

From: Jonathan Gribben <[REDACTED] GRO>
To: "Matthew.Lenton([REDACTED] GRO)>
Cc: "pete.newsome([REDACTED] GRO)>, "Dave.Ibbett([REDACTED] GRO)>, Andrew Parsons
[REDACTED] GRO, Lucy Bremner [REDACTED] GRO
Subject: FW: Roll 2 [WBDUK-AC.FID123822914]

Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 11:07:33 +0000

Importance: Normal

Inline-Images: image001.png; image002.png; image003.png; imaged2829d.PNG; image6ef5c4.PNG; image0542d6.PNG

Matthew,

An urgent question has arisen in relation to paragraph 30 of Steve's second statement. In that paragraph Steve states that transactions were only injected into the counter "in the following circumstances while Mr Roll was employed by Fujitsu (emphasis added):-

- 29.1 fixing a Riposte Index at the counter;
- 29.2 removing a historic message that was influencing the balancing process on a replaced counter;
- 29.3 correcting configuration data after a PinPad change;
- 29.4 removing redundant configuration items;
- 29.5 the example given above involving five corrupted bureau transactions; and
- 29.6 removing historic recovery information."

This is based on the content of row 6 in the table below. Steve's statement goes on to say that this only happened on 14 occasions and only one of those involved transaction data. The 14 occasions were: PC0060114 {POL-0234909}, PC0112293 {POL-0283845}, PC0112293 {POL-0283845}, PC0112397 {POL-0283948}, PC0112650 {POL-0284204}, PC0112659 {POL-0284213}, PC0118037 {POL-0289559}, PC0122806 {POL-0293307}, PC0170799 {POL-0341013}, PC0175821 {POL-0345994}, PC0182141 {POL-0352240}, PC0198266 {POL-0368128}, PC0201613 {POL-0371420}, PC0203896 {POL-0373686}. You can ignore the POL numbers.

It appears that the 14 occasions actually span the life of Legacy Horizon, rather than the period during which Roll was employed. Is that right?

Please would you get back to me ASAP?

Kind regards

Jonny

Jonathan Gribben
Managing Associate
Womble Bond Dickinson (UK) LLP

d:
m:
t:
e:

GRO

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From: Matthew.Lenton@GRO [mailto:GRO]
Sent: 25 January 2019 13:02
To: Jonathan Gribben
Cc: SHenderson@GRO; Lucy Bremner; ParkerSP@GRO; Dave.Ibbett@GRO;
pete.newsome@GRO; Gareth Jenkins@GRO; Andrew
Parsons
Subject: RE: Roll 2 [WBDUK-AC.FID27032497]

Jonny,

Please see below an update which we believe completes the response to action 3 as the remaining 16 incidents referred to yesterday have now been analysed.

Additions in red are additional events not present in the data sent to you on 24-Jan-2019. Changes in text are shown with strikethrough.

Matthew Lenton
Post Office Account Document Manager

P&PS, Digital Technology Services

Fujitsu

Lovelace Road, Bracknell, Berkshire, RG12 8SN

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Web: <https://www.fujitsu.com/global/>

From: Lenton, Matthew
Sent: 24 January 2019 17:58
To: 'Jonathan Gribben'@GRO
Cc: 'SHenderson'@GRO; 'Lucy Bremner'@GRO; Parker, Steve@GRO; Ibbett, Dave@GRO; Newsome, Pete@GRO; 'Gareth Jenkins'@GRO; 'Andrew Parsons'@GRO
Subject: RE: Roll 2 [WBDUK-AC.FID27032497]

Jonny,

Please see below, a response is now added for action 3, which we think is mostly complete but will update further. No other changes to the table.

Matthew Lenton
Post Office Account Document Manager

P&PS, Digital Technology Services

Fujitsu

Lovelace Road, Bracknell, Berkshire, RG12 8SN

Phone: GRO

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Web: <https://www.fujitsu.com/global/>

From: Lenton, Matthew

Sent: 24 January 2019 13:31

To: 'Jonathan Gribben'

Cc: [SHenderson](#); GRO; Lucy Bremner GRO; Parker, Steve

GRO; Ibbett, Dave GRO; Newsome, Pete

GRO; Gareth Jenkins GRO; Andrew Parsons GRO

Subject: RE: Roll 2 [WBDUK-AC.FID27032497]

Jonny,

Please see below revised table with responses added for actions 6 and 8.

