# GIJ Response to Information Requests from Jason Coyne

Ref:     gij response to information requests from jason coyne.docx
Author: Gareth I Jenkins
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## 1.    Management Summary

Jason Coyne, an IT expert working for various postmasters, has asked Fujitsu to respond to a number of questions regarding the operation of Horizon and Horizon Online.

This note documents the questions that have been allocated to Fujitsu from document *180516RFI1935 First Request for Directions 01-00.pdf* together with the responses already provided by Jon Hulme (and others).

I have added the text of the original question (from Jason's document) to aid readability and also added my comments / thoughts on the answer given and any further thoughts I have.

## 2.    The Questions, Answers and Comments

The following subsections go through each question that has been posed to Fujitsu. In each case the question (as worded in Jason's document) is in italics, followed by Jon Hulme's response in purple text. I have then added my comments in red text.

### 2.1    RFI 1.4 (POL-0032932.doc is attached)

*Regarding POL-0032932.doc, what is the purpose of setting an NB102 exception to F99 by FJ?*

> POL-0032932.doc is CS/SPE/011 - Network Banking End To End Reconciliation Reporting

> a)  *How often has this occurred?*

> b)  *What is the cause of an 'Uncleared Transaction Corruptions' and how often do these occur?*

This is about the purpose of setting exception F99 in the NB102 rules concerning Network Banking End to End Reconciliation.

This applies to both Horizon and Horizon Online.

Whenever any incident involving a reconciliation exception in Network Banking has been fully processed, then the transaction needs to be set to F99 to indicate that processing is complete. Therefore, this is done for any transaction that ever appears in a reconciliation report, once the resolution is complete. Matthew/Jason Can we identify to the document that describes the reconciliation process?

With regards to 'How often has this occurred' – the category of NB102 is too wide a category and we suggest this question is clarified as to what specific transaction status

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type. We currently F99 10,000+ transactions per week across all NB102 associated reports (DCP and NBS).

Uncleared Transaction Corruptions would probably be due to bugs and so are unlikely to occur in the Live system. The Security team may be able to provide details of how often (if at all) this subsection of the report is produced. I can't recall seeing one in Live. Jason can you answer on uncleared Transaction Corruptions?

## 2.2    RFI 1.7 a. (POL-0032864.doc is attached);

*In relation to POL-0032864.doc "Data Errors / Not Data Errors":*

> *POL-0032864.doc is CS/SER/017 - Data Errors & Not Data Errors – Contractual Definitions*

   a) *Please describe what "work-arounds" have previously been agreed between PO and FJ in accordance with page 6 where "…inaccuracy or error was not capable of being corrected by the User before irrevocable commitment of the cash account in question…"*

This is about workarounds for the Cash Account error situations in old Horizon.

This applies to the Horizon system prior to the changes introduced by the Impact programme in 2005 or 2006. I was not involved in the detailed reconciliation of the counter until we made the changes to Branch Trading Statements as part of Impact, so don't think I can help with this.

Steve P. do you have any knowledge of this process or can you point Matthew at any documents?

## 2.3    RFI 1.8;

*Please describe in reference to the above document at page 20 what the effects are if the data is not transmitted within five working days?*

This is about "the effects are if the data is not transmitted within five working days (in old Horizon).

We have no knowledge of this – perhaps ask Gareth Jenkins/SSC?

Again, before my time with the counter, so may be able to get something from SSC. I assume this relates to the timings on the old Post Office Ltd accounting system CBDB and the timescale for getting changes into it before it passed data onto other backend systems.

## 2.4    RFI 4.2 (POL-0032913 is attached);

*In relation to POL-0032913, can more information be provided on the "backlog of discrepancies" held by FJ?*

> *POL-0032913 is an informal note entitled SSK Reconciliation*

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This is regarding 1.15, which Steve Parker has responded to (although we don't think Steve's response matches the question being asked).

I've not seen Steve Parker's response in the emails sent to me.

I seem to remember that there were a lot of discrepancies identified in NB102 reports relating to kiosk transactions and there was an issue that because they were not being cleared down (ie set to state F99), then it was difficult to distinguish new discrepancies from old ones. This looks like the notes from a meeting to put in place a better process for clearing down the error logs.

SSC and the Fujitsu Security team (who were also responsible for reconciliation) would have been involved in running this process together with the FSC team in POL.

I was probably involved in the discussions, but I can't remember anything further at this point.

## 2.5 RFI 4.3 (but not the "how many transactions have been repaired" part as this is out of scope);

*Please describe what situation led to the process outlined in POL-0032939.doc (TPS – EPOSS Reconciliation TIP Transaction Repair) and how many transactions have been repaired?*

POL-0032939.doc is not in the email stream I have been sent

This is regarding 1.16, which Steve Parker has responded to, although Steve says he hasn't seen the document which referred to, which you have attached.

