Fujitsu Services	Major Incident Report	Ref:	CS/REP/189
		Version:	1.0
	COMMERCIAL-IN-CONFIDENCE	Date:	24th-Aug-2004

Document Title: Major Incident Report Covering APS Stranded Transactions & APS Reconciliation's between the period 10th July – 29th July 04

Document Type: Report

Release: *S 60*

Abstract: Report covering APS Transactional Processing following S60 Data centre upgrade weekend.

Document Status: Review

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0.0   Document Control

0.1   Document History

Version No.	Date	Reason for Issue	Associated CP/PinICL
0.1	01st Aug 04	Initial Draft	
1.0	24th Aug 04	For Approval	

0.2   Review Details

Review Comments by :	6th September
Review Comments to :	Author

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0.3   Associated Documents

Reference	Version	Date	Title	Source

Unless a specific version is referred to above, reference should be made to the current approved versions of the documents.

0.4   Abbreviations/Definitions

Abbreviation	Definition
AP	Automated Payments
CTS	Client Transaction Summary
CFM1	Core Services Unix
DM	Duty Manager
APS	Automated Payments Service
LST	Live System Testing
PM	Problem Manager
PMDB	Problem Management Database
PO	Post Office
POA	Post Office Account
POL	Post Office Limited
SMC	Systems Management Centre

0.5   Changes in this Version

Version	Changes
0.1	This is the first draft
1.0	For Approval

0.6   Changes Expected

Changes

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0.7 Table of Contents

1.0 Introduction

This document reports on the issues of the failure of Fujitsu Services to Deliver APS Client data files and CTS reconciliation's issues.

This report covers:

- How the problems came to light

- The impact on the branch service

- The investigation

- The resolution

- The root cause

- Actions and recommendations to prevent recurrence

2.0 Scope

The scope of this report covers the failures of Fujitsu Services to Deliver AP client data to a number of AP clients, those of which do not receive files on all 7 days of the week, between the period 10th July – 15th July 04. Attached at Annex A provides a complete list of clients.

It also covers the failure to produce automated APS reconciliation reporting accurately in the form of the daily CTS file produced, between 10th July 04 – 29th July 04. It should be noted that whilst automated process was non operational manual reporting was being covered daily.

3.0 Management Summary

The problem was initially discovered following the weekend of the Data Centre upgrade 9th – 10th July 04. Following the overnight schedule on the 11th July 04, at approximately 09:30 Monday 12th July 04, POL informed fujitsu service's, service Management that there was possible errors in the CTS file. It was suggested that this file was considerably less value than would have been normally expected the approximate value of transactions expected being reduced by up to £30 million.

Throughout these problems the correct escalation routes – including to POL – were followed

Full services were resumed on 15th July 04, following successful development and testing of the required scripts prior to release into the live estate for all AP client stranded data.

The fix for the CTS reconciliation's problem was delivered to live on 29th July 04.

5.0

5.1 Symptoms and Business Impact

5.1.1 Symptoms as seen by Branches & Post Office Ltd.

5.1.2 CTS File Impact

The CTS file had been reported as being considerably under value than expected. The effect of the reconciliation reports being incorrect would have impacted POL's financial settlement with their AP clients. Volumes of client enquiries to POL regarding the missing data and subsequent client settlement, meant that POL had to settle a number of client account on previous trend data. The effort required to settle client accounts and the subsequent adjustments once the true figures had been obtained caused a considerably amount of extra work involved.

4.1.3 AP stranded Transactions Impact

The potential impact of the incident where AP transactions were not migrated from Dynix to Solaris during the S60 Data Centre upgrade was high. All clients who do not receive files 7 days a week were impacted by this, 5 -6 day a week clients did not received data harvested Friday 9th and Saturday 10th July and 6 day a week clients did not receive data harvested Saturday 10thJuly.
The impact is both visible to the AP Clients and their customers with no record of their transaction being received by the AP Client, this could cause red bills, customer disconnections for utility companies and BT, penalty charges or court action due to late payments, cancellation of insurance for AON and would be very visible to the customer. Branches would be receiving complaints from customers who had paid but their account had not been debited and the Helpdesk would have been receiving calls both at Post Office and the AP Clients.

