

DRAFT 05.04.01

PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW - HORIZON NATIONAL ROLL OUT

1. BACKGROUND

The project had its origins in the counter automation strategy as part of the business mission and vision to create an automated retail network. Initially the intention was to achieve this via a Private Finance Initiative (PFI) with the Benefits Agency and ICL Pathway.

Implementation began with 10 initial go-live offices in August 1996. A further 314 outlets progressively entered live trial from April 1997 with a phased extension of the software capability culminating in the Core Services Release with full functionality in April 1999.

After a Government review the decision was made in July 1999 to proceed without the Benefits Agency through a separate contract with ICL Pathway for the delivery of implementation and training arrangements. The business case for automation was subsequently approved by the Post Office Investment Board. The go-ahead was given for a further 1532 to go-live from September 1999 and, subsequently, after protracted release authorisation and acceptance deliberations involving a number of rectification plans, the final phase of implementation, national roll out (NRO), to commence from 24 January 2000.

The National Roll Out project emanated from a reorganisation of the Automation Directorate in January 2000. The aim of the project was to manage, both through the contractual relationship with ICL Pathway and internal resources, Horizon implementation and training to all outlets to prescribed timescales, cost and quality specifications. Essentially the project was about delivering a concentrated and challenging installation programme by building on preparatory work done during preceding years. The scope of the NRO project includes all preparation, training and installation work but excludes direct responsibility for live environment performance. The project does not cover the CSR+ software release strand which was managed as a separate project.

2. PERFORMANCE AGAINST ORIGINAL AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

The main objectives as defined in the Project Initiation Document (PID) and performance against each are :-

2.1 Assure through effective planning and management of the components of the plan with ICL Pathway that implementation and training delivered to outlets meets contractual and business requirements on time, cost and quality specifications.

- All milestones have been met, including the PID deliverables, and the project came in under budget
- The structure of the programme was systematic and enabled all key activities

to be undertaken at the relevant time

- Roles were clear and interfaces with other functions, particularly territories, generally good. Some confusion existed in the early days about the decommissioning and recovery of legacy system equipment though this was soon resolved
- PRINCE methodology was used throughout the project. The application of proper project disciplines throughout the project has provided a benchmark for others to follow.
- There has been an evident reluctance by ICL Pathway to treat Post Office Network as a valued customer from the early days of the Horizon system. This may, in part at least, have emanated from the commercial implications of the switch from a PFI to direct contract. A major consequence of this switch was that PON had to extend its implementation team from 10 people to 450 as it inherited added responsibilities, for example, overseeing surveys, undertaking data migration and supporting outlets post-migration
Whatever the cause, without active management by the project team, including the provision of extra resource, ICL Pathway would not have performed as well, and time, cost and quality specifications would have been in jeopardy. ICL Pathway planning and supplier performance was variable and required detailed control mechanisms, systems (eg. issues management, supporting satellite and mobile solution surveys) and people (eg. Contract Compliance Managers, Product Knowledge Managers) to be put in place by us to manage progress and performance of activity at all outlets. Training, initially on course scheduling then latterly on course occupancy levels, was an aspect that required extra management attention throughout
- Training administration attracted criticism throughout around convenience of course locations, inflexibility of dates and course occupancy. Subpostmasters generally found the second day of the Counter Managers course was not focused enough on balancing, suspense accounts, lottery and bureau de change
- Balancing training was perhaps the weakest link until outlets became familiar with the system. Distribution of the Balancing With Horizon guide did much to bolster knowledge and confidence levels and was well received
- The scheduling of activity was geared more towards supplier convenience than the demands of customer service. Having said this the impacts were generally well managed though some tensions were encountered during the later stages of the project
- The management of suppliers and provision of contingency arrangements by ICL Pathway was variable; third party and sub-contracted arrangements were seemingly the weakest link. Greater visibility of performance management information and contact with suppliers without transferring risks to ourselves would have been helpful
- One of the strengths of the project was the comprehensive and structured documentation of processes and change management.

2.2 Satisfactory roll out of Horizon to all outlets taking remedial action to secure business performance by initiating or developing policies/frameworks as appropriate.

- Activity in the outlets generally worked well though problems with ISDN line provision and satellite permission delays eroded achievement of weekly targets on a number of occasions. Some problems were encountered with

appointments and the standard of some survey and modification work at outlets left something to be desired

- The absence of a coherent and robust outlet and product reference data system was evident at various times during the project
- Policies and approaches to support roll out were developed and deployed as appropriate. Documentation, change control and issue management were universally acknowledged as major strengths
- The management of problem outlets (eg. too expensive, no solution, refusals etc) were all handled sensitively with the co-operation of the NFSP
- The Christmas 1999 installation break was a crucial factor in preparing for the rigours of relentless implementation. The various preparation projects undertaken before national roll out commenced were instrumental in securing its success. In particular the Balancing Guide To Horizon filled a real gap.

2.3 Plan and manage Post Office Network resource requirements according to the needs of the project.

- Numbers on the project team were managed according to need via a project manpower plan which was adjusted to reflect significant changes in the ICL Pathway implementation plan. The nature of outlet migration activity resulted in some anomalies in hours worked amongst field staff but these were managed out
- The involvement of senior field management in the sponsorship and development of implementation activity from an early date proved to be an effective arrangement as too did the use of experienced outlet staff
- The organisational structure of the team was generally sound though the revised gradings during SCS implementation, coming as they did just before national roll out began in earnest, caused a degree of consternation and unrest
- A notable success was the way field teams bonded and supported each other
- The training and provision of balance support to outlets during the early cash accounts after migration was co-ordinated through a sub-project before it was subsumed into the service management function
- Training and preparation arrangements for the CSR+ software upgrade, which were handled by the project, generally worked well
- Equipment resources (eg. cars, mobile phones, laptops) and hotel bookings were logistical challenges at times but were managed efficiently and economically. Central London proved to be a particular problem from a parking, transporting and security viewpoint and required special arrangements to be made
- A comprehensive staff release plan and database were developed to manage the release and redeployment of over 400 people from the project.

2.4 Confirm readiness of other business units to engage in Horizon implementation through effective liaison and communication.

- The involvement of PONEC members on the project board facilitated both a high degree of ownership across the business and close and active co-operation in the delivery of the project without becoming intrusive

- The creation of the Horizon Evaluation Review Forum brought together key people from affected units across the business to co-ordinate activity and provided an effective vehicle for brokering solutions to emerging problems. Salient pieces of work included scenario planning, impact analysis of service failures and driving down amounts in suspense accounts
- An influencing plan to secure the active participation of people across the business was developed and deployed and used to inform the communications plan
- Communications was actively driven by the project manager throughout with regular briefings via all the main internal channels, reactive external publicity and attendance at subpostmaster forums at national and local level
- A regular dialogue was maintained with key stakeholders, including NFSP General Secretary, CWU and CMA, territorial staff and support functions to secure their active co-operation.

