

## Restricted - Management and Commercial

## CAPS and Card Programme Board Action Notes

15 January 1999, Longbenton, Newcastle-upon-Tyne

## Issue 6 (Horizon only)

**Attending:** George McCorkell (Chair), Dave Miller, Vince Gaskell, Peter Crahan, John Delamore, Lis Astall, Ken Davenport, John Codling, Pete Griffiths, Mark Lyons, John MacGregor, Ian Roden (Secretariat)

**Apologies:** Alexis Cleveland

## Horizon Only Action Points

## AP 6.8(H)

*Dave Miller to determine the current state of debate between BES/PAS and see if dialogue between Horizon/CAPS directors could be used to break the apparent deadlock. Dave Miller reported that discussions continue between Horizon and Pathway.*

## AP 700.1(H)

*Dave Miller to arrange for a presentation on the Integrated Programme Plan to the Programme Board meeting on 16 October 1998. Dave Miller reported that discussions continue and a presentation could not be given until an agreement was reached.*

## AP 900.1(H)

*Bruce McNiven to arrange for a presentation on Service management to the Programme Board to include the proposals for service management during Live Trial and a high level view following National Roll-Out. Dave Miller said that a report had now been circulated and agreed to give a presentation at the next CAPS Programme Board.*

## AP 900.2(H)

*Bruce McNiven to arrange for the report from the end-to-end review of service management to be made available to the Programme Board. This was covered in the update for 900.1(H) (above).*

## AP 900.3(H)

*Bruce McNiven to arrange for a formal management checkpoint meeting to take place following the completion of MOR3 and before the next phase of testing commenced. Dave Miller said that a formal management meeting is being arranged.*

## AP 900.4(H)

*Bruce McNiven to provide the Board with a note setting out the current position of TIP testing and any potential contingency options in advance of the next CCPB meeting.*

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Dave Miller agreed to provide the CAPS Programme Board with a presentation and update at the next meeting

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AP 900.5(H)

Bruce McNiven to provide a formal note setting out the conduct of testing. Dave Miller agreed to provide both a paper and presentation to the next CAPS Programme Board.

### The Horizon Directors Report

1. Andrew Simpkins gave a presentation to the Board about the actions taken after the Model Office Rehearsal 3 and End-to-End Testing 2, and Horizon's recommended Re-Plan option following the results of those actions.
2. Andrew Simpkins said that following the unsatisfactory results arising from MOR3/E2E2, Horizon isolated 9 critical problem areas, resolutions and actions to which were agreed with ICL Pathway by the end of November 1998. This involved;
  - 2.1 changes to the TIP interface;
  - 2.2 targeted testing for live migration and reference data changes;
  - 2.3 changes in management roles; and
  - 2.4 changes in processes.
3. Andrew Simpkins confirmed to Vince Gaskell that the process changes were currently being tested in the pre-proving environment.
4. Andrew Simpkins then discussed the pre-proving test plan and the results arising from what had run so far. Of the 347 incidents arising from MOR3/E2E2, approximately 300 required action. 221 incidents were closed by ICL/Pathway by 7/12 and a further 43 by 22/12. 102 tests were witnessed before Christmas, with 83 passing and CAPS testing was reported as successful with 7 medium/low STIRS.
5. Andrew Simpkins reported that the first of the pre-proving cycles (Cycle 1) began on 6/1/99 for counter only (i.e. no 'back office' functions) but covering all critical functions. 72 PinICL solutions were witnessed, 68 which passed and there was a 100% success on stock unit balancing and cash accounts. The pre-proving exercise also raised a further 20 high/medium PinICLs, 10 of which would need to be witnessed by 18/1/98 in the second cycle of testing (Cycle 2).
6. Andrew Simpkins then went on to discuss the key areas and scope of Cycle 2 and the steps to take place after its completion. Vince Gaskell asked if there were clear entry and exit criteria for the approval of Cycle 2. Andrew Simpkins assured him that such criteria existed, he also confirmed to the Programme Board that though not all the incidents were to be witnessed, all the critical ones would be.

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7. Andrew Simpkins confirmed Peter Crahan's assertion that this was not a full End-to-End reconciliation because it did not include cards. Andrew Simpkins explained that this was because the main card problem was with BES, which was dealt with in a separate test run.
8. Peter Crahan asked if BES functionality was proved. Andrew Simpkins said that it had been tested. Vince Gaskell sought assurance that it would not affect the CAPS system. Andrew Simpkins replied that he saw no reason why it would. Vince Gaskell said that before the CAPS Programme agreed the entry criteria for End-to-End Testing and Single Benefit Model Office an assurance was required on BES functionality. It was agreed that there was need for further discussion on this subject outside of the meeting.
9. There was then some discussion about whether or not ICL Pathway, on the evidence of the work done by them after MOR3/E2E2 (as outlined above), enjoyed the confidence of Horizon and the Programme Board.
10. Andrew Simpkins and Dave Miller stated that they believed pre-proving Cycle 1 to have gone well, and showed that the actions agreed to and taken by ICL Pathway after MOR3/E2E2 were robust and worked well. Horizon would need to see the results of Cycle 2 before they felt fully confident with ICL Pathway.
12. Vince Gaskell said that it was the CAPS Programme's perception that Cycle 1 had not gone well because it had generated 20 high/medium PinICLs which had not arisen in the earlier stages of testing. Andrew Simpkins said that some PinICLs had been expected and that they would all be cleared before Cycle 2.
13. George McCorkell asked Andrew Simpkins for a break down of the 347 incidents arising from MOR3/E2E2 highlighting their severity so that they could be compared with the present position. Andrew Simpkins said that he did not have that data to hand because Horizon had concentrated more on collecting data arising from the Cash Accounting and Stock Balancing systems.
14. George McCorkell said that the new PinICLs arising in Cycle 1 negatively affected the CAPS Programme's confidence. Without a detailed analysis of the original incidents and those presently outstanding, it was difficult not to form the opinion that the appearance of 20 High/Medium PinICLs so late into the testing (and only as a result of pre-proving exercise following the poor performance of MOR3/E2E2) pointed towards defective testing or fixes.
15. Andrew Simpkins agreed to provide the Programme Board with a detailed analysis of the original incidents and those outstanding at present. He acknowledged the Programme Board's lack of confidence, and stated that Horizon would not sanction Cycle 2 if he had any concerns. The Programme Board recognised this intention and stressed that they wished to help secure the assurances needed.

