

**From:** "Torstein.O.Godeseth" <[REDACTED]>  
**To:** Mark Underwood1 <[REDACTED]>, "Westbrook, Mark (UK - Manchester)" <[REDACTED]>  
**Cc:** "Gribben, Jonathan" <[REDACTED]>, "pete.newsome" <[REDACTED]>  
**Subject:** RE: Private & Confidential : Subject to Legal Privilege - Audit Logs  
**Date:** Thu, 29 Jun 2017 07:50:38 +0000  
**Importance:** Normal  
**Inline-Images:** image001.png

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Mark,

Apologies for the delay in responding to this request but I felt I needed to check out the position in some detail; below is my understanding of the facts.

As the BRDB is configured it would be possible for the audit of access to the BRDB to be switched off by a DBA with sufficient privilege but it would be necessary to take the Database down and then bring it up again for the configuration change to take effect. It follows that in order for auditing to be switched off and then back on again the database would have to be bounced twice. Given that Oracle allows for auditing to be switched off there is no obvious way to avoid this possibility beyond having processes in place to prevent it happening, as we do.

Prior to the upgrade to the current version of Oracle it would have been possible to switch off the audit and switch it back on again without needing to 'bounce' the database. In this event I would expect the audit trail to include the logoff event for whoever had switched the audit back on again, so I think the situation is, in practice, no different from a scenario previously discussed whereby a user with sufficient privilege could delete records from the audit trail.

I also need to reiterate my view that there is no evidence that anyone has ever actually manipulated any audit records.

Regards etc.

Torstein

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**From:** Mark Underwood1 [mailto:[REDACTED]]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, June 28, 2017 9:06 AM  
**To:** Godeseth, Torstein <[REDACTED]>; Westbrook, Mark (UK - Manchester) <[REDACTED]>  
**Cc:** Gribben, Jonathan <[REDACTED]>; Newsome, Pete <[REDACTED]>  
**Subject:** Private & Confidential : Subject to Legal Privilege - Audit Logs  
**Importance:** High

Hi Torstein,

Have you managed to establish, definitively, whether it is possible to delete / switch off the privileged user audit log without breaking the application?

Many thanks

Mark



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