3. ACHIEVEMENT OF PLAN

- All contractual and business milestones were met. In the early months of roll out actual migrations regularly exceeded plan with a cumulative achievement by mid-October of over 400 outlets ahead of plan. During the later stages of the project some weekly targets were missed as activity moved to the more difficult and thinly spread outlets
- Daily, weekly and monthly reports collated the result of field activity for circulation both within the project and elsewhere in the business. These reports were used to inform and monitor progress against the plan. Deviations from plan were the subject of regular dialogue with ICL Pathway by the NRO project team. High level monitoring of progress against the plan was done by the NRO Project Board and variations were only tolerated where these did not jeopardise contractual or planned migration milestones

4. PERFORMANCE - FINANCIAL

- The management of the complex and extensive contractual arrangement through the specialist services of the Horizon Commercial team was extremely beneficial and enabled the NRO team to focus on delivery
- The project expenditure out-turned favourably against budgetary authority. Even so expenditure control disciplines in the early days of the project were not as rigorous or as widely embedded as they should have been; this was quickly rectified and appropriate responsibilities established
- Within the context of the overall business case and annual budgetary profiles costs were controlled and reported under specific subheads by the NRO Project Finance Manager in the Programme Office. Costs subheads were defined to the lowest sensible accountable level with individuals responsible for activity having accountability for associated costs. Costs were reviewed monthly by subhead against budget by the head of Horizon Implementation and NRO Project Manager. Explanations were sought for any variances, which were only tolerated provided the overall budget and business case was not breached.
- A risk and issues log was maintained throughout the project and regularly reviewed by the project manager and project board

- A Post Project Review of the Horizon Programme will be undertaken by the Horizon Commercial team which will address financial performance more fully including achievement against the original business case and benefits realisation.

5. PERFORMANCE - OPERATIONAL

- The delivery of the project by a dedicated team sitting outside the retail line provided a clear focus and was one of the main ingredients for success. A structured hierarchy with pro-active leadership and good recognition of achievements created a well motivated and performing field force
- The visibility of management information to monitor ICL Pathway performance and initiate necessary remedial activity was generally poor
- The working relationship forged with the ICL Pathway Roll Out Services team were positive and dynamic and a role model for others to follow
- Although all outlets were supported on their first balance by an HFSO sometimes this was on Thursday morning rather than Wednesday afternoon/evening. Where this happened subpostmasters generally felt more exposed and therefore less satisfied
- Both HFSOs and Helpdesks had to go through a steep learning curve in the early days
- Much was asked of RNMs during this project. Although extra resource was provided to do everyday tasks for them they still incurred long hours supporting balances.

6. PERFORMANCE - TECHNICAL

Technical oversight and validation of ICL Pathway activities was almost non-existent compared with the preceding live trial and development phase. Although this was not really a problem it is an area that should not be overlooked either in the Horizon maintenance phase or in future projects.

7. LEARNING OPPORTUNITIES

The full lessons learned report are at Appendix A (NRO project team input) and Appendix B (other business functions).

8. FOLLOW UP ACTIONS

- Satisfactory arrangements exist for the transfer of residual responsibilities to other business units who have all signalled their willingness to accept them. There are no remaining project resources and support services which are not being transferred elsewhere
- All project issues are closed
- All relevant project information is secured and archived or handed on as applicable to permit any future audit of the project's actions and performance
- All involved or interested parties are aware that the project is to be closed and resources disbanded

- The Influencing Plan has been reviewed and ongoing communications messages have been handed on
- There are no contractual implications with decommissioning the project
- ICL Pathway currently have the intellectual property rights to outlet survey plans; future access to these and PON data has been determined.

9. RECOMMENDATIONS

9.1 Supplier issues

- The project, understandably for its size and nature, had a heavy contractual overlay. Despite best endeavours to establish open, constructive, customer focused and forward looking relationships with ICL Pathway directors we did not succeed in mirroring the relationships which existed at working level. Consequently, consideration ought to be given in similar supplier dominated projects in future as to how we can secure commercial benefit via a more creative, constructive and less restraining joint working or partnership arrangement at all levels so that both parties secure a win-win position
- We should never again put ourselves in the position of dependence on either a sole supplier (or, indeed, supplier dominated project progress information) without first establishing a defined and adequate contingency. At the outset we should assure customer pre-eminence with any future supplier who must commit to identify, agree and deliver to our requirements including detailed performance metrics and integrated reporting structures. Furthermore, any future supplier must empower their local field teams to mirror the responsibilities we invest in our people
- Improving the way we manage our chosen supplier; having more than one route without proper technical back-up can make us look both unprofessional and vulnerable
- Supplier scheduling activity, including that of key sub-contractors, needs to be more visibly defined and delivered to an agreed level of quality and time with all activity in any PON location agreed in advance and no indirect contact made with outlets. This should include access to sub-contractor low level plans and guarantees on remedial activity (eg. infrastructure snagging). While it is accepted that suppliers have the right to review the size and structure of their supply teams this should be done in open communication with the customer and any impacts fully understood.

9.2 Project management

- The importance of proper project management disciplines, including documentation, change control, resource and financial management, and the sustained interest, direction and support of the project board throughout cannot be over-emphasised
- The importance of allowing sufficient time to plan and secure the concurrence and readiness of key players pre-implementation should not be underestimated. Defining end user requirements (eg. training, account processing) clearly and concisely at the outset and embodying these in the PID is a necessary discipline. There is also a fundamental need to ensure that all project dependencies are scoped, documented and agreed by all relevant parties and

that compliance controls are in place during the project life cycle to assure consistent delivery

- Business standard planning techniques should be deployed and dedicated planning resource provided from the outset. Any plan of outlet activity should take due account of customer peaks, bank holidays etc and integrate with other concurrent projects which impact on outlets
- Defining end user requirements (eg. training, account processing) clearly and concisely at the outset and embodying these in the PID is a necessary discipline. There is also a fundamental need to ensure that all project dependencies in the form of business interfaces and processes that underpin project deliverables are scoped, documented and agreed by all relevant parties before implementation begins and that compliance controls are in place during the project life cycle to assure consistent delivery
- On any project there needs to be a common, baselined set of data based on robust internal reference data. As a business we are still weak on outlet data management. A strong recommendation for any future project would be to ensure that a universal database, especially for scheduling and performance reporting, is adopted by both ourselves and our supplier with strict control processes being implemented in respect of changes made to that data
- The need for strong and consistent leadership behaviours with clear roles and responsibilities and accountabilities is paramount. On projects of this nature and size a single team concept should be adopted to ensure consistency and avoid communication gaps
- To avoid being numbers driven all projects should develop and deploy a Quality Plan, which should embrace the effectiveness of activities of both external and internal suppliers with appropriate check steps and remedial requirements. Appropriate contingency arrangements need to be identified
- The agreement of the NFSP to use their Discretionary Fund to finance the extra cost of automating those outlets above business limits indicates both the advantage of partnership and seeking inventive ways of meeting excessive costs
- Organisational uncertainty threatened to get in the way of transferring residual responsibilities and people as we planned close down. There is an evident need to be crisper in the way we establish internal ownership and accountabilities.

