POL's power to prosecute in 12 England and Wales would have prevented this scandal need 13 any look at our experience north of the border to see 14 the fallacy in that belief. 15 To learn lessons for the future, we have to properly 16 understand what happened in the past. Evidence on the 17 issues which I have raised has been limited, I have to 18 recognise, and I would invite the Inquiry to consider 19 a closer examination of at least some of these issues in 20 the phases which follow. 21 I'm obliged. 22 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: And I'm obliged to you, Mr Munro, for 23 reminding me of some very important features which have 24 emerged as a consequence of looking at Scotland as well 25 as England and Wales. 112 1 So, I think, Mr Beer, that concludes those who wish 2 to make oral submissions; is that correct? 3 MR BEER: It is correct, sir, yes. 4 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Well, all that is going to happen now, 5 then, is that I propose to make a short statement, and 6 then adjourn the Inquiry. 7 MR BEER: Sir, thank you, yes. 8 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: So unless you have any business, Mr Beer, 9 I will make my statement and adjourn the Inquiry. 10 MR BEER: Thank you, sir. 11 Closing statement from SIR WYN WILLIAMS 12 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Phases 1 to 4 of the Inquiry are now 13 substantially complete. I use the word "substantially" 14 quite deliberately. Oral evidence from a small number 15 of witnesses, including Mr Gareth Jenkins, is yet to be 16 heard and there remains a possibility that the 17 continuing disclosure of documents to the Inquiry will 18 reveal issues related to Phases 2, 3 and 4 which will 19 require the Inquiry to make public additional documents 20 or even adduce further oral evidence. 21 Now, however, it is time to look forward and for me 22 to lay out how and when I propose to deal with the 23 remaining phases of the Inquiry. 24 For some time now, I have been considering the 25 possibility that Phases 5 and 6 should be run together 113 1 as one phase. Having consulted with my legal and 2 Secretariat teams, I have decided that this is the way 3 forward. Those phases are concerned with so many issues 4 which overlap, that to consider them separately would be 5 artificial and probably excessively time consuming. 6 There is, however, one topic within Phase 5 which 7 I do not consider can be appraised finally for some time 8 yet. That is the topic of the three compensation 9 schemes currently in being. I must reach conclusions 10 about whether these schemes are operating and/or have 11 operated fairly, and whether they have fulfilled their 12 stated aim of providing full and fair compensation 13 promptly to all those who are eligible to receive it. 14 I have decided that, to do justice to this topic, it 15 will be heard as part of Phase 7. This will allow me to 16 look at as full a picture as possible relating to 17 compensation issues before I report to the Minister. 18 However, I am conscious that this topic attracts 19 widespread attention for obvious and justified reasons. 20 It is now virtually six months since I delivered 21 an interim report relating to compensation issues to the 22 Minister. I am alive to the possibility that it may be 23 necessary to hold a further, discrete compensation 24 hearing before the beginning of Phase 7. 25 I will keep that under review during the course of 114 1 the coming weeks. 2 Phases 5 and 6 will begin on Tuesday, 9 April 2024 3 and I intend that they will end by Wednesday, 31 July 4 2024. There will be a break of one week during the week 5 of Monday, 27 May. Save during that break, the Inquiry 6 will sit four days per week as has been its practice to 7 date. A written timetable will be published on the 8 Inquiry website in due course. 9 Following consultation with my teams, I considered 10 whether it would be possible to start Phases 5 and 6 11 earlier than 9 April 2024. I have concluded that this 12 is not possible for the following principal reasons: 13 First, it is my current intention to adduce oral 14 evidence from at least 68 witnesses in these phases. 15 A great deal of preparatory work is and will be 16 necessary if that number of witnesses is to be 17 accommodated between 9 April and 31 July. A list of 18 those 68 witnesses will be provided when this statement 19 is published, as it will be later today. 20 Second, if Phases 5 and 6 were to be heard 21 separately, there would need to be breaks before Phase 5 22 began and then before the start of Phase 6. Those 23 breaks, together with the periods necessary for oral 24 hearings, would probably mean that Phases 5 and 6 would 25 not be completed by 31 July, thereby prolonging the life 115 1 of this Inquiry. 2 Accordingly, the break before the start of Phases 5 3 and 6 will help to assist the process of completing the 4 evidence gathering as quickly as is reasonably 5 practicable. 6 Third, a substantial break now will maximise the 7 chance that Post Office, UKGI and any other document 8 providers, with whom the Inquiry has expressed concern, 9 will be able to comply with their disclosure obligations 10 in a timely way. 11 Fourth, I have now heard a great deal of evidence 12 and I have heard a number of submissions on that 13 evidence from representatives of Core Participants. 14 I am satisfied that having the opportunity to take stock 15 at this stage and perhaps formulate some preliminary 16 views will minimise the time I will need to spend 17 writing my report following the completion of evidence 18 gathering. 19 Assuming that Phases 5 and 6 are complete by 31 July 20 2024, Phase 7 will commence on Tuesday, 3 September 21 2024. My current estimate is that this phase will be 22 completed by the end of September 2024 but I make it 23 clear that this is a provisional view. 24 Finally, my report will follow as soon as is 25 reasonably practicable, following the completion of the 116 1 evidence gathering. As I have said, that statement will 2 be published later this afternoon with a list of the 3 68 persons who will be called to give evidence in 4 Phases 5 and 6. 5 Experience over very many years has taught me that 6 when judges or Chairs of inquiries try to make jokes, it 7 usually falls very flat. I will, however, end this 8 session by sharing with you my wry amusement at the 9 efforts of my English brethren and sisters to pronounce 10 the name of Mr Hughie Thomas' branch in Anglesey. 11 Various permutations have been tried. As a South 12 Walian, I would call it Gaerwen. 13 Thank you all very much and I'll see you in April, 14 if not before. 15 MR BEER: Thank you, sir. 16 (1.23 pm) 17 (The hearing adjourned until 10.00 am on 9 April 2024) 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 117 I N D E X Further evidence read into the record by ......1 MR BEER Closing statement by MR MOLONEY ...............6 Closing statement by MR STEIN ................52 Closing statement by MS WATT .................83 Closing statement by MR MUNRO ...............104 Closing statement from SIR WYN WILLIAMS .....113 118