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Name of Bug	**Date**	**Jenkins/Chambers**	**PEAK references & Trial Bundle Ref**	**What was said by Jenkins/Chambers**
1. Receipts and Payments Mis-match bug.	Occurred in 2010	Gareth Jenkins	PEAK PC0204263 dated 16 September 2010 **(Ref F/709/1)**	The bug was documented in a report from **Mr Gareth Jenkins** dated 29 September 2010 where it was stated: "This has the following consequences: There will be a receipts and payment mismatch corresponding to the value of discrepancies that were lost. Note that if the user doesn't check their final balance report carefully they may be unaware of the issue since there is no explicit message when a receipts and payment mismatch is found on the final balance (the user is only prompted when one is just detected during a trial balance)"
2.Callendar Square/ Falkirk bug.	Occurred between the years of 2000 and 2006	Anne Chambers	**(Ref F/333.1/3)**	Fujitsu employee, **Anne Chambers,** stated in an email to Mike Stewart (Fujitsu) in February 2006: "Haven't looked at the recent evidence, but I know in the past this site had hit this Riposte lock problem 2 or 3 times within a few weeks. This problem has been around for years and affects a number of sites most weeks, and finally Escher say they have done something about it."

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3. Suspense Account bug.	Years of effect 2010 to 2013	Gareth Jenkins	PEAK PC0223870 **(Ref F/1045/1)**	**Mr Gareth Jenkins** in 2013 prepared a note entitled "Local Suspense Problem" **(Ref F/1075/1)** which identified that, at that stage, 14 branches had been affected. He stated: "The root cause of the problem was that under some specific, rare circumstances some temporary data used in calculating the Local Suspense was not deleted when it should have been, and so was erroneously re-used a year later. When the SPMR was asked to clear Local Suspense the actual (ie incorrect) amount was recorded in the Audit Trail. This means that there was no corruption in the audit trail and it accurately reflects the transactions that occurred in the Branch. If the BTS from the previous period was taken to provide a set of Opening Balances and all transactions that were logged to the audit trail during the period were taken as adjustments, then this would show the correct value that should be in the Local Suspense account." He also stated, in a passage that is of interest in terms of the dispute between the parties about the use of Audit Data or management data such as Credence (the Post Office maintains that the latter are sufficient, the claimants insist the former are the relevant accurate records) the following: "As well as passing these Local Suspense transactions to the normal accounting tables that are used to update POL SAP and Credence, they are

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				also written to a table in the Branch Database that is used to support the printing of the Branch Trading Statement (BTS) after that Branch has been fully Balanced." Further detail of the problem explained by **Mr Jenkins** in the same report was: "In April 2011 a problem was found with the archiving strategy related to Stock Units that have been deleted in a Branch. A consequence of this is that some changes were made to the archiving strategy on 3rd July 2011. An unintended consequence of this change was that any Branch that deleted a Stock Unit at the end of 2010 which had local suspense transaction in that Stock Unit before it was deleted were left in the table used for constructing the BTS. This meant that as Trading Periods cycle around each year, these BTS records became visible in 2011 when the same Trading Period was reached. The effect of these old records was that after the BTS was produced an incorrect figure was generated for the Opening Balance of the Local Suspense Account for the following period. This amount corresponded to the value of the historical record. These orphaned records were created between 16th November 2010 and 9th December 2010."

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				The Note prepared by **Mr Jenkins** makes it clear that, despite how the Post Office sought to present this in their submissions, this problem persisted. The document states: "This problem was not reported to Fujitsu in 2011/12 and only affected a small number of Branches and only for a single Trading Period. However the two branches with the largest discrepancies did report the issue to Post Office Ltd who could see the impact of the problem in their back end system and wrote off the loss or gain for the branch but did not ask Fujitsu to investigate further. At the same Trading Period in 2012/13, the problem re-occurred and this time one of the affected Branches reported the problem to Fujitsu on 25th February 2013 (Peak 223870) resulting in a detailed analysis of this issue and finding the orphaned BTS records. The root cause was determined by 28th February 2013 and a preliminary report was sent to Post Office Ltd. A further update was sent on 14th March 2013 with a full analysis of the issue and all the affected branches."