9.3 Resources

- Major projects of this nature should be run by a dedicated team including a field force outside the retail line and be appropriately fire-walled from future organisational change to avoid jeopardising their outcome. The use of experienced business managers and not consultants to deliver implementation activity, including the use of retail line and appropriate specialist support staff in both the development and delivery stages of the project, is recommended. Key project managers should either have a PRINCE qualification or be given the opportunity to gain this as early as possible. Appropriate specialist staff should be recruited or developed
- There is a need to fundamentally review the way projects are resourced. Employing managers on long term temporary promotion is not only demotivational but creates ill-feeling when they subsequently leave the project and return to original grades. There needs to be a defined process for resourcing projects embracing both substantive appointments where the project is expected to last longer than, say, 12 months, and a clear exit route for release from the

project. All adverts and subsequent appointment letters should completely clarify whether or not the individual has a right of return to their parent unit and this should be agreed and documented with the old and new line managers. All staff upon accepting a vacancy should be made aware that they will be required to remain on the project until their role is no longer required. This should be stipulated as a pre-requisite of accepting the post. A clear and consistent business policy on temporary promotions would remove any doubt and inequalities about the treatment of individuals, particularly those whose temporary promotions have lasted longer than expected or have been extended by the business. A dedicated Personnel contact at key stages is recommended where numbers warrant

- The provision of a special bonus payment for delivering the project was well received and incentive payments of this nature should be considered an essential part of major projects in future
- The right tools in sufficient numbers need to be provided from the outset to relevant staff to enable them to effectively discharge their responsibilities. The physical resources (eg. cars, mobiles, credit cards) required by the project team to allow them to effectively discharge their role needs to be scoped, risk and impact assessed, and provided at an early stage. PON management teams need to be provided also with clear levels of delegated authority at the outset to maximise prompt decision making and issue resolution

9.4 Training

- All training courses and training content to undergo more in-depth development and quality checks prior to delivery to ensure user comfort. Training should be viewed as a process rather than an event and ensure it caters for different learning pace, styles and requirements. A "one size" fits all approach is not always appropriate, especially if an established learning environment does not exist.
- Learning objectives should be clearly defined at the outset and strategic aims built into the PID. The success of training needs to be quantified in terms of contribution to the bottom line.
- Where business procedures are concerned this should be delivered by in-house trainers

9.5 Communications

- It is imperative that robust influencing and communication processes are established from the outset to ensure that all people affected by the change know what is expected of them and are kept abreast of developments and opportunities to sustain morale.

10. CONCLUSION

Although early stages of the Horizon project were plagued with problems National Roll Out can be construed a success meeting all time, cost and quality specifications. Delivering the project via a dedicated team outside the retail line not only assured focus and delivery but enabled us to skill over 400 people in outlet change management, most of whom will be available for future projects.

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Appendix A

POST IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW OF FIELD MANAGEMENT

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Version:1.0

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Reference: HOR/IMP/PRC016

Document Summary : This document addresses the management and logistical learning points encountered identified via the deployment of a field resource nationally . It identifies improvement opportunities which could be used when considering the processes to be adopted in future. The input for the document has been provided by representatives from field and administration teams working in Territorially based teams and the HO Implementation team

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0.1 DOCUMENT HISTORY

Version No.	Reason for Change	Date of Change
1.0	Consolidated National Implementation PIR for Project Manager	N/A

0.2 ABBREVIATIONS

PON - POST OFFICE NETWORK

SSM - SURVEY SUPPORT MANAGER

CCM - CONTRACTS COMPLIANCE MANAGER

NRO - NATIONAL ROLL OUT

ISD - IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT DATA

SSTL - SURVEY SUPPORT TEAM LEADER

HIM - HORIZON IMPLEMENTATION MANAGER

IRM - ISSUE RESOLUTION MANAGER

NHIT - NATIONAL HORIZON IMPLEMENTATION TEAM

IP - IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAMME AREA

ROHD - ROLL OUT HELPDESK

RNM - RETAIL NETWORK MANAGER

0.3 DOCUMENTS CROSS REFERENCED

Reference	Version	Date	Title	Source
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1. SCOPE AND FORMAT OF DOCUMENT

This document has consolidated the main and understandably repeated learning points from across the Implementation domain. Given the level of overlap it has been decided that the training PIR should be the only separate and referenced associated document. This is due to the specific issues and impacts that were realised throughout the programme relating to Training development and deployment.

The main body of the document will outline the general context of how Horizon implementation has been delivered, the management summary of learning underpins this general context of although having worked well, things can be improved for the future.

2. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This document draws heavily on documents and inputs produced by past and present HIMs Nationally, Bill Kerr, Beverley Evans, Liz Moran, Paul Kirk, Mike Cakebread, Dawn Green, Sue Lock and their teams of SSTLs, FSM, HFSOs, CCMs and IRMs.

Input from the HO Team, other HO and retail line areas is also consolidated within this report to provide a holistic view of how key aspects of the the Horizon Field Implementation activity was managed and more importantly could have been improved. Main contributors include, Don Grey, Douglas Craik, Steve Grayston, Graham Katon, Andy Jones, Barry Evans, Ann Cocker, Steve Gibbs, Frank Manning, Peter Pyecock and Martin O'Toole

3. MANAGEMENT LEARNING POINTS SUMMARY

3.1. Implementation Programme Management

- 3.1.1. Future programmes should fit into a view of the transformational outcome at a Group level. From this understanding of expected contribution detail requirements should be drafted covering the full list of programme deliverables, which must be formally defined with business sponsors, and deployment owners.
- 3.1.2. All programmes must embed as much as possible a commercial ethos at the earliest possible time to ensure that operational agreements reflect the impacts on commercial outcomes.
- 3.1.3. PON management teams to be provided with clear levels of delegated authority at the outset of the programme to maximise rapid decision making and issue resolution. Delegated authorities to included in the project mandates, job descriptions inclusive of any budget limits for role / grade.

