To: Harvey Michael[_____GRO_____]; Bell Gavin[_____GRO_____]
From: Newsome Pete[/O=EXCHANGE/OU=ADMINGROUP1/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=BLAGG-NEWSOMEP]
Sent: Thu 6/25/2015 1:01:24 PM (UTC)
Subject: FW: 3 scenario demo

Information below as discussed.

Pete

Pete Newsome
Business Change Manager
Post Office Account, Fujitsu UK&I
Tel:[_____GRO_____]
E-Mail: pete.newsome@[____GRO____]
Web: http://uk.fujitsu.com

Fujitsu is proud to partner with Shelter, the housing and homelessness charity

Please consider the environment - do you really need to print this email?

From: Parker Steve
Sent: 25 June 2015 12:05
To: Haywood Dave; Newsome Pete
Subject: RE: 3 scenario demo

Minor changes inline

From: Haywood Dave
Sent: 25 June 2015 11:32
To: Newsome Pete; Parker Steve
Subject: 3 scenario demo

Pete / Steve,

My notes from the meeting. Let me know if you require anything else.

```
1) Original Horizon system – can't demo as doesn't exist
      System was largely batch / able to operate offline with transactions stored at the
      counter
      Hard drive was encrypted to secure local transaction data (Riposte distributed database)
      No remote access to ISDN lines because of service provider closed user group.  Even if it
      was possible to dial a branch ISDN line, the ISDN card in branch counter 1 does not
      answer and drops the call. Counter 1 then calls back to known data centre number(s).

2) HNG-X system
      Robustness of audit trail
      Hard drive is not encrypted as no local transaction data
      Remote access
            Must be a Fujitsu employee
            Security / financially vetted
            ikey token (2 factor authentication)
            Live environment AD username and password
            Access to a Fujitsu network (for Live support Terminal Server access)
            Terminal server logins are audited
            Access from terminal server to counter is not audited
            Remote access branch counter key required
            Knowledge of counter names / IP addresses
            Command line access only (no remote desktop)
            No known way to alter / inject transactions into the counter (no transaction data
            stored locally)

3) Local branch access
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LAN access via hub is possible
Attacker needs to determine and use correct IP address
Encrypted Virtual Private Network (VPN) terminates on all counters
No access to key material
No access to data centre beyond boundary VPN servers
No access to post master / clerk username / password
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4) Remote counter access
        RDP (terminal services) is disabled on the counter
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5) Witness statements from Gareth Jenkins – already in the public domain / second sight
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Regards,

Dave Haywood
Security Architect
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Fujitsu
Central Park, Northampton Road, Manchester. M40 5BP.

Tel: [GRO] or Internally [GRO]
Mob: [GRO] or Internally [**GRO**]