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5. Remming In bug.	Present for about five months in 2010 between March and August	Anne Chambers Gareth Jenkins	PEAK PC0203085 **(Ref F/695.1/1)** PEAK PC0195380 **(Ref F/588/1)**	**PEAK PC0203085** On 17 August 2010 from **Anne Chambers:** "A cash pouch was remmed in twice at branch 126109: Pouch barcode 399347067204 2p coin £60 50p coin £250 5p coin £100 Session 1-350379 16/09/2010 10:08 Session 2-195226 16/09/2010 10:08 The PM cannot reverse the transaction since rem reversal isn't allowed. This is NOT another example of the duplicate rem problem that we have seen in the past, where use of the Prev key accepted the same pouch twice. In this case the pouch was processed on both counters... 09:05 c2 get pouch status, retrieve pouch details 09:06 c1 get pouch status, retrieve pouch details 09:08 c2 settle pouch delivery 09:08 c1 settle pouch delivery There were some printer problems on counter 2 which probably explain why this was done." The other contradictory entry within the same PEAK is the next day, 18 August 2010 and states, again from **Anne Chambers**

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				"I checked whether there were any exceptions in the BAL OSR logs for any of the messages, there was nothing. **Gareth Jenkins** thinks that it should not be possible to complete the rem in on both counters. Please investigate." **(F/695.1/4)** **PEAK PC0195380** This KEL was raised by **Anne Chambers** on 2 March 2010, updated on 3 May 2011, and the keywords are remittance, remittence, remin, pouch and delivery. It can be seen that the following is included in the KEL: "Symptoms The clerk went into the Delivery menu and scanned two pouches (one of currency and one of coins). The second pouch was recorded twice on the system, resulting in a loss of £80. Two Rem In slips relating to the second pouch were output, both identical, as well as one for the first barcode. In the most recent instance, the same pouch was remmed in on two different counters at about the same time. Problem This was caused by using the Prev key during / just after the pouch barcode scans. Now fixed - details in PC0195380.

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				In PC0203085, the same pouch was processed on both counters... 09:05 c2 get pouch status, retrieve pouch details 09:06 c1 get pouch status, retrieve pouch details 09:08 c2 settle pouch delivery 09:08 c1 settle pouch delivery PC0203085 - fix applied Jan 2011. Solution - ATOS A transaction log search will prove that the Rem In has been duplicated. Send call to SSC, quoting this KEL. SSC: Known problems have been fixed, so needs fresh investigation if it happens again. POL may need to issue a TC to undo the effects of the extra rem in (in the meantime the branch will report a shortage), so MSU need to inform POL via BIMS."
6. Remming Out bug.	Identified February/April 2007	Anne Chambers	PEAK PC0143435 **(Ref F/384/1)**	Split into two in the Bug Table, 6(i) and 6(ii) Bug 6(i) was identified as KEL **acha**508S. **(Ref F/403/1)** Fujitsu created KEL **acha**508S to advise branches to correct the problem manually and ran automated reports to spot any further occurrences.

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7. Local Suspense Account issue, not the same as 3. Suspense Account bug.	Reported in 2010	Anne Chambers		There were four associated KELs, two were raised by **Anne Chambers** namely **acha**5259Q **(Ref F/637/1),** (for which there were 6 PEAKs) and **acha**5838T (which states there are "two different but similar problems" and appears in the text, but not in the list of KELs at the end of the text by Mr Coyne). Dr Worden's comments in the table were that: "The KEL acha5259Q implies that PO and Fujitsu were able to identify all occurrences of the problem, without being notified by any Subpostmaster. I would therefore expect them to have corrected any impact on branch accounts as part of normal error correction processes. I would not expect evidence of all corrections to accounts to have survived to the present day. PEAKS and KELs are not used to record corrections of financial impact."
8. Recovery Issues.	Years of effect from 2010 to 2018	Anne Chambers	PEAK PC0197769 **(Ref F/617/1)** PEAK PC0214226 **(Ref F/870/1)**	Mr Coyne dealt with two different documents in his report, PC0197769 and KEL **acha**959T. The former was created on 15 April 2010 during the pilot phase of Horizon Online. The root cause of the issue was identified on 26 April 2010, work on a fix was started and this was released in early June as shown in Release PEAK PC0199000 (and then estate-wide to pilot branches) by mid-June 2010.