- 3.1.4. Programmes to have contingency plans / planning defined as core deliverables for all significant interfaces affecting milestone delivery.
- 3.1.5. Programmes need to deploy an ethos of controlled empowerment with defined areas of responsibility to allow field, central and strategic teams to act concomitantly to deliver their input to the programme.
- 3.1.6. Business standard programme management principles should have been applied at the earliest opportunity, with trained and dedicated resource to provide the following deliverables :
- Production of PID
 - Project Organisation, with Role and Responsibilities
 - Project Interface management
 - Product descriptions
 - Product configuration architecture
 - Quality plan
 - Document Review and sign off process
 - Risk management process
 - Issue management process
 - Requirements definition catalogue
- 3.1.7. Ownership of programme requirements should be allocated at the strategic and operational levels ensuring that requirements are passed at points of organisation change, redefinition, removal or delivery of requirements.
- 3.1.8. With a nationally dispersed team, video, telephone, Internet and off site conferencing should all be considered to reduce cost and impacts of travelling whilst maximising impact of information exchange, problem resolution.
- 3.1.9. Programme documentation for review should be provided in an agreed standard or where suppliers veer from agreed packages they must make viewing and printing access available.
- 3.1.10. Infrastructure programmes should plan impacts of bank holidays including roll out rates, upgrade activity, staffing cover.
- 3.1.11. Future major programmes should have as a minimum people experienced in financial and budget management included within the project organisation both at the commercial contractual level and the central deployment levels.
- 3.1.12. Project finance, budget managers should have access to SAP systems to allow adhoc report generation to provide decision support

- 3.1.13. Wherever possible future major programmes should be represented at the initiation stage of any organisational change programmes
- 3.1.14. There should be clear line of sight between change reviewer and their responsibility for agreeing or refusing change.
- 3.1.15. Budget for change to be incorporated into overall programme business case.
- 3.1.16. A fully automated document management system should be mandated and deployed to ensure that only the latest versions of documents , draft or baselines are available for review or reference.
- 3.1.17. Programme information systems and reports to be defined wherever possible in the project mandate i.e. issue management , risk management, document library, change control, scheduling, reporting.
- 3.1.18. Reports should be defined in terms of the on going metrics to be measured or made visible to the business , each report should have an authority to issue with a primary customer group who sign off the need for the report.
- 3.1.19. Reports should be standardised to key information, support tools should allow manipulation if required.
- 3.1.20. Reports should be automated as far as possible and targeted to an identified audiences via an automated interface e.g. Lotus Notes Databases , Business Objects.
- 3.1.21. Wherever possible the implementation plan should be fully discussed and endorsed by all affected parts of the business including other Group projects prior to its initial acceptance. Other projects could then be driven by Horizon as it was the main business objective. and vice versa
- 3.1.22. Have access to a specialist dedicated planning resource in place at the outset.
- 3.1.23. Business standard planning techniques should be deployed.
- 3.1.24. A business planning and integration manager should have been included in the implementation project organisation to avoid conflict situations.
- 3.1.25. For future programmes large scale programmes the planning review process needs to be timely to avoid the continuation of roll out activity against an undefined changed baseline.

- 3.1.26. Wherever possible sight of or access to lower level sub-contractor plans should be agreed in order to place pressure on effective planning and enable detailed review of issues around scheduling e.g snagging programmes.
- 3.1.27. Planning style, format , scope, content, frequency , mediums should be defined as project deliverables at the earliest opportunity.
- 3.1.28. Business interfaces should be defined within the project organisation and mandates with examples of the expected areas of responsibility and scope decision responsibility e.g. operation to define impacts on remuneration to SPMRs, to reach agreements with the NFSP.
- 3.1.29. Budget planning rounds should be formalised and include the management team at the earliest possible opportunity subject to commercial constraints.
- 3.1.30. Roll out planning should ; subject to commercial constraints ; be embedded in contractual re-negotiations as an input as opposed to a reviewer of proposals.
- 3.1.31. Business process changes to be identified as project deliverables as early as possible e.g. NCA conversion requirements and deployment models, management of business configurations.
- 3.1.32. Transformation programmes need to have in situ (or define a requirement) a two tier project interface methodology , e.g at the Strategic programme level to align release plans and at the delivery level to balance product timescales, specification and quality criteria.

3.2. Supplier / Business Interfaces

Supplier

- 3.2.1. The terms of supply, whether from intra-business or external supplier must be clearly defined in contractual terms and not "to be agreed", avoid qualitative requirements where possible, try to be quantitative-deliverables must be measurable in volume and time.
- 3.2.2. It should always be assumed that only contracted services will be provided, any non-contracted enhancements may be welcomed but cannot be relied on until formalised as a contracted service.
- 3.2.3. Every effort should be made for supplier performance to be measured in house rather than by the contractor unless their process/data is entirely transparent and immediately available on demand.

- 3.2.4. Where possible joint working should be used rather than ping-ponging papers, but meetings and agreed actions must be minuted in a central file.
- 3.2.5. All decisions/agreed actions by PO personnel should be in the best interest of the PO, not the supplier. It is reasonable to always assume that vice-versa applies.
- 3.2.6. Wherever possible ensure that systems and software with supplier are compatible with Group standards. Require suppliers to maintain systems and software in line with Post Office Groups IS/IT change/upgrade proposals e.g. :

- Issue management
- Risk Management
- Planning Tools
- Word processing software
- Presentational software
- Spreadsheet software
- Version of Windows

- 3.2.7. Ensure that where continued and reported breakdowns in working relationships have been highlighted , issues are escalated , individuals are dealt with fairly and obstacles are removed from the programme.

Business

- 3.2.8. Impact on all stakeholders must be taken into account, including the "unions" -CMA/CWU/NFSP.
- 3.2.9. For business stakeholders the minimum number of points of contact should be formally agreed with each cascading as appropriate. Consideration may have to be given to interfacing with Postcomm via the PON champion.
- 3.2.10. Identifying who are the real decision makers can sometimes be difficult but must be pursued to successful conclusion to avoid later internal disagreement.
- 3.2.11. The initial identification of needs and interfaces will have to be regularly redressed to keep current.
- 3.2.12. It is important, sometimes vital, not to over-promise other areas deliverables or indeed to make any significant commitment without their agreement.

3.3. Human Resource

3.3.1. Management responsibilities need to be clearly defined and roles should be placed within the project organisation to best suit delivery of the programme e.g the Issue Team may have best been part of the Regional /Territorial Teams thereby ensuring ownership of the resolution of all issues arising.

