Export

Peak Incident Management System

Call Reference	**PC0208119**	Call Logger	Mark Wright -- EDSC
Release	Targeted At -- HNG-X 06.22	Top Ref	PC0221150
Call Type	Live Incidents	Priority	B -- Business restricted
Contact	Mark Wright	Call Status	Closed -- Administrative Response
Target Date	10/03/2012	Effort (Man Days)	0
Summary	SSC Database users do not have correct permissions		

All References	Type	Value	
	Product Baseline	UNIX_SUPPORT_UTILS_0622_V018	
	Product Baseline	UNIX_SUPPORT_UTILS_0622_D018-D017	
	Release PEAK	PC0216786	
	Release PEAK	PC0221150	
	Product Baseline	UNIX_SUPPORT_UTILS_0622_V018-V017	
	DevIntRel-Director	Live Supp.Test	

Collections	Name	User	Date
	RP-release_planning	Sarah Payne	14-May-2012 17:00:59

Impact Statement	User	Date
	Dave Haywood	06-May-2015 09:44:56

1. SSC users affected have more access than is required to database resources. This is contrary to security policy.
2. Cost: There is currently no "cost" to this issue.
3. Perceived Impact: The customer is not aware of this problem or change.
4. Scope: No actual impact/incidents of problems relating to this issue have been experienced yet (and not expected).

Progress Narrative

```
Date:01-Feb-2011 11:57:35 User:Mark Wright
CALL PC0208119 opened
Details entered are:-
Summary:SSC Database users do not have correct permissions
Call Type:L
Call Priority:B
Target Release:HNG-X R3
Routed to:EDSC - _Unassigned_
```

```
Date:01-Feb-2011 11:57:35 User:Mark Wright
[Start of Response]
Development have delivered scripts to allow SSC users to perform certain tidyup tasks (like clear failed recoveries). However
they have been delivered to work against an SSC role which SSC users have not been granted as SSC users have the APPSUP role.

Either SSC user creation/configuration needs to be amended to make sure we have ALL required permissions of the scripts will need
amending to match how our users are set up in live.

Please see email details below describing in more detail:

1) The user creation scripts provided by development offer the option to create each user type (unxadm, appsup, ssc)
2) When we created SSC users for BDB/BRS etc. we used ?appsup? as that is what ssc have always been and what they migrated as on
Horizon databases
3) It became clear that there is also an ssc role which we now know is a requirement for the scripts you refer to
4) We could change the role grants from appsup to ssc and ensure we use ?ssc? for any future user creations but you would then
lose any permissions that are in the appsup role and not the ssc role. We also then have a difference between the DAT databases
(migrated) and the new databases like BDB which is ridiculous
5) We could grant you the ssc role as well and a call could be passed to development to include in the user creation script when
?ssc? is chosen as the group but that seems wrong as well

It all comes down to user administration and the incorrect assumption that adding a user is obvious and doesn?t need some more
detailed documentation other than the current doc which says just add the user with the relevant roles and on the relevant
servers ? head, brick wall and all that

We can certainly add the ssc role to all users on BDB/BRS in the short term but I would need to be sure that a call was with
development for formal review and rethink

Regards, Andrew
```

From: Wright Mark
Sent: 01 February 2011 11:37
To: Gibson Andrew R
Cc: Calvert Wayne; Chambers Anne O
Subject: RE: ssc role

I thought the original issue was why have the SSC users not had the SSC role granted? If it is a bug in the creation scripts then yes, needs dev to fix but I thought something was said the other day about the SSC users not being set up correctly at the start?

From: Gibson Andrew R
Sent: 01 February 2011 11:35
To: Chambers Anne O
Cc: Calvert Wayne; Wright Mark
Subject: RE: ssc role

I suspect you can have both but either way you need a development fix as they produce the user creation script which does the database bit ? if they have to produce a fix, I?d advise making one of the roles suitable rather than having a mix of grants across both roles

From: Chambers Anne O
Sent: 01 February 2011 11:31
To: Gibson Andrew R
Cc: Calvert Wayne; Wright Mark
Subject: RE: ssc role

Unfortunately development write their scripts explicitly to use ssc. So I think we're stuck with it unless they deliver new scripts (which would not be a popular or quick option).

When we go off piste we use appsup. Can we have both??

Anne
(GRO
external GRO

Currently SSC CANNOT use these scripts.

