

Horizon Spot Review 5 – Response

Centrally Input Transactions

1. Summary

As a result of a subpostmaster assertion that on Tuesday 19th August, 2008 he observed an individual based in the basement of the Fujitsu office in Bracknell who demonstrated an ability to pass transactions directly into the Horizon system. Second Sight has raised a number of specific questions of enquiry that require a statement response against each.

2. Questions & Responses

Question 1:

What capabilities did the POL Bracknell team have? (As far as TC or Rem Out type transactions or Journal adjustments are concerned).

Response:

The POL Bracknell Team have no access to the live system so can conduct none of these transactions.

Question 2:

What were the PHYSICAL or LOGICAL controls over their use of the systems available to them?

Response:

There is no Physical or Logical connection to the live system from the areas in Bracknell being discussed/ investigated. Detailed documentation has been supplied of the testing processes and procedures recently audited and the design documents to support this position.

Question 3:

What audit trail is available to show the extent that they posted TC or Rem Out type transactions, or Journal adjustments?

Response:

When any transactions are posted to the database they are contained in the audit trail. As both the original Horizon and replacement HNGx test systems were available to the test teams in that period the test area and the test data is often refreshed and changed it would not be possible to identify any transactions from this period in the test system. Specifically we do not keep audits of test systems, only the Live system. As stated in response to question 1, the teams in the area of Bracknell concerned would have no access to the live system.

Question 4:

Can we reply of the COMPLETENESS of the audit trail? i.e. does it record all transactions or just transactions meeting certain criteria? Is it protected from user manipulation?

Response:

The detailed answer to this is included in two papers *Horizon Data Integrity* and *Horizon Online Data Integrity for Post Office Ltd* which have been presented as evidence in a number of previous court cases.

Question 5:

What USER ID was used if TC type transactions or journal adjustments were posted?

Response:

On the old Horizon System (which was Live in 2008) and Data introduced to the system in the Data Centre would not be marked with any user ID.

Question 6:

Could the POL Bracknell team log on with either super user or SMPR credentials?

Response:

Not in the live system, see test user policy. See the *Horizon Data Integrity* and *Horizon Online Data Integrity* documents for details.

Question 7:

How would TC, Rem Out or Journal Adjustment type transactions executed by the POL Bracknell team be seen by SPMR of Branches affected by those actions?

Response:

For the PO Bracknell team the SPMR would never see any changes as they are in the test not live systems.

The process described in the Operations manual refers to changes that were made to the old Horizon system in 2004 or 2005 relating to Auto Rems and TCs which were introduced at that time as part of the IMPACT Programme. Auto Rems meant that POL send Horizon a data feed defining the content of Cash pouches and so as soon as the Branch scans in the pouch that value of cash is added into their accounts (and a receipt printed). Before that they had to key in the amount and this caused a number of issues with incorrect amounts being keyed.

However as with TCs the SPMR (or a member of staff) would be responsible for the transaction and it would be recorded against their name.

Prior to this, Error Notices were sent to Branches which were often months after the errors occurred and staff were expected to carry out appropriate transactions at the branch. TCs automated this process and speeded it up. Product & Branch Accounting (P&BA) - recently re-named Finance Service Centre (FSA) - have never had access to adjust client accounts on site through Horizon.