3.3.2. Key staff on the project should either have appropriate skills on appointment or the appointment process should include a training outcome map for developing the required skills e.g:

Prince 2 qualification
Budget Management , financial control experience
Training development skills
Database use and management
Operational experience
Technical / specialist skills (surveyor, H&S appreciation)

3.3.3. Clarity of roles , relationships and deliverables between HO and Territorial staff needs to be included in the project mandate, to avoid duplication or non-delivery.

3.3.4. The project mandate should fully scope the non HR resources required to deliver the programme at the earliest point e.g Pool Cars, mobile phones, corporate credit cards.

3.3.5. In determining the resources required to support the programme standard business recruitment and procurement processes must be deployed.

3.3.6. Key roles supporting a programme should be defined as part of the project organisation and made available to supplier and sub-contractors . Where appropriate for smoothe working workshops on expected roles and interfaces between the different organisations resources should be held.

3.3.7. HR involvement at key stages is an overriding requirement. Future large scale projects must have a dedicated HR interface identified in the project organisation and mandated to support the programme from conception to closure including an exit policy. Areas of control to include :

Scoping job role
Producing Job Descriptions
Managing Job Evaluation
Advertising (Re) roles in line with plans
Selection process
Monitoring of staff movements

Management of reserve pools
Policy definition for term of appointments, temporary and permanent.
PDP policy
Exist policy developed in line with prevailing business policy

- 3.3.8. Resource deployment to include demonstrating required skills, ability to provide coaching and or shadowing , buddy system as role requires.

3.4. Support Systems and Resources

- 3.4.1. PON needs to address the issue of robust data management . Future projects should adopt a universal database by both Customer and Supplier with strict control processes being implemented in respect of changes made to that data.
- 3.4.2. Single database source should be used for scheduling and management reporting. The tool used should be generic i.e. not requiring specialist development or training by day to day users.
- 3.4.3. Wherever possible business standard software products should be deployed
- 3.4.4. The issue management process and systems should be included in the project mandate and ideally included in the project organisation from the outset.
- 3.4.5. Helpdesk operation deployment should include sufficient time to cater for operator learning curves.

3.5. Communications. Operational and Business Wide

- 3.5.1. Communications must be actively managed at both the operational and wider organisational / PR levels.
- 3.5.2. A dedicated communications manager role should be included in the project organisation and mandated to define, review and support all aspects of communications supporting a key transformation programme.
- 3.5.3. Information exchange with the retail line needs to be timely.
- 3.5.4. Retail Line should be provided with ability to view issue databases directly, with a timely means in place to raise visibility of defined issue types e.g. major costs, refusals to accept standard modification options , installation aborts , flag cases, failed training.

- 3.5.5. General communications on programme benefits, impacts on end users must be closely managed to avoid disillusionment e.g. "No more summaries" "balance at the touch of a button".
- 3.5.6. Exception management process to be defined within project deliverables for , excess costs management options, Non co-operation processes where inclusion to the programme is mandatory.
- 3.5.7. Span of control within field teams needs to be considered carefully, more experienced managers could cope with a reporting line of 15-20 comfortably, where that level is breached balance between creating smaller teams and the length of time larger teams will be running needs to be understood.
- 3.5.8. Field based document standards should be defined as product deliverables at the earliest point including , formats, access requirements , retention and archiving instructions.
- 3.5.9. Any supplier roadshows facing the operational user community should include appropriate business representatives.
- 3.5.10. Supplier communications with user community to be agreed via a single co-ordination point i.e. communications manager.
- 3.5.11. Supplier field based teams must be empowered to make decisions , the scope of their decision making authority needs to be known to ensure issues are escalated quickly.
- 3.5.12. PON Roadshows were widely used and viewed as important to the success of the programme. These should have been co-ordinated and extended nationally providing consistency.

3.6. Field Management

- 3.6.1. Training of PON resource should be as close to utilisation as possible to deployment. Future programmes should include an initial training product for it's staff, and a fallback training product for refresh where programme slippage occurs.
- 3.6.2. Where any portion of a project team is field based, it's supporting management should have in built flexibility to attend sites, meet staff and undertake office bound requirements.
- 3.6.3. Future programmes should seek visibility of supplier resourcing profiles aligned to the programme plan. Horizon has experienced sufficient drop out rates to indicate that plans had little flexibility or contingency built into them.

- 3.6.4. Supplier contingency plans for key programme activities should be defined as product deliverables.
- 3.6.5. The use of SSMs as a standard approach during combined preparation and modifications activity by the supplier was not the best use of resource. A risk approach should have been deployed, i.e. has there been a history of non-co-operation, has there been a history of issues, or extended survey requirements. Rather than blanket attendance.
- 3.6.6. For infrastructure programmes, a snagging process, should be defined as a product deliverable at the earliest opportunity. To include, format, timescales for resolution, exceptions from process i.e. Security and H&S snags to be resolved with investigation and responsibility to be a retrospective investigation, agreement.
- 3.6.7. For a major infrastructure programme, the coverage and application of any warranty, guarantees, should be defined as product deliverables at the earliest opportunity.
- 3.6.8. Allowable exceptions to a standard solution should be identified as product deliverables at the earliest opportunity e.g. Parcel shelving, walk away solution, mobile options, trolley options.
- 3.6.9. The Supplier and their sub-contractors Quality assurance processes, where appropriate, should be reviewed and signed off in relation to infrastructure type works.
- 3.6.10. Provisions of schedules as per a defined product should be included within contractual agreements and include SLA measures.
- 3.6.11. To support a major programme at all levels, flexibility should be embedded in processes, procedures and behaviours wherever possible i.e. to avoid the refusal of entry to events due simply to a change of name.
- 3.6.12. For all user events off site, clear attendance and contact details to be supplied.

4. BUSINESS REQUIREMENTS .

4.1. Contractual

- 4.1.1. The key area of the contract impacting upon Horizon Implementation was schedule A12 of section GO6. In essence this captured the core deliverables of the implementation programme in terms of process development, planning,, reporting, training and installation.
- 4.1.2. The implementation area like other sections within Horizon suffered from a contractual position that was limited in terms of it's definition and level of detail. This was a hangover from the original PFI status of the programme and the consequent decisions to maintain the structures of the contractual agreements .
- 4.1.3. The main driver for any future programme must be to have clearly defined baselined requirements that have a stated own at both the strategic and operational levels. Requirements must have a tracking mechanism to ensure that they retain visibility at times of organisational changes. The decision making authority for requirements needs to be clearly defined as too often Implementation took the lead on requirements and process developments that should ideally have resided within the business e.g. initial payments to sub postmasters, conversion of NCA status, formal removal of temporary closed and closed Fadcodes from the programme

4.2. Business

- 4.2.1. The programme experienced significant push pull factors with other projects e.g. ISIS , Franchise where competing activities were not initially always managed to the outcomes best suited to the business. At the earliest opportunities links at the strategic and operational levels should be identified as a formal product deliverable to ensure that the spirit as well as the requirement to co-operate and apply roll out criteria.
- 4.2.2. Resources were split between territorial reporting lines and Programme delivery, roles and responsibilities need to be fully articulated to ensure that individuals are always fully geared to delivering the best business outcome.
- 4.2.3. Throughout the programme there was a drive to minimise impacts upon the operational environment. For future large scale infrastructure activities there needs to be an operational level

agreement defined at the outset that accommodates the expected level of disruption.