[End of Response]
Response code to call Live Incidents/Defects(L) as Potential Problem Identified(38)

Date:**01-Feb-2011 11:58:42** User:**Mark Wright**
The Call record has been transferred to the team: BIF

Date:**02-Feb-2011 11:15:27** User:**Saheed Salawu**
A new Business Impact has been added:
This stops support action and needs doing not to delay incident resolution. It is an MSC catchup

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Date:**02-Feb-2011 11:39:17** User:**Lorraine Guiblin**
The Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Steve Parker

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Date:**02-Feb-2011 11:45:02** User:**Steve Parker**
Reference Added: MSC 043J0293352

Date:**02-Feb-2011 13:43:46** User:**Steve Parker**
The Call record has been transferred to the team: Hosts-Des

Date:**03-Feb-2011 09:10:46** User:**Steve Goddard**
The Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Andy Beardmore

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Date:**04-Feb-2011 11:43:58** User:**Mark Wright**
[Start of Response]

This is NOT an MSC catchup, it is a generic role issue with SSC Database users which affects the running of development delivered scripts rather than this single instance of an executable.
[End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 40 -- Pending -- Incident Under Investigation

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Date:**04-Feb-2011 11:46:31** User:**Mark Wright**
TOP Reference set to: DevIntRel-Director Live Supp.Test

Date:**04-Feb-2011 11:46:32** User:**Mark Wright**
Reference Deleted: MSC 043J0293352

Date:**26-Jun-2011 06:08:54** User:**Saheed Salawu**
The Business Impact has been updated:
This stops support action and needs doing not to delay incident resolution.

Date:**01-Aug-2011 17:44:22** User:**Andy Beardmore**
3rd line support should have the SSC role granted as per DES/APP/HLD/0020 v2.0. Host Development to investigate the user creation scripted used by ISD.

Date:**16-Aug-2011 10:08:07** User:**Andy Beardmore**
The optional role 'APPSUP' is extremely powerful. The original BRDB design was that 3rd line support should be given the 'SSC' role (which is select_any_table + select_catalogue) and only given the optional role 'APPSUP' temporarily (by Security Ops authorisation) if required to make emergency amendments in BRDB Live. Since then Host-Dev have delivered a series of auditable amendment tools for known SSC data amendment operations in Live, and these are assigned by role to individual SSC user accounts. As such SSC should not require the APPSUP role in BRDB, unless there is an unforeseen update required to Live.
Transferring to Steve Parker for review/assessment.

Date:**16-Aug-2011 10:08:48** User:**Andy Beardmore**
The Call record has been transferred to the team: BIF
The Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Steve Parker

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Date:**17-Aug-2011 10:54:00** User:**John Simpkins**
[Start of Response]
This is getting confused, this incident is about the SSC role which ISD need to give to the SSC in order to run a script provided to the SSC by development.

These are script executed from the command-line.
[End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 40 -- Pending -- Incident Under Investigation

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Date:**17-Aug-2011 10:55:31** User:**John Simpkins**
The Call record has been transferred to the team: APOP-Host-Dev
The Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Andy Beardmore

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Date:**17-Aug-2011 11:37:03** User:**Saheed Salawu**
Can SSC please have a meeting with Andy Beardmore and Andy Gibson to clarify exactly what else is really required to be done with this Peak. It appears the original issue has been fixed. A conversation will clarify any wider issue

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Date:**13-Sep-2011 13:21:08** User:**Steve Goddard**
The Call record has been transferred to the team: Hosts-Des
The Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Andy Beardmore

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Date:**30-Sep-2011 14:20:02** User:**_Mail Manager_**
External Progress Update Received via Email.
Originator : "Beardmore Andy" <Andy.Beardmore@ GRO
Arrival Date : 30 Sep 2011 13:10:34
Subject : PC0208119
    charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