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				The reference to the "959T" KEL below is the KEL whose full title is acha959T which was **raised by Anne Chambers.** KEL**acha**959T is also the very same KEL referred to in PEAK PC0214226 dated 14 December 2011, headed "Failed Recovery Transaction(s) 12 Dec 11"
11. Girobank discrepancies.	Occurred between May and September 2000	Anne Chambers	PEAK PC0073855 **(Ref F/112/1)** PEAK PC0075312 **(Ref F/114/1)**	In PC0075312, a SPM raised an issue with printing her giro deposits. The issue was identified as being caused by the same root issue as PC0073855 which was already with the development team. These did not impact branch accounts. The KEL with which they are associated is KEL **AChambers**4410R, the same KEL as the PEAK in Issue 4.
12. Counter-replacement issues.	Occurred from 2000 to 2009	Gareth Jenkins	PEAK PC0052823 **(Ref F/54/1)**	PEAK PC0052823 gives a technical explanation for this. It also notes that "Gareth Jenkins viewed this error on rig with Mike Berrisford."
19. Post & Go/TA discrepancies in POLSAP.	Occurred in 2012	Anne Chambers	PEAK PC021943293 PEAK PC021870294	**Anne Chambers** records that: "Branch 020511 has many entries in the Subfiles_on_hold report. This report should be monitored (by ?) to make sure problems are followed up - this should be resolved before closing this call.

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				Horizon is receiving PG data for 6 separate PG tills at the branch, but only 4 of them have associated stock units. This causes the entire subfile for the branch to be Held, and the transaction data is not being sent to POLSAP. However the TA data for the 4 tills which are properly associated IS being sent through, and I think this is probably the cause of the POLSAP anomalies. The two unassociated tills are not doing any cash transactions - this is a known problem (see PC021870294), and means the PM isn't prompted to create an association. This may need fixing via MSC." A bug fix to the Horizon system was identified by Fujitsu, scheduled for implementation 13 September 2012 On 17 September 2012 **Anne Chambers** herself reported in the PEAK that: "Following a change made centrally to facilitate this, the stock unit associations for the two new Post and Go terminals have been created by the branch and all the held external data (43 different days) has now been processed and passed through to POLSAP… We strongly recommend that POL monitor the SubfilesOnHold report which is sent to them daily, so that any other external terminals with

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				problems can be investigated quickly in case a similar correction is needed".
23. Bureau de change	Arose in 2005, 2006 and 2010	Anne Chambers	PEAK PC0200042 **(Ref F/662.1/1)** PEAK PC0200090 **(Ref F/663/1)**	The solution in one of the KELs, raised by **Anne Chambers** namely AChambers2252R is: "Solution - ATOS If a PM reports a loss connected with a currency transaction that was reversed, it is possible that the reversal had not been carried out successfully. Ask the PM to check the Reversal Receipt. If this shows Cash FROM CUSTOMER 750.00 Cash TO CUSTOMER 750.00 they have reversed just the cash settlement part of the transaction, which has no overall effect. The currency and margin part of the transaction has not been reversed. Do a transaction log search using the Session Id from the original receipt, or by date/time. This should show 3 elements - for example 2-29826-2 SC Euro 1-720.00- 2-29826-2 SC Curr Sell Margin 1-30.00- 2-29826-3 SC Cash 1 750.00 The element which should be reversed is 2-29826-2 (i.e. Euros and margin). As long as the PM has not yet rolled over the stock unit, they should be able to reverse this transaction now. If the stock unit has been rolled over, NBSC will have to advise on what can be

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				done to resolve the system loss relating to this transaction."
24. Wrong branch customer change displayed.	Occurred in 2005	Anne Chambers	PEAK PC0128264 **(Ref F/310/1)** PEAK PC0129791 **(Ref F/317/1)**	Peak PC0128264 was opened on 4 November 2005 as a result of a SPM reporting the issue on 4 November 2005. The matter was passed to Fujitsu's development team for a software fix on around 10 November 2005 and a fix was implemented on 18 November 2005. On 6 December 2005, a further instance was reported (Peak PC0129791). The root cause was identified and it was found that this issue related to Peak PC0128264 which documented the fix that had been put in place. The KEL on this was again one authored by **Anne Chambers.**
26. TPSC 250 Report.	Occurred between 2005 and 2009	Anne Chambers Gareth Jenkins	PEAK PC0123056 **(Ref F/287.1/1)**	One PEAK, namely PC0123056, in its entry for 12 July 2005 by **Anne Chambers:** "Yes this is another instance of KEL AChambers253L - mails transaction total value £1.86, prepaid £4.26, so postage label for -£2.40 generated. This has upset the counter reconciliation figures."

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				The software upgrade was accompanied by something called "S80 Release Note – Deferred PEAKs List – Counter." This document is dated 13 October 2005 and is 32 pages long. It "details PEAKs that are outstanding at S80" and the approved form of that document is in the trial bundle. The Technical Design Authority for it was **Gareth Jenkins. (Ref F/303/2)**