- 4.2.4. Horizon had to react to operational request that strained budgets and the actual staff resources to deliver NRO. Specifically PON determined at a late stage that the planned training and support mechanisms including balance support needed to be enhanced, but within the constraints of overall staff numbers. Whilst this proved possible unrealistic expectations prevailed within the business with regards 100% CA support on Wednesday with some RNMs reluctant to provide cover where HFSOs could not be diverted from NRO activity.
- 4.2.5. RNMs in the vast majority of cases and throughout installation cycle were very supportive. In many respects those occasions where support was less forthcoming related to either an initial lack of information being provided to RNMs or a lack of Horizon experience within the RNM Network to make their support worthwhile (at the time of asking).

5. HUMAN RESOURCES

- 5.1. The Horizon programme attracted a large number of skilled and dedicated individuals at all levels.
- 5.2. Future programmes of this scale should have associated to them a dedicated HR specialist to aid the drafting of the project organisation. To prepare a job vacancy filling plan, training, induction and exit planning.
- 5.3. It was considered a significant gap within NRO that HR issues could not be tracked easily through the business standard approaches. A HR specialist would have been able to draft Job description. Job evaluation inputs with operational managers on the programme freeing up a lot of time and mis-understanding on process, application and the eventual outcomes.
- 5.4. To guard against vested interest such a HR representative would be required to remain outside the formal evaluation.

4. PHYSICAL RESOURCES

- 5.5. The Horizon programme with circa 450 staff nationally had significant physical resource requirements i.e. pool cars, laptops, mobile phones, credit cards, fuel cards, taxi accounts, security passes, HFSO and business operating guidelines. The need for these types of

resources should have been scoped at the earliest opportunity with the programme personnel using internal procurement specialist.

5.6. Main areas of issues raised providing the tools for the job were:

- The production of a robust business case for the provision of pool cars, which should have been led by fleet specialists but was left to the programme. This led to a potential £0.5 M early termination lease risk that took an inappropriate level of management cajoling to remove via reallocation of the fleet.
- Provision of laptops to support the migration of ECCO outlets. The business was generally keeping a lid on distribution of equipment the programme had difficulty identifying the need and how that need was going to be supported.
- Mobiles were identified as an operational necessity. Business rules hindered the early provision, this was subsequently overcome via MD intervention.

5.7. The Horizon Roll Out Database had a direct interface to ICL Pathways. The initial aspects of the RoDB were driven by a consultant developing a bespoke system within Access V2.0. This created a level of tie in given the system protocols that were agreed with ICL Pathway.

5.8. The Horizon programme was fortunate to have one Access expert who could bridge the gap between a consultant driven system to the operational systems that were eventual used to support NRO. With limited expertise in access this created to high a reliance on a single (later group) of individuals

5.9. Access version 2.0 provided an underpinning relational database that supported, Horizon Roll Out database that provided subsequent feeds to, Horizon Scheduling database, the Implementation Support database.

5.10. The Horizon RoDB was not business supported, for future programmes where a significant information tool of this scale is required, it should be defined as a programme deliverable.

5.11. The National Network Database (NNDB) and Reference data systems were core inputs to the Horizon RoDB fields that provided a data exchange facility with ICL Pathway. This data was in many areas widely inaccurate or out of synch with reality. The business needs to address its information sources, there robustness, the update facilities and speed of updating as a matter of urgency.

- 5.8. Remedy was obtained as the programmes issue management system. This was never satisfactory as it was a call management system tweaked for purposes it was never intended to support. For other major projects a standard issue management system should be deployed that is fit for the purpose.

5. TERRITORIAL / BUSINESS INTERFACES

- 5.9. The roles and responsibilities of the HIM verses the HLM teams were defined , however the split of the work and deliverables was to a large extent artificial. For future programmes a matrix management approach for resource should be considered to avoid any pull on "loyalties" or reporting lines.
- 5.10. The Retail Line was very supportive of the Horizon Programme. For future major programmes clear guidelines on policy issues must be readily available to ensure consistency and conformity of deployment e.g. the refusals policy was not deployed as issues raised which has lead to a back loading of potential outlet closures at a politically sensitive time.

6. SUPPLIER INTERFACES

- 6.1. At an operational level strong working relationships were built . There was a mutual desire to deliver the programme to plan. However it was evident that in the early stages ICL Pathway managers were stronger in terms of commercial awareness , and that some at the junior management or new to senior salaried areas needed coaching in these areas. Ultimately the team matched if not exceeded it's counterparts to the mid and later stages of the programme.
- 6.2. PON and ICL Pathway Implementation Teams structures sought to mirror each other throughout the life of the programme in order to provide direct operational links resolving issues at the lowest levels. This approach seemed to work well at the NHIT to Kidsgrove central team levels, but to a lesser extent within the field. The reason would appear to have been that whilst PONs HIM and HLM teams had significant levels of decision making , within the bounds of commercial / contractual limits, the same could not be said of ICL Pathways field teams. For future programmes the suppliers representatives roles and authority levels need to be visible to all and real.

- 6.3. PONs interface with the ICL Planning function and outputs was somewhat torturous. The planning process within ICL pathway seem to be process and system driven with the high level roll out plans rarely reflecting reality, where they eventually did reflect reality it was an historic picture. For future programmes the planning requirements must be defined as deliverables, and when captured not contractually should encompass the need to be updated in line with changing baseline, inputs, political drivers within a specified period.
- 6.4. PON at a direct with ICL Pathway, but had to develop indirect relationships with sub-contractors due to some weaknesses in controls and performance. This primarily related to the Training area where management of the training process was poor throughout the programme by the supplier. It was only via persistent operational pressure, senior management leverage and commercial positioning that training eventually delivered to (expected to) the contractual levels of courses and persons trained within costs parameters.
- 6.5. For any future training programme within an infrastructure environment the training element must not sit outside of the main implementation activities as with Horizon. It is a strong belief that if the training had been within the remit of the Kidsgrove implementation team greater impetus to resolve issues would have forthcoming and pragmatic.
- 6.6. At the outset of the programme there needs to be a clear understanding (through a PID and subsidiary documents) of the products which it is expected that the supplier will provide. This needs to be translated into contractual requirements. If, as in this programme, there is a perceived need to keep the requirements high level (to promote free thinking from the supplier/s), then it is essential that there is detail sitting beneath each requirement providing a level of understanding of what must be delivered and the constraints.
- 6.7. In terms of the requirements there must be, as a minimum, clear ownership of each and version / change management control to allow for business change. Where requirements cross functional or business boundaries it is essential that the 'owner' has responsibility for providing the cross functional view and, for matters of detail, can identify who are the stakeholders who will feed into solution agreement.