Actions 3 and 9 are still being worked on, but an update is included in those rows.

Action	Paragraph of Roll 2	Action	Assigned to	Fujitsu
1	8	Keyword search for incidents containing the words "laptop" and/or "luggable" and/or "outreach" etc. <i>[Matthew Lenton] Peak references provided 22-Jan-2019</i>	Fujitsu	Steve / SSC <i>[Matthew Lenton] Completed</i>
2	8	Check what the experts and witnesses say about KEL psteed2847n.	WBD	
3	9	Provide a list of events that give rise to a receipts and payments mismatch Because of the volume of data here (735 incidents) and the need to eyeball each one we're restricted the initial analysis to the 390 calls opened between 1999 and Jan 2002 (inc.). After this the beat rate significantly decreased (only 345 in the subsequent 8 years). This is believed to be due to the version M1 rollout (summer 2001) which appears to have significantly increased the reliability in this area. Analysis	Fujitsu	Steve / SSC <i>[Matthew Lenton] Response provided at left.</i> <i>Updated 25-Jan-2019</i>

Category	Calls	Residue	Comment	Event
Orange Prepay Issue	99	291	Jan 2002. Reference data / software issue. Urgent software fix applied within a week.	Software error
Newly migrated offices (paper to PC)	61	230	Oct 1999 – Nov 2001. Hot spots July – Sep 2000, March 2001. Migration figures accepted inevitably lead to R&P issue. No software fault.	Migration
Erroneous settlement of Transfer Out and Transfer In transactions to Cash (KEL DRowe50K)	39	191	April 2001 - June 2001. Corrected cash accounts provided to Post Office Networks (PON). Counter software fix @ release M1, which rolled out from May 2001.	Software error
'Balancing Error: Receipts and payments do not match, please investigate. The error may be corrected using Reversal Function. WARNING: Continuing may lead to an unbalanced Cash Account" (KEL DRowe1625K)	14	177	March 2001 – July 2001. Reconciliation data has been provided to PON (suspect this was corrected cash accounts). Counter software fix @ release M1, which rolled out from May 2001.	Software error

		Stock unit being rolled over twice before the Cash Account is rolled. (KEL LKiang1222L, GMaxwell159r)	8	169	March 2001 – May 2001. Corrected cash accounts provided to PON. Counter software fix @ release M1, which rolled out from May 2001.	Software error		
		Single Counter Outlet (SCO) was replaced, without synchronising the messagestore. (KEL JBallantyne5328R)	17	152	November 2000 – November 2001. Reconciliation Data provided to PON. Mismatch between receipts and payments is due to a self originated message which overwrote a transaction on the counter messagestore. MSU noted in Nov 2001: This type of R & P incident is the only one we still get regularly. Is there anything that can be/is being done to fix it? Software fix @ release B12.	Software error		
		Software fixes. May be related to above KELs, or other issues.	27 29	125 123	April 2000 – December 2001. 12 @ CI4. 10 @ M1. 5 @ other. 7 @ other.	Software error		

Reference data. Either rollout timetable not followed, resulting in unavailable local products such as OBCS, or products ending and stock remaining.	13	112 110	July 2000 – December 2001. OBCS products will have become available, later than expected.	Reference Data Error
Duplicate incidents within the set being analysed e.g. branch reports the same issue flagged on Fujitsu's host cash account report, or vice versa	34	78 76	September 2000 – December 2001.	Admin Ignore
Reconciliation resolved. May be related to above KELs, or other issues.	41	37 35	August 2000 – December 2001. Identified by data centre reporting. Root cause cannot be determined from Peak Information provided to POL to give correct view of accounts	Unknown
No fault, not R&P Peaks, etc	11	26 24	September 2000 – January 2002	Admin Ignore
Temp Closed offices	5	21 19	May 2001 – January 2002 Correct outlet close process not followed. Information archived (e.g. Balance brought forward) by system.	POL Process Error
Hardware swaps	5 9	16 10	July 2000 – October 2001	Engineering process error