As per the previous PEAK comments, the role 'APPSUP' is extremely =
powerful and should only be used under extreme circumstances and under =
MSC supervision. As such the Branch Database design was that 3rd line =
support users should be given the 'SSC' role, which is effectively read =
access, ie. 'select_any_table + select_catalogue'. SSC team members =
should only have to achoiccess BRSS for normal support investigations, =
unless the information has not replicated in time. SSC should only =
given the optional role 'APPSUP' temporarily (by Security Ops =
authorisation/emergency MSC) if required to make emergency data =
amendments in BRDB Live.
It is a security breach if any user write access is not audited on =
Branch Database, hence the emergency MSC for any APPSUP role activity =

must have session logs attached under the MSC. Host-Dev previously =
provided scipts, such as the Transaction Correction Tool, are written to =
run under the SSC role and also write to the audit logs.
SSC users created on BRDB should only have the SSC role, and the user =
creation script should be amended by Host-Dev to reflect this. A =
separate script giving/revoking emergency MSC access via APPSUP can be =
delivered, logging this to the hostaudit directory. In parallel Host-Dev =
should investigate any Host-Dev delivered script to ensure they are all =
executable by the SSC role. SSC should investigate any of their own =
scripts to ensure they have sufficient permissions under the SSC role, =
taking into account they should primarily perform their work on BRSS. =
Any day to day scripts should not access BRDB directly. Any scripts =
needing more than the SSC role should be questioned, except those that =
would run under MSC APPSUP. Once the investigation is complete, all =
BRDB SSC users with APPSUP should have the role removed by ISD (via MSC) =
and ensure they do have the SSC role.
If anyone is in disagreement with the above course of action, then I'll =
set up a meeting with yourselves and Security when I'm down in BRA01 =
next week.
Regards,

Andy Beardmore, Senior Software and Solution Design Architect
Application Services
Fujitsu
Mobile: [GRO] (External) [GRO] (Internal)
P Please consider the environment - do you really need to print this =
email?

Date:**12-Oct-2011 16:37:06** User:**Andy Beardmore**
a) All OPS$<SSC> users should have the roles DB_MONITOR and APPSUP removed. They also need the SSC role enabled as a DEFAULT. In
effect they should end up as for example:
OPS$[Irrelevant] RESOURCE
OPS$[Irrelevant] SSC

The SSC role has execute permissions to the Host-Dev delivered packages mentioned in the PEAK and resource, monitor (and hence
connect and select any table) and select any dictionary.

A sweep up MSC will be required at some point for get these account changes made into live

b) Host-Dev to amend the create_db_user.sh script to:

create user ops\$${USERNAME} default tablespace ${DAREA} quota unlimited on ${DAREA}
temporary tablespace ${DTEMP} identified externally ;
grant ${role} to ops\$${USERNAME};
grant RESOURCE to ops\$${USERNAME};

c) ISD to create SSC users via call:
/usr/local/bin/create_db_user.sh -i BRDB1 -u <username> -g ssc -d BRDB_SSC_DATA -t BRDB_TEMP2

And first line support users via call:
/usr/local/bin/create_db_user.sh -i BRDB1 -u <username> -g db_monitor -d USERS -t BRDB_TEMP2

d) Branch Support Guide to provide details of creating ISD&SSC users as above (-g db_monitor for ISD) and procedure for these
requesting APPSUP access (MSC) and logging logfiles.

Transferring to Host-Dev for changes to the create_db_user.sh script.

Date:**12-Oct-2011 16:37:41** User:**Andy Beardmore**
The Call record has been transferred to the team: BDB-Host-Dev
The Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Andrew Aylward

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Date:**25-Oct-2011 09:53:00** User:**Andrew Aylward**
The Business Impact has been updated:
1. Cost: There is currently no "cost" to this issue. The users affected have more access than is required.
2. Perceived Impact: The customer is not aware of this problem or change.
3. Scope: No actual impact/incidents of problems relating to this issue have been experienced yet (and not expected).

Date:**25-Oct-2011 09:53:42** User:**Andrew Aylward**
The call Target Release has been moved to Proposed For -- HNG-X 06.22

Date:**25-Oct-2011 09:53:59** User:**Andrew Aylward**
Product HNG-X Platforms -- Branch Database Server - Main (BDB) (version unspecified) added.

Date:**25-Oct-2011 09:54:02** User:**Andrew Aylward**
Product HNG-X Platforms -- Branch Database Server - Main (BDB) updated to Subject.

Date:**25-Oct-2011 09:54:25** User:**Andrew Aylward**

DEVELOPMENT IMPACT OF FIX:

SPECIFY THE HNG-X PLATFORMS IMPACTED:
- Done.

Q: Are all the platforms in the same deployment group?
A: Yes (DC_DATABASE)

TECHNICAL SUMMARY:
This change is to change the script used by POA UNIX and POA ORACLE DBA when creating new SSC/Support users.