- 6.8. In terms of detail encompassed within the requirements - the owner will need to consider in some depth the potential impacts of the solution and where possible pre-empt disagreements downstream with the supplier by stating clearly responsibilities and ownership of relevant elements of the solution. An example where greater 'upfront' thinking may have been beneficial is in the development of the data migration solution where ownership and responsibility for development of the reference data relationship, change management, and data flows may have helped to smooth the way to an agreed solution.

7. BUSINESS CHANGE IMPACTS

- 7.1. The implementation area was affected primarily in two ways, the general business reorganisation SCS and the contractual changes that affected the shape and rate of roll out.
- 7.2. Organisational changes cannot in itself be stopped , however for a programme of Horizon scale it would in future be prudent to include the project / programme manager in impact assessments at the earliest opportunity.
- 7.3. The main areas of concern within the Implementation team with regards contractual changes related to on occasions being an end change impact assessor as opposed to being asked to provide change design inputs. Wherever possible the for future large scale implementation programmes must be involved in shaping the change request rather than responding to it.

8. HFSO FIELD ACTIVITY

- 8.1. HR issues associated to the recruitment of a large field force and how that resource can be managed have been identified earlier in this paper.
- 8.2. HFSO field activity related to the transfer of the outlets operating status from manual to Horizon. This was undertaken via a structured data transfer process using the Horizon MiMan and MiECCO systems.
- 8.3. Conceptually the activity was straightforward. It took some considerable time however to gain the suppliers buy in to the process requirements. The ideal migration working scenario would have been negative stock working, whereby the installation and migration activity could have effectively been separated as entities , and stock declarations would have caught up with entries to the system. The suppliers had a defined solution they were intent on delivering that

had been designed into the overall system. This constrained the migration solution and resulted in PON becoming a sub-contractor to ICL pathway for Migration services.

- 8.4. For any future large scale programme the expected method of data migration must be defined as a core deliverable, with explicit requirements to minimise the impacts on the operational arena and necessary resources to deliver such migration. In essence future migration activity must be defined as via an electronic means , preferably with minor user interaction, i.e. to be done by central systems.
- 8.5. HFSO selection was highly successful in obtaining the right skill set individuals. HFSO Training was considered to be overly long with a lack of emphasis on the more complex areas e.g. suspense accounts. This is generally hindsight, and gaps were overcome within the field by the use of team meetings and the deployment of best practice sessions.
- 8.6. HFSOs built the first significant reservoir of Horizon Operational knowledge and were keen to embed this within the business. They played a significant role in the development of new aide memoirs for using the system and the balancing guides, that have been well received within the network.
- 8.7. The general management logistics of a field force of circa 350 people has provided some of the major challenges to the field teams. Within the overall learning points allocations of pool cars, mobiles, timely schedules have all been identified as key areas of learning for future programmes.
- 8.8. The communications process needs to be speedy and accurate for a field force of this size. One of the main roles of a central team must be to act as a champion for the field force ensuring that they are not bombarded with unnecessary requests, that any request for additional actions have been fully scoped, that any issues or perceptions raised due to one or few minor errors are not mis-represented as general failures.

9. OPERATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS

- 9.1. The field teams set up a very effective update process for teams which included provision of the latest copies of operational procedures.
- 9.2. Field teams were proactive in ensuring that national processes were developed to meet new or revised needs e.g. ALPs.

- 9.3. The Authorised Temporary Procedures and emergency cascades process worked effectively., there were a number of occasions where the needs of the HFSOs for migration activity were not fully scoped and ATPs needed to be changed e.g. Quantum. To overcome this field forces should ensure that they have appropriate links to the areas that generate changes to operational procedures, as Horizon put in place.

10. STRAND DOCUMENTATION

Horizon documentation fell into three broad areas

- (a) Contractual documents with ICL Pathway, Roll out plans, Migration specifications ;

These documents went through a formal document management process ensuring business wide comments were incorporated. The process with ICL pathway included a structured "Fagan" review whereby documents were reviewed line by line with informed representatives of each organisation and signed off on the basis of open debate and closure of issues.

- (a) Requirements /specification documentation

This area formed the largest set of documentation and included the main infrastructure and installation supplier working criteria.. Again these were managed in a very structured manner which worked exceptionally well. This area included the HFSO guide.

- b) Field Procedures

These field based procedures were developed generally between the Head office team and the Field teams e.g. the capping process, or in isolation by the field NHIT. It must be noted that we were not as effective in the overall review, visibility and control of these documents as with ICL documentation.

For all types of documentation the field teams should have had greater inclusion to the final review and sign off to maintain consistent deployment and long term buy in to the processes.

Appendix B

PIR HORIZON PROJECT REVIEW - INPUT FROM BUSINESS FUNCTIONS

1. Security

National security supplied details on screen specification, a number of companies who could carry out the work, the standards employed within the network and how screens could be modified. ICL Pathway compromised certain elements of the screens to ensure the office was a 'fit'. Parcel Hatches, speech units and doors were fitted that were below the normal standard fit sizes.

Compromises in terms of screen specification have been sanctioned to support the Horizon Project albeit against security requirements. In the long term there will be a greater cost implication to the network as non standard equipment will have to be made up specially when replacement is required.

2. Agency & Network Development

The agreement with the NFSP to use the discretionary fund to cover the additional costs for post offices above the business limits worked extremely well in releasing over 500 offices back into the programme.

The process for developing solutions for 'No solution Offices' worked well, although funding was always a problem and an issue. Given the difficult nature of some of these offices, different messages were sent around timings and re-entry to the programme, this causes unnecessary stress and issues that had to be resolved.

Inconsistent deployment of the Non Cash Account policy by the old regions and Territories raised several issues, there was also a lack of support from training. The effect of this is that some offices have been left as NCA which is now causing problems over network closure.

The policy on office refusals worked well overall in what was a very sensitive area. One area of concern was the lack of territorial support to the retail line in deployment of the policy despite consultation and briefings undertaken. Too many issues were referred to Head Office rather than being dealt with at Territorial level.