I can't add to this without seeing the document. Specifically does this refer to Horizon or Horizon Online? There were cases where some transactions harvested from Riposte were missing mandatory attributes – particularly for Mails based transactions, and there was a process for manually correcting these transactions before they were passed to Post Office Ltd. This would have no impact on the Branch accounts and no changes were made to Branch Transactions' – just completing information needed by the back end systems.

## 2.6 RFI 5.2 (Pete – when we spoke previously you suggested this was a question for POL but given that it relates to reconciliation of data within Horizon I think it is one for Torstein);

*Please describe what the process is following the discovery of a discrepancy between the two sources?*

This is regarding 1.18. We have no knowledge of this – perhaps ask SSC.

It depends on the discrepancy and what the sources are. I think we need a more specific question.

## 2.7 RFI 6.3 (POL-0032915 is attached);

*In relation to POL-0032915, are any technical bridge or service bridge meeting minutes (or similar documentation) available (page 31)?*

> POL-0032915 is an unnumbered document - Description of Fujitsu's System of IT Infrastructure Services supporting Post Office Limited's POLSAP and HNG-X applications

This is regarding 1.23 asking for records of bridge meeting minutes. We have no knowledge of this – perhaps ask SSC.

I have attended some Tech Bridge calls, but I don't know what records are kept. This is one for Steve Bansal.

## 2.8 RFI 6.4;

*Regarding Correcting Accounts for _lost_ Discrepancies - G Jenkins.pdf, how was it ultimately decided if/how FJ should be "correcting the data"?*

a) *"Of the cases so far identified there is one for £30,611.16, one for £4,826.00 and the rest are all less than £350" - are these losses or gains?*

b) *How many FJ users are able to adjust the Opening Figures and BTS data?*

c) *Is there an audit trail of a decision being made by POL to 'write off the "lost" discrepancy' and adjusting of the Discrepancy account to align the decision in POL SAP?*

> G Jenkins.pdf is a document I was sent recently and have

This is regarding 1.24 asking detailed questions about "G Jenkins.pdf". We have no knowledge of this – perhaps ask Gareth Jenkins.

It was agreed that the discrepancies would be fixed in POL SAP by FSC. There was a document _DOC_38239623(1)_Documents relating to disappearing discrepancies.pdf which was the merge of records from a Conf call and a note by myself. In the first part on page 3 there were 3 alternative solutions proposed. Solution 2 was actually adopted (but that was not noted in the minutes and was probably decided separately). No changes were made by Fujitsu to any counter data.

## 2.9 RFI 6.5 and RFI 6.5(a) (POL-0032936.doc);

*With regards to POL-0032936.doc, what is the definition of a "red event" and what were the consequences of a red event being raised silently with no direct feedback to the operator?*

a) *Further, how were these 'silent' red events identified?*

> POL-0032936.doc is DEV/APP/SPE/1821- Audit Client Error Handling Improvements

This is regarding 1.25.

A red event is a Window Event Log item with Error status.

Jason is asking more about silent red events.

We suggest Gerald responds to this as it concerns questions on a document he authored.

I think Gerald has covered this.

## 2.10     RFI 8.3 (POL-0032862.doc is attached); and

*In relation to POL-0032862.doc, what is the nature of the data error to be repaired as per section 3.4.3?*

    *a) What information is contained within in a "Business Incident"?*

    *b) Is there a log of all "Business Incidents" and "System Incidents"?*

POL-0032862.doc *is CS/PRO/111- TPS Reconciliation & Incident Management*

This is regarding 1.35.

This concerns old Horizon TPS Reconciliation and Incident Management.

We have no knowledge of this – perhaps ask Service.

This should be addressed by the security team as the Incident team were merged into the security team around the time of the change form Horizon to Horizon Online. I think this is probably the same process as described in section 2.5 above.

## 2.11     RFI 9.3 c.

*With regards to POL-0032836.doc 'EPOSS End-to-end Reconciliation Process For Release NR2 - Incident Management & Resolution':*

    *c) Also please provide a description of the class of documents (if any) which record that data has been modified (and/or transactions inserted) in Horizon in circumstances that may impact a branch's account or transactional information.*

POL-0032836.doc is not in the email stream I have been sent

This is regarding 1.40 in old Horizon.

We have no knowledge of this – perhaps ask SSC.

I assume that this relates to the Riposte based Horizon. I am aware of the process, but I'm not sure how the audit trail operated. I assume it was done by BSU raising a Peak which was sent to SSC to resolve and the Peak would then be closed. Looking at old Peaks raised by BSU might help?