

From: "Newsome Pete" [GRO]**To:** "Satchithananda Muhunda" [GRO]**Subject:** FW: UPDATE Q1 : URGENT ACTION : Accessing Horizon**Date:** Tue, 09 Jun 2015 11:40:17 +0100**Attachments:** image001.png; image002.jpg; image011.png; image012.gif; image003.png; image004.png; image005.png; image006.png; image007.gif; image008.gif; image009.gif; image010.gif

Question re-Remote Access

Pete

Pete Newsome
Business Change Manager
Post Office Account, Fujitsu UK&I

[GRO]

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Please consider the environment - do you really need to print this email?

From: Kevin Lenihan [GRO]**Sent:** 30 January 2015 17:51**To:** Mark Underwood1; Melanie Corfield**Cc:** Newsome Pete; Dave Hulbert; Lesley J Sewell; Dave M King; Julie George; Davidson James**Subject:** UPDATE Q1 : URGENT ACTION : Accessing Horizon

Mark / Mel,

James has had a look at your answer to Q1. And thinks there's too much detail for Paula – this was written for a different type of audience. He has captured the same points but in a more appropriate format :-

He states :-

Having looked again at the request from Paula, it appears that the fundamentals around this question (remote access) are not understood. I suggest that Paula is briefed along the lines of the following.

- 1) No transaction data is held locally in any branch. Transactions are completed and stored in a central database and copies of all data is sent to a secure audit database.*
- 2) Sub-postmasters directly manage user access and password setting locally so system access (to create transactions) are limited to approved local personnel only who are responsible for setting their own passwords. Users are only created following an approval process which requires authorisation by the sub-postmaster. All subsequent transactions are recorded against the id used to log on to the system.*
- 3) Once a transaction has been completed, there is no functionality (by design) for transactions to be edited or amended. Each transaction is given a unique number and 'wrapped' in a digital encryption seal to protect its integrity. All transactions are then posted to a secure and segregated audit server.*
- 4) On approval, there is the functionality to add additional transactions which will be visible and have a unique identifier in the audit trail. This is extremely rare and only been used once since go live of the system in 2010 (March 2010)*
- 5) Support staff have the ability to review event logs and monitor, in real time, the availability of the system infrastructure as part of standard service management processes.*
- 6) Overall system access is tightly controlled via industry standard 'role based access' protocols and assured independently in annual audits for ISO 27001, Ernst and Young for IAS 3402 and as part of PCI audits.*

I suggest that we take James advice on this and combine that with the Q2. Answer as proposed.

Mel / Mark – I'll assume that you are okay with this final position unless I hear differently. James has advised that he is contactable over the weekend, so if you need more information / clarification on any points please direct via me and I'll co-ordinate.

Thanks,
Kevin

Kevin Lenihan | Senior Information Services Manager

2nd Floor, 148 Old Street, London EC1V 9HQ[GRO]
[GRO]

Footer 5

From: Mark Underwood1
Sent: 30 January 2015 17:01

To: Kevin Lenihan; Davidson James; Melanie Corfield
Cc: Newsome Pete <[REDACTED]> [REDACTED] Dave Hulbert; Lesley J Sewell; Dave M King; Julie George
Subject: RE: URGENT ACTION : Accessing Horizon

Fine by me. Mel – let me know if you need me to do anything further

Mark

From: Kevin Lenihan
Sent: 30 January 2015 16:59
To: Mark Underwood1; Davidson James; Melanie Corfield
Cc: Newsome Pete <[REDACTED]> [REDACTED] Dave Hulbert; Lesley J Sewell; Dave M King; Julie George
Subject: RE: URGENT ACTION : Accessing Horizon

Mark,

I have the bullets that James provided earlier in relation to Q2 :-

Q. "you have said this is such a vital system to the Post Office, what testing do you do and how often? When was the last time?"

Answer:-

- There is a Joint permanent test team
- Permanent test facilities are in place
- In constant use to test enhancements and maintenance releases (software upgrades, patching etc)
- All code regression tested to ensure stability of the environment
- All change approved formally by change process
- Processes (change, release etc) audited annually by Ernst and Young as part of IAS 3402 standard
- All access and system segregation, security audited by external PCI auditors for PCI accreditation
- Consequently system stability is high and availability has run consistently above target over many years

I suggest that any words in association to the above are primarily to make the above flow, and they are the facts. I am happy to reconstruct the above into sentences but don't want to dilute the facts provided.

I propose that we provide Mel with the answer to Q.1) as you have stated below (I have already agreed that content with Dave King, Info. Security. AND the bullets provided by James to Q2. so that the final article is crafted by a Comms expert.

Mel / James / Mark – are you all okay with this or do you need me to do anything else ?