Overall the policy on Network Transformation has been effectively deployed, addressing the key issue of paying for OBC changes. There were incidents where the view of the implementation teams was too rigid on issues and did not take into account the operation of multiples and their funding policies.

The overall strategy towards training was not in tune with the contractual relationship that exists between PON and subpostmasters. The requirement

for subpostmasters and their assistants to pass a PSA (Personal Standard Assessment) after training caused some inconsistent anomalies within the network in terms of offices reaching the Minimum Training Compliance to enable migration to be completed. The lack of a pro active approach by Territories in this area, detailed information on PSA failures and provision of training material from ICL Pathway have exacerbated the problem.

The policy for 'out of hours' transactions is at best a stop gap. There are key client and account team issues that need to be addressed.

3. Territories

3.1 Territorial / Business Interfaces

There was a duplication in the Issue Management domain, Territorial Teams duplicated work in recording and raising issues and then passing them to IP teams. Feedback on issue progress was poor as was the length of time to resolve issues.

At local level the integration with ISIS was good but at Head Office level differing messages were coming out about priorities.

The role of Business Service Management was viewed as poor. The ability and willingness to get involved in issue resolution was an area of concern.

3.2 Infrastructure Activity

The control mechanisms over ICL Pathway and their sub contractors were poor, missed appointments, shoddy workmanship and reluctance to accept responsibility for their shortcomings were commonplace.

The quality of some of the surveys, preparations and modifications were in some cases a disgrace.

Problems were encountered with local planning permissions being gained to meet the target infrastructure dates.

The role and expectation of subpostmasters in signing the survey forms was not clear in the offices and led to a number of issues being raised when the infrastructure work did not turn out as expected.

Retail Network Managers were not informed of modification work within their offices and on occasions this led to them being contacted by subpostmasters and in some cases having very emotive conversations.

The scheduling of the Management Information Briefings was not consistent with Territorial involvement required on several occasions to manage and resolve conflicts between users and ICL Pathway (KnowledgePool).

3.3 Installation

The process to determine the number of back office terminals within offices was completed without consideration of the operational balancing aspects of Horizon therefore a shortage of back office terminals resulted.

The process for office configuration caused problems with too many counter discrepancies being encountered causing installation and migration problems.

Retail Network Managers were not informed promptly enough when installations were aborted, this caused issues with the individuals at the office that were raised with the RNM.

It was disappointing that during phase II the same problems were being encountered as in phase I i.e. ISDN line problems. Any lessons learnt in Phase I were not incorporated into Phase II.

3.4 Training administration, scope and delivery

The process for Training scheduling was not consistent with the agreed processes as documented and caused a raft of issues to be raised. (i.e. Training venues should have been checked on maps rather than relying solely on postcode boundaries that caused users to travel excessive distances). A 'local' input to the process would have mitigated a lot of the issues raised.

The forward schedule should have been available to PON from the start of the project, this would have enabled pro active management of the training schedules rather than the constant 'fire fighting' that took place.

The Personal Standard Assessment process required a sub process that detailed the re-training options available (to include informing the RNM of subpostmasters who failed), these sub processes should have been deployed in a consistent manner within territories.

Cash Account Training was not comprehensive enough within the training delivered by ICL Pathway.

The training delivered by ICL Pathway was poor in terms of the instructors had little or no knowledge of Post Office procedures.

3.5 Office Migration

General view received was that on the whole the migration activity went well.

There was no agreed process for dealing with offices whose migrations were deferred, these offices were dealt with in an ad hoc way once their deferral was confirmed.

There were many instances where the HFSO transferred sums into the Suspense Account without informing the office manager.

The standard of the HFSO was the greatest variable within the migration process, there were differing levels of ability within the HFSO groups that directly effected the migration activities.

3.6 Pre / Post 'Go Live' Support

More in depth training for those people who supported 2nd, 3rd and 4th balance support especially around suspense account entries.

The scheduling of Retail Network Manager was not consistent with instances of more than one arriving at an office to offer support,

The allocation of support for balances worked better when the scheduling was undertaken by the cluster groups

Offices were given the impression that they would have a trained person with them for the first balance, far too many did not have anyone leaving them to 'flounder' with an inadequate balancing guide.

3.7 Resources

There would have been a reduction in the number of issues raised if more Survey Support Managers had been available to support surveys.

The IP training teams appeared under resourced to deal with the number of training issues and therefore could not spend time on analysing venues, occupancy and no shows.

The compensation was not sufficient to meet the travel costs of subpostmasters

Retail Network Managers undertook a lot of the balance support activity, it was thought that this activity would be undertaken by the HFSO's. This resulted in RNM's having little time left to deal with other operational issues on Wednesdays.

3.8 Documentation

In the latter stages of the project changes arising from revised documentation have been deployed before the documentation had been signed off.

Operational Instructions and Balancing Guides were excellent, the Quick Reference Cards poor as were the arrangements for CSR+.

The distribution of documentation on the whole was poor with a number of offices receiving their Balancing Guides well after their go live.

The diagrams within the Horizon System User Guide were not well accepted as it contained too many flow charts.

The training joining instructions did not contain enough detail on venue location.

3.9 Communication

The processes supporting the despatch of RGM letters, closure notices and preparation packs was not well developed in terms of responsibility in the early stages of the project. The subsequent change in centralising the work in Bristol was done without consultation with the regions.

The late receipt of survey, re-survey, modification and preparation schedules cause operational problems in ensuring the retail line was informed.

During the infrastructure and installation phases too many people were contacting the offices with differing and at time conflicting information. Offices are still confused as to the correct helpline to contact.

A lack of an integrated approach to offices by Horizon, one office had at least 30 calls on the same subject.

Overall the communication was abysmal, Retail Network Managers were not being kept informed of events.

The Horizon Cash Account feedback form is weighted against the outlet in the assessment for balance support in respect of the scoring.

The process for HFSO's to contact RNM's when offices had problems was not effectively used by HFSO's in some cases.

The process to enable offices to request balance support through NBSC was not totally effective as many requests did not reach the cluster offices.

Retail Network Managers were not informed in sufficient time to deal effectively with issues arising from installation aborts and training.

The Management Information Briefing was too early in the process.

3.10 Other

The helplines are not seen as an effective support to the network, there seems a lack of knowledge and a reluctance to pass to a higher level for resolution.

Installing up to the 8th of December was a mistake.

The number of errors generated post go live is directly linked to poor Cash Account Training, an extra half day should have been allowed.

The legacy left due to the migration use of the suspense accounts needs to be resolved.

The roll out plan appeared to take no account of office size or pressure periods, this operational information should be included within the scheduling process

Overall the size of the project was immense and has been a success which is mainly due to attention to detail, focus, meaningful reviews and a lot of hard work by so many people.