LIST OF KNOWN DIMENSIONS DESIGN PARTS AFFECTED BY THE CHANGE:
- BRDB_SOFTWARE_INSTALLATION_POSTMIG08_0622_<REL>
- BRDB_HNGX_POSTMIG08_CHANGES_0622_<REL>

DEPENDENCIES:
Q: Are there any other PEAKs or CPs with interdependencies on the proposed fix?
A: No. There may be an MSC required in future, but not at this stage.
Q: Are there any clone peaks to take the delivery to a different deployment group? If yes is there any order in which they must be deployed?
A: No.
Q: Any other dependencies such as Infrastructure changes or technical/configuration changes that will not be included in the Development fix?
A: No.

DEPLOYMENT DETAIL:
Q: Does the fix include procedures that are known not to be packagable by Integration in an automatically deployable baseline (DPVB)?
If so, please comment on the nature and technical complexity of such procedures.
A: Nothing complex. A simple software install on the BDB platform is required.
Q: Does the fix require a reboot?
A: No.
Q: Does the fix apply to a clustered database? If so must the deployment be done to all at the same time?
A: Yes. However will not affect the entire cluster. It is run on only one node.

DEV EFFORT IN MANDAYS:
1 day(s) likely effort including development, testing and packaging.

IMPACT ON USER:
Q: Benefit of making the fix.
A: Users created by IRE Support Teams will have correct privileges.
Q: What does the user have to do to get this problem?
A: N/A
Q: How does it affect them when it occurs?
A: N/A
Q: How many branches in the estate are likely to be affected by this issue
A: None. The users referred to in this Peak are not related to the counter.

IMPACT ON OPERATIONS:
Q: Will the absence of a fix for this issue impact the ability of the operations team to support the HNGX system?
A: No.

HAVE RELEVANT KELS BEEN CREATED OR UPDATED?
No. None believed to be required.

IMPACT ON TEST:
Q: What independent test coverage/scenarios does development recommend? (This will often be about the level of regression testing required.)
A: None, other than creating a new user and then asking SSC to test that user's access to required tables.
Q: What CIT test coverage does development recommend?
A: None.
Q: What Development test scenarios are needed?
A: Determined within the Host team. Will test execution and regression.
Q: What Development test scenarios manual/automated should be promoted to CIT?
A: None.

RISKS (of releasing and of not releasing proposed fix):
Q: What live problems will there be if we do not issue this fix?
A: None. Users affected by this change are not Counter related.
Q: What are the risks of this fix having unexpected interactions with other areas?
A: None.
Q: Is this a high-risk area in which changes have caused problems in the past?
A: No.
Q: Should we consider a pilot rollout and of what sort?
A: No.

Date:**25-Oct-2011 09:55:20** User:**Andrew Aylward**
Defect cause updated to 7 : Design - High Level Design

Date:**25-Oct-2011 09:56:20** User:**Andrew Aylward**
Action placed on Team:RelMngmntForum

Date:**25-Oct-2011 15:06:15** User:**John Boston**
The call Target Release has been moved to:Targeted At -- HNG-X 06.22
PTF 25/10/11 - Agreed target of 06.22. Please proceed.

Date:**25-Oct-2011 15:06:23** User:**John Boston**
Action has been removed from the call

Date:**04-Jan-2012 11:54:33** User:**Andrew Aylward**
The Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Vishnu Ramachandran

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Date:**04-Jan-2012 12:04:53** User:**Andrew Aylward**
This change involves updating the SSC User Creation script originally written by Wing (in association with Andy B.) to create SSC
users with a default password and a role that would apply to them.

The plan is as such: -

a) All OPS$<SSC> users should have the roles DB_MONITOR and APPSUP removed. They also need the SSC role enabled as a DEFAULT. In
effect they should end up as for example:
OPS | Irrelevant | RESOURCE
OPS | | SSC

The SSC role has execute permissions to the Host-Dev delivered packages mentioned in the PEAK and resource, monitor (and hence
connect and select any table) and select any dictionary.