				May 2000 – November 2001		
		User	4	6	August 2000 – July 2001 A&G for PM or Trainers, which sometimes wasn't followed (PC0065358). PM ignoring on screen messages (PC0053164). One call where PM accepted shortage, then a call was raised (PC0067250), possibly indicating lack of understanding. Another call (PC0068191) reads like lack of PM understanding of the Cash Account.	Training
		Unclear	6	0	July 2000 – June 2001 Insufficient evidence to comment.	Unclear
		For 2002, 101 of the 124 calls raised that year were opened in January. 99 of those were for the Orange Prepay issue. Only 1 call was opened in February.				
4	12	Did Post Office review TC volumes in order to identify potential software issues.				WBD to pick up with POL
5	16	Review the contract between POL and Fujitsu and summarise SLAs/penalties.				WBD
6	20	Provide a list of reasons for which transaction data would need to be injected at the counter.				Fujitsu
		Issue with Riposte index at counter		Potential financial		Steve / SSC Can this be ascertained

	impact because the wrong value or quantity was being used for a product
Last historic message stored at counter was incorrectly being considered as part of a balancing process	No financial impact. PM recognised that data presented was too old.
Config data relating to PinPad needs to be deleted if PinPad is removed from counter. AKA PinPad LPO delete.	No financial impact
Old configuration objects local to counter needed to be removed. LPO Delete.	No Financial impact
Five corrupted bureau transactions on counter	Financial impact (PC0175821) Changes approved by POL Documented on BIMS
PM left AP recovery for too long. Usually same / next day not months. Ref data for product referenced in AP recovery removed. Impossible for PM to complete recovery. Objects deleted. LPO delete	Possible but unlikely financial impact due to age of recovery information.

* LPO=Local Persistent object. Configuration object used by the Riposte system. By its nature, requires intervention at counter.

Note: Last case (RiposteObject command) still being worked on. This relates to configuration information (similar to LPO above) and will not have any financial impact so is for completeness only.

Method

We searched the following databases to try and identify the incidents for which transaction data has been inserted at the counter:

KEL: Known Error Log

OCP: Operational Change Processes OCR / OCP

Peak: Incident management system

System	Search Keywords
KEL	RiposteMessageFile
KEL	LPO Delete

from the sampling referred to below at 9?