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### AP 1100.2(H)

Dave Miller (Andrew Simpkins) to provide the CCPB with a detailed analysis of the 300+ incidents arising from MOR3/E2E2 with a comparison to the incidents left after the first cycle of pre-proving.

16. Andrew Simpkins then discussed the three Re-plan options. He said that it was clear that Horizon had a differing planning emphasis from BA. POCL would like to move towards the earliest date for roll-out, BA wants a stable plan for multi-benefit operation and ICL Pathway want to maintain the Treasury review plan.
17. Andrew Simpkins highlighted the key factors in Option 1, with Live Trial starting 31/8/99 and full roll out in 4/2000. He acknowledged the CAPS Programme's concerns around parallelism of testing, parallelism of live trials, the millennium effect and risk of an unstable start to multi-benefit live-trial. Peter Crahan asked why these concerns were labelled 'CAPS Concerns'. Andrew Simpkins acknowledged that these were concerns shared by CAPS and Horizon.
18. Andrew Simpkins said the POCL view was that they would only be confident of Option 1's deliverability after the data migration was completed, and that there should be no technical issues from that point onward. Vince Gaskell pointed to the increased parallelism and reduced resilience effecting overall confidence in the plan that were the key issues.
19. Andrew Simpkins said that there was a possibility within Option 1 that if problems arose which were fixed by mid-September - that although the 31/8/99 date would be missed, the 25/9/99 could be met and Live Trial could still be moved forward.
20. George McCorkell reiterated that the need for replanning was caused not by CAPS, but by Pathway, specifically their inability to start Model Office on 14/12/98. George McCorkell emphasised that CAPS was always ready to start on Model Office on that date.
21. Andrew Simpkins said that Option 2 deferred the Multi-Benefit Live Trial in order to avoid the period immediately before and after the millennium. This also deferred start of Multi-Benefit roll-out by 7 months. He emphasised that if this were to happen, there was potentially a commercial impact on all parties and a risk of litigation.
22. Andrew Simpkins said that Option 3 was no easier to pursue from a commercial perspective than 2 and as such Horizon did not recommend it.
23. Andrew Simpkins said that Options 2 and 3 would not be negotiable with ICL Pathway and that they consider Option 1 - the Treasury review plan - the

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contractually binding one. As such, ICL Pathway will make every effort possible to start Model Office by 15/2/99.

24. Andrew Simpkins said that bearing these factors in mind, Horizon recommended that a decision about whether to pursue Option 1 or 2 be delayed until mid-March. This would allow for the ICL Pathway test processes to be monitored weekly and for the service management issues to be progressed. It would also give time for the Ministerial decision to be made on the future of card payment. Dave Miller reiterated his view that Pathway slippage would put the matter into deferral, changing the current proposal from Option 1 to either Option 2 or 3.
25. George McCorkell said that he understood the dilemma presented to Horizon by the commercial considerations outlined. However, waiting for a Ministerial decision before deciding on the plan was not an option because the Minister would have to sign up to a plan and a set of matching commercial agreements before a decision could be reached. George McCorkell also stressed that CAPS would lose all credibility with the field if it gave them a set of dates it subsequently failed to meet.
26. George McCorkell asked Dave Miller what level of confidence he had in Option 1. Dave Miller said that he had seen some hopeful signs that Option 1 was deliverable because of the results of the first cycle of pre-proving, but he could not provide a considered assurance until he had seen the results of the second cycle of testing. That was why Horizon were recommending a delay on a decision. Dave Miller said that until then he could only say that he did not know if Option 1 was deliverable.
27. George McCorkell said that the CAPS Programme could progress without a decision for 1 to 2 weeks, but there was a need to work out a process for finalising commercial matters, and this could not be done without a plan.
28. George McCorkell suggested that although Option 2 might lead to a 7 month delay in beginning Multi-Benefit Card Roll-out, it might not mean that the end of roll-out would also be delayed by 7 months.

### AP 11.4 Vince Gaskell (Val Curran) to assess the impact of Option 2 on CAPS Implementation

29. George McCorkell said that Option 1 was not the preferred Option of the BA. Option 2 changed dates by 7 months and clearly the commercial effects needed to be dealt with, but Option 1 was unattainable. He stressed that a decision had to be made in the next 2 to 3 weeks so that plans could be finalised.
30. Dave Miller concluded that where Horizon were optimistic that Option 1 dates could be kept to, BA were pessimistic. George McCorkell said that it was more accurate to say that BA were realistic.

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31. George McCorkell said that in conclusion, Dave Miller could not say at this point that Option 1 was deliverable. Dave Miller and George McCorkell agreed to have further off-line discussions about the way ahead and the tabled options. Vince Gaskell said that whilst these discussions took place, focus should be placed improving confidence by defining the entry criteria, multi-benefit pre-proving activity and the scope of testing. George McCorkell said that the emphasis should be on planning what was realistically achievable.

*Dave Miller said that obviously George would not say that it wasn't.*