Thanks,
Kevin

Kevin Lenihan | Senior Information Services Manager

2nd Floor, 148 Old Street, London EC1V 9HQ

GRO

Footer 5

From: Mark Underwood1
Sent: 30 January 2015 15:50
To: Davidson James
Cc: Kevin Lenihan
Subject: RE: URGENT ACTION : Accessing Horizon

Hi Kevin my proposed answer to the first question below (it can be sent in its entirety to Mel and she can pick and choose). Though this will need to be signed off by James as accurate.

In terms of the second question, I cannot find anything on the testing carried out. It could very well have been sent to one of my predecessors but I cannot find it anywhere. **James** are you able to put something together based upon the email you sent Kevin?

Mark

In terms of Q1

This question often phrased by Applicants and Second Sight is:

"Can Post Office remotely access Horizon?"

Phrasing the question in this way does not address the issue that is of concern to Second Sight and Applicants. It refers generically to " Horizon" but more particularly is about the transaction data recorded by Horizon. Also, the word "access" means the ability to read transaction data without editing it – Post Office / Fujitsu has always been able to **access** transaction data however it is the alleged capacity of Post Office / Fujitsu to **edit** transaction data that appears to be of concern. Finally, it has always been known that Post Office can post additional, correcting transactions to a branch's accounts but only in ways that are visible to Subpostmasters (i.e. Transaction Corrections and Transaction Acknowledgements) – **it is the potential for any hidden method of editing data that is of concern.**

Can Post Office or Fujitsu edit transaction data without the knowledge of a Subpostmaster?"

Post Office confirms that neither it nor Fujitsu can edit transaction data without the knowledge of a Subpostmaster.

There is no functionality in Horizon for either a branch, Post Office or Fujitsu to edit, manipulate or remove a transaction once it has been recorded in a branch's accounts.

The following safeguards are in place to prevent such occurrences:

- Transmission of baskets of transaction data between Horizon terminals in branches and the Post Office data centre is cryptographically protected through the use of digital signatures.
- Baskets must net to nil before transmission. This means that the total value of the basket is nil and therefore the correct amount of payments, goods and services has been recorded in the basket. Baskets that do not net to nil will be rejected by the Horizon terminal before transmission to the Post Office data centre.
- Baskets of transactions are either recorded in full or discarded in full – no partial baskets can be recorded to the Audit Store.
- All baskets are given sequential numbers (known as Journal Sequence Numbers or JSNs) when sent from a Horizon terminal. This allows Horizon to run a check at the Data Centre for missing baskets (which triggers a recovery process) or additional baskets that would cause duplicate numbers (which would trigger an exception error report to Post Office / Fujitsu).
- All transaction data in the Audit Store is digitally sealed – these seals would show evidence of tampering if anyone, either inadvertently, intentionally or maliciously, tried to change the data within a sealed record.
- Automated daily checks are undertaken on JSNs (looking for missing / duplicate baskets) and on the digital seals (looking for evidence of tampering).

From: Davidson James [GRO]
Sent: 30 January 2015 12:42
To: Mark Underwood1
Cc: Kevin Lenihan
Subject: FW: URGENT ACTION : Accessing Horizon

James Davidson
Post Office

Fujitsu
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Please consider the environment - do you really need to print this email?

Mark,

As discussed, can you hook up with Kevin to review what answers have already been provided to second sight as this should form the Post Office response.

Thanks,

James.

From: Kevin Lenihan [GRO]
Sent: 30 January 2015 09:28
To: Newsome Pete
Subject: URGENT ACTION : Accessing Horizon


Pete,
My phone call earlier today refers.

I need some urgent information as per Paula's note please. Apologies if you've had this before but I'm not aware of the history on this – just point me in the direction of who has that answer and I'll pursue accordingly.

Cheers,
Kevin

Kevin Lenihan | Senior Information Services Manager

2nd Floor, 148 Old Street, London EC1V 9HQ



From: Paula Vennells <[REDACTED] GRO>
Date: 30 January 2015 07:29:00 GMT
To: Mark R Davies <[REDACTED] GRO> Lesley J Sewell <[REDACTED] GRO>
Subject: Urgent: Accessing Horizon

Dear both, your help please in answers and in phrasing those answers, in prep for the SC:

1) "is it possible to access the system remotely? We are told it is."

What is the true answer? I hope it is that we know this is not possible and that we are able to explain why that is. I need to say no it is not possible and that we are sure of this because of xxx and that we know this because we have had the system assured.

2) "you have said this is such a vital system to the Post Office, what testing do you do and how often? When was the last time?"

Lesley, I need the facts on these - I know we have discussed before but I haven't got the answer front of mind - too many facts to hold in my head! But this is an important one and I want to be sure I do have it. And then Mark, to phrase the facts into answers, plus a line to take the conversation back up a level - ie., to one of our narrative boxes/rocks.

Thanks, Paula

Paula Vennells
Chief Executive
Post Office Ltd

[REDACTED] GRO
[REDACTED] GRO

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