*[Matthew Lenton]
Response provided at left, 24-Jan-2019.*

		<table><tr><td>KEL</td><td>Marooned</td></tr><tr><td>OCP</td><td>RiposteMessageFile</td></tr><tr><td>OCP</td><td>LPO Delete</td></tr><tr><td>OCP</td><td>Marooned</td></tr><tr><td>OCP</td><td>RiposteObject put</td></tr><tr><td>Peak</td><td>RiposteMessageFileRiposteMessage</td></tr><tr><td>Peak</td><td>LPO Delete</td></tr><tr><td>Peak</td><td>JBallant498J</td></tr><tr><td>Peak</td><td>MYoung5043M</td></tr><tr><td>Peak</td><td>Marooned</td></tr><tr><td>Peak</td><td>RiposteObject put</td></tr></table>	KEL	Marooned	OCP	RiposteMessageFile	OCP	LPO Delete	OCP	Marooned	OCP	RiposteObject put	Peak	RiposteMessageFileRiposteMessage	Peak	LPO Delete	Peak	JBallant498J	Peak	MYoung5043M	Peak	Marooned	Peak	RiposteObject put		
KEL	Marooned																									
OCP	RiposteMessageFile																									
OCP	LPO Delete																									
OCP	Marooned																									
OCP	RiposteObject put																									
Peak	RiposteMessageFileRiposteMessage																									
Peak	LPO Delete																									
Peak	JBallant498J																									
Peak	MYoung5043M																									
Peak	Marooned																									
Peak	RiposteObject put																									
7	20	Review Peak reference 107043 (example of transaction being injected into counter).	WBD																							
8	21	<p>Did: (1) Belfast team; and (2) privileged users have the ability to inject transaction data between 2001 and 2004? Do they have that ability now?</p> <p><u>Gareth Jenkins:</u> <i>With Horizon Online, there is the Transaction Correction Tool which can inject transactions and this is controlled by SSC. It is audited when it runs and we have only used it once in March 2010. The DBAs in Belfast can in theory do anything to the BRDB. In practice they will run scripts tested by dev as part of a systems upgrade if DB changes are required. Any such access is audited and since 2015 the actual commands run are also audited.</i></p> <p><i>With old Horizon, control was weaker. SSC could inject into Correspondence Servers and also at the counter.</i></p> <p><u>Belfast team:</u> <i>Belfast had administrative access to the correspondence servers and had a <u>theoretical</u> ability to inject data into the messagestores, but don't believe that they had the technical understanding to do so.</i></p> <p><i>Belfast had no access to counters, UNIX/NT team having no users and no knowledge of administrative user accounts/passwords.</i></p> <p><i>They would not have injected any data unless it happened to be done by scripts that they were asked to run and which were provided under change control. Direct manipulation of the messagestore wasn't something that they knew how to do and would not have attempted to do lest it break the running applications which harvested/inserted data. Their understanding of the actual messages was very low/non-existent so would have had no confidence in making any insertion.</i></p>	Fujitsu	[Matthew Lenton] Response provided at left, 24-Jan-2019.																						
9	21	Review a sample of OCPs to give an indication as to how frequently transaction data was injected.	Fujitsu	Steve / SSC – relates to 6 above?																						

		<p><i>[Matthew Lenton] This is proving difficult to provide. The original plan was to examine sample months of change control data and produce rough figures. As Pete Newsome already discussed with you, this lead to it becoming apparent that support did not use formal change control in the earlier years for BAU support actions. We relied on the audit trail within the incidents (Peaks) to document support actions. We had auditability of the work done but no change control entries. We assume that the reasoning behind this was to allow implementation of support actions ASAP, and the audit trail being good enough where there was no financial impact.</i></p> <p><i>Therefore we are still looking at how / if we can provide an accurate answer to this question for the earlier years.</i></p>		<p><i>[Matthew Lenton] Update at left.</i></p>
10	22	Search for documents relating to the controls around transaction data being injected (DE/HLD/002 is an example).	WBD	
11	General	<p>Provide details of Fujitsu's document storage practices and retention policies. Are emails, word documents etc. from 2001 – 2004 available?</p> <p><i>[Matthew Lenton] Answered 22-Jan-2019</i></p>	Fujitsu	<p>Matthew</p> <p><i>[Matthew Lenton] Completed</i></p>

Matthew Lenton
Post Office Account Document Manager

P&PS, Digital Technology Services

Fujitsu

Lovelace Road, Bracknell, Berkshire, RG12 8SN

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From: Jonathan Gribben [<mailto:>
Sent: 24 January 2019 09:56
To: Lenton, Matthew
Cc: [SHenderson](#) ; Lucy Bremner ; Parker, Steve
; Ibbett, Dave ; Newsome, Pete
; Gareth Jenkins
; Andrew Parsons
Subject: RE: Roll 2 [WBDUK-AC.FID27032497]
Importance: High

Matthew,

Please would you provide an update in relation to the below this morning?

Kind regards

Jonny

Jonathan Gribben

Managing Associate
Womble Bond Dickinson (UK) LLP

d: **GRO**
m:
t:
e:

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From: [Matthew.Lenton@GRO](#)
Sent: 22 January 2019 15:46
To: Jonathan Gribben
Cc: [SHenderson@GRO](#); Lucy Bremner; [ParkerSP@GRO](#); [Dave.Ibbett@GRO](#)
[pete.newsome@GRO](#); Gareth Jenkins <[GRO](#)>
Subject: RE: Roll 2 [WBDUK-AC.FID27032497]

Jonny,

I've numbered the actions 1 – 11 below, and added the responses so far to actions 1 and 11 in the Actions column, and some notes on progress etc. to the Fujitsu column.