A sweep up MSC will be required at some point to get these account changes into LIVE ... sensitivity to the needs of SSC when
approaching this.

b) Host-Dev to amend the create_db_user.sh script to:

create user ops\$${USERNAME} default tablespace ${DAREA} quota unlimited on ${DAREA}
temporary tablespace ${DTEMP} identified externally ;
grant ${role} to ops\$${USERNAME};
grant RESOURCE to ops\$${USERNAME};

c) ISD to create SSC users via call:
/usr/local/bin/create_db_user.sh -i BRDB1 -u <username> -g ssc -d BRDB_SSC_DATA -t BRDB_TEMP2

And first line support users via call:
/usr/local/bin/create_db_user.sh -i BRDB1 -u <username> -g db_monitor -d USERS -t BRDB_TEMP2

d) Branch Support Guide to provide details of creating ISD&SSC users as above (-g db_monitor for ISD) and procedure for these
requesting APPSUP access (MSC) and logging logfiles.

Date:**02-Mar-2012 12:16:32** User:**Vishnu Ramachandran**
Product HNG-X Platforms -- Solaris Host (DAT) (version unspecified) added.

Date:**02-Mar-2012 12:16:59** User:**Vishnu Ramachandran**
Product HNG-X Platforms -- Branch Support Server (BRS) (version unspecified) added.

Date:**02-Mar-2012 12:17:12** User:**Vishnu Ramachandran**
Product HNG-X Platforms -- Network Persistent Store (NPS) (version unspecified) added.

Date:**02-Mar-2012 12:30:01** User:**PIT Automated User**
Reference Added: Product Baseline UNIX_SUPPORT_UTILS_0622_V018
Reference Added: Product Baseline UNIX_SUPPORT_UTILS_0622_V018-V017

Date:**02-Mar-2012 12:33:22** User:**Vishnu Ramachandran**
[Start of Response]
/usr/local/bin/create_db_user.sh has been fixed and delivered through baseline UNIX_SUPPORT_UTILS_0622_V018-V017.

An associated LIVE MSC will be raised at the back of this PEAK call to correct access rights of existing SSC support users.
[End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 48 -- Pending -- Fix Released to PIT

Date:**02-Mar-2012 12:33:37** User:**Vishnu Ramachandran**
The Call record has been transferred to the team: Dev-Int-Rel

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Date:**02-Mar-2012 16:00:01** User:**PIT Automated User**
Reference Added: Product Baseline UNIX_SUPPORT_UTILS_0622_D018-D017

Date:**08-Mar-2012 12:24:07** User:**PIT Automated User**
[Start of Response]
Assigning to Integrator
[End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 48 (Fix Released to PIT)
The incident has been transferred to the Team: Dev-Int-Rel
The incident has been assigned to the Team Member: Rick Carter

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Date:**08-Mar-2012 12:24:08** User:**PIT Automated User**
[Start of Response]
Peak has been test installed in Integration. Moving to holding stack awaiting release
[End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 47 (Fix Processed by PIT)
The incident has been transferred to the Team: Int-Rel

Date:**08-Mar-2012 12:25:44** User:**PIT Automated User**
[Start of Response]
Fix processed by integration
[End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 49 (Fix Available for IndependentTest)
Target Date updated: new value is 10/03/2012 18:30
The incident has been transferred to the Team: Live Supp.Test

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Date:**22-Mar-2012 14:42:41** User:**Tyrone Cozens**
Reference Added: Release PEAK PC0216786

Date:**04-Apr-2012 11:32:45** User:**Graham Jennings**
I am rejecting the peak / baseline on the basis that it changes new users access to a role that does not exist on all databases
(SSC Role does not exist on DWh, NPS, RDDS or RDMC DBs) and that it is changing / recommending removal of something not requested
in the original peak (removal of the general use of APPSUP / DBMONITOR roles by the SSC). It also recommends these changes be
implemented by MSC for existing SSC users.

An email chain has been discussing these issues.
Latest is that a meeting with Andy Beardmore(Dev/Design), Steve Parker (SSC), Mark Jarosz (Sec Architect) and Donna Munro (Sec
Ops Mgr)is being arrange to discuss further. I suggest this peak is frozen until the outcome of the meeting has been decided.

