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
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|  | <p>IT issues Conference Call</p> <p>7th April : 2pm-3pm</p> <p style="border: 1px dashed black; display: inline-block; padding: 2px;">GRO</p> <p>Pin: 71583220</p> |  |
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| Item | Description |
|------|---|
| 1. | Service Desk Notifications - text alerts, end of day reporting on Network and Contact Centre affecting issues reported through NBSC. |
| 2. | Reporting incidents into the Service Desk – time taken to actually report the incidents, Service Desk understanding of the incident and where to report to. Examples are: BT related incidents (ICM, BT Cloud), AD user accounts, general Network issues (Moneygram outage) |
| 3. | Service Desk sending IT related incidents back to NBSC to resolve or obtain further information from the Branch. |
| 4. | Horizon balancing issues – mismatch caused by a ref data change. Service desk pushing calls back to NBSC to resolve. |
| 5. | EUC – roll out, issues with access to BT Cloud, Access to shared drives. |
| 6. | Change process – Ref data changes, Camelot lottery changes. Access to 3 rd party call logs. |

Detailed Agenda Items 07.04.16

- Sunday 03.04.16 planned outage which had been communicated to Network by Message Broadcast (MBS) but an alert went out to key stakeholders stating multiple users unable to access Horizon.
- 31.03.16 Paystation TM Bill Payments Incident No. I/8819908- Transaction Acknowledgements (TAs) not received into branch from Tuesday of that week (advice is to wait 48 hours before reporting) NBSC gave the alert to Atos once calls started to come into NBSC 31.03.16. Communication didn't get sent to Network until Friday 12.15 pm (MBS 048) even though Atos had been notified by Jackie Witham Finance Service Centre (FSC) on Thursday 31.03.16. Notification had been sent to Atos by email (Jackie Witham FSC) rather than being telephoned to them. Clarity needed on who takes ownership and who monitors spikes for transactions failing as NBSC/Network branches should have been made aware earlier.
- 26.03.16 – 30.03.16 Horizon balancing Issues-master incident Ref I8808466 other reference numbers include I8798391 / 1722589 / A11943675. Branches started to ring into NBSC to report mismatched figures when balancing. Issues reported to Atos however Atos, including Ian Humphries, were referring the


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calls back to NBSC. the root cause of balancing errors has been identified as an issue with the reference data for a small AP scheme known as Your Housing Group. Fujitsu reported that there were just over 100 branches that had transacted against the problematic scheme, fix put in place but could have been done much earlier.

- 22.02.16 Moneygram Error code 99, error code 1204, impact to branches has been ongoing since changes to product in November 2015. NBSC process is to report an increase in calls from Network branch to Atos. Atos in turn were referring branches back to NBSC. Comms to Network have been consistently slow and this increases calls into NBSC.
- 10.07.15 TC acceptance problem Ref: I7644212. First reported to Atos by FSC on 10.07.15. NBSC subsequently flagged further incidents from branches. Atos kept stating user error and it took until 07.09.15 for Atos & Fujitsu to confirm that there is a bug – a fix will need to be developed, tested and rolled out. We're still awaiting confirmation that the fix implemented on 14.09.15 was successful, that no further incidents have been raised and no branch was adversely affected. (including any branch who may not have raised an issue) NBSC 50% over forecast but calls should have gone to Atos and been managed by them. Wednesday Call
- 06.06.15-Branches were forced to declare cash and found discrepancies I their sales reports. NBSC raised the incidents to Atos but it took a number of calls before the issue was investigated. Wednesday Call
- Disconnected sessions/Stuck transactions- now resolved but it took over a year to get Atos to reinstate a process that should have been baton passed on Service Integration. BIMS process between branch, Fujitsu and POL Finance Service Centre. Branches were being referred back to NBSC to ask for "POL to authorise deletion of transactions" this caused concern within POL & legal teams as sessions cannot be deleted. Throughout Second Sight case management our statement has always been that transactions are corrected with a full audit trail retained. Wednesday Call
- Further examples are :-
- Unable to connect to datacentre 25.10.16 189 calls to NBSC.
- Camelot Lottery changes (13,14,15 October 2015) to £2.00 free ticket. Impact to Network significant, impact to NBSC 12.10 63% 105% 107% 84% 47% 34% over forecast (forecast 10190 got 18257 calls offered).
- Drop & Go- multiple issues.
- Health Lottery- October 2015 branches unable to process prize payments (who should test changes prior to go live, who communicates, who monitors spikes with transactions/transactions failing?)
- October 2014 onwards-AP mismatches as a result of faulty barcode reader. The issue is that a branch user scans an AP transaction with a bar code reader all

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works fine, when the next customer arrives with an AP barcode the payment the customer makes goes to the previous client account with all future customer barcode scanned payments taken on that particular terminal in that branch defaulting to the first client account at the time the barcode reader becomes faulty. The incidents are resolved by replacing the barcode reader once the branch or customers alert the IT helpdesk or CCU of the problem. By this time however a number of customer payments may have gone to the wrong client. FSC have a process for putting things right but it relies on the customer, client or occasionally the branch alerting IT service desk or POL that something has gone wrong, this doesn't always happen and FSC hold the amount pending resolution. Still awaiting an explanation from Fujitsu/Atos. Wednesday Call.

- Change Request for third party supplier information- Still outstanding first flagged in April 2014. Questions now raised regarding who and how supplier contracts are managed? What call logs/engineer information is within their contract to supply? What happens when suppliers move on? Wednesday Call. Request for IT attendance on Wednesday call.
- IT & EUC issues affecting NBSC/CCU/POEx- BT cloud admin access rights ongoing since 2-3 weeks. Drives down 04.04.16. New AD users ongoing since Jan 2016. BT cloud outage Sun 14.02.16 cloud outages 4 times a day ever since. Calls from branch and customers cut off. Failures with Dynamics logging tool and still no access to full reporting suite.