Matthew Lenton
Post Office Account Document Manager

P&PS, Digital Technology Services

Fujitsu

Lovelace Road, Bracknell, Berkshire, RG12 8SN

Phone: [GRO](#)

Email: [GRO](#)

Web: <https://www.fujitsu.com/global/>

From: Jonathan Gribben [[mailto:GRO](#)]
Sent: 21 January 2019 17:39
To: Parker, Steve <[GRO](#)>; Ibbett, Dave <[GRO](#)>; Newsome, Pete <[GRO](#)>; Lenton, Matthew <[GRO](#)>; Gareth Jenkins <[GRO](#)>
Cc: Simon Henderson <[GRO](#)>; Lucy Bremner

GRO**Subject:** RE: Roll 2 [WBDUK-AC.FID27032497]

Dear all,

Privileged & Confidential

Thank you for your time earlier. Here's a list of the actions that I captured from today's calls. Please let me know if there's anything you'd like to add or change:-

Action	Paragraph of Roll 2	Action	Assigned to	Fujitsu
1	8	<p>Keyword search for incidents containing the words "laptop" and/or "luggable" and/or "outreach" etc.</p> <p><i>The Peaks referenced below</i></p> <p><u>PC0100174</u> March 1st 2004 to 5th March 2004</p> <p><i>FAD317309 reporting: Horizon Kit rebooting itself for no apparent reason.</i></p> <p><i>Helpdesk user: "Over the past 2-3 weeks engineers have been to site and have replaced 2xBU's and 2xPSU's but the problem persists."</i></p> <p><i>BU = base units = PC itself. PSU = Power supply units within the base units</i></p> <p><i>RR "Evidence (from event logs) shows that the power is being switched off every morning shortly (ie 5 or 6 minutes) before the PM logs on"</i></p> <p><i>RR: "After carrying out tests on our rigs, I have been able to duplicate the problem here on ONE of our rigs but not on others. It seems that the Screen Power Button is incorrectly connected to the motherboard."</i></p> <p><i>RR: "We have now identified two instances of this, one in live. This is a hardware build quality issue."</i></p> <p><i>This was followed by:</i></p> <p><u>PC0100899</u> 18th March 2004 to 24th March 2004.</p>	Fujitsu	<p>Steve / SSC</p> <p><i>[Matthew Lenton] Details of Peaks provided at left.</i></p>

Hardware returned from site to Bracknell for examination.

RR: "Tests carried out on screen power switch - working correctly, no further action required."

Your questions 2d,e,f,g

d) Is his example true, or could it have been true: Yes. Can find no data on the origin for the statement: "This is a hardware build quality issue". Could be a discussion with engineering which was not recorded on the incident progress. Information we have only describes the hardware issue being seen internally to FJ on one instance of test rig hardware. No hardware error proved on the site.

If so, how often did that sort of problem occur: Very rare. Only one other found using keywords "standby", "laptop", "luggable". PC0055550 which was a problem on prototype hardware going into standby mode.

What would have caused it: Inconclusive. No information on root cause of issue reported by the Post Master onsite. Could be a hardware problem, could be user miss-operation of hardware.

Could it have affected/did it affect branch accounts: No. Once powered on the unit would function as normal.

If so, might its effect on branch accounts never have been detected with the result that some SPMs might have been wrongly held liable for false deficits: No

e) Would Rolls have disassembled laptops and done the other things he describes in para 8:

Have to assume he did as per the incident updates. I expect he had some assistance (especially with kit on test rigs - different team totally) but unable to substantiate.