Date:**04-Apr-2012 11:36:08** User:**Graham Jennings**
The Call record has been transferred to the team: Hosts-Des

Date:**04-Apr-2012 12:12:17** User:**Vishnu Ramachandran**
The Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Andy Beardmore

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Date:**05-Oct-2012 14:35:53** User:**Tyrone Cozens**
Reference Added: Release PEAK PC0221150

Date:**10-Apr-2013 11:20:18** User:**Andy Beardmore**
The initial motive for this PEAK was to ensure all SSC users had the SSC role assigned to be able to execute the data correction
toolset on BRDB. Initially the SSC users were manually set up incorrectly against the HNG-X BRDB HLD, being given the same
permissions as per Horizon, and had too many privileges via the APPSUP role. Host-Dev have delivered the live scripts to ensure
new SSC users have the correct permissions, but a follow-on MSC is required to adjust the privileges of existing users. Graham
Jennings rejected this response as the approach is not consistent across the older Horizon DB's. The fact is that HNG-X did not
include this change to these Horizon environments, so I believe this to be a mute point for this PEAK but more of an interest for
PCI and other Audits. As such I am transferring this PEAK to the new security architect Dave Haywood for further consideration of
tidying up any existing SSC users on BRDB with APPSUP role, only to have RESOURCE & SSC roles.

Date:**10-Apr-2013 11:21:01** User:**Andy Beardmore**
The Call record has been transferred to the team: Architecture
The Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Dave Haywood

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Date:**02-Jul-2014 10:05:56** User:**Dave Haywood**
According to Andy Beardmore's last update, it appears that development have already delivered a fix to apply the correct
permissions to users accounts. Given that databases are being replaced as part of Belfast refresh, I assume that when users are
added to the new databases, the permissions they are granted by the updated scripts will be correct. Left Andy Beardmore a
voicemail to determine if the above assumption is correct. If it is correct, the call can then be closed on the basis Belfast
Refresh will correct this issue.

Date:**02-Jul-2014 11:17:20** User:**Dave Haywood**
Spoke with Andy Beardmore. Only new users are given the correct permissions. Existing user permissions are copied into the new
builds and hence will not be corrected by Belfast Refresh. Suggest an audit of Live and Test is required to:
1) identify existing AD accounts of Oracle users
2) identify SSC users from (1)
3) run a one-time script (based on the permission scripts already delivered) to set the SSC user permissions correctly

The above activity can be performed under MSC but must be trialled in the Test environment before being changed in Live to ensure no adverse side-effects are encountered. Given the existing permission change scripts for new users were delivered some years ago, the probability of the change causing any unforseen issues is thought to be low.

Date:**06-May-2015 09:44:56** User:**Dave Haywood**
The Business Impact has been updated:
1. SSC users affected have more access than is required to database resources. This is contrary to security policy.
2. Cost: There is currently no "cost" to this issue.
3. Perceived Impact: The customer is not aware of this problem or change.
4. Scope: No actual impact/incidents of problems relating to this issue have been experienced yet (and not expected).

Date:**08-Jun-2015 11:04:58** User:**Catherine Obeng**
[Start of Response]
From DH's updated from 4th-Jul-2014, I am routing this call to UNIX/DBA to carry out the tasks in items 1 and 2 of DH's recommendations.
Could Unix or DBA team please advise if either of your teams is in a position to develop the one-time script to implement the correct ORACLE user access (item 3).
Please route to TfS FAO: Unix / DBA.
[End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 38 -- Pending -- Potential Problem Identified

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Date:**08-Jun-2015 11:05:11** User:**Catherine Obeng**
The Call record has been transferred to the team: EDSC

Date:**08-Jun-2015 11:15:41** User:**Chad Daborn**
The Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Mark Wright

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Date:**09-Jun-2015 08:25:26** User:**Mark Wright**
[Start of Response]
Date:2015-06-08 11:04:58 User:Catherine Obeng
[Start of Response]
From DH's updated from 4th-Jul-2014, I am routing this call to UNIX/DBA to carry out the tasks in items 1 and 2 of DH's recommendations.
Could Unix or DBA team please advise if either of your teams is in a position to develop the one-time script to implement the correct ORACLE user access (item 3).
Please route to TfS FAO: Unix / DBA.
[End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 38 -- Pending -- Potential Problem Identified

[End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 68 -- Final -- Administrative Response
Routing to Call Logger following Final Progress update.

Date:**09-Jun-2015 08:25:35** User:**Mark Wright**
CALL PC0208119 closed: Category 68 Type L

Root Cause	Design - High Level Design
Logger	Mark Wright -- EDSC
Subject Product	HNG-X Platforms -- Branch Database Server - Main (BDB) (version unspecified)
Assignee	Mark Wright -- EDSC
Last Progress	09-Jun-2015 08:25 -- Mark Wright