5.2 Detailed explanation of the incident

Clients affected are those that receive files on a 5 day or 6 day basis. These clients receive a 'mop up' file on a Sunday, which includes Friday and or Saturdays files plus any from the Sunday. The clients had been sent the Sunday file but this file only contained Sunday data and did not include the data from Friday and/or Saturday.

This has been diagnosed as affecting those Post Office clients whose transaction data, put through the system on Friday prior to the Solaris port, was scheduled to be sent on Monday. As per normal operation, these transactions were captured in 'Pass Through' files, generated by Dynix. There was a migration step missed in the port to Solaris and these transactions were not migrated into the Pass Through tables in the Solaris database. The net effect being that any transactions generated on the Dynix database not processed that evening for transfer to the clients are still being held in the Pass Through files.

- **There were 581,481 transactions in the pass through files that were not processed. These include Reversed/Reversal pairs that should not be sent to clients.**

- **There are 578,091 transactions not placed into client transmission files.**

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- **These transactions had a value of £22,421,647.86**

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The difference between these figures and those supplied on Monday 12ᵗʰ July 04 is explained by the inclusion of Saturday and Sunday transactions that were sent to clients. These figures are shown on reconciliation report APSS2133 in the reconciliation error line for processing dates 11/07/2004 and 12/07/2004.

Note that the reconciliation reports include Reversed/Reversal pairs .

Value (£)

36,603,932.60	Monday figures as supplied
14,055,741.47	Minus Sunday recon error
126,543.27	Minus Monday recon error
22,421,647.86	Total

6.0 Incident Management

Date & time	Avoidance, mitigation and resolution activities	Communication and escalation activities	Business Impact
	INCIDENT		
12/07/04 09:30	Alerted by POL that the CTS file was potentially Light by some £30 million.	Not aware of any problem at this point investigations started to determine what had gone wrong.	POL could not settle with AP clients accurately.
11:59	Confirmed by SSC that a number of TX's had not been passed to AP clients. Investigations still continuing.	Advised POL & FJS Senior business Managers.	
	POL update confirming that a number of clients had reported lower than average TX's.		
12:10	Raised PM on PMDB PM 0000503	Advised POL of cross domain problem	
14:26	Updated POL with confirmation that a number of AP clients had not received data for either Friday's / Saturday's TX's	POL & FJS Business Manager made aware.	
14:30	Advised POL Problem Management that Problem now Identified, as affecting all AP clients who do not receive files 7 days of the week.	Advised FJS business Managers	
13/07/04 10:30 & 14:00	Conference call with POL & FJS, highlighting the root cause and subsequent actions being taken	Advised FJS business Managers	
16:00	At POL request the problem from herein was Managed via PM.		

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It should be noted that, additionally, senior management in POA and, onwards, senior management in POL were advised of these issues during the day.

7.0   Problem Management

The problem (PM0000503) was raised on 12th July 04 at 12:01, the problem was well managed and the appropriate procedures were followed. POL were kept fully informed as to the Root cause, actions being taken & the expected fix time, daily conference calls were set-up to monitor the progress and overall understanding of the problem, theses were then handed back over to formal problem Management procedures on Tuesday 13th July 04 at 16:00. Daily updates were provided to POL and Fujitsu Business Managers until the problem had been rectified.

The script (fix) for the stranded APS client data was delivered into live the evening of the 14^{h} July 04, for overnight processing 15th July 04 following successful development and LST testing. The problem is still active on the PMDB at the moment following a period of monitoring, the forecast closure date being 4th Aug 04.

APS Client CTS file errors, the above problem reference number exist for both calls. POL were kept fully informed as to the Root cause, actions being taken & the expected fix time scale. The final fix for this was delivered to live on 29th July 04, after extensive development and testing, this being more prolonged due to the extraordinarily amount of data that had to be checked.

8.0   Corrective Actions

Incident/problem Issue	Action to be taken	By Whom	By When	Progress made
Migration Issues as such a one off operation.	Lessons which have been learnt, have highlighted the need for additional peer reviews of code changes & and associated testing			

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