
From: Melanie Corfield[/O=MMS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=MELANIE CORFI1DE623C2-38B2-49FB-AE9A-12E4B20D626720C]
Sent: Fri 30/01/2015 1:45:40 PM (UTC)
To: Mark R Davies; GRO
Subject: FW: Remote Access: in strictest confidence

To see – will check if I have heard back from Lesley on the second part of this re compliance tests etc.

From: Melanie Corfield
Sent: 30 January 2015 09:22
To: Lesley J Sewell
Subject: Remote Access: in strictest confidence

Hello Lesley

Below is the current Q and A we have been using on this, in liaison with Fujitsu (and which is in line with FOIs we have had on the subject).

Regarding the testing and standards, I have pasted below what we have said in FOI but this is from 2011 so might well have changed. Grateful for detail on this.

Many thanks

Mel

Remote Access

There are very concerning stories about remote access to Horizon that might have contributed or been the reason for unexplained changes being made to postmasters accounts – how do you explain changes to accounts at times when postmasters could not possibly have had access themselves?

- *Transaction data in branch accounts can't be changed remotely*
- *No evidence of malicious tampering*

There is very selective, misleading and incorrect information being put into the public domain about a number of cases. Much of this is not actually included in any allegations or complaints put to us by applicants and also changes in nature and detail.

Post Office cannot breach the privacy and confidentiality of individual applicants by discussing their cases, even in the face of unsubstantiated, baseless or malicious allegations. To do so would lead to us being accused of breaching confidentiality and undermining the Scheme and mediation process. So we have been limited in the public comment we can make.

But there is no functionality in Horizon for either a branch, Post Office or Fujitsu to edit, manipulate or remove transaction data once it has been

recorded in a branch's accounts. It is possible for Fujitsu to view branch data in order to provide support and conduct maintenance but this does not allow access to any functionality that could be used to edit recorded transaction data.

There is also no evidence at all of any malicious remote tampering.

So it is not possible to alter postmasters' accounts remotely?

It is not possible to edit or tamper with a transaction once it has been made.

It is possible to add transactions in order to make a correction. This is extremely rare, is carried out with the right level of security and it cannot be done without a postmaster's knowledge.

Can you rule out remote fraud or cybercrime?

There is no evidence at all of this in any of the investigations carried out - there is no evidence that Horizon has not worked as it should do. No company can completely prevent cybercrime but there is nothing to suggest that this has caused any of the issues that have been complained about.

We adhere to industry standards, regulatory and compliance requirements. [Details to be provided separately]

From 2011 FOI. Post Office Ltd as a responsible business undertakes regular and robust external audits of its IT systems which includes Horizon. During the past five years there have been 16 external audits and accreditations. Post Office Ltd undertakes monthly vulnerability scans and penetration tests are conducted annually, therefore there have been 65 scans and tests which we consider audits.

We also referred in another request to VocaLINK and the external consultancy IRM (Payment Card Industry audit). These audits cover the whole system including accounting, along with product and service end-to-end processes. In addition the following accreditations have been applied, British Standards Institute (BSI), security audit 270001 and VocaLink and Merchant Acquirer (Worldpay, Streamline HS

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