Would he have had/did he have the conversation with his manager he describes in para 8: Just can't answer this. My analysis of the issue would suggest that it turned out to be unimportant because there was no proof that this ever happened in the live estate and that his comment of "This is a hardware build quality issue" is simply conjecture. However, he may have discussed with engineering and truly discovered a batch of faulty hardware. I would have expected an update in the incident reading "Discussed with xxxxxxxx in engineering and we determined that..... Bad batch..... etc" No such updates are present.

f) Was the problem referred to in para kept secret, as claimed at the end of para 8: No evidence either way. I would not expect that to

		be the case. It is not in Fujitsu's interest to have faulty equipment that is not corrected damaging reputation. g) Would Fujitsu management have known/did it know about this problem? Would/did Post Office? If not, why not: No way of knowing. Information no longer exists		
2	8	Check what the experts and witnesses say about KEL psteed2847n.	WBD	
3	9	Provide a list of events that give rise to a receipts and payments mismatch.	Fujitsu	Steve / SSC Examples only, or all scenarios that caused them in reality? <i>[Matthew Lenton] May take rest of this week or more. Requires eyeball searching.</i>
4	12	Did Post Office review TC volumes in order to identify potential software issues.	WBD to pick up with POL	
5	16	Review the contract between POL and Fujitsu and summarise SLAs/penalties.	WBD	
6	20	Provide a list of reasons for which transaction data would need to be injected at the counter.	Fujitsu	Steve / SSC Can this be ascertained from the sampling referred to below at 21? <i>[Matthew Lenton] SSC forming a query to find this from OCP data, also determining when transaction would be injected at the counter.</i>
7	20	Review Peak reference 107043 (example of transaction being injected into counter).	WBD	
8	21	Did: (1) Belfast team; and (2) privileged users have the ability to inject transaction data between 2001 and 2004? Do they have that ability now?	Fujitsu	Gareth: answer 1 and 2 and perhaps explain again difference between old and new?
9	21	Review a sample of OCPs to give an indication as to how frequently transaction data was injected.	Fujitsu	Steve / SSC – relates to 20 above? <i>[Matthew Lenton] See action 6 above</i>
10	22	Search for documents relating to the controls around transaction data being injected (DE/HLD/002 is an example).	WBD	
11	General	Provide details of Fujitsu's document storage practices and retention policies. Are emails, word documents etc. from 2001 – 2004 available? <i>[Matthew Lenton] Emails cannot be retrieved from the accounts of former Fujitsu employees from that period, and back ups are</i>	Fujitsu	Matthew <i>[Matthew Lenton] See answer at left</i>

	<p><i>not held for that period of time. The only records of such a person's emails would be if they are part of a current employee's email account or pst archive, in which case it would be only the subset of their emails that were to or from the other user. Similarly, for other documentation that was held locally be individual employees on their laptops, that would have been deleted when the user left.</i></p> <p><i>As we have already seen, some limited information from this period does exist, stored in Dimensions and other networked repositories, some of which we have already provided in connection with this case.</i></p>	
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We are aiming to get a draft response to Roll 2 into circulation by early tomorrow afternoon.

Kind regards

Jonny

Jonathan Gribben

Managing Associate
Womble Bond Dickinson (UK) LLP

d:
m:
t:
e:

GRO

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From: Jonathan Gribben

Sent: 21 January 2019 11:05

To: 'ParkerSP@GRO'; [Dave.Ibbett@GRO](#); [pete.newsome@GRO](#); [Matthew.Lenton@GRO](#); Gareth Jenkins <[Gareth.Jenkins@GRO](#)>

Cc: Simon Henderson <[Simon.Henderson@GRO](#)>; Lucy Bremner

Subject: Roll 2 [WBDUK-AC.FID27032497]

Privileged & Confidential

To discuss

Jonny

Please consider the environment! Do you need to print this email?

The information in this e-mail and any attachments is confidential and may be legally privileged and protected by law. [matthew.lenton@wombledickinson.com](#) is only authorised to access this e-mail and any attachments. If you are not [matthew.lenton@wombledickinson.com](#) please notify [jonathan.gribben@wombledickinson.com](#) as soon as possible and delete any copies. Unauthorised use, dissemination, distribution, publication or copying of this communication or attachments is prohibited and may be unlawful. Information about how we use personal data is in our [Privacy Policy](#) on our website.

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